VLADIMIR ZHIRINOVSKIY
An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist
Morrison
Chapter 5
WHAT SHOULD WESTERN POLICY BE FOR DEALING
WITH ZHIRINOVSKIY?
There are several alternative approaches the West could take vis-a-vis Zhirinovskiy, including:
- neglect,
- aloofness,
- purposeful ignoring,
- constructive engagement, and
- active criticism and containment.
Neglect
If Zhirinovskiy were perceived as harmless, in terms both of intent and power, then the West
could basically shrug its shoulders and neglect Zhirinovskiy and his followers. This approach
could be based on a presumption that Zhirinovskiy does not really believe or support some of the
more outrageous statements or positions he has espoused and that he has made these only to gain
attention. It could also reflect a presumption that the relative success of Zhirinovskiy's party in
the December elections represented only a protest vote and one that is not likely to be repeated.
Another presumption might be that Zhirinovskiy, who despite his efforts, has not been appointed
a government minister or selected as chairman of a major parliamentary committee, is not very
powerful now and is not likely to become much more influential in the future. A further
assumption might be that even should Zhirinovskiy rise to positions of authority, he would
become more responsible in his statements, policy, and actions.
Aloofness
If one believes that in dealing with other countries, particularly democracies or countries
attempting to establish democratic institutions and procedures, it is fundamental that the West
remain neutral and not oppose--or support--any specific politician or party, then an approach
based on aloofness and remaining above or outside the fray might be pursued. If Russia's
executive branch remains basically neutral toward Zhirinovskiy and his party, then this might be a
further reason to pursue this approach.
This course might also be prescribed if one is concerned that active Western opposition to
Zhirinovskiy might be exploited by him or others to gain popular support in Russia from those
who dislike or are suspicious of the West. This approach might also be pursued if one believed
that Zhirinovskiy might rise to power and Western relations with him after his rise to power
would be better if the West had not opposed him on his way up.
Purposeful Ignoring
The West might purposefully ignore Zhirinovskiy, believing that he and his movement thrive on
publicity and that the best way to oppose him is to ignore him. Under this approach, Western
governments would not have their senior leaders, statesmen, or even their ambassadors meet with
him. They would also not issue statements or warnings about Zhirinovskiy, even when he says or
does something outrageous or irresponsible, nor would they include references to him in major
speeches. They might conduct classified research on him and address his activities in restricted
diplomatic channels, but they would not promote any public responses. They might, however,
quietly open or pursue contacts at a low level with those in his movement in an effort to assess the
movements' activities and policies.
Constructive Engagement
If Western leaders judge that Zhirinovskiy is misinformed or misguided and can be influenced to
change his rhetoric and positions, then the West could attempt to engage him constructively in an
effort to cease his offensive, irresponsible statements and positions and to develop closer
relations. Western ambassadors might meet with him to discuss issues, and meetings with
Zhirinovskiy might be sought for important Western government officials and citizens travelling to
Russia. In this regard, he might be treated at least equally to leaders of other political parties in
Russia, or even given greater attention. The West might indicate that if he becomes more
responsible, the West would not oppose and might even welcome visits by Zhirinovskiy to the
West.
Active Criticism and Containment
If leaders in the West believe that Zhirinovskiy is fundamentally a dangerous individual who
presents an increasing threat to democracy in Russia and peace and stability in the world, then an
approach involving active criticism and efforts to contain his influence might be pursued.
This approach might be based on assumptions that Zhirinovskiy has deep prejudices within
him, and that he seeks power and is prepared to say and perhaps do most anything to obtain it. It
could also include the presumption that if he were to gain power in Russia, he would reverse the
process of democracy, moving it back toward dictatorship, stimulate an aggressive Russian
nationalism as outlined in his book Last Dash to the South, and threaten the interests of
neighboring states and much of the world at large.
Under this approach, the West would carefully study, monitor, record, and, as
appropriate, publicize the statements and activities of Zhirinovskiy, using the assets of
government agencies and supporting efforts by the private sector. Public diplomacy campaigns
might be developed to publicize irresponsible and threatening positions espoused by Zhirinovskiy.
When he says or does something irresponsible, Western leaders would publicly take him to task.
Countries could be encouraged to deny him visas to visit their territory, as Germany,
Spain, and apparently Slovenia have. When Western leaders visit Russia, they would avoid
contact with him and could criticize his activities before other Russian leaders and the public,
taking into account internal political sensitivities.
Western governments could also begin contingency planning for political, economic, and
national security steps they might want or need to consider should Zhirinovskiy gain increasing
political strength in Russia.
The Author's Views and Recommendation
The author believes that Zhirinovskiy is fundamentally dangerous for democracy in Russia and
international peace. Zhirinovskiy's statements and activities show him to be a reckless demagogue,
willing to say almost anything to attract attention and gain political power. He has indicated that,
if he comes to power in the near future, he would rule dictatorially at least in the first few years.
He appears fundamentally prejudiced against many non-Russian or non-Slavic ethnic groups
inside Russia and on Russia's periphery, especially the southern periphery. Despite his
protestations, he appears to have anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim prejudices. He has shown a
special affinity for Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq and for right-wing elements in Germany and
elsewhere in Europe. He is antagonistic toward the United States and other Western states. He
advocates an aggressive Russian nationalism, extending Russia throughout the territory of the
former Soviet Union, and deploying Russian forces southward to the Indian Ocean and the
Mediterranean as part of a mission to save and revive Russia and its armed forces. He advocates
redrawing state borders in Europe and has threatened to attack or annihilate many other states.
While some may disregard this as bluster, should he accede to power, he could significantly
threaten international peace. While it should not be overdrawn, the rapid rise from obscurity, the
oratorical skills, the quest for power and dictatorial proclivities, the apparent ethnic and
nationalistic prejudices, the interest in redrawing borders, and the grand design of military
conquest of other states to save and revive the fatherland, all conjure up an image of Zhirinovskiy
as a Russian Hitler.
Responsible political leaders in Russia, in neighboring states, and in the West in general
should share an interest in helping to diminish the chances that Zhirinovskiy could gain greater
power and even accede to a leadership position in Russia. While this might be a shared strategic
objective, reasonable people can debate the best tactical approaches to take vis-a-vis Zhirinovskiy.
The author believes that Western and other countries should pursue, and encourage Russians
to pursue, an approach of "active criticism and containment" of Zhirinovskiy. Zhirinovskiy is too
dangerous to neglect, and remaining aloof or only ignoring him cedes him the field. Western
leaders, statesmen, and senior officials should not meet with him, and efforts toward constructive
engagement risk our giving him credibility and, in effect, helping him win power, only then to see
his dangerous, aggressive nature reemerge. While an "active criticism and containment" approach
might give Zhirinovskiy additional media attention, educated publics and leaders are the best
protectors of democracy and peace.
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