McNair Paper 34, The Russian Military's Role in Politics, January 1995

The August 1991 coup represents a watershed event, both for the fate of the USSR (which the coup conspirators were trying to save) and for the military's role in politics. The top military leader-Defense Minister Yazov-became involved in a conspiracy to remove the legitimate political leader. It appears that the ringleader of the eight-man State Committee for State Emergencies (of which Yazov was a member) was KGB chief Kryuchkov. (Note 25) Yazov's primary motive for joining Kryuchkov (according to both Yazov himself and his associates) was to pre-empt the planned 20 August signing of a new version of the union treaty-an event Yazov viewed as tantamount to the "breakdown of the union." (Note 26)

In the wake of the coup, the Defense Ministry attempted to portray the coup attempt as one in which Yazov and a few isolated conspirators acted essentially alone, without support from Defense Ministry officials. Many in the military leadership attempted to distance themselves from the coup after it failed. (Note 27) Others have depicted themselves as active opponents of the coup and heros of the White House.

It is clear, however, that the Yazov was by no means the only military supporter of the coup conspiracy. Several other top members of the military command-including Deputy Defense Minister and ground forces commander Varennikov and Deputy Defense Minister Achalov-were actively involved in the coup conspiracy. (Note 28) Ironically, the list of coup planners also includes Pavel Grachev, the current Russian Defense Minister, then head of the airborne forces. Grachev testified that he participated with a group of KGB officials in a pre-coup planning session on 5 August 1991 (two weeks before the coup) and another session on August 16. The latter session produced a list of measures to introduce a state of emergency. (Note 29)

Other military commanders supported the State Committee for State Emergency (GKChP) after it seized power on 19 August. (Note 30) Still others, like Leningrad Military District Commander Samsonov, vacillated. (Note 31) Samsonov initially spearheaded measures to implement GKChP orders, appearing on local TV and radio to announce a state of emergency and restrictions on the media. (Note 32) Howver, by the early hours of August 21, when it became clear that the coup was failing, Samsonov had adopted a neutral position. (Note 33)

In addition, virtually all of the toplevel commanders complied with GKChP orders. (Note 34) For instance, on 0800 on 18 August (the day before the emergency was announced), Yazov called a meeting of the high command to inform them about the state of emergency and outline their missions, in terms of securing key installations and maintaining civic order. There is no evidence that any of the generals present refused his orders. (Note 35) Similarly, when Yazov issued an order early the following morning to bring troops into Moscow, "the order was fulfilled with military accuracy." (Note 36) Tanks from the Taman motorized rifle division and Kantemir tank division began rolling into Moscow. (Note 37)

Nor does there appear to have been any dissent at mid-day on the 20th (the day after the emergency was announced), when Achalov met with airborne commander Pavel Grachev (now Russian Defense Minister), MVD first deputy Boris Gromov (now Russian Deputy Defense Minister), and key KGB officials to craft a plan to attack the Russian White House. (Note 38) Grachev himself later testified that he thought the operation a "dubious idea," but "I kept my opinion to myself." (Note 39) Gromov confirms this account: "Not one of (the meeting) participants refused to perform the task assigned to him. . . ." (Note 40)

To be sure, some top level commanders had strong reservations about the entire operation. (Note 41) Several-including Air Force chief Shaposhnikov and airborne troops commander Grachev-began their own private negotiations with Yeltsin and the White House defenders, promising to defy orders in the event Yazov ordered an assault on the White House. (Note 42) Shaposhnikov later claimed that he was planning an air assault on the Kremlin if such orders were forthcoming.

In the end, however, such heroics were unnecessary. On the night of 20/21 August, Yazov-upon hearing a report from Deputy Defense Minister Achalov on the size of the crowds defending the White House-heeded the advice of Shaposhnikov and ordered the troops to halt. The following morning, Yazov called Kryuchkov to tell him he was "withdrawing from these games," then convened a meeting of the Defense Ministry Collegium that adopted a decision to withdraw the troops from Moscow. (Note 43) The coup was over. (Note 44)

As this account makes clear, the military did not mutiny and join Yeltsin's efforts to thwart the coup. (Note 45) The White House defenders of August 1991 (like the White House defenders of September/October 1993) issued statements during the coup claiming that various forces had rallied to their side. In fact, however, only a few troops went over to Yeltsin's side. (Note 46) It was the appearance of large-scale crowds around the White House and the threat they posed of major bloodshed and possibly even civil war in the event of an assault on the White House-not military defections to Yeltsin's side-that deterred Yazov from issuing the order to advance. (Note 47)

It is clear, however, that most military leaders (even Yazov himself) were highly reluctant to support the conspiracy. Military commanders at all levels were willing to deploy forces, but balked when it came to employing them against those resisting the coup. It was this reluctance to employ military force to back the coup conspirators that doomed the coup.