India's Nuclear Gambit: Rationale & Repercussions
Public
Event
Date and
TimeMay 14, 1998
Location
U.S. Institute of Peace
2nd Floor Conference Room
1200 17th St, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Directions
India's Rationale
The Indian action is the result of a complex set of factors
relating to security and the nature of the global arms control regimes. Included are
the lack of movement on an agreement with the United States on civilian nuclear
energy cooperation and removal of technological controls, as well as sanctions in
place since the 1974 Pokhran test. On the security side, India has seen China's
nuclear modernization and military build up legitimized by the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) systems,
and the continued nuclear and missile cooperation between China and Pakistan in spite
of China being a signatory to the NPT. The fact that the security environment would
deteriorate further as China becomes more powerful and strengthens its strategic
relationships around India was cited as a major factor. It was felt that without a
credible deterrence in place India would not be able to cope with the challenges
posed by China. Public opinion in India has never accepted the two-class nature of
the international system as codified in the nuclear arms control regimes. If the
world were to be divided into two classes of powers, then India would be unwilling to
belong to the group that does not set the rules. The options that remained then were
two:
- Sustain its nuclear restraint in the form of 'recessed' or non weaponized
deterrence by building nuclear weapons covertly and remaining outside the arms
control regimes at the risk of destabilization, or;
- Openly develop a bomb and
attempt to integrate India into the international regimes including CTBT and Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as a nuclear weapons state. India's support for
nuclear disarmament has always been extremely strong.
Sujit Dutta: "You must agree that there is no
possibility for movement on nuclear disarmament, given the logic of the military and
arms control doctrines, of the five nuclear states."
Recent progress in India-U.S. relations was cited, progress many thought would
have developed more quickly in the wake of the Cold War. Now, however, there is
little recourse other than sanctions against India.
Patrick Cronin: "If anyone in India calculated that this
testing would somehow get them a seat at the table so that India could be dealt with
on a panoply of issues, these tests have assured the opposite result. That is, there
will be only a unidimensional aspect to U.S.-India relations, at least for the short
to mid-term."
Implications for Intelligence and Verification
Vipin Gupta, who co-authored the July 1996 report "Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations
in the Rajasthan Desert," participated via teleconference to discuss aspects of his
current project as well as implications for international verification. Use of open
source information and technologies (commercial satellite imagery, internet,
worldwide web, etc.), and the manner it applies to arms control is significant. He
and a colleague tested a new verification procedure in late 1995, using India as a
case study. They targeted the area in which India conducted its first nuclear test in
1974, and the results can be seen at
http://www.ca.sandia.gov/casite/gupta/index.html. There were allegations as early as
the early 1980s that India was preparing to conduct such tests. Allegations were
substantiated, and Gupta and his colleagues noted that incremental steps were taken
over an 18-year period. Despite conflicting explanations coming from a variety of
government sources, Gupta stated that his findings were based upon open source
information. Concerns regarding the verifiability of the CTBT are misplaced according
to Gupta. "While it is a bonus to try to actually detect nuclear test preparations,
that is not a critical component towards implementing this treaty, from a strictly
technical standpoint," he said. Gupta hoped that collaboration with Indian scientists
in the future would enhance verifiability of the CTBT, based on India's clandestine
nuclear test program.
Implications for Regional & International Security
Ambassador Goodby found it
difficult to be optimistic, considering the impact on ongoing negotiations with other
states, suggesting that a domino effect of an arms race is probable throughout the
subcontinent, spreading into Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. He cited the difficult
negotiations with Iran and Russia and the question of necessity, and indicated that
this would now complicate the issue. "It is a very messy and dangerous situation from
the standpoint of cooperation and relations." He noted that repercussions would be
complicated.
James Goodby:"It is a very messy and dangerous situation
from the standpoint of cooperation and relations."
Sujit Dutta rejected the notion of chain reactions throughout the region. India is
not a signatory to the NPT, which suggests that if there is going to be any
demonstrative effect, it should be the duty and responsibility of the nuclear weapon
powers, who should show responsibility and readiness to deal with the question of
nuclear disarmament. He indicated that it is irresponsible to blame India for
potential reactions, rather than those signatories of the NPT and CTBT who may
abrogate the regimes. As far as Pakistan is concerned, since 1987 every Pakistani
leader has been saying that they have the bomb. A Pakistani test at this point causes
no particular concern in India. The U.S. has "waived aside the Symington Amendment
during the Reagan Doctrine days and during the Cold War days when Pakistan was a
critical factor in the Afghan Policy... and allowed Pakistan to go ahead with its
nuclear policy. It now has a full capability, and India has to live with it. So let's
be fair... either deterrence operates for the five countries, or it operates for
everyone. If everyone else has agreed to stay with one side or the other of the
nuclear nonproliferation regimes, then they've accepted it. Where is the question of
chain reaction? There has been no violation of any agreement on India's part... I
don't think we should try and even discuss extreme positions that only give reasons
for arms lobbies to now go on to new kinds of theories of building up arms, using the
India example. India has had an extremely responsible policy for 24 years [since the
1974 Pokhran test], and has kept a restrained regime. What was the implication or
reaction of the five nuclear powers to that? ... Even now, they've said that NPT
cannot be amended under any circumstances. That is not a way to build any
international system."
Implications for the U.S.
Participants generally concurred that the question of
U.S.-India relations was irrelevant; the important policy issue in the U.S. will be
the incentive given or not given to other countries to proliferate. The U.S. response
will be calculated in such a manner to dissuade other nations, who may perceive a
gain in India's status, from starting their own nuclear programs, or proceeding
further. So while India may hope to join the nonproliferation regime as a nuclear
weapons state, the U.S. and others will seek to avoid any appearance of India being
rewarded for what it has done. "What India has created is another new club. The
challenge for the U.S. is to make sure the membership of that club remains a
membership of one," one participant stated.
Dutta suggested that, coupled with the security issues which have gone unaddressed
by the NPT regime is the allegation that it is a regime discriminatory in nature; as
the world moves closer to the CTBT review in 1999, there is decreasing opportunity to
test and therefore become a nuclear state. The discriminatory nature of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime was acknowledged. When testing ceases, nuclear arsenals will
remain, guaranteeing the security of nuclear deterrence for only China, France,
Russia, U.K. and U.S., the current nuclear states. The CTBT and the FMCT are
fundamentally tied to the NPT; in addition to the rationale already discussed, it is
presumed that India, which vetoed the CTBT in 1996 for failing to link it with
nuclear disarmament or address security issues of any but the five nuclear powers,
conducted its recent tests to provide an avenue by which it may join and thereby
secure the CTBT in 1999. The United States and other nuclear powers would be
ill-advised to ignore the fact that weapons treaties and nuclear nonproliferation
regimes designed for the good of a few and not the collective are fundamentally
flawed. Should the regimes fail to meet political and security requirements of
non-nuclear states while applying pressure to sign, then resistance can and should be
expected. India has made it clear on many occasions that it sees partnership status
in which it is invited to contribute, rather than subordinate status in which it
continues to be dictated to, as the only acceptable outcome. India perceived a choice
to test its nuclear weapons, join the club and engage in international security
dialogue, or to refrain from testing, stay out and lose its long term security
option.
Dutta noted that there has been no movement away from deterrence in the military
doctrine of the five nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapons will remain relevant in
the security dynamics of the world in the 21st century. India, however, was required
to abjure such a doctrine for itself, despite the serious security implications of
this reality. The question of whether such a regime is internationally acceptable was
tabled. Dutta discussed the India-China relationship, noting the key role Chinese
actions had played in the evolution of the Indian decision on nuclear weapons. India
had officially offered to talk with Pakistan about no-first-use nuclear doctrine.
Pakistan refused and China did not respond to any proposal for a dialogue on
strategic and arms control issues. Continued Chinese nuclear weapon and missile
buildup and its collaboration with Pakistan in these areas through the past two
decades—in spite of China's signing the NPT—had seriously undermined India's
external security. Discussions with Chinese arms control and security experts clearly
indicate they perceived India as a rudimentary nuclear weapon state. The People's
Liberation Army (PLA) would reflect such an understanding. This was a dangerous
situation from the Indian perspective since it did not have the capability of
credible minimum deterrence. The Chinese would not undertake any talks with India on
arms control or nuclear reassurance because that would have meant formally accepting
India as a nuclear weapons state. Despite the fact that India-China relations have
improved substantially in the post-Cold War years and the two sides have agreed on a
series of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), the relationship has been at risk due
to the rapidly changing power relationship between China and India; lack of movement
on resolving the outstanding disputes, especially on territorial claims along the
Himalayan frontier; and the global acceptance of China as a great power with the
inherent right to build nuclear weapons and missiles. India has also been concerned
about the increasing possibility of a bipolar Asian politico-security structure
evolving as a result of growing U.S.-China interactions. The U.S. and China have in
recent years focused their discussions on ways to bilaterally manage the Asian
security environment, including Southern Asia that would ensure a special hegemonic
status for Beijing—a trend that was an anathema to New Delhi.
Next Steps
A series of factors have, therefore, contributed to India's decision to
test nuclear weapons. Despite the many ramifications, India would certainly expect
that its security concerns, its consistent support for nuclear abolition, and its
strict export controls relating to all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems would make other states to react positively, and not to take extreme steps
that would close diplomatic options. India for its part would have to move—as it
has already stated—towards joining the CTBT, entering the discussions on the FMCT,
announcing a no-first-use doctrine, and unilaterally offering nuclear assurance and
specific CBM talks to both Pakistan and China. India has already declared itself a
nuclear weapons state. It would then appear that creative and sustained Indo-U.S.
diplomatic talks are crucial for dealing with the new situation. India still believes
that it is important to work on a global security framework not based on weapons of
mass destruction—including nuclear weapons.
One participant noted that "so much of the outcome depends upon U.S. and
superpower response, and that's the linchpin. If we respond by seeing this as an
enormous threat, or if we seek to de-escalate, that is the question and the
challenge. If there is widespread acknowledgment in the State Department and senior
policy circles of the discriminatory nature of the nuclear club, that there is
tremendous asymmetry in the international system, now is the time for the U.S. to
take action, to reverse these trends. We're on the top of the heap, we are the
superpower, so let's set the tone, let's ratify SALT II, let's begin the disarmament
process, let's perhaps use this very unfortunate development as a catalyst for
fundamental change in the nuclear nonproliferation regim. ...We're the largest
weapons dealer in the world, for the sixth year in a row, so our response to this
could set a whole new tone in the international system if we stepped up incentives,
if we try to de-nuclearize ourselves, and we begin dismantling the large stockpiles
here in this country." (B. Wien, USIP). Dutta's proposal that this represents an
opportunity for progress among the nuclear powers was echoed by members of the panel
as well as the audience.
Cronin acknowledged the problem inherent in potentially different conclusions and
lessons drawn by "would-be" nuclear powers. Above all, the United States and the
international community should seek to further elaborate nonproliferation norms and
institutions to include non-nuclear states; draw realistic options vis-a-vis India;
try to preserve Pakistani restraint; and provide clear indications to would-be
proliferators as to the dangers and costs of such a course of action, and its impact
on the international community.
Speakers
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