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GUIDE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE

[This Guide describes suggested nonmandatory approaches for meeting requirements. Guides are not requirements documents and are not construed as requirements in any audit or appraisal for compliance with the parent Policy, Order, Notice, or Manual.]

The term "field element" used in this Guide includes operations offices, service centers, site offices and area offices.



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INITIATED BY:
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FOREWORD

This Guide is approved for use by the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Security. It is intended and available for use by all DOE elements, including National Nuclear Security Administration components, and DOE contractors that employ protective forces.

Suggestions for improving this Guide are welcome and should be sent to—

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

In light of the events of September 11, 2001, it is even more vital than before to ensure national security interests and departmental personnel are well protected. Emergency situations stemming from natural or man-made disasters, including terrorist activities, may require the establishment and deployment of a contingency protective force (CPF) and the sustained conduct of operations. This Guide has been developed to support the continued safe and secure operation of Department of Energy (DOE) sites and facilities, including National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sites and facilities, and the protection of Departmental employees, including NNSA employees, contractor employees, and the public under such adverse conditions.

1.2 SCOPE

This Guide outlines the responsibilities, planning considerations, training, management oversight, and other activities related to establishment of a CPF. Appendixes A and B contain applicable references and definitions of terms, and Appendix C contains CPF lessons learned. Appendixes D through M contain various sample forms, letters, and schedules to help administrative staff plan for a CPF. While the Department is neutral in labor disputes between its security contractors and their work forces, a protective force (PF) work stoppage would raise serious issues for the security of facilities and assets. Therefore, this is one of the potential events that should be taken into account when planning for the security of facilities and assets under adverse conditions (see below).

1.3 GENERAL

The following emergency situations could require the establishment and deployment of a CPF.

- Demonstrations or Civil Disturbance. These situations are normally announced, and consequently, the PF could be augmented by local law enforcement agency (LLEA) and PF personnel from other sites, as required.
- Natural or Man-Made Disasters. The primary concerns in these situations are environmental, safety, and health issues and the protection of classified information and special nuclear material (SNM). Because these situations offer little or no warning, so augmentation would consist of recalling off-duty PF personnel, relying on supervisors, and extending work hours.
- PF Work Stoppages or Strikes. Site security during a work stoppage can be provided by PF supervisors, managers, and qualified administrative personnel augmented by qualified non-bargaining-unit personnel from other DOE PF contractors and sites.

- Short-Term Vulnerability Operations. To mitigate a pronounced safeguards or security vulnerability, additional PF personnel would usually be deployed until the vulnerability was corrected. Because the short-term nature of such events does not justify permanent physical security upgrades, additional PF personnel would be used on an extended hourly basis.

2. PLANNING

2.1 GENERAL

The successful deployment of a CPF is ultimately based on detailed and careful planning. Therefore, the planning phase for contingency operations is considered the most critical part.

2.2 INITIAL PLANNING

Ideally, planning for emergency nonroutine situations or potential work stoppages involving the site PF should be ongoing. A 1-year planning window is considered the minimum required to adequately plan for, train, and assemble a CPF to assume complete site security operations. The initial planning objective is to clearly define responsibilities and timelines for planning activities so the most cost- and process-efficient development, coordination, preparation, and implementation can occur within the time available. Suggested action items include agreement upon a basic charter, development of an action plan, establishment of a contingency operations center (COC), breakdown of work requirements, and scheduling of milestones.

All potential agencies, organizations, departments, and individuals, regardless of eventual participation or level of support, should be involved in the initial planning. It should be assumed that either work stoppages or demonstrations will occur to ensure adequate and realistic planning and preparation.

Ideally, CPF planning should be focused and continuous. Regardless of work stoppages, PF contract negotiations, or the actual threat or likelihood of a civil disturbance, nothing should interrupt or stop the planning process.

2.3 ACTION PLAN

Successful planning requires recognition of the need for an action plan and agreement by management to develop one. The action plan should include a commitment to prepare task lists and draft a CPF operations plan. CPF planning/implementation can be broken down into four distinct phases, with numerous activities taking place simultaneously:

- planning,
- activation,
- operations, and
- closeout.

2.4 CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

A site-specific CPF operations plan should be developed to ensure tasks are assigned and responsibilities clearly defined. The plan should include a prioritization of security requirements to ensure no degradation of safeguards and security protection. The number of posts should be

reduced to the minimum necessary, thereby reducing staffing requirements as much as possible. An initial draft of the operations plan, outlining proposed staffing, should be prepared immediately for field element comment. The plan will undergo numerous revisions and changes as situations develop and additional facts and information become available. Working drafts will provide a vehicle for coordination and planning by all interested parties. (See Appendix D, "Sample Contingency Protective Force Operations Plan.")

2.5 TASK LIST

A list of all necessary CPF tasks, activities, and actions should be developed. For each task, the list should detail the functional area, responsible individual/agency, and estimated completion date. The task list should be updated as appropriate and disseminated to all affected organizations. (See Appendix E, "Sample Task List.")

2.6 SELF-ASSESSMENTS

Administration of a self-assessment by PF management before deployment of the CPF can be a valuable tool for determining whether all required tasks have been completed and helps ensure the changeover in security forces is as smooth as possible. During actual contingency operations, an abbreviated self-assessment should be conducted to review all aspects of the ongoing operation. Likewise, a self-assessment should be conducted after return to normal operations; this will greatly aid in assessing effectiveness of planning and provide a format for an after action/lessons-learned report.

2.7 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The following, while not all-inclusive, should be considered during contingency planning.

a. Operations.

- (1) Will site operations be conducted at preemergency work levels?
- (2) Which site operations, duties, and tasks will continue unaffected and which will be curtailed or temporarily discontinued? How will they be staffed?
- (3) What will be the probable size of the site workforce on the first day of the work stoppage or emergency situation?
- (4) What will be the chain of command for contingency operations?
- (5) Who will be the site and PF management points of contact (POCs)? For DOE Headquarters (HQ)? For the news media?
- (6) For planning purposes, what will be the estimated length of the emergency situation or work stoppage?
- (7) If the emergency situation is a work stoppage, what will be the response of other bargaining units and individual members?

b. Law Enforcement.

- (1) Which organization or agency has LLEA liaison authority for coordination and requests for assistance?
- (2) Who is specifically designated/authorized to execute formal arrest and criminal complaints with the responding LLEA?
- (3) Will formal criminal complaints be followed up in cases where arrests are made?
- (4) Will there be documentary coverage of the work stoppage or civil disturbance, including still photography and video with sound?
- (5) What is the site law enforcement jurisdiction and what level of support will LLEAs provide based on that jurisdictional status?

c. Access Control.

- (1) If the emergency situation is a work stoppage, will individual members of the bargaining unit who want to report to work be permitted to do so?
- (2) During a work stoppage, how will site access be handled? Will at least one access control point be reserved for neutral personnel?

d. Logistics and Administration.

- (1) Will an offsite transshipment off-load point be established in the event truck drivers will not cross picket or demonstration lines? If so, when and how will it be staffed?
- (2) Will non-SNM shipments be sent and received?
- (3) Will special equipment such as street sweepers, portable lighting, and tow trucks be available?
- (4) At what level (and from which office, department, or division) will the COC be supported and staffed?
- (5) What are the potential impacts of work stoppages/nonroutine operations on the Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP)/Personnel Assurance Program (PAP) and on the security clearances of PF personnel?
- (6) When will offsite vendors, subcontractors, and suppliers be notified of the pending work stoppage or nonroutine operation?

2.8 POLICY DECISIONS

Policy decisions may result from issues raised during initial planning; therefore, policy issues such as those listed below should be identified and their resolution coordinated among HQ,

NNSA, program offices, field elements, the site facility management contractor (FMC), and the PF contractor.

- a. Will consolidation and/or lockdown of SNM, classified matter, and DOE special security interests be implemented to assist in the reduction of security posts, response elements, and patrols? Would consolidation and lockdown also reduce the risk of multiple response scenarios and ease the burden on the entire CPF?
- b. Will normal plant operations be maintained versus reducing or curtailing some operations?
- c. What will be the FMC's approach in responding to work-stoppage-related complaints, issues, and allegations made by the bargaining unit?
- d. Will selected critical operational supplies and spare parts be stockpiled by the FMC in the event of a protracted work stoppage or disruption of delivery?
- e. If a work stoppage occurs, what will be the PF management strategy to de-escalate and/or avoid confrontations with bargaining unit management and picketers?
- f. Will official requests be submitted to LLEAs for strict enforcement of laws such as trespassing and endangerment?
- g. What is the defined role of Federal law enforcement agencies, and what will be the timetable for their assistance, if necessary?
- h. What is the anticipated need for LLEA physical presence and support at site access control points to prevent disruptions and violence?
- i. Who will be the official site POC for the control and release of all information concerning the emergency situation or work stoppage?
- j. Who will determine the type of coordination, cooperation, and relationship to be established with the news media?
- k. Has the number and management of site access points been reviewed to ensure the proper locations and operations and that the fewest gates and entrances are in use? Will each access point require law enforcement protection that would create an unnecessary staffing burden on the LLEA?

2.9 SITE OPERATIONS REVIEW

- a. Planning decisions concerning consolidation or lockdown of SNM targets should be prioritized. Changes in location and security of SNM may impact the perceived attractiveness of the target and thus reduce the risk. This, in turn, will affect the number and disposition of CPF personnel.
- b. SNM targets should be assessed, if possible, with the goal of eliminating or reducing the threat of theft or sabotage. Consolidation of SNM targets will decrease CPF strength and alarm response requirements.

- c. A work stoppage impact assessment study should be conducted by the FMC and plant operations to determine activities that are required for operation versus those that can be postponed.
- d. PF requirements may be evaluated by comparing normal staffing and operations versus what is feasible with a CPF. Reductions can be effected by changing administrative requirements [e.g., the convenience of expedited entry-exit to the plant site or Protected Area (PA)]. Short delays at portals and entry control points may be acceptable at peak times during picketing or demonstrations as a tradeoff for reducing commitments and staffing. In some cases where posts cannot be closed, staff reductions may be possible.
- e. Consideration should be given to consolidating CPF assets within the PA and Material Access Area (MAA) and to changing the requirements for armed and unarmed posts in other locations.
 - (1) Evaluation of the site safeguards and security plan (SSSP) and vulnerability assessment (VA) reports will assist in determining possible post reductions and changes.
 - (a) Each post and patrol should be analyzed and prioritized for level of staffing and necessity.
 - (b) The number and location of supervisory personnel also should be reviewed based on changes in posts/patrols and the use of CPF personnel not as familiar with site operations and procedures as the site PF.
 - (c) Any emergency situation where staffing levels are reduced provides an opportunity to assess and possibly reduce certain posts and requirements after the emergency ends.
 - (2) Whatever the emergency situation, any degradation to the protective envelope provided for SNM is unacceptable. (See Appendix F, "Sample Post/Shift Assignment Matrix.")

2.10 CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE SCHEDULING

- a. Shift hours should not exceed 12 working hours in a 24-hour period or 60 hours in a 7-day work period. Safety and health considerations of the CPF individuals and continued high levels of security are paramount.
- b. A rotation policy concerning the relief of augmentees should be established and published before their arrival. A 30-day rotation policy with the option to volunteer for an additional mutually agreed upon period of time is a viable option. Consideration for replacement arrival, training, and cost should also be factored into the rotation policy time frame. A possible alternative to the augmentee rotating back to the home site after a set length of time could be a paid spousal visit in return for which the augmentee would agree to a voluntary extension of the assignment.

- c. An established, written, and equitable overtime policy for the CPF is required to ensure fair treatment regarding granting overtime and the potential to earn additional income. Augmentees need to understand whether home site or work site overtime policies will be used.

2.11 REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE

PF subject matter experts should be available to provide assistance during all phases of PF contingency operations.

- a. DOE HQ.

- (1) Office of Security provides support on the following:
 - (a) PF policies in the areas of qualifications, training, tactics, and employment and policy concerning special response teams (SRTs);
 - (b) requirements for PF equipment, communications, weapons, and uniforms;
 - (c) qualifications for PF employment;
 - (d) operations security and counter intelligence issues and procedures; and
 - (e) PF operations policy, SSSPs, and VA reports.
- (2) DOE/NNSA program offices are responsible for the following:
 - (a) representing program office interests,
 - (b) providing program and project direction and planning,
 - (c) providing funding assistance, and
 - (d) approving SSSPs.
- (3) Office of the General Counsel assists in planning, as necessary.

- b. DOE/NNSA field elements provide the following:

- (1) oversight of DOE policy implementation,
- (2) safeguards and security guidance, and
- (3) funding review.

- c. Nonproliferation and National Security Institute (NNSI)/Central Training Academy (CTA) can provide the following:

- (1) training instructors,
- (2) training evaluators,
- (3) training records and qualification reviews, and
- (4) assistance in developing CPF training plan schedules.

- d. Office of Secure Transportation (OST) may assist with augmentee and replacement personnel transportation issues and other transportation security issues.
- e. Site FMCs provide general site support and logistics and maintenance assistance.

2.12 SPECIAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

- a. Availability of road-cleaning equipment to sweep up nails and other objects that could damage tires.
- b. Use of temporary PF posts inside the perimeter of the site and away from picket or demonstration line locations.
- c. Emergency or portable lighting for temporary gate or access point operations.
- d. Portable toilets to ensure temporary gate and access control points have adequate sanitation facilities.
- e. Tow trucks and fuel to remove, refill, or jump-start disabled PF vehicles.
- f. Establishment of temporary onsite detention/arrest centers to deal with trespassers, vandals, or perpetrators of acts of violence.
- g. Establishment of formal record keeping and segregation of files pertaining to the CPF and operations associated with the emergency.
- h. Procurement and issuance of cellular telephones to CPF managers and supervisory personnel.
- i. Approved onsite and LLEA parking locations for the safe parking of bargaining unit or demonstrator privately owned vehicles.

3. COORDINATION

3.1 GENERAL

Coordination and control of the numerous onsite and offsite offices, agencies, and organizations involves continuous communication, meetings, and teamwork.

3.2 COMMUNICATION

A number of methods are available to help ensure organizations and individuals are kept informed and updated. Official press releases, site internal public address systems, telephone voice mail broadcasts, electronic mail, fax machine distribution systems, personal pager broadcasts, and employee bulletin boards are all available and should be used as appropriate. Official company and DOE letterheads should be used to preclude unauthorized and counterfeit correspondence.

- a. DOE/NNSA field elements should be designated as the POCs for responding to HQ (DOE, NNSA, or program office) inquiries. Within each field element, one individual or position should be appointed to release media information, work stoppage negotiation information, damage information in the event of a disaster, and any other written correspondence related to the CPF operation. Field element public affairs offices (PAOs) should develop review and approval processes for releasing information.
- b. Daily written status reports faxed to HQ will alleviate communications and coordination concerns between the field element and the various interested offices at HQ. Reports should be limited to one page and contain short, concise paragraphs summarizing the issues or facts as they occur. In certain situations, the use of telephonic communications may be necessary to report critical or time-sensitive information.
- c. At the site, daily telephonic updates to upper and lower management will keep superiors and subordinates informed and help dispel rumors.
- d. Keeping the CPF current on all aspects of the situation will alleviate rumors as well as uncertainty (see also paragraph 8.2, "Rumor Control"). Briefings to the CPF should include a comprehensive initial briefing as part of the site-specific training program and a daily briefing at the shift rotation. (See Appendix G, "Sample Work Stoppage Questions and Answers Information Sheet.")
- e. Briefings to subordinate organizations and subcontractors also should be included in all communication or information distribution plans.

3.3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Within DOE, the following key organizations should be kept up-to-date on the status of the planning and operation of the CPF to enable them to provide support as indicated. (See Appendix H, "Sample Briefing Topics.")

- a. NNSA/program offices—Departmental oversight and site support.
- b. Office of Security—policy and assistance.
- c. NNSI/CTA—training support.
- d. OST—augmentee support.
- e. Field elements—operation updates and status of augmentee work performance.
- f. Office of the General Counsel—labor relations; jurisdictional and arrest and detention authority issues.
- g. Finance and Accounting—augmentee salary, overtime, lodging, and transportation costs.
- h. Office of Worker and Community Transition—guidance and assistance in labor relations.

3.4 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FIELD ELEMENTS

At each field element, the following key divisions or departments should be kept up-to-date on the status of the planning and operation of the CPF so they can provide support and assistance.

- a. Office of the Manager.
- b. Public Affairs.
- c. Chief Counsel.
- d. Individual site facility or operations managers.
- e. Emergency preparedness staff (emergency operations center).
- f. NNSA/program offices.
- g. Office of Security.

3.5 SITE FACILITY MANAGEMENT CONTRACTOR

The site FMC has certain support operations and activities that should be coordinated on a continuous basis, including the following:

- a. safeguards and security and public affairs support to the site;
- b. personnel support to the COC, and;
- c. logistical support to the CPF.

3.6 PROTECTIVE FORCE CONTRACTOR

Each PF contractor should assign key departments to develop the CPF operations plan task list, participate in the self-assessment, and support ongoing CPF operations. While PF contractor organizations may not be organized exactly as described below, the functions/activities described should be handled somewhere in their organizational structures.

- a. The PF manager acts as the single POC for information concerning the CPF.
- b. The PAO prepares and controls all press releases and inquiries and acts as official spokesperson for the PF manager.
 - (1) Any contingency type event at a DOE facility will draw interest and concern for the health and safety of the public; therefore, the initial press release concerning a work stoppage or ongoing demonstration should be prepared, approved, and ready for dissemination immediately upon commencement of the activity.
 - (2) PF contractors should consider additional staffing for the PAO until the emergency situation is no longer considered newsworthy.
- c. The appropriate legal advisors consult with DOE on preparing restraining orders, as necessary; assisting in damage claims; and providing legal advice as required.
- d. The Finance and Accounting Department arranges transportation (air and ground), lodging, pay, per diem, overtime rates, and budgeting and accounting for CPF operations.
- e. The Personnel Security Section ensures security clearances for all CPF staff members are current and valid and verifies the enrollment status of each CPF member in the PSAP/PAP as required. The Personnel Security Section is also responsible for conducting security inbriefings and debriefings of CPF personnel. In some circumstances, the section is also responsible for developing and implementing the operations security plan.
- f. The Logistics and Equipment Department ensures sufficient quantities of seasonal uniforms, weapons, PF equipment, and communication equipment are available for the CPF. The Logistics and Equipment Department plays a key role in the changeover of PF personnel and the CPF at the beginning and end of the work stoppage or contingency operation.
- g. The Environmental Safety and Health Department reviews all plans, training, and COC activities for health and safety issues. Additionally, the department monitors CPF activities, posts, and patrols to ensure compliance with environmental safety and health procedures and requirements.
- h. The Operations Section implements the contingency plan, operates the COC, controls and manages the CPF, and provides input to the self-assessment and after-action report.
- i. The Planning Section maintains and eventually archives all formal records and documentation pertaining to the CPF operation. The Planning Section, supported by the other departments as necessary, develops the contingency plan, completes the self-assessment and after-action report, and establishes the COC.

- j. The Training Department develops and implements all training plans, lesson plans, training schedules, individual and unit training, limited-scope performance tests (LSPTs), and testing. The Training Department requests, compiles, and maintains all CPF training records and evaluates the qualifications and certifications of all CPF members to ascertain security police officer (SPO) status and additional training requirements.
- k. The Command, Control, and Communications Section supports COC activities and daily operations of the CPF and provides staffing support as necessary.

3.7 CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

When activated, the COC becomes the focal point for CPF operations management; it does not augment or replace the site emergency operations center. The COC manages all CPF information and data, shift scheduling, and rotation of the CPF. The main functions of the COC are to control all planning and scheduling for the CPF and routine communications relative to the work stoppage or emergency, to maintain liaison through communications with LLEAs and the site, and to provide some of the administrative functions normally handled by PF shift commanders. If activated in advance of a work stoppage or other security emergency, the COC can also serve as the single POC by receiving and disseminating information concerning augmentee requirements and act as the hub of pre-work-stoppage activities. Coordination among all support activities and individuals is vital to the success of the COC and the CPF operation.

3.8 TEAMWORK CONCEPT

The extensive support and coordination between and among different organizations on and off the site will be heavily dependent upon teamwork. The safety of all personnel and the security of SNM will be paramount. Cooperation and teamwork among all DOE, contractor, subcontractor, and LLEA personnel are critical to success.

3.9 MEETINGS

Each organization should strive to conduct coordination and staff meetings in accordance with specific needs and requirements. Normally, DOE will conduct morning staff meetings and evening management updates. The COC can operate through twice-daily shift briefings and meetings between PF management and the CPF.

4. LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCIES

4.1 GENERAL

A single Federal POC should be established and maintained for communication and coordination between the site and each LLEA. Coordination, support, and requests for assistance should be firmly controlled to ensure credibility and continuity of effort with all LLEAs.

Typically, law enforcement agencies do not seek to make arrests in civil disturbance or work stoppage situations; however, when used with restraint and sound police judgment, arrests are a key to preventing strike violence and returning order to civil disturbance situations.

Planning with LLEAs for the detention, arrest, and processing of protesters and/or environmental activists during civil disturbance situations should include memorandums of understanding to define responsibilities. Detainee holding areas, processing points, and transportation requirements should be coordinated well in advance. In situations involving natural or man-made disasters, the operation of a joint command center to effect coordination should be included in any planning.

4.2 LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY OFFICES

In some instances, coordination and support will take place between the local jurisdictional office of an LLEA (e.g., highway patrol) and the State or Federal headquarters of the same agency. Regardless of the size or type of jurisdiction, any LLEA involved in any aspect of legal jurisdiction over possible CPF operations should be fully aware of the current situation and actions and possible requests for assistance. The following are examples of LLEAs with which the site and/or CPF might interact.

- a. Local police.
- b. Sheriff.
- c. Local offices of State law enforcement organizations.
- d. Local court system.

4.3 STATE AGENCIES

State law enforcement agencies have the ability to draw upon additional assets and resources to respond to requests for assistance and to support CPF operations. State agencies include the following.

- a. Office of the Governor.
- b. State National Guard.
- c. State police headquarters.

- d. State highway patrol headquarters.
- e. State court system.

4.4 FEDERAL AGENCIES

Depending on the type of occurrence, Federal agencies such as the following may be needed to support CPF operations.

- a. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- b. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- c. U.S. Marshal (Department of Justice).
- d. U.S. Attorney's Office.
- e. U.S. Magistrate.

4.5 COORDINATION MEETINGS

Well planned and coordinated meetings are critical to ensuring effective use of time and resources. The POC should inform LLEAs immediately when a work stoppage settlement has been reached, including when it is to be effective, and when an emergency situation has been declared over. This allows for reassignment of LLEA assets assigned to site support and entry control point monitoring.

4.6 SITE ACCESS MONITORING

Access points are critical locations at the site during work stoppages, demonstrations, or civil disturbances. Not only are picket line confrontations and acts of violence possible at access points, but the safety of employees and visitors may also be threatened. It is quite important to refrain from documenting legal activities, but illegal activities should be documented as fully as possible. The documentation may be required as proof of criminal charges and/or as evidence in other legal proceedings.

- a. If possible, video and still photography should be available for use at access control points during peak hours to record disturbances as appropriate. However, PF and field element legal counsel should be consulted before video or photographic surveillance is initiated because documentary surveillance of workers engaged in legal and legitimate collective bargaining activities, such as legal picketing during a work stoppage, can itself amount to an unfair labor practice in that it interferes with or inhibits the workers in the exercise of their rights.
- b. In the absence of photographic surveillance, gate observers can be used to produce a written, chronological listing of date, time, and event information. A special log

specifically designed for recording access control point and picket line activities should be developed and implemented.

- c. The most beneficial access control point monitoring involves the use of LLEA patrols at the site entrances. LLEA patrols can monitor traffic flow and act as a deterrent to confrontations and incidents. The patrols should maintain a neutral position and interact only on an official basis. Additionally, LLEA patrols should be in position to closely observe all activities at gates and to respond appropriately to unsafe and unlawful acts. Specifically, patrols should be alert to the following violations of laws while still allowing picketers their legal right to picket.
- (1) Impedance of traffic by the picketers or other persons associated with the picket line.
 - (2) Destruction of private or public property.
 - (3) Assault, including ethnic and sexual intimidation.
 - (4) Child endangerment.

5. AUGMENTEE SELECTION AND REQUIREMENT STANDARDS

5.1 GENERAL

A site anticipating a nonroutine situation or emergency that might require augmentees should, if possible, send a formal request for augmentees (non-bargaining-unit members if the anticipated situation is a work stoppage) to other DOE sites 6 to 9 months before the anticipated date for the situation. Early notification allows the host site to identify potential problems associated with qualification, certification, and required generic training of augmentees. It further allows the host site to ensure all training records, security clearance information, and PSAP/PAP documentation are complete and correct. (See Appendix I, "Sample Letters.")

5.2 REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE

The following information should be provided to those sites potentially providing augmentees to aid the planning process.

- a. Projected emergency start date.
- b. Projected duration of the emergency.
- c. Site-specific training requirements.
- d. Defensive and offensive position requirements.
- e. List of intermediate force weapons used at the host site.
- f. Site weapons restrictions.
- g. Approved procedures for weapon manipulation and first-round carry.
- h. Use of force requirements.
- i. Additional PF equipment requirements.

5.3 REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS

Employees eligible for consideration as augmentees should have the following qualifications/certifications.

- a. Primary and secondary weapons qualifications.
- b. Medical and physical fitness qualification.
- c. Security clearance.
- d. PSAP/PAP status.

- e. Valid driver's license.
- f. Intermediate force weapon training.

5.4 AUGMENTEE IDENTIFICATION

The total number of fully qualified augmentees should be identified to the host site at least 45 days before their departure from their home sites. Within 2 weeks, a "by-name list" should be provided to the host site. The following is the minimum information that should be provided for each augmentee.

- a. Name.
- b. Social security number.
- c. Weapons qualifications.
- d. Current medical/physical fitness test.
- e. Security clearance.
- f. PSAP/PAP status.
- g. Training status.

5.5 HOME SITE SUPPORT

Each home or support site is required to provide the following items to the augmentee.

- a. Appropriate and sufficient quantities of uniforms, if required.
- b. Leather gear or load-bearing equipment.
- c. Intermediate force weapon.
- d. Duty weapon.
- e. Basic load of ammunition.
- f. DOE weapons card.
- g. Respirator equipment to include special inserts if required (if not available at the home site, requirements should be identified to the host site).
- h. Protective vest.
- i. Prescription safety glasses, if necessary.
- j. Two pairs of prescription glasses, per DOE requirements.

5.6 REPORTING DATE COORDINATION

Reporting requirements for augmentees should be clearly delineated, and alternate augmentees should be identified along with the primary augmentees. Because of potential unanticipated delays, the host site should allow a 12-hour reporting window for augmentees. Transportation and shipping delays of weapons and equipment should also be anticipated.

5.7 LOGISTICS

Reservations for rooms, cars, and airplane tickets should be made well in advance and coordinated with all parties. (Block reservations with options for cancellation should be applied when possible.) In planning for augmentee staff, the following things should be considered.

a. Funding/Compensation Issues.

- (1) Finance and administration can be consolidated at the host site or work hours and overtime can be sent to the augmentee's home site for inclusion in individual finance records and eventual payment.
- (2) Salary issues can become a primary concern to augmentees and should be aggressively solved as they arise. Shift schedules, rotation policy, and overtime criteria provisions for the CPF should be sent to all sites and to individual augmentees to ensure a complete understanding of pay options and potential problem areas.
- (3) Per diem tables should be coordinated with home sites and augmentees to ensure an understanding of the current authorization rate.
- (4) Overtime criteria and rates often vary for each site and PF. An explanation of when overtime starts and the equitable distribution of overtime should be established and disseminated to all home site finance departments and augmentees.

b. Lodging/Transportation Issues.

- (1) All augmentees should be lodged at the same site unless this is impractical. At the least, lodging sites in the same general location should be used and augmentees from the same home site should be lodged together and scheduled on the same shift.
- (2) Transportation to and from the work site should be coordinated to ensure all CPF members are accommodated and adequate transportation is provided if more than one lodging site is used.
- (3) Rental cars should be allocated on a basis of no fewer than three persons per vehicle. Full-size, four-door vehicles or vans should be reserved to ensure all gear

can be adequately transported. If available, government vehicles should be used to lower costs.

- c. Rotation. A policy on rotation to home sites should be communicated to all augmentees ahead of time. If practical, some augmentees may be permitted to remain for an additional rotation if a spousal visit can be arranged; the transportation and training costs would be less than if a replacement had to be sent and trained.
- d. Communications. Telephone and/or e-mail capabilities should be considered so that augmentees can communicate regularly with their families.

5.8 AUGMENTEE WELCOME PACKAGE

The host site should prepare and send “welcome packages” to help augmentees assimilate into the CPF and encourage esprit de corps. To ensure all pertinent information has been disseminated and received by augmentees, the packages should be sent to prospective staff before they leave their home sites. Welcome packages may include but are not limited to the following.

- a. A letter of acknowledgment from the manager of the PF and/or DOE site manager containing—
 - standards of conduct and professionalism;
 - work requirements, including rotation, shift length, overtime, and pay;
 - coordination concerning lodging and transportation;
 - final reporting date, time, and location information; and
 - suggested methods of shipping weapons and intermediate force chemicals.
- b. Site information, history, and general knowledge.
- c. Local community information.
- d. Site and local area maps.
- e. Places of local interest, recreation, and leisure.

5.9 AUGMENTEE IN-PROCESSING

- a. Augmentees should report within a specified time frame (12 hours is suggested) and be greeted by host personnel assigned, trained, and available to quickly and efficiently complete all in-processing procedures and support. Advance information concerning incoming flights could aid in airport pickups and alleviate transportation and orientation problems. (See Appendix J, “Sample Checklists.”)

- b. The armory should be set up to receive, document, and store augmentee weapons immediately. Firearms storage, documentation, and sign-out procedures should be disseminated to all augmentees.
- c. All equipment, uniforms, and weapons should be inspected and inventoried to ensure adequacy and acceptability by CPF management. The issuance, documentation, and control of host site equipment should be scheduled immediately to ensure proper fit, wear, and operability.
- d. A written disciplinary policy should be established and explained to all individuals who make up the CPF. Misconduct and negligence will not be tolerated during contingency operations. Violators will be sent back to home sites.

5.10 BADGING

- a. If the home site has issued the standard DOE badge, it may be used by augmentees. If not, host site badges should be issued.
- b. A contingency picture identification badge should be developed and issued to members of the CPF. This badge will be used in addition to normal security badges to designate those personnel with approved access to the site.
- c. Augmentee badging should be arranged to preclude overloading the badge operation.

6. CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE TRAINING

6.1 GENERAL TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

The training of auxiliary force and augmentee members who will eventually make up the CPF and assume site security responsibilities is of paramount importance. Training requirements for the auxiliary force and augmentee members will vary according to previous levels of training, the amount of refresher training needed, and the degree of site familiarization required. Requests for training support and assistance should be considered early in the planning phase and training plan development.

6.2 TRAINING PLAN

A comprehensive training plan and training schedule are critical to the effective constitution of a CPF. The rotation policy of augmentees and the rotation schedule are also tied to a comprehensive training plan to ensure replacement of fully trained CPF members.

6.3 AUXILIARY FORCE TRAINING

Former SPOs who are in nonunion supervisory, administrative, staff, and management positions, and who remain site-qualified or are capable of being requalified, may be used to make up the auxiliary force component of the CPF. A training and qualifications records check should be performed as soon as possible to determine suitability and acceptability of potential CPF members. Refresher training should be initiated in sufficient time to not only ensure training completion and pertinent qualifications, but to rule out personnel who are no longer suited for CPF duties. Firearms will not be issued unless all approved DOE training, medical, and fitness standards are met. The number of auxiliary staff members available dictates the number of augmentees required. [See Appendix K, "Sample Refresher Training Requirements and Verification for Auxiliary (Site) Force Personnel."]

6.4 AUGMENTATION FORCE TRAINING

Only fully qualified and certified SPO nominees should be accepted. Training records, PSAP/PAP status, and security clearance information should be requested from the home sites in sufficient time for full review of all potential candidates and to allow for rejection and new requests for support, as necessary. (See Appendix L, "Sample Training Schedule for Augmentation Force Personnel.")

6.5 SITE-SPECIFIC TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

- a. Determine the amount of training needed for a variety of site-specific posts and patrols such as the following.
 - Unarmed posts (security officers).
 - Armed posts/patrols (SPO I and SPO II).
 - SRTs (SPO III).

- b. Train CPF members to perform duties at a single post or patrol initially. Cross train on additional posts or patrols as time permits.
 - (1) Cross training CPF members on multiple posts and patrols increases the flexibility of assigning personnel and creates additional opportunity for overtime and adjusting work hours.
 - (2) Cross training should be addressed in the training and rotation plans.
- c. Look for opportunities to optimize training and foster teamwork such as pairing up auxiliary force members and augmentees for training. Whenever possible, pair-up training should be used to take advantage of auxiliary force experience and familiarity with the site.
- d. Include a map orientation, terrain walk, “windshield tour,” and actual physical orientation to the post or patrol area where the CPF member is to work.
- e. Train CPF members to the required level in radiological contamination, alarm annunciation, monitoring, assessment training, and emergency procedures.
- f. Coordinate environmental safety and health training with other departments well in advance to ensure adequate instructors, equipment, and classroom space.
- g. Ensure site-specific requirements for the loading configuration of all firearms are thoroughly understood by all CPF members.
- h. Brief CPF members on the operations security plan to ensure they understand the operational and sensitive information that should be protected.

6.6 CENTRAL TRAINING ACADEMY SUPPORT

The CTA, upon request, can provide valuable training assistance and support. Requests and coordination should be accomplished ahead of time because of the nature of training requirements and commitments of the CTA.

6.7 RETRAINING AND REMEDIATION POLICY

A written policy concerning the retraining of auxiliary force members of the CPF should be established to ensure only qualified and trainable individuals are selected. Time and cost should be factored into selection decisions. Examination and LSPT failures also should be addressed and policy guidance disseminated to all CPF members to ensure they understand the consequences of failure. If a one-time failure is acceptable, then such a policy should be adhered to and enforced. Accurate and full documentation should be completed and annotated on individual training records. Augmentees who fail to meet acceptable testing standards should be sent back to home sites immediately.

6.8 FOLLOW-ON TRAINING

CPF training should be a continuous process until the force is relieved of duty and contingency operations have ended. Additional follow-on training includes the following:

- a. supervisory personnel conducting individual training on all posts during all shifts;
- b. field training officers, if available, conducting daily evaluations and retraining at posts and during patrol breaks, as necessary and practical;
- c. CTA instructors conducting post and patrol evaluations and retraining, as necessary;
- d. maintaining standard operating procedures and general and post orders on each post and patrol for reference, review, and self-training; and
- e. qualified personnel conducting job knowledge and performance evaluations.

6.9 CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE VALIDATION TEST PLAN

The CPF should be validated to ensure it is capable of performing and sustaining contingency operations. The same standards, timelines, and requirements outlined in the SSSP VA report for the site PF should be strictly adhered to by the CPF. Any test result deviation in which SNM or other DOE security interests are put at risk is unacceptable and should be corrected before the CPF assumes contingency operations.

Ideally, a force-on-force (FOF) exercise to validate training and assess the CPF should be conducted. An FOF exercise would provide a vehicle to collect data for analysis, provide timeline testing, and allow vulnerability comparison and analysis with VA results in the SSSP. However, such an exercise places a significant demand on current staffing and costs and could impact site safety or jeopardize labor relations and ongoing negotiations with the bargaining unit. The potential for confrontations between the CPF, site PF, and aggressors also exists and presents control problems. Time to conduct such a detailed exercise may not be available either.

In lieu of conducting an FOF exercise, LSPTs of individual CPF members, patrols, and units can be initiated. LSPTs, together with establishing specific response timelines and post/patrol inspections, can provide sufficient data to validate the CPF's ability to perform contingency operations.

6.10 REPLACEMENT TRAINING

Plans and training schedules should be developed and in place to conduct replacement training, depending upon the anticipated work stoppage and length of tour for the augmentees.

6.11 TRAINING RECORDS

Training records of site auxiliary force personnel and augmentees should be consolidated as soon as possible. Augmentee records should be requested in sufficient time for evaluation of

certification and qualification requirements. Special records jackets can be prepared on each individual assigned to the CPF during the contingency period. The records can be broken down into two sections: (1) records documenting training received by the augmentee at the home site, including current physical, medical, and firearms qualifications, in accordance with pertinent DOE policy and (2) records of all training, examinations, LSPTs, retesting qualifications, and certifications conducted after arrival at the site. Augmentees should be queried as to work experience and knowledge to take advantage of previous training and experience. (See Appendix M, "Sample Work Experience Form.")

7. CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE DEPLOYMENT

7.1 GENERAL

The COC provides a single POC and clearinghouse for the dissemination of information and a focal point for offsite support.

7.2 CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER OPERATIONS

- a. Preemergency activation of the COC should be considered as soon as possible. The COC should be operated for 12-hour periods during workdays before augmentees arrive and go to 24-hour continuous operation as soon as augmentees start arriving onsite.
- b. The ability to communicate is vital to the effectiveness of any law enforcement agency or PF. The COC serves as the communication base for the CPF.
 - (1) Because of varied backgrounds, CPF members should be trained in standard communication procedures and common codes.
 - (2) Contingency operations should require the encryption of radio communications by certain elements.
- c. The COC should monitor contingency force response to central alarm station (CAS) and secondary alarm station (SAS) intrusion detection system alarms.
- d. The COC should maintain an accurate chronological log of events and activities from activation to closeout of operations.
- e. The COC should test the work continuation notification plan and alert roster.
- f. Staffing the COC and the CPF should begin with site auxiliary force personnel filling the most critical PF assignments. These include COC staffing and shift supervisor positions, CAS/SAS operations, alarm stations within the PA, and SRT positions. Augmentees should be assigned to posts commensurate with their ranks and training and the needs of the site. The training concept of pairing auxiliary force personnel and augmentees also should carry over to post staffing, when possible. Post/patrol pairing will further enhance training and response.
- g. The COC should have complete and current listings of the onsite and offsite POCs.
- h. Access to the COC should be strictly controlled to protect sensitive contingency operations and ensure only CPF personnel with valid requirements and a need to know are allowed admittance. Special badging or the use of access rosters is recommended to help restrict access into the COC.
- i. A physical security survey of the COC, including access control, internal operating procedures, physical security equipment, and hardware, should be conducted before

activation. Any deficiencies noted should be corrected or compensated to ensure a secure environment to direct contingency operations.

- j. An operations security assessment should be conducted to identify critical and sensitive information to be protected and to determine potential pathways in which the information could be obtained in an unauthorized manner.

7.3 WORK STOPPAGE DEPLOYMENT AND RELIEF PLANNING

- a. Gasoline should be readily available to replenish PF vehicles in case they are intentionally depleted before changeover and work stoppage situations.
- b. New radio codes should be prepared and made ready for dissemination and use.
- c. Additional charged radios and fresh batteries should be available for issue as required.
- d. New lock combinations should be placed on containers, with qualified personnel available to make the changes.
- e. The relief of the PF and change-out by the CPF should be dictated by PF management and not by circumstances such as a planned walkout or set deadline. Planning the change-out in advance of the anticipated time will alleviate potential confrontations between forces and the opportunity for vandalism.
- f. If possible, relief should be done in specific order by individual patrols and posts. A one-by-one patrol and post relief lessens the chance for confrontations and maintains maximum security. A suggested generic relief order, starting with the most critical posts/patrols and ending with the least important, is as follows.
 - (1) CAS/SAS posts.
 - (2) SRTs.
 - (3) MAA posts.
 - (4) PA mobile response units.
 - (5) Towers (as applicable).
 - (6) Access control posts and portals.
 - (7) Property Protection Area (PPA) posts.
- g. Extra keys for vehicles, doors, and other PF-controlled areas should be available in the event they are lost or misplaced. If practical, locksmiths should be placed on standby to ensure immediate access to required PF areas.
- h. Vehicle maintenance schedules should be strictly enforced and vehicles maintained in top condition before any anticipated work stoppage to ensure dependability of the PF vehicles.
- i. A supply of patrol and post forms should be available to replenish stocks that are missing or depleted.

7.4 CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE DEPLOYMENT PREPARATIONS

- a. Relief of the PF and posting of CPF should be accomplished with minimum disruption of security operations.
- b. Before the CPF assumes duties at posts and patrols, all PF posts and mobile units should be inspected and photographed to document their physical condition.
 - (1) Additionally, checklists can be developed so site PF personnel can complete a post/patrol inventory as a normal procedure during shift change and, subsequently, changeover to the CPF.
 - (2) The incoming CPF will verify the same post/patrol inventory checklist with a CPF supervisor present.
- c. Post inspections should be conducted twice per shift on changeover day. Thereafter, inspections should be made once per shift.
- d. PF management and HQ and field element representatives should be present at the initial CPF roll call to demonstrate the importance of the operation and to show support for the CPF.
- e. Discipline and professional standards of the CPF are vital to a smooth relief of the PF and transition to CPF operations.
- f. PF supervisors should monitor all aspects of the changeover and relief to ensure incidents or confrontations between forces are avoided.
- g. If possible, disinterested parties should monitor the changeover. HQ Federal employees can be used to monitor CPF operations, including the shift briefing and PF post and patrol relief.
- h. The use of an independent assessment to determine the effectiveness of management and oversight of CPF operations during the emergency situation is an effective method of quickly evaluating operations and correcting management problems, which may not be readily apparent because of concerns and involvement with day-to-day activities.
 - (1) The assessment should be conducted as soon as possible after the CPF is in place to take advantage of lessons learned and to make operational adjustments. This will improve and correct management operations during the early stages of the nonroutine operation, civil disturbance, or work stoppage.
 - (2) The review should include applicable records, documents, procedures, correspondence, and plans and observations and discussions with FMC and PF company management and DOE field element safeguards and security managers.
 - (3) Interviews should be conducted with PF management personnel and auxiliary force and augmentee force SPOs.
- i. All logs, post and patrol reports, incident reports, alarm assessments, and documentation generated by the CPF should be specially annotated as such and archived separately.

7.5 PROTECTIVE FORCE EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS TURN-IN PROCEDURES

- a. All PF equipment (e.g., radios, keys, intermediate force weapons, handcuffs, and respirators) should be inspected and a receipt provided when turned in by the PF at the onset of a work stoppage.
- b. Firearms will be turned in to the armory immediately, inspected (broken down), and the weapons cards retained with the firearms in the armory.

8. MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO WORK STOPPAGE ACTIVITIES

8.1 GENERAL

PF management should take a proactive role during a work stoppage to ensure site employees, property, and vital interests are protected. While the CPF assumes many of these responsibilities, PF management also should take an active role.

8.2 RUMOR CONTROL

During any unusual situation rumors and half-truths spread through the work environment; therefore, timely and accurate dissemination of information is of utmost importance.

- a. During work stoppages, allegations should be investigated and responded to immediately.
- b. Managers and supervisors should be attuned to rumors and gossip within the CPF ranks and ensure accurate information is passed on to CPF members.
- c. The use of a newsletter to control rumors and disseminate information to CPF members is a valuable tool in managing a diverse organization. Information in the newsletter should be timely and accurate to ensure it is read, and it should be published at least weekly.
- d. DOE and the public should be fully satisfied with the adequacy of site security and the safeguarding and security of SNM and other critical national assets. This allows PF management to negotiate without security becoming an issue in the work stoppage.
- e. Workers not involved with the work stoppage also should be kept fully informed of all work stoppage activities.

8.3 CROSSING PICKET LINES

Employees should be made aware of the mixed feelings that could affect them during the crossing of a hostile picket line, including the following:

- a. the strong desire to get to work and not be injured,
- b. the equally strong desire not to appear afraid or intimidated in the face of threatening pickets,
- c. the wish to avoid direct or close contact with pickets or other strikers, and
- d. the need to be cordial or at least display a lack of animosity toward striking fellow employees.

8.4 GUIDELINES FOR CROSSING PICKET LINES

Information such as the following should be communicated to individuals who might have to cross a picket line, including regular employees and CPF members.

- a. Stay inside your vehicle and do not linger when traveling through a picketed gate.
- b. Drive with added caution.
- c. Do not use language or gestures that might provoke negative responses.
- d. Do not respond in any way if you are confronted in a negative manner or with abusive language.
- e. Car pool with other employees whenever possible; this reduces the total number of vehicles entering the site and ensures witnesses to any unlawful acts committed or attempted against personnel.
- f. Do not exit your vehicle, even if you encounter acts of violence (e.g., property damage to vehicles); continue to the first security post, call security, and prepare a report.

8.5 DAMAGE CLAIMS

In the event of vandalism or violence, a system for submitting, processing, and investigating damage claims as a result of work-stoppage-related incidents should be established.

8.6 OPERATIONS SECURITY

- a. Contingency-operation-related information should be considered “Official Use Only” and handled accordingly.
- b. Physical security measures and practices should be reviewed to ensure adequacy and adaptability to the COC and other physical locations used by the CPF, such as classrooms and shift briefing areas.
- c. Information security procedures such as document control, accountability, destruction, and transfer should be considered when CPF operations or work-stoppage-related information is involved.
- d. Operations security assessments of activities, programs, or facilities should be conducted to identify critical information to be protected and the potential pathways in which the information could be obtained in an unauthorized manner.

8.7 BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES

Bomb threats from varied sources are a real possibility during work stoppages, demonstrations, civil unrest, and other security emergencies. Current procedures should be reviewed and amended as necessary. Refresher training should be conducted on how to respond to telephone bomb threats, who makes decisions on evacuations or conducting searches, and when and how to initiate search procedures.

9. REDEPLOYMENT OF THE SITE PROTECTIVE FORCE

9.1 GENERAL

Redeployment of the site PF should be planned, coordinated, and executed as carefully and thoroughly as initial deployment of the CPF.

9.2 PROTECTIVE FORCE RECORDS REVIEW

A review of each individual PF member's training, qualification, and personnel security records should be conducted to ascertain his/her fitness for return to duty.

- a. A review of PF training and firearms qualification records should be conducted to identify any individuals whose qualifications have expired or will expire by the end of the redeployment month.
- b. A firearms range schedule for requalification should be developed immediately.
- c. A review of PF medical and physical fitness qualification records should be conducted to identify any individuals whose qualifications have expired or will expire by the end of the redeployment month.
- d. A physical fitness test schedule should be developed for necessary requalification.
- e. A review of individual PF physical profiles and limited work requirements should be conducted to determine work status.
- f. A letter for PSAP/PAP reinstatement should be prepared for those PF members eligible for PSAP/PAP.

9.3 CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE CHANGE-OUT

- a. Senior management should be present at the shift briefing to welcome back PF members and explain any changes or management decisions that affect PF operations.
- b. The shift briefing should consist of post/patrol assignments, expected standards of performance, post/patrol inventory requirements, a reminder of PSAP/PAP reporting responsibilities, and specific posting instructions.
- c. Each post and patrol will be changed out from CPF personnel to PF personnel with a PF supervisor present to monitor the relief. If possible, disinterested party monitoring also may be required to minimize potential conflicts.
- d. Before the PF returns to posts and patrols, all posts and mobile units should be inspected and photographed to document physical condition.

- (1) CPF personnel should complete a post/patrol inventory checklist prior to changeover to the site PF.
 - (2) The incoming PF can verify the same post/patrol inventory checklist with a PF supervisor present.
- e. To maintain maximum security, personnel change-out should progress from the most critical posts/patrols to the least important, as follows.
- (1) CAS/SAS.
 - (2) SRTs.
 - (3) MAA posts.
 - (4) PA mobile response units.
 - (5) Towers (as applicable).
 - (6) Access control posts and portals.
 - (7) PPA posts.
- f. When the supervisor and site PF personnel arrive at the post/patrol, the supervisor should ask CPF personnel for completed post/patrol inventory checklists or vehicle sheets and any normally transferred equipment (keys, radios, etc.). CPF personnel may then be released to leave the post and report for final checkout and release.
- g. Site PF personnel may then assume the post/patrol and complete a post/patrol inventory while the PF supervisor is present. The supervisor should immediately resolve any discrepancies.

9.4 CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE OUT-PROCESSING

All CPF personnel should report immediately to a predetermined location for out-processing at the end of their final shifts. At a minimum, the following areas should be addressed in a checklist (see Appendix J, "Sample Checklists").

- a. Security (debriefing statement and security operations nondisclosure form).
- b. Property supply.
- c. Arms room.
- d. Badging.
- e. Administration.
- f. Letters of appreciation and verbal recognition, if appropriate, should be presented to CPF personnel by DOE/NNSA senior management before the CPF personnel return to their home sites.

- g. CPF training records should be annotated to reflect approved training, certification, and qualifications.
- h. Each augmentee should be debriefed concerning possible site security improvements noted during the contingency tour. Such recommendations and suggestions could involve operations, procedures, equipment, physical security systems, or PF activities.
- i. The receipt and return of the firearms from other sites should be controlled by written receipt form. A three-part receipt or similar method would provide adequate controls and documentation.

10. AFTER-ACTION REPORT AND LESSONS LEARNED

10.1 GENERAL

Accurate and complete documentation on all contingency operations activities is vital for reviews following the phase-out of the CPF and for preparing reports, answering inquiries, and preparing for audits. Each office and organization that supported the CPF should have generated documentation concerning the support provided. Upon resumption of normal operations, all documentation not already maintained in the COC should be centralized, reviewed, and archived.

10.2 DAILY JOURNALS

Managers and supervisors who participate in any of the phases of a CPF operation should maintain daily journals recording any support provided to and/or actions taken as a result of contingency operations. Likewise, organizations should maintain daily journals of support provided and record any significant activities.

10.3 MANAGEMENT BRIEFING BOOK

A chronological record of daily (24-hour) occurrences should be compiled in a briefing book and provided to senior management on and off the site to keep them apprised of all significant activities. Such briefing books are an excellent source of information for preparing a formal after-action report.

10.4 MEETING MINUTES AND NOTES

Each coordination and planning meeting should be summarized in notes and informal minutes disseminated to all participants to ensure decisions and tasks are properly understood and followed.

10.5 SECURITY SELF-EVALUATION FROM CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE MEMBERS

CPF members should be debriefed before returning to their home sites. Debriefings should include discussions of safeguards or security procedures, physical security measures, and/or equipment changes or upgrades that would enhance security onsite. Likewise, changes that would improve support for, training of, or planning for the CPF should also be discussed.

10.6 AFTER-ACTION REPORT AND LESSONS LEARNED

A formal after-action report outlining lessons learned should be initiated immediately after the return to normal operations. A realistic completion date and recommended format should be included in the call for input. The report should be broken down into issues, background, and recommendations.

APPENDIX A. REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 1046, “Physical Protection of Security Interests.”
2. 10 CFR 1047, “Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by Protective Force Officers.”
3. 10 CFR 1049, “Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by Protective Force Officers of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.”
4. DOE O 151.1A, *Comprehensive Emergency Management System*, dated 11-1-00.
5. DOE O 470.1, *Safeguards and Security Program*, dated 9-28-95.
6. DOE P 470.1, *Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Policy*, dated 5-8-01.
7. DOE O 471.2A, *Information Security Program*, dated 3-27-97.
8. DOE O 472.1B, *Personnel Security Activities*, dated 3-24-97.
9. DOE O 473.2, *Protective Force Program*, dated 6-30-00.
10. DOE M 473.2-2, *Protective Force Program Manual*, dated 6-30-00.
11. DOE 5632.1C, *Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests*, dated 7-15-94.
12. DOE M 5632.1C-1, *Manual for Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests*, dated 7-15-94.

APPENDIX B. DEFINITIONS

Alarm Assessment—The process of determining an alarm condition stimulus.

Augmentation Force—The offsite protective force (PF) supervisors and managers (non-bargaining-unit members) who have been tasked to participate as members of a contingency protective force. Security police officers and security officers from PF organizations not represented by a bargaining unit.

Augmentee—One who participates as a member of the augmentation force.

Auxiliary Force—The onsite protective force (PF) supervisors and managers (non-bargaining-unit members) who have been tasked to participate as members of a contingency PF.

Bargaining Unit—The legally recognized unit of employees represented for collective bargaining purposes by a labor organization which negotiates on behalf of protective force members.

Contingency Protective Force (CPF)—A combination of onsite protective force (PF) supervisors and managers (auxiliary force); offsite PF supervisors and managers (augmentation force); Federal employees who are members of the Office of Secure Transportation; and other Federal employees. The CPF is staffed and organized for the duration of the emergency or nonroutine situation.

Economic Strike—Work stoppage over economic issues (i.e., disputes over wages, hours, or working conditions).

Force-on-Force Testing—Validation testing to ensure the contingency force can adequately defend site targets.

Illegal Picket—A picket line formed at an access gate that all parties had formally agreed would be excluded from work stoppage activities.

Injunction—A court order enjoining a bargaining unit or management from a given course of action.

Lockout—A management decision that prohibits members of the bargaining unit from entering the site and returning to work.

Picket—A person stationed outside a DOE site access gate during a strike to express protest or grievance and discourage entry by other nonstriking employees or vendors.

Picket Line—A line or procession of people picketing a DOE site access gate.

Protective Force—Security officers, security police officers, Office of Secure Transportation Federal agents, and other personnel assigned to protective duties involving the safeguards and security interests of the Department.

Restraining Order—A legal action forbidding a party from doing a threatened act until a hearing on the application can be heard.

Strike—A concerted refusal by employees to go on working in an attempt to force an employer to meet certain demands.

Unfair Labor Practice Strike—A strike in protest of unfair labor practices. The strike can happen any time the bargaining unit believes management has conducted unfair practices.

Union—A recognized organization legally formed to represent its individual members in collective bargaining, contract negotiations, and labor matters.

Work Stoppage—An authorized or unauthorized refusal to work by a group of employees.

APPENDIX C. CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE LESSONS LEARNED

The following are guidance points derived from lessons learned on the adequacy of security and contingency protective force (CPF) operations before and during protective force (PF) work stoppages.

1. Certifications and Qualifications.
 - a. Ensure minimum certifications of augmentees are current for the skills/positions required.
 - b. Ensure minimum certifications of site auxiliary force personnel are current for the skills/positions required.
 - c. Ensure all medical certifications are current.
2. Management and Oversight.
 - a. Conduct inspections of specific PF operations to assess performance.
 - b. Review and correct all inspection/survey findings.
 - c. Keep those workers who are onsite and not involved with the work stoppage informed of all related activities.
 - d. Centrally locate all funding activities.
 - e. Create and foster an environment of teamwork among all participants.
 - f. Give priority to the emergency, unusual occurrence, or work stoppage, and avoid a “business as usual” mode.
 - g. Recognize Department of Energy responsibilities will increase beyond the customary oversight role.
 - h. Ensure all decisions and activities support the number one priority, the protection of Department of Energy assets.
 - i. Establish and maintain good liaison with local law enforcement agencies.
 - j. Respond to all allegations quickly and in writing.
 - k. Maintain separate files, logs, and journals of activities related to the emergency.
 - l. Keep everyone who needs to know informed at all times.

3. Performance Testing.

- a. Initiate force-on-force tests and limited-scope performance tests (LSPTs) involving simulated attacks to test the effectiveness and training of the CPF.
- b. Conduct individual LSPTs before CPF members assume their duties.
- c. Conduct ongoing, unannounced LSPTs for the duration of the CPF activation.

4. Training.

- a. Conduct extensive site orientations.
- b. Perform post and patrol training on specific duties, functions, guard orders, and standard operating procedures.
- c. Ensure all training records, certifications, and qualifications for each CPF member are documented and available.

5. Operations.

- a. Test and verify all notification lists before the work stoppage.
- b. Establish communication channels early, and ensure they are clearly defined.

6. Planning.

- a. Ensure replacements are onsite well in advance of all required training and orientation.
- b. Develop, staff, and revise a comprehensive contingency plan as required.
- c. Determine specific requirements for the number and skill levels of personnel required.
- d. Establish a time frame for rotating CPF members.
- e. Negotiate and designate specific picketing/demonstration areas for the bargaining unit.

APPENDIX D. SAMPLE CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE OPERATIONS PLAN

This sample plan outline is intended to be generic in nature and to act as a guide in the development of a site-specific contingency protective force (CPF) operations plan. It provides a wide range of CPF topical areas and procedural requirements that may or may not be applicable in all circumstances.

1. PURPOSE.

The (name of site/facility) Contingency Protective Force (CPF) Operations Plan has been developed to ensure the continued safe operation of Department of Energy (DOE) sites and individual facilities. The primary focus of the plan is to provide for the safeguarding and security of DOE special nuclear material and other security interests and to provide for the safety, health, and protection of all personnel, the public, and the environment.

2. SCOPE.

The plan outlines the responsibilities, requirements, qualifications, and functions to be implemented in the event of emergency and/or nonroutine situations involving protective force (PF) operations. Distribution of this plan is controlled to ensure all revisions are incorporated into existing plans.

3. REFERENCES. (List appropriate DOE, local, and other documents that apply to the plan.)

4. DEFINITIONS/ACRONYMS. (Include definitions and acronyms not found in the Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide.)

5. RESPONSIBILITIES. (Define the responsibilities collateral to each of the following positions, as appropriate.)

a. Department of Energy

- (1) Site Manager
- (2) Public Affairs Officer
- (3) Facility Representatives
- (4) Manager, Safeguards and Security (DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration)
- (5) General Counsel
- (6) Manager, Site Emergency Operations Center
- (7) Office of Labor Relations

- b. Site Protective Force Contractor
 - (1) General Manager
 - (2) Contingency Operations Center (COC) Shift Leader
 - (3) Public Affairs Officer
 - (4) Chief Counsel
 - (5) Finance and Accounting Department
 - (6) Manager, Personnel Security Department
 - (7) Logistics and Equipment Issue/Control Officer
 - (8) Environmental Safety and Health Officer
 - (9) Operations Department
 - (10) Planning Department
 - (11) Training Department
 - (12) Performance Testing Department
 - (13) Command, Control, and Communications Department
 - c. Site Facility Management Contractor (FMC) Manager
 - (1) Facility Managers
 - (2) FMC Safeguards and Security Director.
6. ASSUMPTIONS. The following are examples of the types of questions that can guide the development of site-specific assumptions for this section.
- a. Will DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration and the FMC attempt to conduct operations at pre-work-stoppage levels?
 - b. Which site operations will continue and which will be curtailed?
 - c. Will members of the bargaining unit who want to report to work be permitted to do so, or will they be locked out?
 - d. Will an offsite transshipment point be established?
 - e. If a work stoppage occurs, what will be the chain of command for work stoppage operations?
 - f. If a work stoppage occurs, what will be its estimated length?
7. CONTINGENCY PROTECTIVE FORCE.
- a. Current Protective Force Deployment

- b. Protective Force Available (auxiliary and augmentation forces)
 - (1) Security Officer
 - (2) Security Police Officer I
 - (3) Security Police Officer II
 - (4) Security Police Officer III
 - (5) Specialized Personnel (pilot, crew chief, dog handler, boat crew)
 - (6) Clerical
 - (7) Supervisors and Managers
 - (8) Administration
 - c. Assignments (Posts/Patrols)
 - (1) Modifications to Existing Staff
 - (2) Armed Posts
 - (3) Unarmed Posts
 - d. Post/Patrol Closure Selection and Criteria
 - e. Scheduling
 - (1) Shift Hours
 - (2) Overtime Policy
 - (3) Rotation Policy
 - f. Overtime Required to Meet Staffing Requirements
 - g. Auxiliary Force Requirements and Qualifications
 - h. Augmentation Force Requirements and Qualifications
 - i. Administration
 - (1) Pay
 - (2) Per Diem
 - (3) Transportation
 - (4) Rental Cars
8. TRAINING PLAN.
- a. Responsibilities

- b. Requirements Analysis
 - c. Auxiliary Force Training Records Review
 - d. Augmentation Force Requirements and Records Review
 - e. Instructor Requirements
 - f. Administrative Requirements
 - (1) Classrooms
 - (2) Equipment
 - (3) Support
 - (4) Documentation
 - (5) Training Maintenance
 - g. Specific Site Requirements
 - h. Central Training Academy (CTA) Support Requirements
9. SITE ENTRANCE AND EXIT PLAN.
- a. Picketed Gate
 - b. Nonpicketed Gate
 - c. Vendor-Refusal-to-Enter Procedures
 - d. Transshipment Procedures
10. REQUIRED OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.
- a. Operational
 - b. Offsite Support
 - (1) DOE Headquarters
 - (2) Office of Transportation Safeguards
 - (3) CTA
 - c. Site Support
 - d. Administrative
 - e. Emergency
 - f. Other Site Activities

- g. Communications
 - h. Coordination
11. OVERSIGHT AND OPERATIONAL TESTING.
- a. COC
 - (1) Staffing
 - (2) Operation
 - (3) Training
 - b. Limited-Scope Performance Tests
 - c. Force-on-Force Performance Tests
 - d. Roll Call Training
 - e. Post and Patrol Surveillance
12. CONTINGENCY PROCEDURES.
- a. Possible Violence
 - b. Possible Work Stoppage Sympathy Support
 - (1) Onsite
 - (2) Offsite
 - c. Site Emergency Operations Center
13. PLAN ACTIVATION AND EXECUTION.
- a. PF Post and Patrol Relief Procedures
 - b. Posts, Vehicles, Equipment Turn-Ins
 - c. Firearms and Equipment Turn-Ins
 - d. COC Activation
 - e. Records Management
 - f. Security Self-Evaluations
14. PROTECTIVE FORCE RECOVERY OPERATIONS FOLLOWING EMERGENCIES.
- a. Post and Patrol Transfer
 - b. Debriefing

- (1) Security Interests
- (2) Security Incident Response Plans
- (3) Safeguards and Security Systems
- c. Interviews for After-action Report and Lessons Learned
- d. COC Draw Down
- e. After-action Report and Lessons Learned

**SUGGESTED ATTACHMENTS
(Samples Not Included)**

- Attachment 1 Post and Patrol Staffing Requirements
- Attachment 2 Post and Patrol Closure Priority List
- Attachment 3 Contingency Operations Center Procedure
- Attachment 4 Post and Patrol Orientation and Briefing
- Attachment 5 Contingency Protective Force Training Schedule
- Attachment 6 Contingency Force Performance Test Plan
- Attachment 7 Contingency Force Training Job Performance Measures
- Attachment 8 Key Personnel Alert and Notification Roster
- Attachment 9 Contingency Protective Force Requirements and Qualifications Checklist
- Attachment 10 Contingency Protective Force In-Processing and Out-Processing Checklists

APPENDIX E
SAMPLE TASK LIST

Functional Area	Task/Activity/Action	Responsibility	Completion Date
Plans	Develop a draft contingency protective force (CPF) operations plan		
	Integrate the CPF operations plan with site facility management contractor operations		
	Integrate the CPF operations plan with the Department of Energy field element		
	Develop task list		
	Develop post/patrol priority closing list		
	Develop augmentee requirements		
	Develop employee briefings		
	Conduct self-assessment of contingency operations		
	Develop format for after-action report		
	Develop format for lessons learned report		
	Conduct records maintenance		
	Plan protective force (PF) change-out		
	Plan CPF relief		
	Provide initial employee briefings		
Operations	Direct Contingency Operations Center activities		
	Compile records/forms/reports		
	Conduct PF change-out		
	Conduct CPF relief		
	Develop CPF staffing assignments		
	Monitor overtime expenditures		
	Develop limited-scope performance tests		
	Maintain local law enforcement liaison		
Training	Screen all auxiliary force training records		
	Screen all augmentee force training records		
	Develop training plan		

SAMPLE TASK LIST (continued)

Functional Area	Task/Activity/Action	Responsibility	Completion Date
	Develop training schedules		
Training	Conduct auxiliary force training		
	Conduct augmentee force training		
	Conduct access control training		
	Conduct all necessary certifications and qualifications		
	Conduct central alarm station and secondary alarm station training		
	Verify training readiness of the CPF		
	Maintain all training records		
Logistics	Develop CPF equipment requirements		
	Develop required seasonal uniform requirements		
	Verify availability of required uniforms and equipment		
	Develop CPF firearms requirements		
	Develop CPF transportation requirements		
	Develop rental car requirements		
	Develop lodging plan and make lodging arrangements		
	Develop severe weather provision requirements		
	Develop hand receipt system for the CPF		
	Develop damage claim procedures		
Internal Security	Develop CPF Personnel Security Assurance Program/Personnel Assurance Program requirements		
	Develop and implement plan for security clearance validation		
	Develop and implement badging and accountability card requirements		
	Conduct operations security/counter intelligence activities before work stoppage		

SAMPLE TASK LIST (continued)

Functional Area	Task/Activity/Action	Responsibility	Completion Date
Internal Security	Conduct operations security/counter intelligence activities during work stoppage		
Security	Develop site-specific security operations nondisclosure forms		
Finance and Accounting	Develop costs and budget for anticipated contingency operations		
	Obtain funding for contingency operations		
	Set up contingency operations budget and cost accounting system in accordance with all applicable rules and regulations		
	Identify and plan for all salary-/pay-related issues, including overtime rates and per diem issues		
	Designate point of contact and coordinate with other sites for funding and salary issues		
	Maintain records in accordance with all rules and regulations		
Public Affairs	Develop media plan		
	Develop and issue initial press releases		
	Issue site notifications		
	Issue information and status papers		
Environment, Safety and Health	Coordinate all training requirements with training organization		
	Monitor working conditions and CPF activities		
Quality Assurance	Develop limited-scope performance tests		
	Conduct limited-scope performance tests		
Legal	Prepare restraining orders		
	Review local law enforcement agency jurisdictional responsibilities		
Management and Operating Contractor	Coordinate reduced operations		

SAMPLE TASK LIST (continued)

Functional Area	Task/Activity/Action	Responsibility	Completion Date
	Coordinate reduced access control restrictions		
	Coordinate with offsite vendors and suppliers		
Management and Operating Contractor	Coordinate with subcontractors		
	Coordinate lockdown of special nuclear material locations		
	Coordinate sitewide employee notifications		
	Coordinate special nuclear material vault opening and closing schedule		
	Ensure site emergency operations center staffing		
	Develop plans for transshipment point		
DOE/NNSA Field Elements	Ensure site emergency operations center activation		
	Approve requests for restraining orders		

APPENDIX F. SAMPLE POST/SHIFT ASSIGNMENT MATRIX

List in order of importance or priority of staffing all posts, patrols, entry control points, towers, supervisory positions, special response teams, dog teams, and helicopter crews that will be required during the emergency and contingency protective force personnel assigned to each. (The lowest priority positions will be candidates for possible closing, if required.)

PRIORITY	POST/PATROL	DAY SHIFT (0600-1800)	NIGHT SHIFT (1800-0600)	RELIEF SHIFT
1	Material Access Area	Auxiliary R. Edge	Auxiliary R. Showers	Auxiliary A. McCulloch
2	Material Access Area	Augmentee L. Davis	Augmentee S. Ball	Auxiliary A. Nettleingham
3	North Portal	Auxiliary D. Solich	Augmentee P. Brenner	Auxiliary J. Cronin
4	Tower 1	Not staffed	Augmentee	Augmentee
5	Property Protection	Augmentee	Augmentee	Augmentee

Auxiliary—Auxiliary Force Personnel
Augmentee—Augmentation Force Personnel

APPENDIX G. SAMPLE WORK STOPPAGE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS INFORMATION SHEET

If questions and answers are to be distributed, the following may provide a helpful starting point. They should be reviewed carefully.

Q. How long will the stoppage last?

A. The length of the work stoppage cannot be forecast. Historically, Departmental protective force work stoppages have lasted from several days to more than 6 weeks.

Q. If protective force members want to cross the picket line, will they be allowed?

A. Security police officers have been advised by management of their options. This includes crossing the picket line, but significant numbers are not expected.

Q. Is mediation being considered?

A. A Federal mediator was involved in negotiations before the work stoppage.

Q. I understand that some members of the contingency force are from other sites. What is the position of their unions?

A. The contingency protective force members from other sites are not members of other collective bargaining units.

Q. Is the contingency force well trained?

A. Yes. All contingency force members meet Department of Energy requirements for qualifications and training.

Q. I heard that you are arming secretaries and clerks. Is this true?

A. No. All armed individuals are fully trained and qualified and meet Department of Energy qualifications for their positions. Administrative personnel may be providing administrative support such as answering telephones in the secondary alarm station or checking badges at outer gates.

Q. What is the status of the posts? Are they all staffed?

A. All security posts required to maintain the safety and security of the site are being staffed 24 hours per day.

Q. Did the guards just abandon their posts?

A. No. Security police officers were relieved from their posts and their union gave them written procedures to follow.

Q. How does the walkout affect security here onsite?

A. A fully trained and qualified contingency protective force, consisting of security officers and security police officers from other sites, current protective force supervisors, former security police officers who have requalified as required by Department of Energy requirements, and other individuals with military and law enforcement backgrounds, has been assembled to ensure adequate security levels are maintained during this work

stoppage. All individuals involved have received site-specific training and meet Department of Energy qualification requirements.

Q. Is there a danger to the public?

A. There is no risk to the public. The security of Department of Energy assets will be constantly reviewed to ensure there is no degradation.

Q. Should members of the public be concerned?

A. No. The facility is fully secured by qualified personnel; adequate security will be maintained.

Q. What about the special nuclear material stored there?

A. The special nuclear material is secure, with our graded security approach and operational system in place and fully functional.

Q. Is there a concern about sabotage?

A. Our mission is to protect the site assets from sabotage. Security systems are operational and the level of concern remains unchanged.

Q. What do you mean, "security systems"?

A. The protective force uses a graded security system approach that includes electronic equipment as well as security police officers. All these elements combined make up the security systems.

Q. What are you doing to prevent sabotage?

A. Ensuring that all systems remain operational.

Q. Do you feel that the site is safe?

A. Site security is being maintained by an experienced, trained, and qualified contingency protective force.

Q. If it is safe with the reduced number of people, why under normal circumstances are there more?

A. Normally, the additional individuals are required for relief factors such as vacations and shift rotation. The shift schedule has been modified and no vacations or planned absences are being allowed. Certain operations have been limited.

Q. Is it true that language exists in the contract proposal that would allow the company to lay off protective force employees and rehire them at a lower hire rate?

A. No.

NOTE: These questions are not all-inclusive nor are they required in any way to be published. The Office of Public Affairs and Chief Counsel should review them before publication.

APPENDIX H. SAMPLE BRIEFING TOPICS

- Date of Work Stoppage
- Contingency Protective Force
 - Auxiliary Force
 - Augmentation Force (Sites Supporting)
- Contingency Protective Force Planning
 - Rotation Policy
 - Overtime
 - Shift Length
- Cost Schedule (1 Week, 4 Weeks, 8 Weeks)
- Contingency Protective Force Training
 - Length
 - Site Familiarization/Orientation
 - Environmental Safety and Health
 - Limited-Scope Performance Testing
 - Force-on-Force Exercises
- Local Law Enforcement Liaison
- Other Assistance
 - Central Training Academy
 - Department of Energy Headquarters
 - Office of Secure Transportation
- Contingency Protective Force Testing
- Work Stoppage Status
- Work Stoppage Impact on the Site
- After-Action Report
 - Self-Assessment
 - Lessons Learned

APPENDIX I. SAMPLE LETTERS

ADVANCE NOTICE OF POSSIBLE WORK STOPPAGE

Subject: Advance Notice of Possible Protective Force Work Stoppage at _____ .

To: See Distribution List

The current collective bargaining agreement between the protective force contractor, _____ , and the _____ union expires _____ .

In the event that a new agreement has not been successfully negotiated, a work stoppage could be called by the _____ union. A detailed contingency plan has been developed to ensure that adequate security levels are maintained during such an event. The implementation of the plan will require non-bargaining-unit personnel from other Department of Energy facilities to serve as replacements for striking protective force bargaining unit members. An analysis of security operations indicated that _____ additional protective force employees would be required from other sites to support this contingency plan. This is the minimum number needed to ensure safeguards and security requirements at _____ are maintained.

Pertinent information.

The _____ DOE point of contact is John Smith. He can be contacted by _____ , fax _____ , or pager _____ .

It is requested that other participating Department of Energy offices appoint a protective force contractor point of contact and make logistical arrangements directly with Mr. Smith.

It is anticipated that participating protective force personnel will work 12-hour shifts but no more than 60 hours in a 7-day period. The planned tour of duty is 30 days.

Participating protective force personnel should make travel arrangements that permit them to arrive onsite no later than _____ on _____. In the event that a work stoppage appears likely and the plan is activated, participants will be required to attend _____ orientation and site-specific training from _____ to _____ .

Lodging will be arranged by local protective force management.

Per diem and pay rates (both regular and overtime) will be based on participating organization policies.

Rental cars will be authorized at the ratio of one car per every three participants.

It will be necessary for each participant to send (fax) copies of his/her most current firearms and physical fitness qualification records to Mr. Smith by _____. Only participants who have records showing current and complete qualifications are acceptable.

All individuals must bring their weapons authorization credentials.

Participants must be qualified with the _____ . _____
will be provided.

Participants must provide their own duty weapons (sidearms only), intermediate force weapons, leather gear, and uniforms. Cleaning and maintenance of uniforms will be provided onsite.

Each participating site's point of contact will be contacted no later than _____ and as required thereafter concerning the status of the support required until all labor issues are resolved.

Security clearance information for all participants will be validated through the _____
_____ classified visitor control system.

Please identify your points of contact and have them contact Mr. Smith at their earliest convenience. To facilitate contingency planning efforts, we request that you respond no later than _____ with the number of participants that you will provide. Individual names, social security numbers, and other personal information are requested by _____ to facilitate clearance and Personnel Security Assurance Program/Personnel Assurance Program transfers.

Your assistance in this effort is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Site Manager

**STATUS UPDATE ON POSSIBLE WORK STOPPAGE
AT _____**

Subject: Status Update on Possible Work Stoppage at _____ .

To: See Distribution List

Negotiations will soon commence between the _____ protective force contractor and the _____ union. The current collective bargaining agreement expires on _____ .

We very much appreciate the commitments made by many of your respective protective force contractor organizations to supply non-bargaining-unit personnel to assist in the event that work stoppage seems likely. Your collective workforce commitments, augmented by qualified onsite non-bargaining-unit members, will provide a sufficient number of personnel to ensure our protection requirements can continue to be met in the event of a work stoppage.

All augmentees should now arrive no later than _____ to allow for training and performance testing.

Your continued assistance in this effort is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Site Manager

**ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND INFORMATION
LETTER TO AUGMENTEE**

Dear Augmentee:

I have recently been notified that you have volunteered to participate on the _____ contingency protective force. Mr. J. R. Smith has been established as an overall point of contact to ensure your in-processing runs smoothly and that your time spent in support of the contingency protective force is well managed. After you arrive onsite, Mr. Smith will be your primary focal point for any inquiries or problems that may arise.

Lodging and transportation have been arranged, and you should contact your local point of contact for the specifics.

You will be working 12-hour shifts with adequate time off to relax. No contingency protective force member will work more than 60 hours in a 7-day period.

It is expected that your tour of duty will be 30 days. If needed, another detachment of personnel will arrive and be trained.

Your continued assistance in this effort is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Protective Force Contract Manager

APPENDIX J. SAMPLE CHECKLISTS

AUGMENTEE QUALIFICATIONS/CERTIFICATIONS AND SITE REQUIREMENTS

NAME: _____ SOC. SEC. NO.: _____ HOME SITE: _____

	YES	NO
1. Physical fitness qualification scores	___	___
2. Semiannual firearms qualification scores	___	___
3. Intermediate force weapons record of training or qualification	___	___
4. Respirator card issuance	___	___
5. Badging	___	___
6. Clearance	___	___
7. Personnel Security Assurance Program/Personnel Assurance Program	___	___
8. Accountability cards	___	___
9. Site post and patrol training	___	___
10. Special nuclear material recognition training	___	___
11. Nuclear criticality safety training	___	___
12. Building orientation training	___	___

The following are commonly recurring documentation inconsistencies.

- Physical fitness qualification scores not recorded in individual training records.
- Semiannual weapons qualification scores not recorded in individual training records.
- Soon-to-expire weapons qualifications.

AUGMENTEE IN-PROCESSING

NAME: _____ SOC. SEC. NO.: _____ HOME SITE: _____

Documentation on Hand.

	YES	NO
Physical fitness training results	___	___
Training records	___	___
Clearance	___	___
Personnel Security Assurance Program/Personnel Assurance Program documentation	___	___
Respirator card	___	___
Weapons authorization credentials	___	___
Driver's license	___	___

Firearms.

Duty handgun	___	___
Auxiliary firearm	___	___
Other special assigned firearms	___	___
Intermediate force weapons	___	___

Uniforms and Equipment.

Uniforms	___	___
Boots	___	___
Overcoat	___	___
Leather gear/web gear	___	___
Safety glasses	___	___
Vest	___	___
Personal protective equipment (e.g., respirator, gloves, boots)	___	___
Dosimeter	___	___

Site Requirements.

Security badge	___	___
Accountability badge	___	___
Accommodations arranged	___	___
Transportation coordinated	___	___

AUGMENTEE OUT-PROCESSING

NAME: _____ SOC. SEC. NO.: _____ HOME SITE: _____

Office Clearance.

	YES	NO	SIGNATURE
Internal Security	___	___	_____
Procurement (supply room)	___	___	_____
Environment, Safety, and Health (Respirator)	___	___	_____
Armory	___	___	_____
Badging (security badge and accountability badge)	___	___	_____

Receipts.

Weapons shipment	___	___
Lodging	___	___
Car rental	___	___

NOTE: Each individual is responsible for obtaining signatures from each of the above-listed offices before departure. Any missing equipment will be reported to the home site for payment or replacement.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER ACTIVATION

	INITIALS	TIME
1. Notify Shift Supervisor	_____	_____
1a. Brief Supervisors	_____	_____
2. Notify Department of Energy Operations Office (safeguards and security organization)	_____	_____
2a. Notify Site Emergency Operations Center	_____	_____
2b. Notify Department of Energy Headquarters (Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration/program offices)	_____	_____
3. Notify Site Facility Management Contractor	_____	_____
3a. Notify Lock and Key	_____	_____
3b. Notify Motor Pool (vehicle maintenance)	_____	_____
4. Notify Protective Force Manager	_____	_____
5. Notify Local Law Enforcement Agencies	_____	_____
6. Notify Lead Augmentees at Lodging Site	_____	_____
7. Notify Augmentee Home Site	_____	_____

- NOTES:**
1. Messages left on pager systems or voice mail are not considered notifications.
 2. Subnotifications (e.g., 2a) may be the responsibility of the primary office/agency.

APPENDIX K. SAMPLE REFRESHER TRAINING REQUIREMENTS AND VERIFICATION FOR AUXILIARY (SITE) FORCE PERSONNEL

NAME: _____

SUPERVISOR/TRAINER: _____

INSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE/ADMINISTRATION.

Supervisor Verified by:
(Initials and date)

Report time and location _____

Shift briefing _____

Fitness-for-duty inspection/requirements _____

Chain-of-command knowledge _____

Time card procedures and overtime reporting _____

Personnel Assurance Security Program/Personnel Assurance Program _____

Dosimeter issuance/update _____

Site protection strategy and alarm/intrusion response _____

ARMORY OPERATIONS.

Armory location/weapon issuance policy _____

Weapon-loading procedures/demonstrated _____

LEGAL ISSUES.

Deadly force conditions/understanding _____

Force continuum/understanding _____

Arrest authority/understanding _____

WEAPONS.

Primary duty weapons current _____

Secondary duty weapons current _____

Intermediate force weapon current _____

POSTING OPERATIONS.

Staging area _____

Transportation _____

Access control _____

Post/key/radio exchange _____

Searching requirements/understands _____

Package search/understands _____

POSTING OPERATIONS (continued).

Vehicle search/demonstrated _____
Personnel search/understands _____
Contraband seizure/understands _____

EQUIPMENT/OPERATION TESTING.

X-ray operation/understands _____
Stationary metal detector/understands _____
Hand-held metal detector/demonstrated _____
Stationary radiometric/understands _____
Hand-held radiometric/demonstrated _____
Central alarm station radio/base station/demonstrated _____
Central alarm station radio/portable/demonstrated _____
Perimeter Intrusion Detection Assessment System sector
monitor/demonstrated _____
Auxiliary weapons locations _____
Auxiliary weapons access _____
Auxiliary weapons inventory _____
Mobile unit auxiliary access _____

CRITICAL FACILITY AWARENESS.

Building orientation _____
Command and control _____
Radiological sabotage defense strategy _____
Emergency response responsibilities _____
Nonsecurity emergency responses _____
Containment responsibilities _____
Areas of responsibilities _____
Tactical deployment _____

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH REQUIRED TRAINING.

First responder _____
Applicable Radiological Worker (I or II) _____
Building/Protected Area/Material Access Area orientation _____

NOTE: Auxiliary force personnel will have various levels of current training and experience. Required knowledge must be individually evaluated.

**APPENDIX L. SAMPLE TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR
AUGMENTATION FORCE PERSONNEL**

DAY ONE

<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>INSTR.</u>	<u>LOC.</u>
0600-0730	In-processing, badging, and administrative subjects		
0730-0830	Welcome—comprehensive briefing, work stoppage or emergency status		
0830-0930	Site orientation, maps, diagrams, and windshield tour		
0930-1130	Respirator training, testing, and fitting		
1130-1300	Lunch and travel		
1300-1600	Site-specific mandatory training for all new employees		
1600-1630	Bomb threat procedures		
1630-1800	Dinner and travel		
1800-2000	Deadly force, force continuum, arrest authority		

DAY TWO

<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>INSTR.</u>	<u>LOC.</u>
0600-0730	In-processing and administrative followup		
0730-0830	Human Resources, Finance in-processing		
0830-1000	Post/patrol assignment/orientation, shift assignment, issuance of post/patrol orders		
1000-1100	Site protection strategy and alarm/intrusion response responsibilities		
1100-1130	Armory tour, orientation, and procedures		
1130-1300	Lunch and travel		
1300-1530	Building orientations		
1530-1630	Special nuclear material recognition		
1630-1730	Communication operation and procedures		
1730-1900	Dinner and travel		
1900-2100	Access control, pass and badge system, operation (overview) of metal detectors and X-ray scanner, inspections		

DAY THREE

<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>INSTR.</u>	<u>LOC.</u>
0600-0630	Weapon carry refresher		
0630-0700	Reports and forms		
0700-0730	Restraint and cuffing refresher		
0730-1100	First responder awareness to emergency situations		
1100-1230	Lunch and travel		
1230-1600	Nuclear criticality and alarm recognition and response procedures		
1600-1730	Post/patrol operations and familiarity, building orientation and tour		

NOTE: Comfort breaks are taken at the discretion of the instructor. Subjects are generic in nature and may not be all-inclusive for every site or location.

APPENDIX M. SAMPLE WORK EXPERIENCE FORM

NAME: _____ HOME SITE: _____

The following information is solicited to better apply your experience and knowledge on the contingency protective force.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY EXPERIENCE AS A MEMBER OF A PROTECTIVE FORCE.

Number of years: _____ Locations: _____

Positions/duties: _____

EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING IN A CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY.

Number of years: _____ Type agency: _____

Locations: _____

Highest rank achieved: _____

Type and length of training: _____

MILITARY SERVICE.

Experience or training related to protective force operations: _____

Highest rank achieved: _____

SUPERVISORY EXPERIENCE.

Military: _____

Department of Energy protective force: _____

OTHER EXPERIENCE OR SPECIAL TRAINING.

Former member of special response team: _____

Explosive training: _____

Antiterrorism training: _____

Locksmith: _____

Armorer: _____

Intrusion detection system repair: _____