OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[DOE
LETTERHEAD]
National Nuclear Security Administration
March 19, 2004
The Honorable John T. Conway
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, NW.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20004
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In your letter dated January 20, 2004, you
asked to be informed of the analysis and corrective measures to be taken
regarding a recent event associated with the W56 Dismantlement Program.� The Secretary provided the causal analysis to
you in a February 25, 2004, letter. �Additionally, my staff briefed you on the
investigation on February 26, 2004. �The
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is fully committed to resolving
the root causes associated with the event and ensuring that the lessons learned
are transferred to similar operations.
This letter provides a summary of the
corrective measures we are taking to resolve the causes of the subject event. �Corrective actions are being taken by four
organizations: �(1) the Pantex contractor,
BWXT Pantex; (2) the Pantex Site Office (PXSO); (3) the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL); and, (4) the NNSA.
The enclosed BWXT Pantex Improvement Plan
addresses the judgment-of-needs identified by the W56 Investigation Report. �The PXSO conducted a self-assessment and is
implementing enhancements to its facility representative training program and
improving the site interface with the Nuclear Explosive Safety Change Control
Process. �The PXSO has shared its
corrective actions with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board staff.
The LLNL reviewed its internal procedures
and the BWXT Pantex interfaces to identify areas for improvement. �The improvements reiterate the importance of
the weapon system single point-of-contact within the laboratory, provides a clear
statement regarding the laboratory role and responsibilities for reviewing and
concurring in the BWXT Pantex nuclear explosive operating procedures and their
changes, and reaffirms the importance of performing visual confirmations of weapon
configurations, especially for those that involve change control activities.
The NNSA has initiated actions to review and
update the Development and Production Manual to clarify expectations for the
Nuclear Explosive Operations Change Control Process and to refine how the
laboratory weapons responses are incorporated into all authorization bases at
the BWXT Pantex. �This action is expected
to be completed by June 2004.
I have asked Mr. Dan Glenn, Manager of PXSO,
to formally transmit the updated BWXT Pantex Improvement Plan. �With transmittal of this final plan, we will
consider your January 20, 2004, reporting requirement fulfilled. �If you have questions, please contact me or
Mr. Marty Schoenbauer of my staff at 202-586-1730.
Sincerely,
Linton F. Brooks
Administrator
Enclosure
cc w/o enclosure:
J. McConnell, DNFSB
W. Andrews, DNFSB
M. Whitaker, DR-1
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