RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

It is important to avoid extremes when discussing the delicate issue of Russian-Ukrainian relations and their impact on the stability of Ukraine. One extreme is to explain away many, if not most, of Ukraine's domestic difficulties by blaming the infamous hidden (or not so hidden) hand of Moscow. This tactic was regularly used by many of Ukraine's politicians during the first 2 years of Ukraine's independence, sometimes with the aim of diverting attention from reluctance to deal with or incompetence in addressing the many domestic problems.

The other extreme is to minimize Russia's influence on developments in Ukraine and to take at face value official Russian government statements concerning full respect for Ukraine's sovereignty. According to this complacent point of view, the occasional expression of dissatisfaction by certain Russian parliamentarians or private individuals concerning, say, Kiev's policies regarding Crimea is of little or no consequence as long as there is no change in Russia's official policy of respect for Ukraine's sovereignty, and no direct actions to undermine this sovereignty.

It is not easy to determine the reality between these two extremes. Russia's leadership and its policies concerning Ukraine are clearly not responsible for the majority of the problems now facing this country. Where direct Russian interference in domestic Ukrainian affairs can be identified, it has not involved dramatic forms of intervention with clearly identifiable consequences. Rather, it usually consists of attempts to take advantage of Ukraine's internal problems to promote Russia's domestic or international interests. The many displays of incompetence by Ukraine's leaders following the euphoria of independence certainly provided Russia's politicians and officials with many such opportunities.

On the other hand, most outside commentators now acknowledge that the majority of Russia's politicians are convinced that Ukraine's independence in its present form will not last for long. There is a widespread conviction in Russia that, at a minimum, hegemony will readily be established over Ukraine, and a recent analysis of the positions taken by various Russian politicians concerning Russian-Ukrainian relations concludes that for a majority of the political forces in Russia,

The current separation with Ukraine, rightly or wrongly, is more and more being treated as very much analogous to the German division after the Second World War. The implications behind this analogy are very clear. First, there is a belief and conviction that re-unification between the two states is ultimately inevitable; and secondly, there is a clear preparedness in much of the Russian political class to wait for as long as it takes to achieve re-unification. In other words, therefore, the issue will not go away from the Russian political agenda for the foreseeable future.81

Such attitudes are considered, at best, to be arrogant and patronizing by the large number of Ukrainians committed to their country's independence. The most provocative comments concerning Ukraine are usually voiced by individual politicians or by the legislative branch of the Russian government, rather than by President Yeltsin or other members of the executive branch of government. However, the regular disparaging or openly hostile comments concerning Ukraine emanating from the Russian parliament and representatives of political parties in Moscow have a significant impact on the political scene in Ukraine. They receive considerable coverage in the Ukrainian media, help mobilize the nationalist and national-democratic forces already suspicious of Moscow's intentions, and help prevent the emergence of a consensus in Ukraine on the nature of future relations with Russia. They also add another psychological burden to the many other burdens carried by Ukrainian citizens.

The two issues having the greatest symbolic and political impact on Ukrainian-Russian relations are very tightly linked. They are the fate of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) and its infrastructure, as well as the fate of the Crimean peninsula as a whole. Given the limited capabilities of the BSF it seemed logical to assume that, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, representatives of Ukraine and Russia would quickly devise a pragmatic formula that would allow for a division of the BSF and resolve the fate of its infrastructure--but these issues quickly became enveloped in highly emotional rhetoric.

In Russia, attitudes concerning the BSF have been greatly influenced by attempts to foster the myth of a great and noble Russian/Soviet naval tradition, although the Russian/Soviet navy, and the Black Sea Fleet in particular, did not play a particularly glorious role in Russian/Soviet military history.82 However, the heated rhetoric in Russia concerning the fate of the BSF is only partially linked to its past or current military-strategic importance. Its roots can more easily be traced to the continuing popularity of an imperial myth portraying the conquest of Crimea in the 18th century as striking a fatal blow to Ottoman influence in the south of Russia, subsequently allowing Russia to play a major role in the Black Sea and beyond. Many Russians, including representatives of Russia's democratic camp, strongly feel that Crimea is an integral part of their country's patrimony, that Crimea's current status as part of Ukraine is unnatural, and that sooner or later Crimea (possibly together with much if not all of the rest of Ukraine) will "return" to Russia. In particular, many Russian politicians have clearly linked the fate of the BSF to that of Crimea as a whole.83

Coinciding with widespread nostalgia for Crimea among the general public is a growing trend in official circles, reflected in the evolution of Russia's military and foreign policies following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, to regard this country's neighbors within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as falling into an unquestioned sphere of direct Russian interests in which one will see an ever-increasing tendency towards economic, military, and political integration. As part of this trend, Russia's leaders have demonstrated a strong commitment, widely held among Russia's political parties, to maintain military bases in CIS member states and promote the military integration of the latter.84

Establishing control over the Black Sea Fleet and its infrastructure provides Russia with the most logical avenue for maintaining such bases in Ukraine. The BSF may be incapable of playing any significant role outside of the Black Sea basin, but military bases in Crimea would provide Russia with an important and strategically convenient means of influencing developments throughout the entire Black Sea region. In particular, if there was an escalation of tensions with Ukraine, Russia could use these bases to quickly establish control of Crimea quickly, project force along Ukraine's entire Black Sea frontier, and then control Ukraine's maritime trade.

Such control would be of particular importance if a major oil terminal is built in the Odessa region, which would greatly reduce Ukraine's dependency on fossil fuels from Russia and Central Asia. Russia's leaders have shown a keen awareness of the importance of such fuel supplies for the western states of the CIS.85 They appear intent on maintaining this dependency, and this strengthens the elite consensus in Russia on the need for a strong naval presence in Crimea.

This presence is also important to Russia because of the impressive military infrastructure in Crimea. The monetary value and strategic importance of this infrastructure far outweigh that of the actual ships and aircraft of the BSF, since it includes a variety of facilities for testing new equipment, as well as naval tactics and operations, and training naval personnel. In addition, a large percentage of the Soviet Union's military shipbuilding capacity was located in Crimea.86

In historical terms, Crimea does not have the same symbolic importance for Ukraine that it has for Russia, and as a new and economically weak state Ukraine clearly cannot afford to support the BSF in anything like its present form. However, the rhetoric on Crimea emanating from Kiev is not motivated solely by concerns about the potential security implications of a major Russian base strategically located on the Crimean peninsula. In Kiev, developments in Crimea and the Russian military's presence there are perceived as a crucial symbol of threats to Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Western journalists and analysts sometimes imply that because Crimea was supposedly arbitrarily transferred from the Russian to the Ukrainian republics of the USSR in 1954, one could easily envisage a similar transfer of Crimea from Ukrainian to Russian jurisdiction in the future. This argument ignores the fact that, although political considerations probably played a role in this transfer, it was not an arbitrary move, and it took place in a very specific context. It was abundantly clear in 1954 that because of its proximity and direct territorial links with Crimea, Ukraine was by far the most convenient supplier of basic inputs into the Crimean economy, for Ukraine provided (and continues to provide) Crimea with almost all of its water, electricity, industrial raw materials, etc.87 It appears to have been a simple and logical administrative measure, in the context of the highly centralized USSR of the time, to arrange for Crimea's transfer to Ukraine's jurisdiction.

However, present circumstances are very different, because Ukraine, as a newly independent state, is still establishing its identity and international profile and is bound to react strongly to any challenges, real or perceived, to its territorial integrity. Thus Russia's strong commitment to maintaining a major naval base in a strategically significant region populated largely by Russians could not fail to provoke concern in Kiev. A disturbing example of the disruptive influence of Russia's military presence in a fellow Soviet successor state could, after all, be found directly on Ukraine's western border. In Moldova's Transdniestria region (the so-called "Dniestr Republic"), there is a prime example of what one observer has labelled a Russian "protection racket":

Encouraging separatist movements under the guise of defending embattled Russian minorities, and then intervening as peacemaker when the conflicts between the separatists and the successor regimes get out of hand.88

An agreement that foresees the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Transdniestria region in 1997 was signed by Moldovan and Russian negotiators in October 1994. However, Russia's 14th Army in Transniestria has developed such a close relationship with the territory on which it is stationed that a full and unambiguous withdrawal is unlikely:

Most of the officers [of the 14th Army] reportedly identify the Dniestr Republic as their home, and local residents are being recruited into the enlisted ranks. The result is a unit that has its own set of strong interests tied to the existence of the Dniestr Republic. . . . Even if the 14th Army is eventually "withdrawn" from the region, it is likely to be replaced by a Russian "militia" that would deploy much the same weapons and many of the same officers and enlisted men.89

In addition, the commander of the 14th Army, General Lebed, has evolved into a "rogue" officer who has entered into numerous open conflicts with his superiors in Moscow and is highly popular among Russia's military personnel. Lebed has refused to accept military posts outside the Transdniester region, and it is widely believed that he will soon leave the military to play a significant role on Russia's political stage.90

Similar uncertainty surrounds the eventual fate of the Black Sea Fleet and its infrastructure. Although the draft of a comprehensive agreement on Russian-Ukrainian friendship and cooperation was initialed in Kiev in February 1995, it did not resolve the BSF dispute, and this as well as other contentious issues continue to prevent the signing of a final version of the agreement. It is clear, however, that the negotiators for Russia are driving a hard bargain with their Ukrainian counterparts and are continuing to insist that Russia maintain a strong, long-term presence in Crimea.91

Of particular concern to the Ukrainian authorities is that in the past, a number of BSF personnel were allowed to stand as candidates for office to both the Crimean Supreme Soviet and the Sevastopol city council, where they formed a powerful military lobby. An increasingly symbiotic relationship developed between the BSF, which has for all intents and purposes been transformed into a Russian Black Sea Fleet, and the local administration in Crimea. For example, the Russia-Unity fraction in the Crimean parliament, which includes a number of former BSF officers, is led by a former deputy commander of the BSF, Vice-Admiral O. Frolov. The interests of a Russian BSF are also strongly defended by the great majority of the many former Soviet/Russian military officers who have retired in Crimea.92

This growing symbiosis was reflected in a speech delivered by Admiral Eduard Baltin, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, when he appeared before the State Duma of the Russian Federation in November 1994 to describe the situation in the BSF and Crimea. In his presentation he stressed, "The infrastructure of Sevastopol' and the fleet have grown together so tightly that it is now impossible to separate them."93 However Admiral Baltin, who is supposed to represent the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, was clearly interested in more than just the military equipment and shore facilities of the BSF. He was openly speaking on behalf of Russia and pro-Russian forces in Crimea when he stated, "From a political point of view Sevastopol', with its clearly defined Russian mentality, provides Russia with its last opportunity to strengthen its positions in Crimea."94. Thus a network of mutually supportive relationships has arisen among the pro-Russian majority of officers in the BSF, the municipal Sevastopol' and Crimean authorities, and certain political circles in Moscow.

In comparison, until recently the steps taken by Ukraine's leaders to influence developments in the BSF, deal with autonomist and separatist trends in Crimea, and counteract Moscow's initiatives generally appeared to be inconsistent, indecisive, and ineffective. Former President Leonid Kravchuk's Crimea policy was, in effect, a nonpolicy, because it relied on maintaining the status quo on the peninsula, and he preferred that difficult Ukrainian-Russian negotiations over issues such as the division of the Black Sea Fleet conclude with ambiguous statements that could be interpreted variously by both sides.

Kiev's passivity in this and other policy sectors fostered the emergence of a scenario in accordance with which Russia would gradually extend its control over Ukraine as a result of the latter's eventual inability to resolve its own domestic problems. Such control would not necessarily threaten Ukraine's formal sovereignty, as many of Russia's current or potential leaders would probably prefer to maintain Ukraine as a pliant vassal state rather than incorporate it into a reborn Russian empire.

Many of President Kuchma's nationalist critics were greatly perturbed when he seemed to initially confirm their suspicions that he was out to appease Russia and "sell out" Ukraine. In line with his pre-election commitments, his administration quickly took a number of steps that should have reduced tensions between the two countries. For example, the renewal of economic ties between Ukraine and Russia was strongly encouraged, and although Ukraine had developed a strong commitment to NATO's Partnership for Peace program from its very inception, President Kuchma stressed that Ukraine would remain a neutral state outside of all military blocs.

President Kuchma's administration has also clearly indicated that it plans to continue the inclusive policy of building a political rather than ethnic nation on the territory of Ukraine, and less emphasis has been placed on introducing the Ukrainian language in all spheres of life. As a result it has become more difficult for Russia's authorities to argue for some form of intervention on behalf of ethnic Russians in Ukraine on the grounds that they are suffering discrimination.

However, it soon became clear that these policies were not intended to mollify Moscow, but to adjust Ukraine's policy priorities and give them a more pragmatic orientation. This became apparent when the Kuchma administration shifted its attention from economic reform to the situation in Crimea, and took a number of decisive steps in March-April 1995 to subordinate Crimea to Kiev's authority and move ahead with negotiations concerning the division of the Black Sea Fleet.

In the process a number of the differences between Russia and Ukraine have taken on a more distinct profile. For example, until recently Russia's President Yeltsin could blame the Russian parliament's provocative but rhetorical statements concerning Crimea's future (and especially the status of Sevastopol) for much of the bad feeling between Kiev and Moscow. However, now that intergovernmental negotiations concerning the fate of the Black Sea Fleet have focussed on the concrete details of the basing rights of the Russian share of the Fleet, it has become clear that Russia's official negotiators are demanding a degree of control over the entire city of Sevastopol, as the main base of the Fleet--clearly unacceptable to the Ukrainian side.95

The question of the basing of the Black Sea Fleet will continue to pose problems to Ukraine because of the Fleet's symbiotic link with the local Crimean administration, and the emotional fervor now surrounding this issue. However, with respect to the question of Ukraine's general control over Crimea, as well as other contentious issues in Russian-Ukrainian relations, the Ukrainian side is in a much more advantageous situation now than in 1992-93.

The local pro-Russian authorities in Crimea have largely been discredited, the Crimean public is in an apathetic frame of mind, and a major split has recently occurred in the Crimean parliament, with a sizable number of deputies (according to one report, 42 out of a total of 98) calling on Kiev to dissolve the assembly.96 In addition, it appears that the decisiveness and dynamism demonstrated by President Kuchma in promoting economic reforms is now being applied to the fields of regional and foreign policy. This comes at a time when Moscow is preoccupied with issues such as winding up its campaign in Chechnya, which has drawn widespread condemnation in the world community.

As a result, Ukraine's peaceful moves to re-establish its control over Crimea have drawn a generally favorable response from the international community (e.g., the Europarliament97), and the situation on the peninsula is now being monitored by representatives of organizations such as the OSCE, which will help deter outside intervention in the affairs of the peninsula. In fact, Western interest in Ukraine and support of its current policies have grown considerably, and some Russian newspapers have claimed that the West is now more supportive of Ukraine than Russia.98

However, Western support for Ukraine is no substitute for friendly, mutually beneficial relations between Russia and Ukraine, if only because of the long and "transparent" border between the two countries. Ukraine cannot isolate itself from Russia, and President Kuchma seems sincere in his intention to pursue better relations with Moscow. Nonetheless, he is insistent that Ukraine be treated as a fully independent state by Moscow. Even if liberal democratic trends prevail in Russia, however, it will take a considerable period of time before most Russians become fully accustomed to the idea of an independent Ukraine, and thus a fairly lengthy period of tensions between the two states is inevitable.

Over time, frictions between the two countries will become increasingly centered on their economic relations, and this will the area of greatest challenge for Ukraine. If it does not continue moving rapidly to reform its economy, Ukraine could well end up as an agricultural periphery to a more dynamic Russia. In the short to medium term, Russia has a significant lever of influence on Ukraine (short of the use of force, which does not seem likely)-- possible restrictions on the supply of fossil fuels to Ukraine-- which will lose its significance only when Ukraine cuts down on its consumption of such fuels and ensures that it has access to alternative sources of energy.