CHAPTER 7
CHALLENGER ACCIDENT AND AFTERMATH

Assured Access to Space: 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 1986. This publication reports on hearings held by the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications on several occasions in 1986 following the Challenger accident.

Baker, David. "Science Crashed with Challenger." New Scientist. 29 January 1987, pp. 55-57. Written on the first anniversary of the Challenger accident, this article asserts that space science was set back many years because of the retrenchment of the space program. Baker analyzes what he thought was a dangerous trend in the space program, the subversion of science for military payloads. Even without this, contends Baker, literally hundreds of scheduled experiments for the Shuttle have been delayed for an indefinite period. He ends by saying that the fate of the Shuttle resulted in the loss of 38 years from the science projects discussed in the article.

Beck, Melinda. "NASA's Troubled Flight Plan: There's no Turning Back, but Are We on the Right Path?" Newsweek. 10 February 1986, pp. 35-38. This is a good article on the development of the space program and the alleged loss of nerve resulting from the explosion of Challenger. It suggests that NASA was naive to put all eggs in the Shuttle basket and that a reevaluation is appropriate.

Bell, Trudy E. and Esch, Karl. "The Fatal Flaw in Flight 51-L." IEEE Spectrum. (February 1987): 36-51. This article, based on personal interviews and Rogers Commission and congressional committee reports, reviews the events leading up to the Challenger accident. It discusses the steady erosion of concern about the deficiencies of the O-ring design as NASA and Thiokol became more complacent with the Shuttle's operational success. Other reasons cited for NASA's and Thiokol's failure was their rigid chains of command, the lack of input from the NASA safety office, the financial and possible political pressure to launch, and the lack of secondary manufacturing sources for the boosters. The article concludes that management was in general too wedded to a climate that simply ignored bad news, rather than pay attention to it and try to correct reported problems.

Bell, Trudy E., and Esch, Karl. "The Space Shuttle: A Case of Subjective Engineering." IEEE Spectrum. (June 1989): 42- 46. These writers, in an unreferenced article based on interviews, describe the development of a NASA cultural bias toward engineering reliability and safety during the development and construction phase of a spacecraft. Because of this approach, NASA never placed reliance on probabilistic risk analysis, the statistical tracking of failure rates, and had collected none on which to base a statistical analysis. This was not an issue until the Challenger accident, when it was found that a statistical effort could have predicted the probability of failure and perhaps signaled that caution was in order.

Biddle, Wayne. "NASA: What's Needed to Put it on its Feet?" Discover. 8 (January 1987): 30-41. This is a lengthy special report on issues relating to NASA management of the space program. The Shuttle program, its management, operations, and restructuring following Challenger are examined.

Brosz, Tom. "NASA Works to Get Shuttle Back into Space." Commercial Space Report. 10 (November 1986): 1-6. This article discusses NASA's efforts to recover its Space Shuttle program following the Challenger tragedy and to begin flight once again. Brosz suggests that the majority of the payloads are military and government satellites. NASA hopes to restructure the Shuttle program's management system and develop a management structure based upon the successful Apollo program. It was also working to correct flaws in the solid rocket boosters and crew escape systems.

Brosz, Tom. "The Challenger Disaster: Causes and Consequences- -Part II." Commercial Space Report. 10 (March 1986): 1- 5. According to the author, NASA's monopoly on all Space Shuttle flights was the cause of what became an essential prohibition from space for the United States following the Challenger accident. Because of the monopoly, commercialization of the Space Shuttle had been virtually impossible, and now that the accident has occurred, companies are forced to look for alternative launch sites and vehicles. Europe's Arianespace may try to absorb as many of the satellite customers as it can. With all the space eggs in the Shuttle basket, the United States has been forced to take a back seat to other nations who have a variety of launch capabilities.

Challengers: The Inspiring Life Stories of the Seven Brave Astronauts of Shuttle Mission 51-L. New York: Pocket Books, 1986. This book, written by the staff of the Washington Post, describes the careers of the seven astronauts killed in the Challenger accident of January 1986. It is a relatively standard journalistic account, but it contains considerable background not found elsewhere.

Cohen, Daniel and Susan. Heroes of the Challenger. London: Archway Paperbacks, 1986. Published in July 1986 about the people killed in the Challenger explosion. Provides a media approach to covering the life stories and events of STS-51L in an inexpensive and compact version of Challengers.

Dobrzynski, Judith H. "Morton Thiokol: Reflections on the Shuttle Disaster." Business Week. 14 March 1988, pp. 82-83. Discusses the problems and accomplishments of Morton Thiokol in light of the O-ring problem on the solid rocket boosters that was a critical failure item for the Challenger accident. Special attention is paid to the work of Charles S. Losk, lead man at Morton Thiokol.

Dworetzky, Tom. "Return of the Shuttle." Discover. 7 (July 1988): 46-55. This is a special report somewhat flippantly subtitled "Righting the Stuff," which surveys the space program. A significant portion of it deals with the Shuttle program and how NASA is restructuring it to return to space following the Challenger accident.

Feynman, Richard P. "An Outsider's Inside View of the Challenger Inquiry." Physics Today. 41 (February 1988): 26-37. This article, by one of the nation's leading scientists, is an outstanding discussion of the O-ring problem and Thiokol's attempted solution both before and after the Shuttle accident.

Feynman, Richard P. "What Do You Care what Other People Think?" Further Adventures of a Curious Character. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1988, as told to Ralph Leighton. This is a fascinating personal account of the work of the Rogers Commission to unravel the reasons behind the Challenger disaster. Feynman was responsible for the assignment of responsibility for the accident to the O-rings of the solid rocket boosters and he discusses with compassion and insight the personalities and events surrounding the discovery.

Forres, George. Space Shuttle: The Quest Continues. London: Ian Allen, 1989. In what could only be considered a broad introduction to the Shuttle program, the author describes the reassessment of the Shuttle program following the Challenger accident and its return to flight in September 1988. Designed for the buff market, it is well-illustrated but has no references.

Furniss, Tim. "Space Comes Down to Earth." Space. 2 (September-November 1986): 38-41. This article examines the Challenger accident and other failures and how they may affect the future exploration of space. A brief overview of the Shuttle's budget, missions, setbacks, and schedules is given. Some of the pressures on the Shuttle that he identifies include a wide range of customers, the space station, Shuttle modifications, presidential reports, and safety. The author offers a provisional flight schedule for the Shuttle.

General Accounting Office. Space Shuttle: Changes to the Solid Rocket Motor Contract TLSP: Report to Congressional Requestors. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1988. This report, done after the Challenger accident, describes the changes to the Space Shuttle solid rocket motor contract, and assesses the redesign of the motors following the accident, describing the changes in the motor joints and other design changes to enhance the motor's safety and reliability. These changes were incorporated into 13 sets of boosters for the Shuttle. It also comments on the method used to assess the costs of these changes, noting that the fees paid were changed from specific cost and performance incentives to more subjective valuations by NASA.

General Accounting Office. Space Shuttle: Follow-up Evaluation of NASA's Solid Rocket Motor Procurement. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1989. This report reviews NASA's "plans to establish and maintain competition in the future procurement of Shuttle solid rocket motors and the quality assurance and industrial safety programs at Morton Thiokol's solid rocket motor manufacturing plant."

General Accounting Office. Space Shuttle: NASA's Procurement of Solid Rocket Booster Motors. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, August 1986. This report assesses NASA's efforts to procure the solid rocket booster from Morton Thiokol following the Challenger accident. It discusses the redesign effort and analyzes the costs to the Shuttle program.

Goldberg, Steven. "The Space Shuttle Tragedy and the Ethics of Engineering." Jurimetrics Journal. 27 (Winter 1987): 155- 159. This article criticizes the divorce of engineering judgement from management decisions, using the Challenger accident as a case study.

Implementation of the Recommendations of the Presidential Committee on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, June 1987. This is an in-depth report of the NASA leadership to President Ronald Reagan on the method and results of the implementation of changes recommended to the Shuttle program in light of the Challenger accident. The leadership emphasized the sweeping changes coming to the agency to ensure that nothing of this type ever happened again. They note that the interplay of national politics, NASA management, and individual engineering decisions is critical.

Investigation of the Challenger Accident: Hearings before the Committee on Science and Technology. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 1986. 2 Vols. This large work contains the testimonies of numerous high- ranking witnesses concerning the Challenger accident. It includes the statements of more than 60 people taken during 10 formal sessions. Understanding its contents is critical in any serious effort to appreciate and interpret the complexity of the events leading up to the tragedy.

Investigation of the Challenger Accident: Report of the Committee on Science and Technology. House Report 99-1016. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 1986. This report's findings are similar to those of the Roger's Commission, drawing conclusions and making recommendations on the Challenger accident. It comments that the pressure to maintain a schedule of 24 launches per year prompted NASA to take more shortcuts than appropriate and blames not only NASA but also Congress and the administration for contributing to this pressure, including that to evolve from an R&D to a competitive operational agency, which also contributes to this difficulty. The report reemphasizes the need for safety and stresses the nonroutine nature of space flight.

"James Beggs Speaks on the Future of NASA." Science & Technology. 24 July 1987, pp. 17-21. This interview with the former NASA Administrator contains a significant discussion of the agency's role in the development of the Shuttle. Beggs had objected to the appointment of Dr. William Graham as deputy administrator and had, according to many sources, been forced out of the Administrator's job as a result. Graham had been on the scene to issue the go decision leading to the 1986 Challenger disaster. Beggs discusses pointedly the accident and the investigation thereafter. He notes that the review was not thorough enough and that the accident requires further examination.

Kline, Timothy E. "Walking on Wings: Caution and Courage for Manned Space Flight." Air University Review. 37 (May-June 1986): 70-75. In the wake of the Challenger accident, this article describes the balance necessary in manned space flight between the acceptance of risk and the commitment to safety, taking a historical perspective.

Kovach, Kenneth A., and Render, Barry. "NASA Managers and Challenger: A Profile and Possible Explanation." IEEE Engineering Management Review. 16 (March 1988): 2-6. This article is a sociological study of NASA management and the Challenger disaster. Based on a series of tests conducted on NASA personnel between 1978 and 1982, the authors conclude that agency leaders are characterized by a tendency not to reverse decisions and not to heed the advice of people outside the management group.

Kubey, Robert W., and Peluso, Thea. "Emotional Response as a Cause of Interpersonal News Diffusion: The Case of the Space Shuttle Tragedy." Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media. 34 (Winter 1990): 69-76. This article looks at the psychological aspects of disasters reported in the media using the Shuttle accident as the principal vehicle. It asserts that there is a strong and direct correlation between the strength of emotional reaction by the public and the time spent talking and showing pictures of the accident.

Lansford, Henry. "Phoenix in Space: Rising from the Ashes to Orbit." World & I. 5 (December 1990): 315-21. Discusses the return to operational status of the Shuttle and offers some observations on the revisions to the Shuttle program in the wake of the Challenger accident.

Lapp, Ralph E. "$10 Billion More for Space?" New Republic. 26 (21 February 1970). This lengthy analysis is a thoughtful critique of the Space Shuttle by a leading opponent of the manned exploration of space. Lapp, a physicist without institutional affiliation, opposed the manned flights of Apollo and suggests here that the Shuttle is a spacecraft in search of a mission. He downplays the scientific and economic benefits of the Shuttle.

Lewis, Richard S. The Last Voyage of Challenger. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. A follow-on to his Voyages of Columbia, this book presents in a large- size format with many illustrations the story of the tragic loss of Challenger in 1986.

Lewis, Ruth A., and Lewis, John S. "Getting Back on Track in Space." Technology Review. 89 (August-September 1986): 30- 40. This article assesses U.S. space policy in light of the Challenger accident, reviewing the objectives and commitment. It takes a historical view of the evolution of the manned program, assesses the payload capability of the U.S. and Soviet Union, and the NASA budget as a percentage of GNP. It finds that the U.S. has received a lot for a relatively modest outlay.

Lopez, Ramon. "Impact of Challenger Loss: Future Shuttle Flights Tied to Presidential Probe Findings." Space Markets. 1 (Spring 1986): 40-45. Argues that the Challenger disaster was caused by several unfortunate miscalculations, and that now the question of its impact on the space program must be considered. Lopez asserts that June 1987 is the earliest date that the Shuttle may be operating again, so viable alternatives should be sought in the commercial world to place satellites into orbit. Unfortunately, U.S. military vehicles cannot ease the situation since all already have assigned payloads. Questions remain, according to the author, about whether or not to build another Shuttle, and whether or not the Shuttle design needs to be recast.

Magnuson, Ed. "Putting Schedule over Safety; Despite Challenger, the Shuttle Program Ignores Whistle-blowers." Time. 1 February 1988, pp. 20-21. This short article focuses on Sylvia Robins who contends that NASA and its contractors are still wedded to Shuttle launches on an accelerated and unattainable schedule in spite of the Challenger accident.

Marsh, George. "Eject, Eject, Eject: The Escape Pod May Be the Most Cost-Effective Solution for the Next Generation of Spacecraft." Space. 4 (January-February 1988): 4-8. The Challenger disaster brought to light the inherent risks involved in space travel. Since then the space agencies and their major contractors have placed great emphasis on concepts and systems for escaping from space vehicles. The risk of failure is highest in the first stages of launch, when the power concentration is so large. This article examines some of the recent developments in rocket extraction systems and their potential use for the Shuttle.

Marshall, Eliot. "The Shuttle Record: Risks, Achievements." Science. 14 February 1986, pp. 664-66. In the aftermath of the Challenger accident this article assesses the history of the Shuttle from the perspective of what it has accomplished for the nation. It is a favorable record of risk versus achievement, according to the author.

McAleer, Neil. Space Shuttle: The Renewed Promise. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, n.d. This slick booklet attempts to explain exactly what took place following Challenger before NASA returned to flight in 1988. Emphasis is on the Shuttle's potential and flexibility and on restoring confidence in the program. A full-color format.

McConnell, Malcolm. Challenger: A Major Malfunction. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1987. This book is one of several "exposes" of NASA's Shuttle development and operations management that appeared following the Challenger accident. Written by a journalist and containing no scholarly apparatus, the book has on its dust jacket the phrase: "The True Story of Politics, Greed, and the Wrong Stuff." It deals with the events leading up to the decision to launch the Shuttle on 28 January 1986, emphasizing the immediate causes of the accident. McConnell highlights the pressures to launch, the objections of engineers, and the internal debates on the subject. He claims that NASA was responsible for the disaster by pressing operations officials to launch the Shuttle on January 28 so that the President could mention it in that evening's State of the Union Address. He cites as evidence conversations between a NASA public affairs person and the White House Press Office. NASA has denied this contention. He also makes much of the Utah connections of NASA administrator James Fletcher in the award of the Utah-based Morton Thiokol to make the solid rocket booster. He suggests that the Reagan administration's enthusiasm for the privatization of space and the DOD's eagerness to use the Shuttle for Strategic Defense Iniative combined to cause overwhelming pressure to launch. Most serious, he alleges that the NASA reorganization following the accident was a paper tiger carried out by the same people who had been in leadership positions beforehand.

McKean, Kevin. "They Fly in the Face of Danger." Discover. 7 (April 1986): 48-54. This article deals with the formal assessment of risk at NASA, emphasizing the Shuttle program and failure modes in systems.

Miller, Jon D. "The Challenger Accident and Public Opinion: Attitudes Toward the Space Programme in the USA." Space Policy. 3 (May 1987): 122-40. This article discusses the results of a survey of American attitudes toward the space program and the Shuttle. The survey was carried out in three periods: before the January 1986 Challenger accident, immediately afterwards, and five months later. It found that the accident strongly shifted public opinion in favor of the space program and the Shuttle. Many people expectated a timely resumption of Shuttle flights, although there was a delayed recognition of the significant impact of the accident on the space program. There was a shift in public attitudes toward a more positive assessment of the benefits and costs of space exploration. Positive popular response towards funding was even more marked, something rarely found in public opinion studies.

Minsky, Marvin. "NASA Held Hostage: Human Safety Imposes Outlandish Constraints on the U.S. Space Program." Ad Astra. 2 (June 1990): 34-37. Assesses the length to which NASA has altered its approach and hardware used in spaceflight to ensure the safety of people aboard the Shuttle. The costs of this and validity of the human spaceflight program are assessed and still found wanting.

Moore, David H. Setting Space Transportation Policy for the 1990s. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 1986. This short monograph reviews the Space Shuttle policy since the inception of the program and describes the process for the 1990s. It advocates a return to flight for the system, but suggests that the Shuttle does not provide assured access to space and that expendable launch vehicles are also necessary.

Moorehead, Robert W. "America's Shuttle Returns to Space." Progress in Space Transportation. New York: European Space Agency, 1989. pp. 81-90. This article describes the restructuring and streamlining of the Shuttle management organization following the Challenger accident. It identifies the associate administrators for space flight and spells out their duties, and describes the NASA policy of assigning astronauts to management positions. It also comments on the role of the spaceflight safety panel. Finally, the author discusses non-managerial safety enhancement programs: the solid rocket booster changes, the Shuttle crew escape systems, and landing improvements.

NASA's Plans to Procure New Shuttle Rocket Motors. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Operations, 1986. This lengthy report contains the hearing of the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee on this subject conducted on 31 July 1986 after the loss of Challenger.

NASA's Response to the Committee's Investigations of the Challenger Accident. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 1987. This publication contains the hearings relating to the actions of NASA following the Roger's Commission report concerning the Challenger accident. These were held before the committee on 26 February 1987, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.

Perrow, Charles. Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. (New York: Basic Books, 1984). This is a study of the management of technological innovations and how to make them more effective in their development. The author makes plain that a normal accident is one whose failure can be predicted with careful analysis, distinguishing between linear systems (dams), complex ones (nuclear power plants), and loose ones (most manufacturing). In tightly-controlled, high-risk systems such as spaceflight, events leading to tragedy can happen so quickly that intervention is likely to make matters worse. In those systems, it is impossible to anticipate and design complex safety systems; the systems become so complex that failure probabilities are enhanced. He also describes modern management theory to create mechanisms to minimize the risks in these systems. He believes risks should be analyzed and placed into one of three categories: (1) where the risks outweigh the benefits as in nuclear power plants, abandonment is desirable; (2) where the risks are presently too high as in DNA research, efforts should be suspended until acceptable levels of risk can be attained; and (3) where efforts are risky but can be controlled to some extent as in chemical plants and air traffic control, projects should be carefully regulated and restricted. He places spaceflight in the second category.

Petroski, Henry. To Engineer is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985). A pre-Challenger book relevant for its reflections upon the relationship between engineering and risk. The author comments on the development of a special faith attached to modern technology in the public mind, and the effect of recent disasters, from Three- mile Island to Chernobal had on that confidence. This book is not simply a chronicle of accidents, but seeks to look at the process of engineering and its creative aspects apart from its scientific ones. He notes that the design process accepts failure and seeks to test and gradually develop a system, whatever it might be, that has an acceptable level of risk to operate. He cautions that nothing is error free. He ends with a discussion of structural failures and their causes, dividing them into several categories. He notes that many recent failures are not due to engineering but to poor construction, inferior materials, inadequate attention to detail, or poor management and oversight.

Results of the Development Motor 8 Test Firing. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 1987. This publication reports to the subcommittee on Space Science and Applications on the successful performance of the redesigned Shuttle solid rocket boosters at the Morton Thiokol test facility in Brigham City, Utah. Hearings were conducted on 16 September 1987, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.

Ride, Sally K. Leadership and America's Future in Space: A Report to the Administrator. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1987. Following the Challenger accident NASA reassessed its posture in the space program and commissioned several studies. This one, written by an astronaut, asks the question, where should NASA head with the space effort in the next twenty years? Essentially a study in strategic planning, a major part of this book deals with the ability to reach space efficiently, safely, and reliably. Two principal means are suggested, and Ride indicates that a mix is best, the Shuttle and expendable launch vehicles. These should become the centerpiece of all other endeavors for NASA, she argues.

Riffe, Daniel, and Stovall, James Glen. "Diffusion of News of Shuttle Disaster: What Role for Emotional Response." Journalism Quarterly. 66 (Autumn 1989): 551-56. This article is a study of the reporting (or over reporting) of the Challenger accident and the viability of emotional stories. It assesses the response of the public to this type of media coverage and offers some sophisticated analysis of the process.

Rogers, William P. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986. 5 Vols. The first volume of this publication contains the report itself, while the rest have supporting documentation and testimony. This is an exceptionally important study based on the Commission's investigation of the Challenger accident. It has aroused controversy in all quarters as being either too lax in its indictment of NASA's management or too harsh in its criticism.

Roland, Alex. "Priorities in Space for the USA." Space Policy. 3 (May 1987): 104-14. This article follows the story of the Shuttle development, placing it in the context of the history of the U.S. space program from Apollo to the Space Station. The Shuttle was, according to Roland, one of a series of space "spectaculars" and has proven to be expensive and unreliable, practical only for a very limited number of specialized missions. The space station also cannot be justified on a cost-effective basis, and the author concludes that the station and the replacement orbiter for the Challenger should be cancelled. In their place NASA should begin a major program to develop a new launch vehicle independent of the military. The aim should be toward a dramatic reduction in launch vehicle costs, making spaceflight practical, and a truly independent NASA, which could restore the United States to space preeminence. This article is followed by a response from John M. Logsdon and a rejoinder from Roland.

Roland, Alex. "The Shuttle's Uncertain Future." Final Frontier. April 1988, pp. 24-27. Written by a critic of the manned space program in general and the Shuttle in particular, this article assesses the state of the nation's space program in the two years following the Challenger accident. Roland contends that the process of developing the Shuttle was too politicized and cost-conscious for it to result in a reasonably safe system. More important, he maintains that despite, or perhaps because of, the Shuttle's technical sophistication, it is inherently flawed as a reliable vehicle to place cargo in orbit. He suggests that the only way out is for NASA to begin seeking alternatives to the Shuttle for launching payloads.

Sehlstedt, Albert, Jr. "Shuttle's History Provides Answers." Baltimore Sun. 12 October 1986, pp. 6-9. More than just a news story, this lengthy feature is a cogent analysis of the problems in the development of the Shuttle that led to the Challenger disaster. Sehlstedt points to the problems of political compromises on funding forcing technological compromises in the Shuttle. Ultimately they caught up with NASA.

Shayler, David. Shuttle Challenger. London: Salamander Books, 1987. Another picture book, this large-format work is a discussion of the system, its performance, missions, and other assorted tidbits concerning the Challenger. There are descriptions of its construction, missions, and the accident. There is some discussion of the inquiry into the accident, as well as biographies of each of the astronauts flying on the spacecraft.

Space Shuttle Accident: NASA's Actions to Address the Presidential Commission Report. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 1987. This contains the NASA briefing to the committee chairman on 30 October 1987.

Shuttle Recovery Program. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 1988. This publication contains the hearings on this subject before the subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space held on 16 February 1988, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. It contains an overview of the recovery program and focuses on the management of risk.

Sidey, Hugh. "Pioneers in Love with the Frontier." Time. 10 February 1986, pp. 46-47. This thoughtful discussion of the development of the U.S. space program emphasizes the role of the frontier and the exploration imperative in the United States. Sidey, an extremely articulate commentator, suggests that nothing worthwhile is gained without sacrifice. This was a response to the naysayers of the space program after the Challenger accident.

Simon, Michael C., and Hora, Richard P. "Return of the ELVs." Space World. January 1988, pp. 15-18. This article reports on the development and construction of a new generation of expendable launch vehicles. After the Challenger disaster NASA and everyone else realized the short-sightedness of disallowing access to space via expendable boosters. A crash program began to remedy this problem, the fruits of which the authors describe.

Simon, Michael C. Keeping the Dream Alive: Putting NASA and America Back in Space. San Diego, CA: Earth Space Operations, 1987. This is a slim volume that is chiefly interesting because of its discussion of the difficulties NASA has experienced in meeting the challenge of using and exploring space. It has two full chapters on the Shuttle and its development, as well as the effort of selling it to the public in the 1970s as the central means of access to space. There is also a discussion of Challenger and the difficulties created and problems illuminated by the disaster.

Space Shuttle Accident. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 1986. This is a set of hearings conducted by the Senate subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space in the 99th Cong., 2d Sess., on the accident and the Rogers Commission report.

Space Shuttle Oversight. Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 1987. This contains hearings held on the subject, prompted by the Challenger accident held on 22 January 1987 before the subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. This hearing deals specifically with the accident, NASA management, design and safety of the Shuttle, and launch operations.

Space Shuttle Recovery. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 1987. This publication contains the text of hearings before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications at the 100 Cong., 1st Sess.

Stine, G. Harry. "The Sky Is Going to Fall." Analog Science Fiction/Science Fact, August 1983, pp. 74-77. In an article that in retrospect appears prophetic, the author describes several problems with the Shuttle and comments on what he considers a serious possibility that a major malfunction could destroy a mission and all aboard. He rests his argument on the complexity of the system and the inherent dangers of space flight. He assumes that there will be no way to prevent this accident--all activities of this magnitude eventually have a disaster--but what Stine wants his audience to do is to spearhead opposition to what he thinks will be an attack on the space program coming as a result of an accident. He wants to ensure that the baby is not thrown out with the bathwater. He urges everyone to blunt a media attack. He wants to save the space program because he is convinced that the wellbeing of humanity rests on exploration of the solar system.

Strategy for Safely Returning Space Shuttle to Flight Status. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, 1986. Text of hearings on this subject before the subcommittee on Space Science and Applications conducted on 15 May 1986, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. It emphasizes the safety issues of flight and the redesign of the solid rocket boosters before a return to flight.

Taylor, Stephen. "Aerojet in Focus." Space. 4 (July- August 1988): 34-37. The launch propulsion industry received a boost from the growing demand for launch services brought on by the grounding of the Shuttle after the Challenger accident. The emphasis is on the growth of Aerojet as a result of these developments, and it is currently aiming, with NASA, to reduce the cost of low earth orbit to $300 per pound.

Tests of the Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor Program. Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 1988. Text of the hearings on the booster redesign effort undertaken by NASA through the primary contractor, Morton Thiokol, held on 27 January 1988.

Trento, Joseph J., with reporting and editing by Susan B. Trento. Prescription for Disaster: From the Glory of Apollo to the Betrayal of the Shuttle. New York: Crown Publishers, 1987. Not truly an investigation of the Challenger accident, this book is an in-depth review of the NASA management and R&D system emphasizing the agency's "fall from grace" after the Apollo program. Essentially Trento argues that the giants of the 1960s, the men who successfully managed the lunar program, were gone and were replaced with government bureaucrats who played the political game and sold the Shuttle as an inexpensive program and, in the process, sowed the seeds of disaster. Trento blames the Nixon administration for politicizing and militarizing the space program, and every NASA administrator since that time has had to play hard, but against bigger opponents, in both arenas. Declining every year since then, NASA was truly in the doldrums by the time of the Challenger accident. He argues that the failure was not the O-rings that ignited the spacecraft, it was the political system that produced them.

Wainright, Louden. "After 25 Years: An End to Innocence." Life. March 1986, pp. 15-17. With the characteristic Life emphasis on photographs, the longtime writer for the magazine assesses the space program after the Challenger accident.

"Whistle-blower." Life. March 1988, pp. 17-19. This is an interview with Roger Boisjoly, the former Morton Thiokol engineer who complained to the media and anyone else who would listen that his company and NASA had neglected critical safety indicators and allowed the Shuttle to be launched against many people's objections. That management decision led to the loss of the Challenger, millions of dollars, lots of time, an untold amount of credibility, and most important the lives of seven people. Contains numerous photographs.

Whitehead, Gregory. "The Forensic Theater: Memory Plays for the Post-Mortem Condition." Performing Arts Journal. 12 (Winter-Spring 1990): 99-110. This article assesses the use of traumatic shock from the death of loved ones or the immediacy of death brought to the screen in theater. As only one example, the author uses the Challenger disaster as a vehicle to assess psychological and collective behavior.

Wright, John C.; Kunkel, Dale; Pinon, Marites; and Houston, Aletha C. "How Children Reacted to Televised Coverage of the Space Shuttle Disaster." Journal of Communication. 39 (Spring 1989): 27-45. This is a complex study of the reactions of children to the reporting of the Shuttle accident. It uses sophisticated statistical methodology to measure six major variables and finds an intense reaction to the accident brought on by the anticipation of seeing a teacher teach a class from the Shuttle and watching the explosion on television.