McNair Paper Number 20 Chapter 4, August 1993
The implosion of the Soviet Union has created the real likelihood of general conflagration in post-Soviet Eurasia. This is especially true of Russia's "near abroad," the territorial arc stretching from Tallin to Yalta and containing six independent countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic republics. This area contains 70 million people, over 250 strategic nuclear missiles and provided roughly one-third of the former Soviet Union's total economic output. Russian policy toward the "near abroad" will indicate what kind of Russia--nation, empire or anarchic battleground--the West will face in the 21st century.
While the Cold War in Europe ended in a phenomenal strategic victory for the West, the dissolution of the USSR
continues to disorient NATO capitals. The emergence of fifteen fissiparous states, the devolution of a disciplined imperial military into various self-directed armed forces, the erosion of unitary control over 30,000 nuclear warheads, and the spontaneous combustion of inter-republican conflict are among the scenarios which completely eluded Western planners even five years ago. Despite the implosion of the Warsaw Pact, any new concert of Europe will be buffeted by the ongoing revolutions in the former Soviet empire. As NATO official Christopher Donnelly puts it, "Russia is no longer threatening, but it is frightening."1
Such an environment is hazardous for daily political forecasts, let alone long-range strategic visions. George Breslauer argues that we have no experience analyzing countries "that are attempting nation-building, political democratization, and economic reform in a context of economic austerity, imperial disintegration, and the collapse of state structures."2 Western governments, however, must appreciate the forces driving defense and diplomacy in the former USSR in order to foresee--and, perchance, to forestall--the real likelihood of general conflagration in post-Soviet Eurasia.
Several unappreciated realities demand a review of the states on Russia's European periphery.3 The Republic of Ukraine, by virtue of its geopolitical position, resources and nuclear weapons, is already a major actor on the European security scene. Quiescent Belarus, capital of the moribund Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), nevertheless has created its own army and could be drawn into a regional conflict. A shooting war erupted in Moldova in mid-1992 which, though currently ignored by the West, evinces eerie parallels to the Balkans.4 The Baltic republics, centrifugal pioneers of the Soviet break-up, continue to "host" unwelcome Russian military units and an unsettled Slavic population whose cause has energized Moscow's conservatives. Russian policy toward the blizhniye zarubezhniya ("near abroad") will indicate the kind of Russia--nation, empire or anarchic battleground--the West will face in the 21st century.
The Region
The territorial arc stretching from Tallin to Yalta contains six independent countries with 70 million inhabitants, over 250 strategic nuclear missiles,5 and provided roughly one-third of the economic output of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine alone has a population of 52 million (including some 11 million Russians) and the second largest standing army in Europe. Unlike the Central European Warsaw Pact states, these republics did not even enjoy a chimerical notion of statehood,6 and so were thrust even more abruptly into independence in 1991. Like Russia, all six share unfathomable socioeconomic nightmares, not least of which is that each has banished its Communist Party without casting off its Communists. Jack Snyder identifies in these countries all the historical "risk factors for intense outbursts of aggressive nationalism," i.e., "democratization, state building, marketization, mass communications."7
The borders of these states were designed, courtesy of Josef Stalin, to heighten ethnic identities and justify repressive Soviet rule. The area, formerly known as "the Soviet West," maintains strong cultural links with Western neighbors despite russification and sovietization.8 While democratic and market forces are extremely fragile, each republic intends to follow the Central European republics into Western economic and security structures.9 In addition, there are economic, military and sociological crises raging in the republics that impinge directly on Russia's future and Western security--defense conversion and arms sales, a nuclear tug-of-war between Moscow and Kiev, incipient "warlordism" in Moldova, and Russian restiveness in the Baltic states.
The two keys to security relations in this region are the republics' obsession with Russian power, and the Russian military's enhanced policy role toward the republics. Ukraine's leadership in particular has justified its authoritarian state-building efforts by appealing to fear of Muscovite imperialism. As Russian civil authorities are blamed for the "loss" of territory under Moscow's sway since Peter the Great, the CIS and Russian General Staffs have usurped some Foreign Ministry prerogatives, militarizing policy toward the "near abroad."10 Hence, the current interplay between Russia and these states--on issues such as division of property, rights of russophones in the republics, and security pacts with other states--will be a bellwether for the strategic orientation of the world's first former superpower.
Ukraine: The Strategy of Nomenklatura Nationalism
Ukraine, the largest and most anti-Russian non-Russian republic in the former USSR, arouses Western attention mainly due to Kiev's contradictory statements concerning nuclear weapons on its territory. The single mindedness with which Western politicians emphasized the nuclear issue (in addition to bruising Ukrainian sensitivities) convinced Kiev that the weapons were of considerable diplomatic and economic utility. Future Western policy initiatives will be more successful if our awareness of Ukrainian politics extends beyond our interest in START implementation and adherence to NPT.
The opportunity to establish a sovereign Ukrainian republic surprised most Ukrainian politicians, including then-Communist Party Chairman Leonid Kravchuk, whose utterances during August 1991 were artfully ambiguous.11 Unlike tumultuous Moscow during the August events, neither a coup nor an anti-Communist revolution occurred in Kiev. As the dissident leader Vyacheslav Chornovil noted some six months after the coup, "If you look at a map of Ukraine to see how democratic it is, then three-quarters of the territory should be painted red or pink because, even today, it is under control of our sovereign Ukrainian Communists."12
Still, despite the fact that Ukraine enjoyed only two previous periods of independence since the Mongol invasions (in the mid-17th century and during the 1917-1921 period),13 Kravchuk moved swiftly and skillfully to establish the rudiments of statehood. He nationalized Soviet property, decreed the establishment of independent Ukrainian governing entities, and made forceful public statements that convinced many anti-Communist opposition leaders that he was indispensable to the consolidation of Ukrainian independence.14
For Kravchuk, the main factor in the successful realization of independence was the swift creation of a Ukrainian armed force out of the remnants of the Red Army based on Ukrainian territory. The leader of the 1917 Ukrainian republic, according to Kravchuk, "made two cardinal mistakes. He entered into a political alliance with Russia and he did not create a Ukrainian army."15 In the fall 1991 interregnum between the coup and the establishment of the CIS, Kravchuk had no doubts that Ukraine would "activate" Soviet military forces on Ukrainian territory. On December 27, 1991, CIS Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov announced the rejection of a unified CIS force. This admission, according to Stephen Foye, meant that "less than two weeks after the creation of the CIS the integrated military structure maintained over seventy years of Soviet rule had begun to unravel in earnest."16
Having been hailed as the man who stood up to Moscow, however, the former Chairman of the Ukrainian Communist Party and his KGB cohorts are paying for this particular path to independence. First, Kravchuk's determination to place "state-building" before democracy has damaged Ukraine's international reputation and eroded public confidence in the regime.17 Second, the aggressive identification of Yeltsin's Russia with the Soviet empire has exacerbated a bitter psychological schism with Moscow that transcends any single political or economic issue. As Aleksandr Kluban of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense puts it, "Russia simply can't put up with the idea that we're an independent state. They do it formally. We recognize them as a great power, but they still don't treat us as an independent, sovereign state."18 Ukraine's economic performance, which has the dubious distinction of making the Russian economy seem stable by comparison, is intensifying social conflict in the eastern, heavily russophone mining and industrial oblasts.19
Internal military challenges include the absorption of a large Soviet officer corps, the revamping of command structures, personnel recruitment, and the conversion of Ukraine's massive military industry. Externally, the numerous conflicts with Russia include ownership and control of military assets, especially nuclear weapons and the Black Sea Fleet, the status of Russian-dominated areas such as the Crimean peninsula, and a tangle of economic issues, notably energy supplies. Kiev's progress on all scores is decidedly mixed, and the nuclear issue, like Banquo's Ghost, continues to haunt diplomatic discussions throughout Europe.
Officially, Ukraine inherited an army of roughly 1,200,000 active servicemen, which Kiev plans to cut by roughly one million by the year 2000. The Ukrainian armed forces today employ roughly 650,000 men and women, including some 200,000 officers, most of whom are Russian.20 Moreover, there are over 100,000 Ukrainian servicemen in other republics who have been offered billets in the Ukrainian armed forces. Part of Kiev's plan to "nationalize" the army was a requirement that all military personnel swear a loyalty oath to the Ukrainian state. According to independent sources, 90 percent of the servicemen and officers in the three Ukrainian military commands swore loyalty to Ukraine.21
Despite the quantitative success of Ukraine's loyalty oaths, however, there are signs that the institutional loyalty of the type Samuel Huntington described in The Soldier and the State may be lacking in Ukraine. First, many officers took the loyalty oaths for material reasons--Ukraine's economic prospects appeared brighter than Russia's in late 1991--and growing numbers became dissatisfied with their material lot by summer 1992.22 Indeed one public opinion poll showed that only 43 percent of officers who swore loyalty actually took the oath seriously.23 As a result of such reports, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MOD) organized a "social-psychological division," with its own command chain reminiscent of the Red Army political indoctrination system. Further down the command chain, desertion, draft evasion and theft of military property are rampant throughout the armed forces.
The most unnerving dispute between Russia and Ukraine during 1992 was the status of strategic forces located in Ukrainian territory. Although Ukraine had made numerous declarations about its intention to become a "nuclear free state," which go back to Ukraine's sovereignty declaration in 1990, its actions during the year signalled otherwise. On March 10, 1992, Ukraine suspended transfers of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. At the same time the CIS command disputed Ukraine's right to assume control of the strategic air bases in Ukraine, which contain 42 long-range bombers, including 20 Tu-160 Blackjack bombers in Priluki.24 During the summer Ukraine continued its efforts to assume "administrative control" of the former Strategic Rocket Force sites in Ukraine, placing officers who were swore loyalty to Ukraine in charge of launch sites. Even though Kiev signed the Lisbon START protocols, which calls for removal of Ukraine's strategic weapons within seven years, the agreement has been criticized in the Ukrainian parliament on the eve of the January 1993 ratification vote.25 While Ukraine may be using the nuclear "card" to obtain more Western aid, recent statements by Ukrainian leaders stressing the need for U.S. or NATO "security guarantees" may indicate a hardening of Kiev's position.
After a "hot" spring and early summer of 1992, two Russian-Ukrainian summits were held, one of which produced an agreement to place the Black Sea Fleet under joint Russian-Ukrainian command for three years, at which time the fleet will be divided. While the summits were hailed in the West (and in the state-controlled Ukrainian media), the arrangement on the Fleet was promptly attacked by parliamentary leaders in both Kiev and Moscow. According to a Ukrainian cabinet minister, the accord was merely an effort to calm Western worries.26 Still, by early July 1992, both Russia and Ukraine ratified the CFE treaty, meaning that Moscow at least recognized Ukraine's seizure of conventional military forces.
While it is true that the two Presidents see no positive outcome of further Russian-Ukrainian tension, the level of hostility between important sectors of the political elites of the two nations is acute. The ex-Communist Ukrainian elite sees a Russia that is disintegrating into utter chaos, and they expect a successor regime to Yeltsin that is far less congenial to Ukrainian independence. Hence they might prove unwilling to downsize the Ukrainian military, or convert the unproductive military industrial complex, or to relinquish nuclear weapons. At the same time, as Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma points out, "There isn't a single sector of the economy that isn't disastrous--agriculture, industry, the credit finance system, health, ecology."27 This economic plight has already destabilized the eastern regions, and could prompt disintegrative pressures or violent social unrest. Should such violence occur in the eastern regions, where Kiev is redeploying military units, the potential for Russian military intervention in Ukraine would be frighteningly clear.
Beyond these immensely difficult issues, many Russian politicians silently share radical Russian People's Deputy Sergei Baburin's view that, "either Ukraine unites with Russia, or war."28 Given the historical ties, trade relations (80 percent of Ukraine's commerce is with the Russian Federation), and the existence of 11 million Russians in Ukraine, many Russians, even the most liberal and democratic, demonstrate a psychological difficulty in recognizing a permanently independent Ukraine.29 At the same time, a Russian bogeyman has become all the more important for Ukrainian leaders whose democratic shortcomings and economic failures may threaten their grip on power. And, as veterans of the Soviet Communist power structure, the maintenance of power transcends all other considerations for Kravchuk and his circle.
Belarus and the Mantra of "Stabilnost'"
Belarus, with a population of 10.3 million (13.2 percent Russian), has had positively romantic relations with Russia compared with Ukraine. Internally, the post-Communist nomenklatura in Minsk has elevated "stabilnost'" (stability) over democracy, deciding not to hold free elections, limiting entrepreneurial activities, and preventing the emergence of an independent judiciary.30
The ruling parliament, dominated as in Ukraine by veterans of the Soviet-era Communist nomenklatura, has proven far more amenable to Russian perspectives and sensitivities, particularly on nuclear weapons dismantlement. As Minsk is the titular CIS capital, Belarusian leaders have been strenuous in their public defenses of the Commonwealth and its structures.31 When asked about Belarusian foreign policy, one Minsk official noted, "in the near future virtually every step in this direction will be taken in full accordance with the interests of Russia."32
Similarly, Russian attitudes and statements toward Belarus have been benign. Andrei Kortunov writes that the lack of Belarusian nationalism and russophobia permit a high degree of cooperation, even within the military sphere. "Russia could probably achieve more than just a Finnish model of security cooperation with Belarus."33 Culturally, Russians in Moscow have more in common with residents of independent Belarus than with their countrymen in far off Irkutsk or Vladivostok.
Nevertheless, Minsk has made clear that it desires bilateral relations with Russia in the security sphere, not CIS collective security pacts. Belarus also balked at some Russian-sponsored CIS initiatives on financial burden-sharing. And Belarusian authorities have spoken out recently regarding their concerns about political instability in Russia.
Belarus's Defense Minister identified draft evasion, corruption in the military, and the low esteem with which the army is held in Belarus as his major concerns.34 Moreover, few officers in the Belarusian army wish to leave, and thousands of Belarusians stationed in Russia plan on returning home, which will strain Belarus's already sparse fiscal and housing resources. Minsk is forming its own armed forces (a defense law was passed in March 1992) of 90,000-100,000 by 1994, and Belarusian will be the official language in the military by 1998. The defense doctrine of Belarus states that it will be a neutral, non-nuclear state, whose strategy will be based on defense of its borders.
Located as it is between Ukraine, Russia, Lithuania and Latvia, it is doubtful that Minsk could remain neutral in a regional conflict. And, like every nation in the "Soviet West," Belarus has territorial disputes with Lithuania and Poland as a result of Stalin's redrawing of borders after World War II. Given Ukraine's problems with Russia, border conflicts with Lithuania, and Russia's Cold War with the Baltic states, Belarus may be forced to reassess its hopes about "stability" in the very near future.
Moldova and Trans-Dneister: The Next Sarajevo?
In mid-1992, as the West anxiously focused on the prospect of a wider conflict emerging from the Balkans, the first war in the European heartland of the former Soviet Union erupted six hundred miles northeast of Sarajevo. Although a tenuous "ceasefire" has been in effect since the summer, the Trans-Dneister has all the attributes of likely future conflicts in and around Russia--border disputes, Russian nationalism, Communist revanchism, and a highly politicized, self-controlled ex-Soviet army. As Stephen Foye puts it, "Moldova in 1992 represented a far more immediate threat to stability in the region....the Dniester region [after Kaliningrad] could become a second longer-term security problem for European leaders."35
Sandwiched between Ukraine and Romania, and granted territory from both by Stalin, Soviet Moldavia was an ethnic melange of ethnic Romanians, Gagauz, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians. During the last years of the Gorbachev regime, as the "Moldovan Popular Front" agitated for greater ties with Romania, the Russian Communists on the Slavic east bank of the Dniester River organized themselves in opposition to both reform and Moldovan independence. Following the coup in 1991, the dominant Romanians established what some Slavic residents viewed as an ethnically based state. Some Russians pointed to statements made in Bucharest about eventual incorporation of Moldova into a "Greater Romania," which the political leadership in Chisinau (formerly Kishinev) did not initially contradict. As a result, existing ethnic tensions burst onto the political, and eventually military, spheres.36
On the surface the contest between the former Soviet republic of Moldavia and the Russian separatists on a sliver of land east of the Dniester River resembles other blood feuds that have erupted across Eurasia. The Moldovan republic, with a population of 4.3 million nestled between Romania and Ukraine, is dominated by 2.8 million ethnic Romanians whose leaders seek closer ties--some say federation--with Romania. The official language of the republic is Romanian, and Moldova has even adopted the Romanian flag. As much of modern Moldova was annexed by the Red Army in 1940 after the Hitler-Stalin Pact, many Moldovans feel their aspirations are as worthy of Western support as those of the Baltic states.
East of the Dniester, where one quarter of the population is Russian, a separatist cabal of old-line Russian Communists holds sway with the help of the remnants of the 14th Russian Army.37 Also in this mix are roughly 600,000 Ukrainians--yet another of Stalin's numerous cartographic bequests--and 800,000 ethnic Romanians who fear the tender mercies of a Russian force that sports slogans such as "Death to Romanians" on its armored vehicles.
What distinguishes this conflict is the remarkable degree of political involvement by the Russian military commander, General Aleksandr Lebed, and the proximity of Russia and Ukraine.38 Lebed, who has called Moldova a "fascist" state and continued to make political speeches following a ban on such statements by Russian officers, fancies himself the guarantor of the self-styled Dniester Republic, itself a kind of redoubt for paleo-Communists in the former USSR. Former KGB officers and ex-Soviet OMON officers have been identified as serving in the "Dniester Republic" security services. However, even putative Russian liberals such as Yeltsin advisor Sergei Stankevich support the actions of the 14th Army as protecting legitimate Russian interests.
After several months of sporadic, but often intense, fighting, the region was somewhat becalmed by the summer ceasefire. Neighboring Ukraine has shifted its position on the Dniester region by suggesting it gain autonomy from Moldova.39 Yeltsin was quoted in the Financial Times as saying, "Don't worry, there won't be a war. We will pull back the 14th Army to Russian territory and will not permit Russia to be dragged into war."40
But the army has not been withdrawn. In fact, on December 2 there was a report that a transfer of equipment from Russia's 14th Army to the "Dniester Forces" was in progress. The report indicated that the remnants of the 14th Army would be turned over to "local authorities" in the "Dniester republic" or "sold" locally and that the units themselves would be "disbanded" locally instead of being withdrawn.41 At any rate, it is clear that no effective diplomatic initiatives have come from the Russian Foreign Ministry, and the tensions that exist between Moldova and Russia are fuelled by individuals in the Russian parliament and MOD. Also, despite the fact that Moldovan authorities have declared their opposition to unification with Romania, at least for the time being, they have indicated their growing reluctance to sign the CIS Charter.42
Finally, the Ukrainians have a great interest in the Dniester conflict. Any movement of Russian forces would have to take place through Ukrainian territory or airspace, as there is not a contiguous border with Russia. Kiev is also concerned about a flood of refugees from the region to a Ukraine with scarce support resources. There is the geopolitical problem of an aggressive, autocratic Dniester republic on Ukraine's western frontier, something mentioned by Mircea Snegur in May.43 Given the many other Russian-Ukrainian strategic disputes, the Trans-Dniester situation could prove to be far more than an inconvenient legacy of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.
The Baltics: Of Citizens and Soldiers
The intensification of the drive for Baltic independence in 1986 struck many in the West as a quixotic exercise. Some even criticized Baltic activists, many of whom were local Communist Party officials, as injurious to the cause of Soviet reform.44 In fact, the independence movement in the Baltics and the violent intervention in Lithuania and Latvia in January 1991 helped precipitate the ultimate break between Yeltsin and Gorbachev that paved the way for the August revolution.
The Baltic republics today confront the same daunting litany of social, economic and political ills faced by other post-Communist nations: economic and ecological catastrophe, the absence of legitimate political institutions, and the challenge of creating responsive state structures and civil societies. The Baltics, however, bear some unique burdens. As late recipients (1940) of the gifts of Soviet socialism, many Balts have memories of interwar independence. These images, romanticized through five decades of occupation, form a powerful--and not always democratic--element of Baltic political culture. Second, the Balts confront the armed detritus of their former colonists, most of whom feel no responsibility for past crimes. Finally, due to fifty years of forced population transfers, industrialization, and relentless russification, the social and demographic composition in the republics scarcely resemble those of pre-1940.
It is important to distinguish among the Baltic republics. They are diverse nations with distinctive problems regarding political development and relations with Moscow.45 Still, the most pressing security problems for each state in the near term are the severe political and economic dislocations caused by independence. The conflict between preservation of national culture and the creation of vibrant, contemporary democracies is more acute in the Baltic states than in Eastern Europe due to the corrosive legacy of Soviet annexation. This legacy colors all attempts to create tolerant republican political virtues such as respect for majority will and minority rights.46
The internal challenges complicate the withdrawal process, which has been the primary Western concern. For the Balts, the issue is not merely troop withdrawals, but financial restitution for property and equipment seized by the Soviet government since 1940 and support for the massive ecological cleanu In Moscow's view, withdrawals will occur, but at a pace that fits with Russia's ability to absorb forces into the federation. Moscow's negotiating terms also include the "protection" of Russian speakers living in the Baltic states. Some Russian military officers even discuss retaining access to certain strategic facilities built by Soviet authorities on Baltic territory.47
Lithuania
Lithuania has enjoyed the greatest success in organizing a centralized Lithuanian armed force and in negotiating Russian troop withdrawals. Of course, Lithuania does not have nearly the number of Russian-speaking residents as the other two states (roughly 10 percent of the population in Lithuania, compared with almost 50 percent in Latvia and 40 percent in Estonia). Also, Lithuania's location on the east-west rail link between the Russian Federation and the Kaliningrad oblast gave Vilnius some added leverage.
On September 8, 1992, after months of arduous negotiations, the Russian and Lithuanian Defense Ministries established a framework for the withdrawal of all Russian military personnel from the territory of the Lithuanian republic by August 31, 1993. Boris Yeltsin and then-Lithuanian leader Vytautus Landsbergis failed to sign a general, "political" agreement on troop withdrawals, prompting many in Vilnius to view the timetable accord with some skepticism. Still the timetable was judged in Vilnius to be a major accomplishment for Lithuanian diplomacy, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin called it a "model" for the region.48 Withdrawals proceeded in the absence of the political accord, beginning (most conspicuously) with the airborne unit that participated in the January 1991 assault on Vilnius.
Lithuanian officials are divided on how to interpret events in Moscow in the wake of the timetable agreement. Some believe that Yeltsin is making slow but steady progress in reforming Russia's political scene against the coalition of reactionary forces who oppose Baltic sovereignty. Others, pointing to Yeltsin's October 29 decree suspending Baltic troop withdrawals, argue that Russian democrats are being isolated by reactionary forces in the military. However, there is strong consensus in Lithuania that Yeltsin was the strongest supporter of Baltic independence in the Russian leadership, and that his removal from office would jeopardize the independence of all the Baltic states and destabilize the entire continent.
The new Lithuanian government elected in the fall of 1992 is led by members of the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party, or the former Lithuanian Communist Party. Although the respected Lithuanian Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius will be retained in his post, some Lithuanians feel that Russia may seek to stall on its commitments, or to demand renegotiation of certain elements.
Latvia
In contrast with the cautious optimism in Vilnius, Latvia faces deeper problems with respect to Russian troop withdrawals, relations with the large Russian-speaking population, and Baltic security cooperation.
Internally, no full post-independence parliamentary elections have been held, and major decisions about citizenship and constitutional authority have been stalled as a result.49 Interviews with Latvian officials repeatedly emphasize how fifty years of Soviet rule hampered the creation of a healthy democratic culture. "We are being asked to do too much," noted then-Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans in September 1992, "and democratic ways of doing things are foreign to our genetic makeu Russia succeeded in creating a Soviet man here."50 He concluded that Latvia's internal problems must be confronted before Russian relations can be stabilized. Ironically, Russian official Sergei Zotov made the same point: "Without real steps to change the legislation infringing on political, economic and social rights of Russians, steps to create an atmosphere of good-neighborly relations between all nationalities, without a firm denunciation of territorial claims to the bordering Russian lands, further talks will be of no success."51
Negotiations between Riga and Moscow have been hampered by several political and social realities. First, as Riga is the Headquarters of the Russian Northwest Group of Forces, more Russian troops are stationed in Latvia than in the other two republics. Of these troops, however, almost half are officers. "An army with this many officers is no longer merely a military force--it becomes a political force," notes Paul Goble.52 Moreover, as a result of Stalin's forced transfer of populations in the Baltic states after 1940, almost half of the residents of Latvia are ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. The Russian-speaking population in Riga actually exceeds 50 percent. Although the Latvians have not as yet passed a law on citizenship, the drafts circulating in parliament and elsewhere have been aggressively denounced by Moscow as anti-Russian. Finally, Russia seeks continued access to several "strategic facilities" in Latvia, most notably a missile defense radar complex located at Skrunda.53
Estonia
Estonia is the northernmost Baltic republic with the smallest population (1.2 million) and the most difficult relations with Russia. As consumed as it is with the withdrawal of some 30,000 Russian troops based in Estonia, Tallin also has to cope with competing Estonian military institutions and an activist Russian minority.54 During Lennart Meri's first official visit to NATO Headquarters as Estonia's head of state, he said that among other problems faced by Estonia was the need to counter the "growing pressure from Russian extremists."55
With or without an agreement, Moscow has already begun moving its forces out of Estonia. Of the roughly 30,000 troops stationed in Estonia at the beginning of 1992, half had been removed by the time of Yeltsin's decree suspending withdrawals.56 That includes the closure of three Russian bases on an island off the Estonian coast which had served as a western outpost of the Soviet Air Force. The Russian Defense Ministry announced in October 1992 that conditions for Russian military forces were so horrendous that a pullout should be undertaken without delay. Meanwhile, the two sides have been negotiating in desultory fashion on an agreed timetable for withdrawal.
It would be cause for quiet optimism if withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states were the only significant security problem in the region. The Russian leadership intends to withdraw its remaining forces from the republics, not out of a charitable concern for Baltic independence, but rather because of the deteriorating conditions on ex-Soviet installations in the region and the prospects for a breakdown of discipline within the Russian officer corps.57 The timetable accord with Lithuania, while not fully applicable to Latvia and Estonia, should nevertheless serve as a rough model for the other two states.
Of the remaining issues on Moscow's agenda--access to strategic facilities and "human rights" for Russian residents--the first issue will almost certainly be settled amicably, while the second will prove much more difficult. Many Baltic leaders express a private willingness to accommodate Russian demands for delaying withdrawals from certain facilities. For Moscow, the human rights initiative has proved effective in the public relations contest. Many Russian political parties have clamored for liberalized citizenship rights for Russian residents in the Baltics, as well as the provision of pension and other benefits to retired servicemen. The economically-strapped Baltic states will be hard pressed to provide such financial support. Still, the problems looming above all others, especially in Latvia and Estonia, will be citizenship rights. The problem for Moscow is the reliability of the officers in the Northwest Group of Forces, who may decide to be the arbiters of their own fates in the Baltic republics.
1917 and 1992: The Burdens of Empire and Revolutions
Oleg Rumyantsev, Chairman of the Constitutional Commission of the Russian Federation Parliament, stated: "There are about 25 million Russians and Russian-speakers who, for the first time in 200 years, find themselves outside of Russia and subject to the laws of other independent nations.... It is keenly felt in a country which still retains the psychological detritus of a superpower."58
It is one of the many ironies of Russian history that, in order to sort out post-Soviet Europe in 1992, one must go back to 1917. The Bolsheviks sought to graft an internationalist, "scientific" ideology on a Russian nation-empire riven by a philosophical identity crisis.59 The putschists of 1991 dealt a terminal blow to Lenin's experiment, but in so doing they exhumed the dichotomy of Russia-as-nation versus Russia-as-empire. Of course, this centuries-old dilemma was horribly aggravated by 75 years of Stalinist "nationalities" policies that brutally uprooted millions of people, changed boundaries repeatedly, and politicized all ethnic relations.60
Russia today finds itself in a peculiar position. It considers itself the successor state to the USSR, and yet it was the Russian republic which posed the most direct threat to Gorbachev's USSR. The Yeltsin-Gaidar team seeks to create a democratic republic with a free market economy, yet it is accused of weakness by Russian conservatives and of imperialism by its neighbors. Yeltsin was the first Russian politician to recognize the legitimacy of Baltic independence, yet it was he who ordered the suspension of Russian troop withdrawals from the region in October 1992. And while the Russian leadership has established a Russian defense ministry and a Russian armed force, it still maintains the pretence of a CIS unified command and announces the viability of CIS collective security measures which are viewed in the other republics as an attempt to resurrect the Warsaw Pact.
The "near abroad" problems bedeviling Russian politicians are often overlooked by Western analysts who focus on Russian politics or the economic reform debate. However, as Oleg Rumyantsev notes, concern over Russians in the republics "is not a cause just of the political right, but of all Russian parliamentarians. It is the most important cause we now have."61
If it is the most important cause for Russian parliamentarians, it has become a central part of the agenda of the conservative forces in Russian politics and their military allies. In June 1992 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev wrote an article in which he condemned the "party of war," or those seeking to unify the Russian populace by being bellicose toward the near abroad. This was just after Russian President Boris Yeltsin reversed himself on an earlier idea about a civilian defense minister, appointing Afghan veteran General Pavel Grachev as Defense Minister.62 Yeltsin himself later criticized Kozyrev, and in October gave a speech in which, according to ITAR-TASS, he "expressed his dissatisfaction with Russia's frequently spineless conduct on the international arena, her defensive tactics, and her imitation of others."63
These developments are cause for concern because they indicate a willingness by Yeltsin to grant the Russian military a greater voice in foreign policy. Military leaders, including the CIS General Staff, have become increasingly politicized due to the collapse of the old control mechanisms. Some, such as General Igor Rodionov, chief of the General Staff academy, and Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, deputy chief of the General Staff, have made pointed attacks on civilian political leaders for their insufficient attention to Russia's global interests.64
The military tends to be even more sensitive about the 25 million Russians outside of Russia, and the use of force in protection of those rights were included in a draft of the Russian defense doctrine in May. As Stephen Foye notes, the draft "continued to place Moscow conceptually at the center of a unified defense system that seemingly included all or most of the old empire."65 The draft also implicitly rejected civilian control of the military. In fact, there is no legislative guidance on civil-military relations in Russia today, or any understanding of constitutional checks and balances. There are also disputes between military leaders on the issue of troop withdrawals, which some officers feel will damage Moscow's military capabilities and undermine officer morale.
On August 24, 1991, immediately following the collapse of the coup, Boris Yeltsin's spokesman noted that Russia reserved the right to renegotiate its borders with other post-Soviet states.66 Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, an Afghan veteran, has made several provocative visits to other republics, most provocatively in the Crimea, stating, "The historical consciousness of Russians does not permit anyone mechanically to bring the borders of Russia in line with the Russian Federation."67 An emerging line within Russia was expressed by Russia's ambassador to the United States, Vladimir Lukin, who described a "new encirclement" of hostile successor states, where, given its geographical and historic interests, Russia would have to play a more traditional, activist role.68
In viewing Russia's relations with the near abroad, we should keep in mind Alexander Belkin's description of Russian statehood: "Russia still has no borders defined in accordance with international law; she has no concept of national interest; and she has yet to formulate a definitive long-term national development strategy."69 As long as Russia fails to know itself, its policies toward its former underlings can scarcely be expected to be based on enlightened self-interest. And, from a strategic perspective, that lack of self-awareness is perhaps the most sobering reality of all.
Conclusions
Perhaps the silver lining in this strategic cloud is that the internal challenges facing these republics are so daunting as to preclude major, deliberate inter-republican hostilities. Stephen Meyer describes a Russian military in such an advanced state of institutional decomposition that there are no serious discussions of strategic doctrine, let alone coordinated planning for offensive operations.70 In Moldova, a "Dniester Republic" Defense Force might not have the same leverage to draw Russia into the fray as did Russian Lt. Gen. Lebed's Russian 14th Army. In his study of post-Soviet nationalism, Jack Snyder argues that:
...if Ukraine seems unduly assertive in its national claims, this stems not from confident swagger, but rather from its own self-doubts about the solidity of newly won sovereignty. Claims on the Black Sea Fleet, foot-dragging on denuclearization, resistance to Crimean self-determination, and insistence upon a self-defeating degree of economic independence have been motivated largely by the symbolic politics of the assertion of national independence."71
Comfort might be found in the actual Russian withdrawals from the Baltic States, the Moldovan government's assurances that it would not merge with Romania, or the Belarusian commitment to denuclearization.
Of course, the pace of change in the region is so intense that almost any of the above frictions, from nuclear control to civil unrest to military insubordination, could catalyze major conflict between Russia and its Western neighbors. Inter-republican relations in the post-Soviet West are more likely to resemble a new type of Cold War, characterized by internal preoccupations and unconsummated strategic ambitions. The six republics will view Russia as the principle threat to their survival or sovereignty over the next decade, and Russia will use all its resources to prevent these states from joining an anti-Russian coalition, be it NATO or a Black Sea-Baltic Confederation.72 Therefore, we are likely to witness a situation in which the republics neither refederate with Moscow nor are allowed to join Western security organizations.
Given this framework, and the residual anti-Western, anti-American attitudes in Russian (and Ukrainian) political and military circles, there are clear limits on Western policy. But the West must be more active in supporting those forces in the republics who seek to consolidate democracy as well as independence; in providing aid and expertise in the arts of republican government and civilian control of the military; and in providing the economic assistance targeted on the creation of non-military enterprises.
The West should rid itself of the illusion that the CIS will ever serve as the functional equivalent of the USSR in military or strategic terms. We must recognize that the CIS is viewed by the other republics, except Belarus, as an entity whose usefulness has passed. At the same time, the West should not seek to isolate Russia by building security relations with the other republics that resemble a new cordon sanitaire. Rather, we should accept the fact that in the future we are going to have to deal with more, rather than fewer, regional actors.
Some specific initiatives flow from the above analysis:
The United States should offer to dismantle the ICBMs and nuclear devices on bomber bases in the former Soviet republics in situ, disassembling the missiles and purchasing the fissile material. The Ukrainians have often argued that they have no desire to have nuclear weapons on their territory, but that they lack the facilities to denuclearize themselves and they mistrust Russian intentions. Such an initiative by Washington, particularly if it were coupled with similar offers to the other republics, would test their sincerity on this issue. While Russian officials such as General Kolesnikov would rail about Western "interference," the Russians would certainly prefer such intervention to a nuclear Ukraine.
The United States should offer a dramatic new package of conventional risk-reduction mechanisms and confidence-building measures with the republics, including upgrading warning capabilities and providing equipment for safe transport and disposal of nuclear materials. If the Russian or Ukrainian military rejects such offers as "interference," they should be informed that Western aid programs may be affected by such attitudes.
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) should offer to convene a political summit on the future of Moldova and the Trans-Dniester region, with active U.S. participation, to determine the future borders, political arrangements, and armed forces of the republic. At the same time, a UN peacekeeping force could be inserted to help monitor the results of the summit and to transport troops and equipment from Moldova to Russia.
The Nordic countries--Finland and Sweden in particular--could offer to monitor Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltic States. These and other Nordic countries, along with the EC and the United States, should contribute to a fund to build housing for Russian officers returning to Russia from all foreign bases.73
The United States should expand its contacts with defense officials in the republics. This initiative would include expanding U.S. defense attache presence, organizing republic exchange programs, and composing study plans and supplying curricular materials for educational training of republican defense specialists. Such an effort would provide for greater interplay with military officers in the region and would greatly expand the pool of qualified civilians involved in defense decisions in these countries.
All the republics, particularly Ukraine, require massive help in industrial conversion. While Western economists and arms controllers argue that the military-industrial base in Ukraine must be reduced, little has been offered to cope with the social dislocation of such industrial decline, unemployment, and the harmful erosion of scientific and technological skills. Such industrial refitting must be a part of any new "Marshall Plan" program for the region.
Obviously, these modest steps must be part of an overall effort to encourage the peaceful transformation of the former Soviet Union. They are also a small part of a more ambitious American requirement to reassesss European security and America's role in it (a task, fortunately for the author, that is beyond the scope of this article.) Above all, our goal should be to support democrats in all the republics as opposed to favoring one country over another. The above observations are offered to help concentrate minds toward that task. The alternatives could make us truly nostalgic for the late, unlamented Cold War.
1. Christopher Donnelly, remarks, "Russian Fission--Nuclear Consequences of Political Disintegration," U.S. Department of Energy Workshop, Washington, DC, December 9, 1992.
2. George Breslauer, Panel Discussant, "Transition to Democracy in the Eurasian Commonwealth," 24th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Phoenix, Arizona, November 20, 1992.
3. The countries under discussion here are Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
4. Moldova's delegate to the UN General Assembly, Vitalie Snegur, describing the "devastating" situation in the Dniester region, bemoaned that "A screen of silence has been drawn over this tragedy." See RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 234, December 7, 1992, 3.
5. As of December 1992, 176 ICBMs (130 SS-19s, 46 SS-24s) were located on two sites in Ukraine; 80 SS-25s were located at two sites in Belarus. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1992-93 (London: IISS, 1992) 71, 86.
6. See Paul Goble, "Ethnic Politics in the USSR," Problems of Communism, July-August 1989, 1-15.
7. Jack Snyder, "Containing Post-Soviet Nationalism: International Substitutes for Impotent States," (Washington: National Council for Soviet and East European Research, 1992), 7.
8. See, for example, Roman Solchanyk, "Poland and the Soviet West," in S. Enders Wimbush, ed., Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 158-180.
9. The Baltic states, pointing to their interwar status as a kind of mini-European Community, have patterned their security institutions after the Nordic nations. Ukraine has established cooperative defence agreements with Hungary and plans similar agreements with Poland and the Czech republic. In an article in an authoritative Ukrainian defense journal, three Ukrainian officials described NATO as "a strategic counterweight to Russia in Europe," a mission to which Kiev would like to contribute. See Aleksandr Goncharenko, Oleg Bodrug and Eduard Lisitsyn, "Possible Ways of Safeguarding Ukraine's National Security," Narodnaya Armiya, pt. 1, July 29, 1992, 2. FBIS-USR-92-118, September 16, 1992, 53.
10. Christopher Donnelly notes that, "whilst the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, the Soviet armed forces have not." "Evolutionary Problems in the Former Soviet Armed Forces," Survival, Autumn 1992, 28-42.
l1. Western scholars were similarly surprised. See Charles F. Furtado and Andrea Chandler, eds., Perestroika in the Soviet Republics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 215.
12. Vyacheslav Chornovil, quoted in Laurie Hays, "As He Builds a National Ukraine, Chief Becomes Thorn in Yeltsin's Side," Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1992, 1.
13. The authoritative English-language volume on Ukraine is Orest Subtelny, Ukraine--A History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). See especially Part Three, "The Cossack Era," and chapter 19, "The Ukrainian Revolution."
14. On Ukraine's path to independence, see Adrian Karatnycky, "The Ukrainian Factor," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992, 90-107; Taras Kuzio, Ukraine--The Unfinished Revolution (London: Institute for European Defense & Strategic Studies, 1992); and Roman Solchanyk "Russia and Ukraine: The Politics of Independence," RFE/RL Research Report, May 8, 1992, 13-16.
15. Quoted in Chrystia Freeland, "Kiev Leader: From Apparatchik to Nationalist," The Washington Post, May 6, 1992, A16.
16. Stephen Foye, Military/Security Notes, RFE/RL Research Institute, November 24, 1992.
17. See "Ukraine--Independent, but not yet free," The Economist, June 13, 1992, 54-55.
18. Quoted in Stephen Erlanger, "Ukraine Finds 'Active Independence' Despite Military and Other Obstacles," New York Times, September 6, 1992. See also Kuzio, Ukraine--The Unfinished Revolution, op. cit., 9-10.
19. See Margaret Shapiro, "Ukraine's Leaders Retreat From Reform," The Washington Post, October 24, 1992, A17.
20. See Molod Ukrainy, August 21, 1992.
21. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, Political Review, October 1992, 82-83.
22. See Vladimir Ruban, "Rozhdeniye Voyennoi Derzhavy," ("Birth of a Military Power") Moskovskii Novosti, No. 32, August 9, 1992, 6-7.
23. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, Political Review, October 1992, 83.
24. IISS, Military Balance 1992-93, 86. On the dispute over control of strategic air bases, see Serge Schmemann, "Friction Rises and Ukraine and Russia Clash over Ex-Soviet Armed Forces," The New York Times, March 3, 1992, 3.
25. On Kiev's efforts to "activate" nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil, see Irwin Stelzer, "Ukrainian chaos threatens peace in east," Sunday Times (London), August 9, 1992, III-7; Chrystia Freeland, "Ukraine Having Second Thoughts About Giving Up Nuclear Weapons," Washington Post, November 6, 1992, A. 20; Fred Kaplan, "Ukraine officials tying missile removal to aid," Boston Globe, November 16, 1992, 1.; and Mark Frankland, "Ukraine's stance on nuclear arsenal stirs fresh worries," The Washington Times, November 23, 1992, 7.
26. See John Lloyd, Chrystia Freeland, and Anthony Robinson, "History bears down on States of the Union," Financial Times, August 19, 1992, 3; and "Statement of the Republican Party on Events Concerning the Black Sea Fleet," August 4, 1992, published in Ukraine in Documents (Kiev: Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research, 1992), 77-78.
27. Quoted in Serge Schmemann, "New Leader in a Lament for Ukraine," The New York Times, November 9, 1992, A9.
28. Quoted in Oleg Bodrug, Aleksandr Goncharenko and Eduard Lisitsyn, "Possible Ways of Safegurading Ukraine's National Security," Narodnaya Armiya, July 29, 1992. FBIS-USR-92-118 September 16, 1992, 53.
29. See John Lloyd and Chrystia Freeland, "Divided feelings about Russia split former USSR into two camps," Financial Times, June 5, 1992, 4. On Russian attitudes toward Ukraine, see the work of the great Russian philologist Dmitrii Likhachev, Reflections on Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), es "The Greatness of Kiev," 62-76, and chapter 3, "The Baptism of Rus' and the State of Rus'."
30. Ignor Sinyakevich, "Offensive of the PostCommunist Nomenklatura Calls a Halt," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 19, 1992, 3. FBIS-SOV-92-234, December 4, 1992, 35.
31. See "Ex-Soviet Summit Called a Success," The New York Times, February 19, 1992, 16.
32. Quoted in Moscow INTERFAX, November 30, 1992. FBIS-SOV-92-233, December 3, 1992, 28.
33. Andrei Kortunov, "Strategic Relations Between the Former Soviet Republics," Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, No. 892, April 17, 1992, 6.
34. Pavel Kozlovsky, "Do Not Be Critical. We Have Worked out our Conception," Respublika, October 21, 1992, 2. FBIS-SOV-92-219, November 12, 1992, 74.
35. See Stephen Foye, op. cit., 5.
36. See the report by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Fact-Finding Mission to Moldova, November 22-26, 1991.
37. On the roots of the Dniester conflict, see Vladimir Socor, "Creeping Putsch in Moldova," RFE/RL Research Report, January 17, 1992, 8-13.
38. See Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev," RFE/RL Research Report, May 1, 1992, 39-45.
39. Kravchuk had previously insisted on the principle of "inviolability of borders," in all such disputes within the CIS. His mid-summer shift in policy could prove risky, considering the numerous parts of Ukraine seeking similar degrees of "self-determination," such as the Crimea.
40. Financial Times, May 27, 1992.
41. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 232, December 3, 1992, 3.
42. RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 235, December 8, 1992, 3.
43. See RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 95, May 19, 1992, 3.
44. See "The International Status of the Baltic States: The Baltic Republics Fifty Years After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact," in Nationalities Papers, the Semi-Annual Publication of the Association for the Study of the Nationalities of the USSR and Eastern Europe, Fall 1989, 156-203. See also Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Baltic Independence and Russian Empire (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), es 293-318.
45. See Graham Smith, ed., The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (London: Longman, 1990), chapters 3-5; Romuald H. Misiunas, "The Baltic Republics: Stagnation and Strivings for Sovereignty," in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 204-227; and Economic Survey of the Baltic Republics, published by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in collaboration with the government authorities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Stockholm, June 1991.
46. See, for example, the interview with Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautus Landsbergis in Moskovskiy Novosti, No. 32, August 9, 1992, 11.
47. For a detailed look at Russian troops in the Baltic republics, see "Problems of Military Withdrawal," in RFE/RL Research Report, August 28, 1992, 15-37.
48. See John Lloyd, "Moscow tries to reassure Baltic states," Financial Times, November 5, 1992, 4.
49. On the debate in Latvia over citizenship, see Alexei Grigorievs, "The Controversy over Citizenship," Uncaptive Minds, Winter 1991-92, 57-60.
50. Interview with the author, Latvian Foreign Ministry, Riga, September 19, 1992.
51. Quoted in TASS, September 28, 1992. FBIS-SOV-188, September 28, 1992, 14.
52. Paul Goble, speech at Club 21 in Riga, September 18, 1992.
53. Located 120 kilometers west of Riga, the Skrunda facility includes a "Hen House" radar used for early warning and space tracking, and a Krasnoyarsk-type large phased-array radar systems (LPARS) still under construction. See the U.S. Department of Defense publication Military Forces in Transition (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991), 39.
54. The Estonian city of Narva, scene of Peter the Great's first defeat in the Great Northern War, is a hotbed of Russian nationalism, and site of one of the many anti-Baltic speeches made by radical Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky. For Zhirinovsky's views on partition of the Baltic states, see RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 234, December 7, 1992, 6.
55. Quoted in ITAR-TASS, November 25, 1992. FBIS-SOV-92-229, November 27, 1992, 64.
56. Helsingin Sanomat, September 29, 1992, quoted in Military and Security Notes, RFE/RL Research Institute, Issue 41, October 1992.
57. See John W.R. Lepingwell and Alfred A. Reisch, Military and Security Notes, RFE/RL Research Institute, Issue 49, December 1992.
58. Quoted in John Lloyd, "Painful legacy of an empire," Financial Times, July 9, 1992, 12.
59. On Bolshevik ideology toward the multinational Russian empire, see Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1990); Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964); Walter Laquer, The Fate of the Revolution (New York: Scribner's, 1967, revised and updated 1987); Adam B. Ulam, The Bolsheviks (New York: Macmillan, 1965); and Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power (New York: Summit Books, 1986).
60. See Roman Szporluk, "The National Question," in Timothy J. Colton and Robert Legvold, After the Soviet Union--From Empire to Nations (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1992), 84-112; Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," Problems of Communism, July-August 1989, 15-35; and Helene Carrere d'Encausse, The End of the Soviet Empire--The Triumph of the Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
61. Quoted in John Lloyd, "Painful legacy of an empire," op. cit.
62. See Michael Dobbs, "Coup Lifted War Heroes to Top of Russian Military," The Washington Post, September 27, 1992, A37.
63. Moscow INTERFAX, October 27, 1992
64. See RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 145, July 31, 1992, 2.
65. Stephen Foye, "CIS Armed Forces Yearender, 1992," Military/Security Notes, RFE/RL Research Institute, November 24, 1992, 6.
66. See Taras Kuzio, Ukraine--The Unfinished Revolution (London: Institute for European Defense & Strategic Studies, 1992), 9.
67. Aleksandr Rutskoi, "V zaschituu Rossii," Pravda, January 30, 1992.
68. Vladimir Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy, Fall 1992, 57-75. The article received great attention in Ukraine and the Baltic States.
69. Alexander A. Belkin, "Needed: A Russian Defense Policy," Global Affairs, Autumn 1992, 89.
70. Stephen M. Meyer, remarks, "Russian Fission--Nuclear Consequences of Political Disintegration," U.S. Department of Energy Workshop, Washington, DC, December 9, 1992.
71. Jack Snyder, "Containing Post-Soviet Nationalism," op. cit., 33-34.
72. Although Lithuanian President Landsbergis and some Ukrainians have floated the idea of a confederation including Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltics, no real progress has been made beyond various bilateral cooperation agreements. The Baltic defense ministers have had a hard time realizing their plans for Baltic security cooperation. See Andrei Kortunov, "Strategic Relations Between the Former Soviet Republics, op. cit., 6.
73. See George F. Kennan, "For Russian Troops, A House to Go Home to," The Washington Post, November 8, 1992, C7.