[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]
January 11, 2000
The Honorable Carolyn L. Huntoon
Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management
Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585-0113
Dear Dr. Huntoon :
As part of the development of an
Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS), each site within the defense nuclear complex
has been developing work planning activities that encompass the functions and principles
of Integrated Safety Management at the activity level.
These actions are vital to ensuring the protection of workers.
The enclosed report, prepared by
members of the staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board), documents the
staff's latest observations concerning the Department of Energy's (DOE) upgrade of the
work planning process at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
(INEEL). The staff found that there has
recently been significant improvement in ISMS development at the activity level, and has
identified one aspect of the process that might be considered a best practice.
Further enhancements to the work
planning process are required, however, to bring the process up to the standards set by
other sites within the DOE complex. These
enhancements include better selection of tasks that require hazard analysis, a better
connection between the identified hazards and the controls intended to mitigate them, and
improved processes for conducting work in a research and development environment.
Finally, the Board is still concerned
that the management attention and resources needed to resolve a long-standing problem with
conduct of operations at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center have
apparently not been applied.
The Board believes the information in
the enclosed staff report will be useful to DOE in its continuing pursuit of improved
safety at INEEL. If you have comments or
questions on this matter, please do not hesitate to call me.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
c: Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.
Enclosure
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Staff Issue Report
December 22, 1999
MEMORANDUM FOR: | G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director J. K. Fortenberry, Deputy Technical Director |
COPIES: | Board Members |
FROM: | D. L. Burnfield |
SUBJECT: | Review of Work Planning at Idaho Engineering and Environmental Laboratory |
This report summarizes the results of
a review by members of the staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). Staff members D. Burnfield and R. Daniels, along
with outside expert D. Volgenau, met with representatives of the Department of Energy
(DOE) and Bechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC (BBWI) at the Idaho Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory (INEEL) on October 19-21, 1999, to review the implementation of an Integrated
Safety Management System (ISMS) at the activity level.
Background. The staff's review focused on activity-level work
planning and execution at INEEL as a follow-up to similar reviews conducted in November
1996 and March 1998. In performing this
review, the staff used site-wide procedures to examine work planning and execution at the
Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC).
Work Planning and Execution. A number of areas requiring improvement had been
noted in the processes for work planning and execution during the staff's visits in
November 1996 and March 1998. Site directives
issued since May 1999 govern three separate systems used for work planning: one covers maintenance and construction work,
another covers facility operations, and a third governs the conduct of research and
development work. There is significant
variation in the level of maturity of these directives and their implementation. A verification review of ISMS implementation at
INTEC is currently scheduled for February 2000. Meeting
this schedule is a major focus of the site, but significant effort remains if this is to
be accomplished.
A structured process is used for the
definition of scope, prioritization, and scheduling of work at the INTEC site. The goal is to ensure that all work at the site is
well planned and coordinated and authorized in the plan of the day. The process uses a rolling 5-week work window
leading to work authorization and completion. Planning
for work outside of this window is the responsibility of the cognizant manager. This process should assist in the implementation
of an ISMS. The process is not currently
being used in other parts of INEEL, but its future implementation is planned.
Several aspects of the work planning
process at INEEL, such as the facility hazards list, could be identified as best practices
and shared with the complex to ensure that they are understood by work planners at all
sites. This might be done through a formal
lessons-learned bulletin.
Additional observations resulting from
the staff's review are provided below for each of the three areas of work planning at the
INTEC site.
Maintenance and Construction Work--INEEL STD-101 outlines a single process for all work planning
related to maintenance and construction. This
process appears to be well implemented and actively practiced by management and workers. The directive captures the essence of ISM. Its
application in the field has revealed a number of areas that need clarification and
improvement, and a revision to the directive that incorporates these enhancements is
planned for the near future. The staff has
identified additional enhancements that could be made, as described below. However, the work planning process currently being
used at INTEC for maintenance and construction work represents a significant improvement
over that observed during the November 1996 and March 1998 reviews by the Board's staff.
The staff reviewed in detail a work
package developed for the repair of a leak on a vessel drain isolation valve. This maintenance task occurred in a physically
restricted area with high radiation levels, high contamination levels, and a potential for
exposure to nitric acid. The package was one
of the first prepared using the new standard (STD-101).
Although the work had been completed successfully, the Board's staff noted a number
of errors and weaknesses in the work planning process that could have increased
unnecessarily the exposure of workers to hazards. Observation
of these errors led the staff to identify steps that could be taken to improve the
process, such as the following:
Because an adequate method does not exist for differentiating
mid-level tasks from low-level tasks, the process would not require some type of hazard
analysis for what was a relatively complex, nonroutine task. Standard commercial practice, as well as practice
at other DOE sites, would have required a job hazard analysis for this type of task. There is a need to evaluate ways to improve the
process of selecting jobs that require hazard analysis.
The process does not link the controls from permits, in this case
a Radiological Work Permit (RWP), to the task being performed. For example, the RWP would have allowed the work
to be completed in an 800 mrem/hour field, while the work was planned for a 100 mrem/hour
field. Allowing work to be performed in a
high radiation area eight times the level actually expected could result in unexpectedly
high doses to the workers unless the controls or stay-times are adjusted accordingly. Also, at levels as high as 800 mrem/hr, one would
expect to find additional task specific training to be provided to the workforce. The controls contained in the permit should be
representative of the work to be performed.
Operations--The directive governing operational activities (MCP-3562) is in
the very early stages of implementation. This
procedure describes the process for performing hazard identification, analysis, and
control for operational activities. Although
the procedure is conceptually sound, weaknesses have been identified, and a major revision
is planned. Many technical procedures
(approximately 1,000) require review for compliance with MCP-3562. The review process is just beginning and is
scheduled to be completed by September 2000. Establishing priorities for review of the
technical procedures could prove beneficial.
A review of the past year's occurrence
reports, along with the review conducted by the Board's staff in March 1998 at the
facility, followed by discussions with the manager of INTEC Building CPP-603/749 (spent
nuclear fuel) revealed a continuing pattern of weakness in conduct of operations. Although some improvement has been observed, more
is needed. The identified weaknesses appear
to be hindering the ability to meet schedules mandated by federal court order for removal
of the fuel from the CPP-603 basins by December 2000.
Research and Development--The directive governing the conduct of research and development
(MCP-3571) does not fully capture the essence of ISM, and does not adequately require the
performance of hazard identification and analysis and implementation of appropriate
controls. This procedure is to be used in pilot research projects conducted at INTEC. The directive does not address formal scheduling
of the work or the capturing of lessons learned for feedback. The staff believes INEEL management could improve
this document by incorporating appropriate aspects of the latest Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) Laboratory Implementation Requirements and Laboratory Implementation
Guidance on hazard analysis and controls.[1]
Feedback for Continuous
Improvement. The need to improve the
effectiveness of the feedback system for capturing pertinent lessons learned was noted
during previous reviews of work planning conducted by the Board's staff. Although improvements have been made, the staff's
most recent review revealed the need for further enhancement to ensure that the feedback
system is truly effective. For example, none
of the three directives governing work planning adequately addresses the capture and use
of lessons learned, and the site computer database for accessing lessons learned does not
appear to be user-friendly. No work
control-related lessons learned since implementation of the directives in May 1999 were
available for review.
DOE Oversight. The Department of Energy Idaho Field Office
(DOE-ID) has an active program for the review of site contractors. Both focused and general-area reviews are being
conducted. The reviews have identified
issues that have required contractor action. During
the past year, most of the emphasis has been on reviewing the contractors= conduct of operations. Some reviews addressed the contractors= work control processes for specific work. In these reviews, there were repeated deficiencies
in the identification and analysis of workplace hazards and the implementation of
effective controls for these hazards. Further,
focused reviews of the worker protection aspects of ISM at the activity level could
improve the DOE-ID oversight of the work planning process.
[1]These
requirements and guidance can be found under "Safe Work Practices" at the LANL Web site (http://labreq.lanl.gov/hdir/labreq.htm).