McNair Paper Number 45, Notes, October 1995
1. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and the Comparative Case Studies," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69. On the requirements for successful deterrence see, William W. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence (Princeton: Center for International Studies, 1954); Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); idem., Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Oran Young, The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
2. The empirical findings on the relationship between capability and deterrence stability are inconclusive. While some empirical findings support the preponderance hypothesis, other studies do not support the proposition that the overall balance of military power effects the likelihood of deterrence success and war initiation.
Studies which support the argument that a favorable balance of capabilities insure deterrence stability include: Erich Weede, "Overwhelming Preponderance as a Pacifying Condition Among Asian Dyads, 1950-1969," Journal of Conflict Resolution 20, no. 3 (September 1976): 395-411; David Garnham, "Dyadic International War: 1816-1965," Western Political Quarterly 29, no. 2 (June 1976): 231-42; Cynthia A. Cannizzo, "The Costs of Combat: Death, Duration and Defeat," in J. David Singer, ed., The Correlates of War vol. 2, (New York: Free Press, 1980), 233-57; Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965," American Political Science Review 78, no. 4 (December 1984): 1057-69; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496 526; idem., "Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (March 1988): 29-46; idem., "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World Politics 42, no. 4 (April 1990): 466-501; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), and Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War," American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (June 1988): 423-44.
Studies which show that a preponderance of capability does not insure stability include: Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capability, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 (June 1983): 195-229; Frank J. Wayman, J. D. Singer, and Gary Goertz, "Capabilities, Military Allocations, and Success in Militarized Disputes," International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 4 (December 1983): 497-515; J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "Foreign Policy Indicators: Predictors of War in History and in the State of the World Message," Policy Sciences 5, no. 3 (September 1974): 271-96; Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard E. Koch, Jr. "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War," in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1961), 469-482.
We should note that in the studies which find support for the preponderance hypothesis the evidence is not conclusive. In Huth's and Russett's project, for example, cases of deterrence success may include cases in which the challenger did not seriously considered an attack. See Jim Fearon, "Bayesian Learning and Costly Signaling in International Crises" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992), ch. 5.
3. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985); Richard Ned Lebow, "Deterrence: A Political and Psychological Critique," in Paul C. Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis and, Roy Radner, eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 208-24; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," in Steven E. Miller ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An International Security Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
4. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 336-69.
5. Ibid., 348.
6. For a good discussion of the diversionary theory of war, or the scapegoat hypothesis, see Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War," in Manus I. Midlarski, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
7. The study of enduring rivalries has gained renewed interest lately in the international relations literature. On May 1-2, 1993 a special conference was held on the topic at Indiana University in Bloomington, IN, under the leadership of William Thompson.
8. The theoretical arguments advanced by the competing frameworks, the rational deterrence model (RDT) and advocates of the "weakness thesis," or critic of deterrence, can be found in Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?" Security Studies 3, no 3, (Spring 1994): 384-427; and Lieberman, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Success and Failure in the Enduring Rivalry Between Egypt and Israel, 1948-1979" (Ph.D. diss. University of Chicago, Chicago, 1993).
9. On the War of Attrition see, Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969-1970: A Case Study of Local Limited War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); Ahmed S. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," Journal of Palestine Studies 3 no. 1 (Autumn 1973): 60-87; Dan Schueftan, Attrition: Egypt's Post War Political Strategy, 1967-1970 [ in Hebrew] (Tzahal, Ministry of Defense Publication, 1989); Lawrence Whetten, The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1974); Yitshak Arad, ed., Elef ha-Yamim, 12 Yuni 1967-8 August, 1970 [1000 days, 12 June 1967-8 August 1970] (Tel-Aviv, 1972); Mordechai Naor, Hamilhama leachar ha-Milhama [The War After the War] (Tel-Aviv, 1970); Edgar O'Ballance, The Electronic War in the Middle East 1968-1970 (London, 1974); Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975); Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan Publishing Company), ch. 12; Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Strategy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987). Dan Schueftan's book, Attrition is a good source for the perceptions of four important Egyptian decision-makers during the War of Attrition: Egypt's President Nasser, the Editor of Al-Ahram Heykal, the Minister of War Fawzi, and the general secretary of the President's office Farid. Scheuftan relies on many Arab sources and documents as well as on a book by Fawzi, The Three Year War.
10. Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," in Jervis et al, Psychology and Deterrence, 37.
11. This study focuses on the rational deterrence theory debate and the way evidence from the War of Attrition is used in this debate. This study does not attempt to address other debates that use the War of Attrition as a case study. For arguments critical of Israel's decision to escalate the war see, Avi Shlaim and Raymond Tanter," Decision Process, Choice, and Consequences: Israel's Deep Penetration Bombing in Egypt, 1970," World Politics 30, no. 4 (July 1978).
12. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 41.
13. On "designing around" as a cause for deterrence failure see, Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), and, George and Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989), 170-83.
14. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 43-49. See also Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 76-82.
15. Ibid., 45.
16. Nasser's choice of an attrition strategy cannot be understood in the absence of an analysis that incorporates the learning that took place from 1948 to 1967. Stein does address the period of deterrence stability between the War of Attrition and the 1973 war but for unexplained reasons her longer term perspective does not include the events from the end of the 1967 war to March, 1969, when the main phase of the War of Attrition began.
17. On the importance of interests for the stability of deterrence see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense 30-31; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, (January 1979), 314-315; Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), ch. 8.
18. Stephen Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence Adelphi Paper no.50 (London, 1968).
19. Snyder's and Diesing's find that challengers, in most cases, do not make explicit estimation of the defender's interests. See Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). Lebow asserts that challengers frequently resort to force anticipating that defender will acquiesce rather than fight back. On this point see Lebow, Between Peace and War.
20. Schueftan's, Attrition, 37-63, 97-111; Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 171-175; Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 62, 77.
21. Yaniv, "Deterrence without the Bomb," 138.
22. Heykal, in Al-Ahram, 7 March 1969, cited in Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 171.
23. Shabtai Teveth, Moshe Dayan: The Soldier, The Man, The Legend (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 597.
24. Schueftan, Attrition, 41.
25. Adeed I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World:The Elements of Foreign Policy (New York: Wiley, 1976), 51; Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
26. Hassanain Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 414-27. In 1967 Nasser originally thought that war preparation would take months, then three years, and in the end he realized that five years was a more realistic target. For an extensive analysis of the Egyptian leadership's perceptions of Egypt's limited capabilities see, Scheuftan, Attrition.
27. Daniel Dishon, ed., Middle East Record (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1971-1977), vol. 3, 261-262.
28. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418.
29. Heykal, in Al-Ahram, 7 March 1969, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 162.
30. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World.
31. Muhammed Fawzi, The Three Year War, 375-376, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 107.
32. Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 131-132; Daniel Dishon, Inter-Arab Relations 1967-1973 An Occasional Paper (Tel-Aviv, 1974), 5.
33. Varda Ben-Zvi, "The Decline of Egypt in the Arab World: From Khartum to Rabat," in Shimon Shamir, ed., The Decline of Nasserism, 1965-1970: The Waning of a Messianic Movement [Hebrew] (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1978), 267-86.
34. Evron, The Middle East, 178-186.
35. Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War, 87.
36. Dan Margalit, Sheder mea-Bayit ha-Lavan: Aliyato u-Nefilato shel Memshelet ha-Likud ha-Leumi [Message from the White House: The Rise and Fall of the National Unity Government] (Tel-Aviv, Otpaz, 1971), 215, and Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 83-85.
37. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 39-40.
38. Moshe Dayan, Avnei Derekh, [Story of My Life], (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, Yedioth Ahronoth Edition, 1976), p. 513; Dishon, ed., Middle East Record, pp. 582-583; Mohammed Heykal, The Road to Ramadan, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), p 48; Nasser's Speeches, 1969-1970, pp. 75-92.
39. Muhammed Fawzi, The Three Year War, 228, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 136.
40. Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 150.
41. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 416.
42. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 197.
43. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418.
44. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 194.
45. Al-Ahram, 23 August 1968, cited in Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War, 50-51.
46. Muhammed Fawzi, The Three Year War, 188-89, 194-95, 345-47, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 50-62.
47. Scheuftan, Attrition, 198.
48. Ibid., 205.
49. Ibid., 224-25. Scheuftan relies for his evidence on the Middle East News Agency reports from Cairo, October 2 and 10, 1969, and November 7 and 21, 1969.
50. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 41.
51. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).
52. Stein, "Deterrence and Miscalculated Escalation," 20; Lebow and Stein, "When Does Deterrence Succeed,"; Lebow, "Deterrence Failure Revisited," 209.
53. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 41-49.
54. Ibid., 45, and Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 78-80.
55. Jon D. Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and the War in the Middle East (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), ch. 4; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star Over the Nile: The Soviet- Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 29-31; Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1972), 87-89.
56. The discussion of the balance of capability is based on Avner Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, ch. 4; Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 189-198; Geoffrey Kemp, "Israel and Egypt: Military Force Posture 1967-1972," in F. B. Horton, A. C. Rogerson, and E. L. Warner, eds., Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), and Hans Rattinger, "From War to War: Arms Races in the Middle East," International Studies Quarterly 20, no. 4 (December 1976): 501-531.
57. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 191.
58. Scheuftan, Attrition, 204-205.
59. Zeev Schiff, Knafayim me'al Suez [Phantom over the Nile: The Story of the Israeli Air Corps], (Haifa: Shikmona, 1970), 44-46; Shlaim and Tanter, "Decision Process," 484 and Scheuftan, Attrition, 197.
60. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418.
61. Schiff, Knafayim me'al Suez, 190; Shlaim and Tanter," Decision Process," 486, and Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War, 89.
62. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 418.
63. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 63.
64. Schiff, Knafayim me'al Suez, 23.
65. `Shlaim and Tanter, "Decision Process," 489.
66. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 423-426.
67. Ibid., 423.
68. Ibid., 422.
69. On the conversation with Tito see Abd al-Majid Farid, Al-Dustur, 21 August 1978, 33-34, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 129. In the same article Farid quotes Nasser explaining to the Jordanian Prime Minister as well as to the Iraqi President that while Egypt may be able to defend herself it was far from being able to mount a successful attack to recapture the Sinai.
70. Nasser's Speeches, 1969-1970, 75-92; see also Nasser's addresses on 27 March 1969, 1 May 1969, 23 July 1969, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 153.
71. Dishon, Middle East Record, 125-126.
72. Scheuftan, Attrition, 159.
73. Heykal, The Road to Ramadan, 62.
74. Ibid., 165.
75. O'Ballance, The Electronic War, 31-32.
76. Nasser's 23 November 1967 speech, cited in Scheuftan, Attrition, 125.
77. el-Sadat, In Search of Identity, 150.
78. Ibid., 196; Saad el-Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), 12; Scheuftan, Attrition, 135-6.
79. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 63.
80. Barry O'Neill, "The Strategy of Challenges: Beheading Games in Mediaeval Literature and Superpower Contests in the Third World," (April, 1990); Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict; Idem, Arms and Influence; On the concept of reputations in the literature of economic game theory see Reinhard Selten, "The Chain-Store Paradox," Theory and Decision 9, (1978): 27-59; David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory 27, (1982): 253-279; Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory 27, (1982): 280-312; Robert Wilson,"Deterrence in Oligopolistic Competition," in Paul C. Stern, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis and, Roy Radner, eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
81. Jervis, " Deterrence Theory Revisited," 315; Michael Desch, "The Keys That Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery," International Security 14, (1989): 86-121; Maxwell, Rationality in Deterrence, and Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," in Jervis, Lebow and Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence.
82. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 44.
83. Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 423.
84. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 78.
85. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 188.
86. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 83-85; Dan Margalit, Sheder mea-Bayit ha-Lavan, 84-95; Michael Brecher, Decisions In Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1975), 462-463; Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, ch. 4.
87. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 44.
88. Heykal, The Road to Ramadan, 78-85; Sadat, In Search of Identity, 151-152; Dishon, Middle East Record, 44-45; Rubinstein, Red Star Over the Nile, 105-113; Ya'acov Ro'i and Ilana Dimant Kass, "The Soviet Military Involvement in Egypt, January 1970-July 1972," The Soviet and East European Research Center, Research Paper no. 6, (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, February 1974): 8-12.
89. Despite the otherwise excellent study of Israel's deterrence policies, Shimshoni's argument that Israel "lost her first war" in the War of Attrition is a bit exaggerated. See, Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 170. For a convincing argument that Israel attained its objectives and the apparent draw was due to Soviet intervention see Schueftan, Attrition, 395-411.
90. For a description of the Israeli raids see Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 123-170; Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War; Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, ch. 4; Schueftan, Attrition.
91. Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, ch. 4, and Shlomo Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 136.
92. Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," 66-67.
93. Barry Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313-335.
94. Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 6.
95. Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model."
96. This argument is made not only by critics of deterrence but by some deterrence theorists as well. See Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, 51-53.
97. Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 85.
98. Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes (New York: G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1992), 492. On the consensus which existed on this point in the Israeli government see Yair Evron, The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 59.
99. Mahmud Riad, The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Quartet Books, 1981), 143.
100. Schueftan, Attrition, 407-409.
101. Russel Leng, "When Will They Ever Learn: Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 (September 1983): 379-419.
102. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 37.
103. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New York: The Free Press, 1977).
104. Hassan el Badri, Taha el Magdoub, and Mohammed Dia el Din Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 1973 (Dunn Loring, Va.: T.N. Dupuy, 1978).
105. Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 45-48.
106. Richard D. Anderson, Margaret G. Herman and Charles Herman, "Explaining Self-Defeating Foreign Policy Decisions: Interpreting Soviet Arms for Egypt in 1973 through Process or Domestic Bargaining Models?" American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (September 1992): 759-767.
107. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 38-41. Stein's article uses the Egyptian decision-making during the period leading to the 1973 war to challenge deterrence theory.
For a perspective which tries to explain Egyptian decision-making on rational grounds see, John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 155-162.
Memoirs and narrative histories of the Egyptian decision-making process during the period before the war can be found in Mohammed Heykal, Nasser: The Cairo Documents (London: New English Library, 1972); Heykal, The Road to Ramadan; Heykal, The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); el Badri, The Ramadan War; el-Shazli, The Crossing; and el-Sadat, In Search of Identity.
An excellent study of the evolution of Sadat's policies towards Israel is Shimon Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat: The Search for a New Orientation [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 1978).
For an Israeli perspective see Hanoch Bartov, Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days [Hebrew] (Tel-Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978); Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (Novato, Calf.: Presidio, 1980); Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publications, 1974); Ze'ev Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army; Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975); Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, ch. 4. A detailed analysis of the diplomatic process during the period can be found in Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining, ch. 3.
On the war see Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).
A large literature on the 1973 war deals with the concept of intelligence estimates and surprise attacks and is indirectly relevant the debate on deterrence. See Zvi Lanir, Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis (Tel-Aviv: The Center for Strategic Studies, 1983); Avraham Ben Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks," World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 381-395; Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War," World Politics 28, no. 3 (April 1976): 348-380.
108. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 58.
109. Ibid., 41-49.
110. Ibid., 49-51.
111. On Egypt's strategy in the War of Attrition see Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, ch. 4; Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition; Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," and Schueftan, Attrition.
112. Schueftan, Attrition, and Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, ch. 4.
113. Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East, 141.
114. Ibid., 146.
115. It was not until 1977 that Sadat's conception of peace came close to the Israeli interpretation which included reconciliation. See Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat, 95.
116. Ibid., 93-94.
117. Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining, 161.
118. Sadat, In Search of Identity, 232, 238; el Badri, el Magdoub, and el Din Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 18.
119. Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat, 71-85.
120. On Egyptian concerns with their vulnerable interior see Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 94, 130-131, 144, and Sadat, In Search of Identity, 219-221.
121. Schueftan, Attrition, 339-351.
122. On Soviet-Egyptian relations see Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy toward Egypt (New York: Macmillan, 1979); Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile.
123. Yaacov Roi, The USSR and Egypt in the Wake of Sadat's "July Decisions," (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 1975), and Anderson et al, "Explaining Self-Defeating Foreign Policy Decisions."
124. The main elements of a limited-aims strategy can be found in Heykal's writings during the early stages of the War of Attrition, but a concious adoption of this strategy by the Egyptian decision-makers does not occur until after Sadat and his military commander realized that an all-out-war strategy was not viable. For evidence that the building blocks of the limited-aims strategy existed in Heykal's writing see Hassanain Heykal, "The Strategy of the War of Attrition," 414-427.
125. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 38-41.
126. Cited in Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 40, 57.
127. Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World, and Ajami, The Arab Predicament.
128. Yaniv, Deterrence without the Bomb, 171; Shimon Shamir, "Arab Attitudes Towards the Conflict With Israel Between 1967 and 1973," 185-199 and, Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat.
129. Avner Yaniv, "Deterrence without the Bomb," 138.
130. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 40.
131. William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 168, and Heykal, Road to Ramadan, 8.
132. Yaniv, "Deterrence without the Bomb," 131.
133. Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, ch. 4, and Badri et al., The Ramadan War, 29.
134. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 47.
135. Ibid., 43.
136. Ibid., 42.
137. Ibid., 47-48.
138. Ibid., 43-49.
139. Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 60, 86, and Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 22-23, 245-246.
140. Egypt was also concerned about Israel's nuclear capability, which posed a serious challenge to the Arab regimes while the conventional balance remained deadlocked. See, Fuad Jabber, Israel and Nuclear Weapons: Present Options and Future Strategies (London: Internationa Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971).
141. el Badri, The Ramadan War, 19.
142. Ibid., 15, and Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 60.
143. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence," 43-49. See also Khalidi, "The War of Attrition," 76-82.
144. Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 94.
145. Ibid., 116.
146. According to Heykal, "it was a long time before Egypt became ready to accept the idea of a limited attack aimed primarily at opening up political possibilities." See Heyka, Road to Ramadan, 167-168.
147. Dina Rome Spechler, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East: The Crucial Change," in Paul Marantz and Blema S. Steinberg, eds., Superpower Involvement in the Middle East: Dynamics of Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: 1985), 133-171.
148. Shlaim and Tanter, "Decision Process," 499-516; Heykal, Road to Ramadan, 5-6, and Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 34-35, 58-59.
149. el Badri, The Ramadan War, ch. 2; Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, chs. 2-3, and Mohamad el Gamasy, "The Military Strategy of the October 1973 War," in October 1973 War, proceedings of an international symposium held on 27-31 October 1975 (Cairo: Ministry of War, 3 October 1976), 31-43.
150. el Badri, The Ramadan War, 17-18; Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 88, and Sadat, In Search of Identity, 244.
151. The possibility of an oil embargo, Syrian participation in a two front war and the achievement of strategic surprise were all important factors in Sadat's ultimate decision to go to war. But had the Egyptian leadership not been able to conceptualize the limited-aims strategy in order to offset Israeli superiority, the other factors would not have been sufficient to convince Sadat to go to war. On the economic circumstances which made the use of the oil weapon possible see Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped (New York: 1976), and Raymond Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis (New York, 1976). On the Syrian involvement see Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War, 68
152. Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 117.
153. Ibid., 117.
154. Ibid., 94, 130-131, 144.
155. Ibid., 119.
156. Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model," 27-28.
157. Dayan, My Life, ch. 28.
158. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 49, and George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 531.
159. Nasser, speech, 27 March 1969.
160. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 49-50.
161. Immediately after the Six Day War Israel offered Egypt the Sinai in return for a peace treaty arrived at through direct negotiations. Syria was also offered a similar deal. The only caveat was the demilitarization of these territories. This Israeli offer, made through the good offices of the United States, was good through October, 1968. See Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel Through My Eyes (New York: G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1992), 492. On the consensus which existed on this point in the Israeli government see Yair Evron, The Middle East, 59. Israel's position hardened after the War of Attrition but a serious Egyptian peace offer would have most probably tilted the balance of forces within the Israeli government toward the forces which advocated territorial compromise in return for peace.
162. On the interim agreement negotiations see Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining, 139-154.
163. Ibid., 140.
164. See Sadat's account of his negotiating position see the description of the 11 May meeting in Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 71.
165. In his response to UN mediator Jarring, Sadat said that Egypt would accept "salaam" but not "sulh." To the Israelis peace as a political settelment in the absence of reconciliation meant that Egypt could abandon the peace agreement if and when circumstances changed. See Aronson, Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East, 143.
166. Ibid., 149.
167. According to Yehoshua Raviv, Dayan's military adjutant at the time, these were the main obstacles to an interim agreement. See Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat, 250.
168. Stein argues that Sadat departed from past practice and offered to sign a peace agreement with Israel. See Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 49.
169. Shamir, Egypt Under Sadat, 93.
170. Ibid.
171. Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation and Conventional Deterrence," 58.
172. Ibid.
173. See his introduction to Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez.
174. Badri et al., The Ramadan War, 15.
175. Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 68.
176. For Shazli's description of Egypt's vulnerability see his The Crossing of the Suez, 15. Egypt's air force commander, Bagdadi, complained that Egypt did not have a weapon which could threaten Israeli population centers and thus deter Israel from attacking Egypt's interior. Soviet SCUD deliveries in 1973 gave Egypt an appropriate response and was a major element in the decision to challenge. On Sadat's concerns on this matter see his statement during the June 6, 1972 meeting of the Egyptian high command. See Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 94, 116.
177. Ibid., 94.
178. Ibid., 116.
179. According to Heykal, "it was a long time before Egypt became ready to accept the idea of a limited attack aimed primarily at opening up political possibilities." See Heyka, Road to Ramadan, 167-168.
180. See Shimon Shamir's introduction in Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 11.
181. On the shift in Egypt's goals and the rise of the forces advocating the disengagement from Pan-Arab politics see Ajami, Arab Predicament, 81.
182. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New York: The Free Press, 1977).
183. el Badri, The Ramadan War, 17; Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez, 26-27, 262.
184. Ibid.
185. Cited in Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence, 211.
186. Adan, "Quality and Quantity in the Yom Kippur War,"; Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: October, 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), 233-234, and Heykal, Road to Ramadan, 219-220.
187. Successful deterrence does not necessarily lead to peace. The success of deterrence creates the conditions in which challengers are willing to consider other options to resolve the conflict. On the intricate trilateral negotiations which ultimately lead to the resolution of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and the signing of the peace treaty see Edward R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York, 1976); and Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Quadrangle, 1976); William Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), and Shibley Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
188. While only Egypt was willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel at the time, it is important to note that this is not a unique case of deterrence success. As a result of the Yom Kippur War, deterrence stability also exists on the Syrian-Israeli front, and the Palestinian leadership adopted the more moderate goal of a two-state solution instead of the replacement of the Israeli state by a Palestinian state.
189. Nasser was under strong pressures to challenge deterrence in another period not addressed in this paper, the 1956 to 1967 period, and he refrained from a challenge because Israel's threat at the time was very credible. See Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate."
190. "By war, reputation was maintained." Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (New York: New American Library, 1966), 1. Quoted in Paul Gordon Lauren, "Theories of Bargaining with Threats of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 185.
191. This theme is developed more fully in my dissertation. See Lieberman, "Testing Deterrence Theory."
192. Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capabilities and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes," 195-229.
193. Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), 99-102. For a similar argument see Fearon, "Deterrence and the Spiral Model," ; idem., "Domestic Political Audiences and Escalation of International Disputes" (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2-5 September 1993), 1-28. According to Fearon only costly signals which involve high audience costs, if the defender backs down, and introduce the risk of inadvertent escalation, are credible. Troop movements and mobilization are such acts which introduce risks only resolute actors are likely to undertake.
194. Frank, Passions Within Reason.
195. On the erosion of the effectiveness of PGMs in the Yom Kippur War due to the 'learning through battle' capability of the Israelis see, Ori Even-Tov, "The Utility of New Technologies for Conventional Defense," in John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturn Eds., American Defense Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 366-73.