

Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders

Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan

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**UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE**

PEACEWORKS



Library of Congress Control Number: 2005910666

Peaceworks No. 56. First published March 2006.

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SUMMARY

In Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in countless other hotspots around the world, religion has been a major factor in matters of war and peace. Since religion often plays a significant role in conflicts, it also needs to be one of the factors addressed in mediating conflicts. Yet, because the United States separates religion from political matters to a greater degree than many other areas of the world, Americans frequently have difficulty understanding the crucial role religion can play in conflict transformation.

As this study demonstrates, military chaplains, as clergy and officers, occupy a unique space that blends a secular status and a religious one, making them well suited to serve as intermediaries between military and religious leaders in areas of conflict and postconflict stabilization. While chaplains are not positioned to take on such major conflict mediation tasks as healing historic wounds in ethnic and sectarian conflict, they *are* positioned to communicate with religious leaders in discrete areas of conflict and contribute toward improved dialogue, trust, coordination, problem solving, and localized violence reduction. By drawing on the experiences of fourteen chaplains who had substantial interaction with religious leaders in Iraq and/or Afghanistan, or who supervised other chaplains involved in such activities, the author provides an exploratory study of the important mediating role chaplains can play in overseas military operations.

After briefly examining the military guidelines that provide the basis for chaplains to act as liaisons with religious leaders, the author examines the chaplain's dual standing as a clergy-person and a military officer and the boundaries of the chaplain's potential role as liaison. Specifically, the author unequivocally states that the primary mediating focus of chaplains should be on establishing communications and building relationships with local religious leaders on the ground—not on attempting to negotiate the resolution of broad historical problems. In harvesting the accounts of the fourteen chaplains whom he interviewed, the author next offers key peacebuilding principles and lessons that are informed by a sound reading of conflict resolution literature. For example, he finds that all chaplain outreach efforts must be balanced with security concerns to ensure not just the chaplains' safety but also that of the local religious leaders with whom they meet. Further, he finds that chaplains who wish to serve in such a manner must have a willingness and ability to interact with religious leaders of other faiths and must not be theologically and personally inclined to view those of other faiths as enemies. Ultimately, the accounts he offers are meant to provide real-world examples of successful civil-military relations and to provide crucial guidance for chaplains to follow when serving as liaisons between the military and local religious leaders in overseas conflict zones.

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While the primary role of military chaplains is to minister to the troops, as this study powerfully illustrates, chaplains can do much to not only mediate conflict on the ground but also help win the hearts and minds of local populations in support of U.S. combat and postconflict stability operations throughout the world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although I am listed as the author, there are many people who have contributed an enormous amount to this publication and rightly could be listed as coauthors. First, I want to thank each of the fourteen chaplains who are listed below and John Finney, a political adviser to the Maryland National Guard, for sharing their liaison experiences and insights. This publication would not have been possible without their contributions. I also want to recognize Chaplain Hal Scott, who reviewed the manuscript thoroughly several times and offered many thoughtful suggestions. Additionally, John Crist, my program officer at the United States Institute of Peace, was a tremendous source of encouragement and guidance during the entire process and writing of this project. Finally and most importantly, I must thank Elizabeth Dahl, my research assistant, who was exceedingly overqualified for the position—as I was completing this *Peaceworks* she was completing requirements for a Ph.D. in international relations at American University. Elizabeth provided superb expertise on conflict resolution and valuable feedback throughout the development of this publication.

Chaplain (LTC) Larry Adams-Thompson, U.S. Army, CJTF-76, was deployed in Afghanistan from March 2004 to March 2005.

Chaplain (COL) Douglas Carver, U.S. Army, CJTF-7, was deployed in Iraq from March 2003 to March 2004.

Chaplain Tierian Cash, CAPT, U.S. Navy, Combined Forces Command Afghanistan, was deployed in Afghanistan from October 2004 to March 2005.

Chaplain Leslie Dawson, MAJ, Canadian Armed Forces, Kabul Multi-national Brigade, was deployed in Afghanistan from July 2003 to January 2004.

Chaplain (LTC) Chet Egert, U.S. Army, 101st Airborne Division, was deployed in Iraq from July 2003 to February 2004.

Chaplain (CPT) Eric Eliason, U.S. National Guard, 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, was deployed in Afghanistan from February to June 2004.

Chaplain Steve Evans, CAPT, U.S. Navy, Command Forces Command Afghanistan, was deployed in Afghanistan from April to October 2003.

Chaplain Phillip Gwaltney, CAPT, U.S. Navy, U.S. Central Command.

Chaplain (MAJ) Carlos Huerta, 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, was deployed in Iraq from March to December 2003.

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Chaplain Erik Lee, LT, U.S. Navy, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, was deployed in Iraq from March to July 2003.

Chaplain (COL) Ken Sampson, U.S. Army, CJTF-180, was deployed in Afghanistan from May 2003 to April 2004.

Chaplain (CPT) John Stutz, U.S. Army Reserve, 101st Airborne Division Civil-Military Operations Center, was deployed in Iraq from March 2003 to February 2004.

Chaplain Brian Waite, LT, U.S. Navy, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, was deployed in Iraq from March to May 2003.

Chaplain (CPT) Tom Yates, U.S. Army Reserve, Task Force Victory, Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force, was deployed in Afghanistan from January to October 2004.

INTRODUCTION

During the first few days of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, was beginning its assault against Iraqi forces in An Nasiriyah, Chaplain Brian Waite was at the battalion aid station ready to minister to wounded marines. Soon he received word that his commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Dunahoe, wanted him to handle a crisis that had arisen with local civilians.

In the early phase of the battle, the battalion had captured and secured a school. However, during the fight the Fedayeen Saddam, an Iraqi paramilitary organization, had used some civilians as human shields, which resulted in the deaths of a man and woman, who were shot by the marines. Lieutenant Colonel Dunahoe told Chaplain Waite that since he was the “people” person, he needed to resolve the problem with the local populace while the colonel continued to lead the battalion in its combat operation. Chaplain Waite, his religious program specialist (RP), and a Kuwaiti translator met with a community leader in a large field that was located directly behind the school. As Chaplain Waite talked with the leader, people in the neighborhood began to feel more secure about coming out of their homes. Soon a curious crowd of more than one hundred people gathered around the chaplain, RP, and translator.

Chaplain Waite felt uneasy about the situation because the three of them were surrounded by a sizeable group of angry citizens. Initially the crowd was hostile because they blamed the marines for the deaths of the two civilians. The chaplain explained that the marines were there as liberators and that the man and woman were killed because the Fedayeen had used them as human shields. The tension lessened as local eyewitnesses corroborated the account and the crowd began to understand the circumstances of their neighbors’ deaths.

The people wanted a proper burial before sundown for these two members of their community and requested that the marines transport their bodies to a local cemetery so the interment could be performed there. The chaplain explained that the burial had to be held in an area that the marines had already secured. The school was the only location that met this condition, so an agreement was reached that a temporary interment would be conducted in the field just inside the school grounds. Working through the translator, this process of explanation and negotiation was slow and meticulous, taking several hours.

Once it was decided that the burial would occur at the school, Chaplain Waite helped dig the graves. He believed that it was important to demonstrate in a concrete way to the local people and the young marines that the U.S. military genuinely cared for the Iraqi people. The chaplain did not participate in the actual burial ceremony, but he did stand by and observe the service.

This successful negotiation of the burial on the first day of the battle was crucial because it established a unique bond between the chaplain and the community leader that continued

throughout the battalion's presence in the city. During that week, the chaplain met daily with the community leader to discuss the needs of the people, which mostly were for food, water, and medical care. The leader would tell the chaplain what the requests were and the chaplain would work with him to try and meet those needs.

The most pressing concern among the local population was the lack of food. After entering the city's Baath Party headquarters, the marines discovered an enormous storage facility filled with food and weapons. The chaplain was tasked to coordinate with the community leader distribution points in the battalion's sector of the city where people could come and pick up the food. Through the efforts of this and other marine battalions in An Nasiriyah, the basic necessities of the local population were being met.

As a result of these and other acts of goodwill from the marines, information flow into the battalion increased considerably. In one instance, a lawyer came forward and gave information to the battalion that Private Jessica Lynch was being held by the Fedayeen in a local hospital. He did so, in part, due to the level of trust that had been established between the marines and the local community. An Nasiriyah became infamous because eleven soldiers of the U.S. Army's 507th Maintenance Company and eighteen marines of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, were killed there during the first few days of the war, and Private Lynch, a member of the 507th, was captured and then later rescued.

This example is only one of many in Iraq and Afghanistan that demonstrate how chaplains acted as liaisons between the U.S. military and the civilian population. Chaplains communicated with local spiritual leaders, established religious councils, coordinated mosque renovation projects, improved trust, dispelled stereotypes, organized and celebrated community religious services, and even trained an Afghanistan Security Force (ASF) soldier as a chaplain.

If one looks at some of the most recent conflicts in which the United States has been involved—Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, for example—religion has been a major influence in the local culture. In these three regions, as well as numerous others around the world, religion also has been a factor in matters of war and peace. Since religion often plays a role in conflicts, it should be one of the elements addressed in developing a resolution. Yet, because the United States tends to separate religion from politics to a greater degree than many other areas of the world, Americans frequently have difficulty understanding the crucial role religion can play in conflict transformation.¹ Jonathan Fox asserts that a major reason for this separation is that the social science and international relations disciplines largely have antireligious roots.² Chaplains, however, as both clergy and military officers, occupy a unique space that blends a secular status and a religious one. This position makes them well suited to serve as intermediaries between the military and religious leaders in areas of conflict and postconflict stabilization.

In recent years there has been an increased interest regarding the role chaplains should play as liaisons with indigenous religious leaders. For instance, Douglas Johnston of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy has suggested that military chaplains ought to have a more

prominent role in interacting and negotiating with civilian religious leaders. In *Faith-Based Diplomacy*, Johnston says, “With appropriate training, the role of military chaplains could be expanded to include peacebuilding and conflict prevention.”³ Some chaplains have gladly embraced this expanded role, while others have serious misgivings about the wisdom of adding this emerging task to their responsibilities.

This paper is an exploratory study that focuses on fourteen chaplains who had substantial interaction with religious leaders in Iraq or Afghanistan, or who supervised other chaplains involved in such activities. Although there are many instances in which chaplains have had noteworthy liaison experiences, they have received little in-depth analysis. This paper examines what some of those chaplains did, how they did it, and what the results were. Each chaplain in this investigation participated in an in-depth interview that lasted from one to five hours and was conducted in person or by telephone. Many other chaplains and contacts also were consulted for background information. From reading this paper, one may get the impression that most of the chaplains in Iraq and Afghanistan performed intermediary roles. Many chaplains, though, for a variety of reasons, did not interact with indigenous religious leaders. This inquiry highlights the experiences and insights of chaplains who had significant liaison engagements or supervised such actions, and derives common principles and practices that chaplains can utilize in the future.

In addition, this project discusses basic peacebuilding principles that are based on conflict resolution research and are supported by chaplains’ common experiences. Although the chaplains largely were unaware that they were following fundamental peacebuilding principles, many of the chaplains who interacted effectively with religious leaders did so in vastly different circumstances and followed surprisingly similar practices. As chaplains have linked with religious leaders in these areas of conflict, they have contributed toward improved dialogue, trust, coordination, problem resolution, and violence reduction. These accounts provide real-world examples of successful civil-military relations and offer crucial guidance for chaplains to follow when they serve as liaisons between the military and local religious leaders.

Nevertheless, the narratives in this paper are not intended as rigid models that all chaplains must follow as they deploy to conflict areas around the world. One must be cautious of establishing universal principles based on a limited number of liaison experiences or taking what a chaplain did in one operation and making it a required standard for all chaplains. Great variation exists in the political, religious, and security environments from one operation to another and even between various regions within the same country. What may be possible in one locale may not be feasible in another. Furthermore, due to other pressing responsibilities, some chaplains might not have time to engage indigenous religious leaders. Additionally, because of the nature of a military unit’s mission, some chaplains may not have any opportunity to interact with the local populace.

After mentioning briefly the military guidance that provides the basis for chaplains to act as liaisons with religious leaders, this paper provides reasons as to why this role is suitable for chaplains. The recent attention on chaplains functioning as liaisons raises several important

issues. For instance, due to the military's emphasis on collecting human intelligence, chaplains may be put in a position that potentially compromises their noncombatant role when they engage religious leaders. Furthermore, in an asymmetric warfare environment, security is a major concern not only for chaplains but also for the local religious leaders with whom they interact. As a result of meeting with chaplains, some religious leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan faced intimidation, violence, or assassination. How do these security concerns impact a chaplain's ability to interface with community religious leaders?

Another matter that will be considered is the chaplain's dual standing as a clergyperson and a military officer. This status uniquely positions chaplains within the military to establish effective relations with indigenous religious leaders, a finding that is supported by many instances in which chaplains had more immediate credibility and rapport with religious leaders than other military members.

Additionally, in order to function as effective intermediaries, chaplains and their commands must understand clearly the boundaries of the role. For example, based on their position and training, chaplains should not be viewed so much as negotiators as "bridge builders." Thus, the primary focus of chaplains should be on establishing communication and building relationships—not on attempting to negotiate the resolution of broad historical problems. This principle was evident in the extensive interactions Chaplains Chet Egert and John Stutz had with religious leaders in Mosul, Iraq. As a result of their weekly meetings with local clergy councils, they learned about various Iraqi concerns. The U.S. military then addressed these concerns in different ways, such as by providing information about and allowing visitation to local detainees, assisting with security for religious leaders, renovating religious sites, and offering solutions to a range of community needs. Due to these efforts, suspicion between the two sides gradually turned to trust and close relations were established.

Some of the knowledge and skills necessary for a chaplain to act successfully as a liaison, such as an understanding of basic peacebuilding principles, will also be examined. Even more essential, however, is a chaplain's disposition toward and ability to interact with religious leaders of other faiths. Having an open and accepting attitude toward indigenous religious leaders is a prerequisite to serving as a link between them and the U.S. military. Furthermore, most of the liaison work chaplains perform will be with midlevel religious leaders of a country—individuals who may have influence over the local populace but do not have any significant national political power and are not well enough known to attract high-profile attention.

Moreover, chaplains are more inclined to understand the significance of gestures and rituals, especially spiritual ones, and utilize them in making connections with local religious leaders. All of the chaplains in this study, on some level, used such symbolic acts to enhance their relationships with their civilian counterparts. Finally, inasmuch as "winning hearts and minds"

necessitates the development of mutual understanding and respect, chaplains are valuable resources who can advance the peacebuilding process effectively. For example, collaborative efforts between Chaplain Eric Eliason and Afghan village elders and imams for the renovation of twenty-six mosques contributed directly toward discrediting Taliban and al Qaeda propaganda. As chaplains establish relations and communication with religious leaders, they can have a positive influence on gaining the trust of the local populace.

THE FOUNDATION FOR ACTING AS LIAISONS

In order to clarify the role of chaplains serving as links between the U.S. military and local religious leaders, relevant military doctrine must be explored. The following five publications discuss the provision of religious ministry and religious ministry support within the U.S. military and provide limited guidance regarding chaplains acting as liaisons with indigenous religious leaders.

Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 pertains to chaplains assigned to joint billets, which are typically combatant commander and joint task force commands. It states:

The JFCH [joint force chaplain], after careful consideration and only with the JFC's [joint force commander's] approval, may serve as a point of contact to HN [host nation] civilian and military religious leaders, institutions, and organizations, including established and emerging military chaplaincies, through the CMOC [civil-military operations center].⁴

Meanwhile, Field Manual 1-05 (FM 1-05), which is a similar document to JP 1-05 but specific to the army, maintains:

Chaplains will support the commander through advisement in the following areas that may influence CMO [civil-military operations]: Relations with indigenous religious leaders when directed by the commander.⁵

Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-05, which is for navy commands, indicates:

Naval commanders may be designated as JTF [joint task force] commanders. In these situations, the senior chaplain has the following responsibilities: Functions as an intermediary between locals and the command on matters that may be religious, or as a spokesperson to foster awareness about indigenous concerns, issues, or attitudes.⁶

This publication goes on to assert:

As part of the CRP [command religious program], chaplains (under command direction) coordinate or assist with humanitarian projects, develop community relations, and liaison with foreign religious leaders. . . . The authority for the RMT [religious ministry team] to liaise with any of the indi-

viduals or groups is approved and coordinated by proper military authorities. Liaison activities are not initiated or performed outside the chain of command. When approved by the command, efforts are to be encouraged because of the benefit derived from the establishment of relationships, which in turn help support the mission (refer to JP 3-07.6 for additional information).⁷

Similarly, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 6-12A and 6-12C are for Marine Corps commands and the navy chaplains assigned to them. MCRP 6-12A states, “As a principle adviser, the chaplain provides liaison with civilian or religious leaders (community groups, missionaries or indigenous population).”⁸ MCRP 6-12C adds:

In recent years commanders have found chaplains to be excellent liaisons with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations. . . . Chaplains have also provided valuable service in MOOTW [military operations other than war] by acting as liaison with local religious leaders.⁹

So, on the subject of chaplains as intermediaries, there is a range of official guidance from various military publications. Although brief, this guidance provides the foundation in military doctrine for chaplains to act as liaisons with religious leaders at the joint and individual service levels. All of the doctrine is broad in scope, which gives commanders and chaplains latitude in determining how most effectively to fulfill this responsibility. In addition to guidance on the chaplains’ liaison role, all of the publications cited herein offer direction regarding chaplains as advisers to the commanding officer, not only on religious issues within the command but also outside of the command. It is these two responsibilities—acting as religious liaisons for and advisers to commanding officers—that form the basis for chaplains to serve as intermediaries with spiritual leaders.

A crucial matter is whether chaplains are endorsed for this liaison activity. Religious endorsing agents (i.e., churches, synagogues, and mosques) send their clergy into the military primarily to provide ministry to military personnel and their family members—not to serve as liaisons with religious leaders. Yet endorsing agents also understand that chaplains minister in a broader context than traditional civilian models and therefore should see an occasional intermediary function in operational settings as compatible with a chaplain’s clergy role.

Furthermore, numerous civilian clergy, churches, synagogues, and mosques are engaged in interfaith dialogue and peacebuilding. These efforts, which are in harmony with the mission of many faith communities, also are appropriate for military chaplains. As clergy and noncombatants, chaplains by calling and status serve as peacemakers and in some military operations may be in a position to build bridges with indigenous religious leaders. Unquestionably, a chaplain’s primary responsibility is to provide for the free exercise of religion for soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, their families, and other authorized personnel. Nevertheless,

communicating with local religious leaders in a commander's area of responsibility (AOR) for the purpose of establishing mutual trust and understanding also is within the scope of a chaplain's function.

Some may posit that chaplains are not capable of performing a liaison role; however, as will be demonstrated in this paper, even with limited formal training as intermediaries, chaplains have interacted effectively with local religious leaders. While Afghanistan and Iraq are the most recent examples, chaplain liaison activities predate these operations. Recently, U.S. and non-U.S. military chaplains have operated successfully as liaisons in the Balkans, Haiti, and East Timor. Beyond the U.S. military, Canadian, Australian, Norwegian, and South African armed forces have some tradition of their chaplains engaging as intermediaries in stability operations. While there is little in military doctrine that addresses this subject, there are noteworthy instances from several countries in which chaplains have acted in this capacity. Thus, the chaplain liaison role has worked successfully, albeit on a periodic basis, not only within the U.S. military but also in other militaries.

Due to the nature of the ongoing global war on terrorism, certainly the U.S. military will continue to conduct stability operations for the foreseeable future. Since military personnel will have to engage the local population more and more in these operations, chaplains also must be prepared to interact with community religious leaders. In Iraq, for instance, when combat operations shifted to stability operations in March 2003, Major General David H. Petraeus instructed his principal staff members to engage their civilian counterparts in the AOR. Accordingly, the judge advocate general (JAG) worked with the legal system, the surgeon dealt with community medical services, the engineering officer worked with civilian engineers on construction projects, and the chaplain interfaced with religious leaders. Major General Petraeus directed all of the chaplains in his division to make contact with local religious leaders. He saw these leaders as important players in the stabilization of Iraq and viewed chaplains as the natural choice to build relationships with them. In combat or stability operations, many other military personnel will be called upon to interact with the civilian populace, and chaplains must be prepared to do the same.

LIAISON PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES

Preserving a Noncombatant Role

“Chaplains must at all times, both in time of war and time of peace, be engaged exclusively in religious duties; and they must always abstain from hostile acts.”¹⁰

A problematic issue about functioning as liaisons with local religious leaders is that it puts chaplains in a position that potentially could compromise their role. For instance, commands may desire to use chaplains to gather useful information when they are functioning in this intermediary capacity. These situations must be handled wisely because they have significant ramifications on a chaplain’s noncombatant role and their credibility with outsiders.

The army’s FM 1-05 declares, “Under Title X of the U.S. Code, Chaplains should not perform the following: Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and/or target acquisition.”¹¹ The Marine Corps MCRP 6-12A asserts, “Chaplains should be careful when providing information in direct support of combat as not to assume a position of intelligence gathering and therefore enter into the realm of the combatant.”¹² On this same subject, the navy’s NWP 1-05 adds:

As part of the CRP, chaplains coordinate or assist with humanitarian and community relations, liaison with foreign religious leaders, and minister (when authorized and directed) to captives, evacuees, detainees, migrants, refugees, and EPWs [enemy prisoners of war]. Because of these contacts, information is gained through casual and unintended conversation that may contain information relevant to the operation. Commanders must take great care and exercise caution not to utilize RM [religious ministry] and RMT as a means to gather information, thereby jeopardizing the noncombatant status of chaplains. Chaplains advise commanders when there is a possible infringement in this area. However, this does not preclude chaplains from providing commanders with information gained regarding threats to forces, peace, stability, or other hostile activities.¹³

While this publication states that the noncombatant status of chaplains should not be jeopardized by intentionally utilizing them to gather human intelligence, it also gives a great amount of latitude as to how chaplains should handle situations if they receive such information. The flexible guidelines provided in military doctrine must be assessed in light of a chaplain’s clear understanding of his noncombatant role.

The potential tension between the chaplain's role as a liaison and the importance of human intelligence raises two crucial questions. First, as the commander's liaison to religious leaders, what kind of information should chaplains provide to their commanders? Second, what should chaplains do if they obtain knowledge of enemy threats? NWP 1-05 states plainly that a chaplain's noncombatant status does not prevent him from conveying information that can save the lives of military personnel or civilians.¹⁴ Regarding this matter, there is an obvious difference between a chaplain who is approached by someone with unsolicited information and a chaplain who seeks proactively to gather human intelligence. In the former case, chaplains should perform the duty of every military member—report threats against coalition forces or civilians to the command. In the latter case, if chaplains deliberately seek to collect intelligence, they are compromising their role as chaplains. However, relaying information regarding threats against U.S. forces or the local community does not violate their noncombatant status.

In Iraq, civilians occasionally came to chaplains with crucial intelligence. In one case, a local man in Mosul approached Chaplain Stutz (deployed in Iraq from March 2003 to February 2004), the 101st Airborne Division CMOC chaplain, with what he claimed was information about the location of Saddam Hussein's two sons. Chaplain Stutz handled the situation by taking the individual to the division's G-2 shop, which is responsible for intelligence. By taking this action, he avoided acting as a "middleman" between the information source and the G-2. In most of these types of situations, chaplains arranged for individuals with information to talk directly to the "2 shop," thereby preserving an explicit distinction between the chaplain and intelligence collection.

Chaplain Carlos Huerta (deployed in Iraq from March to December 2003), the chaplain for the 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, of the 101st Airborne, also was careful to maintain his distinctive role as a chaplain. Chaplain Huerta, who was tasked with contacting imams in the area of Mosul for which his battalion was responsible, deliberately chose not to visit imams with battalion personnel who were collecting human intelligence. Intelligence would visit imams and ask them important questions such as whether they were being threatened or if insurgents were hiding weapons in their mosques. In contrast, the chaplain talked with imams about their concerns and spiritual issues—not about information useful to intelligence. Chaplain Eric Eliason (deployed in Afghanistan from February to June 2004), the chaplain of the 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, faced a similar tension in Afghanistan when he coordinated the renovation of village mosques. The decision concerning which villages to assist was made by the local firebase commander, who selected only villages that were cooperating with and supporting coalition efforts by providing human intelligence or turning over weapons. Chaplain Eliason chose to handle this situation by purposely avoiding the reasons behind the commander's decisions. He simply worked with those villages that were authorized by the command.

In another instance, after initially arriving in Afghanistan, Chaplain Larry Adams-Thompson (deployed in Afghanistan from March 2004 to March 2005), the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76 chaplain, continued the work of his predecessor, Chaplain Ken Sampson, who had

organized monthly luncheon or breakfast gatherings between military chaplains and local mullahs. The original intent of these meetings was to discuss concerns, build relationships, and exchange information. Chaplain Adams-Thompson broadened the purpose of the chaplain-mullah meetings by obtaining one million dollars in CERP (commander's emergency response program) funds that chaplains across Afghanistan could use in projects they organized with local mullahs. He encouraged chaplains to work through the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) commanders in their locales to arrange meetings between chaplains and mullahs for the purpose of determining how they could assist the leaders. Through these contacts chaplains coordinated with mullahs for the renovation of religious structures and the provision of such items as carpets and sound systems for mosques, generators for orphanages, and educational supplies for schools.

In one particular effort, Chaplain Adams-Thompson worked through a PRT commander to set up a luncheon at a local restaurant between chaplains and mullahs in Kapisa Province. During the meeting, the chaplains asked the mullahs what they thought about the impact of all the outside actors that have been in Afghanistan, including the British, Soviets, Taliban, and now the United States and multinational forces. The mullah in charge of education for the province said they were pleased that the United States was helping further education in the country. He appreciated all of the schools the United States was building for Afghanistan, because in order for the nation to move forward, their education infrastructure had to be improved. He added, however, that since the United States was only constructing public schools and not madrassas, which are traditional Islamic schools, the impression persisted that the United States was more concerned with secular than religious education. The mullah said that over the years all of the madrasa structures had been destroyed and the religious schools were meeting primarily in tents. So if the United States would construct some madrassas, even on a ratio of one-to-ten to public schools, a powerful message would be sent to the population that the United States cared about the Afghan people—their religion and culture. The chaplain took that information back to his commander.

Note that the feedback from the mullah was not related to combat operations. Rather, it provided an awareness of wider issues in the AOR. Chaplain Adams-Thompson encouraged chaplains to take similar issues from their meetings with mullahs back to their commanders. This example demonstrates how chaplains can advise commanding officers on the ways religion impacts the AOR. Local religious leaders, who usually are quite influential in their communities, can provide unique viewpoints on issues and concerns among the populace. Such insight is crucial for commanders, and chaplains are often in a unique position to provide it. This information is not tactical; rather, it is situational awareness that can be utilized to build bridges with the general population. As a result of Chaplain Adams-Thompson bringing the education mullah's assessment back to the command, approval was given to fund the construction of a madrasa in Kapisa Province, the first U.S. effort of its kind in Afghanistan.

Chaplains must be careful not to allow their interactions with religious leaders to be used inappropriately as human intelligence collection opportunities. For instance, if chaplains were debriefed by intelligence in order to gather information from their contacts with religious

leaders, it would put them on a slippery slope that could compromise their noncombatant role. However, none of the chaplains in this study felt pressured by their command to gather human intelligence. Nor did they think their command was compromising their noncombatant status. As chaplains communicated plainly what they were and were not able to do in this arena, their commands respected those boundaries. For example, shortly after arriving in Afghanistan, Chaplain Adams-Thompson met with his G-2 and told him what he could and could not do in terms of information operations. He indicated that during the twelve months he was in-country, the command never attempted to utilize his links with local religious leaders in an improper manner. Chaplains are responsible for maintaining a clear understanding of their noncombatant boundaries and communicating those to their command.

Balancing Security Concerns with Outreach Efforts

"It was kind of dangerous because we were in some pretty rough areas and I had to continually look at what is the advantage of me putting myself and others at risk and where is this going to take us."¹⁵

Security is another issue that must be addressed with respect to chaplains liaising with local religious leaders. The concern is not only for the safety of chaplains but also for the religious leaders with whom they meet. There were instances in Iraq and Afghanistan in which intimidation, violence, or assassination was committed against religious leaders who cooperated with chaplains and the coalition. Careful consideration has to be given as to how much danger local leaders are placed in by meeting with a chaplain. Do the benefits of meeting with a religious leader outweigh the risks he and U.S. forces face? Many chaplains struggled with this issue. Obviously, the opportunity to interact with community religious leaders will be restricted or eliminated when these threats are too great.

Chaplain assistants (CAs) and religious program specialists (RPs) are army and navy enlisted personnel, respectively, who assist chaplains and play the central role in force protection for chaplains. Those CAs and RPs who were skilled in force protection freed chaplains to focus more energy on liaison efforts with community religious leaders. Additionally, chaplains and their CAs or RPs had to balance force protection measures with the benefits of engaging the local community. For example, after the end of major combat operations in Iraq, chaplains and CAs with the 101st Airborne Division began to travel each week into downtown Mosul to meet with local religious leaders. In the early months, they maintained a low profile because they drove only one vehicle. However, as the insurgency increased and the threats became more serious, they took a convoy of four or five vehicles into the city, and the CA responsible for security began to take a much tougher stance. After arriving for one of the meetings with the Council of Imams, the CA insisted on blocking off traffic at both ends of the street so no vehicles could drive past the building. Later the division chaplain attempted to convince his CA that by taking such action, they were losing ground with the local populace. Initially, the CA followed his advice, but after coming out of a meeting a couple of weeks later, the chap-

lain discovered that his CA had once again secured traffic at both ends of the street. The CA was responsible for security, so it was ultimately his decision on what security measures to take. Local residents complained to the imams about the inconvenience, so two weeks later the location was moved to a building around the corner. Finally, the imams decided that it was safer for everyone if they started meeting at the division's headquarters, which was located at one of Saddam's former palaces. This situation reveals the complexities of balancing force protection concerns with the desire to build friendly relations with the community.

Security issues hampered the chaplains' ability to liaise with religious leaders in several ways. For example, if religious leaders came onto the military compound, there was the issue of security searches prior to entering. Some of the leaders viewed searches as insulting, and many also were uneasy about being seen with military personnel and their weapons. While in most instances weapons were not allowed in the religious facilities or meetings, there usually were military vehicles and personnel around the buildings, which brought added attention to the leaders.

Generally, liaison activities were more prevalent in Afghanistan than in Iraq because the security environment was more stable. However, security concerns varied greatly from region to region in both countries. Thus, the liaison work chaplains accomplished in some areas was not possible in others. While a senior chaplain might encourage chaplains in subordinate commands to liaise with area religious leaders, each local commander must determine whether the environment in his AOR is secure enough for his chaplain(s) to do so. Due to given operational or security situations, many chaplains had little or no interaction with religious leaders, which was a disappointment to some. However, since these dilemmas are certain to continue in the future, chaplains must balance their desire to interact with local religious leaders against operational and force protection requirements.

Utilizing Their Unique Role

"Clearly, a spiritual dimension will be required if the cycle of revenge that typically accompanies ethnic hostilities and other conflicts is ever to be broken."¹⁶

Due to their dual role as an officer and clergyperson, chaplains are in a unique position to relate with indigenous religious leaders in a way that no other military member can. Their position as a spiritual leader tends to create a deeper and more immediate bond between them and civilian religious leaders. Douglas Johnston notes that, in general, religious people are inclined to relate more naturally with other people of faith and engender a greater amount of trust and communication.¹⁷ A distinct implication of this notion is that when the military needs to engage local religious leaders, chaplains are the natural choice to fill this role. This dynamic was demonstrated during Operation Iraqi Freedom, when the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, entered An Numaniyah, a city of 350,000. Members of a Civil Affairs Group

(CAG) met with the city's civic leaders, but the leading Shiite cleric in the city made it clear that he preferred to meet with a religious figure whom he could view as his counterpart. The Shiite cleric's life experience was that religious leaders had the real authority and influence in the community.

The battalion colonel, along with the chaplain, sergeant major, and a couple of other officers met with the cleric in his home. After inviting the group into his study, the cleric, who was well educated and fluent in English, spoke directly to the chaplain and showed him the lineage of his bloodline, which went all the way back to Ali, the son-in-law of Mohammed and a revered Shiite figure. He understood that the chaplain was a Christian minister and spoke of his respect for Christianity, stating that Islam and Christianity are monotheistic religions that trace their religious heritages back to Abraham. The cleric viewed the chaplain as an advocate who would understand and be sympathetic to his situation. The several meetings battalion leaders had with the cleric dealt primarily with practical issues, in particular his concern for protection and unencumbered influence in the community. As a result of the development of this relationship, the cleric handed over his personal weapon to the marines and urged the local populace to surrender their weapons, too. Periodically, the marines went to a collection point outside the mosque, where, over the course of several weeks, they retrieved a large number of weapons.

Another example of the unique position of chaplains that allows them to relate effectively with local religious leaders is seen in Chaplain Eliason's work. In addition to working with village elders and mullahs on mosque renovations, Chaplain Eliason conducted training with an ASF soldier, Maseullah, who was selected by his fellow soldiers to be their mullah. A Special Forces soldier at a Konar Province firebase suggested that Chaplain Eliason could train Maseullah to be an ASF chaplain, just as the U.S. Army soldiers were training the other Afghan soldiers in their respective skills. After establishing an initial relationship with the mullah, Chaplain Eliason offered to do some chaplain training with him, to which Maseullah responded enthusiastically. Chaplain Eliason held five training sessions with the mullah. He talked with him about how the chaplaincy functioned in a Western army but added that he did not know what would be applicable in the Afghan culture. He told the mullah that it would be up to him to decide what he could do. The topics the chaplain discussed came directly from the training notes he had recently received from the U.S. Army's Chaplain Officer Basic Course. Subjects included the role of a chaplain, ministry of presence, confidentiality, counseling, performing ceremonial events, responding to medical emergencies, advising the commanding officer, dealing with detainees and EPWs, patrolling, caring for the wounded, memorializing fallen soldiers, respecting religious diversity, and the chaplain as a noncombatant. Upon his completion of training, the Special Forces team presented Maseullah with a certificate of appointment as the Pesch Valley ASF chaplain.

Maseullah's receptivity was remarkable in light of the fact that, when he was a child, his parents sent him to a Pakistani madrassa where the most significant part of his training was learning to recite the entire Koran in Arabic from memory. While in the madrassa he also was taught that the United States is the "Great Satan" that wants to destroy Islam. After he

participated in the mosque repairs and received training from Chaplain Eliason, Maseullah traveled back to his former madrassa and told his teachers that what they were teaching about the Americans was untrue. He invited them to come to the Pesch Valley and see the mosques that the Americans had helped repair.

Because of their professional clergy status, Chaplains Waite and Eliason were individuals within their commands well suited to relate with indigenous religious leaders. There was a deeper level of respect and more immediate rapport between them and their civilian clergy counterparts. As military officers, chaplains will be involved in combat or stability operations around the world. In many of these locations, religious leaders will be influential members of the community who relate more naturally to other religious leaders. Given their status as professional clergy, it is likely chaplains will enjoy additional credibility. Thus, chaplains are ready and capable assets in this arena. While they are military officers, they also are professional clergy who are uniquely positioned to facilitate mutual understanding between the military and local religious leaders.

Serving as Links with Local Leaders: The Chaplain's Diplomacy

"In a world where war is everybody's tragedy and everybody's nightmare, diplomacy is everybody's business."¹⁸

Due to the complexities and entrenched nature of many world conflicts, most people feel powerless to have any real impact on the resolution of serious hostilities. Because of this, people tend to think of conflict resolution as occurring on the track-one level, which is official state-to-state negotiation that involves formal party-to-party interaction. Raymond Cohen defines this type of diplomacy as "a process of communication between states seeking to arrive at a mutually acceptable outcome on some issue or issues of shared concern."¹⁹ This kind of negotiation involves professional state-sponsored diplomats who rely heavily upon verbal and analytical problem-solving skills in order to move conflicted parties toward a settlement.

Unofficial levels of diplomacy are considered "track two," which refers to individuals or groups outside of the government who work for peaceful resolutions. These actors could be NGOs or religious leaders. Joseph Montville, who is credited with originating the term "track-two diplomacy," defines it as

Unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict. . . . Track-two diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance, to manage conflicts by exploring

possible solutions out of public view and without the requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage.²⁰

In order to be more specific about the range of possible unofficial actors, Louise Diamond and John McDonald have broadened the term to “multi-track diplomacy.”²¹ They place these unofficial players into such categories as businesspeople, private citizens, activists, and religious actors. They state:

Multi-track diplomacy is a multi-disciplinary view of peacebuilding. It assumes that individuals and organizations are more effective working together than separately, and that ethnic and regional conflict situations involve a large and intricate web of parties and factors that requires a systems approach. Each track in the system, including religion, brings with it its own perspective, approach, and resources, all of which must be called on in the peacebuilding process.²²

Chaplains are probably more familiar with the systems approach as it relates to family therapy, which suggests that individuals should be understood in the context of their family, not in isolation from it. Therefore, if parents bring their troubled teenager in for therapy, it is not only the teenager who requires counseling, but the entire family. The therapist needs to see the teenager in the context of how all of the family members relate to one another, because all of the members contribute in some way to the cause and resolution of the teenager’s problems. This same dynamic applies to conflicts within societies. Every aspect of a society should be part of the solution, including religion. Thus, religion is one of the tracks that Diamond and McDonald discuss in multitrack diplomacy—an area in which chaplains are particularly qualified to operate. Since religion is such an integral part of the cultures in Iraq and Afghanistan, it can have a substantial—even essential—influence on peacebuilding.

So, there are many tracks of diplomacy. Some efforts are official, between states, while others are unofficial and occur between individuals or organizations in a society. Hence, it is important to understand that multitrack diplomacy has played an important role in preparing the groundwork for success in numerous conflicts, including in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Bosnia, Angola, Mozambique, Tajikistan, and Israel-Palestine.²³ More specifically, religious diplomacy has been instrumental in peaceful conflict resolution in such places as South Africa, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Beirut, and in mitigating violence in other conflicts, such as Nigeria’s civil war.²⁴ Therefore, the chaplain’s diplomacy is one of many tracks that can contribute to resolution. Chaplains are on the front lines of conflict, which often puts them in the position to work with religious leaders to solve problems and mitigate violence.

As chaplains engage religious leaders, it must be remembered that in contrast to expert state-sponsored negotiators, chaplains function more as liaisons, which means they serve as links or channels of communication between the military and local religious leaders. This distinction

between the roles of negotiator and liaison is important to keep in mind with regard to chaplains. As mentioned earlier, people commonly think of a “negotiator” as professionally trained, as in the case of diplomats, attorneys, and businesspeople. Chaplains are not skilled negotiators and should not be viewed as such. In fact, the army’s FM 1-05 states, “Under Title X of the U.S. Code, Chaplains should not perform the following: Direct participation in negotiations or mediations as sole participant.”²⁵

However, as liaisons, chaplains are principally able to establish communication, develop trust, resolve misunderstandings, and, where possible, solve problems, especially when religious actors or issues are involved. This function is similar to the intermediary role chaplains commonly play in a command. Some individuals come to chaplains, whom they view as an impartial party with considerable influence in the command, and describe a problem they have with their supervisor or chain of command. As a relatively impartial party, chaplains listen to the individual, evaluate the situation, and then decide what course of action to take. If chaplains address the issue with someone in the chain of command, they are acting as mediators, not negotiators. So chaplains frequently act in a quasi-intermediary capacity within commands, and when authorized by their commanding officer may function in a similar manner as a link between the command and local religious leaders.

As one considers the nature of most conflicts today, it is likely that the U.S. military will be called upon often to act as de facto mediators, attempting to build or maintain peace between incompatible groups. This increasing demand is due in part to the fact that the most entrenched hostilities involve people who live close to one another, usually in the same country or community.²⁶ Research reveals that every year since 1986 the majority of the world’s conflicts have been intrastate rather than interstate.²⁷ These intrastate divisions are often along ethnic and religious lines, as they are in Iraq among the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. In these situations, there frequently is deeply rooted hurt and anger over past wrongs committed by the other side, which may date back hundreds or even thousands of years. These kinds of conflicts take time to resolve and ordinarily involve a gradual process of reconciliation. As the United States becomes increasingly engaged in these kinds of hostilities, a greater demand will be placed on military personnel to interact with civilian populations.

There have been past conflicts in which the U.S. military has been called upon to play such a role. For instance, in 1996, Task Force (TF) 3-5, an army battalion stationed in Germany, was deployed to Brcko, Bosnia, to perform stability operations. The Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks were the warring parties in the region. Because of the nature of the Bosnian mission, soldiers had extensive interaction with civilians. Soldiers, in effect, became third-party mediators to an extent none of them had imagined. They were actively involved in assisting conflicted civilians in reestablishing relationships with one another. A primary skill of chaplains is the rebuilding and reconciliation of relationships, which is a key aspect of effective stability operations. As relationships are rebuilt, the reconciliation process can begin. In these types of stability operations, third-party actors, such as the U.S. military and their chaplains, can help move the process along. When functioning as a quasi-impartial third party in conflict, chaplains primarily should seek to be bridge builders. Trust and communication are the foundation for a

healthy relationship and are the first elements to break down in conflicts, so chaplains should focus initially on rebuilding these ingredients.²⁸ Therefore, in these situations, fundamental goals ought to include developing mutual understanding; reestablishing trust, interdependence, and a shared identity; seeking common ground and a shared vision; and uniting the community across all of its divides.²⁹ Building bridges through dialogue and community development efforts can be the first step in the process of reconstructing relationships.³⁰

Thus, in stability operations, chaplains may act as quasi mediators between two or more conflicted parties. As demonstrated earlier, such was the case in the Balkans, where the U.S. military acted as a stability force between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. In contrast, due to the nature of the conflicts, chaplain mediation in Iraq and Afghanistan has occurred on a more limited scale. However, even there, some chaplains have been asked to play a mediator role. For instance, after arriving in Mosul, the 101st Airborne Division initially requested that the imams and bishops meet with the chaplains for dialogue. Although the imams and bishops had grown up with each other in the same communities and their friendships went back many years, they never had met as one group. However, after the second gathering, the bishops told the chaplains that they wanted to meet with them separately. They were smaller in number and did not think they could be completely open about their concerns with the imams present. So, in the first meeting just between the chaplains and Christian leaders, the bishops brought out hundred-year-old maps of the local area and explained how over time parcels of their land had been taken from them and given to Muslim squatters. The bishops wanted the coalition to settle the score and resolve the property disputes.

Chaplain Egert (deployed in Iraq from July 2003 to February 2004), the 101st Airborne Division chaplain, looked into the issue and learned that the interim government was not going to deal with any property rights issues. These land controversies were complex and existed not only between Christians and Muslims but also among various tribes. This incident demonstrates how, if chaplains do liaison work with conflicted groups, as third parties, they will likely be asked to help settle complicated historical disputes. Many of these kinds of entrenched disagreements date back hundreds or thousands of years and do not lie within the authority or expertise of a chaplain to solve.

Another dynamic of interacting with multiple religious groups is that it is essential for the various communities to view chaplains as impartial players. In some areas of Iraq where Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians coexisted, chaplains had to be particularly cautious that they did not show favoritism toward any religious community. This situation can be difficult as hostile religious and ethnic groups can easily misinterpret one's actions, and chaplains generally identify more easily with religious bodies that are similar to their own faith tradition.

Additional considerations for chaplains engaged in deeply rooted conflicts are that they are present only for brief periods, do not live among the people, usually do not have the necessary foreign-language skills, and cannot assimilate into the culture. Military chaplains are outsiders who have inadequate time and circumstances for building deep relationships with indigenous religious leaders. These factors greatly limit the chaplains' opportunity to have a long-term

substantive influence on the local situation. Although they will not be present for the long-term work necessary to establish an enduring peace, chaplains can certainly be involved in the early stages of these endeavors and must understand the limitations of their role.

Finally, as chaplains prepare to rotate back to the United States from combat or stability operations, it is crucial that they pass on their efforts to other chaplains, NGOs, and IGOs (intergovernmental organizations). This transition can be difficult because the relieving chaplain likely is entering with an entirely new command with different personalities and ways of operating. Furthermore, evidence from this research indicates that successful liaison efforts are substantially dependent upon a chaplain's personality. Some chaplains who had developed effective relationships with local religious leaders were followed by chaplains who did not have the same level of interest or comfort in connecting with indigenous religious leaders, so the work was reduced or eliminated. Another challenge that makes maintaining continuity problematic is that there may be no NGOs or IGOs with which the chaplain may collaborate or that can continue his efforts. These kinds of factors contribute to more erratic and short-term engagements with civilian religious leaders.

Relating with Religious Leaders of Other Faiths

"The most hopeful and heroic stories of interreligious peacemaking emerge from those rare individuals who possess a combination of deeply authentic expressions of their own religiosity together with an unconditional respect for or love of nonbelievers as fellow human beings."³¹

In order to relate positively with indigenous religious leaders, chaplains must possess several capabilities. Most important, they should be well grounded in their faith and clear about their identity as religious leaders. R. Scott Appleby writes:

Contrary to the misconceptions popular in some academic and political circles, religious actors play this critical and positive role in world affairs not when they moderate their religion or marginalize their deeply held, vividly symbolized, and often highly particular beliefs in a higher order of love and justice. Religious actors make a difference when they remain religious actors.³²

Christopher Hall adds, "If Christian, Muslim, and Jew are to live together in security and freedom in the years to come, we must learn to speak lovingly our understanding of truth to one another while yet avoiding the temptation to water things down to a vapid commonality."³³ These statements reflect the long-standing philosophy of the military Chaplain Corps: "cooperation without compromise." Hence, chaplains and the religious leaders with whom they interact should not marginalize their religious beliefs in order to develop a relationship or work with one another. Rather, they must rely on their own faith for spiritual grounding while

simultaneously focusing on the common bonds from each of their traditions that can bring them together.

Chaplain Stutz, who had extensive interaction with religious leaders in Mosul, advised that chaplains not be so conciliatory that they overidentify with the other. He said that in an effort to build a relationship with religious leaders, some chaplains could become so accommodating that they lose their sense of self.³⁴ Chaplains should respect others but remain true to themselves and their faith. Interestingly, the U.S. Department of State's policy is that international assignments are normally for a maximum of two to three years. The basis for this limit is the supposition that the longer a person is in another country, the more sympathy and identification that individual risks developing with the local culture, perhaps becoming too loyal to that country. This dynamic of human behavior has some application to chaplains as they interact with local religious leaders. In their desire to build bridges, chaplains risk overaccommodating the other. Following the death of Pope John Paul II, the Reverend Augustine DiNoia, the Vatican's second-ranking official in charge of safeguarding orthodoxy, said, "The relationship among religions is probably the most significant" issue facing the next pope.³⁵ "The fundamental problem is how to value another religion without devaluing your own."³⁶ Thus, chaplains must balance appropriately devotion to their own faith with a healthy respect for the religious beliefs of others.

Additionally, the ability to accept someone whose theology and culture are different from your own is crucial. Marc Gopin says that in order for interfaith dialogue to occur, "Religious communities need to . . . develop the skills necessary to truly listen to another religious reality and culture, to not be threatened by it, and to discover the spiritual resources to make peace with those who are in a different theological universe."³⁷ Given the pluralistic nature of military ministry, chaplains should be theologically and personally inclined not to view those of another religious faith as enemies. Accounts in this study reveal that chaplains demonstrated genuine respect and regard for the religious leaders with whom they dealt. Although there usually were significant theological differences, they did not allow them to be insurmountable barriers to the relationship. Their actions signal the importance of possessing a basic comfort level in interacting with religious leaders of other faiths and not feeling personally threatened by the differences.

Yet not all chaplains may be well suited for religious leader engagements. Due to theological or personality factors, some chaplains might have difficulty functioning in this capacity. Commanding officers recognize that chaplains are completely qualified to conduct religious services and ministry, but with respect to liaising with civilian religious leaders—especially those of a different faith or gender—some commanders may have reservations. Some fear that chaplains might get involved in religious disputes. However, all of the chaplains in this study had their commanding officers' confidence and were viewed as competent to deal with local religious leaders. Undoubtedly, when commanding officers evaluate their chaplains' ability to serve as liaisons, they consider the chaplains' experience and disposition for this kind of work.

The ability to find common ground also is essential. Although there may be significant theological differences between a chaplain and a local religious leader, they must find a way to emphasize those areas of mutual agreement, theological and otherwise. Areas of common ground may include positions as basic as a mutual belief in God, similar moral traditions, the practice of spiritual disciplines, the importance of scripture, and a shared religious history. In practice, the chaplains in this study focused on those matters they had in common with civilian religious leaders. In the majority of cases, these interactions did not involve in-depth interfaith discussions. Due to wartime circumstances, they focused on pragmatic short-term problem solving, not on conversations about deep theological subjects.

An unanticipated aspect of the interactions between chaplains and indigenous religious leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan was the level of openness of many clerics to Christian chaplains. Many chaplains expected the clerics to be closed and suspicious, but in most cases, the response was the opposite. For instance, in various conversations with chaplains, numerous clerics in Iraq and Afghanistan emphasized that Islam and Christianity share a belief in one God and have Abraham as their common ancestor. These were fundamental points of agreement.

Another surprise involved Chaplain Huerta, a rabbi who, once stability operations began, was tasked to work with schools, mosques, and orphanages in his battalion's sector of Mosul. In discharging these responsibilities, he coordinated the renovation or construction of twenty-five schools. While in Iraq, Chaplain Huerta, who is fluent in Hebrew, began to study the Koran and learn Arabic. Periodically, when the situation was appropriate, he would cite a Koranic verse during his conversation with local leaders or citizens. This action had a noticeable positive effect on people. Chaplain Huerta's efforts to rebuild schools, learn Arabic, integrate the Koran into his personal interactions, and embrace the Iraqi people greatly impressed the local populace. These acts resulted in the development of close relationships with many civilians and culminated with the mayor of Mosul inviting Chaplain Huerta to participate in the dedication ceremony of a local school by reading a chapter from the Koran.

Chaplain Leslie Dawson (deployed in Afghanistan from July 2003 to January 2004), a Canadian chaplain who served as the Multi-national Brigade chaplain, was astonished by the acceptance she received from mullahs. As the senior chaplain for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), she organized a meeting between multinational chaplains and forty mullahs in Kabul. After consulting several liaison officers, she decided not to attend the event because she thought her gender would create an obstacle for some of the mullahs. However, following the gathering, she received word from other chaplains that the mullahs had indicated they would have been glad for her to attend and thought that as the senior multinational chaplain she should be present. Also, a month later, she was invited to attend a gathering with coalition chaplains and area mullahs at Bagram Air Base. At this and a subsequent meeting with community leaders in which she was the only woman present, she was warmly received and was asked many questions about her role as a woman and a chaplain. Chaplain Dawson was surprised by their receptivity and curiosity.

These unexpected experiences demonstrate that while in some situations it is probably wise to err on the side of caution, the stereotypes chaplains have of religious leaders and the general populace of other countries may be inaccurate. As in all religions, there is a wide range of beliefs and many exceptions to our preconceived notions. Therefore, as clergy who seek to promote understanding and reconciliation, chaplains should anticipate and foster qualities such as openness, respect, and acceptance.

A note of caution should be sounded about proselytizing. There were instances in Iraq when local imams proselytized some Christian chaplains aggressively. Proselytizing is not unusual. It takes place in the United States and within the military, so it should not be surprising that indigenous religious leaders might attempt to proselytize. There were also cases when some clerics expressed anti-Semitic attitudes. These incidents are a reminder that there are some religious leaders, due to their theology or prejudices, with whom chaplains probably cannot liaise. As an example, consider the experience of Chaplain Tom Yates (deployed in Afghanistan from January to October 2004), who was assigned to Task Force Victory, Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force. Chaplain Yates was invited to participate in the dedication of a new PRT headquarters building. He sat with two mullahs on the platform, and as clergy, all three of them offered public prayers during the ceremony. Afterward, Chaplain Yates had a cordial conversation with the two mullahs and learned that there were other mullahs who did not attend the event because they were strongly opposed to a Christian chaplain giving a prayer at the ceremony. This incident reflects the reality that there are some leaders within all faiths who resist interfaith endeavors. Due to the beliefs or intolerance of others, some attempts may not be possible. Therefore, chaplains have to understand and be sensitive to the theological position of local religious leaders with whom they liaise and accept that reality, whatever it may be. Just as in the United States there are many clergy who are not interested in dialogue or bridge building with leaders of other faiths, so, too, are there religious leaders in other countries who have no interest in interacting with military chaplains and may even be hostile.

Engaging Midlevel Leaders

“Middle-range actors are far more numerous than are top-level leaders and are connected through networks to many influential people across the human and physical geography of the conflict.”³⁸

In order for a durable peace to be established in a given conflict, effective conflict transformation must occur in three echelons of a society: the top, middle, and grassroots.³⁹ Of these three echelons, middle-range leaders are crucial because they are uniquely positioned to influence senior leaders above them and the grassroots below them.⁴⁰ Middle-range leaders are respected within the community and have significant influence; however, strictly speaking, they normally are not political leaders and usually do not desire political positions for them-

selves. This leadership level, whose influence should not be underestimated, is the one with which the vast majority of chaplains liaise.

As an example, consider the work of Chaplain Stutz in Mosul, during OIF. By the time the 101st Airborne Division arrived in the city in May 2003, the local population had already ransacked most of the public buildings, including museums, from which they stole many invaluable artifacts. Chaplain Stutz, who participated in weekly meetings with two religious councils, the Council of Imams and the Council of Bishops, requested that the religious leaders encourage the local populace to return the stolen items. Much to his surprise, over a period of weeks, most of the items were returned. Through these two councils, the chaplains continued to work with religious leaders to address many community concerns. Practical issues were discussed, such as those related to city sanitation problems, widespread criminal activity, and, most prevalent, questions about detainees. Matters of cultural misunderstandings were also aired. For example, some imams felt they were not treated with enough respect when they were stopped and searched by soldiers. As a result of these meetings, the chaplain educated soldiers on how to appropriately deal with imams. He also arranged for weapon permits to be issued to imams that allowed them to carry weapons for self-defense, which was critical due to the high rate of crime and assassinations. More important, Chaplain Stutz became the primary contact person between the public and regional detainees and arranged for imams to regularly visit and interview detainees in the 101st Division holding area. This connection was vital because it established the chaplain and local imams as communication links between the U.S. military and civilians who had a detained family member. These actions strengthened the relationship between the chaplain and local religious leaders, who, in turn, were important conduits to the grassroots level of Iraqi society. Chaplain Stutz believes that because of the work he and other 101st Division chaplains did with imams, attacks against U.S. forces were reduced.

In another situation, which will be discussed more fully later, the 19th Special Forces Group in Afghanistan was spread out along the border with Pakistan. Taliban and al Qaeda elements were propagating fear that the United States was there to spread Christianity and crush Islam. If imams believed these lies and broadcast them to the populace, it would be extremely difficult for U.S. forces to overcome their influence and gain the people's trust. As a result of Chaplain Eliason's relationships with local mullahs in Konar Province and the renovation of mosques there, it was difficult for al Qaeda to convince the populace that Americans were there to destroy Islam. Additionally, during the calls to prayer in Iraq, some mosques issued anti-U.S. and anticoalition statements, while others issued words of support. These are examples from Iraq and Afghanistan that demonstrate how clerics who are midlevel leaders can influence the grassroots, and how working with existing societal structures is important in combating an insurgency and conducting stability operations.

Building Bridges through Dialogue

“Dialogue means we sit and talk with each other, especially those with whom we may think we have the greatest differences.”⁴¹

A central aspect of a chaplain’s liaison efforts is the promotion of dialogue. There were many instances in Iraq and Afghanistan in which chaplains developed ongoing discussions with community religious leaders. Louise Diamond says, “In dialogue, the intention is not to advocate, but to inquire; not to argue but to explore; not to convince but to discover.”⁴²

An example of this approach is reflected in the meetings Chaplain Ken Sampson (deployed in Afghanistan from May 2003 to April 2004), the CJTF-180 chaplain, organized between chaplains and local mullahs. Chaplain Sampson’s initial philosophy in establishing these prayer breakfast or lunch meetings was that “military chaplains are religious leaders and mullahs are religious leaders, so why don’t we get together to talk?”⁴³ Over time, as they met each month, relationships deepened. The process began, however, with a simple desire to open up channels of communication and promote understanding between people of faith. John Finney (deployed in Afghanistan from September 2003 to January 2004), the CJTF-180 political adviser (POLAD), said this dialogue between the chaplains and imams was some of the most effective work the U.S. military was conducting with the local populace.⁴⁴ These gatherings and the relationships that grew out of them formed a foundation upon which Chaplain Adams-Thompson, who followed Chaplain Sampson, was able to build.

In order to be successful in establishing positive dialogue and developing strong relationships with local religious leaders, chaplains must possess basic communication and relational skills. However, rather than concentrating on techniques or style, the focus should be on the character qualities necessary for ensuring successful dialogue. Writing about keys to effective peacebuilding, John Paul Lederach says, “Qualities of practice point us less in the direction of technique and more toward attitude and character.”⁴⁵

One of the most crucial attitudes chaplains need in order to be effective facilitators of dialogue is humility. Marc Gopin says, “Humility is critical in the process of working with others in groups—whether they are groups as small as two people or as large as an entire organization.”⁴⁶ Humility is reflected through asking questions and inquiring about the concerns and views of others and is a good starting point in building dialogue because it helps ease initial suspicions and gain acceptance from the other.⁴⁷ Some individuals are so self-centered they have little interest in asking other people questions about themselves. In social gatherings these persons may talk about themselves—their achievements, concerns, and opinions—but show no curiosity regarding the achievements, concerns, and opinions of the people with whom they are conversing. Humility gives people the capacity to demonstrate more interest in others and less in themselves. Thus, it is a quality that can serve as a foundation upon which authentic dialogue is built.

Chaplain Eliason, who had extensive interaction with Afghan mullahs and village leaders, exhibited this attitude. He asked the village mullahs questions and first sought to genuinely learn about their religion and culture. When the opportunity emerged for him to train Masseurullah to be a chaplain in his ASF unit, Chaplain Eliason said it was important before offering the training to inquire about how one demonstrates respect for Muslim traditions. He said, “Teaching professional Western style chaplain practices must be done with respect and sensitivity—an invitation rather than an imposition.”⁴⁸ This approach reflects an ability to listen and exhibits cross-cultural sensitivity, both of which are expressions of humility that can greatly enhance rapport.

Another demonstration of humility is treating the other as an equal who is deserving of one’s respect. This mindset should result in the use of a collaborative style, which invites more participation and increases the likelihood of a positive response, rather than an authoritative approach, which shuts down dialogue and likely leads to a negative reaction. As a case in point, consider Chaplain Stutz, who said that when he initially began meeting with the Mosul religious councils, the gatherings were Western in style. Namely, they were led by chaplains and managed efficiently with a set agenda, much like an American business meeting. After Chaplain Egert adjusted the gatherings from this mode to a more collegial style, a gradual shift in the tone of the meetings occurred. Such steps as providing a written agenda in English and Arabic, inviting more input from the religious leaders, and placing a greater emphasis on the relationship among the participants enhanced rapport, improved dialogue, and ultimately made the meetings more productive.

Developing Relationships: A Key to Success

“People the world over crave authentic relationship in a time of violent crisis, and they often do not receive this at the hands of professional, instrumentalist intervention by outsiders.”⁴⁹

In conflict resolution, Westerners typically are most comfortable with getting “right down to business” and confronting the issues directly. However, moving too quickly in this manner bypasses relationship building and undermines the importance of first attempting to understand one another. In contrast to an instrumental focus, which seeks to obtain an immediate goal, chaplains should make establishing relationships a main priority.⁵⁰ This latter approach views conflict resolution more as a process.⁵¹

Lederach says that relationships, interdependence, trust, and commitment are essential to creating a durable peace.⁵² A lasting peace will come about only when across a society, at various levels within the society, true reconciliation and a building of relationships are established.⁵³ Since the human relationship is a key ingredient in the resolution and healing of deeply rooted conflicts, it is highly beneficial in stability operations for conflicted groups to be given opportunities to establish constructive relationships. Activities that allow opposing

parties to be together and come to know one another facilitate in the humanization of the other side. Generally, a positive relationship with another person contributes an enormous amount toward preventing future violence against that individual; that is, it is more difficult to commit violence against someone you hold in high regard than against someone you view as an adversary. Thus, peacebuilding and conflict resolution endeavors between hostile groups must include acts to establish relationships and promote reconciliation. These two efforts are among the most effective methods of peacebuilding.⁵⁴

At the same time, relationship building and reconciliation processes also require the hardest work and the most time.⁵⁵ Some experts suggest that in order to bring peace to long-standing, entrenched conflicts, it is necessary for peacemakers to live in conflicted communities for extended periods. This peacebuilding action is known as field diplomacy and involves peacemakers living and working in areas of conflict and thereby gradually becoming integrated into the community. It is believed that by building close relations with the indigenous population, one has the greatest impact, because hostile attitudes are most effectively and profoundly changed through human relationships, not formal declarations or settlements.

Thus, developing personal relationships with and among hostile parties is a key element in effective conflict resolution. It is also a fundamental principle for chaplains to emulate in order for them to succeed in their work with religious leaders. An example of this dynamic was seen in the friendship Chaplain Douglas Carver (deployed in Iraq from March 2003 to March 2004), the CJTF-7 chaplain, developed with Hayder Abdul Karim, an Iraqi surgeon. In August 2003, Chaplain Carver was invited to attend a gathering of prominent religious leaders that was sponsored by the newly formed Iraqi Inter-religious Council for Peace. Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, Dr. Hayder was the individual most responsible for the creation of this council, which is affiliated with the World Conference of Religions for Peace. Dr. Hayder believed that Iraq would change by engaging religious leaders, and the organization he was establishing would promote that goal. Representatives and key leaders from all of the major Iraqi groups and some international religious organizations were present at the initial meeting—Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, Christians, and others, including a top aide of the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most senior Shiite leader. This two-day meeting was held in Baghdad and was a groundbreaking event that provided an excellent opportunity for dialogue and relationship building. It was an initial step in attempting to establish constructive relationships among Iraq's diverse religious leaders.

After the meeting, Dr. Hayder began to take Chaplain Carver throughout Iraq to meet various prominent religious leaders. The leaders would express their concerns and request assistance, and Chaplain Carver would take those issues back to his command. Chaplain Carver in turn took Dr. Hayder to military hospitals to show him how the military was providing health care even to insurgents who had injured themselves while building bombs. Through such interactions these two men developed a unique bond. Chaplain Carver said that much of the work with the religious leaders was about building relationships and trust. Most of the chaplains in this study made the same observation. From their experiences in interacting with religious leaders, they came to realize that their relationship with the leaders was the key to success.

Supporting this view about the importance of relationships, Montgomery Fate says that in Iraq the “U.S. emphasis on force protection prevented soldiers from visiting coffee shops and buying small items on the economy. Consequently, soldiers and marines were unable to establish one-to-one relationships with Iraqis, which are key to both intelligence collection and winning ‘hearts and minds.’”⁵⁶ While chaplains are not involved in intelligence collection, they are in the business of building relationships and are particularly adept at doing so with religious leaders.

A useful concept in relationship building is the contact hypothesis, which is “the notion that better communication between groups of people is facilitated simply by bringing them together and allowing them to interact.”⁵⁷ This theory appears flawed because of the numerous cases that have been commonly observed when substantial contact between conflicted groups did not produce positive communication. In fact, many people, if left to their own devices, have extremely destructive interactions. Due to past injuries, grievances, and prejudices, their dealings with one another are largely negative. This pattern is particularly evident among troubled married couples. All chaplains have counseled couples who have erupted into a heated argument and replayed the old tapes they have played on many previous occasions, while the chaplain sits on the “sideline” observing them battle each other angrily. If ground rules are not established or the chaplain does not guide the interaction, a conflicted couple can easily revert to their negative pattern of communication. Because of this pattern in human behavior, social psychologists have suggested various criteria for improving the likelihood of positive interaction among different groups. Some of these conditions include making sure the interaction is voluntary, is among equals, emphasizes cooperation rather than competition, and receives strong institutional support and guidance.⁵⁸

The contact hypothesis, as summarized here, clearly is relevant to what chaplains do as liaisons. In some cases chaplains may act as quasi mediators, attempting to bring two or more conflicted parties together, as in the Balkans with the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. In other instances, as chaplains liaise with local religious leaders who are of a different culture, language, and possibly religion, they seek to develop a personal connection with them. Thus, chaplains should act as guides helping to create an environment under which the contact hypothesis can be realized. Consequently, if chaplains are going to bring antagonistic parties together to give them an opportunity to establish a relationship, they must also provide an environment that gives the interaction a high likelihood of success.

Louise Diamond says that there are three types of peacebuilding. “Political peacebuilding is about agreements . . . structural peacebuilding is about activities . . . and social peacebuilding is about relationships.”⁵⁹ Chaplains primarily operate in the arena of social peacebuilding, for which they are well suited. For instance, Chaplain Egert noted that when he first began to meet with the Mosul religious councils his connection with the Council of Bishops was immediate and friendly. The Christian leaders were glad the U.S. military was in Iraq and, from the beginning of their bimonthly meetings with the chaplains, provided a warm welcome and generous meal at each gathering. In contrast, it required months of working with the Council of Imams to develop a close relationship. Even though Chaplain Egert had weekly meetings

with the Council of Imams, it was difficult gaining the clerics' trust; they were more suspicious of U.S. intentions in Iraq. For example, there were many accusations in the media that the United States was there only for oil. Nevertheless, as a result of good-faith actions, Chaplain Egert steadily gained the imams' trust and developed a close relationship with them. Over time, the imams learned that they received more understanding from a chaplain than from any other person in the U.S. military and that the chaplain also had significant influence within the command. However, in order to maintain credibility with the imams, it was important for the chaplain to address their concerns honestly, follow up on what was discussed, and achieve results. Chaplains have to connect with the needs and concerns of the religious leaders so they can move the relationship to the next level. Chaplain Egert did this by arranging for several key religious leaders to make weekly visits to Iraqi citizens held in the 101st Division's detention center. Additionally, when a prominent imam was detained and questioned because he matched the description of a suspected insurgent, Chaplain Egert acted quickly to resolve the situation. The imam's six-hour detention was extremely offensive to several of Mosul's leading religious leaders. The chaplain arranged for a proper private apology from the command and financial restitution for the imam. These steps restored the imam's honor and contributed greatly toward trust and enhanced ties with local religious leaders.

Some of the common ways chaplains strengthened relationships with local religious leaders were through socializing before and after meetings, sharing meals, showing respect, conducting collaborative council meetings, listening to clerics' concerns, resolving practical problems the leaders raised, coordinating physical improvements of religious facilities, and attending religious events. Basic actions such as these are essential to building effective relationships with community leaders.

Tapping into the Significance of Acts, Gestures, and Rituals

"Ritual is an essential element of religion because it binds people together; ritual is a tool for building relationships."⁶⁰

As Lisa Schirch indicates, there are symbolic acts, gestures, and rituals that communicate more to others than words.⁶¹ For instance, when a person is deeply hurt by another individual, seeing a change in the other's behavior frequently is even more important to the injured party than an apology. In these situations, an individual's actions speak more profoundly than his words. A common saying is that "people are what they do." Words can go only so far before they must be supported by concrete actions. More and more, experts in conflict resolution are finding that actions are exceedingly important in building trust. For example, in communities that have been plagued by violence, gestures and acts of kindness have a healing effect that is more profound than words.⁶² Thus, as chaplains liaise with religious leaders, they cannot rely merely on verbal communication in order to develop deeper relationships with others or to bring conflicted groups together. They have to consider the acts, gestures, and rituals that might bring them closer to the religious leaders, or opposing parties closer to one

another. So, in many instances, it is not so much chaplains' verbal skills or negotiating power that carries the day as it is their acts, gestures, and rituals. These actions lay the foundation for close relationships.

It is commonly said that people learn more effectively by doing than by simply listening. Ritual is a way for people to participate in an activity that speaks to them on a deeper emotional level than words alone do. If an individual visits the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery, he will observe an unbroken ritual performed by highly trained military personnel in honor of service members whose remains have never been positively identified. During this ceremony no words have to be spoken because the symbolic actions of the personnel who guard the tomb speak powerfully to the observers. Rituals can be any activity that brings people together and causes them to bond with one another. They can include athletic events, religious services, and holiday observances.

The truth of this principle was seen in An Nasiriyah, where Chaplain Waite gained the trust of the local population more by his actions than by his words. When Chaplain Waite assisted in digging the graves for the two Iraqi civilians that were killed during a battle, he was offering a gesture that communicated more powerfully than spoken words. When he arranged for the distribution of food that was captured from the city's Baath Party headquarters, he demonstrated his sincerity as well as that of the U.S. military. When Chaplain Stutz in Iraq and Chaplain Eliason in Afghanistan worked with local leaders to renovate mosques and other religious facilities, they were building relationships with the indigenous community. When Chaplain Egert adjusted the format of Mosul's religious council meetings by taking such steps as slowing down the pace of the meetings, providing a written agenda in English and Arabic, and interacting with the religious leaders in a more collegial and collaborative manner, the parties' rapport and the effectiveness of the meetings improved dramatically. When he and Chaplain Stutz organized a series of eighteen *iftar* (fast-breaking) meals during Ramadan, these community rituals brought the Iraqi people closer to the 101st Airborne Division. These eighteen events, each of which included a prayer, were held with specific leadership groups, such as police, educators, and civic leaders, and were primarily meant to serve as social gatherings. Major General Petraeus or one of his senior staff officers represented the division at each of the feasts. Their presence, which was a symbolic act, communicated the importance the U.S. military placed on these events.

What might seem like an insignificant gesture could actually be extremely important. Gestures can be as simple as shaking hands, offering a cordial greeting, or sharing a meal. When Chaplain Egert and other 101st Division chaplains met with the Council of Imams, a strong cup of coffee was usually offered to all of the attendees. A man came around the room with a pot of coffee and one cup. He would pour the coffee in the cup, invite the person in front of him to drink, and then go to the next person, refill the same cup, and extend the same invitation. Thus, everyone at the meeting drank from the same glass. Chaplain Egert always took part in the ritual because he thought it was important to accept their hospitality. So, although he did not care for the nonhygienic practice, he participated because it was a way of embracing the imams' customs, showing respect, and demonstrating a desire to

befriend them. This simple concrete gesture communicated to the imams more powerfully than his words.

For clergy and people of faith, ceremonies of a religious nature are particularly significant. All religions have many forms of ritual, and they are especially prominent in worship. A combination of words and actions and the symbolism behind them give profound meaning to religious rites. Prayer is a form of ritual that has the ability to reach across cultural divides, particularly among people of faith. A compelling example of the power of community prayer is seen in the actions of Chaplain Erik Lee (deployed in Iraq from March to August 2003), who was a member of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. The 2nd Battalion advanced to Baghdad, went as far north as Tikrit, and then turned south and spent two months in As Sumawah, a city of more than one hundred thousand people located on the Euphrates River, 164 miles south of Baghdad. After arriving in the city, the battalion established its headquarters at the local train station and then called a meeting with the area sheikhs. The purpose of the meeting was to get acquainted with the local leaders, hear concerns, answer questions, and share information. Prior to the meeting, Chaplain Lee talked with his commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel O'Donahue, and suggested that the event begin with a prayer. Chaplain Lee explained that most of the sheikhs were religious figures and this act would be a way of showing these leaders that Americans respected religion.

The colonel opened the meeting with a few remarks and then introduced Chaplain Lee, who he said would give a prayer. Chaplain Lee explained how the marines respected the Iraqi tradition of faith and appreciated the calls to prayer they heard five times a day from the mosques. He said, "Oftentimes in the United States before important events and meals we pray, and we can think of no better way to begin this meeting than with prayer."⁶³ Chaplain Lee then gave a prayer thanking God for his presence, for the people and leaders of As Sumawah, and requested a blessing on the leaders and their families. Immediately after the prayer ended, the Iraqis broke out in spontaneous, enthusiastic, and long applause. Chaplain Lee and his command leaders were astonished by their passionate response.

After that meeting, until the time the battalion left, Chaplain Lee received regular invitations to give a prayer at various community functions, such as the installation of judges, the graduation ceremony for police officers, and whenever the sheikhs gathered for a meeting with the battalion. During the two months the battalion was in As Sumawah, the chaplain offered public prayers at twenty-five events. Additionally, he visited twenty families in local hospitals, most of whom had children injured from collateral damage during the war. Usually the families asked Chaplain Lee to say a prayer for them. Finally, two imams invited Chaplain Lee to attend the Friday services at their mosques. After receiving permission from his colonel, he went to the mosques in local civilian clothing, met with the imams prior to the services, and then with a translator at his side attended the services. One can see that the prayer Chaplain Lee offered at the initial meeting with the sheikhs set in motion the subsequent opportunities and extension of friendship from the local community and religious leaders.

Together, the examples from these five chaplains are a noteworthy collection of rituals (whether giving a prayer, organizing Ramadan feasts, or arranging for a burial), gestures (drinking coffee before a gathering or creating a more collegial approach in meetings), and acts (renovation of mosques) that built relationships of trust and collaboration between the U.S. military and the local populace.

Contributing to Winning Hearts and Minds

“As one former military officer has observed, the mark of a great campaign is not what it destroys, but what it creates.”⁶⁴

The 1907 Hague Convention established the requirement that an occupying military force “shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.”⁶⁵ The Fourth Geneva Convention, of 1949, expanded this obligation, saying that an occupying force must work in cooperation with the national and local governments to maintain critical public services, such as education and medical care, and provide relief supplies, such as food and water.⁶⁶ Thus, these two documents require a military force that occupies a nation to maintain law and order and, as much as possible, protect civilian populations against the effects of war; if a military power conducts combat operations, it must consider the welfare of the civilian population.

In modern warfare, as the enemy is defeated on the battlefield, there has to be a simultaneous effort to win the hearts and minds of the local populace. Since there is frequently no longer a clear line of distinction between when combat operations end and stability operations begin, the U.S. military cannot wait to begin stability operations until after combat has ended. Iraq and Afghanistan are both examples of this new reality, and due to the nature of the U.S. military’s overwhelming power and increased involvement in stability operations, this will likely be the case in future conflicts. In Iraq and Afghanistan, stability operations were occurring while combat operations were still ongoing. Chaplains were part of efforts to establish relations with civilian religious leaders as combat was in progress. In An Nasiriyah, Chaplain Waite was arranging with a local community leader for the distribution of food to citizens even as the battalion was fighting the Fedayeen. In Mosul, 101st Airborne Division chaplains met weekly with local religious councils even as the division was fighting insurgents.

Since the United States has no bona fide rival in the world today, there is little doubt that its military is capable of defeating any enemy on the battlefield.⁶⁷ However, winning the hearts and minds of a population, which is as important as winning the war, is another matter. Both have to be part of any U.S. military objective in war. Yet, as Joseph Nye says, “The U.S. has designed a military that is better suited to kick down the door, beat up a dictator, and then go home rather than stay for the harder imperial work of building a democratic polity.”⁶⁸ Karin von Hippel adds, “Whether they like it or not, the U.S. and European militaries will have a role to play in future peace-support operations. European militaries do not view these operations

as suspiciously as their U.S. counterpart because of their historical experience in 'gray' military operations during the colonial period and, for the British military today, in Northern Ireland as well."⁶⁹ Winning the hearts and minds is essential to our success in Iraq and Afghanistan and will continue to be so in future operations. A key in reaching this objective is to use the existing structures within a given society.⁷⁰ If religion has an influence in the culture, then its presence should be addressed. Unfortunately, however, the role of religion is frequently misunderstood and marginalized.

Because of their professional status and skills, chaplains are logical figures to be utilized in relating with the religious structure of a society. Consider the impact of Chaplain Eliason's liaison work. A few months after completing the U.S. Army's Chaplain Officer Basic Course, Chaplain Eliason joined his command, the 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group of the Utah National Guard, which was already deployed in Afghanistan. The battalion's mission was to improve the region's security and stability. In order to achieve this objective they had eight Special Forces firebases located along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan. Each team conducted patrols, gathered intelligence, collected weapons, trained the ASF, searched for al Qaeda and Taliban members, worked to discredit al Qaeda and Taliban propaganda, and built relationships with local leaders. The Special Forces teams met regularly with the leaders of villages that were in the vicinity of their firebases, and Chaplain Eliason began to attend some of these meetings. The translator usually introduced Chaplain Eliason as a "Christian mullah," so the Afghans viewed Chaplain Eliason as equivalent to a mullah in their culture and for this reason respected his position.

In March 2004, Lieutenant DeMott, the battalion's finance officer, and Chaplain Eliason were flying by helicopter to one of the firebases. Lieutenant DeMott was on her way to make some payments from the CERP fund. The lieutenant told the chaplain that he could use money from this same fund for projects he wanted to organize, which is how the idea of using a small amount of CERP money to conduct mosque repairs was born. After returning to headquarters, Chaplain Eliason initiated a request and received approval to spend \$30,000 on mosque renovation projects. He then approached Captain Ron Fry, the commander of the Konar Province firebase, with the mosque renovation idea. Captain Fry was enthusiastic about the plan but suggested conducting smaller jobs that could be finished more quickly, rather than larger ones that would take longer to complete and affect fewer villages. Captain Fry wanted to conduct projects that would have an immediate positive impact on the local population, affect as many people as possible, and support those communities that cooperated with U.S. forces. Minor renovations of select village mosques met all of these criteria. Having received funding authorization from headquarters and Captain Fry's support, Chaplain Eliason decided to begin his efforts with a large mosque that was located immediately next to the Konar Province firebase. The chaplain and his CA supervised the first mosque renovation in order to make certain that it was completed in a timely fashion. Following success at the first mosque, Chaplain Eliason continued the effort with other mosques in the province. The village elders oversaw all of the subsequent projects, which included obtaining estimates and hiring the craftsmen.

The process the chaplain followed to coordinate renovations was to first meet with Captain Fry, who, without disclosing the reasons behind his decisions, would tell the chaplain which villages to approach. Chaplain Eliason then would go with Special Forces soldiers as they conducted patrols through these villages. While in the villages, the chaplain would ask to meet with the elders and the mullah. The elders had the power and influence and were the primary decision makers in the villages, even more than the mullah, and were generally more involved than the mullah in deciding what mosque repairs were needed. The chaplain told them that the U.S. Army had a limited amount of money to spend on mosque restoration projects, and the elders would then develop a list of needed renovations and cost estimates for the work. They would bring the list and estimates back to the chaplain at the next meeting, and then he would tell them which jobs could be funded. The work typically involved repairs such as painting, waterproofing roofs, replacing windows, repairing damaged floors and walls, and rebuilding damaged portions of the structure. After the first mosque renovation, the elders became fully responsible for overseeing and contracting the work out to local craftsmen. The army paid part of the money up front and the rest when the job was completed. This process was chosen because it ensured that mosques were restored according to local preferences, and it was the best way to require accountability and guarantee that the work was accomplished.

Throughout the eight months that the 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces, was in Konar Province, Taliban and al Qaeda members periodically left night letters in the villages that said Americans were crusaders who were there to destroy Islam. Over time, the people grew to distrust this propaganda because they saw the American respect for their religious beliefs and culture as demonstrated by the mosque renovations. Thus, these projects directly contradicted Taliban and al Qaeda propaganda and were an important means of changing local attitudes about why American forces were in Afghanistan. According to Captain Fry, the mosque renovations were the most effective civil affairs project his firebase conducted in the province.

Acts of aid, such as the efforts of Chaplain Eliason, are a way of dispelling stereotypes that others may have of you, causing them to question their assumptions and prejudices. When chaplains are involved in humanitarian efforts to improve the local community, such actions communicate to the people that Americans are not what they thought they were. Thus, if a chaplain offers respect and support to an indigenous religious leader, the act may so surprise the leader that he could begin to look at the United States in a new way. Establishing dialogue with a local religious leader, listening to his concerns, and conducting community renovation projects are unilateral acts of kindness that can transform hearts and minds.

CONCLUSION

The evidence from this study demonstrates that chaplains can act effectively as intermediaries between the U.S. military and indigenous religious leaders in combat and stability operations. The primary role chaplains have played as liaisons in Iraq and Afghanistan is building bridges of communication and trust between the military and local leaders. Additionally, chaplains have addressed a variety of issues that affected or were raised by religious leaders.

Several basic yet valuable principles and practices that can aid chaplains in having positive interactions with local religious leaders have been revealed in this investigation. Most important, chaplains must clearly understand who they are—their unique role and status as clergy-persons and military officers and the appropriate parameters of such a position. In order to maintain proper boundaries, chaplains need to remain in their “lane” and recognize that they only act with the authorization of their commanding officer. Other crucial elements of successful liaison efforts include fostering dialogue, developing relationships, demonstrating respect, avoiding arrogance, and tapping into the power of acts, gestures, and rituals. Many of these intermediary abilities are grounded in fundamental human relationship skills that most chaplains already possess.

Undoubtedly, the chaplain’s liaison responsibility raises a number of complex issues. Many chaplains are apprehensive about the potential ramifications of this expanding endeavor. One concern is that if they engage religious leaders, some commands may inadvertently use their relationship with those leaders to gather human intelligence. In spite of this legitimate apprehension, the participants in this research indicated that when chaplains understand and communicate their boundaries clearly, commands respect those limits.

Nevertheless, several aspects of the chaplain’s noncombatant role need further clarification from each of the military services. For instance, what actions should chaplains take in order to ensure that their relationship with religious leaders is not used improperly for information operations (IO)? Moreover, to what extent, if any, should chaplains be involved with IO? Presently the official guidance is insufficient, and as a result, chaplains are handling these matters in different ways, which sends contradictory messages and creates confusion for commanders and chaplains alike. The military services need to discuss and delineate more specifically what constitutes appropriate chaplain involvement with IO at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of responsibility.

Additionally, while it has been demonstrated that service and joint doctrines authorize the liaison role for chaplains, the guidance should be more explicit. The services should discuss and provide further details regarding the parameters for chaplains functioning in such a capacity. While chaplains are engaged in these efforts, there is little official guidance other than the general authorization to do so.

How chaplains advise commanders with regard to religious matters in the AOR is another important issue. Although chaplains are presumed to be subject-matter experts in world religions, the reality is that most are not what one would truly call “experts.” Currently, each chaplain is individually responsible for gaining knowledge of the religions and cultures where he is deploying, which often is done by browsing the Internet or reading a few books. However, understanding the complex religious and cultural history of a particular state or region is difficult and requires much more extensive preparation. While chaplains have expertise about their own faith tradition, are religiously pluralistic, and possess a broad knowledge of religion, they are not typically experts in world religions or cultures. Therefore, they must be cautious in how they position themselves as advisers to the commander on indigenous religious matters. Furthermore, while possessing a good knowledge of other religions and cultures is important, the legitimacy of chaplains acting as liaisons is based not so much on their expertise in religion as on their position as professional clergy and military officers. Because of this dual status, they are uniquely positioned in the military to connect with community religious leaders and deal with the religious networks within a given culture.

Although this exploratory study reveals that chaplains are well suited for an intermediary role, another issue is the competencies chaplains need in order to fulfill this responsibility effectively. Some chaplains, especially new ones, may not have the maturity, knowledge, theological beliefs, or personal disposition to work closely with religious leaders of other cultures and faiths. Other chaplains might see intermediary situations as opportunities to proselytize rather than build relationships. Therefore, given the potential problems chaplains could create in this liaison capacity, is it prudent for chaplains to be involved in these activities? While the possibility exists that a chaplain could mishandle the liaison function, evidence indicates that those chaplains who performed this role were overwhelmingly constructive and prudent in the way they dealt with religious leaders. Chaplains were respectful of other faiths and cultures and skilled in building bridges with local religious leaders.

Nonetheless, the question still persists as to what core knowledge and competencies chaplains should have in order to function successfully in an intermediary capacity. Most chaplains have not received adequate training in world religions, conflict resolution, cross-cultural interfaith dialogue skills, or the many facets of religious liaison and advisement responsibilities—all of which are essential. Further, since chaplains typically do not bring these proficiencies with them when they enter the chaplaincy, core knowledge and skill standards should be developed and implemented for training. This paper has discovered common underlying liaison principles and practices that were used by chaplains in Iraq and Afghanistan, most of which have application in other situations. However, since each combat and stability operation is unique, principles and practices should be captured from each operation and communicated to the Chaplain Corps. Training that addresses the broader liaison issues should occur at various stages of a chaplain’s career. Equally important is for commanding officers to receive training in order to understand the capabilities and limitations of utilizing chaplains as liaisons.

While most cases of liaison work had positive outcomes, chaplains must avoid naïveté as they engage local religious leaders. Not all leaders will embrace military chaplains. Furthermore,

some leaders in conflict zones may misrepresent themselves and attempt to manipulate chaplains. Since chaplains usually have a different cultural, linguistic, and religious background than the leaders with whom they interact, they are at a distinct disadvantage in having the insight to distinguish between sincere and deceitful individuals. As an example of this dynamic, consider an army officer in Iraq who spoke with an imam at a mosque. The imam assured him that he was supporting the coalition. However, after the U.S. soldiers withdrew, Iraqi forces searched the area and discovered a large cache of weapons hidden in vehicles in the mosque parking lot.⁷¹ Chaplains must be discerning so they are not viewed as naive by their command or local leaders.

Additionally, chaplains must understand that regardless of what military publications state about chaplains liaising with local religious leaders, this work cannot be undertaken without the commanding officer's authorization. All of the military publications cited in this paper maintain that liaison activities have to be part of the commander's plan. Therefore, chaplains first must gain the confidence of their commanding officer. Chaplains in this study often took the initiative by talking with their commanding officer about how they could assist in this area. Moreover, it is important for chaplains to communicate and work closely with the CMO, CAG, or POLAD. Civil Affairs has the most expertise and primary responsibility for interacting with the civilian population. Chaplains need to understand that their efforts are only one aspect of the commander's broader plan. They are not "lone rangers," but are simply one part of the larger civil-military effort and must not overreach their mandate.

Another crucial matter regarding the chaplain intermediary function is the necessity of careful forethought and preparation. Chaplains must have a purpose for their engagements with religious leaders and goals for what they and their commander desire to achieve. John Finney, who served as a POLAD to commanders in Bosnia and Afghanistan, gave this advice: "Before you go to a meeting [with local religious leaders] you must be prepared. Know what the meeting is for and what you want to get out of the meeting."⁷² Chaplain Adams-Thompson, who was the CJTF-76 chaplain in Afghanistan for one year, said he did not just want to have casual meetings between chaplains and mullahs, so he developed a detailed mullah engagement strategy and then trained each chaplain in his AOR in the goals and methods of this effort.⁷³ As a result of implementing this plan, the interactions between chaplains and mullahs became more intentional, with mullahs discussing their concerns and viewpoints and chaplains seeking ways to address those matters.

Related to this suggestion, several chaplains emphasized the importance of follow-up and follow-through. They said that if religious leaders discuss their concerns with chaplains, they expect the chaplains to take action. If the issues they raise are not adequately addressed, they will steadily lose interest in meeting with chaplains. Religious leaders must see that chaplains are spiritual figures in the U.S. military who also have influence in the organization.

The chaplain liaison role also raises the question of priorities. A chaplain's main focus of energy should always be with military and other authorized personnel. Frequently, chaplains are thinly distributed across the military. In some cases, chaplains were so busy ministering to

military personnel that they had no time to meet with local leaders. In other situations, the liaison demands were so great that chaplains could have spent all of their time working with religious leaders. For example, Chaplain Carver had many opportunities to meet with leading Iraqi religious leaders, but he had to balance that with his primary duties of providing religious ministry leadership and support to U.S. personnel. Referring to this issue, he said, “How do we wear both hats? I could have devoted so much time, at the expense to my fellow senior officers and staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs), and just done [liaison work with religious leaders].”⁷⁴ Any interaction a chaplain has with local religious leaders is secondary to providing ministry to military personnel. This emphasis is reflected in the guidance of the U.S. Army’s FM 1-05: “UMTs [unit ministry teams] are reminded that CMO support is a secondary responsibility and that the personal delivery of religious support is always the UMT’s imperative.”⁷⁵ This statement expresses the position of all branches of the armed forces—that providing ministry to military personnel supersedes liaison efforts with local religious leaders. Therefore, if chaplains serve as intermediaries, they must balance their time carefully between military personnel and local religious leaders.

Undoubtedly, chaplains functioning as liaisons is an evolving and emerging role that will continue to unfold and be explored. Although chaplains assigned to army and Marine Corps ground units will have the most opportunity to engage in liaison efforts, all chaplains deploying in support of combat or stability operations should be prepared to fill this responsibility. While chaplains should be mindful of the nature and parameters of their role as liaisons, they have demonstrated that they can contribute greatly toward building valuable relationships with religious leaders and enhancing the larger effort of winning the local population’s trust.

ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	area of responsibility
ASF	Afghanistan Security Force
CA	chaplain assistant
CAG	Civil Affairs Group
CERP	commander's emergency response program
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CRP	command religious program
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
FM	Field Manual
G-2	intelligence
GWOT	global war on terrorism
HN	host nation
HUMINT	human intelligence
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IO	information operations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JAG	judge advocate general
JFC	joint force commander
JFCH	joint force chaplain
JP	Joint Publication
JTF	joint task force
MCRP	Marine Corps Reference Publication
MCWP	Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MOOTW	military operations other than war
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NWP	Naval Warfare Publication
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
POLAD	political adviser

PRT	provincial reconstruction team
RM	religious ministry
RMT	religious ministry team
RP	religious program specialist
SNCO	staff noncommissioned officer
TF	task force



NOTES

1. Douglas M. Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, eds., *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 5.
2. Jonathan Fox, "Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations," *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (2001): 54.
3. Douglas M. Johnston, *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 25.
4. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Religious Support in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, June 9, 2004), chapter 2, paragraph 3, a, (5).
5. U.S. Army, *Religious Support*, Field Manual (FM) 1-05 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, April 2003), appendix A, paragraphs A-1 and A-2.
6. U.S. Navy, *Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy*, Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-05 (Newport, R.I.: Department of the Navy, August 2003), paragraph 5.8.4.
7. NWP 1-05, paragraphs 6.2.7 and 6.3.12.
8. U.S. Marine Corps, *Religious Ministry Team Handbook*, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 6-12A (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, May 16, 2003), chapter 2-5.
9. U.S. Marine Corps, *The Commander's Handbook for Religious Ministry Support*, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 6-12C (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, February 2, 2004), chapter 4-8.
10. U.S. Marine Corps, *Religious Ministry Support in the U.S. Marine Corps*, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 612 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, June 2001), chapter 24.
11. FM 1-05, appendix A, paragraph A-2.
12. MCRP 6-12A, chapter 25.
13. NWP 1-05, paragraph 5.2.7.
14. Ibid.
15. Chaplain Carver, telephone interview by author, March 23, 2005.
16. Douglas M. Johnston, "Religion and Conflict Resolution," *Fletcher Forum* 20 (Winter/Spring 1996): 60.
17. Johnston and Sampson, *Religion*, 5.
18. Lord William Strang made this remark in 1959.

19. Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 9.

20. Ibid. Historian Peter Galison's description of the Cold War's "ontology of the enemy," in which each side saw the other as a "cold-blooded machinelike opponent" who wanted only to win and whose every move reflected that goal, recalls my ideas on conflict syndrome. Cited in Joseph V. Montville, "The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy," in *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*, ed. John W. McDonald, Jr., and Diane B. Bendahmane (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, 1987), 7.

21. Louise Diamond and John McDonald, *Multi-track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*, 3rd ed. (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1996), 1.

22. Louise Diamond and John McDonald, "Multi-track Diplomacy" (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy, 1993).

23. Several of these efforts are detailed in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Herdling Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999). John Paul Lederach also mentions aspects of such multitrack efforts as the Oslo Accords and the Northern Ireland and Mozambique peacebuilding processes in *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 32–34, 47, 53, and 67. Lastly, supporting articles are available at the Beyond Intractability website at http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/multi-track_diplomacy.jsp, accessed March 31, 2005.

24. A number of examples are provided in Johnston and Sampson, *Religion*, 6; on Mozambique, see R. Scott Appleby, "Religion as an Agent of Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding," in *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 828–832. Appleby adds that settlements also were attempted in Guatemala, Burundi, and Albania (838, n23).

25. FM 1-05, paragraph A-1.

26. Lederach, *Building Peace*, 13.

27. According to the annual *SIPRI Yearbooks*, this trend dates back at least to 1986, the first year the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute collected this kind of data. Every year since that time, there have been more intrastate conflicts than interstate conflicts. See the 1987–2004 *SIPRI Yearbooks* (Oxford University Press).

28. James Notter and Louise Diamond, "Building Peace and Transforming Conflict: Multi-track Diplomacy in Practice," Occasional Paper 7 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy, October 1996), 11.

29. LeRoy Harvey and John Victory, "The Creative Community Handbook: A Leap to Possibilities Thinking" (a project of the Michigan State University Community and Economic Development Program), June 2004, 8.

30. Notter and Diamond, "Building Peace," 11.

31. Marc Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence, and Peacebuilding* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 202–203.
32. R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 16.
33. Christopher A. Hall, “Truth, Pluralism, and Religious Diplomacy: A Christian Dialogical Perspective,” in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 87.
34. Chaplain John Stutz, interview by author, January 11, 2005.
35. Quoted in Daniel Williams and Alan Cooperman, “Vatican Rethinking Relations with Islam,” *Washington Post*, April 15, 2005, A20.
36. Ibid.
37. Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon*, 203–205.
38. Lederach, *Building Peace*, 42.
39. Ibid., 38.
40. Ibid., 94.
41. Louise Diamond, “Dialogue: Peacebuilding Through Discovery” (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 3.
42. Ibid., 1.
43. Chaplain Ken Sampson, telephone interview by author, November 17, 2004.
44. As recounted during interview with Chaplain Sampson.
45. John Paul Lederach, “Five Qualities of Practice in Support of Reconciliation Processes,” in *Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Religion, Public Policy, and Conflict Transformation*, ed. Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., and Rodney L. Petersen (Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation Press, 2001), 184.
46. Marc Gopin, “When the Fighting Stops: Healing Hearts with Spiritual Peacemaking,” in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 143.
47. Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon*, 194–195.
48. Eric A. Eliason, “A Report on Chaplain Training for an Afghan Security Forces Mullah,” unpublished ms, nd, 2.
49. Gopin, *Between Eden and Armageddon*, 156.
50. Ibid., 154.
51. Lederach, *Building Peace*, 178.
52. Ibid., 130.
53. Ibid., ix–xii.

54. Ibid., 93.

55. Ibid.

56. Montgomery McFate, "Does Culture Matter? The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," Office of Naval Research (ONR), unpublished ms, 3.

57. Judith N. Martin and Thomas K. Nakayama, *Intercultural Communication in Contexts*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 135.

58. Ibid., 136–138.

59. Louise Diamond and John McDonald, "What Is Peacebuilding?" (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy, 1993).

60. Lisa Schirch, *Ritual and Symbol in Peacebuilding* (Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2005), 138.

61. Ibid., 2.

62. Marc Gopin, "The Practice of Cultural Diplomacy" (November 22, 2002), unpublished ms, 6.

63. Chaplain Erik Lee, telephone interview by author, April 20, 2005.

64. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 99.

65. 1907 Hague Convention (Hague IV), "Annex to the Convention," section 3, article 43.

66. Fourth Geneva Convention, U.N.T.S. no. 973, vol. 75, part 3, section 3, articles 50, 55, 56, and 59, August 12, 1949.

67. Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 299–300.

68. Nye, 139.

69. Karin von Hippel, "Democracy by Force: A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building," in *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks*, ed. Alexander T. J. Lennon (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 115.

70. McFate, 4.

71. John F. Burns, "Iraq Government Calls for an End to Mosque Raids," *New York Times*, May 17, 2005, 1.

72. John Finney, telephone interview by author, March 23, 2005.

73. Chaplain Larry Adams-Thompson, telephone interview by author, April 19, 2005.

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75. FM 1-05, appendix A.

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