## **Summary Report of Occurrences Reviewed**

## From January 29 – February 2, 2007

**Summary:** 37 occurrences at 14 sites reviewed during this period.

## Significant Occurrences (6)

## **Occupational Safety/Industrial Hygiene – 1 occurrence at 1 site**

• <u>Y-12 Site (Significance Category 3).</u> On January 25, 2007, a machining supervisor in Building 9204-2 exhibited throat/nasal irritation while working on a glove box containing lithium hydride. Subsequently, several shop personnel exhibited similar respiratory distress. All affected employees reported to site medical for evaluation. Glove box work was suspended, and air sampling equipment was installed near the glove box.

## Radiological Control – 1 occurrence at 1 site

• <u>Los Alamos National Laboratory (Significance Category 3).</u> On January 18, 2007, a review of an employee's health physics checklist identified inconsistencies in the bioassay requirements for various organizations at Technical Area-55, Plutonium Process & Handling Facility (TA-55-4). Management identified improvements to be made in the dosimetry program.

## Safeguards and Security - 1 occurrence at 1 site

• <u>Los Alamos National Laboratory (Significance Category 4).</u> On January 25, 2007, Technical Area-55 (TA-55) management identified procedural deficiencies associated with the roll-out of new Tamper-Indicating Device (TID) processes for the operation of TA-55 classified computer systems. TA-55 management paused classified computing operations pending implementation of compensatory measures

### Criticality Safety – 1 occurrence at 1 site

• <u>EM – Savannah River Site (Significance Category 2).</u> On January 23, 2007, an engineering review identified an incorrect mass Criticality Safety Limit (CSL) applied to several cells in H-Canyon resulting in non-conservative calculated flush frequencies for these cells. Failure to perform a flush on the required date for one cell resulted in a violation of the Double Contingency Analysis. However, the maximum undetected fissile mass that could have accumulated could not have challenged the CSL.

### Near Misses – 1 occurrence at 1 site

• <u>EM – Hanford Site (Significance Category 3).</u> On January 29, 2007, an employee was working from a bucket truck dropped a four-pound, six foot long "hot-stick" from a height of 15 feet. The hot stick glanced off the shoulder and hardhat of an electrician working below. There were no personnel injuries.

### Shipping-Quality Assurance – 1 occurrence at 1 site

• <u>EM – Hanford Site (Significance Category 3).</u> On January 29, 2007, a Hanford validation of an off-site subcontractor who performs processing and treatment activities on Hanford's Low-Level Waste and Mixed Low-Level Waste concluded corrective actions put in place following two events were ineffective. Hanford management suspended waste shipments from the subcontractor until the subcontractor implements effective corrective. [This is considered a positive event because of the actions taken by the Hanford contractor to address this problem.]

Other Occurrences (31). See Table (Note: The Table includes the occurrences listed above).

Occurrence Category	Number of Occurrences				Number
	E&E	NNSA	SC	DOE Total	of Sites
Injury – Industrial Hygiene/Occupational Safety	2	1	0	3	3
Near Miss	1	2	1	4	3
Authorization Basis	2	2	0	4	3
Radiological Concerns	1	2	0	3	2

Environmental	2	0	1	3	3
Fire Safety	0	1	0	1	1
Shipping/Quality Assurance	1	0	1	2	2
Criticality Safety	2	0	0	2	2
Industrial Operations	0	0	0	0	0
Conduct of Operations	0	2	1	3	3
Electrical Safety	2	1	0	3	2
Lockout/Tagout – Electrical	1	1	0	2	2
Equipment Failures	1	1	0	2	2
Safeguards and Security	0	1	0	1	1
Suspect & Counterfeit Parts	3	1	0	4	4
Total	18	15	4	37	

# Secretarial Office Summary

National Nuclear Security Administration	15 occurrences	(5 sites)
Office of Environmental Management	16 occurrences	(4 sites)
Office of Science	4 occurrences	(3 sites)
Office of Fossil Energy	1 occurrence	(1 site)
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management	1 occurrence	(1 site)