ADVANCES IN UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL PEACEMAKING

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Contents

Foreword

The work supported by the Grant program of the United States Institute of Peace has always been notable for its breadth of subject matter and depth of analysis. Within the expansive intellectual territory covered by the fields of conflict resolution, international security, comparative politics, and international law, the Grant program has earned an enduring reputation as an important source of funding for original, timely, and insightful work. Since its inception in 1986, the Grant program has awarded more than 1,700 grants to grantees located in forty-five U.S. states and the District of Columbia, and in seventy-four foreign countries. Grant funding has helped build a diverse community of institutions focusing on international conflict, including a wide array of universities, thinks tanks, nonprofit organizations, schools, and church organizations in the United States and abroad. Grants have produced groundbreaking work in a wide variety of fields, ranging from policy-oriented research, educational curricula, and training programs to radio and TV documentary programs.

As this, the third volume of *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking* testifies, the Grant program's tradition of supporting both variety and quality has been ably upheld in the early years of the twenty-first century. This publication spotlights no fewer than 117 books, articles, and films supported by the program and completed between 2000 and 2005. For reasons of space, the description of each project provides just a snapshot of that project's aims, arguments, and findings, but collectively these snapshots form a sweeping panorama of the international scene over the period.

The range of topics can be gauged from the titles of the chapters in the first part of the publication, which present thematically focused essays on authority and legitimacy in the international system; the use of force; democracy amid diversity; international negotiation; truth, justice, and reconciliation; and faith in conflict and peace. This thematic breadth is complemented by a geographic diversity, with the second part of *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking* traveling from Africa to Asia, Europe to Latin America and the Middle East.

The structure of this volume allows readers to turn to chapters covering general themes and geographic regions in which they have an interest. Within the individual chapters, works are grouped together according to their specific subject matter, thereby allowing readers who may be familiar with some of the works featured here to discover other studies on related topics. Scholars will find in *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking* an invitation to explore many new avenues of research and analysis. The volume will be equally valuable for busy practitioners who normally do not have the time to read a wide range of scholarly works.

All readers whose work covers some of the fertile territory surveyed in *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking* may be interested to learn that each year the Grant program invites applications for funding for research, educational, training, and related projects. Those projects may be implemented either in the United States or abroad and should seek to expand useful knowledge about preventing, managing, and resolving violent conflict and promoting post-conflict peacebuilding outside the borders of the United States. Further information on the Solicited and Unsolicited Grant Initiatives can be found online at http://www.usip.org/grants/index.html.

The views expressed in this report are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace. We are very grateful to Amy L. Smith for her perceptive reading of the works analyzed herein.

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
Introduction

The Grant program of the United States Institute of Peace provides support to a wide range of individuals and nonprofit organizations from around the world, including scholars, diplomats, negotiators, and documentary filmmakers. This volume of *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking* presents some of the insights, analyses, and conclusions that have resulted from their work. Grantees have studied conflicts and peace processes in all regions of the globe, reflected on their involvement in international negotiations or as members of truth commissions, conducted comparative scholarly research, filmed documentaries on several post-conflict situations, and developed a range of policy suggestions dealing with conflict management and peacemaking.

All the materials summarized here come from grants whose products were completed between 2000 and 2005. They include 117 books, edited volumes, articles, monographs, and films.

This volume is divided into two parts. The first part consists of essays on six themes around which many of the grant products cluster. The first of these essays addresses the international system, including the norms that govern international intervention, as well as critiques and suggestions for improving the operations of international organizations. Collectively the grantees present a sobering picture, one in which the mistakes of the past present clear challenges to constructing a brighter future. International organizations need to focus less on acquiring authority and more on exercising it in an accountable and effective fashion.

The second essay focuses on the use of force in international interventions and on efforts to avoid using force through methods such as sanctions and embargoes. Many grantees see little reason to applaud the international community's performance over the past decades, and instead underscore conceptual and practical shortcomings in the use of force. However, grantees have by no means abandoned faith in the potential of forcible intervention, and they offer a range of bold proposals for creating larger, better-trained, or more-responsive forces able to step decisively into international hotspots.

The third essay examines the relationship between democracy and conflict, especially within divided societies. Grantees caution against an uncritical faith in the ability of democratic institutions to swiftly reverse the tide of intrastate conflict and emphasize the need to tailor democratic prescriptions to fit local conditions and to adjust democratic expectations to match the imperfect realities of complex societies. Even so, the overall tenor is upbeat, with grantees eager to discover not *if* democratic institutions defuse conflict, but *how* they do so.

Different types, styles, and stages of formal negotiations are the subject of the fourth essay. Every negotiation, whether over climate change or orange imports, has its own dynamics, but grantees uncover fundamental commonalities in terms of structure and strategy that characterize particular kinds of negotiations. Each nation, too, tends to conduct negotiations in its own distinctive style—a style, grantees contend, that owes much to each country's political and institutional culture.

Numerous aspects of justice and reconciliation in post-conflict societies are discussed in the fifth essay. The past dozen or so years have witnessed a remarkable growth in the use of a variety of mechanisms designed to help a divided society establish a shared truth, achieve justice, and foster reconciliation. In a series of powerful and compelling case studies, grantees examine how many of these mechanisms—such as truth commissions, international tribunals, and amnesties—have fared in practice in many different parts of the world. Grantees also explore the processes of forgiveness and reconciliation and discover both key ingredients and disturbing dilemmas.

It is not so much dilemmas as dichotomies that feature prominently in the sixth essay, which focuses on the relationship between religion and conflict. As grantees show, religion

can spark and fuel violent conflict, but it can also inspire a determination to extinguish the flames of sectarian hatred and build a peaceful future. Equally, faith can shape not only broad philosophical perspectives on the nature of conflict, but also specific, practical approaches to achieving and sustaining peace. Unsurprisingly given the events of recent years, Islam attracts the attention of grantees, who investigate the association between its radical wing and contemporary terrorism and also reveal Islam's practice of and potential for peacebuilding.

The second part of this volume consists of briefer essays, each examining the work of grantees on a particular region. Chapters 7 though 11 look in turn at Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, in each case exploring both local and regionwide causes of and responses to conflict.

Readers may be surprised to discover that the events of 9/11, the "global war on terrorism," and the conflict in Iraq do not dominate the discussion in this volume. Part of the reason for this is simply that many of the grantees featured in the following chapters planned or even began their research before the attacks on New York and Washington and before the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. (No doubt, the next volume in the *Advances in Understanding International Peacemaking* series will feature many more projects that focus on subjects such as radical Islam, terrorism and counterterrorism, and the future of the Middle East.) Part of the reason, too, is that scholars of conflict and conflict resolution wisely prefer to dissect evolving *patterns* of events, rather than specific, isolated events, and it usually takes at least five or ten years for such patterns to become evident. Many of the studies described in this volume examine topics such as the use of force in humanitarian interventions, democratization, and the record of truth commissions and international tribunals—topics that played prominent roles on the international stage in the 1990s.

Probably the chief reason, however, for the limited coverage of the aftermath of 9/11 is that the fields of international relations and conflict resolution are wonderfully rich, offering a remarkable array not only of subjects but also of perspectives on those subjects. This volume provides impressive testimony to this wealth. Indeed, because of the scope of coverage, most of the summaries provided in this volume are necessarily brief. They are meant to alert the reader to the quality of material generated by grantees and encourage the reader to explore the full versions of studies that seem of particular interest. To this end, the volume concludes with a detailed bibliography so that readers can locate complete versions of all grant products.

Authority and Legitimacy in the International System

International organizations are capturing the attention of many United States Institute of Peace grantees. When they examine the international system, grantees ask precise questions about how to improve the performance of particular organizations or hone skills for tackling specific problems. But they also step back to reflect on normative concerns. By what authority do international organizations wield as much power as they do? What is the basis of legitimacy of international action by formal organizations or coalitions? How can international actors be held accountable? Can we devise international initiatives that are not only effective and efficient, but also legitimate, accountable, and fair?

In wrestling with these normative questions, grantees look both forward and backward. Some trace the evolution of specific organizations and issues (such as the doctrine and practice of refugee repatriation); some examine contemporary cases (such as the role of the United Nations during the Rwandan genocide); others consider the immediate future (how to improve peacekeeping or interim international administration); and yet others use the broadest sweep of history in search of potential patterns (the maintenance of peace and stability in the midst of system transformation). In many instances, grantees find little reason to celebrate the past or to greet the future optimistically; too often, they discover, international organizations have acquired and exercised authority but they have not done so with the consent or even for the benefit of the people they are supposed to serve.

Pathological Bureaucracies?

Engage virtually any topic of global concern—violent conflict, economic development, humanitarian assistance, refugee flows, trade, climate change, public health, food safety, transportation—and one encounters some of the 238 international organizations (IOs) that states have created. In *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, **Michael Barnett** and **Martha Finnemore** diagnose and critique IOs' often inefficient, dysfunctional, and even pathological behavior. They particularly address IOs' action beyond mandates, evolution beyond expertise, and self-defeating insistence on following rules.

Barnet and Finnemore are dissatisfied with a state-centered approach that views IOs as passive tools of states. They argue that analysts should consider these organizations above all as bureaucracies. The core and compelling issue for Barnett and Finnemore is the multiple bases of IOs' authority and consequent autonomy. As bureaucracies, IOs exercise rational authority through standardized impersonal rules and procedures. Delegated authority is conferred on IOs by the states they serve. IOs also command authority due to their technical expertise in such areas as finance, public health, engineering, or the logistics of aid delivery. The moral authority of IOs comes from the social utility of their expertise as well as their embodiment of values shared by the entire international community.

To Barnet and Finnemore, these different forms of authority—rational, delegated, expert, and moral—both put IOs "in authority" and make them "an authority." Their multifaceted authority gives IOs the autonomy to act on the world and shape social reality by using information to encourage or prevent coordinated action, interpreting problems and defining solutions, and identifying social tasks to be shared and categories of actors to be recognized.

Paradoxically, IOs' authority often lies in their ability to appear powerless: following impersonal and neutral rules, merely serving others, letting the data speak for themselves, and always working for the good of all. "Although bureaucrats present the rules in a value-neutral way," observe Barnett and Finnemore, "and portray themselves as having no power, bureaucratic power includes the ability to use rules, regulations, information, and decrees in ways that compel others to act" (165).

However, the very aspects of IOs that make them authoritative and powerful can also produce inefficiencies and self-defeating outcomes. Barnett and Finnemore analyze pathological behavior in three very different international organizations: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Secretariat. These disparate case studies permit the authors to wrestle with instances of IO dysfunction generally attributed to state power rather than the organizations' bureaucratic nature. For example, the view persists that powerful states require the IMF to extend capitalism, insist that UNHCR repatriate refugees, and opposed UN intervention in Rwanda.

The range of cases permits an assessment of IOs dealing with different issues: finance, humanitarian protection, security. This assessment includes organizations with a diversity of internal structure, governance, and budgetary resources: the IMF finances itself with money returned on the funds it manages, UNHCR depends on voluntary contributions, and the United Nations levies dues but has no means to ensure payment. The bases of authority of these organizations are also varied, mixing the full range of rational, delegated, expert, and moral authority.

The IMF was established to monitor exchange rates and provide currency to help states through balance-of-payment difficulties. It has vastly expanded its involvement in the management of domestic economies by requiring adjustments in all aspects of budgets, tax collection systems, subsidies and price controls, trade policy, wage restraint, and the like. Barnett and Finnemore trace this astounding expansion to the IMF's evolving technical expertise, which shapes its understanding of what constitutes a problem and appropriate solutions. That apparently neutral expertise also incorporates normative judgments, as the IMF sees imbalances as the fault of the individual deficit state, which must therefore adjust. "This monetary approach isn't wrong," Barnett and Finnemore note, "but it isn't the only way to conceptualize the problem" (55).

A systemic model, by contrast, might call for compulsory adjustments from states with balance-of-payments surplus. The IMF staff's failure to follow this route results not from the surplus states' exercise of power, but rather from the staff's own analytical framework. Furthermore, Barnett and Finnemore argue, the IMF's expanding mandate has derived not from the organization's success, but indeed from failure. Because previous policy interventions did not rebalance a nation's economy, the IMF steadily widened its area of concern. The further the IMF extends beyond its core expertise, however, the more frequent its policy failures and the greater its loss of credibility.

UNHCR has also evolved from its original mandate. The organization's initial focus on refugee protection has been displaced by an emphasis on material assistance and repatriation.

Barnett and Finnemore focus on changes in how UNHCR determines when repatriation should occur. An earlier imperative that refugee repatriation be voluntary has gradually become equat-ed with objective improvement in conditions in the country of origin. The determination of such improvement is in the hands of UNHCR's experts. That shift transfers the decision-making authority away from those taking the risks—the refugees themselves—and delivers it to the bureaucracy. "UNHCR might well be correct in its assessments," Barnett and Finnemore argue, "but the issue at hand is who gets to make that decision" (114). With reference to the controversial repatriation of the Rohingyas from Bangladesh to Burma in the 1990s, Barnett and

Finnemore observe, "This discourse of repatriation not only created the possibility of pathological behavior but also underscored the sense in which UNHCR's power is one of domination" (120).

In the UN Secretariat's response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Barnet and Finnemore (and Barnett in much greater detail; see below) see a pathological adherence to bureaucratic rules. The United Nations' standard analysis led it to see the violence in Rwanda as the result of civil war. Particularly following its peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Bosnia, the United Nations had affirmed that it would not intervene in civil wars and would become involved only under certain conditions: where a cease-fire was in place, the mandate was clear, the safety of UN personnel was reasonably assured, and the parties were committed to a peace process. The categories and rules developed within the UN bureaucracy shaped its misreading of the violence in Rwanda and "led it to reject intervention as inappropriate and undesirable, even in the face of mass killings." Thus, Barnett and Finnemore assert, "a Secretariat that professed humanitarian goals used peacekeeping rules to conclude that a humanitarian intervention was not warranted to stop crimes against humanity" (122).

Reflecting on these case studies, Barnett and Finnemore observe that IOs were created to achieve laudable goals and have developed the power and authority to achieve them. Yet they have distorted economies, repatriated refugees to unsafe conditions, and permitted genocide to continue. These bureaucracies continue to expand and extend their mandates; can such expansion be good?

Questionable Legitimacy, Limited Accountability

Historically, IOs have been associated with liberal political ideas (the sanctity and autonomy of the individual, democracy as the most desirable and just form of government) and liberal economic perspectives (the value of markets). However, Barnett and Finnemore point out, "the liberal norms embodied and promoted by these organizations are generally not matched with the accountability or participation procedures that liberalism favors. These are emphatically not democratic organizations" (15).

Some scholars have expressed concern about "illiberal democracies" in which proper electoral procedures are not matched by genuine liberal values. Barnett and Finnemore raise a similar concern about "undemocratic liberalism" at the global level. Their analysis of a range of IOs leads them to conclude: "The bureaucratization of world politics means that global bureaucrats have the authority to act in powerful ways. Sometimes this can mean emancipation, at other times domination" (166).

Richard Caplan is equally concerned about the legitimacy of international authorities. *International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rules and Reconstruction* examines operational challenges of international administration in post-conflict settings, but also addresses deep normative questions. Under what circumstances, he asks,

> is it legitimate—and for whom—to administer war-torn territories? How much authority should be entrusted to transitional administrators? To whom should international administrations be accountable? How are the aims of the international community and those of the local parties to be reconciled when they come into conflict? To what extent should transitional authorities seek to transform the societies over which they exercise authority, and towards what ends? When does "benign administration" become "neo-colonialism" and how is that to be avoided? (4)

Caplan addresses the mandates, structures, functions, and effectiveness of international administration, drawing on the conduct of complex multilateral operations in Eastern Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor. Such operations, he observes,

must pursue two, not necessarily compatible imperatives: meeting the immediate needs of the population (a secure environment, delivery of humanitarian aid) and establishing a basis for sustainable economic reconstruction and political institution building. The balance between the two can be very difficult to achieve.

Caplan identifies five tasks of international administrations and their related dilemmas:

1. Providing public order and internal security, which requires vetting previously politicized or corrupt police forces while maintaining some locally relevant knowledge and experience;
2. Repatriating and reintegrating refugees and internally displaced persons, while determining whether reestablishing multiethnic communities is a proper and fitting objective in situations of ethnic cleansing;
3. Performing basic civil administrative functions efficiently, while also building local capacity that will be sustainable after international actors withdraw;
4. Developing local political institutions and building civil society with attention to local bases of legitimacy, which might be far different from the secular liberal values held by many international actors;
5. Reconstructing and developing the economy, which often involves transforming and privatizing the economy, rather than restoring the preexisting statist system.

In his discussion of planning, management, and transitions of international administrations, Caplan maintains attention to issues of authority and legitimacy. Should there be limits on the exercise of international authority? When should power be transferred, how, and to whom? How should a lack of cooperation, even obstruction, by the preexisting power holders be handled? How can accountability to the governed be arranged without jeopardizing the integrity of the operation? How can the exercise of international authority contribute to state building? And how can the exercise of such authority merit legitimacy? As Caplan makes abundantly clear, these are by no means theoretical questions, suitable only for scholarly debate. They are very much on the minds of those in the field and of concern to the local population.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the gap between the aims of local and international elites has at times been very wide. The United Nations' high representative has promoted particular electoral outcomes, overridden court judgments, and dismissed more than a hundred elected and appointed officials (including mayors, presidents of municipal assemblies, cantonal ministers, judges, directors of companies, and a member of the Bosnian presidency). The high representative may order such dismissals on the grounds that the official is—in the high representative's estimate—obstructing implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, broadly interpreted. No evidence is formally required to support the action, nor is there any court of appeal. Such lack of due process, notes Caplan, has not been lost on the local political elite. As he quotes one Bosnian politician, "They remove a man, label him dishonest, do not present any proof, and then talk to us about human rights" (188).

Caplan is concerned with the effectiveness of international administration and understands that to be effective, such authority must also be legitimate. Legitimacy is generated partly by conformity to recognized principles and rules of behavior. It also rests on consent, which may be particularly problematic in war-torn settings under an externally imposed administration. Legitimacy, Caplan argues, is further built on trust, the assurance that international authority is exercised on behalf of the local population. "Trust, in turn, is ensured in part through the principle of accountability: the idea that the administering authority can and should be held responsible for its actions" (195). But to whom is a transitional international administrator accountable? Strictly speaking, transitional administrators are answerable to the body that appointed them—the UN Security Council, for example, or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—and not directly to the local population. Caplan concludes,

As we have observed with respect to other aspects of international administration, there is, then, a fundamental contradiction that lies at the heart of these initiatives: while international administrations seek to promote democracy, among other objectives, they are in many ways undemocratic in the manner in which they function. There is no separation of powers: executive, legislative and judicial authority are vested in a single individual (the transitional administrator) whose decision cannot be challenged by the local population, whose actions are not always transparent, and who cannot be removed from power by the community in whose interests he or she exercises authority ostensibly. (196)

Caplan's recommendations include not only devoting more resources to better planning and management and more rapid deployment of assets, but also greater attention to the politics and legitimation of international administration.

Legitimation and public ownership of peace processes are the themes of the aptly titled *Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking*, edited by **Catherine Barnes.** This collection of essays includes reflections on public participation in peace processes in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Mali, Guatemala, and the Philippines.

Contributor **Marrack Goulding,** who has been involved in negotiating and implementing numerous peace settlements, reflects in "Public Participation and International Peacemaking" on why mediators from IOs and foreign governments often hesitate to involve the public, despite the relevance of such inclusion to the legitimacy, acceptance, and effective implementation of peace agreements. He offers three possibilities. First, IOs and their member states tend to see peacemaking as "a quintessentially governmental activity," most properly and efficiently conducted by officials (87). Another possibility, in Goulding's experience, is that mediators from IOs and foreign governments are often ill informed about the country where they aspire to make peace. It is thus difficult for them to conceive of ways to include the public or to appreciate the value of such inclusion. A third possibility is that international mediators tend to arrive only once national efforts have failed. In such situations, civil society may be so polarized or disintegrated that its inclusion in a peace process would be very difficult to manage. External support for civil society, particularly at the implementation and peacebuilding phases, then becomes important. Goulding suggests that non-governmental organizations, rather than IOs or foreign governments, could best accomplish this task. "Though they may be foreigners," he writes, "they too are representatives of civil society" (89).

Failing Their Target Populations

Several grantees address failures by international organizations to serve the interests of their respective target populations. These failures can bring dreadful, indeed horrific, consequences. One of the worst such examples in recent decades is explored by **Michael Barnett** in *Eyewitness to Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. Barnett was an eyewitness not in Rwanda but at the United Nations. An academic on leave from his university in 1994, Barnett was at UN headquarters in New York working on African issues when the genocide was perpetrated. He recalls seeing the reports and being horrified but not advocating intervention. Rather, he endorsed the view held within the United Nations that given the situation on the ground (civil war) and UN limitations (recently demonstrated in Bosnia and Somalia), nonintervention was the only choice.

Writing and lecturing over the subsequent year, Barnett continued to endorse that position until, listening to yet another defense of UN inaction, he was suddenly "unnerved by the recognition that almost all the United Nations' anxious concern was self-absorbed. There was remarkably little space for the Rwandans. How could it have been even faintly principled to ignore such crimes against humanity?" (preface, xi). Fully aware that "the UN staff and diplomats

in New York, in the main, were highly decent, hard-working, and honorable individuals who believed that they were acting properly when they decided not to try to put an end to genocide," Barnett sets out to unravel how this occurred and to assign some moral responsibility for the failure (20).

Barnett is sympathetic to the constraints faced by UN staff. "Attempting to recreate the view from New York," he writes,

> means that we have to take seriously the fact that heavily overworked individuals were overseeing an operation of marginal importance, were highly economical and instrumental in the knowledge they sought to understand Rwanda and ultimately create policy toward it, and were using categories available from the organizational culture in which they were embedded to do so. (60)

These factors contributed to the initial erroneous assessment that what was occurring in Rwanda was a civil war. Barnett also differs from those who see the now-famous telegram from Romeo Dallaire warning of an arms cache and impending violence as a clear but ignored warning. Such an interpretation, in Barnett's view, is "historically promiscuous" (80). Seen in proper historical and organizational context, the cable was troubling and did indeed inspire alarm, hastily convened meetings, and a further flurry of cables. But it could not have served as an accurate indication of what was to come.

Following the events of April 1994, of which the UN Secretariat was fully informed, the misinterpretations and inaction became, in Barnett's view, inexcusable.

At this point, the UN Secretariat "rank-ordered its responsibilities and calculated the risks associated with different types of actions. There were peacekeepers to protect. Also to consider was an organization that might not survive another failure. Protecting the organization from further harm or exploitation was, from the Secretariat's view, ethical, legitimate, and desirable" (124). The Secretariat therefore "selectively presented information to the council, opted to avoid the language of ethnic cleansing in favor of the morally neutral language of civil war, and refrained from making the strongest case available for intervention. At that moment the Secretariat made a choice that violated its duties of office" (174). Barnett affirms that "a different presentation by the Secretariat would have altered the debate, given muscle to the arguments for intervention, and shaken the case for [UN] withdrawal. The entire parameters would have shifted, and such a shift would have led to a different outcome. *It might have changed the outcome*" (126, emphasis in original).

Where did the United Nations' behavior come from? Barnett returns to the "totemic importance of rules." UN rules regarding peacekeeping deployment (under conditions of stability, with a clear mandate and a working cease-fire)

> were connected to the survival of the organization, an organization that is not simply an instrument but also an expression of the international community. These rules created a localized, historicized, and uneven moral landscape that made indifference possible. . . . These rules, in effect, differentiated subjects of concern from subjects of neglect, those whom the United Nations felt obligated to protect from those it did not. . . . Acting responsibly, the United Nations concluded, also included a duty to safeguard the organization's health. It was Rwanda's misfortune to be the site of one of the first explicit applications of these rules. (175–76)

Thus, in Barnett's assessment, "the Secretariat bears some moral responsibility for the genocide. If I seem more critical of the Secretariat that I am of member states or the council . . . it is because the Secretariat made a choice that thoroughly violated its professional obligations and ethical duties" (174).

The scale of the consequences of the United Nations' shortcomings in the case of Rwanda is, fortunately, unparalleled, but as other United States Institute of Peace grantees make clear, there are many other instances in which the interests of international organizations and their supposed constituents have clashed.

In *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path*, **Gil Loescher** recounts UNHCR's history from its inception in 1951 through the successive tenures of its high commissioners and then looks to the future. The historical perspective permits Loescher to observe that "the autonomy and authority of UNHCR in world politics has grown over time and the Office has become a purposeful actor in its own right with independent interests and capabilities" (6). Over the course of its evolution, in Loescher's view, "the agency has at times pursued policies that have been at odds with the interests of its major constituency" (362).

Tracing trends in the broader political context, specific refugee crises, and shifts in UNHCR's doctrine, leadership, and organization, Loescher identifies the two most significant changes in UNHCR's treatment of refugees in the past fifty years: a shift from protection to material aid and a much greater (and riskier) emphasis on repatriation.

"Perhaps the most significant change in UNHCR's organizational culture in recent years," Loescher writes, "has been the shift in the agency's focus from legal protection to material assistance" (363). With that shift, attention to rights and legal issues has declined and the logistics of delivering food, shelter, and medicine have taken precedence. Thus, "for the UNHCR staff, the general tendency is to perceive emergencies in terms of logistics and not as failures of politics, the development process, or ethnic relations. The UNHCR's objectives are increasingly pragmatic—to do the best in difficult circumstances and to implement options with the least negative impact—and not chiefly to uphold universal principles" (363). In Loescher's assessment, this shift led UNHCR to "spread its capacities too thinly . . . [and] the place of protection within the UNHCR's decision-making hierarchy was downgraded" (338.)

The emphasis on repatriation is equally problematic. Like Barnett and Finnemore, Loescher is concerned about refugees' diminished role in making decisions about their repatriation. He notes that by the 1990s, the UNHCR had

> developed terminology and concepts like "safe return" which stipulated that conditions in the home country did not have to improve "substantially" but only "appreciably" so that there could be a "safe" return. The UNHCR had come a long way from its traditional position that repatriation had to be a strictly voluntary decision by refugees. Rather, it would now be the UNHCR who would make the assessment as to whether conditions presented a threat to their safety. Moreover, there was a growing view that refugee safety did not necessarily always out-weigh the security interests of states or broader peace-building and conflict resolution goals. (284)

This orientation has led UNHCR to "occasionally act in expedient but irresponsible ways, such as when it coerces refugees by closing down camps or reducing food rations and services in an effort to get refugees to repatriate" (18). By repatriating refugees prematurely to locales of violence and famine, the UNHCR "became complicit in many of the refugee protection failures [of the 1990s]" (39).

Observing that "there is an acute need to reverse the worldwide erosion of refugee protection," Loescher offers several suggestions to address the inadequacies of UNHCR (365). He advocates stronger policy research and strategic thinking capacities in the agency and far greater cooperation with other UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, and external researchers. Loescher urges UNHCR to become much more accountable through such measures as annual audits conducted by an external ombudsman to assess the protection provided by the agency and the management of its operations, "so that the Office will have to account publicly for policy failures resulting

in risks to refugees" (375). Loescher also calls for the inclusion of refugees themselves in external review as a valuable means of restoring UNHCR's legitimacy.

Patricia Weiss Fagen faults the UNHCR and other international agencies for their too-swift engagement in reintegrating refugees. In two chapters, "Post-Conflict Reintegration and Reconstruction: Doing it Right Takes a While" (in *Refugee Protection: Ethical, Legal, and Political Problems and the Role of the UNHCR*) and "Conflict Resolution and Reintegration: The Long-Term Challenges. Case Studies of Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina" (in *Refugees and Human Displacement in Contemporary International Relations),* Fagen addresses the limitations of international actors who try to achieve a major impact in a very short time and therefore fail to build sustainable solutions or enhance local capacity.

With reference to refugee reintegration projects in a number of settings, including Central America, Cambodia, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Haiti, Fagen faults programs such as the UNHCR's quick impact projects that ostensibly aim to establish the foundations of further development. Too often, these projects produce quick achievements by bringing materials and staff from outside the country, failing to establish local capacity or incorporate local input in such decisions as the location of schools, clinics, wells, or access roads. Long-term goals are frustrated by the generation of unrealistic expectations and funding patterns that promote fragmentation and dependence. "Every country that has received international assistance," comments Fagen, "has experienced setbacks, distortions and outright failures when major humanitarian entities have scaled down programs prematurely and left behind half-completed projects" ("Post-Conflict Reintegration and Reconstruction," 6).

What Hopes for Greater Accountability?

The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, edited by **David M. Malone**, is an impressively large volume that covers major UN operations on four continents and pays attention to the institutional shape and decision-making processes of the UN Security Council as well as emerging concerns (human rights, armed nonstate actors, democratization, and so forth). Despite this great breadth of coverage, accountability and legitimacy are recurring themes among the volume's contributors.

Some contributors address the lack of accountability of the UN overall. In their article "The Security Council and the Rwanda Genocide," **Howard Adelman** and **Astri Suhrke** consider the UN commission of inquiry into UN failings in Rwanda to have been thoroughly inadequate.

> The selective version of the history of the mission presented in the official UN "blue book" functions effectively as a cover-up rather than a full disclosure of relevant documentation. And despite the apologies and inquiries and efforts to describe, explain, recommend, and allocate blame, no one was in the end held accountable for possibly the greatest failure of the UN in its history. Heads did not roll among the diplomats or in the Secretariat. Kofi Annan, who was head of the DPKO [Department of Peacekeeping Operations] at the time, went on to become Secretary General, taking with him his closest staff, who had been central in the decisionmaking process in Rwanda. Overall, the weak accountability mechanisms in relation to disasters like Rwanda constitute a fundamental structural weakness of the UN system. (495)

Several other contributors to the volume address issues of accountability, transparency, and legitimacy within the organization. For example, in "The Permanent and Elected Council Members," **Kishore Mahbubani** examines the relative power of the five permanent and ten elected members of the Security Council. As currently

structured, only the five permanent members (P-5) have a continuous record and institutional memory of the council's work over the years, leaving the ten elected members (E-10) at a clear disadvantage. Furthermore, the five permanent members conduct many debates and decisions behind closed doors, excluding the ten elected members from the decision-making process. In practice, Mahbubani writes, "the P-5 have been given power without responsibility; E-10 have been given responsibility without power" (256).

Theresa Whitfield is similarly concerned about the United Nations' internal practices, particularly the role played by Groups of Friends that form around particular issues and rarely include developing countries. Their deliberations and actions lack transparency and arguably usurp the authority of states elected to the Security Council. In her chapter "Groups of Friends," Whitfield observes, "It can be galling to elected members to see colleagues outside the Council have access to privileged information and influence that they themselves do not enjoy" (320).

What are the chances for reform, learning, and change within the United Nations? Discussing the challenges of international administration, **Simon Chesterman** is well aware of the difficulties. In "Virtual Trusteeship," he writes,

> The accepted wisdom within the UN community . . . is that a successful UN peace operation should ideally consist of three sequential stages. First, the political basis for peace must be determined. Then a suitable mandate for a UN mission should be formulated. Finally, that mission should be given all the resources necessary to complete the mandate. The accepted reality is that this usually happens in the reverse order: member states determine what resources they are prepared to commit to a problem and a mandate is cobbled together around those resources—often in the hope that a political solution will be forthcoming at some later date. This reality means that the Council learns, if it learns at all, largely by doing. (231–32)

Other United States Institute of Peace grantees are also concerned about the prospects for UN reform. In *Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress*, **Edward C. Luck** takes a long view, mindful of the many attempts at reform that have already occurred. Luck observes that UN reform is a very difficult undertaking, partly because the system is diffuse and members rarely unite behind specific reform goals. Nonetheless, he notes, the process of reform is virtually constant. Unfortunately, many of those involved are unaware of the history of reform efforts, and so repeat efforts that have proved unworkable in the past. "The key to UN reform, in that sense," suggests Luck, "may lie less in trying to be innovative than in understanding why past initiatives have failed and how the strategies and tactics for achieving them could be improved" (47).

Luck also notes that "change happens even if reform doesn't" (48). As international conditions change and formal reform efforts fail to keep pace, the organization adapts one way or another: "Entrepreneurial UN officials, Member States, and civil society representatives are all adept at circumventing the rules and procedures to get things done" (48). Furthermore, the path of reform tends to be unpredictable. Luck notes, "Rarely does a reform wave end up where its initiators expected" (49). He concludes by underscoring the dilemma facing the various advocates of UN reform, "Should the goal of UN reform be to make its decision-making processes more reflective of the membership as a whole or more in line with the prevailing balance of power and capacity outside of its halls?" (51).

The challenge facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was coupling adaptation with enlargement. In *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*, **Ronald D. Asmus** chronicles NATO's efforts to respond to the changed environment in the late 1990s by expanding its membership and redefining its pur-

pose. Asmus's diplomatic history covers the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into NATO. It also addresses the redefinition of NATO's mission from a security organization deterring a Soviet threat to Western Europe into an organization dedicated to "building an undivided, democratic, and secure Europe and protecting its members from the new threats of the post–Cold War era" (19).

Asmus recounts debates, disputes, and turning points in the lengthy process of expansion and adaptation, arguing that "the enlargement of NATO was neither inevitable nor preordained. It took place because the United States, as the lead ally in the Alliance, made it a top strategic priority that it pursued in the face of strong Russian opposition, at times tepid European support, as well as significant criticism at home" (290). The result, in Asmus's assessment, is "a new NATO for a new era . . . [recast as] a tool to promote Europe's unification, manage security across the continent, and defend common trans-Atlantic values and interests beyond its borders" (291, 290).

Zoltán László Kiss also addresses changes in NATO. His "Lessons of the Kosovo War: Dilemmas Regarding Abilities of NATO and the EU to Manage National and Ethnic Conflicts in Central and South-Eastern Europe" looks at the performance of NATO in Kosovo and concludes that this instance of humanitarian intervention had a positive impact on the organization's long-term viability. Kiss also draws attention to the importance of NATO's further adaptation to carry out the tasks of humanitarian intervention. Such tasks might include protecting refugees, defending demilitarized zones, protecting sanctuaries, delivering humanitarian aid, supervising demobilization and disarmament, and training police. Continued adaptation, argues Kiss, will help NATO maintain itself as a suitable tool for crisis management.

And what if the entire international system, not merely organizations within it, must change? In *Power in Transition: The Peaceful Change of International Order*, **Charles A. Kupchan, Emanuel Adler, Jean-Marc Coicaud,** and **Yuen Foong Khong** confront this possibility. Issues of legitimacy and norms are again paramount concerns. The authors begin by noting that although "American preponderance provides a remarkable geopolitical stability at the start of the twenty-first century . . . as the century progresses, America will not be able to sustain the global preponderance that it enjoys today" (1). As the current unipolar system gives way over time to a multiple centers of power, the system will be far less stable. The authors therefore ask under what conditions the coming transition to multipolarity can be managed peacefully.

In framing their question, the authors begin by noting that power transitions are not only contestations over power. They are also contestations of ideas, identities, and values. Indeed,

> peaceful transition results from implicit and explicit negotiation over ideas and identity much more than from adjustments to or negotiation of the material balance of power. Potential rivals must first engage in a process of ideational convergence, which then enables them to resolve, or in some cases renders irrelevant, their contest over material power. A shared ideational framework moderates, if not eliminates, the sense of threat posed by countervailing power. (8)

Specifically, the authors identify three related mechanisms as key to peaceful transitions in the international order. First is that the dominant power and the rising challenger engage in reciprocal construction of benign images, so that both may view the other's material power as nonthreatening. This involves new rules for trade, use of force, and territorial change. Second, both must fashion an agreement to their mutual satisfaction on the overall outline of a new international order. Third, both must manage to legitimate that order through behavioral conventions, institutions of governance, and a normative framework.

As the authors explain, "The parties must forge a consensus not just on rules but on the values that underlie those rules" (9). The legitimacy thus attained "deepens the durability of peaceful change by protecting it against elite turnover and, during the democratic age, eliciting popular consent in and support for the prevailing international order" (9). All three elements—benign assessments, order, and legitimacy—are essential to the peaceful transitions. Further, these three elements work sequentially:

> The mutual attribution of benign character is the starting point: it enables contenders for primacy to pursue rapprochement and to replace mutual threat with mutual trust. Agreement on order is the next step: it produces a new hierarchy and a new set of rules of the road. Legitimacy is the capstone of the process: it helps create a new political space that transcends the boundaries of the original parties and locks in a stable zone of peace. (170)

To assess this framework the authors examine three cases. The United States' overtaking of Great Britain in the late 1800s and early 1900s was a power transition in the most formal sense. Mutual attribution of benign character was perhaps the strongest factor enabling the peacefulness of this transition.

The second case, the Concert of Europe (1815–54), was a regulatory convention for managing ongoing power shifts. Member willingness to forgo immediate goals and exercise restraint in the interest of mutual accommodation was key to the Concert's success. Agreement on order among the Concert's members was highly salient, particularly the acceptance of spheres of influence. Shared commitment to monarchy and Christianity as the foundations of legitimacy also supported the Concert.

The third case, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in existence since 1967, broadens the historic and geographic range of the study. Although not as ordered and legitimate as a formal security community might be, ASEAN is notable for "[preserving] peace in an unstable neighborhood" (15). Now in its fourth decade and having admitted all the states of its region, ASEAN exemplifies

> sovereign states agreeing to pursue multilateral aims for the ultimate goal of managing power differential among members. The exercise of strategic restraint facilitates the mutual perception of benignity, resulting in a more durable dynamic of cooperation. The institutionalized mechanisms within the organization, agreement on hierarchy within the region, as well as a shared anti-colonialist legacy have helped to further agreement on order and legitimacy. (102)

The authors utilize these three cases to reassess their initial framework of the key elements of peaceful transition. They suggest that "benignity is perhaps the most powerful of the three variables, but the addition of legitimacy and order makes the framework not only a necessary cause of peaceful power management, but a sufficient one as well" (130). They further conclude, "As benignity, order, and legitimacy have supported peaceful power management across two centuries and three regions, and among states on either side of the colonial divide, it appears that this formula will serve us well for the power transition that may arise as American preponderance wanes" (131).

The Use of Force

When and how should the international community use force in pursuit of peacemaking or humanitarian objectives? This question has elicited significant interest from grantees but little agreement beyond the need to do things differently. Some grantees contend that the current UN system for deciding whether to intervene forcibly in a conflict works reasonably well, despite its flaws. Most, however, focus on the conceptual and especially the practical shortcomings of the deployment of force over decades of peacekeeping and in current operations.

Seeking more effective alternatives, grantees examine the record of inspections, sanctions, and embargoes as alternatives to direct military intervention and consider the possibilities for improving such strategies. Other grantees favor bolder options, among them the creation of a "cosmopolitan military," a UN rapid-reaction force, and a large pool of rapidly deployable national forces.

Muddling Along: The Best Option Available

In *Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks*, **Thomas M. Franck** compares historical practice with the formal UN Charter and is not disturbed by the discrepancies between them. Franck's premise is that if we pursue only peace, we risk perpetuating injustice. Yet injustice threatens peace, and peace without justice is hollow. Likewise, if we strictly follow the letter of the law and adhere to every rule, we risk permitting atrocity and committing injustice. Yet legality without justice lacks legitimacy. In trying to close the gaps between peace and justice and between law and legitimacy, Frank urges us to look to historical precedent and the adaptations and adjustments that have been made in practice, rather than trying to devise a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Muddling along, with attention to circumstance and context, has in his view worked thus far.

Franck explains that the UN Charter aimed to do away with recourse to force except in response to clear international aggression. Nonetheless, some historical cases of the use of force in other circumstances have been accepted as legitimate by the international community. Three contrasting cases, among the many Franck discusses, illustrate the pattern.

In 1971 India invaded East Pakistan, thereby facilitating its secession as Bangladesh. The United Nations called for India to withdraw but did not label the invasion an act of aggression. On the one hand, Franck writes, "democratic India had put a welcome stop to a terrible carnage in East Pakistan being perpetrated by Pakistan's junta," including military suppression of a civilian insurrection, violations of human rights, and immense refugee flows (142). On the other hand, India's motives were questionable. The dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of a new state dependent on India clearly served India's national interests. In light of the humanitarian disaster, India's action had some legitimacy, although the remedy was not entirely acceptable. In this instance, Franck observes, international unease over India's intervention competed with relief.

Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1978 was easier for the international community to endorse. When Idi Amin's regime in Uganda made border incursions into Tanzania, the latter seized this provocation as a pretext to end Amin's brutal rule and egregious human rights violations. In a context of widespread international contempt for the Amin regime, the border incursions were accepted as sufficient legal cover for a full-scale invasion that toppled Uganda's government, despite being a disproportionate reaction to a relatively minor border provocation. The United Nations, writes Frank, "expressed its assent in silence." Significantly, Tanzania was nonaligned and had no territorial ambitions, withdrawing in 1981 once a new government was established in Uganda. In Franck's analysis, "If recourse to a legal fiction—that Tanzania

Thomas M. Franck

In Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002

was acting in self-defense—made more palatable what was in all but name recognized as a necessary humanitarian intervention, then the system was quite willing to use that time-honored device to disguise under a thin veil of superficial consistency the significance of a gradually evolving pragmatic change in the way its rules were being applied" (145).

In contrast, when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea in 1978–79, the international community's perceptions and judgments were unfavorable. The Khmer Rouge's horrendous record on human rights was well-known, but the reaction to Vietnam's invasion, especially among developing countries, was "almost uniformly negative." The Vietnam invasion was seen to serve geopolitical rather than humanitarian purposes. Furthermore, Vietnam's own human rights record was tarnished and it had stood by during the worst Khmer Rouge atrocities. While in no haste to withdraw its forces, Vietnam also made no pretense of installing governance by consent. "Observing this sorry spectacle," writes Franck, "most governments could identify with neither protagonist, but only with the still widely valued principle prohibiting resort to force, no matter what" (151).

Looking over these and many other cases, Frank concludes:

> The institutional history of the UN—as distinct from the Charter's text—and record of state practice neither categorically precludes nor endorses humanitarian intervention. Rather, the history and practice support a more nuanced reconciling of the pursuit of peace . . . and of justice through the protection of human and humanitarian rights. . . . In this practical reconciliation we can detect a pragmatic range of systemic responses to unauthorized use of force, depending more on the circumstances than on strictly construed text. (38–39)

Is this practical reconciliation sufficient, or should a new formal doctrine of humanitarian intervention be developed? Franck argues in favor of a case-by-case adaptation and attention to relevant circumstances. "The essence of mitigation," he writes, "is that the law recognizes the continuing force of the rule in general, while also accepting that, in extraordinary circumstances, condoning a carefully calibrated and justifiable violation may do more to rescue the law's legitimacy than would its rigorous implementation" (185). Thus, with respect to humanitarian intervention, "the reconciling of law and justice" is better pursued via mitigation and careful attention to context "rather than by torturing the facts of crisis or the text of the law" (188). With such practice, Franck acknowledges that humanitarian interventions will occur selectively. He argues that this "is entirely inevitable and beside the point." Rather, "the ultimate test of a humanitarian intervention's legitimacy is whether it results in significantly more good than harm, not whether there has been a consistent pattern of such interventions whenever humanitarian crises have arisen" (189).

Conceptual Confusion and Practical Shortcomings

An agreed doctrine of humanitarian intervention may well be unnecessary, but as **Trevor Findlay** argues in *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, improved conduct of such interventions is imperative. His study examines use-of-force dilemmas in a wide range of international operations (such as humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement) in Congo, Cyprus, Lebanon, Somalia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and elsewhere. He traces the evolution of the use of force and the inadequacy of current doctrine to guide such use, whether for defense of mission or for the far more complex issues of deployment in situations of anarchy or protection of nonuniformed UN personnel or civilians. Overall, Findlay finds that "the use of force by UN peacekeepers has been marked by political controversy, doctrinal vacuousness, conceptual confusion and failure in the field" (351).

Findlay is dismayed that lessons have not been learned and, furthermore, are not being taught. "What is remarkable," he writes, "is how unsophisticated, incomplete and often incoherent with regard to the use of force issue the [peacekeeping training] manuals are, even as late as the 1992 editions, despite years of . . . experience in the field" (122). He finds in these

manuals, for example, incomprehensible and confusing usage of terms like "non-armed force" and "non-violent use of force." Challenges that peacekeepers are likely to encounter—such as whether and how to prevent civilians from being massacred or what to do when repeated violations of an agreement occur—are not addressed. Also lacking is discussion of the risks of using force, the difficulties of preemptive self-defense, or the subtleties of interpositional techniques.

Nor does Findlay find much evidence that learning and training will improve. He notes that the 1996 report on Rwanda from the United Nations' Lessons Learned Unit, like the Somalia report, "was biased towards improving peacekeeping in the traditional sense rather than considering any new peace operations paradigm. It proffered forty-three lessons, most of them eminently sensible, which would undoubtedly improve all types of peace operations. Not one of them related to the use of force, even in self-defense" (322).

Improving the use of force will require developing better doctrine. In Findlay's view, this process will include confronting "the norms (some would say the shibboleths) of traditional peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense" (384). Reform efforts will also have to address the duty of UN troops to protect other UN and international personnel and civilians. A major constraint to doctrinal development is opposition from states—including China and many developing countries—that fear such development would facilitate UN intervention in their own affairs and limit their sovereignty. On this topic, Findlay sees more division than consensus.

Thomas R. Mockaitis concurs with many of Findlay's observations in *Civil-Military Operations in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo*, as do the contributors to *The Future of Peace Operations: Old Challenge for a New Century*, edited by **Thomas R. Mockaitis** and **Erwin Schmidl.** These texts identify some interesting differences between the various national contingents participating in recent international operations involving use of force. In Bosnia, for example, coalition partners had very different conceptions of the appropriate level of force. While British, Canadian, German, and Polish troops "smiled, waved and frequented bistros for a tea or coffee in the majority of cases with a reduced protection posture, U.S. troops secured a perimeter while one officer wearing body armor and helmet approached people with an interpreter and perhaps one or two others" (*The Future of Peace Operations*, 34). As this behavior raised suspicions and increased unease among civilians, the disparity in force-protection policy was arguably not merely an irritant to be resolved among partners, but also affected the progress of the mission. Similarly, in Kosovo, while other international contingents based their headquarters in major towns, the U.S. troops built their own self-contained camp at Bondsteel. In addition to wasting resources, Mockaitis argues, U.S. force protection actually impedes civil-military cooperation by frightening local people, creating expectations of trouble, and increasing tensions rather than reducing them.

Sanctions: A Problem of Enforcement

Given the many shortcomings of the current use of force, some grantees explore the possibility of avoiding it altogether while nonetheless achieving the aims of humanitarian intervention. Sanctions are one approach to doing so, although they also have drawbacks.

The strengths and weakness of international sanctions are explored by **David Cortright** and **George A. Lopez** in *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* and by several contributors to *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft*, also edited by Cortright and Lopez. As a starting premise, they argue that it is essential to recognize that "sanctions *are* extreme measures that can have effects in some cases equal to or more severe than those of war. The perception of sanctions as a peaceful, or 'soft,' tool or persuasion does not reflect the harsh reality of the economic and social devastation that can result" (*The Sanctions Decade*, 6).

A range of sanctions, including commodity boycotts, freezing of financial assets, withholding of credit and loans, arms embargoes, and travel restrictions, has been applied

in a number of settings in recent years. Some sanctions regimes are comprehensive; others are targeted. A smart sanctions policy, these authors suggest, "is one that imposes coercive pressure on specific individuals or entities and that restricts selective products or activities, while minimizing unintended economic and social consequences for vulnerable populations and innocent bystanders" (*Smart Sanctions*, 2).

The authors review partial successes and significant failures of sanctions in a variety of settings, including Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, and Sierra Leone. In the course of this review, they back away from their earlier endorsement of targeted sanctions. Cortright and Lopez admit that

> Many sanctions policymakers and analysts, ourselves included, have expressed enthusiasm for the potential of targeted sanctions to achieve political impacts without causing unintended humanitarian hardships. . . . The evidence from the UN cases of the 1990s offers only limited support for the viability of this strategy, however, while raising a number of questions and concerns. (*The Sanctions Decade*, 208)

Instead they conclude that what is essential for the success of any sanctions regime is not precise targeting but consistent enforcement. "A sanctions fence is only as strong as its weakest link" (*Smart Sanctions*, 62). Cortright and Lopez advocate establishing a new Office of Sanctions Affairs in the UN Secretariat. They also recommend that states pass laws criminalizing violations of UN arms embargoes. Harmonizing enforcement capacity through enabling legislation and statutory authority is essential, as is shared political commitment.

The film *Gunrunners,* produced by **PBS Frontline/World** and **the Center for Investigative Reporting,** conveys some of the immense difficulties in enforcing arms embargoes. The film accompanies a UN expert panel as it investigates the flow of small arms to West Africa. It documents links between Eastern European organized crime, particularly Ukranian arms traders dispersing post-Soviet weapons stockpiles that have become an important economic asset; international business interests trading timber, diamonds, and other commodities; and West African warlords. The film traces a shipment of arms and ammunition from Ukraine through Burkina Faso to Liberia and then to a tragic massacre in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The entire record is pieced together from scattered clues—documents seized in an Italian drug bust, radio records of flights, and the careful discernment of patterns in international business and criminal dealings. None of this is straightforward. As a Belgian arms-trade expert observes, the UN team has no power of subpoena or search, no rights to interrogate or engage in covert investigation. Rather, he explains, "we basically have to charm our way in." The team's power to enforce any arms embargo is equally minimal, consisting of revealing their findings, shaming violators, and hoping that states will take action.

One instance of concerted international effort is the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), formed to enforce a ban on Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. In *The United Nations and Iraq: Defanging the Viper*, **Jean E. Krasno** and **James S. Sutterlin** utilize oral histories of UNSCOM staff to examine the commission's successes, obstacles, short-comings, and eventual demise. The 1991 UN Security Council resolution that banned Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction was part of a cease-fire agreement drawn up by the victors to disarm an aggressor. UNSCOM was given unprecedented powers of on-site inspection.

Krasno and Sutterlin discuss the politics of cooperation among UNSCOM's many partners, the differing styles of its successive directors and some key players, controversies over its tactics, turning points in its efforts, and Iraq's concealment strategies. They note, "The strategy initially seemed clear: inspect the declared sites, carry out the destruction of the specified items, set up the monitoring mechanism, allow sanctions to be lifted, and go home" (47). Iraqi noncompliance and concealment, however, required a vast change of strategy. UNSCOM eventually became as involved in proving illegal concealment as in disarming Iraq, engender-

ing some of the political dilemmas that contributed to UNSCOM's demise, despite its many accomplishments.

Radical Reconceptions

A Cosmopolitan Military

Even with substantial international cooperation, the use of force and enforcement of sanctions are problematic. It is not surprising, then, that several grantees attempt to reconceive the basis and practice of the use of force in humanitarian intervention altogether. Contributors to *Forces for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-First Century,* edited by **Lorraine Elliot** and **Graeme Cheeseman,** step back and explore cosmopolitanism: the notion that the world is a single moral community, individual persons are the ultimate units of concern, and actors have the obligation to act on that concern without favoritism. The implication of cosmopolitanism for military forces is that they should be used "to defend the moral community of humankind as well as to defend territorially bounded political communities" (1). A cosmopolitan military would defend "the other" rather than defending against "the other." Such a prospect raises many questions: "Can a traditional military, constituted by the Weberian state as the agent of its legitimate monopoly on violence, be restructured materially and normatively in the interests of non-statist and universal moral values? Can militaries serve both cosmopolitan and statist objectives at same time?" (4)

A cosmopolitan military would entail transformation of means as well as ends, and rules of engagement and conduct of personnel would require adjustment. NATO's aerial bombing of Kosovo, for example, had a humanitarian goal but did not pursue cosmopolitan means, because the nations involved were unwilling to sacrifice the lives of their own soldiers to protect strangers.

In grappling with the construction of a cosmopolitan military force, contributors to this volume return to the "the vexed question of whether the United Nations should have its own military capability" (101). Although many good arguments support the idea of a UN standing force, thus far most governments have remained adamantly opposed. "The principle is firmly entrenched: armies belong to states, not to the heads of inter-governmental organizations" (113). An alternative proposal is the appointment of a UN general staff. In this scenario, officers would choose to leave their national armies in mid-career and work until retirement as UN staff members, forming a military cohort in UN uniform, prepared to deploy to the field immediately. Some opposition to this proposal is political, as it is argued that international organizations simply should not have militaries. Financial and administrative concerns are also raised, since there are no provisions for rank, uniform, and the like within the UN structure. Operationally, some critics doubt that hypothetical UN officers could keep up with changes in doctrine, strategy, and practice once separated from their regular armies. The idea remains part of the debate; however, "it is very unlikely that the United Nations will be enriched with a cosmopolitan military force in the twenty-first century" (114).

UN Legionnaires

A full commitment to cosmopolitanism is not necessary in order to advocate some form of rapid reaction force under UN auspices. In *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen,* **John G. Heidenrich** entertains that possibility, along with many other means to prevent genocide. He reviews the many forms of nonviolent pressure that might be brought to bear against an impending genocide, including diplomacy, publicity, economic pressure, sanctions, and nonviolent resistance. He further considers the value of covert action, secretly arming the imperiled, physical sabotage, assassination, secret nonlethal material support, psychological operations, and rescues. Military action—using airpower alone, interposition, partitioning, creating safe havens—also has a part to play. Too often, however, military expeditions are expedient and hastily improvised. "Their limitations," Heidenrich

argues, "reflect the consequences of waiting too long, and doing too little, as a brewing crisis becomes a genocide" (164).

Multinational forces can have particular shortcomings, resulting from the different operating procedures, training styles, equipment, and combat and peacekeeping doctrines of contributing nations. Evaluating the construction and performance of international military operations, Heidenrich concludes that "over the years, this haphazard process has produced some very haphazard multinational forces" (196).

What would be a better alternative? Heidenrich calls for an international legion of volunteers employed in the service of the United Nations. Such a legion would be available to the UN Security Council for early rapid deployment in a crisis, particularly for "relatively small scale but still risky missions of importance" (234). In Heidenrich's vision, the UN legionnaires would be proficient not only in combat skills but also in "local negotiation skills, foreign cultural awareness, patience in the face of repeated foreign insults, and able to work well with both the UN bureaucracy and with countless non-governmental organizations" (238). Labeling such a force "UN military police" would help remind the UN Security Council, concerned governments, and the general public that such a force could not wage war, but instead would engage in military police duties.

A Rapidly Deployable Force

Michael E. O'Hanlon also explores the possibilities of a rapidly deployable military force, but not one organized as a standing force under UN auspices. In *Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention*, O'Hanlon investigates the prospects of each nation increasing its deployable military capacity so that humanitarian interventions could be conducted more promptly and effectively when deemed advisable. "Rather than thinking in terms of a 5,000-person UN force," O'Hanlon argues, "the international community should develop the capacity to deploy and sustain much larger numbers of troops abroad" (9).

Having surveyed recent and current conflicts around the world, O'Hanlon calculates, "It would be desirable for the international community to have the capacity to deploy up to 200,000 troops at a time. Since some countries will choose not to participate in any given operation, and since troops will need to be rotated to avoid exhaustion and burnout, a total pool of perhaps 600,000 personnel would be desirable" (85). Although the international community already has about that number of military personnel who could be rapidly deployed and then sustained in overseas theaters, almost two-thirds of the total number now come from the United States. O'Hanlon sees a role for other nations to equalize the burden and ensure that humanitarian interventions occur when and where needed.

Overall, O'Hanlon argues that most countries would not need to add troops to their armed forces to meet this goal. On the contrary, "they would generally be better advised to reduce overall troop numbers to free up funds that could be used to improve the capacities of their remaining units for rapid deployment and sustainable operations abroad" (113). Power projection capabilities rather than increased troop size should be the focus.

O'Hanlon argues that given their wealth, military proficiency, and commitment to human rights, the major industrialized democracies could contribute much more. "Major western countries need not greatly increase defense spending," he writes, "but they do need to change their defense priorities—and Washington needs to support their efforts to do so, rather than fear a weakening of its alliances simply because its advanced allies seek somewhat greater military autonomy" (133). Developing countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America need to train and equip their forces better. O'Hanlon acknowledges that international assistance is essential but asserts that the "scale of the American contribution need not be especially onerous—resources on the order of one billion dollars a year and quite modest numbers of uniformed military personnel to act as trainers would be sufficient" (113).

Without such a global coordinated effort, O'Hanlon argues, humanitarian interventions will continue to be uneven and inadequate. Surveying the extent of civil

warfare and internal conflict, he laments the tragic toll in human lives and also raises the concern that "failed states can contribute, at least indirectly, to the success of global terrorist networks, which can use such states as sanctuaries, for acquiring resources, and in some cases for finding willing recruits" (111).

The Merits of Nonprovocative Defense

Geoffrey Wiseman

Concepts of Non-Provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security

New York: Palgrave, 2002

Failed states and nonstate actors are now a primary threat to international security. But this situation does not obviate the need for wise defense policies between traditional states. In *Concepts of Non-Provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security*, **Geoffrey Wiseman** addresses the so-called security dilemma—the dynamic in which one state's efforts to increase its security are perceived as being achieved at the expense of another's, promoting spirals of competition and arms races that may lead to war. Tracing the development of the idea of non-provocative defense in different settings, Wiseman examines Western Europe in the 1980s and after the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union from 1986 to 1989, the 1990–91 Gulf War, and developments in the Asia-Pacific region after 1989.

Wiseman is also attentive to the recent "stunning recovery of faith in the doctrine of humanitarian military intervention" (131). Noting that such intervention requires offensive capabilities, Wiseman observes, "defensive proponents were not necessarily against humanitarian intervention, but some did demand a high level of respect for the increasingly unfashionable counter-norm of sovereignty at a time when an extraordinary reversal of political positions had occurred: the progressive left favored intervention while the conservative right was more concerned with 'home' defense" (134).

Wiseman readily admits that all theorizing about the security dilemma occurred in the context of the Cold War. Under changed international conditions, is the concept still useful? "The question is whether this focus remains justified when civil wars appear to be more prevalent than international conflict, and whether defensive force postures remain relevant when war is waged by groups other than organized states" (24). He finds that nonprovocative defense is still relevant as one of several security policy options. According to Wiseman, "While several key trends that developed in the early post–Cold War era—such as complex multipolarity, state fragmentation, broader definitions of security, and the growing number of internal wars—were not conducive to non-provocative defense advocacy, they did not spell an end to the idea" (226).

Democracy amid Diversity

Democracy can influence conflict in many ways, both within and between states. Within nations, democracy is often assumed to have the potential to defuse conflict in divided societies. Grantees turn the spotlight on these assumptions and discover some interesting results. For instance, institutional design is important, but highly polished designs do not tend to work as well as untidy, locally modified ones; the kind of first-past-the-post electoral systems popular in the West often encourage extremism in divided societies; and elections of any kind often favor extremists in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. Like electoral systems, electoral monitoring has significant flaws and limitations, but even so it is invaluable to building public confidence in the democratic process and otherwise fostering peace. Other institutions, including civil society associations, may also be central to helping divided but democratic societies avoid conflict. Shifts toward democracy in divided societies can be particularly complex, not only for electoral engineering but for the politics of mobilization.

Between nations, variations on a long-standing theory posit either that democracies rarely go to war with each other or that they avoid the resort to aggression toward all other states. Grantees test these hypotheses by examining the particular mechanisms by which democracy affects foreign policy decision making.

The Impact of Institutions

The contributors to *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, edited by **Andrew Reynolds,** share the premise that political institutions significantly shape the logic and outcomes of democratic politics. Contributors thus research and debate the merits of presidential versus parliamentary systems, federal versus unitary constitutions, and proportional versus winner-take-all elections for their potential to ensure peace and stability, particularly in divided societies. The design of political institutions is their primary focus, but all the contributors are equally committed to two further positions. First, some political conflicts are intractable in the short term. For these, institutional design is no panacea. Second, no uniform design should be applied in all divided societies. The best ways of achieving power sharing may vary across cases. As Reynolds affirms in the introduction, and as is borne out in every chapter, "the purpose of this book is not to proselytize" (3).

Many factors limit the power of design. People involved in creating political institutions, for example, are often facing many concurrent challenges, including post-conflict economic reconstruction. The particular characteristics of ethnic diversity—such as the size, wealth, and goals of the minority—also shape and constrain the most suitable institutions for different circumstances. And the impact of complex electoral rules can be difficult to predict, even in stable political systems. Many features of the transitional environment contribute to determining what is feasible. As contributor **Steven L. Solnick** observes in "Federalism and State-Building: Post-Communist and Post-Colonial Perspectives," "the set of *desirable* institutional models may be quite different from the set of *attainable* institutional equilibria" (204, emphasis in original).

That may be just as well. In the judgment of contributor **David Horowitz**,

> If [theoretical, off-the-shelf] designs were really adopted in an unmodified form, their democratic legitimacy might be at risk. The hash that is made of designs in the process of adoption may make conflict reduction much more difficult than it might be, but there may be some compensating advantages. A messy process of adoption, replete with design-destroying reciprocity, may give rise at least to a sense of local ownership of the product, even if the institutions fall short of what is required to mitigate conflict. (36)

Ultimately the success of political institutions in preventing domestic conflict may rest less on their polished design than on the populace's commitment to them. As contributor **Brij V. Lal** affirms in "Constitutional Engineering in Fiji," the most recent constitution in Fiji "will remain a piece of paper unless there is a united will in the citizenry to make it work for the common good. In Rousseau's words, the most important laws are those which are not 'graven on tablets of marble or brass, but on the hearts of its citizens'" (292).

Elections and Divided Societies

Different Electoral Designs, Different Outcomes

Benjamin Reilly

Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001

Benjamin Reilly continues the attention to political institutions as mechanisms for conflict management in divided societies, but he narrows the focus to electoral rules in *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management.* In divided societies, Reilly explains, politicians often have an incentive to appeal to ethnic identities as a means of mobilizing a constituency. In the resulting cycles of "outbidding" among politicians, extremists overwhelm moderates. But, Reilly argues, nothing in this pattern is inevitable. Changes in institutional rules—to facilitate and encourage cross-communal communication, bargaining, cooperation, and interdependence between rival politicians and their respective constituencies—would alter this pattern. A different set of incentives would encourage rational office-seeking politicians to pursue moderate centrist forms of political competition. Reilly aims to identify the electoral rules and practices that will most reliably produce such "centripetalism"—that is, political systems in which "the focus of political competition is directed at the center, not at the extremes" (6).

In pursuit of this goal, Reilly documents the effects of proportional representation and preferential vote-pooling electoral systems by examining the electoral history of divided societies that have used such institutions—Papua New Guinea from 1964 to 1972, Northern Ireland since 1973, Sri Lanka since 1978, Estonia in 1990, and Fiji in 1999, as well as Bosnia and some other nondivided cases from Australia, Europe, and North America.

Papua New Guinea provides the strongest case for the centripetal effects of preferential voting systems. In elections from 1964 to 1972, voters could rank-order multiple candidates beyond their first choice. This preferential voting system, in Reilly's analysis, "allowed ethnic voters to reconcile two divergent aims: the need to vote for their own 'local' ethnic candidate (who almost invariably received the first preference) and the desire to vote, using secondary preferences, for the candidate of their choice (who would often be someone from outside their immediate area)" (68).

In 1975 Papua New Guinea abandoned these electoral methods for a first-past-the-post system. In the country's highly fragmented, clan-based society, this change resulted in a very different kind of electoral competition. Incentive for cross-ethnic voting vanished and candidates concentrated on their clan base alone. Parties have degenerated, replaced by tribal mobilization. Candidates with less than 30 percent of the vote win a disturbingly high number of seats. Electoral violence has risen—rationally, since with a first-past-the-post system, a small number of votes can make a large difference, and stealing or stuffing ballot boxes is efficient. Reviewing the evidence from Papua New Guinea, Reilly concludes, "It would be hard to find a clearer example of the importance of political institutions in general, or the case for centripetal strategies of institutional design in particular" (94).

Reilly's research on Fiji and Sri Lanka permits him to identify some limitations to the approach. In contrast to Papua New Guinea, centripetal strategies have played "at best, a modest and insufficient role in promoting multiethnic democracy in Fiji, while having little discernible impact at all upon ethnic relations in Sri Lanka" (124). Why is this the case? In part, Reilly attributes it to the complexity and comprehensibility of electoral reforms. Elites grasped the importance of the rules and how best to shape them for their own advantage. In Fiji, for example, compulsory expression of a complete set of preferences coupled with the introduc-

tion of a party ticket—in which the party provides a ticket with a prearranged preference schedule—placed too much power in the hands of party elites. In Sri Lanka the marking of preferences is optional, but lack of voter education means the process is not widely understood. Few voters express second or third preferences, so the centripetal potential of such practices is not achieved. Thus, the Fijian and the Sri Lankan cases "point not just to the possibilities, but also the limitations, of electoral engineering. . . . Both point to the necessity for policymakers to think hard about the consequences of even minor technical innovations" (127).

In addition to technical design issues, Reilly attends to the impact of social context, particularly the level of geographic dispersion of ethnic groups. In a variety of cases, he observes that centripetal methods work best to encourage interethnic accommodation "when constituency boundaries can be drawn in such a way as to create ethnically heterogeneous districts," even if that means very large districts (165). Reilly concludes that in many regions of the world, where ethnic groups are intermixed and ethnic tensions appear to result, "the centripetal approach may well be the most fruitful method of encouraging cooperative, inter-ethnic politics" (193).

The Limits of Electoral Engineering

Carrie Manning is well aware of the limits of elections in divided societies, particularly those emerging from conflict. She examines elections in three post-conflict settings in a series of articles, "Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Lessons from Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique," "Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996–2002: Democracy in Search of a State?" and "From Armed Conflict to Civil Opposition: Post-conflict Party Development in Mozambique, Bosnia, and Kosovo." She points out that in post-conflict settings,

> the first few elections will have little to do with the traditional functions of representation and accountability. Instead, elections are first and foremost about the division of power between competing elites who have recently been locked in military confrontation or who have been outside that confrontation but who have been excluded from political activity as a function of it. ("From Armed Conflict to Civil Opposition," 5)

Particularly in Bosnia, the intent of the international community has been to use elections as part of a larger strategy to effect structural political change. As Manning notes,

> Because democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not just an end in itself, but a means to an end—namely the establishment and consolidation of a multiethnic Bosnian state—progress in Bosnia's democratization process is measured not only by assessing the quality of the democratic procedures, but by assessing the particular outcomes they produce. ("Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 4)

Despite the immense involvement of international experts and their explicit use of electoral design to achieve multiethnic results, Bosnian elections continue to produce successes for nationalist parties over moderate alternatives. Manning attributes this trend to the continued control by nationalist parties of essential economic resources. Voters continue to support them not because they wish to return to conflict but because these parties can deliver resources that voters need. In Manning's assessment, Bosnia thus demonstrates "the limits of what can be achieved through electoral and constitutional engineering without structural change" ("Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 15).

Monitors: Imperfect but Invaluable

The international monitoring of elections, even if they do not produce outcomes desired by the international community, may nonetheless contribute to public confidence in the integrity of elections, better campaign processes, and more-informed electorates. So argues **Eric C. Bjornlund** in *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy.* From his study of fifteen years of electoral monitoring in ninety-four newly democratic and semi-

authoritarian countries, Bjornland also recognizes the shortcomings of this practice. Too often, he suggests, far too much is expected of transitional or post-conflict elections, which may contribute to but do not constitute nation building. Even so, many unrelated actions, such as the restoration of aid, membership in international organizations, or improvement of bilateral relations, frequently depend on the holding of successful elections.

Although it has improved, electoral monitoring remains marred by methodological flaws, especially an overemphasis on election day itself rather than the broader process. Furthermore, monitoring organizations and missions can reflect interests and objectives other than democratization (including security, trade, and other foreign policy goals). High-profile international monitoring teams can usurp resources that might have gone to domestic teams, which often have a significant potential to strengthen democracy. Finally Bjornland notes that the international community has yet to develop a definitive approach for dealing with governments that claim or maintain power based on fraudulent or manipulated elections. In short, Bjornlund recognizes, election monitoring "can contribute to democratization but can also be counterproductive" (14).

International electoral monitoring aims to assess elections against universal standards. Bjornlund notes that an international consensus has gradually emerged on what constitutes a democratic election, which includes fair conduct of the balloting and counting, opportunities for political parties to compete, reasonably equitable access to media, impartial election administrators, fair rules, a political environment free of intimidation, and prompt and just resolution of election-related disputes and grievances. "Free and fair" has become "the rhetorical touchstone" of this consensus. Nonetheless, Bjornlund laments, the phrase "has tended to obscure rather than clarify" (95). The development of clear standards of what constitutes free and fair has lagged. Judgments are often subjective and vague, while "existing criteria are impractical and inconsistent with actual practice" (96). Furthermore, the emphasis suggests a dichotomy, that any particular election is or is not free and fair, diminishing the understanding that "elections are actually political processes more realistically judged along a continuum and placed in context" (97).

Domestic electoral monitoring may have a great deal to contribute to democratization. In Bjornlund's assessment, "the dramatic development of the past two decades is the emergence of nonpartisan election monitoring conducted by organizations from civil society rather than from the formal political sector, electoral authorities, or political parties" (210). Starting with the National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections in the Philippines in the mid-1980s, Bjornlund credits domestic election monitoring with encouraging citizen involvement in politics, empowering civic organizations in public affairs, and building new political networks committed to democratic politics.

Perhaps the best approach would be to blend both approaches, with international support for domestic monitoring. Thus far, attempts have resulted in missed opportunities and unintended consequences. In Indonesia, for example, civic organizations and university-based networks with international support mobilized more than half-a-million poll watchers on election day in 1999. But in this flawed effort, many inadequately prepared groups joined the process at the last minute, local organizations devoted energy to competing for international funds rather than working on substantive issues and strategies, and an opportunity to build a foundation for democratic reform was lost, according to Bjornlund. In many ways, he writes, "the considerable [international] funds actually hampered the development of politically active citizens" (269).

Despite current shortcomings, Bjornlund affirms,

> if properly conceived and implemented, comprehensive international and domestic election monitoring not only provides an objective assessment of a given country's electoral process but can also promote the integrity of the elections and related institutions, build public confidence and participation in the electoral process, and complement and encourage domestic engagement in democratic politics. (9)

Civic Networks and Intercommunal Peace

Elections, however engineered and monitored, are not the only mechanism for fostering peace and democracy in divided societies. In *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*, **Ashutosh Varshney** analyzes intercommunal networks within civil society. Varshney distinguishes between two kinds of networks: associational (composed of organized groups such as sports clubs, reading groups, film clubs, business associations, trade unions, festival organizations) and quotidian (consisting of routine interaction in streets, buses, parks, markets, and other public places). Although both promote peace, Varshney finds that associational networks are far sturdier in urban settings, particularly in deflecting attempts by politicians to foment division and polarization.

Varshney's methodology is to compare three pairs of cities, each with a roughly similar proportion of Hindus and Muslims, one city prone to violence and the other city predominantly peaceful. The comparisons give Varshney the opportunity to thoroughly examine the causal connection between associational civic engagement and ethnic peace. With attention to the roots of associational networks in the transformative mass politics of the 1920s and 1930s, Varshney traces the evolution of civic groups in the six cities, looking at the strength of intracommunal as well as intercommunal links, networks operating at the mass as compared to the elite level, and the decline or strengthening of different groups over time. He concludes not only that rich civic engagement ensures intercommunal peace better than mere quotidian contact, but that vibrant nonstate civic networks—rather than state action such as stronger policing—have and will continue to enable peace between different communities.

Undermining Democracy by "Demobilizing" Citizens

Violence between communities is subject to many interpretations. Intercommunal violence in the former Yugoslavia has been attributed to "ancient hatreds" and alternatively to manipulative leaders "playing the ethnic card" to rally ethnic groups against each other. In *The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s*, **V. P. Gagnon Jr.** rejects both interpretations. Rather, he argues that in the context of the end of communism and rising popular interest in democratization and significant reform, threatened conservative leaders actively "demobilized" the citizenry (discouraged civic participation and political engagement).

Because they sought to maintain their control of existing structures of power or position to convert state-owned property to privately held wealth, elites wanted to silence and marginalize challengers and demobilize their potential supporters. Faced with the prospect of being ousted from power through either elections or street protests, they strove to create fear of an existential threat, emphasize a terrible enemy, and thus encourage the population to view those who spoke of reform as "dupes or tools of the evil forces . . . as traitors" (182). Their immediate tactics were to deploy paramilitaries, using violence to destroy heterogeneous communities and state-controlled media to instill a sense of threat. Citing preexisting intercommunal peace, high rates of intermarriage, multiethnic veterans' organizations, draft resistance, and desertion, Gagnon argues that "violence and threats were necessary to ethnicize a society that had until then not been divided along ethnic lines" (151). Only through extensive efforts at demobilization, "by using the image and discourse of injustices being perpetrated against innocent civilians by evil others defined in ethnic terms, conservative elites managed successfully to divert attention away from demands for change toward the question of these injustices. The violence thus served to silence and marginalize the proponents of fundamental change" (181).

Democratic Decision Making and the Democratic Peace

Turning to the influence of democracy on international conflict, **Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee** construct three models in *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century*, each with a different causal mechanism, to specify exactly how domestic democratic

institutions influence foreign policy choices of state leaders. The Political Accountability Model describes the institutional means by which the political opposition can punish or reward leaders for their decisions. The Political Norms Model sees institutions as a source of values and principles that guide bargaining and conflict resolution in international disputes. The Political Affinity Modeldescribes the similarity of institutions between states as a basis of mutual perception and political alignment, enabling leaders to differentiate between potential allies and security threats.

To test these models, Huth and Allee constructed a global data set of 348 territorial disputes from 1919 to 1995. (Five appendices to the book summarize the cases and explain their coding.) Huth and Allee then used statistical methods to compare the explanatory power of each of the three theoretical models in these cases, examining each territorial dispute at three stages: challenge to the status quo, negotiation, and military escalation. Their results take into account these different phases.

At the negotiation stage, for example, the Political Accountability Model is particularly strong. Huth and Allee find that at this stage, leaders in challenger states are sensitive to electoral cycles (both their own and their adversaries'). As elections approach, international negotiations are less likely to produce settlement agreements. Leaders are also less likely to bring home agreements that require concessions unless they command significant party support, because they are keenly aware of the domestic politics of treaty ratification. Similarly, they are not apt to put concessions on the table unless they are confident that their opponents (democratic or not) can survive the political battle at home over ratification. They are, nonetheless, more likely to offer concessions to other democratic leaders. Because of their expectation of domestic opposition, leaders of democracies may also avoid accommodation. Thus, democratic politics may make compromise more difficult and prolong the time needed to negotiate the settlement of a territorial dispute.

At the phase of military escalation, findings from the Political Accountability Model indicate that state leaders are wary of risking wars with opponents who are politically secure from domestic opposition. While the Political Norms Model has substantial explanatory power during the stage of challenging the status quo, it is weaker for the subsequent stages of negotiation and military escalation. The Political Affinity Model produces the weakest result across all three stages of territorial disputes. Huth and Allee's most powerful single finding is that escalation to war never occurred between pairs of states with strong democratic institutions. Between these pairs, war was avoided at an earlier stage than between the other pairs.

International Negotiation

International negotiations range from multiparty talks on momentous issues such as climate change and nuclear proliferation to bilateral agreements on seemingly innocuous subjects, such as setting a quota for orange imports. But even apparently humdrum subjects have the capacity to excite fierce passions, bring into play a wide range of bargaining strategies and tactics, and reveal surprising facets of the negotiating environment.

As they explore the dynamics and intricacies of negotiation, grantees dissect both multilateral and bilateral encounters on subjects ranging from torture to pollution, business mergers to jet fighters. Grantees confront some of the biggest questions on international negotiations, from their fundamental normative bases and long-term viability to the precise identifiable qualities of national negotiation styles, as they interpret the formation, content, and implementation of international agreements.

Justice and Fairness: Making Negotiation Feasible

In *Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation*, **Cecilia Albin** considers normative issues that implicitly or explicitly underlie international negotiations. She examines four case studies: negotiations over environmental pollution and acid rain in Europe, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nuclear nonproliferation, and the talks under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and in the World Trade Organization. The cases vary on the nature of the issues, the number of parties involved, their power relations, the institutional settings, and the political context. From these varied cases, Albin offers several observations about normative aspects of international negotiations.

According to Albin, "It is clear that although negotiators may not have framed or even thought consciously of the issues as matters of justice and fairness, such concepts were frequently reflected in their behavior" (217). An absence of words does not mean that the concepts of justice and fairness are absent from the debate. Likewise their explicit usage does not mean they are being genuinely discussed; they may be deployed tactically. Across the different case studies, Albin perceives a concern for justice and fairness at every stage, from the beginning as talks are structured and agendas set, in the bargaining phase, and through implementation and compliance.

Albin finds that the substance of justice and fairness in international negotiation is not precise but tends to cluster around several basic commitments. For example, negotiations must be seen by all parties as impartial, with the interests and claims of all considered and none asked to act specifically against their interests. The process and outcome of negotiations should deliver joint gains. Parties also have a duty to implement freely negotiated agreements. The presence of justice and fairness does not alter basic asymmetries of power among the negotiating parties, but it makes negotiation feasible. As Albin concludes,

> The design of workable arrangements can rarely rely on hard-nosed bargaining and the promise of mutual benefits alone. In order to win the respect and voluntary approval of the parties and their constituencies, the provisions must be seen as worth honoring partly by appealing to their sense of fairness. They must include principles of allocation of rights, duties, benefits, and costs among parties who are joined in a cooperative venture, and reflect their voices and concerns. Negotiators are thus motivated to formulate terms, and behave more generally, on grounds which others can freely accepts as reasonable and authoritative rather than merely self-serving. This facilitates the achievement of broadly supported agreements. (218)

Unceasing Negotiation, Evolving Regimes

Contributors to *Getting It Done: Post-Agreement Negotiation and International Regimes*, edited by **Bertram I. Spector** and **I. William Zartman,** focus on the aftermath of agreements. The book's premise is that viewing international regimes as though they were final agreements followed by clear implementing legislation and then compliance is "both to miss their reality and mistake their nature" (5). Rather, the editors concur, "Problems are not static and neither are their solutions" (4). Some aspects of a problem are always left unresolved, and new problems arise in the process of implementation. Interests and resources of signatories may change. Advances in science may offer new solutions to some problems. Changing situations create new challenges, unanticipated when agreements were established. Thus, international regimes are always ongoing processes, adapting and transforming to remain relevant, useful, and vital to their stakeholders. "To be viable over the long term," the editors argue, "regimes have to evolve and that evolution is accomplished through a process of continuous negotiation. Regimes are born through negotiation processes, and they evolve through postagreement negotiation processes" (4).

Contributors examine four cases in detail. The Mediterranean Action Plan, begun in 1975 to reduce maritime pollution, provides an opportunity to look at a regional regime dealing with the environment. Negotiations involved in establishing and transforming the Conference and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (C/OSCE) is a case of a regional regime on security issues. The Ozone Depletion Regime, with rounds of negotiations in Vienna and Montreal in the 1980s, is a global regime concerning the environment. The evolving regime against torture, particularly the 1984 UN Convention against Torture and creation of the special rapporteur on torture, is an example of global negotiations on human rights.

Three kinds of international regimes emerge from the examination of these cases. First are those that remain in force as originally negotiated. Such regimes are rare; indeed, none is featured in the book. A second, more common category consists of regimes that grow and evolve along a fairly steady course through recurrent negotiation. European negotiations over maritime pollution are an example of this type. The regime against torture, at the time of the writing of *Getting It Done,* also exhibited steady though slow progress. The third category, in which the international regime against torture may now be placed, comprises regimes that "follow a jagged course, forward, backward, and sideways, from one negotiated encounter of parties to another" (272). The authors place the C/OSCE in this category, "with its internal battles over its appropriate strength and direction and the change in mission occasioned by the shift from the Cold War" (272). From their review of different international regimes and the ongoing postagreement negotiations that are necessary to keep them viable, the authors warn that "regimes cannot at any time safely be assumed to be 'mature,' having reached their final form" (90).

National Negotiating Styles

Bilateral negotiations over very specific issues would seem far simpler than the multilateral encounters discussed in *Getting It Done*. Yet nation-to-nation negotiations also have many elements, involve a surprising number of players, pass through several different stages, and feature a wide variety of strategic approaches and tactical gambits. The changing political environments, both global and domestic, in which negotiations occur can have a significant impact on bilateral negotiations, as can the institutional structures of each party's government, the specific issues at stake, and the individuals sitting round the negotiating table. The culture, especially the political and institutional culture, of each nation also exercises a significant influence on the negotiating style of its diplomats and politicians. As several grantees attest, different negotiators from the same nation tend to display similar attitudes toward the use of time, explicit or implicit language, threats, ritual, and so forth. However, while some traits are in evidence over many years, others have a shorter life span;

as **Patrick Cronin** points out in his conclusion to *Case Studies in Japanese Negotiating Behavior*, "to find recurring patterns in a national negotiating style is not to point to permanent tendencies so much as to underscore prevailing proclivities" (156).

In *How Germans Negotiate: Logical Goals, Practical Solutions*, **W. R. Smyser** examines German behavior in a range of situations, including official negotiations on economic and security issues as well as private business transactions. Across these varied cases, Smyser perceives some essential patterns. The most fundamental is German commitment to a *Gesamtkonzept*, a comprehensive or governing concept or foundational logic. According to Smyser, "Germans do not argue in immediate and specific terms, seizing principally on the details of any particular issue or any particular solution. Instead, they insist that any proposal must have a thorough foundation in logic and abstract reason" (24). Strategic tenacity on the basis of a *Gesamtkonzept* is balanced by tactical flexibility. Thus, for example, Germans held to the notion that a unified Germany merited a greater role in international financial institutions. When Germany's first nominee to head the IMF was rejected, the German government offered a second nominee but did not back away from its commitment to the idea that Germans now belonged in the top rank of international finance. It is this commitment to an underlying conceptual premise that "distinguishes negotiations with Germans from negotiations with others" (89).

In anticipation of negotiating with Germans, Smyser offers two pieces of advice. First, be very well prepared, knowing the facts and logic of one's own position thoroughly and the Germans' position equally well. Second, expect to negotiate in logical terms and be able to show how your proposal has a logical basis.

Negotiations with Japanese have a very different quality. In *Case Studies in Japanese Negotiating Behavior*, **Michael Blaker, Paul Giarra,** and **Ezra Vogel** explore four cases of extended U.S.-Japanese negotiations over trade and security issues: orange imports (1977–88), rice imports (1986–93), the development of the FSX fighter aircraft (1985–89), and the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship (1991–96). Across these cases, the authors identify several significant features of Japanese negotiating style.

A first observation is that Japanese prefer to avoid or minimize negotiations. Thus, for example, "the Japanese government's dearest wish in the negotiations over rice imports (and, indeed, orange imports) was not to enter negotiations in the first place" (62). Negotiations tend to be slow (hence the extended time frames of each case study), with the Japanese aiming to limit the scope of discussion and taking very cautious, noninnovative, defensive, or reactive positions, pursuing only incremental change.

Why is this so? The authors point to the imperative of maintaining harmony within Japanese culture, despite a fragmented and pluralistic society that is mirrored in dispersed power among different branches of government bureaucracy. The search for harmony in a vertically organized but horizontally competitive environment puts enormous importance on internal consensus building, which can be very time-consuming. In Japan, in contrast to Germany, "decisions are thus not so much reached by a logical analysis of options as arranged by the interests and relative power of the various actors. Effective Japanese leaders are consensus builders, able to figure out how to accommodate the interests of each group or to compensate those groups whose interests are harmed by an agreement" (9).

Partly because of the Japanese drive to build an internal consensus, "negotiation is not seen as a legitimate clash of different points of view but as a failure of the consensus process. International negotiation is to some extent not negotiation at all but an attempt to carry out the domestic agreements reached by a consensus-building process" (10). In his conclusion to the volume, Patrick Cronin offers this summary of the quality of U.S.-Japanese negotiations, in the hope that future negotiators will enter talks with greater understanding and sensitivity: "Whereas American negotiators conceive of negotiating, in its simplest form, as a dialectical process—two competing views clashing to reach a compromise—the Japanese tend to see negotiation as the art of explanation, attempting to bring outsiders to understand and accommodate an unyielding internal consensus" (150).

Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation

A society emerging from conflict must strive to establish a shared truth, achieve justice, and foster reconciliation if it is to escape self-perpetuating cycles of violence and victimization. This is no easy task. There are myriad ways to continue to blame or dehumanize the other, to miscarry justice, and to generate shallow or false reconciliation. Fortunately, there are also many different ways of overcoming or avoiding those obstacles to building a lasting peace.

As they grapple with the concepts of truth, justice, and reconciliation, grantees assess numerous efforts to translate such concepts into post-conflict practice. They examine a wide variety both of cases (Peru, South Africa, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Asia-Pacific, and the former Yugoslavia) and of mechanisms (among them, truth commissions, court cases, international tribunals, transnational courts, and amnesty). Grantees also dissect the processes of forgiveness and reconciliation and discover a number of key ingredients as well as several disturbing dilemmas, not least for the victims of violence.

Clearly, there is no single recipe for success, but there are a number of elements that must be factored into every effort to foster truth, justice, or reconciliation. One such element—emphasized by many grantees—is time. None of the initiatives analyzed by grantees promised or achieved swift results; even court cases typically take years rather than months to unfold, and their ripple effects take many more years to work their way through the affected societies. Furthermore, in many situations it may actually be wise to let time pass before even attempting to confirm truth, redress injustice, or initiate reconciliation. To make matters yet more complex, the challenges of truth, justice, and reconciliation appear to endure. Even a successful post-conflict process cannot be expected to settle these issues once and for all. Success consists in handling them constructively in each iteration.

Truth Commissions: Dispelling Obliviousness in Peru

Truth commissions are frequently the sites of efforts to construct a shared understanding of recent history and put an end to inflammatory myths and the self-serving ignorance or denial that can feed further cycles of violence. A shared understanding of the past helps a society to cohere as a whole that acknowledges and respects all its members.

The film *State of Fear*, produced by **Paco de Onis,** records the efforts to establish truth following twenty years of terror in Peru. The film recounts the brutality of the Shining Path terrorist group, the state's excessively militarized response, and the complacency of much of Peruvian society, as investigated by Peru's truth commission.

The revolutionary movement Shining Path formed in the impoverished Peruvian highlands in the 1970s. Over time it pursued a strategy of violence and terror in the rural Andes, the Amazon, and eventually Peru's cities. The government countered with an aggressive military response that included massive violations of human rights and broad repression. The military action was ill informed, counterproductive (arming indigenous communities, which fed the violence), and ineffectual. It was coupled with a dismantling of democratic institutions as the congress was dissolved, the judiciary lost its independence, and mass arrests and preventive detention became widespread. Twenty years of political violence left seventy thousand dead and a vast record of human rights violations and destruction of the rule of law.

One motif of the film is the government's manipulation of the fear of terrorism in order to enhance its own power. For years after the Shining Path's leader was captured and the movement defeated, the government continued to use the threat of terrorism to concentrate its power and justify its abuses. Its excesses eventually included gross financial corruption and electoral fraud, leading to its popular overthrow.

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Another motif of *State of Fear* is the chasms within Peruvian society. Prior to the emergence of Shining Path, the upper classes in the capital city of Lima were unaware of and unconcerned about the extreme poverty, exploitation, and exclusion suffered by much of the population. Once the revolutionary movement was active, the upper classes were willfully ignorant or permissive of the human right violations the government perpetrated in response. A member of the government and representative of the educated upper class describes herself as having been "comfortably oblivious," first of the suffering and then of the scale of repression. A leader of the human rights movement that sought to document atrocities and human right violations as they were occurring laments, "There was very little we could accomplish in a society that wasn't listening." Both individuals eventually participated in Peru's truth commission.

A Travesty of Justice in Croatia

Efforts to achieve justice and accountability frequently—but not exclusively—occur via court cases, whether conducted domestically, internationally, or transnationally. The film *Lora*, by **Factum** (a documentary production company) and **B92** (a radio station), concerns a local court case addressing torture in a prison in Split, Croatia. From 1992 to 1996, some fifteen hundred prisoners—a mix of soldiers from the Yugoslav National Army and Serbian and Montenegrin civilians living in Split—were jailed without arrest warrants or indictments and subjected to barbaric torture and other inhuman treatment in the Lora Prison. Sixty to seventy individuals were killed. The film covers the attempt in 2002 to prosecute eight members of the Croatian Military Police who were among those immediately responsible for two deaths.

The local court case is a cynical travesty, with the judge expressing his certitude of the defendants' innocence and castigating the media and human rights organizations as "agents of Serbian counterintelligence." Local officials make "humanitarian" visits to the imprisoned defendants and express hope for their immediate release, and witnesses are threatened and intimidated. Former prisoners who had escaped the region refuse to return to testify in the case, as their personal safety is clearly at risk. All eight defendants are found innocent, although a higher court overturns the lower court's ruling and demands they be returned to custody. Two of the defendants have already left the area, and the judge, who must sign documents for their recapture, has gone on vacation; according to the local officials, he cannot be found.

The film has three intertwining elements. One is direct testimony. Numerous former prisoners recount the horrors, describing the tortures they experienced or witnessed and exhibiting their scars, both physical and psychological. High-ranking Croatian military officials completely deny the events at Lora Prison and assert that all the evidence is fabricated. A second element is the conventional, contemporaneous television news coverage of the progress of the trial and its outcome, reported without commentary. The third element, interspersed throughout the film, is an elder Croat man in ethnic costume. He plays a folk instrument and sings the many verses of a song of ethnic hatred for all Serbians and of the victimization of Croatia. In this context, *Lora Prison* conveys the incapacity of a local court to pursue or achieve justice.

Justice in Yugoslavia Undercut by International Actors

Peace with Justice? War Crimes and Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia, by **Paul R. Williams** and **Michael P. Scharf,** explores a failure to pursue justice at the international level. In the authors' assessment, international efforts to foster peace in the former Yugoslavia needlessly jettisoned justice. Too often, these authors argue, international negotiators made a false dichotomy between peace and justice and acted to ensure peace without a commitment to justice—thus undermining the stability of the peace achieved. Williams and Scharf charge international negotiators with readily accepting falsehoods and propaganda (about ancient hatreds or the equal responsibility of all sides) put forth by perpetrators of violence and including war criminals (such as Slobodan Milosovic) as essential and legitimate partners in peace negotiations.

Factum and **B92**

Lora

Croatia, 2004

Paul R. Williams and **Michael P. Scharf**

Peace with Justice? War Crimes and Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia

New York: Palgrave, 2002

Williams and Scharf further discuss the weaknesses of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, attributing them to its undercutting by international actors. They note, for example, the refusal of the United States and Britain to cooperate with the tribunal, specifically by withholding evidence obtained by wiretaps, electronic surveillance, and satellite photography that would have facilitated Milosevic's indictment for war crimes in Bosnia. Because Ambassador Richard Holbrooke held that "you can't make peace without President Milosevic," justice was obstructed for the sake of reaching an accommodationist peace.

International actors also undercut local efforts to achieve justice. The 1996 Rules of the Road Agreement, devised by Holbrooke and Milosevic following the Dayton Peace Accords, hampered domestic prosecutions by requiring local police officers to send all information and evidence concerning suspected war criminals to the tribunal prosecutor's office for review. Arrest of an individual could occur only when the prosecutor's office indicated in writing to the local authorities that sufficient evidence existed to proceed further, resulting in the immediate need to review more than sixteen hundred cases from Bosnia and Croatia—and an insuperable bottleneck at the prosecutor's office. Cases could not be pursued effectively, and local authorities resented being bypassed and shut out. Thus, according to Williams and Scharf, "the effect of the Rules of the Road Agreement was to entirely override the domestic legal structure in the area of war crimes" (119). At every level, these authors see missed opportunities to establish truth, prosecute justice, and begin a process of genuine reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia.

Transnational Courts: Prosecuting Pinochet

Naomi Roht-Arriaza

The Pinochet Effect: Transitional Justice in the Age of Human Rights

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005

Transnational courts—that is, national courts acting under universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against humanity occurring in other nations—are other possible fora for post-conflict justice. These are the subject of **Naomi Roht-Arriaza's** *The Pinochet Effect: Transitional Justice in the Age of Human Rights.* Each legal forum has its limitations. Local courts may lack either the capacity or the political protection to pursue trials of powerful violators. International tribunals are costly, relatively inaccessible, and rare, dependent on an unusual expression of international political will. Transnational court cases have raised concerns about the validity of universal jurisdiction, but they also offer significant opportunities to pursue justice, even where they have not resulted in final verdicts.

As Roht-Arriaza explains, the Chilean military had denied the report of the country's truth and reconciliation commission, never publicly acknowledging any institutional responsibility for the human rights violations and crimes committed during the Pinochet dictatorship. It granted itself amnesty and immunity from prosecution. In such a context, Chilean courts were unable or unwilling to act.

Then, in 1998, former dictator Pinochet traveled to Britain for medical care. There a Spanish judge served him with an indictment for violations of human rights of Spanish citizens who had resided in Chile. Roht-Arriaza recounts the twists and turns of this episode: the action and inaction of the governments of Britain, Spain, and Chile; the efforts of international networks of exiles and activists; the significance of the personalities and styles of some key actors; the mix of careful strategies and happenstance; the consequential tactical errors and victories; and the side effects of concurrent political battles.

Ultimately, Pinochet was deemed too ill to stand trial and was permitted to return to Chile. The case did not have a formal legal outcome, but, as Roht-Arriaza's title suggests, it had an immense impact—not only on the vulnerability of this particular dictator ("Within the space of less than a year, Pinochet had gone from untouchable to the most complained-against man in Chile, facing years of charges" [85]), but also on the Chilean courts, the concept of universal jurisdiction, and the understanding of transitional justice.

Roht-Arriaza identifies several positive aspects of transnational court cases. One is their notable accessibility to victims and survivors, to exile and diaspora communities, and to hu-

man rights activists and lawyers. With references to cases in Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, Chad, Congo, and Suriname, she demonstrates that these actors are not passive, waiting to be called by prosecutors driving the litigation. Rather, they are agents, mastering the court systems of other countries, offering to testify, gathering evidence, and building networks. The decentralized structure of such courts, in contrast to international tribunals, has facilitated such participation, breaking the isolation and silence of victims and fostering their empowerment. Thus, Roht-Arriaza suggests, transnational court cases can have a significant impact even when they do not result in final verdicts.

Similarly, the lack of final verdicts has not impeded transnational court cases from making substantial contributions to the essential task of establishing the truth.

"The criminal investigations," she writes,

> acted in part like declaratory judgments: a way to put the evidence together, to have it evaluated by an expert and publicly validated in judicial pronouncements. In that sense, they share with truth commissions, "truth trials," and other types of sanctions an emphasis on telling the story. They provide a nice illustration of the argument that it is fair process, at least as much as outcome, that determines victim satisfaction with a judicial process. (214)

A third significant aspect of transnational cases is that they encourage change in domestic courts. This transformation occurs via many routes. National courts may be shamed or politically embarrassed by transnational cases into taking action. Powerful individuals opposing or obstructing the activity of national courts may be politically weakened by being subject to trial elsewhere. National courts may also be able to build on evidence gathered, testimony collected, and arguments pursued in other courts. In many ways, transnational court cases can strengthen domestic courts. Thus, Roht-Arriaza affirms, far from competing with, superseding, or obviating domestic efforts, "the very success of the foreign investigations changes the domestic conditions that give rise to them and the attitudes of the actors involved" (195). In the Pinochet case, the Spanish court's "investigation affected Chile's political and judicial processes profoundly, speeding up and strengthening already existing tendencies and serving as a catalyst for change" (85).

Roht-Arriaza summarizes the transformative power of transnational cases in achieving justice:

> The power of these cases does not come solely, or even, I suggest, mainly, from the capacity to capture errant dictators and torturers. Nor does it come from the possible salutary deterrent effects, either on atrocities or, at the least, on post-atrocity travel. In any case, these effects are next to impossible to measure in more than anecdotal terms. Rather, the primary value lies in the ability of a transnational investigation to prompt investigations and prosecutions at home. Through focusing world attention, through forcing the government to defend its judiciary, through empowering and strengthening domestic human rights lawyers and activists, transnational prosecutions time and time again have jumpstarted stalled or non-existent processes of accountability. (223)

A further issue addressed by Roht-Arriaza is the timing of efforts to pursue justice and their many iterations. In a number of instances, governments have decreed the end of a transition, sealed cases, established amnesties, or issued final reports—only to have the unresolved or untouched issues rise again. Offering as examples the decades that intervened before some Nazi prosecutions, France's admissions of collaboration, Spain's apologies to Franco's victims, or U.S. payment of reparations to interned Japanese, Roht-Arriaza suggests that calls for justice may be periodic or cyclical, perhaps corresponding to generational change. It may be, she suggests, "that at least some aspects of justice prove easier to attain after time has distanced the actors, and the society, from the events in question" (221).

Ronald C. Slye

■ *"Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation: Reflections on the South African Amnesty Process" (in Truth Versus Justice)*

Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press

■ *"Justice and Amnesty" (in Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa)*

London: Zed Books, 2000

■ *"Human Rights Beneficiaries, and South Africa: Some Thoughts on the Utility of International Human Rights Law"*

Chicago Journal of International Law 2, no. 1 (Spring, 2000)

■ *"Amnesty" (in Truths Drawn in Jest)*

South Africa: David Philip, 2000

Time, Revelation, and Reconciliation in South Africa

Ronald C. Slye addresses the timing of efforts to achieve justice in post-conflict settings. Slye offers insights on the passage of time, the characteristics of amnesty, and the conditions for reconciliation in South Africa in four essays: "Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation: Reflections on the South African Amnesty Process" (in *Truth Versus Justice*), "Justice and Amnesty" (in *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*), "International Law, Human Rights Beneficiaries, and South Africa: Some Thoughts on the Utility of International Human Rights Law" (in *Chicago Journal of International Law),* and "Amnesty" (in *Truths Drawn in Jest*). In each essay, Slye explores the particular quality of the amnesty process in South Africa and its impact on the goals of truth and reconciliation. In his definition, truth is a society's shared understanding of its past, while reconciliation requires accountability and the creation of a human rights culture that values human dignity and the rule of law.

In many historical cases, amnesties have not contributed to truth. Rather, they have actually concealed facts, obstructed inquiry, and prevented accountability. The South African amnesty, however, was innovative because revelation was its main purpose. It had three requirements: that the applicant make full disclosure, that the act for which amnesty was sought be associated with a political objective, and that the act was not committed for personal gain or from personal malice.

The amnesty hearings in South Africa revealed an enormous amount of information. "There is no doubt," affirms Slye, "that the quantity, and probably also the quality, of the information elicited from the amnesty hearings was higher that what would have been elicited from criminal trials" ("Amnesty, Truth, and Reconciliation," 177). Indeed, a significant amount of the material in the *Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission* came from the amnesty hearings.

Nonetheless, the South African amnesty process is problematic. Of the three requirements for amnesty, that of a political objective has proved the trickiest. The privileging of specifically political crimes and political violence has weakened the moral legitimacy of the process, which is seen to disregard many other aspects of injustice. And in practice, evidence of a political objective has often been reduced to whether the perpetrator was following a superior's orders, thus reintroducing a defense discarded after World War II at Nuremburg, where judges affirmed that every individual is a moral being, responsible for his or her own actions. In fact, few political superiors in South Africa have taken responsibility for ordering atrocities. This has weakened the legal legitimacy of the process. Thus, although valuable, the South African amnesty still raises troubling questions about the relationship between amnesty, accountability, and justice. Reviewing South African political cartoons, Slye observes an undercurrent of uncertainty. Does amnesty provide justice or prevent it? Might amnesty be "part of a transformative process towards a new and better form of justice for a new and better South Africa?" ("Amnesty," 101).

That question can be answered only by the passage of time, a process Slye reflects on further. He considers, for example, myths of French resistance that took decades to be challenged and countered by recognition of the degree of French collaboration with the Nazis. On the one hand, recurring controversies over the extent of the complicity by Western nations with the Nazis suggests that the perpetuation of such myths, in attempting to achieve reconciliation at the cost of truth, is bound to fail. Myths do not put these matters to rest. On the other hand, Slye suggests, perhaps the myths were necessary for the creation of a stable and democratic postwar French government and were thus socially useful. Evaluating the two paths—myth creation versus immediate disclosure—is difficult. We cannot know what sort of society France would have become if the truth of Vichy France had been revealed and discussed in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Nor do we know the long-term effects of the delayed revelations.

These insights lead Slye to consider how best to combine the sometimes competing goals of confronting the past and moving forward. He concludes that "reconciliation requires that

the goals of both law and history be met: that some form of accountability (legal judgment) and understanding (historical judgment) be combined. An amnesty process like South Africa's is the closest thing we have yet seen to achieve the goals of both disciplines" ("Amnesty," 79).

The Process of Forgiveness

The challenges of reconciliation are engaged from a very broad perspective in *Forgiveness in International Politics: An Alternative Road to Peace* by **William Bole**, **Drew Christiansen,** and **Robert T. Hennemeyer.** On an explicitly sociopolitical, rather than interpersonal, plane, the authors offer a fourfold definition of forgiveness involving truth, empathy, forbearance, and a commitment to repair broken relationships. The four elements are not sequential, and forgiveness is a process, not an isolated act or event. The element of moral truth presupposes a judgment by the victim that an objectively moral wrong has been committed knowingly and freely against one's self or group by a responsible agent. Thus past evil is not denied, ignored, excused, or forgotten. Via empathy, the victim acknowledges the humanity of enemies, even in their commission of dehumanizing deeds. The perpetrator is not defined by his or her evil actions. The element of forbearance refuses revenge. Although punishment is possible, the victim reaches a decision not to be governed by revenge. Forgiveness is compatible with justice, but not with vengeance. The fourth element is the commitment to repair a fractured relationship and a willingness to coexist.

The authors emphasize that victims should not be pressured to forgive out of some sense of social utility. They also urge advocates of forgiveness to be mindful that "forgiveness in politics takes place in politics. The transactions may derive from transcendent values such as truth and empathy; but once transported to the political realm, they become subject to the uncertainties of that realm, the ambiguities of judgment and possibilities of miscalculation or unintended consequences" (82).

The authors offer lessons learned from their review of or involvement in many processes of reconciliation, including in Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. Among them are that shared historical truths should be established and memory should be managed so that it does not become mythohistory; corporate apologies must include acknowledgment, repentance, and restitution; eventual reconciliation requires an atmosphere of forgiveness at the societal as well as the interpersonal level; and a culture of forgiveness requires not only effective conflict resolution but also sociolegal mechanisms that facilitate respect for human rights, social peace, and equitable development.

The Ingredients of Reconciliation

Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific, edited by **Yoichi Funabash**i, takes up these themes and lessons in the Asian context. The volume explores seven case studies of the need for reconciliation within or between Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, East Timor, and Australia. Contributors to this volume are quite cognizant of the importance of time in achieving reconciliation and the lingering problems that arise from a failure to address historical issues. Disputes over history textbooks and public memorials continue to aggravate relations between and within nations in Asia, as does the lack of prosecution for crimes against humanity. Funabashi emphasizes that the challenge of facing history and achieving reconciliation is a task not only for newly democratizing countries, but for established democracies as well.

Reviewing the need for reconciliation in several cases in Asia, Funabashi arrives at several lessons. Reconciliation, in his view, defies any universal formula, but must be built on specific circumstances. It is also a long process—so it is best to begin as soon as possible. And it must be a joint effort of victims and perpetrators. Funabashi affirms that human rights violations are a universal human experience. Thus one needn't look for the causes of historical problems in the particular traits of another ethnic or national group; no one has a monopoly on either cruelty or suffering. And a realistic approach is better than an excess of idealism. As

Funabashi reflects, a view of human beings as "neither fundamentally evil nor fundamentally good but rather fundamentally weak is a productive one" (179). Political leadership is key, but individual initiative is also essential. Each person should take a fresh look at history, learn and teach the truth, and examine whether past injustices are sources of continuing political and economic injustice and disparities. If so, appropriate efforts should be made redress them and enhance dialogue and exchange. Cultivating democracy and encouraging multilateralism and regionalism will also facilitate reconciliation. Finally, Funabashi affirms, citizens' behavior should project the nation they hope to build. "The manner in which a nation faces up to history reflects what kind of country it wants to be and how its people . . . want to be remembered by future generations" (183).

While Funabashi and the other contributors to this volume discuss reconciliation at the level of international relations, they also attend to the personal pain of violation and the healing experience of forgiveness. Funabashi, for example, ultimately describes reconciliation as requiring "the kind of grace that in individuals arises at the intersection of heartfelt remorse and heartfelt forgiveness" (183).

Victims of Violence and Denial in Northern Ireland

Intimate experiences of violence and trauma are the subject of *Personal Accounts from Northern Ireland's Troubles: Public Conflict, Private Loss*, edited by **Marie Smyth** and **Marie-Therese Fay.** This collection of fourteen oral histories includes survivors, family members, witnesses, police, and paramilitary members who have been deeply and directly affected by the violence in Northern Ireland—whether the Catholic-Protestant conflict, disputes within different factions, or local groups imposing order and punishments on their own people. Victims of shootings and bombings frequently remark on the inadequacy of the posttrauma treatment they received, which generally consisted of being sedated and left alone. They also discuss the continued sense of threat from either a generalized sense of insecurity and paranoia or the knowledge that the known perpetrators remain in the community. And many feel themselves to be neglected, ignored, or forgotten. Reflecting on the process of collecting these oral histories, the editors note that the individuals "barely needed our questions, they only required our attention" (3). In their conclusion, Smyth and Fay express their anger over the "denial and disassociation" with which many in Northern Ireland react to the troubles.

Dilemmas of Reconciliation in South Africa and Rwanda

Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela also grapples with the chasm between personal experience and general societal attitudes, particularly in confronting evil directly or finding the means to reconcile. As a psychologist who grew up in a black township and later served on South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Gobodo-Madikizela explores the complex dynamics of post-conflict reconciliation. In *A Human Being Died That Night: A South African Story of Forgiveness*, she reflects on her own reactions in interviewing Eugene de Kock. Known as "Prime Evil," de Kock was the commanding officer of state-sanctioned death squads under the apartheid regime. He is currently serving a 212-year sentence for crimes against humanity. Gobodo-Madikizela conducted several interviews with de Kock in Pretoria's maximum security prison and uses the experience to explore the nature of evil, remorse, and empathy, as well as the proposition that individuals and societies could transcend hate and former enemies could live as neighbors.

About this individual perpetrator, she wonders, "Was evil intrinsic to de Kock, and forgiveness therefore wasted on him?" (15). This leads her to ask, "Does knowing that you are wrong and persisting in it reveal a greater depth of moral decadence (or psychic damage) than having the kind of malfunctioning ethical compass that makes you unable even to realize *that* you are wrong? Which kind of individual is the more redeemable?" (67).

The encounter with de Kock forces Gobodo-Madikizela to question herself. At one point, de Kock begins to exhibit remorse: trembling and weeping, in a breaking voice he expresses the wish to bring back the people he has murdered. "Relating to him in the only way one does in such human circumstances," she writes, "I touched his shaking hand, surprising myself" (32). She then immediately recoils and finds herself deeply disturbed and confused. "I felt guilt for having expressed even momentary sympathy and wondered if my heart had actually crossed the moral line from compassion, which allows one to maintain a measure of distance, to actually identifying with de Kock" (32).

Such experiences inform Gobodo-Madikizela's analysis of the psychological dilemmas faced by victims. She writes of powerlessness as "the affliction of the traumatized." Thus, some victims, unused to being able to claim their rights, may be unable to express their rage at the perpetrator even when the perpetrator no longer poses a danger. Yet the act of forgiveness may be empowering. Gobodo-Madikizela observes:

Although forgiveness is often regarded as an expression of weakness, the decision to forgive can paradoxically elevate a victim to a position of strength as the one who holds the key to the perpetrator's wish. For just at the moment when the perpetrator begins to show remorse, to seek some way to ask forgiveness, the victim becomes the gatekeeper to what the outcast desires—readmission into the human community. And the victim retains that privileged status as long as he or she stays the moral course, refusing to sink to the level of the evil that was done to her or to him. (117)

Her analysis continues with careful attention to the concept of dialogue between victim and perpetrator as a step toward reconstituting society. Dialogue, she writes,

humanizes the dehumanized and confronts perpetrators with their inhumanity. Through dialogue, victims as well as the greater society come to recognize perpetrators as human beings who failed morally, whether through coercion, the perverted convictions of a warped mind, or fear. Far from relieving the pressure on them, recognizing the most serious criminals as human intensifies it, because society is thereby able to hold them to greater moral accountability. Indeed, demonizing as monsters those who commit evil lets them off too easily. (117)

A sustained, engaged dialogue can transform the perpetrator from the demonic to the forgiven by creating the conditions for the perpetrator to confront the truth "that all along, he knew that he was human and knew right from wrong. The act of humanizing is therefore at once both punishment and rehabilitation" (120). And a perpetrator's remorse can revalidate a victim's pain, "in a sense, giving his or her humanity back" (128). Often the victim then takes the further step of forgiveness, not out of altruism or commitment to higher principles but as part of the process of becoming rehumanized. The victim needs to forgive, she writes,

in order to complete himself or herself and to wrest away from the perpetrator the fiat power to destroy or to spare. It is part of the power of reclaiming self-efficacy. Reciprocating with empathy and forgiveness in the face of a perpetrator's remorse restores to many victims the sense that they are once again capable of effecting a profound difference in the moral community. . . . Far from being an unnerving proposition and a burdensome moral sacrifice, then, compassion for many is deeply therapeutic and restorative. (128–29)

But empathy and forgiveness are difficult. Gobodo-Madikizela attests that people distance themselves through anger from those who have harmed them because of the fear that "if we engage them as real people, we will be compromising our moral stance and lowering the

entry requirements into the human community" (120). This, she realizes, is the source of her own intense discomfort with the empathy she felt for de Kock at the moment she reached for his hand. She also observes the discomfort of many of her friends and colleagues when she discusses her prison conversations. Many are inclined to surmise that she is personally fascinated by de Kock, or even romantically attracted to him. These are more comfortable, acceptable conclusions than the prospect of compassion toward such an evil person. They make it possible for Gobodo-Madikizela's listeners to continue to distance and insulate themselves. "Confronting on a human level with a monster," she acknowledges, is "a profoundly frightening prospect, for ultimately, it forces us to confront the potential for evil within ourselves" (123).

As imperative as the process of forgiveness is for victims and perpetrators alike, it is not all there is to societal reconciliation. "The question," according to Gobodo-Madikizela, "is no longer whether victims can forgive 'evildoers' but whether we—our symbols, language, and politics, our legal, media, and academic institutions—are creating conditions that encourage alternatives to revenge" (118). Further, "true social transformation—and healing of victims—will come about only if the issues of economic justice and the myriad problems that postapartheid South Africa faces are addressed" (126).

Two films by **Anne Aghion** approach the tentative, complex, and unfinished dynamics of reconciliation in Rwanda. They examine the *gacaca* process, citizen-based tribunals established because the formal judicial system in Rwanda had no capacity to adjudicate more than 100,000 imprisoned for their role in the 1994 genocide. Under the gacaca system, leaders of the genocide and those who have committed sexual crimes are held for trials, but other prisoners, numbering in the tens of thousands, who have confessed their guilt are released to their communities to reconcile and rebuild.

Aghion's first film, *Gacaca, Living Together Again in Rwanda?* gathers testimony from survivors and prisoners from the hillside district of Ntongwe in anticipation of gacaca. The second film, *In Rwanda We Say . . . the Family That Does Not Speak Dies*, resumes the story as prisoners are released. Returning to the same hillside hamlet, the film follows the impact of the prisoners' reintegration on this community. Neither film attempts to provide analysis or formal interpretation; rather the footage and the testimony speak for themselves.

Both films include many expressions of survivors' sense of powerlessness and rage. Many scoff at the impunity enabled by the system: "You kill, confess, get three years, come out and kill again." They also express a sense of futility about their own role in gacaca: "I didn't have him imprisoned, nor did I have him released," says one villager. Another asks, "You think a poor farmer has any say?" Several express a sense of insecurity: If they denounce someone, they fear they will be subject to baseless denunciations. And many are frustrated by the process of publicly presenting prisoners, feeling "it was impossible to speak" at the public meetings.

Many prisoners, including those who have confessed, express denial or a lack of responsibility. One says, "I was told to confess, to not make waves." Another hedges, "I ask forgiveness for the crimes I was forced to commit. I have a clear conscience." Accused of killing a woman's husband and stealing her two cows, a prisoner immediately counters: "I just picked up a stray. I paid for it." Some prisoners assert a strange equivalence with their own predicament: "If people were killed without reason, you can see that people could be imprisoned without reason." Others discount the accusations, saying that heavy-hearted survivors charge anyone who is available: "We were hauled off for no reason, due to their pain."

The gacaca system appears overly bureaucratized. Officials and scribes record details in triplicate, asking for exact addresses and dates and lists of implements used as weapons. Rarely do the officials look the accused in the eyes in such sessions. The focus appears to be on the bureaucratic act of record keeping, rather than the moral act of confession. In a public session, when the prisoners are presented to the community one at a time, the justice official urges the village to accept a prisoner, saying: "He's had the courage to confess. . . . He'll return here and he'll help rebuild Rwanda." The official turns to the prisoner, saying, "You are very brave." The camera then catches the face of a survivor in the crowd who has recounted the murder of his

entire family by this man and his accomplices. As the official praises the bravery of the confessed killer, the survivor turns and looks away.

Aghion's films show innumerable expressions of profound pain and despair. Having witnessed the murder of his father, one youth speaks of feeling that his brain is affected. He has dreamt of the murder ever since. A woman tells how the perpetrators pulled her child off her back to beat the child to death. She knows the killers have returned to her community. "Let them come again," she says. "Let them kill me. Who would stop them? There's no one left. Let them kill me. I'm already dead."

Throughout the films, children are a striking presence. They run in the grass, dance in the rain, play hopscotch, or wrestle one another, and they are within hearing of all that is expressed. One leans against the knee of an adult as he recounts killing a child. Another is by the side of the woman as she describes her baby being pulled off her back. In light of what many grantees have had to say about the passage of time, one wonders how these children will handle the next round of justice and reconciliation.

After his release and return to the hillside village, the prisoner the film follows most closely offers a very different perspective on his presence from that of the survivors in the village. He explains that if he were to go to the homes of his accusers, they would think he was there to commit further wrongs. But if he just meets them on the path, at the bar, from time to time in a simple chat, then this sense will gradually vanish. On the other hand, his neighbors whose family members the released prisoner has killed express the opposite sentiment. "The worst part," one says, "is that we meet every day, on the path, at the well." Another observes: "They said they would come to ask forgiveness, but none has come to darken my door. My brother's killer is a neighbor. He has never come."

There are many enigmatic moments in these films. They preserve a contemporary record of the ongoing gacaca and the larger process of reconciliation in Rwanda. Aghion is at work on a third film.

Faith in Conflict and Peace

The relationship between religion and conflict is marked by dichotomies. Religious faith can, for instance, enflame sectarian hatreds and perpetuate cycles of violence, but it can also inspire people to turn away from violence, transcend conflict, and envision a peaceful future. In a similarly dualistic fashion, faith can inform grand perspectives on war and peace, but it can also provide a framework for very practical methods of peacebuilding in very specific cases.

These and other dichotomies feature prominently in the work of grantees as they explore some of the many ways that religious faith frames, obstructs, inspires, and enables peace. Some grantees take a very broad view, examining the complex interaction between war, peace, and religious perspectives over the course of millennia, in numerous countries, and within several religious traditions. Others focus on that interaction within a single country, yet still discover—as in the case of Guatemala—enormous diversity that defies simple generalizations about the relationship between politics and faith. Understandably, Islam attracts significant attention, both because of the association between its radical wing and contemporary terrorism and because of its rich trove of peacebuilding practices and potential. Other forms of peacebuilding also interest grantees, notably the "appreciative inquiry" method, which has been fruitfully employed in a wide variety of settings.

A Broad View

In *A History of Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim Perspectives on War and Peace*, **William J. Frost** provides a comprehensive survey of views on war and peace from several major religious traditions. The first of two volumes, *The Bible to 1914*, surveys ancient history through World War I; the second volume, *A Century of Wars*, brings the study to the present. In each volume, Frost considers the influence of organized religion on war and peace, attending to theological, institutional, and social manifestations. He searches for the ways that people's faith has caused or prevented wars, shortened the duration of wars, influenced their conduct, interpreted their meaning or significance, and shaped the subsequent peace.

Frost readily acknowledges that the uses of faith are rarely determined by a face-value acceptance of any theological point. "Those who wish to see their action as ethical," he writes, "can easily find a text or interpretation to suit their purpose—whether their goal is saintliness, worldly power, absolution from guilt, or a combination of motives difficult to unpack." In the case of Christianity, for instance, Frost argues that "political and religious authorities have often assured their followers that there is a simple Christian attitude to war and peace: believe and do what we tell you is right" (74). Similarly, in discussing the political uses of Buddhism and Buddhist uses of politics, he observes that "monks who accommodated the teaching of the Buddha to the needs of monarchy facilitated the survival and spread of Buddhism. In return kings who still made war to obtain power would support religious institutions, publicly accept the teachings, and use them to justify their reign, pacify the population, and promote morality" (190).

Another recurring theme of Frost's two-volume study is the primacy for any religion of spiritual rather than political peace. Spiritual peace concerns a relationship with an ultimate reality, however the divine is manifested within different faith traditions. No political strategy can yield such peace. Thus, Frost writes, "to ask that the church, synagogue, ashram, or mosque prevent war is to misunderstand how they function in society. Getting involved in a political debate before, during, or after a war would be to divert attention from the eternal wisdom needed by all" (781). He concludes, "What religions alone cannot now do and could not do in the past is prevent or stop a war, because faith when politicized tends to lose the ability to transcend culture" (785).

William J. Frost

A History of Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim Perspectives on War and Peace

Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004

God's Terrorists

Jessica Stern is also concerned with the relationship between faith and conflict, narrowing the focus to religiously inspired terrorists. In *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, she studies leaders and organizations of holy warriors. Stern identifies several types of organizations. In leaderless resistance networks, prominent figures inspire operatives to act on their own. By contrast, in commander/cadre organizations, leaders may provide orders, training, housing, salaries, payments to martyrs' families, and punishment for disobedience. The different types of organization exhibit comparative advantages. Leaderless networks are more resilient, while commander/cadre organizations are capable of mass attacks. Stern also discusses hybrid organizations that combine various features of the leaderless and commander/cadre models. She observes that "the requirements for running terrorist organizations are similar to those of running a firm or an NGO [non-governmental organization]. Today's multinational terrorist leader is an entrepreneur who brings together mission, money, and market share. He hires skilled and unskilled labor and often pays competitive rates" (142).

Although Stern encounters violent militants from several religious traditions, in her view Muslims are more susceptible to becoming terrorists. "The notion that a new world order is responsible for all of societies' ills attracts adherents all over the globe and in every religion," she writes, ". . . but it has spread to large numbers only in Muslim-majority states" (286).

Pointing to Islamist victories in elections in Algerian and Turkey, Stern suggests that promoting democracy is not necessarily the best way to counter Islamic extremism. She has several other proposals for a practical U.S. response. Crushing headquarters and training camps is ineffective, she argues, because sleeper cells are already widespread. Furthermore, violent repression spawns more recruits. U.S. insistence on the death penalty creates problems with most allies. Stern thus advocates covert action and psychological warfare, with greater emphasis on human intelligence and local languages. She notes that the United States "is not entirely averse to allowing other governments to use torture. Since September 11, the U.S. government has been discretely transporting terrorism suspects to countries that are known to torture" (291). Such a policy, Stern argues, should be opposed "not only for moral reasons, but for pragmatic ones as well" (291). Stern further suggests that the United States purchase the expertise of terrorist organizations that go out of business, develop educational alternatives to Islamic religious schools, improve its public relations campaigns, improve security at nuclear sites, and upgrade the global system for monitoring disease, since attacks with biological weapons could be indistinguishable from natural outbreaks of disease. She concludes: "I am not arguing in favor of cosmopolitanism, but rather, a smarter realpolitik approach. Even if we take no interest in the well-being of other states' citizens, our long-term national security interests demand that we carefully consider how our policies impact terrorists' recruitment drives" (295).

Islam and Peacebuilding

Mohammed Abu-Nimer gives extensive attention to the peacebuilding potential of Islam. In *Non-Violence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice,* he begins by noting a Western preconception that Islamic religion and culture are inimical to peace. As one manifestation, Abu-Nimer observes that the Library of Congress lists five entries under the category "Islam and nonviolence," while the entries under "Islam and violence" go on for pages. This preconception, Abu-Nimer writes, is itself "an impediment to discussing and promoting nonviolence and peace building in Islamic nations" (2). Abu-Nimer's aim is to move beyond a stale debate about whether Islam is or is not inherently inimical to peace and explore instead the myriad nonviolent values and methods found within Islam. He begins with a theoretical framework and then considers some historical cases.

At the level of values and principles, Abu-Nimer finds much in Islam to support the application of nonviolent and peacebuilding strategies. These include the primacy of justice and the imperative to strive for peace through justice. Forgiveness is also a prized virtue in Islam,

as are patience, solidarity, universality, and inclusiveness. An examination of Islamic texts and traditions yields the existence of, and even emphasis on, values that would ground the pursuit of peace.

Turning to historical cases, Abu-Nimer notes first the continuing practice of traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution in many Arab-Muslim communities. These mechanisms include a role for respected local interveners and accepted methods for indicating that revenge will not be pursued, as well as recognized procedures for investigation, mediation, and compensation. Public rituals, including the reading of Qur'anic verses, mark the culmination of conflict resolution.

Abu-Nimer next gives his attention to recent efforts to conduct peacebuilding training workshops in Muslim settings. He is cognizant of many obstacles, both at what he terms the macrolevel of social and political structures and at the microlevel of personally held myths. At the macrolevel, Abu-Nimer notes the political stagnation of many Muslim countries, their lack of imaginative and creative political leadership, dependence on a mediocre technocracy, and valuation of loyalty over competence. All these factors can impede social and political progress. General economic impoverishment is also an obstacle to the application of peacebuilding strategies, as people must devote all their efforts simply to physical survival.

A patriarchal social structure is another major stumbling block to fostering peacebuilding skills. "Islamic social systems are based on male dominance in all social and political spheres," he writes (116). Thus women's contribution to social and political movements is simply lost, and peacebuilding strategies—which are founded on principles of equality, freedom, and respect for all—are sabotaged. "In many male-dominated peace-building training workshops," Abu-Nimer observes, "the issues of gender relations and patriarchal system have been defined as taboos that are often dismissed with ironic and cynical remarks" (116).

Obedience to and respect for hierarchy are further obstacles to peacebuilding in many Islamic settings. Hierarchical relationships have sometimes made it impossible to use role playing and simulations in peacebuilding workshops. Participants have also expressed frustration as they attempt to execute action plans in the postworkshop phase but must first gain the approval of managers, officers, teachers, or husbands.

At the microlevel Abu-Nimer identifies many myths that obstruct the adoption of nonviolent and peacebuilding strategies among Muslim activists. Many workshop participants, for example, need to be reassured about the nature of peace—particularly that it will include justice, freedom, and equality and not simply be the absence of violence without justice. They are concerned that strategies of peacebuilding will not produce justice. Many either doubt that nonviolence can be an effective method of peacebuilding or see it as a Western Christian philosophy rather than something that is also grounded in Islam.

In his final case, Abu-Nimer considers the application of nonviolence within the first Intifada, 1987–92. Acknowledging that this was not an entirely nonviolent movement, Abu-Nimer is nonetheless impressed by the level of restraint and the degree of steadfastness shown by Palestinians in the face of repression. Among the organized, nonviolent strategies used during the Intifada, Abu-Nimer notes economic, political, and social noncooperation, symbolic expressions (such as flags, colors, and graffiti) of independence and resistance, and the development of alternative institutions through popular committees. In his view Islamic values of unity, solidarity, justice, forgiveness, and steadfastness reinforced the use of nonviolent strategies in the Intifada.

In conclusion, Abu-Nimer offers six guidelines for fostering peacebuilding skills in Muslim communities. First, recognize that Islam encompasses values and norms that promote peacebuilding. Second, appreciate and utilize the indigenous peacebuilding practices and values in Muslim communities rather than importing Western models. Third, understand that peacebuilding programs will "eventually run up against certain problematic core values in the sociocultural structures of many Muslim communities (especially in the Arab Muslim context), such as hierarchy, authoritarianism, patriarchy, and so on," (185) and overcome such obstacles by harnessing local forces for change. Fourth, design and implement projects in accordance with

values derived from a specific context. Fifth, include local participants in planning and implementation, beyond mere tokenism. And sixth, see long-term conflict resolution and sustainable socioeconomic development as inseparable.

An Innovative Path to Peacebuilding

Mohammed Abu-Nimer is the coeditor of another book on peacebuilding, *Positive Approaches to Peacebuilding: A Resource for Innovators.* Along with fellow editors **Cynthia Sampson, Claudia Liebler,** and **Diana Whitney, Abu-Nimer** explores the practice of "positive approaches" to building peace. Although these practices originated chiefly within the field of organizational development, specifically for business management and leadership, they have been adopted and employed by many religiously inspired peacebuilders. Contributors to this volume focus particularly on the method of "appreciative inquiry" and offer the reflections and experiences of Mennonite, Catholic, Evangelical, Muslim, and other faith-based peacebuilders around the world.

Many ways of confronting a difficult situation begin by trying to identify and analyze the problem. The technique of a problem tree asks stakeholders to name the problem they face, then specify the conditions that cause this problem, determine what causes these conditions, and identify the root causes of the problem. The method of appreciative inquiry, by contrast, proposes a possibility tree that asks stakeholders what dreams they have, how they can make those dreams happen, and what they will do to enact and sustain the dreams.

The four recognized elements of appreciative inquiry are discovery, dream, design, and destiny. Discovery involves appreciating and valuing the best of what is. This is not necessarily "what is good" but rather "what gives life." The underlying notion is that in all human systems some things work well (or once did), and these can be identified, analyzed, and built on. The dream phase consists of envisioning what might be and offering bold statements about ideal possibilities. Design involves dialoguing about what should be, especially in terms of principles and priorities. Destiny consists of generating what will be by taking and sustaining action.

Appreciative Inquiry rests on several premises. One is that reality is cocreated or constructed through people's language, thoughts, images, and beliefs about reality. The act of asking questions and the content of those questions are very influential. Questions themselves are seen as an act of intervention, and the type of questions asked determines the type of answers produced. Appreciative inquiry also holds that people manifest what they focus on and grow toward what they ask questions about. Appreciative inquiry is a holistic and meaning-making undertaking. It values storytelling as a means to convey holistic wisdom.

At times, its advocates acknowledge, appreciative inquiry may be inappropriate on its own or may need to be adapted to the local context. In posttraumatic settings there may be an imperative need to grieve. In situations of deeply held resentments, failing to name these resentments may leave them repressed. And in war zones, contributors **Paula Green** and **Tamra Pearson d'Estrée** observe in "The Positive Power of Voice in Peacebuilding,"

> starting with "appreciation" may seem naïve, silencing, and violating to the aggrieved parties. If we encourage premature appreciation, it may appear as if we as facilitators are collaborating with the lies, serving as partners in the denial of injury. . . . [T]o focus on "good news" in such contexts allows the stronger group to avoid hard questions of responsibility and yet feel as if they have contributed to making peace purely through their participation. (316)

Yet its advocates see great value in appreciative inquiry, even for "addressing structural and direct violence, as long as it remains dynamic and adaptive to particular contexts" (188). One crucial life-giving quality they identify in Appreciative Inquiry is simply the experience of narrative, or finding the voice to tell the lived story. "Voice," according to Green and d'Estrée, "validates identity, shifts power, and restores one's humanness. It is not just the voice of the speaker as victim that is critical to successful dialogue, but the recognition, acknowledgement,

and validation of that victimhood by the listener, especially when the listener is part of the perpetrating community" (317). Besides, its advocates argue, in almost all settings appreciative inquiry can be adapted to or accompanied by other approaches. And the alternative of a straight problem-solving approach also has its shortcomings, because it may reinforce hierarchy, erode community, and instill a sense of self-enfeeblement.

Contributors reflect on their experiences introducing appreciative inquiry to a variety of groups, including youth gangs in El Salvador, indigenous communities in northeastern India, evangelical and gay groups in the United States, participants in Muslim-Serb dialogue in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and local communities in postgenocidal Rwanda. In a concluding note, the editors urge those who would make use of appreciative inquiry not to get caught up in it as a means, but rather to keep the emphasis on the end goal of peace: "In some circumstances the most effective Appreciative Inquiry work can be done without calling it a methodology and giving it a name. This is not for the purpose of deceiving, but to preserve the focus of the process on meeting the interests and needs of the group and not on a preoccupation with the technology for getting there" (391).

Guatemala's Religious Mosaic

Appreciative Inquiry's concern to discover and acknowledge "voice" is shared by the makers of the film *Precarious Peace: God and Guatemala* by the **Catticus Corporation** and the **Gr and GR Projects.** This documentary presents some of the many voices of religiously active people in Guatemala—a country with five-hundred-year "culture of violence." Out of fear that the impoverished and racially excluded indigenous Mayan population might rise up, Guatemala's rulers have always followed the dictum, "be assimilated or eliminated." Government repression and massacres of the Mayans in the second half of the twentieth century prompted the formation of a guerrilla movement, which in turn sparked further government repression, with the Mayan population often victimized by both government forces and guerrillas.

Although the indigenous Mayan population has been the primary victim of that violence, no faith group—and Guatemala has many, including some three-hundred different Protestant denominations—has been untouched by the violence. The film conveys the remarkable plurality of religious perspective and organization in Guatemala and displays some of the diverse views that coexist despite their incompatibility. In the film progressive Catholics decry the "structural violence" of the situation in Guatemala and lament that Protestants are not more political. (Members of the Catholic hierarchy were involved in Guatemala's truth commission, while Lutherans organized talks between the government and guerillas in Oslo, leading to the 1996 Peace Accords.) Mennonites speak of creating an alternative space for peace. Pentecostal congregations participate in an exuberant worship service that they assert resonates with Mayan spiritual expression. Its leader criticizes the Catholic Church for engaging only in political analysis, while he feels his own church is more relevantly present in people's lives, through not only worship services but also schools and hospitals. At a school run by a sect called Primitive Methodists, no politics is permitted, according to the school's director. Although its students are Mayan, the curriculum has no indigenous content. Students learn to take dictation in secretarial classes, and the director explains, "We don't teach religion; we teach about the Lord Jesus Christ." The evangelical El Shaddai congregation pursues a strategy of "health and wealth." Its prosperous leader affirms that for those who follow the path of God, economic development will result, while those who do not follow the path are cursed. A Mayan spiritual guide conducts a fire ceremony, attended by a Presbyterian, that celebrates the Mayan vision of the cosmos while also offering a blessing of this film and a prayer for peace.

The film does not attempt to generalize about religion in Guatemala but rather conveys some of the complexity of the country's religious plurality. At the close of the film an individual involved in religious dialogue laments that too often people come from the United States "wanting to *do* something"—build roads, construct houses, labor in fields. He wishes they were willing to come just to listen and learn.

Africa

Grantees examine Africa from many different vantage points. Some undertake vast comparisons, looking at the parallels in state failure across Africa and the former Soviet Union. Others look in depth at particular conflicts within communities in Nigeria or Congo. Many grantees describe efforts to mediate or manage conflict. These range from international collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union to local initiatives, such as disputes over taxi routes in Cape Town. Others look at aspects of building the rule of law, from the experiences of a judge in Tanzania to the efforts of women to gain legal access to land in Rwanda.

Fragile States and a Fragile Peace

In *Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective*, edited by **Mark R. Beissinger** and **Crawford Young,** contributors explore similarities between two seemingly very different regions and discover that both are suffering from the same grievous condition: not just a crisis in democratic governance or market economies, but a protracted crisis of the capacity of states to fulfill the functions expected of them. Acknowledging the vast differences between Africa and the post-Soviet states, contributors analyze patterns of dysfunctionality in both regions—particularly the disintegration of state authority, encompassing criminalization, corruption, ineffectual regulation, and the inability to provide basic services. This massive deterioration of state capacity means that the goal of reform must shift. "Liberalization, political or economic, is emptied of its content if its object, the state, lacks minimal capacity," note Beissinger and Young in their conclusion (483).

In contrast to Beissinger and Young's grim diagnosis, **Ken Menkhaus** sees reason for Africans to be optimistic, albeit guardedly. In "A 'Sudden Outbreak of Tranquility': Assessing the New Peace in Africa," Menkhaus observes a fragile peace emerging since 2002, where many had expected renewed violence. His assessment leads him to anticipate a future that is "sobering, but not bleak" (74).

While many observers try to explain why Africa's wars persist, Menkhaus wonders why some appear to be ending. He offers three possibilities. First, the peaceful period is merely a lull before conflicts reignite. Second, the interests of the many who benefit from violent conflict (war merchants trafficking in materiel, soldiers looting civilians, warlords seizing humanitarian aid, businesses offering services to international aid organizations) are changing. To the degree that they perceive that the rule of law would protect their plundered wealth, they might shift, in effect, from being warlords to being landlords. A third possibility is that warlords are altering tactics in response to changed circumstances (including international pressure to hold war criminals accountable and enforce arms embargoes), creating an appearance of peace and governance while working to perpetuate the underlying conditions of lawlessness from which they benefit.

Menkhaus is inclined to foresee continuing peace in Africa but is concerned that this "new peace" may indeed be merely a "new purgatory"—that is, "peace without reconciliation, governments of national unity that are neither unified nor provide governance, and communal violence and armed criminality that replace open warfare but have comparable effects on human security" (88).

As Menkhaus narrows his focus to Somalia, he dissects the crisis without finding much basis for optimism. In "Protracted State Collapse in Somalia: A Rediagnosis," Menkhaus asks why all efforts to revive a central government in Somalia failed. He acknowledges the relevance of many factors, including the incompetence of external mediators, the greed and stubbornness of Somali leaders, public fear of the reemergence of a predatory central state, and the centrifu-

gal tendencies of clan structure. Menkhaus further suggests that the general concept of state failure be disaggregated into three phenomena: protracted collapse of central government, protracted armed conflict, and lawlessness.

Such disaggregation makes it easier to see whose interests are being served by Somalia's state failure and whether that failure is in fact the desired outcome for some constituencies. Among the groups that might want to perpetuate the power vacuum are those who feel they have not gained enough in the conflict and are therefore unwilling to permit a peace process to progress; others who benefit from a continued situation of lawlessness and conflict (including war criminals and merchants of war); and a third group whose members could potentially benefit from peace and government but are unwilling to relinquish the modus vivendi they have constructed and accept the high level of uncertainty involved in the reestablishment of the state. Because these different constituencies exercise veto power over peace processes, Somalia's crisis is protracted.

Pierre Englebert and **James Ron** also explore the causes of enduring conflict in "Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville's Ambivalent Resource Curse." Congo-Brazzaville's substantial petroleum resources have fueled its civil war, but domestic politics have shaped the trajectory of war and peace. When the political system was more stable (as in the 1980s), civil war did not occur. The process of democratization in the early 1990s engendered some instability, permitting civil war to break out. Comparing this with other cases of natural resource wealth and political stability in Africa, the authors conclude, "No matter how tempting natural resources might be and how they may exacerbate ongoing instability and armed conflict, they are unlikely to stimulate civil war on their own unless the political context is already unstable" (76).

Gérard Prunier examines conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In "Congo-Kinshasa: The War Nobody Stopped," he observes the indifference of the international community and its inclination to furnish humanitarian aid but avoid any further involvement. In "The Catholic Church and the Kivu Conflict," Prunier focuses on the DRC provinces of North and South Kiva. Here the role of the Catholic Church is complicated by the fact that its clerics have come to share the ethnic and political prejudices of the communities they serve.

The Recurring Great Lakes Crisis: Identity, Violence, and Power, edited by **Jean-Pierre Chrétien** with **Richard Banégas,** is a collection of essays dealing with many aspects of conflict in Africa's Great Lakes region, particularly issues of identity, moral violence, collective memory, and victimhood. The people of the region are being asked to undertake immense tasks of reconciliation and rebuilding in record time. Democracy in these settings, the authors argue, should acknowledge the value of preexisting pluralism and the importance of consensus and not be equated with electoral majority rule.

African Solutions to African Challenges

African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS, by **Victoria Holt** with **Moira Shanahan**, reviews efforts to improve cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as they engage in conflict intervention in Africa. Collaboration, while a desired goal, has not been easy: "Fundamentally, the UN is not designed to support other organizations' peace operations" (5). Meanwhile "ECOWAS does not easily coordinate offers of outside assistance, since it has lacked a central office that can report on its needs, coordinate offers of support and manage inquiries" (55). A new approach is needed, especially as the demand for peacekeeping missions in Africa has grown. Synergies in funding, planning, logistics, and training could lead to more effective complementarity between the different organizations.

Daniel Lieberfeld examines the process of getting to negotiations in South Africa in five articles and chapters: "Contributions of a Semi-Official Prenegotiation Initiative in South Africa: Afrikaner-ANC Meeting in England, 1987–90," "Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984–1990," "Getting to the

Negotiating Table in South Africa: Domestic and International Dynamics," "Nelson Mandela: Partisan and Peacemaker," and "Peace Profile: Nelson Mandela." He finds that preliminary initiatives substantively supported official negotiations. They enabled participants to gain information about their counterparts, test responses to specific proposals, allay mistrust, and enhance the sense that a negotiated resolution was possible. Track-two talks also built popular acceptance of the prospect of negotiations, accustoming each side's constituents to the idea of talks with the enemy.

Intervention in the Niger Delta has occurred at many levels. *Conflict and Stability in the Niger Delta: The Warri Case*, by **T. A. Imobighe, Celestine O. Bassey,** and **Judith Burdin Asuni,** reports on efforts to mediate ethnic conflict in the oil-rich Warri area of Nigeria through a series of workshops and training sessions for a variety of constituents: youth, community leaders, educators, and local government officials. The workshops were preceded by research into the conflict and were followed by conciliation meetings. The authors report that the initiative made progress in facilitating communication, allaying fear, and ending misperceptions among the different ethnic groups competing for control of Warri.

In Cape Town, South Africa, disputes over control of routes by two rival transport associations were escalating toward violence in the early 1990s. The film *Taxi War* recounts the successful mediation efforts conducted by **Africa's Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes** (ACCORD). Its approach emphasizes inclusiveness, openness, and reconciliation by building relationships. ACCORD sees its mediation of the taxi dispute as an example of "African solutions to African challenges."

Building the Rule of Law

Establishing an independent and effective judiciary has many dimensions in Africa. **Jennifer A. Widner** provides an account of the development of Tanzania's judicial institutions through the life story of Francis Nyalali, who served as the country's chief justice from 1976 to 1999. In *Building the Rule of Law: Francis Nyalali and the Road to Judicial Independence in Africa*, Widner identifies challenges faced by the judiciary, including a lack of resources and training and a heritage of deep legal pluralism characterized by the coexistence of customary and religious law, as well as state and international law. Nyalali's long tenure included presiding over the transition to multiparty democracy and Tanzania's first multiparty election in 1995. In telling his personal story, Widner examines many aspects of the establishment of an independent judiciary.

Matters of law are as significant at the personal and local level as at the institutional and national level. **Laurel L. Rose** investigates the strategies of women seeking to gain a legal right to land in "Women's Land Access in Post-Conflict Rwanda: Bridging the Gap between Customary Land Law and Pending Land Legislation." Although women produce 70 percent of the country's agricultural output, many do not have adequate access to land. Rose finds that women are caught between different legal systems—customary local systems and incomplete, formal national systems—and they therefore try to select the best forum in which to pursue their goal of access to land. The situation is made more insecure by the unclear legal status of widows whose common-law husbands were killed in the genocide and by the disruption of established local practice as villagers fled violence. Rwandan women are maneuvering between a traditional customary system that discriminated against them and a still incomplete national effort to craft new, comprehensive legislation governing land tenure. Rose concludes that in this time of transition, Rwanda needs to define and guarantee women's land rights in both theory and practice.

Daniel Lieberfeld

- *"Contributions of a Semi-Official Prenegotiation Initiative in South Africa: Afrikaner-ANC Meeting in England, 1987–90"* (in *Paving the Way: Contributions of Interactive Conflict Resolution to Peacemaking*)

  Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2004

- *"Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984–1990"*

  Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 3 (2002)

- *"Getting to the Negotiating Table in South Africa: Domestic and International Dynamics"*

  Politikon 27, no. 1 (2000)

- *"Nelson Mandela: Partisan and Peacemaker"*

  Negotiation Journal 19 (2003)

- *"Peace Profile: Nelson Mandela"*

  Peace Review 16, no. 3 (2004)

T. A. Imobighe, Celestine O. Bassey, and **Judith Burdin Asuni**

Conflict and Stability in the Niger Delta: The Warri Case

Ibadan, Nigeria: Academic Associates Peaceworks, 2002

Jennifer A. Widner

Building the Rule of Law: Francis Nyalali and the Road to Judicial Independence in Africa

New York: W. W. Norton, 2001

Laurel L. Rose

"Women's Land Access in Post-Conflict Rwanda: Bridging the Gap between Customary Land Law and Pending Land Legislation."

Texas Journal of Women and Law 13, (2004)

Asia

Grantees writing on Asia focus on the high level of distrust between nations and the means to dispel it, including greater efforts at cooperation, confidence-building measures, track-two meetings, and popular exchanges. Some of these efforts encompass entire regions, while others are bilateral affairs between old enemies (such as the two Koreas), more recent regional rivals (such as China and India), and global competitors (notably, China and the United States). Of course tensions exist not only between but also within Asia's nations, and secessionist movements have emerged in countries such as Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka. Grantees look at the history of and responses to such movements and focus in particular on the potential of autonomous arrangements to defuse intrastate conflict.

Efforts to Overcome Distrust and Build Confidence

In *Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization*, **Gilbert Rozman** surveys regional relations between China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia during the fifteen years after the end of Cold War. He finds that mutual suspicions, enduring nationalism, and clashing strategies undermined aspirations for regionalism. Whether in the area of economic integration, shared security agenda, political cooperation with collective action, social exchange, or popular consciousness of regional identity, the potential for regionalism in Northeast Asia was not realized. To overcome mutual distrust and achieve that potential, Rozman offers a number of suggestions, including embracing globalization, fostering a regional identity, compromising on territorial disputes, steering North Korea toward transition, encouraging Russia's active involvement in regional security, and strengthening large joint projects such as energy pipelines, transportation corridors, and urban networks.

ASEAN has undertaken a series of track-two meetings to ease tensions over the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and a number of disputes regarding reefs, islands, and seas. *Finding Common Ground on the Oceans: The Informal Meeting of the ASEAN Sea Law Experts on the UNCLOS*, edited by **Carolina G. Hernandez,** reports on these meetings. Coming to a shared understanding on UNCLOS has been difficult due to the ambiguities of the law itself (such as the lack of definition of key terms and the failure of states to specify their territorial baselines) and the very divergent interpretations of the law among ASEAN member states. Informal meetings continue.

Sheldon W. Simon also reports on track-two efforts within ASEAN in "Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: The CSCAP experience" and "Managing Security Challenges in Southeast Asia." Councils on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAPs) are national track-two groups preparing studies on security matters for use in ASEAN's official negotiations. They are composed of scholars, non-governmental security specialists, and government officials acting in a private capacity who meet regularly in working groups to prepare reports on such topics as confidence- and security-building measures, comprehensive security, maritime security, and transnational crime. Simon reports that officials from ASEAN's regional forums have "uniformly expressed appreciation for CSCAP proposals and have positively evaluated their utility" (194). In Simon's view CSCAPs may nonetheless suffer from "group think," as they are made up of many of the same individuals who have always worked together in think tanks and universities, with little input from anyone outside these circles or from non-governmental organizations.

Gilbert Rozman

Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004

Carolina G. Hernandez, editor

Finding Common Ground on the Oceans: The Informal Meeting of the ASEAN Sea Law Experts on the UNCLOS

Manila: Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, 2003

Sheldon W. Simon

- *"Evaluating Track II Approaches to Security Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: The CSCAP Experience"*

  Pacific Review 15, no. 2 (2002)

- *"Managing Security Challenges in Southeast Asia"*

  NBR Analysis 13, no. 4 (2002)

Moonis Ahmar edited a volume on efforts to reduce distrust and foster cooperation in South Asia. Contributors to *The Challenge of Confidence-Building in South Asia* affirm the need for and great potential of confidence-building measures, not only on military and security matters, but also on water use, environmental protection, trade, travel, and cultural exchange. Such measures would allay a generalized sense of insecurity at the societal level and on specific military matters, affecting the mutual perception of adversaries in the region.

Prospects for Stability in a Nuclear Subcontinent, edited by **S. Rajagopal** and **Sridhar K. Chari,** focuses on security issues in South Asia. The book asks, "Has overt nuclearisation increased instability in the region?" and concludes that it has not (171). Rather, contributors see sources of instability in the weaknesses of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including its discriminatory nature, indefinite extension, and the signatories' failure to move toward the disarmament to which they committed themselves or to prevent the clandestine transfer of weapons technology and equipment to both NPT and non-NPT states.

Misperception and Reconciliation in the Koreas

The Reshaping of Korea, a monograph prepared by the **Pacific Council on International Policy,** reports on transformations in and between both Koreas. After its export boom, South Korea is struggling to reform its economy in the face of obstruction by inefficient conglomerates. Politically it needs to become less autocratic and centralized and strengthen the rule of law. North Korea appears to understand that it cannot continue as it has, but its economic shifts may be mere tactical responses rather than deeper changes in strategy. Sources of political change in North Korea are not clear; yet, "as in the economic realm . . . tactical changes can cumulate over time" (35). Reconciliation between the two states in formal, government-to-government negotiations has been "a perilous enterprise," which bolsters the rationale for multiplying track-two contacts (44). The U.S. role in reconciliation is hampered by the United States' view of North Korea as a rogue state. For the United States "perhaps the place to start is with a richer understanding of what is occurring in North Korea and what might ensue in the future" (46).

In *Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation*, **Roland Bleiker** also looks at the limitations that result from misperceptions between the two Koreas and between the United States and North Korea. Bleiker writes, "Neither North nor South Korean people have a realistic idea of what everyday life looks like in the vilified other half" (xxxii). For decades, each regime has legitimated itself by demonizing the other. The United States, for its part, seeks to limit North Korea to its role as a rogue state, but this ideological stance prevents the United States from recognizing and reacting to the interactive dynamic of security relations or generating innovative approaches. The solution to the problems caused by these antagonistic perceptions, Bleiker affirms, is "the promotion of communication and face-to-face contact among Koreans on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone, and a willingness to accept that after half a century of division, North and South Korean people have developed a different—and perhaps inherently incompatible—sense of identity and politics" (116).

China and India: Asian Competitors

Threat perceptions are also problematic between China and India. According to **Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu** and **Jing-dong Yuan** in *China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?,* the two nations are engaged in an undeclared competition for influence and dominance in Asia. Sidhu and Yuan foresee three possible futures for relations between these two nations: open competition for regional hegemony in both military and economic terms; joint efforts to promote multipolarity; or, most pragmatically, a continued search for solutions to their unresolved disputes while they explore areas of potential cooperation via both track-one and track-two exchanges.

Moonis Ahmar, editor

The Challenge of Confidence-Building in South Asia

New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001

S. Rajagopal and **Sridhar K. Chari**, editors

Prospects for Stability in a Nuclear Subcontinent

Bangalore, India: National Institute of Advanced Studies, 2003

Pacific Council on International Policy

The Reshaping of Korea

Los Angeles: Pacific Council on International Policy, 2001

Roland Bleiker

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Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and **Jing-dong Yuan**

China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?

Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003

David M. Lampton and **Richard Daniel Ewing**

U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11th World

Washington, D.C.: Nixon Center, 2002

Cheng Li

■ *Bridging Minds across the Pacific: U.S.-China Educational Exchanges, 1978-2003*

Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2005

■ *"Poised to Take the Helm: Rising Stars and the Transition to the Fourth Generation"*

Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2003

■ *"The New Political Elite and the New Trend in Factional Politics."*

Paris: Institut français des rélations internationals, 2003

Bruce J. Dickson

Red Capitalists in China

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003

Rodd McGibbon

Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?

Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2004

Jeffrey Ayala Milligan

Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy: Schooling and Ethno-Religious Conflict in the Southern Philippines

New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005

China and the United States: Competition or Cooperation?

David M. Lampton and Richard Daniel Ewing focus on the changing relationship between the United States and China in their monograph, *U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11th World.* Terrorism has replaced China as the looming threat in U.S. perception, easing the relationship between the two countries in some ways, as both assert a need for cooperation in combating terrorism. Yet it also complicates their relations, as China has long-standing, ongoing relations with several nations (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq among them) of concern to the United States. To encourage cooperation between China and the United States, Lampton and Ewing counsel the Bush administration to ease pressure on China regarding Taiwan, which remains China's primary security concern. The United States should also exercise restraint in market protection measures, thereby facilitating China's steady integration into the world economy. They further advocate that the United States strengthen the role of the National Security Council in creating policy toward China, so as to ease bureaucratic friction between different policymakers dealing with economic, military, and diplomatic matters.

Cheng Li examines one aspect of cooperation between the United States and China in his edited volume, *Bridging Minds across the Pacific: U.S.-China Educational Exchanges, 1978–2003.* In twenty-five years, China sent more than 700,000 citizens abroad to study, primarily to the United States, and hosted 350,000 foreign students. This educational exchange enhanced China's intellectual vitality and fostered the diffusion of international norms in China, particularly as its citizens returned to take teaching posts and hold high government positions. Li also notes changes in China's political elite in "Poised to Take the Helm: Rising Stars and the Transition to the Fourth Generation" and "The New Political Elite and the New Trend in Factional Politics."

Consequences of changes in China's economic elite are the subject of **Bruce J. Dickson's** *Red Capitalists in China.* New economic entrepreneurs are the hope and fear of those who do and do not want economic reforms to lead to political change in China. Both groups share the presumption that private entrepreneurs will be agents of political change. Dickson's research leads him to doubt that presumption. He finds that China's private entrepreneurs are generally apolitical and share the interests and policy preferences of China's government and party officials. They are more likely to support the status quo than to challenge it. "The entrepreneurs' pronounced fear of instability," Dickson writes, "may make them a conservative force, rather than a liberalizing one. . . . On issues of political participation, they exhibit an elitist perspective that is not conducive to full democratization" (163).

Secessionist Challenges, Autonomous Solutions?

Change in Indonesia, particularly in response to secessionist challenges, has included initiatives and reversals. As **Rodd McGibbon** explains in *Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?,* Indonesia's government conceded autonomy to provincial secessionist movements in 2001, when central authority was weakened due to political transition and an earlier economic crisis that had resulted in extensive IMF intervention in policymaking. The Indonesian government at this time feared state disintegration. As crises receded and centralization was reasserted, the government's attitude toward autonomy changed. By 2003 the Indonesian government was imposing martial law in Aceh and subdividing Papua. McGibbon concludes that autonomy is a fragile policy, subject to reversal. If it is to be a solution to separatist conflict, it must be not just a matter of negotiation between elites but part of a broader process that cultivates popular support.

Jeffrey Ayala Milligan examines long-standing efforts to maintain autonomy among Muslims in the Philippines in *Islamic Identity, Postcoloniality, and Educational Policy: Schooling and Ethno-Religious Conflict in the Southern Philippines.* With a historical perspective extending back centuries, Milligan examines a variety of efforts to subdue, subordinate, marginalize,

or assimilate Mindanao's Muslim, or "Moro," population. He observes the continuity of approaches in colonial and postcolonial periods and pays particular attention to "pedagogical imperialism." More recent efforts at noncoercive integration and limited autonomy, in Milligan's view, leave in place the assumption that "the so-called Moro Problem was a problem located among Muslim Filipinos. . . . However, it was never just their problem, for it was driven in large part by the centuries-old stereotypes, bigotry, fear, and mistrust of Christian Filipinos for Muslim Filipinos. The autonomy project did not—indeed could not—address this aspect of the problem" (111–12).

Greater success may be underway in Bouganville. **Andy Carl** and **Lorraine Garasu** edited a collection of essays, *Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea–Bouganville Peace Process*, which recounts the violent separatist conflict of the late 1980s and the subsequent internationally mediated peace process and truce monitoring. The peace agreement includes provision for a binding referendum to be held in ten to fifteen years to determine Bouganville's ultimate political status and a high degree of operational autonomy in the interim.

In *Paradise Poisoned: Learning about Conflict, Terrorism, and Development from Sri Lanka's Civil Wars*, **John Richardson** offers his conclusions on the best ways to avoid secessionist conflict based on his study of Sri Lanka. Among his ten imperatives for preventing conflict are maintaining public order as a prerequisite to all other development initiatives, meeting the needs and aspirations of fighting-age young men, offering generous funding and training to professionalized internal security forces, and adopting development policies that meet people's aspirations while pursuing a middle path between capitalism and socialism, including greater involvement of multinational corporations and private businesses in supporting successful development policies.

Europe

Grantees assess prospects for peace and security across Europe. Some focus on the small scale, as in an anthropological study of refugees returning to a Bosnian village. Others look at the national level, particularly the aspirations and viability of separatist states in Eurasia. Large-scale intercontinental security relations are also addressed, including the broadest strategies to ensure peace between Russia, Western Europe, and the United States.

Return and Reintegration in the Balkans

The film *Returning Home: Revival of a Bosnian Village,* by **Tone Bringa** and **Peter Loizos,** recounts the efforts of families displaced by war to return to their homes, many of which have been destroyed or are occupied by other displaced persons. The way back is complicated by cross-cutting patterns of flight and refuge. Often, for one family to return, a second family must vacate the home of the first, requiring a third family to vacate the home of the second, and so on. Returning refugees also emphasize their need for international assistance to rebuild houses. The film shows conversations and coffee shared between Bosniac and Croat families who have become neighbors in the confusion, commiserating over their common experiences of flight and rebuilding.

In *Reintegration of Former Kosovo Liberation Army Combatants in Post-Conflict Society in Kosovo,* **Sultan Barakat** and **Alpaslan Özerdem** assess international efforts to reintegrate former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fighters. The authors' research leads them to emphasize the importance of microenterprise development programs for ex-combatants. Vocational training programs, although less expensive, are effective only if there are opportunities for graduates in the local labor market. Microenterprises can provide employment for family members as well as the ex-combatants themselves and can generate positive multiplier effects on the local economy.

Separatism and Conflict in Eurasia

Dov Lynch turns to unsettled disputes in *Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States.* The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in fifteen new internationally recognized states and five other "states" that declared themselves independent: Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. Although Chechnya's self-proclaimed independence has been crushed, the latter four have endured—despite being unrecognized and isolated. In a tangle of criminality and corruption, none is prospering although all are surviving. Their unsettled status exacerbates the region's poor economic situation, reinforces tendencies toward criminalization, and destabilizes the area militarily. Because neither the recognition nor the elimination of these states is practical, Lynch proposes a coordinated international approach. It would include some degree of sovereignty without full independence; the return of internally displaced persons; security measures such as the reduction of troops and weapons; economic support to put a brake on criminalization; and more direct exchanges between political elites, business elites, educators, and others.

Thomas De Waal's *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* examines a violent conflict that remains unresolved despite a 1994 cease-fire. De Waal observes "a kind of slow suicide pact in which each country hurts the other, while suffering itself" (3). Hate narratives and the cultivation of a sense of victimhood through media and official discourse have fed the conflict. In De Waal's view, "the biggest problem is not so much lack

Tone Bringa and **Peter Loizos**

Returning Home: Revival of a Bosnian Village

Sarajevo: Saga Film and Video Production, 2001

Sultan Barakat and **Alpaslan Özerdem**

Reintegration of Former Kosovo Liberation Army Combatants in Post-Conflict Society in Kosovo

York, U.K.: University of York, 2001

Dov Lynch

Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004

Thomas De Waal

Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War

New York: New York University Press, 2003

of a readiness to compromise as lack of a readiness to contemplate any future with the other side at all" (281).

Building Euroatlantic Security

Turning to security issues at the broadest level, **James Goodby, Petrus Buwalda,** and **Dmitri Trenin** coauthored *A Strategy for Peace: Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community.* Although peace has become stable in North America, Western Europe, and Northwestern Europe, elsewhere within the Euroatlantic system it is precarious. Between Russia and the West, "war has not yet been excluded and military deterrence remains a factor in interstate relations, even though war is a remote contingency. This situation can be called a *conditional* peace" (4). How might a *comprehensive* stable peace be achieved? The authors recommend a security community "in which the main centers of gravity are the European Union, Russia, and the United States, with no one of them dominant" (8). To facilitate cooperation, the European Union should reform its decision-making process, Russia should develop its civil society based on democratic principles, and the United States should support the enlargement of NATO and a common European defense force. A convergence around democratic values and means of governance need not require identical institutions and policies. Rather, "what matters is that disputes and conflicts between nations be regulated by some means other than resort to force" (25).

In *Nuclear Nonproliferation in U.S.-Russian Relations: Challenges and Opportunities*, **Vladimir Orlov, Roland Timerbaev,** and **Anton Khlopkov** look further at security concerns and cooperation. They note the United States' and Russia's common interest in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. The two countries should continue to strengthen safeguards and upgrade systems of protection and control. As the international stalemate in nuclear disarmament continues, these authors urge all nuclear nations to undertake unilateral disarmament while continuing with formal arms control negotiations. Official negotiations create legally binding and verifiable agreements, but unilateral actions can also yield substantial pragmatic results.

James Goodby, Petrus Buwalda, and **Dmitri Trenin**

A Strategy for Peace: Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002

Vladimir Orlov, Roland Timerbaev, and **Anton Khlopkov**

Nuclear Nonproliferation in U.S.-Russian Relations: Challenges and Opportunities

Moscow: Center for Policy Studies in Russia, 2002

Latin America

In the Latin American context, grantees examine a wide variety of subjects, from post-conflict police reform, to Colombia's "democratic security" policy, to the empowering effect of participation in women's organizations in Nicaragua. Despite their diversity, most of the grantees' topics speak in one way or another to the fragility of democratic institutions in Latin America and the need for greater popular participation.

Slow Progress toward Police Reform

In *From Peace to Governance: Police Reform and the International Community*, **Melissa Ziegler** and **Rachel Neild** provide a rapporteurs' report on a 2001 conference on police reform following dictatorship or violent conflict, often in a context of rising crime and public demand for tough measures. Overall, progress in Latin America toward democratic policing has been slow, due in part to ill-defined reform strategies, disorganized reform coalitions, and the size and length of the task. Issues of effectiveness and accountability dominate debates on police reform. Many reform advocates see the two as mutually dependent. Indeed, as Ziegler and Neild summarize this view, "the heart of democratic policing precisely lies in the intertwined nature of the two" (19). Populations subject to high levels of crime are less convinced and often demand repressive policing practices. Referring to South Africa as well as Latin America, conference participants suggested that police reform projects should include efforts to convince the public that effectiveness and accountability are complementary.

Security and Democracy in Colombia

Several working papers and other articles—most from the Inter-American Dialogue—offer updates on issues of security and democracy in Colombia: "A New Approach: Álvaro Uribe's Democratic Security Project," by **Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez**; "Álvaro Uribe: Dissident," by **Fernando Cepeda Ulloa**; "Turning Point in Colombia?" by **Vinay Jawahar**; "State Building in Colombia: Getting Priorities Straight," by **Michael Shifter** and **Vinay Jawahar**; and "U.S. Human Rights Policy toward Colombia," by **Michael Shifter** and **Jennifer Stillerman.** These call attention to President Uribe's unfolding policy toward militant revolutionaries, paramilitaries, and narcotics traffickers in Colombia. Departing from the policies of his predecessors, Uribe called for "democratic security," which includes reasserting state authority over the entire national territory, denying resources to state opponents by shutting down the flow of resources from drug trafficking, reestablishing clear and complete military superiority, and eventually entering a negotiated peace settlement. Although impressed with Uribe's commitment and engagement, critics have expressed concern that he is strengthening presidential authority but weakening institutional authority. Others worry that the pursuit of security has entailed measures, including antiterrorist legislation, the weakening of the judiciary, and mass arrests, that are fundamentally undemocratic.

Andean Instability

In "Breakdown in the Andes," **Michael Shifter** turns to sources of instability in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In all three countries Shifter sees fragmented societies suffering from discredited political parties, ineffectual leadership, and corrupt institutions. Shifter faults the general U.S. reaction of indifference and fatalism and calls for Washington to rally international support for ambitious development efforts in the region.

Civil Society: Participation and Empowerment

Other grantees examine civil society in Latin America and some of the ways participation in organizations and networks can be empowering. In "Toward a Transnationalism of the Middle: How Transnational Religious Practices Help Bridge the Divides between Cuba and Miami," **Sarah J. Mahler** and **Katrin Hansing** explore some popular efforts to interact across the Florida Straits, particularly via sister parishes, despite a dominant discourse discouraging cooperation between the United States and Cuba. These transnational religious ties constitute an intermediate level of interaction and offer potential for reconciliation.

　　Lorraine Bayard de Volo explores women's organizations in Nicaragua in "Mobilizing Mothers for War: Cross-National Framing Strategies in Nicaragua's Contra War" and "The Nonmaterial Long-Term Benefits of Collective Action: Empowerment and Social Capital in a Nicaraguan Women's Organization." In her studies of the Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs of Matagalpa, de Volo examines the utility of such organizations for the state in channeling member grievances, disseminating propaganda through supposedly apolitical mothers, and evoking sympathy nationally and internationally. De Volo also explores members' valuation of the emotional support, collective identity, and empowerment they gained from active participation in the organizations following the Contra war of the 1980s. She argues that participation in such organizations enhances its members' political engagement and can thus strengthen democratic foundations.

The Middle East

Grantees analyze many aspects of political change and stasis in the Middle East, from variations in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism across the region and the interaction between Arab elites and political change to enduring stumbling blocks in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the prospects for U.S.-Russian cooperation in the region.

From Arab Secularism to Islamic Fundamentalism

In *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse*, **Mansoor Moaddel** explores the social conditions that enabled the emergence of powerful ideologies in the Arab world: Islamic modernism in India and Egypt in the latter part of the nineteenth century liberal nationalism in Egypt and Iran and Arab nationalism in Syria in the early twentieth century, and Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Algeria in the mid-twentieth century. Paying explicit attention to the sociological method for explaining the proximate conditions of ideological change, Moaddel examines how the rise of secularist modern states generated their nemesis, Islamic fundamentalism.

Endorsing a dialogic approach, Moaddel affirms that each side of a debate structures the kind of argument its opponents advance against it. Nonpolitical plural targets generate apolitical, dispersed, oppositional discourses; monolithic state-centered targets generate politicized ideologies. In a series of discontinuous cultural episodes in the Middle East, Moaddel sees the rise of secularist states whose ruling elites intervened in cultural affairs to promote their ideology. It is in opposition to such states, Moaddel argues, that politicized fundamentalist Islamic movements have formed. Thus, across the Middle East "the main culprits in the genesis of religious extremism were the totalitarian despots who resided at the pinnacle of state power" (343).

Jordan, in Moaddel's view, is the exception that proves the rule. In *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of State-Religion Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria*, he highlights the peaceful relations between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood following the democratization movement launched by King Hussein in 1989. Moderation and pluralism from the authoritarian state, which intervened little in cultural production and did not attempt to impose a secularist ideology, meant that Islamic opponents were less extremist, founding the Islamic Action Front Party to compete in elections. This leads Moaddel to the view that secularization should consist not of the separation of state and religion, but rather of the freeing of the state from any ideology.

Elites and Political Change

Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change, edited by **Volker Perthes,** examines politically relevant elites in nine settings. Contributors focus on changes in elite composition and agendas and their import for political change. In Jordan, Morocco, and Syria, the elite has renewed itself and adapted.

A change in the composition of the elite may be coming in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In Algeria, the elite is fragmented, hampering political reform; in Tunisia, new elites have been co-opted into the state. In Lebanon routes to power for new elites, other than those tied to Syria, have been blocked, while elites in the Palestinian territories have shifted from state building to crisis management. In his conclusion Perthes underscores that "elite change in autocratic systems should not be confused with transition to a new system" (306).

Mansoor Moaddel

■ *Islamic Modernism, Nationalism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005

■ *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of State-Religion Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria*

New York: Palgrave, 2002

Volker Perthes

Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change

Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2004

Aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Negotiating Jerusalem, by **Jerome M. Segal, Shlomit Levy, Nadar Issat Sa'id,** and **Elihu Katz,** examines public attitudes toward Jerusalem. Control of the city appears to be an insurmountable obstacle, with both Palestinians and Israelis reflexively declaring that its status is nonnegotiable. But these authors found in the course of their research that phrasing questions about Jerusalem's future differently yields different answers. No one is willing to give up the city, but each is willing to relinquish control of certain neighborhoods to the other side. Israelis and Palestinian each value most highly those portions of the city where their fellow nationals live, as well as their respective religious sites. Thus, by disaggregating the question of control of Jerusalem, progress may be made toward a final agreement on its status.

Exile and Return: Predicaments of Palestinians and Jews, edited by **Ann M. Lesch** and **Ian S. Lustick,** examines another major obstacle to peace: disagreement on the status and rights of Palestinian refugees. Eschewing further technical or legalistic formulas, contributors to this volume aim to construct a "new intellectual infrastructure" for imagining approaches to the refugee question. Noting the changes that have occurred in Israeli historiography, contributors concur that the source of the enduring refugee problem is neither mass expulsion nor mass flight in 1948, but rather the Israeli government's decision to ban the return of the displaced. "This ban," the editors note, "was enforced immediately, systematically, and coercively. On this point there is no controversy" (7). This is the basis of the Palestinians' continuing sense of injustice. In chapters on many aspects of the refugee question, several contributors return to the importance of establishing shared truths, perhaps through a truth and reconciliation commission, and the potential power of public apologies. Lustick argues that Israelis will have to be "gradually socialized away from depending on narratives of national pride that require the denial of palpable Palestinian truths" if there is to be any "normalization of ties between the two nations that claim the Land of Israel/Palestine" (127).

In *Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine*, **Nathan J. Brown** argues that Palestinian politics consists of more than the conflict with Israel. Palestinians are also concerned with "resuming" their past political entity, Arab identity, and normal political life beyond the nationalist struggle. In their political discourse, Palestinians portray their political institutions as "having authentic antecedents that need only be revived or redirected toward nationalist ends. This is, to be sure," Brown notes, "a very retrospective reading of history, one that imposes a nationalist narrative on a very complicated past" (6). Brown examines this dynamic within Palestinian legal structures, constitutional framework, parliament, civil society, and educational curricula. Until the violence ends, Brown contends, Palestine remains interrupted.

The **International Crisis Group** (ICG) studied aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in three reports published in 2004. *Dealing with Hamas* argues that international community should abandon an incremental approach to the conflict. It should also stop waiting for a "reliable Palestinian partner" to emerge. To the contrary, "only a credible political process can produce an effective Palestinian leadership, not the other way around." (ii). After a cease-fire is reached, Hamas should be brought into negotiations.

ICG's second report, *Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Peacemaking*, notes that the geographically dispersed refugees have not been an organized political force. An internal Palestinian dialogue is long overdue. "Achieving strategic consensus and clarity among Palestinians on the refugee question," this report asserts, "is a key component of the peace process" (ii).

The third ICG report, *Identity Crisis: Israel and Its Arab Citizen*s, examines discriminatory laws and the inequitable allocation of land and other state resources in Israel. Such systemic inequities increase the impoverishment, alienation, and anger of Israel's Arab citizens. The report challenges Israel to redress these injustices and urges the Arab Israeli leadership to pursue change democratically, including dismantling patronage and client networks that undermine effective, representative local governance.

Jerome M. Segal, Shlomit Levy, Nadar Issat Sa'id, and **Elihu Katz**

Negotiating Jerusalem

Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2000

Ann M. Lesch and **Ian S. Lustick**

Exile and Return: Predicaments of Palestinians and Jews

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003

Nathan J. Brown

Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine

Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003

International Crisis Group

- *Dealing with Hamas*

  ICG Middle East Report, no. 21 (2004)

- *Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Peacemaking*

  ICG Middle East Report, no. 22 (2004)

- *Identity Crisis: Israel and Its Arab Citizens*

  ICG Middle East Report, no. 25 (2004)

U.S.-Russian Cooperation in the Middle East

Geoffrey Kemp and **Paul Saunders** examine international perspectives and cooperation on the Middle East in *America, Russia, and the Greater Middle East.* They review the history of U.S.-Russian relations regarding the Middle East and assess current U.S. and Russian interests in the region. These interests are not identical, but neither are they fundamentally incompatible, and Kemp and Saunders see the potential for cooperation in seven areas: terrorism, proliferation and Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the aftermath of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, drug trafficking, regional stability, and energy projects. Such cooperation, the authors advise, "should be pursued with realistic, rather than idealistic, expectations" (58).

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
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**Judy Van Rest**, Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, Washington, D.C.

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