McNair Paper 60, April 1999, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives
7.
Conclusions
The
RMA has emerged as a key concept in the restructuring of U.S. military power
within the post-Cold War system. As
such, key allies of the United States need to come to terms with American
approaches and programs in shaping their own responses to the post-Cold War
security system.
For
Western Europeans, the end of the Cold War has carried with it a new phase in
the building of Europe. At the
same time, the Western European model of development is challenged by the
American economy and by broader globalization processes. The RMA is part of a much broader American challenge to
Europe; a European variant of the RMA will be a subset of a broader process of
economic, cultural, and organizational change in the decade ahead.
The
consensus within Western Europe upon the need to build more flexible, mobile,
power-projection forces has not been carried forward to date into a clear
force structure model. Indeed,
the RMA process and the American approach, or rather the military services'
various responses to the RMA, are key influences upon any European RMA model(s).
For
the French, the model of an autonomous European defense identity guiding a
future European force structure is undercut by the continuing influence and
power of the United States. Indeed,
as Europe responds to globalization, a purely European defense identity seems
further rather than closer to realization.
A
European RMA built around a European defense identity would be the classic
French response to the American challenge.
Rather than clearly rejecting this aspiration, the French may see a
more flexible approach emerge in practice-some
European defense consolidation, some transatlantic defense consolidation, new
approaches to NATO power projection, new operational approaches among key
member states of NATO toward power projection, and the blending of the new
professional French Army with allied approaches to operations and force
structure development.
A
mixed model of European consolidation and participation in American
innovations in the military sector will drive Europe toward a variant of the
RMA. A European RMA will
emphasize regional power projection in close proximity to EU territory-the
Baltic for the Germans, the Western Mediterranean for the French.
Innovations in specific technologies-notably
information, precision strike, and sensor technologies-can
be drawn upon in the process of innovation.
But
the need to put together a bargain between Europe and the United States in
approaches toward regional security will remain important to shaping the
future; here, Germany, like Britain, plays a key role.
The Germans wish to work within an interallied setting with the United
States. NATO remains pivotal for
Germany.
Nonetheless,
for Germany to focus more attention upon its military contributions to
European security, more consideration for German definitions and approaches
toward security interests will be necessary.
The dilemma for the French rests on Germans de-emphasizing Atlantic
leadership on security policy only to emphasize their own and not the French
definitions for European security policy.
The Baltic zone of security could become a priority area of interest for German defense around which forces could be redesigned to provide defensive protection of this core zone for NATO in the years ahead. An emphasis upon defensive weapons rather than deep- strike weapons could form a particular German approach toward this region.
The
growing shift of emphasis toward British rather than French industry to
cooperate in building modern weapons may presage a shift in German interests
toward a European approach led more by German and Anglo-Saxon interests than
French. German forces are
following closely their bilateral relations with key U.S. forces (notably the
Air Force and the Army) in seeking to define a German piece of the RMA puzzle.
As such, the European approach to the RMA might follow more a liberal
than a corporatist model of European security.
Timothy Garton Ash has argued that Europe should be concerned more with
the consolidation of Europe's
liberal order than a "vain
pursuit"
of unification. He noted that "a
degree of power projection, including the coordinated use of military power,
will be needed to realize the objectives of liberal order even within the
continent of Europe and in adjacent areas of vital interest to us, such as
North Africa and the Middle East."1
A European RMA (drawing as it will upon Europe's relationship
with the United States and the ability to redefine the scope and nature of
interallied operations) can make an important contribution to the
consolidation and projection of Europe's liberal
order.
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Note
1. Timothy Garton Ash, "The Threat to Europe," Foreign
Affairs 77, no. 2
(March-April 1998): 65.