DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
June 10, 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR: | G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director | |
COPIES: | Board Members | |
FROM: | Donald J. Wille | |
SUBJECT: | Hanford Site - Spent Nuclear Fuel Project - Operational Readiness Review Planning and Vulnerability Assessment - Trip Report (May 29-30, 1996) |
The Vulnerability Assessment performed by the DOE Safeguards and Security (SAS) personnel at the DOE Richland Operations Office (RL) resulted in definition of specific design features to be incorporated in the design of the CSB. Sufficient design information concerning access prevention to the CSB was provided to the architect engineer so the construction of the substructure could proceed. DOE-RL was satisfied with the SAS team participation and timing with the SNFP design activities.
Operator and Radiation Control Technician hiring and training will be a significant schedule challenge. WHC estimates that 140 to 160 operators will be needed to operate the several facilities 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for an expected 2 year period of spent fuel transfer. In addition, engineering and maintenance personnel will be needed to support the operating staff. WHC is developing a schedule for procedure preparation and validation to support training, system startup, and operations, including maintenance. Training will be performed on mockups and cold facilities where possible since construction completion of the actual facilities will occur only a short time before operations are to commence. Completion of the necessary elements of the contractor and DOE ORRs on such a tight schedule poses a major threat to meeting the milestone dates for Recommendation 94-1. WHC is developing an ORR Implementation Plan to address those issues related to the compressed schedule.
The DOE-RL SAS group formed a team to evaluate the CSB for protection against terrorist threats and to prepare a Vulnerability Assessment. This team included expertise in structural analysis and nuclear safety analyses. Specific threats considered were based on DOE requirements and the analyses resulted in the design of a number of individual features that were transmitted to the SNFP for implementation. These features were discussed with the project designers to provide an acceptable design approach. In particular, access prevention to the CSB was addressed in a way that permitted the construction of the CSB substructure to proceed on schedule. Involvement of the SAS team with the SNFP will continue as the detailed design of the CSB continues. Jim Spracklen, Head of the DOE-RL SAS group, expressed satisfaction with the timing and interaction of the SAS team with the SNFP and would proceed in the same way, if the project were repeated.