

## **Executive Summary**

---

### Evaluation of Support to Mobilized Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve Units

#### **Background and Overview**

**Congressional Request.** This evaluation was initiated on April 9, 2004, in response to a November 6, 2003, letter sent to the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG) and signed by 28 members of Congress (see Appendix B). The letter expressed concerns that deployed Army National Guard soldiers were subjected to inadequate supply of potable water, lack of proper clothing, poor food quality, inferior medical care, and difficult access to communications with their families.

**Evaluation Scope.** To address this congressional request, this report examines mobilization and logistics issues impacting Army National Guard and the Army Reserve units that deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Together, these forces comprise the reserve component (RC). When the RC is combined and integrated with the US Army active duty component (AC), the resultant capability is the “total force.”

**Historical Disparity Between AC and RC.** There are inherent disparity factors when comparing AC to RC force structure. Historically, the policy of “tiered readiness” means that, in a resource-constrained environment, where there is insufficient funding to resource all units simultaneously with the latest equipment and training, those units expected to deploy first receive the newest equipment and increased funding. This resource allocation strategy ensures that the first units expected to deploy can do so immediately, without delays for receipt of newer equipment, additional people, and/or training. Consequently, the reserve components, which were expected to have more time to get ready, have received less funding, less training, and less modern equipment than their active component counterparts. RC forces make up over 54 percent of the total force; yet receive less than 11 percent of the Army’s budget. Nevertheless, since September 11, 2001, nearly 40 percent of the RC units have mobilized.

#### **Evaluation Methodology**

On April 9, 2004, after preliminary inquiries into the issues highlighted in the congressional letter and press reports, we announced this evaluation to review the support provided to the mobilized Army National Guard (ARNG) units and extended the scope to include US Army Reserve Command (USARC) units. Specifically, this report evaluates two basic arguments:

1. Adequacy, and
2. Disparity

The first argument centers on whether the support provided to the RC was adequate, and sufficient to meet mission needs.


The second argument centers on whether treatment and support of the RC units were the same as provided to the AC units.

To evaluate these arguments of adequacy and disparity, we had to separate “perceptions” from “reality” and draw conclusions from empirical data, rather than from anecdotal reports. We also had to determine if policies/guidance were adequate and if the data we gathered were representative and accurate. The team also had to factor in the realities and uncertainties of a nation preparing and going to war. Therefore, to accomplish these tasks, the team used this methodology:

- ✓ Reviewed policy and guidance that existed prior to OEF and OIF for each of the areas.
- ✓ Interviewed RC/AC officials and enlisted soldiers who were deployed or had returned from Iraq and Afghanistan.
- ✓ Used survey techniques:
  - Sent out comprehensive questionnaires to RC and AC Commanders/First Sergeants who were currently deployed or had just returned from deployment, receiving responses from 72 RC and 40 AC units.
  - Sent out comprehensive questionnaires to State Adjutants General (TAGs) and Commanders of Reserve Readiness Commands (RRCs).
  - Conducted sensing session interviews using a comprehensive set of questions on each of the areas.
- ✓ Questioned AC/RC staff subject matter experts.
- ✓ Identified new and revised policies to improve the logistical support process.
- ✓ Analyzed all the data to formulate appropriate observations and recommendations.


## Results

The support provided to mobilized Army National Guard and Reserve soldiers was adequate overall. Although numerous sensing session and unit questionnaire respondents expressed concern about instances of perceived disparate treatment, we did not find disparate treatment to be systemic, beyond that which results from the tiered readiness system. Some RC soldiers alleged that AC soldiers got more/better food, better medical/dental care, and had better access to telephones and internet communications with families. The chart above summarizes responses on the issue of general disparity between RC and AC soldiers, based on sensing sessions with soldiers and questionnaires sent to unit Commanders/First Sergeants, State Adjutants General, and U.S. Army Reserve Regional Readiness Commands.




We focused specifically on the following issues: availability of potable water, proper individual clothing (mainly Desert Camouflage Uniforms—DCUs—and desert boots), food/food service, medical/dental care, and access to communications with family members.


Although bulk water produced by Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPU) was readily available, both RC and AC soldiers stated that ROWPU water was over-chlorinated and tasted bad. Other concerns were that the water was too hot to drink and could have caused diarrhea. In some instances, bottled water was rationed in March, April, and May 2003 e.g., only two 1.5 liter bottles per person per day. Again, ROWPU potable water was available in adequate quantities. There was a plentiful supply of bottled water after the first three months of OIF.



There were initial problems with an adequate supply of DCUs and desert boots. After initial inventories had been issued to higher tiered units (mainly AC), stock depletion could not be immediately replaced. Therefore, many RC soldiers only received 2 sets of DCUs and 1 pair of desert boots. Some reportedly received a mixed issue, e.g., summer jacket, winter trousers. However, the Army Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) and regular combat boots were designated as acceptable *in lieu* of items. Each RC soldier was supposed to report to the mobilization station with their normal issue of four sets of BDUs and two pair of regular combat boots from home station. With these *in lieu* of items, the supply of proper clothing was adequate. Army Logistics' reports indicate that, based on demand data and shipment, DCU stocks were adequate to issue 4 sets per soldier by November 2003.



### Food and Food Service Quality




The concerns expressed regarding food and food service were limited to menu variety at contractor-operated dining facilities (DFACs), and not about poor food quality. Some soldiers at remote sites complained about the variety of hot food delivered from the Dining Facilities (DFACs) and only having Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs). There was an alleged incident of food poisoning in Kuwait in 2002 and one incident of food rationing in Afghanistan in 2002. The guards at the Abu Gharaib prison in Iraq said that

prisoners got more and better hot meals. There were no complaints about spoiled food or food poisoning in Afghanistan or Iraq. There was one complaint about an initial shortage of cooks in


Kandahar, Afghanistan. There were numerous complaints about the initial shortage of hot meals, fresh fruit, and vegetables. However, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that food and food service support was adequate.

Most medical concerns were about lack of routine dental care--an issue affecting AC and RC soldiers equally in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our evaluation concluded that medical/dental care was adequate with no evidence of disparity between RC and AC soldiers.

### Medical/Dental Care



### Access to Communication with Family



Morale phone calls to “home” using Defense Switch Network (DSN) was slow and unreliable. Early in OIF, soldiers had to wait in line for hours for a 15 minute phone call once a week. Soldiers complained that there were insufficient numbers of DSN telephones and phone card charges on commercial phones were too expensive. Initially, there was limited internet computer (e-mail) capability. The ability to

communicate electronically with family members at home clearly fell short of soldiers’ expectations. Those expectations may have been unrealistic in a developing combat theater. Some AC units brought more unit-owned computers with them than RC units did. However, beyond that, there was no disparity between RC and AC soldiers’ ability to communicate with family members. CENTCOM and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command have significantly improved access to communications with family as the theater has matured. These efforts continue.

During the course of this evaluation, it became evident that most Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units were not preparing or forwarding formal After Action Reports (AARs) for use in the Army Lessons Learned System. We found no clear indication of unresolved issues being consolidated and tracked at the Army National Guard Bureau or the U.S. Army Reserve Command. When RC units do not actively participate in the Army’s established Lessons Learned System, the ability of the Center for Army Lessons Learned to collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned during mobilization/demobilization and combat operations is diminished and could lead to recurring mistakes and deficiencies.

## **Conclusions**

In the areas of potable water, proper clothing (DCUs/desert boots), food/food service, medical/dental care, and access to communications with family members, the logistical support provided to both RC and AC soldiers was adequate and sufficient to meet mission needs.

The preponderance of the evidence shows no systemic disparity in the logistic support provided to RC and AC soldiers, beyond that resulting from the tiered readiness system.

Furthermore, the feedback from our sensing sessions indicates that RC units, both Army National Guard and US Army Reserve, do not routinely participate in the established Army Lessons Learned System, as outlined in AR 11-33.

## **Recommendations**

To improve the mobilization and logistical support to both RC and AC soldiers, we recommend:

1. The Army G-4 should develop a plan of action and schedule to implement short and long term palatability improvements of field drinking water supplies in arid environments, including those recommended by the Joint Medical Field Water Subgroup, Joint Environmental Surveillance Work Group, which advises the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Health Protection and Readiness).
2. The RC leadership should ensure that all RC soldiers understand:
  - a. the concept of “in lieu of” equipment issues, and
  - b. the “disparity by design” issues associated with tiered readiness.
3. Reserve Readiness Commands and State Adjutants General must assess the Organization Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE) readiness within their subordinate units and ensure that shortages are requisitioned, in accordance with Army regulations, prior to mobilization. They must also ensure that RC soldiers take their OCIE with them to mobilization stations.
4. Army G1, in coordination with Army G4, should update the Army Personnel Policy Guidance to clarify the responsibilities for purchasing and requisitioning OCIE shortages at the mobilization stations.
5. The Commander, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) should:
  - a. Publish guidance on evaluation/analysis of DD Forms 5161, “Comprehensive Food Service Inspections,” and other food inspection reports, as required by Army Technical Bulletin MED 530.
  - b. Establish procedures for corrective implementing recommendations derived from the evaluation/analysis of food service reports.

6. LOGCAP and the DoD Veterinary Service Activity should establish a quality assurance procedure to track corrective action(s) for USACHPPM identified food service deficiencies.

7. The Army Surgeon General should:

a. Identify what elements comprise appropriate medical care in a combat theater and how those elements should be compiled and reported.

b. Establish metrics that measure the quality of medical treatment rendered to the individual patient in the combat theater.

8. The Chief, Army Reserve/Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Command should:

a. Establish procedures requiring all US Army Reserve units mobilized and deployed in support of contingency or combat operations to prepare and submit After Action Reports (AARs), after returning from deployment, thru their chains of command, to the U.S. Army Reserve Command for consolidation and forwarding to US Army Forces Command and the Center for Army Lessons Learned, in accordance with AR 11-33.

b. Establish a procedure to document and track the status of open action items resulting from recurring issues, recommendations, or lessons learned, as reported in the AARs.

9. The Director, Army National Guard and State Adjutants General should:

a. Establish procedures requiring all Army National Guard units mobilized and deployed in support of contingency or combat operations to prepare and submit AARs, after returning from deployment, thru their chains of command, to the Director, Army National Guard for consolidation and forwarding to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, in accordance with AR 11-33.

b. Establish procedures to document and track the status of open action items resulting from recurring issues, recommendations, or lessons learned reported in the AARs.

## **Management Comments and Evaluation Response:**

**The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs** “concurred with comment.” Their comments addressed general aspects of the report, not related to any specific recommendation. Both agencies’ complete responses are included in [Appendix D](#).

**The Department of the Army Inspector General** provided the response of “noted with comments,” stating, in part: “due to the report highlights on tiered readiness, (Recommendation 2) it would be helpful to readers to also know how the Army has changed to the AC/RC Force Generation Model, where units progress through levels of increasing readiness toward potential deployments.” The complete Army IG response is included in [Appendix E](#).

**I&E Response:** Army Modernization Plan 2002, Annex F states, in part: “The Army force structure goal is to have all active and reserve component elements interchangeable.” FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 “Training: Army Relationships,” dated July 20, 2000, states, in part: “The Army has prioritized combat forces according to expected deployment requirements in support of operation plans (OPLANs) and the need to be capable of responding to unforeseen crises. The strategy requires a multi-mission capable force of AC and RC units trained to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force.” A Conventional Force Generation Model was created to depict the synchronization of The Army Plan, combatant commanders OPLANs, Supply Support Center requirements, and resource priorities for conventional Army forces.

**The United States Army Reserve Command (USARC)** provided management comments on Recommendation 3. The complete response is included in [Appendix E](#).

Recommendation 3 states: “Reserve Readiness Commands and State Adjutants General must assess the Organization Clothing and Individual Equipment (OCIE) readiness within their subordinate units and ensure that shortages are requisitioned, in accordance with Army regulations, prior to mobilization. They must also ensure that RC soldiers take their OCIE with them to mobilization stations.”

USARC Comments: “FORSCOM Regulation 700-2, “Logistics Standing Instruction,” instructs RC units to minimize stockage list of OCIE to training requirements only. There is no mandatory stockage authorized list of OCIE for RC units. Also, IAW CTA 50-900, most Army Reserve Central Issue Facilities (CIF) at the mobilization stations have the staff, expertise, and mission to provide the OCIE necessary to support a unit deployment to a designated geographic region or climatic zone. OCIE requirements vary by deployment region/zone and RC units generally do not know before mobilization what the deployment site is; therefore, the actual list of requirements is not known. The Army Reserve Command published mandatory OCIE stockage list of items common to all zones, to ensure all units had a baseline stockage of OCIE.

The CIFs at some mobilization stations actually refused to provide OCIE to Army Reserve units, stating the equipment must be provided by the Army Reserve.

As stated in the recommendations, RC soldiers must understand the concepts of "in-lieu-of" equipment and "disparity by design." These very concepts support a practice of issuing equipment as needed, when needed, by a Central Issue Facility. The report recognizes that RC forces are inadequately funded, therefore, the most efficient management of resources would be to consolidate and issue OCIE **as needed** by the mobilization station CIF. It is not fiscally prudent to fill warehouses and pay storage costs for OCIE not used for training, when the mobilization stations already operate a CIF.”

**I&E Response:** It is incumbent on RC leadership to comply with appropriate regulatory guidance regarding OCIE. While not all OCIE is required to be on hand, items such as BDUs and regular combat boots are required to be in the possession of RC soldiers. The RC leadership must confirm such possession, accountability, and serviceability in accordance with AR 710-2, “Supply Policy Below the National Level.”



In the Army Reserve 2005 Posture Statement it states: “Although the Army Reserve received \$40 million in National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) funding for FY05, an equipment shortfall totaling more than one billion dollars still remains.”

**The National Guard Bureau (NGB)** responded to chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6. The complete response is included in [Appendix F](#).

NGB Management Comments: NGB “nonconcurrent” with the statement on page 22 of the draft report: “Army Logistics’ reports indicate all deploying units were issued four sets of DCUs and two pair of desert boots by November 2003.” NGB stated that this was misinformation.

“While all major commands were fielded the appropriate quantities of DCUs and boots, divisions are not doctrinally required to support non-divisional units. Therefore, although the non-divisional units were in divisional areas of responsibility, the commands were not inclined to support them. Therefore, while adequate numbers of uniforms were available in theater, the distribution was not even. As most non-divisional units are ARNG and USAR, those units predominantly were without the DCUs and boots.”

With regard to Recommendation 2, (in lieu of items and tiered readiness), NGB stated: “The RC leadership does not need to ensure that all RC soldiers understand the tiered readiness system which includes “in lieu of” and “disparity by design.” The 12 April 2004 Army Campaign Plan (ACP) provides direction for preparing the Army to create and sustain a campaign-capable joint and expeditionary Army.”

**I&E Response:** We modified the statement on page v of the EXSUM and page 22 in the final report to read “Army Logistics’ reports indicated that, based on demand data and shipment, DCU stocks were adequate to issue 4 sets per soldier by November 2003.” However, it is possible that distribution of these DCUs did not make it down to all individual soldiers (RC/AC) before they redeployed from theater. Although there may have been a higher percentage of RC troops that did not receive 4 sets of DCUs, there was no evidence to suggest that RC troops did not receive 4 sets of DCUs just because they were RC. Distribution priority for DCUs was primarily to divisional units, followed by non-divisional units. The priority list did not distinguish AC from RC. While some non-divisional units were AC, a high percentage of non-divisional units were RC.

While various initiatives, to include the AC/RC Force Generation Model, promise to better manage readiness among AC and RC forces, the effort will only be as accurate as the ability to predict future requirements by type of unit. As new contingencies develop, RC units may have to be called up before they have reached their highest state of readiness. If that happens, there will likely be “in lieu of” equipment issues. It is important that RC soldiers understand these issues.

NGB concurred with Recommendation 10—After Action Reports (AARs).

[Return to Table of Contents](#)