Iraq Sanctions: What Have We Learned?
Panel Discussion
![Iraq Sanctions Panel](images/photos/dsw_iraq-sanctions.jpg)
l to r: David
Baldwin, Jon B. Alterman,
Meghan L. O' Sullivan and George Lopez
Date and Time
Monday, July 17,
2000
2:00 PM-4:00 PM
Location
U.S. Institute of Peace
2nd Floor Conference Room
1200 17th St, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Directions
A July 17 panel discussion,
organized by the Institute's Research
and Studies Program, examined
the effectiveness and lasting legacies of decade of economic
sanctions on Iraq.
Speakers:
- Jon
B. Alterman
Program Officer, Research & Studies Program, USIP
- David
Baldwin
Ira D. Wallach Professor of World Order Studies
Columbia University
- George
Lopez
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies
University of Notre Dame
- Meghan
L. O' Sullivan
Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program
Brookings Institution
Summary
Prof. Baldwin began the session
with a general overview of sanctions. He stressed that
sanctions should be seen as but one element of statecraft.
Like other elements of statecraft, sanctions often have
multiple goals. He argued that in any individual case, the
success of sanctions is a matter of degree, and that the
utility of economic sanctions must be judged in relation to
the costs and benefits of alternative policies. The
question, therefore, is not "Do sanctions work?" but rather
"To what degree do they work, with respect to what goals, at
what costs, and in comparison with what alternative courses
of action?"
Turning to Iraq, our sanctions policy
there seems to have had three stages: From August to
December 1990, from 1991 to 1998, and from 1998 to the
present.
In the first stage, our goals were to
swiftly express condemnation of the Iraqi invasion, to
demonstrate our resolve, and to preserve Kuwaiti assets. In
addition, we sought to avoid triggering an Iraqi invasion of
Saudi Arabia, and win an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. In
this, US policy was successful on all but the last point,
and it did so at relatively low cost.
COERCIVE ARMS
CONTROL
In the second stage (1991-1998), we
sought to use sanctions to promote compliance with UN
Security Council Resolution 687. The UN introduced the Oil
for Food Program to mitigate the human suffering caused by
sanctions policy, although it languished for five years
until Saddam Hussein agreed to its implementation. Bringing
down the regime was never a goal of the UN
sanctions.
Like the first stage, the costs of
this stage were relatively low, and the Oil for Food Program
was self-financing. Alternative policies to ensure that Iraq
disarmed, such as a complete occupation of the country, may
have been more effective in winning disarmament, but would
have been far costlier to implement.
In December 1998, the US made a
mistake by stating that regime replacement was a goal of US
policy. Weapons inspectors were withdrawn later that month,
followed by four days of aerial bombardment. The
administration appears to have adopted such a policy because
the costs of alternative policies (an occupation of Iraq,
for example) were considerably higher.
In this third stage of Iraq sanctions
policy (1998-present), the ruling elite has insulated itself
from the effects of the sanctions, and in some cases is even
benefiting from them. The human consequences of this policy
are real. Yet who is to blame?
POINTING FINGERS
Saddam Hussein delayed implementation
of the Oil for Food Program for five years, and has a
history of long delaying the distribution of supplies. In
any event, he can secure the lifting of sanctions tomorrow
if he simply complies with the relevant UN
resolutions.
In addition, while opponents of
sanctions often decry their human effects, the potential
victims of Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
are also legitimate objects of humanitarian
concern.
If there is a way to target sanctions
more at the leadership than the people, we should. But most
proposals along this line tend to underestimate the
difficulties in doing so, especially with regard to dual-use
items.
END OF THE ROAD
Prof. Lopez argued that the
utility of the present set of sanctions has been exhausted.
In the absence of being able to move a successor to UNSCOM
into place, we are moving away from a policy which uses
sanctions as a way to controlling WMD toward a general
policy of deterrence. Such a policy has been successful in
the past against countries with more capabilities than Iraq
has. Rather than advocate the complete dismantling of
sanctions, Lopez suggested that they should be sharpened and
accompanied by a full-blown, multilateral humanitarian
policy.
Prof. Lopez noted that, in the Iraqi
case, sanctions have bought a mid-level economy to its
knees. Since April 1991, there has been an unprecedented
economic calamity in Iraq. The economy has been set back at
least three-quarters of a century. Two generations of
Iraqis' lives have been fundamentally changed, but such a
change has not produced political compliance.
INCENTIVES
In order for sanctions to be
effective, he added, they must be part of a larger program
of coercive measures. Since 1993, sanctions have been "the"
policy rather than a component of policy. In addition,
sanctions are rarely effective unless they are also combined
with incentives. Indeed, the sanctions-incentives mix may be
the key to a successful policy. The structure of UN
resolution 687, which had far more provisions than any
previous UN Security Council sanctions resolution, provided
little room for incentives to reward partial Iraqi
compliance with its provisions. The all-or-nothing approach
understates great progress made in scaling back Iraqi
capabilities in nuclear, chemical and ballistic weapons
development.
Also, it is important to remember that
sanctions have costs, and there comes a point at which the
costs erode the leverage necessary to maintain the
sanctions. In the Iraq case, this may have occurred as early
as 1996.
Prof. Lopez suggested, in conclusion,
that the overall strategy toward Iraq must be reexamined,
and a balance reestablished between sanctions and other
elements of statecraft. The utility of sanctions
internationally is jeopardized by the failure of sanctions
in the Iraq case.
More generally, we have learned that
sanctions will only work if they are part of a larger
policy, and if they are narrow and limited. Finally, Prof.
Lopez appealed for lifting comprehensive trade sanctions,
yet maintaining control over military and dual use
technology and continuing to isolate the petroleum,
diplomatic and business communities. Financial controls
should also remain in place. In other words, the world
community should adopt a "smart sanctions" approach to
effect change in Iraq.
REASONS FOR
DIFFICULTIES
Dr. O'Sullivan suggested that
sanctions on Iraq did not provide the expected leverage for
at least two reasons. The first is the regime's pointed
indifference to the suffering of its people. Second, the
elaborate smuggling network established with regime
complicity funded regime activities, consolidated regime
control and insulated the leadership from the deprivations
of sanctions.
Saddam has also been able to
manipulate the international community, giving him hopes
that he can "outwait" the sanctions. He has played the
humanitarian suffering card quite well, and his
multibillion-dollar debts to France and Russia have given
him leverage with permanent members of the Security Council.
Both France and Russia have signed contracts with Iraq to
carry out commercial activities when sanctions are lifted,
giving them incentives to lift the sanctions sooner rather
than later, and disincentives to push for regime
change.
Sanctions must be viewed as a tool,
not a strategy, but sanctions have been used all too much as
a substitute for strategy, to the neglect of other tools
like diplomacy, military force, and covert action, all of
which have been used poorly in the Iraq case.
LESSONS LEARNED
Among the lessons of the Iraq case is
that previous conceptions of sanctions have been flawed. We
had previously thought that imposing enough hardship on a
population will lead either to a revolt, or pressure on a
leader to step down or change his policies. Such has not
happened in Iraq. If we have to revisit the idea of how
sanctions work, we need to think more about how to target
sanctions, and how to incorporate a bargaining mechanism
within the sanctions structure.
On the multilateral front, we have to
understand that the UN framework for sanctions against Iraq
is what has kept them in place for so long. Multilateral
sanctions can be imposed by regional organizations (like the
sanctions against Burundi) or by an ad hoc collection of
countries, but such arrangements do not have the durability
of sanctions imposed by the Security Council, since few
countries want to openly flout their UN obligations.
LOOKING FORWARD
Looking forward, we have to think more
about how targeted countries will respond to the imposition
of sanctions. Perhaps one explanation for the longer-range
problems of sanctions on Iraq is that they were never
intended to last for a decade. Still, factors like Iraq's
outstanding debt to Russia should have been foreseen and
addressed early in the process.
We also need to put greater emphasis
on other tools. Sanctions cannot do everything, and they are
especially ill suited to achieving very ambitious aims.
Finally, we need to give great attention to enforcement.
Even if the sanctions are 95 percent effective, the five
percent leakage will almost certainly go to the targeted
regime and help prolong its rule.
Looking forward on the Iraq case, we
need to pay more attention to coalition maintenance, and do
more to curtail smuggling. There is a role for our European
allies here to speak with Iran and convince the government
that enforcing sanctions against Iraq is in our mutual
interest.
The bottom line of any new policy
toward Iraq is that no resources can flow to the leadership
until an UNSCOM-like organization has given the country a
clean bill of health.
In addition to that bottom line, we
should put in place a policy that alleviates human suffering
in Iraq, weakens the support base for the regime, and builds
up the coalition to contain Iraq. In this regard, we should
examine four possible changes to policy: to consider
allowing consumer imports; consider allowing foreign oil
companies to invest in Iraq, provided that resources are
kept away from regime; focusing on improving the civilian
infrastructure; and exploring ways that more humanitarian
supplies can reach the general population. In regard to the
latter, we should try to find a way out of putting contracts
under the Oil for Food Program on hold, perhaps by
establishing a structure to monitor how such supplies are
used. We also might think about how international aid
agencies could execute contracts in Iraq so that the
domestic situation improves but money is kept away from the
regime.