McNair Paper Number 20 Chapter 2, August 1993
For over three decades, Central European stability was maintained by a coercive military alliance. But since 1988, the Central European environment has been marked by increasing disorder and ethnic tensions. For instance, nationalism is eradicating the synthetic states that previously brought order to the region. The Central European security environment during the latter half of the 1990s is more likely to resemble the increasing disorder of the past five years than the order of the Warsaw Pact era. Whether Central Europe will "return to Europe" or descend into chaos will be determined by not only the people of Central Europe but also by the continued vitality of regional institutions and the active engagement of the United States
in Europe.
Central Europe, the region between the former Federal Republic of Germany and the former Soviet Union, has been treated harshly by history and has experienced profound transformation since the revolutions of 1989-1991. The region comprises the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Its 80 million people aspire to "return to Europe."1 The challenge facing Central Europe is whether the return to Europe will be successfully negotiated or if external challenges will cause the region to descend into chaos.
Central Europe in the Warsaw Pact Period
Although the Warsaw Pact era (1955-1988) was characterized by a high level of military threat, it was also, ironically, highly stable. While Central Europe was involuntarily embedded in the Warsaw Pact, that alliance did enforce a sort of regional order.
The Soviet First and Second Strategic Echelon forces which were deployed offensively against the NATO alliance during this period played an important concurrent role in maintaining political order in Central Europe. On the one hand, Soviet forces propped up unpopular Communist regimes in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1956, 1970, 1976 and 1980-1981. On the other hand, the USSR--as Warsaw Pact "ally"--provided integrated air defense coverage, "occupied" divided (East) Germany, and "secured" Central Europe's eastern frontier.
Only a few years ago (1988), Poland had a secure eastern frontier and 406,000 troops (15 divisions) facing west. It also had two Soviet divisions comprising 58,000 troops on its soil. Between Poland's western Oder-Neisse boundary and the Inter-German Border was an East German "buffer" occupied by 11 (6 active and 5 mobilization) GDR divisions and 19 Soviet divisions comprising 172,000 and 380,000 troops respectively.
Although Czechoslovakia had a secure eastern frontier, it had no such western buffer as did Poland. Czechoslovakia did have 10 divisions comprising 200,000 troops and 5 Soviet divisions comprising 75,000 troops "defending" its western frontier with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). At that time the Bundeswehr had 488,700 troops as part of NATO, and the FRG hosted over 400,000 allied troops: 245,800 American, 67,000 British, 50,000 French, 26,600 Belgian, 7,100 Canadian and 5,500 Dutch.2
Hungary constitutes Central Europe's south. In 1988, Hungary maintained 15 brigades comprising 120,000 troops and hosted four Soviet divisions comprising 64,000 troops on its soil facing in the direction of Italy in the South-Western Theater of Military Operations.
Physically separated from the FRG by neutral Austria in the west, Hungary enjoyed "secure" frontiers to the east with Warsaw Pact "allies" the USSR and Romania, and to the north with Czechoslovakia, a synthetic multinational state created by the Treaty of Versailles in 1918. To the south lay Yugoslavia: another stable, but non-aligned multinational state also created by the Treaty of Versailles.
Central Europe in Transition
On December 7, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev announced the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe.3 With the revolutions of 1989, Central Europe regained control of its national military forces, demanded total Soviet withdrawal from its territory, and initiated the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet troops have withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary respectively. While 6,000 troops remain in Poland at the end of 1992, these, along with those in (formerly East, now unified) Germany will soon be removed.
Central Europe's military forces have themselves undergone significant restructuring and reductions making them no longer a military threat to NATO. The German Democratic Republic's six-division (plus five mobilization divisions) National People's Army has disappeared along with the GDR itself. The Czech and Slovak Federated Republic's (CSFR) ten-division, 200,000-troop force is being reduced to 90,000-100,000, has been defensively restructured and subordinated to CSFR civilian national command, and is redeploying east. Poland's 15-division, 400,000-troop force has drawn down to 200,000, has also been defensively restructured and subordinated to civilian national command, and is redeploying east. Hungary's military force has been reduced to 75,000.
Germany
Most significant, Central Europe's western, eastern, and southern external environment has undergone extraordinary historic transformation. To the west, it has been transformed by German unification. This step has, of course, raised concerns in both Central and Western Europe. Unification has created a nation of 75 million Germans4 and shifted the center of political gravity in Europe. Germany is now potentially Europe's greatest continental economic and political power.
Upon unification on October 3, 1990, Germany had 560,000 troops and the NATO umbrella was extended from the former IGB to the former GDR-Polish border.5 According to the "Four-plus-Two agreement," the Soviets agreed to withdraw its Western Group of Forces by the end of 1994, and Germany would reduce its unified forces to 370,000 troops, a level below that of the Cold War, in order to build confidence in Europe. If Germany implements its plan for a new Army Structure 5 (which creates a more mobile and flexible ground force), revamps the Luftwaffe and Navy6 and creates an independent logistics and command and control system7 by the turn of the century, the Bundeswehr will be the only European military force, other than that of Russia, capable of global air- and sea-lift projection.
Although the 1994 unified German military force is 24 percent smaller than that of the Cold War FRG alone,8 the other Central European militaries have been reduced by a significantly greater proportion, thereby increasing Germany's relative military power. By 1994 Germany may not be as tightly embedded in NATO and, at most, will host far less than 200,000 Allied troops: 130,000 Americans (75,000 if President Clinton implements his plan), 25,000 British, 20,000 French, 2,000-3,000 Belgians, and 2,000 Dutch.
Central Europeans are worried that after 1994 when the last Soviet forces have been withdrawn and NATO forces substantially reduced, Germany will demonstrate greater independence in security policy. Whatever happens, the Germany of the future is likely to be very different from the Germany of Adenauer to Kohl. Germany will have at least three potential alternatives from which to choose: continued participation in NATO, whose future status is uncertain; closer direct cooperation with France within the Western European Union (WEU), along the lines of the Franco-German (Euro) Corps; and, least likely, unilateralism.
Poland's New Security Concerns
Only a few years ago Poland had a secure eastern frontier and an East German buffer to the west. In 1994 Poland's military will have declined from 406,000 to 200,000 and will share a border with Germany, whose military force will outnumber it almost two-to-one.9 If the NATO umbrella and American, British, French and other NATO forces withdrew from Germany, Poland would feel ever greater insecurity.
Whereas Poland's eastern frontier was secure in 1988, disintegration of the USSR has complicated Poland's security planning. Poland now has four independent neighbors--Russia (Kaliningrad), Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine--three of which represent potential security problems--on its eastern frontier.
Poland's primary eastern security concern involves the Kaliningrad salient, which with a population of 900,000 remains part of Russia.10 Among Kaliningrad's numerous nationalities, Russians comprise the majority, although its German population has increased in recent years. With many of the 2.5 million Germans living in the former USSR wanting to emigrate, Poland is concerned that a German repopulation of Kaliningrad11 might cause problems with Germany. Kalingrad was, after all, once the East Prussian city of Konigsberg. Poland wants Kaliningrad to remain Russian in order to prevent a German encirclement of Poland. To prevent such an encirclement, the Poles are willing to accede to a Russian foothold in Central Europe. Another Kaliningrad issue involves the increased concentration of Russian troops (from 200,000 to 400,000 between the Fall of 1990 and 199212) in the enclave. Because of the Soviet troop withdrawals from Central Europe, Kaliningrad has become a giant armed camp with greater combat power than that of the entire Polish armed forces
Lithuania represents Poland's second eastern security concern. The main issue is Lithuania's treatment of its Polish minority, which constitutes seven percent of its 3.6 million population. Polish-Lithuanian relations were inflamed when the Salcininkai and Vilnius district councils, which represent mostly Poles in and around Vilnius, supported the attempted August 1991 putsch in Moscow.13 The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet disbanded the councils and appointed Lithuanian administrators, an act that Poland viewed as an infringement on the rights of the Polish ethnic minority.14 Despite the signing of a declaration of Good-Neighborly Cooperation15 and a consular convention on January 13, 1992, Polish-Lithuanian relations remain tense.16
Poland, Belarus and Ukraine
Poland's third eastern neighbor is Belarus. On October 5, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Belarus voted to adopt a resolution creating an armed force.17 The republic's defense minister argued that the force should number about 90,000.18 On January 11, 1992, the Belarus Parliament adopted a resolution stating that all troops on Belarus soil, except strategic forces (which would remain under the control of the Confederation of Independent States), would be under command of the Belarus Council of Ministers.19 Poland and Belarus signed declarations on economic cooperation and on good-neighbor relations that confirmed existing borders and obligated the two states to ensure the rights of Byelorussians in Poland and some 500,000 Polish minorities in Belarus.20
Poland's fourth eastern neighbor is Ukraine, with which it must come to agreement on such long-term security issues as borders, the ultimate size of an independent Ukrainian military force (which for the foreseeable future will remain the second largest in Europe after Russia: roughly 700,000 in 1992), and nuclear weapons.
Poland became the "first" country to recognize Ukrainian independence when it was declared on December 1, 1991. Andrzej Zarebski stressed Poland's desire to establish "the best possible relations between the two countries."21 On December 13, 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament approved a concept for defense and a force structure not to exceed 420,000 troops.22
Poland has to find diplomatic middle ground between Russia and Ukraine while still maintain very close relations with Ukraine. That Poland has been somewhat successful was made evident when Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk noted in a December 20, 1991, interview that he wanted "close contacts" with Poland and that any past complications could be overcome by friendly agreements.23 Then on January 14, 1992, when Defense Minister Morozov met with former Polish Defense Minister Jan Parys, he pledged that all tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from Ukraine by July 1, 1992, that strategic nuclear systems would be dismantled by the end of 1994, and that Ukraine would accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Parys described this meeting to be of "historic significance," noting that once Ukraine becomes non-nuclear, its armed forces will pose no threat to Polish security.24
However, on March 12, 1992, Kravchuk announced his decision to suspend the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and their destruction under international supervision. He claimed that his decision did not change Ukraine's commitment to nuclear-free status. Instead, he argued, Ukraine was aiming to reduce the nuclear potential rather than to redistribute it from one region to another.25 The ultimate disposition of Ukraine's strategic nuclear weapons remains unclear.
Poland's southern security has become more complicated rather than dangerous. With the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, Poland now has two neighbors--the Czech Republic and Slovakia--on its southern border. In sum, whereas in 1988 Poland had three neighbors (GDR, Czechoslovakia and the USSR), as of January 1993 it has seven, some of which remain very unstable and have potential territorial claims against Poland. While in 1988 Poland's 406,000 troops faced west, in 1994 Poland's 200,000 troops will be very thinly stretched against an array of over one million troops in Kaliningrad, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and Germany.
Czechoslovakia and Hungary in Transition
The dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federated Republics this year symbolizes the inherent problem faced by Central Europe: the nationalistic destruction of the synthetic states that previously brought order to the region. The triumph of nation over state exacerbates ethnic rivalries, creates conditions for border conflicts, and, if nothing else, connotes disorder and chaos. This problem is particularly acute for Hungary.
Shortly after Vaclav Havel became Czechoslovakia's President, he visited Hungary on January 26, 1990, to discuss outstanding issues between the two states: the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project, Polish-Czech-Hungarian cooperation, and the 600,000 Hungarian ethnic minority in Czechoslovakia.26 Since ethnic minority issues were one source of potential cleavage between the two countries, Havel and Hungary's new President Arpad Goncz decided in July 1990 to set up a commission to monitor minority difficulties and to work out proposals for legal and institutional mechanisms to protect minority rights.27
Despite these efforts, the continued aggravation of relations resulting from ethnic minority issues has been a major factor in the failure of Hungary and its Czech and Slovak neighbors to renegotiate a friendship and cooperation treaty.28 While Hungary is concerned about the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, Slovakia's Carnogursky has argued that Slovakia's Hungarian minority enjoys full rights, but that the 200,000 Slovaks in Hungary do not. The plight of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia after independence could worsen, leading to increased tensions between the two countries.
To Hungary's south lies the former Yugoslavia. Its disintegration has increased tensions and exacerbated ethnic problems in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia (Vojvodina). There are 10,000 ethnic Hungarians living in Slovenia, 40,000 in Croatia, and 500,000 in the autonomous province of Vojvodina, now part of Serbia. Hungary is concerned that civil war and ethnic strife in Yugoslavia would lead to the mass emigration of ethnic refugees.29
Conflict between Croatia and Yugoslavia created more security problems for Hungary. Yugoslav aircraft have violated Hungarian airspace on many occasions.30 Yugoslavia has accused Hungary of smuggling arms to Croatia,31 a charge the Hungarians angrily denounced as "malicious."32 When Yugoslavian aircraft dropped a container of anti-tank shells on the Hungarian village of Barcs across the Croatian border on October 27, 1991, Hungary declared the bombing "a deliberate act,"33 increased military readiness along the border,34 and reinforced the Border Guard with so-called "Action-Squadrons."35
By November 1991 Hungary had taken in over 50,000 Yugoslav refugees; meanwhile, oil supplies had been reduced because of damage to the Adria pipeline. Because Hungary wanted to maintain political and economic relations with the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and not aggravate the position of Magyars in Vojvodina, it had to toe a delicate line on recognizing Croatia and Slovenia.36
Hungary and Romania
Hungary's former ally, Romania, with whom relations have been strained by the Warsaw Pact's collapse, contributes to Hungary's southern security problems. In March 1990, the apparent breakdown of political consensus in Romania aggravated ethnic tensions between Hungarians and Romanians in Tirgu Mures, Transylvania.37 Hungarian Deputy Chairman of Parliament Matyas Szuros expressed concern about the treatment of the 2.3 million Hungarians in Romania and stated that there was no possibility of beginning a new chapter in Hungarian-Romanian relations until Romanian authorities took steps to ensure the Hungarian minority's "individual and collective rights, cultural autonomy, and legal safeguards to maintain its national identity."38
Hungarian elections and the emergence of a new government on May 23, 1990, did not improve the political relationship with Romania. In August 1990 Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszensky said that he was not optimistic about Hungary's future political relations with Romania, noting that Romania's policy forced ethnic Hungarians either to emigrate or to remain "completely intimidated and silent."39 Meanwhile, Romania has expressed concern about the 200,000 ethnic Romanians living in Hungary.40
Despite political tensions, the militaries of the two states have concluded an agreement on cooperation related to air space and have established an open-sky policy.41 The "Open Skies" agreement, signed on May 11, 1991, makes it possible for unmarked aircraft of either country to fly into the airspace of the other, four times a year, for flights of three hours or 1,200 kilometers, to collect and process information for "confidence-building" purposes.42
When the first round of talks on the basic Hungarian-Romanian treaty opened on January 28-30, 1992, relations were strained not only by issues of ethnic minority, but also by borders. Hungary does not want to change its border, but it does want to keep the border porous to maintain contact with the Hungarian minority in Romania. Nonetheless, when fighting died down along the Hungarian-Yugoslav border, Hungary moved 300-400 Border Guards to the Romanian frontier to deal with increasing illegal immigrants.43
Hungary's situation is only a microcosm of the problems arising from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the subsequent disintegration of Central Europe's synthetic nation-states. Ethnic strife and hyper-nationalism have resumed their traditional role in the region, increasing the potential for even wider conflict.
Central Europe in the Year 2000: Avoiding a Descent into Chaos?
The Central European security environment of 1995-2000 is likely to constitute a continuation of the present disorderly era, unless the United States and Western Europe are able to moderate and contain the rise of nationalism within and around Central Europe. If not, the future portends: political turmoil, internal strife, open ethnic warfare, and increasing pressure to eliminate old states and create new ones.
Internally, Central Europe must create capitalist economies and liberal democratic political institutions. Externally Central Europe faces three uncertainties: (1) Germany's future security role; (2) developments in the former Soviet Union; and (3) protracted crisis in the Balkans. Each of these unpredictable challenges will have a significant impact on Central Europe's future security. Internal and external uncertainties have forced Central European nations to search for security through bilateral ties, as well as to create subregional institutions and increase their participation in existing regional organizations.
Bilateral Relations: Central European states have, since 1918, exhibited behavior characterized more by competition than cooperation. Accordingly, the new Central European leaders have recognized that to cope with the security vacuum in the region and to facilitate their "return to Europe," they must overcome old rivalries and demonstrate their ability to cooperate among themselves. To this end, they have actively sought bilateral "good-neighbor" relations and treaties--which recognize existing borders and respect minority rights--with each other, in addition to treaties with western, eastern and southern neighbors.
Central European countries have also used their own bilateral good-neighbor treaties to acquire West European support for their "return to Europe" by joining such European institutions as the European Community (EC), WEU, NATO, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the United Nations (UN). While the EC remains the institution of choice for economic and political integration, NATO remains the preferred security institution because it ties the United States to Europe. For instance, bilateral good-neighbor treaties signed by Poland,44 Czechoslovakia,45 and Hungary46 have consultative security clauses, with the two largest continental NATO powers--Germany and France.
Subregional Organizations: Central Europe is also developing a new subregional organization--the Visegrad Triangle/Group--in order to re-enter Europe. Following Jozsef Antall's September 1990 proposal to create a new Central-East European Union security structure, leaders of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia convened at Visegrad, Hungary on February 15, 1991, to determine forms of cooperation among the three states and to stress that they were not creating an alliance directed against the USSR or Germany.47 When the triangle summit again met on October 5-6, 1991, it issued the so-called Krakow Declaration, which declared association with the European Community a priority and welcomed the October 2, 1991, Genscher-Baker declaration to broaden NATO.48 The May 6, 1992, Prague triangle summit issued a joint communique that "emphasized their long-term aim: to become full members of NATO."49
Multilateral Organizations: While all three triangle states view the UN, CSCE, and WEU multilateral institutions as necessary and useful security tools, they do not see them as sufficient security guarantees. The United Nations is simply too large to be an effective guarantee for triangle security. Although the 52-member CSCE also shares some of the limitations and problems resulting from rapid expansion brought about by the creation of new states, the triangle members see the institution as useful50 and have employed it to deal with minority rights as a security issue.51 The nine-member WEU, which is much smaller and potentially more effective as a security tool, lacks the transatlantic tie52 and has recently evidenced less enthusiasm in broadening to the east.
This leaves 16-member NATO with its recently created 36-member North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as the remaining security institution of choice. Considering the free-fall in Central Europe's military forces resulting from draconian domestic economic constraints, the complications arising from potential instability and unrest to the east and south, coupled with the shift in Germany's relative military weight and potential to develop an independent military force, NATO has become a critical security anchor for Central Europe because it keeps the United States engaged in European security.
While Central Europe at the end of the 20th century will face many of the same problems that it faced in the post-Versailles Treaty period, there are differences arising from the existence of many multilateral institutions--EC/WEU, NATO/NACC, CSCE, UN--and the active engagement of the United States. If these multilateral institutions were to become less effective and the United States were to withdraw its forces from the Continent, the probability of Central European instability would increase, and Central Europe would likely descend into chaos.
If EC, NATO, CSCE, UN, and other multilateral subregional institutions become more effective, the United States will find it easier to remain engaged in Europe. CSCE and the UN have had limited success in moderating ethnic tensions and thereby reducing the possibility of conflict. And in a case where conflict has erupted--as in the former Yugoslavia--such organizations have, so far, helped to contain the conflict and prevent it from spreading.53
Since the United States is not an EC member, it can do little to assist Central Europe's entry into that organization. However, the U.S. can, and should promote Central Europe's formal entry into NATO by establishing an associate membership path to full membershi54 By promoting Central Europe's re-entry into Europe by membership in NATO, the United States would enhance Central Europe's security, revitalize NATO and increase its own prestige and presence in a vital corner of Europe.
In sum, in the year 2000 Central Europe's "return to Europe" or descent into chaos will be determined not only by Central Europeans, who have taken cautious but determined encouraging first steps, but by the continued vitality of subregional and regional institutions and the active engagement of the United States in those organizations and in Europe. These subregional and regional institutions are the necessary tools to bring order to the resulting disorder created by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and to moderate and contain the increasing rise of nationalism within and around Central Europe.
1. There are 16.5 million in the GDR, 38 million in Poland, 10 million in the Czech Republic, 5 million in Slovakia, and 10.5 million in Hungary.
2. The Military Balance, 1988-1989 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), 48-50, 65, 67.
3. Gorbachev announced unilateral reductions of 500,000 persons, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft overall. See M.S. Gorbachev's United Nations Address, Pravda, December 8, 1988, 1-2. FBIS-SOV-88-236, December 8, 1988, particularly 17-18.
4. In addition, Germany hosts about five million guest workers.
5. Hamburg DPA, October 13, 1990. FBIS-WEU-90-200, October 16, 1990, 11.
6. For a discussion of Army Structure 5, see Col. Karl-Theo Schleicher, Truppenpraxis, January/February 1992, 13-17. For Luftwaffe restructuring, see LTG Joerg Kuebart, "No Restructuring Without a Price," Europaeische Sicherheit, September 1991, 502-508. For Navy restructuring, see Rear Admiral Gerhard Bing, "Naval Armament en Route to 'Fleet 2005'," Wehrtechnik, November 1991, 4-12. Also see Thomas-Durell Young, The Normalization of German Defense Structure, SSI Report, U.S. Army War College (forthcoming).
7. For a discussion of the development of an independent logistics and command and control capability, see Ruediger Moniac, "Primacy of Policy or Who Leads the Bundeswehr?" Die Welt, April 7, 1992, 5. Also, Thomas-Durell Young, Bundeswehr Plans for a National Command Structure, SSI Special Report, U.S. Army War College, March 24, 1992.
8. Using the 488,000 (FRG-only) Bundeswehr figure, the 370,000 unified force represents a decrease of 118,000 or 24 percent.
9. In fact in February 1992 National Security Advisor Jerzy Milewski introduced an initiative, which former defense minister Jan Parys strongly opposed, to reduce the Polish Armed Forces by another 50,000 troops. Warsaw PAP, February 5, 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-025, February 6, 1992, 10.
10. In 1939 Poland had pressed for demilitarization of Eastern Prussia under Poland's supervision. But at the 1943 Teheran Conference the Western allies accepted Stalin's demand that Kaliningrad and the surrounding territory be awarded to the Soviet Union as the USSR's only open port on the Baltic Sea and as compensation for its war losses.
11.The Eintract Society for German Culture in Kaliningrad plans to settle 200,000 Germans in the region.
12. Two Russian armies are stationed there with a navy base and command for a large fleet. Warsaw Wprost, November 17, 1991, 31-34. JPRS-EER-92-003, January 9, 1992, 39-42. Polish National Security Bureau director Jerzy Milewski noted that he understood that Russia had a shortage of housing for soldiers and families, but such a "concentration of foreign troops close to our borders is unjustified.... Poland can treat such a deployment only as a temporary solution." Warsaw PAP, March 2, 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-042, March 3,1992, 11.
13. In an effort to assuage Lithuania, the Poles recalled the councils' chairman and deputy and replaced them with pro-Lithuanian Poles. Warsaw PAP, September 4, 1991. FBIS-USR-91-029, September 10, 1991, 7-8.
14. Warsaw Radio, September 16, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-179, September 16, 1991, 23.
15. For text, see Vilnius Ekho Litvy, January 16, 1992, 6. FBIS-SOV-92-019, January 29, 1992, 85.
16. On March 18, 1992, Warsaw protested to Vilnius for not establishing a date for the two Polish districts' local council elections in Vilnius claiming this a breach of the Good Neighborly Cooperation agreement. RFE/RL Daily Report, March 19, 1992, 5.
17. Izvestiya, October 5, 1991, 2. FBIS-SOV-91-197, October 10, 1991, 60.
18. Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda, January 3, 1992, 1. FBIS-SOV-92-004, January 7,
1992, 66-67. In a November 1992 interview in Warsaw, I was told that Belarus presently has 200,000 troops, not the 90,000 publicly cited.
19. Moscow Interfax, January 12, 1992. FBIS-SOV-92-008, January 13, 1992, 52.
20. Warsaw PAP, October 10, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-198, October 11, 1991, 20.
21. Warsaw PAP, December 2, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-232, December 3, 1991, 29.
22. Radio Kiev, December 13, 1991. FBIS-SOV-91-241, December 16, 1991, 67-68.
23. Warsaw PAP, December 20, 1991. FBIS-SOV-91-246, December 23, 1991, 63.
24. Warsaw PAP, January 14, 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-010, January 15, 1992, 29.
25. Moscow Izvestiya, March 14, 1992, 1-2. FBIS-SOV-92-051, March 16, 1992, 1.
26. Report On Eastern Europe, February 9, 1990, 48.
27. Communique, Prague Domestic Service, July 12, 1990. FBIS-EEU-90-135, July 13, 1990, 11.
28. Prague CSTK, March 5, 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-045, March 6, 1992, 6.
29. Magyar Hirlap, March 12, 1991, 1. FBIS-EEU-91-050, March 14, 1991, 27-28.
30. Budapest MTI, August 23, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-165, August 26, 1991, 17.
31. Tanjug, September 11, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-177, September 12, 1991, 34.
32. Budapest MTV Television, September 12, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-178, September 13, 1991, 13.
33. Budapest Kossuth Radio, November 7 and 8, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-217, November 8, 1991, 18-19.
34. Budapest MTI, November 22, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-227, November 25, 1991, 15.
35. LTG Bela Gyuricza interview, Budapest MTI, November 12, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-219, November 13, 1991, 18; Budapest Kossuth Radio, November 22, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-227, November 25, 1991, 14.
36. On January 15, 1992, Hungary extended formal diplomatic recognition to Croatia and Slovenia.
37. Gyula Horn interview, Vienna Die Presse, March 14, 1990, 3. FBIS-EEU-90-051, March 15, 1990, 30.
38. Report On Eastern Europe, March 30, 1990, 53.
39. Report On Eastern Europe, August 17, 1990, 33.
40. Budapest MTI, January 27, 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-018, January 28, 1992, 15-16.
41. Budapest MTI, February 3, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-024, February 5, 1991, 26. Budapest Domestic Service, February 25, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-039, February 27, 1991, 9.
42. Budapest MTI, May 11, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-094, May 15, 1991, 32.
43. Budapest Kossuth Radio, January 28, 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-019, January 29, 1992, 12.
44. The Polish-French Treaty on Friendship and Solidarity signed in April 1991 was the first such treaty signed by Poland with another state. It included an article that states: "If a situation arose in Europe which, according to one of the sides, would pose a danger for peace, or would undermine its fundamental interests of security, the partner may request the other side for holding immediate consultations of the issue. the sides will make every effort to adopt a joint stand on the ways of overcoming such a situation." (Warsaw PAP, April 9, 1991. FBIS-WEU-91-069, April 10, 1991, 26.)
The Polish-German Good Neighbor Treaty negotiations commenced in November 1991 and was signed on June 17, 1991. Article 7 of the Treaty states: "If a situation arises which in the opinion of a party to the treaty poses a threat to peace or is a violation of the peace or which can prompt dangerous international developments, then both parties to the treaty will immediately contact one another and endeavor to coordinate their positions and to achieve agreement on measures suitable for improving or overcoming the situation." (Berlin ADN, June 17, 1991. FBIS-WEU-91-117, June 18, 1991, 8.)
45. The Czechoslovak-French Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed on October 1, 1991, was the CSFR's second such treaty signed after the July 5, 1991 treaty with Italy, which also contained a mutual consultation clause in case of emergency. For French treaty, see Paris AFP, October 1, 1991. FBIS-WEU-91-192, October 2, 1991, 8. The Czechoslovak-German Good Neighbor Treaty talks opened on February 27, 1991, initialed on October 7, and finally signed on February 27, 1992. Article 7 of the Treaty calls for mutual consultation and coordination on security matters within the framework of CSCE to develop measures to ameliorate the situation. For treaty text, see Berlin ADN, October 7, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-197, October 10, 1991, 13.
46. The Hungarian-French Treaty of Friendship and Concord was signed on September 11, 1991. For treaty, see Budapest MTI, September 11, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-177, September 12, 1991, 18. The Hungarian-German Good Neighbor Treaty talks opened in July 1991, initialed on December 18, and finally signed on February 6, 1992. For treaty, see Budapest MTI, February 6, 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-026, February 7, 1992, 10.
47. Budapest Domestic Service, February 13, 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-031, February 14, 1991, 30.
48. Krakow Declaration, October 6, 1991. European Security, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1992, 104-108.
49. Joint Communique, Budapest MTI, May 6, 1992. FBIS-EEU-92-089, May 7, 1992, 3.
50. Warsaw is the home for the CSCE Center for Free Elections, Prague is the home for the CSCE Secretariat.
51. Poland's foreign minister Skubiszewski attempted to use the September 10, 1991 CSCE Moscow Conference On the Human Dimension to pressure Lithuania to respect Polish minority rights. Czechoslovakia's foreign minister Dienstbier proposed at the same CSCE Moscow Conference that a committee of non-governmental observers be set up as ombudsmen to deal with complaints on human rights violations.
52. Hungary, which for historical reasons has fewer concerns about Germany, seems to be the most enthusiastic triangle member for using the WEU. On March 31, 1992, deputy defense minister Rudolf Joo appealed to the WEU to fend off threats posed by civil war and economic chaos in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and called for a "security partnership" first as an observer, then as an associate member. See RFE/RL Daily Report, no. 54, April 1, 1992, 5.
53. Without these organizations, we would see Germany and Hungary supporting Croatia and Slovenia, France and Russia supporting Serbia, and Greece supporting Macedonia.
54. For an exposition of this argument, see Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?" Orbis, Winter 1992, 21-35.