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Who Should Read This Report and Why? DoD civilian and military personnel who are responsible for the management of military personnel should read this report. The report discusses how standard operating procedures would help reduce confusion about personnel staffing levels at headquarters level and at the warfighting level, as well as help improve optimization of personnel staffing levels.
Background. I Marine Expeditionary Force, as one of the Marine Corps' warfighting commands, deploys in response to component commander taskings to conduct small-scale contingencies within joint operations. This report addresses Marine Corps enlisted personnel staffing requirements and personnel staffing levels of selected I Marine Expeditionary Force infantry and non-infantry battalions, which deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom between January and February 2003.
Marine Corps battalions' enlisted personnel staffing levels were below the 100 percent of their table of organization1 requirement. In addition, 1st Marine Division officials stated that in the months just before deploying, they were unable to retain key personnel who had orders to special duty assignments, such as recruiting duty and drill instructor duty and other taskings from higher headquarters. Headquarters Marine Corps also did not approve the filling of I Marine Expeditionary Force's 453 contingency coded billets,2 which required I Marine Expeditionary Force's headquarters staffs to conduct 24-hour operations under wartime conditions.
Results. According to Marine Corps officials, Marine Corps battalions that deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom successfully completed their mission; however, they did so with vacant enlisted warfighting positions. Specifically, three infantry battalions, a light armored reconnaissance battalion, and an artillery battalion reported personnel staffing levels just before deployment of 93 percent, 83 percent, 75 percent, 84 percent, and 87 percent, respectively, of their table of organization. The Marine Corps did not have formal standard operating procedures to deploy in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions; did not fully and timely implement its mobilization management plan; and had not developed a formal management control plan. As a result, Marines faced higher risks during deployments due to increased demands placed on limited personnel resources. Developing and implementing standard operating procedures for units deploying in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions; modifying the current mobilization plan; and developing a formal management control plan will help optimize personnel staffing levels during future deployments and will correct the weakness identified in this report. See the Finding section for the detailed recommendations.
Management Comments and Audit Response. The Marine Corps concurred with the intent of the recommendation to modify the current mobilization plan to include additional procedures, other than activating the Individual Ready Reserve, for increasing personnel staffing levels when deploying in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions. The Marine Corps did not concur with the recommendations to develop and implement standard operating procedures for units deploying in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions and to develop and implement a formal management control plan for planning, directing, coordinating, and supervising active forces.
The Marine Corps stated that standard operating procedures were successfully followed to the extent possible. We do not believe that the Marine Corps has standard operating procedures that address manpower issues for deployment in support of combatant commanders' warfighting missions or a formal management control plan that identifies the management of personnel in deploying units as an assessable unit.
We request that the Director, Manpower Personnel Plans and Policies Division
in the Office of the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs provide additional comments on the final report by August 16,
2004. See the Finding section of the report for a discussion of management comments
and the Management Comments section of the report for the complete text of the
comments.
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1 A table of organization describes the Marine Corps organizational manpower requirements in terms of grade and military occupational specialty.
2 Contingency coded billets are those billets filled under wartime conditions and are included in the Marine Corps’ overall structure for readiness and operational purposes.
Any comments or suggestions should be sent to: auditnet@dodig.mil