

## **Summary Report of Occurrences Reviewed** *From August 4 – 8, 2008*

**Summary:** 28 occurrences at 17 sites reviewed during this period.

### **Significant Occurrences (5)**

#### **Conduct of Operations – 1 occurrence at 1 site**

- **NA – Savannah River Site (Significance Category 4).** On August 4, Shaw AREVA reported a violation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements following NRC inspection activities conducted from April 1 through June 30, 2008, at the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility construction site. Shaw AREVA failed to implement certain MOX Project Quality Assurance Plan requirements, which included proper document storage, documented training, approved QA procedures, and identification of conditions adverse to quality.

#### **Safeguards and Security – 1 occurrence at 1 site**

- **EM – Savannah River Site (Significance Category 3).** On August 1, after completion of Dillon M-134 familiarization and qualification training courses at the Advanced Tactical Training Academy, an instructor fired the remaining 50-75 rounds from the gun's magazine. A series of sparks emitted from the muzzle and the flash hider launched approximately 25 yards down range. The instructor, who was shooting, along with other instructors who were observing, immediately secured the weapon. After securing the weapon, the other instructors noticed small spots of blood on the clothing of one of the instructors who was observing. The instructor had several superficial wounds; however, he was not experiencing any effects of pain and had not noticed anything unusual to himself. The instructor was transported to the Medical College of Georgia, in Augusta for evaluation and treatment. Investigators determined that a Rue pin failed, which allowed the barrel clamp to move in front of the barrels, causing it to be struck by rounds.

#### **Authorization Basis – 1 occurrence at 1 site**

- **SC – New Brunswick Laboratory (Significance Category R).** On August 1, 2008, NBL management stood-down operations involving the use of nuclear material pending the completion and approval of a Justification for Continued Operation. Activities exempt from this stand-down include plutonium inventory reduction project and Type A or less uranium shipping operations. This recent stand-down resulted from the comments of a Safety Basis Review Team's review of NBL's revised Documented Safety Analysis, Technical Safety Requirements and Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. The Laboratory has experienced recurring safety basis deficiencies since weaknesses were identified in their Safety Analysis Report back in December 2004, which resulted in a stand-down.

#### **Criticality Safety – 1 occurrence at 1 site**

- **EM – Savannah River Site (Significance Category 3).** On July 31, it was identified that H-Canyon Tank 11.1 has been receiving uranium material from HB-Line with the potential for undissolved uranium compounds. The presence of fissile solids in Tank 11.1 creates a potential criticality scenario but is not addressed in the H-Canyon Double Contingency Analysis and no defenses are in place for this scenario. Criticality Safety evaluated the

current configuration of Tank 11.1 and recommended that it would be safe with all solids assumed to be fissile as this would be significantly less than the areal density limits of the tank. The agitator controls were posted and an administrative seal placed on the agitator Motor Control Center to ensure the Tank 11.1 agitator could not be restarted. A New Information/Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA) declaration was initiated with a PISA declared.

**Fire Protection – 1 occurrence at 1 site**

- ***NA – Y12 National Security Complex (Significance Category OE).*** On August 4, 2008, a fire of short duration (8 minutes) was reported in a drum in Building 9720-19 and an evacuation of 165 feet was initiated. Personnel evacuated to their assembly stations and all were accounted for. Two employees who discovered the fire were transported to Y12 Occupational Services for evaluation and were released without requiring treatment. No radioactive materials were involved, but the fire involved hazardous chemicals that could potentially pose a threat to workers in the immediate vicinity of the incident. The chemicals were polyurethane resin (TC-280 Part A) and polyurethane curing agent (TC-280 Part B), which are mixed together to produce a closed-cell foam that is used for packaging. An investigation into the cause of the fire has been initiated.

**Other Occurrences (23).** See Table (Note: The Table includes the occurrences listed above).

Occurrence Category	Number of Occurrences				Number of Sites
	E&E	NNSA	SC	DOE Total	
Injury - Industrial Hygiene/Occupational Safety	0	1	1	2	2
Near Miss	2	0	0	2	2
Authorization Basis	4	0	1	5	3
Radiological Concerns	1	0	0	1	1
Environmental	0	0	0	0	0
Fire Safety	0	1	0	1	1
Shipping/Quality Assurance	0	0	0	0	0
Criticality Concerns	1	0	0	1	1
Industrial Operations	0	0	0	0	0
Conduct of Operations	4	5	0	9	7
Electrical Safety	0	0	0	0	0
Vehicle Accident	0	1	1	2	2
Equipment Failures	2	0	0	2	2
Safeguards and Security	1	1	0	2	2
Suspect & Counterfeit Parts	1	0	0	1	1
Other	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>28</b>	

**Secretarial Office Summary**

National Nuclear Security Administration	9 occurrences	(6 sites)
Office of Environmental Management	12 occurrences	(7 sites)
Office of Nuclear Energy	4 occurrences	(1 site)
Office of Science	3 occurrences	(3 sites)