

Introduction

Why Reconciliation?

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I MUST CONFESS THAT I FEEL A CERTAIN HESITATION in using the term *reconciliation* in the title of this volume. After all, how likely is it that the victims and the victimizers in such incidences of gross injustice as mass slaughter can achieve reconciliation when even coexistence between them is fraught with difficulties? However, I am one of many Japanese who, while not having been directly involved in Japan's military aggression and colonial behavior before and during World War II, nonetheless feel a sense of responsibility for those actions. Furthermore, I believe that Japan's inability to deal adequately with its historical legacy has prevented it from developing constructive security relations with its neighbors, which in turn has impeded the emergence of a multilateral security framework in the region. Japan can become a "normal country" only if it addresses this legacy more earnestly and pursues a path toward historical reconciliation with its neighbors.

Japan's record is not unique, but rather one example of an experience common within human society, and I believe that by reexamining Japan's past from various perspectives, we can enhance our knowledge and understanding of painful historical issues in a way that will better enable us to resolve them. Similarly, we can learn from the wisdom of those elsewhere in the world who have already accomplished some level of reconciliation. In that spirit, this volume addresses not only Japan's past but also the

histories of several relationships in the Asia-Pacific region between countries and peoples who harbor a profound sense of injustice.

Relationships between Japan and China, North and South Korea, Japan and South Korea, Taiwan and China, Indonesia and East Timor, Cambodia and Vietnam all still resonate with traditional geopolitical conflicts. The historical issues unresolved between these and other countries have become key factors contributing to tensions between them. Since the end of the Cold War, Asia has not experienced the kind of mass genocide seen in Europe and Africa, but we cannot afford to relax even for a moment our vigilance against such a possibility, as was seen in East Timor. We must maintain a constant effort to lighten the burden of history. In Japan's case, pressure from various groups that have suffered from Japan's aggression and oppressive rule—among them, prisoners of war, “comfort women,” and conscript laborers—has added a new dimension to this already complicated issue.

The seven case studies presented in this book cover diverse forms of conflict and reconciliation, including those between different nation-states, nation-states of the same ethnic group, groups within the same nation, and different ethnic groups. There are, however, many other instances of ethnic strife and unresolved historical issues within the Asia-Pacific region that this volume does not address—notably, the conflicts between India and Pakistan, China and Tibet, the Tamil and Sinhalese communities in Sri Lanka, and ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Such limitations in the scope of our coverage must be acknowledged and should be borne in mind by our readers.

A Global Trend toward Apology

More or less in step with the advent of the post-Cold War era, there has emerged a global trend toward offering apologies for past wrongs. One after another, nations and organizations in various parts of the world are voicing apologies for past actions that caused suffering for many people.

One of the earliest manifestations of this trend came in 1990, when the administration of President George Bush provided compensation to Japanese-Americans who had been interned in the United States during the war in the Pacific. Of the approximately 120,000 internees, some

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65,000 survivors received, along with their compensation checks, a presidential letter that read: "A monetary sum and words alone cannot restore lost years or erase painful memories; neither can they fully convey our nation's resolve to rectify injustice and to uphold the right of individuals. But we can take a clear stand for justice and recognize that serious injustices were done to Japanese-Americans during World War II."

Similar efforts have been made in a variety of contexts. Mikhail Gorbachev admitted in 1990 with "profound regret" that Joseph Stalin's secret police had murdered fifteen thousand Polish officers in Katyn Forest in 1940. Pope John Paul II apologized for the Catholic Church's failure to help save the Jews from the Holocaust. Britain's Queen Elizabeth II apologized for her country's persecution of the Maori people of New Zealand, and laid a wreath and offered a silent prayer at the site of the British army's massacre of Sikhs at Amritsar. The British prime minister Tony Blair expressed deep regret for Britain's actions during the potato famine in Ireland in the nineteenth century. President Bill Clinton expressed regret during his African tour of 1998 for the role of the United States in African slavery. The government of Germany established the special Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Fund to provide individual compensation to Jews and other Eastern European and Soviet citizens conscripted for forced labor by German enterprises prior to and during World War II. The thrust of these gestures is essentially one of symbolic recompense for debts of a moral nature.

Japan, too, has grown apologetic. In his 1993 general-policy address to the Diet, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa expressed "profound remorse and apologies for the fact that Japan's actions, including acts of aggression and colonial rule, caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for so many people." In 1995, in a statement on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama also expressed "feelings of deep remorse and . . . heartfelt apology" for Japan's "colonial rule and aggression." In the joint statement issued by President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi of Japan in 1998, the two countries took a significant step toward reconciliation, with Japan expressing "deep remorse and heartfelt apology" for its wartime colonial rule, and South Korea voicing appreciation for "the role that Japan has played in promoting peace and prosperity within the international

community through its security policies—foremost its exclusively defense-oriented policy and three nonnuclear principles under the postwar Japanese Peace Constitution—its contributions to the global economy, and its economic assistance to developing countries.”

This global trend of expressing sorrow has been driven by the emergence on a worldwide scale of victims of past human rights violations who, feeling they have yet to receive due redress, are raising their voices in protest and in demands that lost rights be restored. This phenomenon may be regarded as the flip side to the globalization of issues arising from past injustices, or “historical issues.”

This global interest in revisiting painful historical issues has been spurred by several factors, among them democratization in various parts of the world throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, and the consequent prominence of so-called transitional justice as an issue demanding immediate attention. In their respective transitions from military to democratic rule, countries such as South Africa, Guatemala, South Korea, the Philippines, Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador have faced a common problem of how to redress the serious injustices perpetrated by earlier regimes so as to achieve transitional justice without destroying either the fledgling process of democratization or people’s rising hopes of building a better society. This became an even more pressing issue during the 1990s as former Soviet and Eastern European communist-bloc countries began their own processes of democratization.

However, historical issues are far from limited to questions of transitional justice in newly democratizing countries. Even in mature democracies such as the United States, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, and France, questions are being raised about how to deal with lingering issues of a troubled past, including slavery, treatment of aboriginal peoples, colonialism and colonial wars of independence, war crimes, and collaboration with Nazi authorities. The “ethnic cleansing” that flared up on the Balkan peninsula with the end of the Cold War stands as grim testimony to the fact that even Europe is far from being completely free of “revenge cycles” over historical issues. Nonetheless, European countries have achieved considerable progress in reconciliation. In 1999, for example, the French parliament unanimously passed a bill formally recognizing the 1954–69 conflict that led to Algeria’s independence as being a “war,” and not simply an operation to “maintain law and order,” as the French government had

formerly claimed. Furthermore, during the visit of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria to France in 2000, President Jacques Chirac heralded a new era in the relationship between France and Algeria by calling for the two countries to face the future “side by side.”

In a very twisted way, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon highlighted the dangers of leaving historical scars to fester. The roots of terrorism can usually be found in the (mis)teaching of history, and certainly the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were schooled to believe that most of the problems facing the Muslim world were the result of a long history of malign Western—and especially American—influence and interference.

Worryingly, as outlined in the report issued in July 2002 by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), it is not only al Qaeda terrorists and radical Islamists who view the United States in such a poor light. “America does indeed have a serious image problem,” remark the authors of *Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform*. “Gallup’s poll of nearly ten thousand people in nine Muslim countries—including Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—found that 53 percent of respondents viewed the United States unfavorably.”¹ This disquieting discovery was further confirmed by the results, released in December 2002, of a survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. According to the survey, the percentage of people regarding the United States favorably fell significantly compared with that in 1999/2000: in Turkey, for example, the percentage fell from 52 to 30 percent; in Pakistan, from 23 to 10 percent; and in Indonesia, from 75 to 61 percent.² The CFR report urged that the U.S. government launch a public diplomacy campaign aimed at countering one-sided depictions of the United States. In August 2002 the Bush administration did just that, deciding to establish the Office of Global Communications to promote and explain U.S. policies and actions to the rest of the world.

The importance of countering historical misrepresentations is not limited to the relationship of the United States with Muslim societies. In respect to China, for instance, President Bush has drawn attention to the biased view of the United States presented in Chinese classrooms:

As America learns more about China, I am concerned that the Chinese people do not always see a clear picture of my country. . . . My friend, the Ambassador to China, tells me some Chinese textbooks talk of Americans as “bullying the

weak and repressing the poor.” Another Chinese textbook, published just last year, teaches that special agents of the FBI are used to “repress the working people.” Now, neither of these is true—and while the words may be leftovers from a previous era, they are misleading and they’re harmful.³

The End of the Cold War and the “Beginning of History”

The end of the Cold War has brought not, as some commentators famously expected, an “end to history” but rather a new beginning, albeit a beginning shaken by eruptions over issues concerning historical injustices and grievances. Several factors can be identified that have contributed to this unsettling but potentially positive development.

- With the lifting of ideological and political constraints on efforts to expose and renew demands for the redress of past injustices long suppressed under Cold War regimes, the victims have begun to make their voices heard both in their own countries and abroad.
- As democratization movements get under way throughout the world, legal structures enabling more active assertion of individual human rights have become more widespread, both in the developed world and in developing countries. These conditions have enabled the victims of past injustices to stage protests and press claims that could not be advanced before.
- The democratization process is in some respects conducive to the fostering of ethnic-nationalistic sentiment, which in turn can easily lead to oppressive rule by the majority ethnic group and to human rights violations against minorities. The heightening of ethnic-nationalistic sentiment also increases the likelihood of strained relations with neighboring countries.
- As prevailing ideologies and ruling regimes have collapsed, ethnic groups have sought to reestablish their identities. In many cases, this has resulted in a redefining of collective identity in narrower and more exclusive terms. Furthermore, there is a growing tendency to invoke history in an effort to cement such redefinition. This kind of identity politics is apt to foster a sense of victimization and aggressive exclusionism. Such a process is typified by the “ethnic cleansing” that took place in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Caucasus.

- With heightened awareness of ethnic identity as one aspect of human rights, more and more of the victimized are taking the view that any violation of their identity as a member of a distinct group prevents them from enjoying a full complement of human rights. Among the victimizers as well, there is a growing sense that ignominious aspects of their past and the manner in which they are addressed significantly affect a nation's image and identity.⁴
- Rather than seeking to cultivate a broad perspective on issues of historical interest, the mass media is increasingly focusing on the oral recollections of particular individuals and groups; in many cases, these recollections are becoming the prevailing mode of historical description in a visually oriented popular culture. This process is giving rise to a phenomenon whereby, according to Professor Carol Gluck of Columbia University, history loses out to memory.⁵ The trend of multiculturalism in which various groups contend with one another to assert their respective identities is apt to engender a "culture of revering victims" and a mass media that typically pays most attention to those who can be portrayed as wronged and victimized.
- Among groups who feel that their identity is being threatened by advancing globalization, there is a growing trend to reorganize and reunify under the catchwords of *history* and *culture*. This process is susceptible to efforts to revise the group's history in ethnic-nationalistic terms.
- Technological advances in the Internet and other global media at the command of individuals have vastly increased the potential for individual empowerment and enabled victims' claims to reach a global audience. As a corollary, individual and collective feelings and protests have come to enjoy a more direct influence not only within the country in question but also throughout the international community.

A case in point concerns a public lecture that was held at the Osaka government's International Peace Center in January 2000 under the title "The Verification of the Rape of Nanjing: The Biggest Lie of the Twentieth Century." In response to the lecture, Chinese computer hackers attacked Japanese government websites, besmearing them with anti-Japanese text. The incident marked the opening of a new phase in the problem of lingering historical issues between Japan and China.

Recollections of the experiences of individual Chinese (and their claims for compensation) had been largely ignored in the earlier process of historical reconciliation, which proceeded from the normalization of relations between Japan and China in the 1970s to a treaty on peace and friendly relations between the two countries. Now, however, such personal memories have the potential to strain the bilateral relationship. If China should embrace full-fledged democracy, such memories could burst to the fore in more striking ways.

A Regionwide Phenomenon

How each country addresses its historical issues—that is, how it manages the remembering and the forgetting of the past—will influence the future direction of strategic realignment among countries in Asia, not least among them Japan, China, and North and South Korea. Relations between Japan and China are particularly susceptible to being swept up in a revenge cycle. However, the reemergence of historical issues in the post–Cold War era is not a phenomenon that is limited to one country or one bilateral relationship. Rather, the trend has become highly visible in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. For example:

- The post–Cold War democratization process that took place in South Korea and Taiwan has made it possible for South Korean and Taiwanese civilians to bring lawsuits for individual compensation for Japanese war crimes. To a large extent, tensions between South Korea and Japan in the 1990s over such issues as the sex slave legacy and history textbooks have been a side effect of this process.
- Australian aborigines have addressed historical issues as part of efforts to rediscover and reinstate their identity. Such a search for identity by minorities must inevitably occur within a complex dynamic of reaction and counteraction as the majority attempts to reestablish its own identity.
- South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the UN-led war crime tribunals for Bosnia and Rwanda have prompted strong interest in such measures within the Asia-Pacific, most particularly in Cambodia.

All of these examples attest to the fact that interest in historical issues has been stimulated not only by regional factors but also by global (and globalizing) forces, not the least of which are the global media.

Nevertheless, historical issues have been defined in the historical, strategic, and social contexts unique to each case. Each case is peculiar in its own way, and as an aggregate, they defy universal definition. Various factors complicate the situation even further: Is a given issue interstate or intrastate in nature? Is it ethnic or religious? Does it fall within an international political or geopolitical environment? Given such variables, it is critical to analyze such issues on a case-by-case basis, paying special attention to the inherent dynamics of each.

The Case Studies

In this volume, we present seven such case studies. They feature both interethnic and international antagonisms and cover a broad geographic area that includes Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, Cambodia, East Timor, and Australia.

In the first case study, "Evaluating the Inter-Korean Peace Process," Scott Snyder argues that the recent attempt at reconciliation between North and South Korea differs from all previous attempts because, this time, the two countries are the primary players. As a result, he views the prospects for reconciliation as positive but warns that real reconciliation on the Korean peninsula may take several decades to achieve. Snyder notes that while unique, the recent manner of attempting reconciliation is still inherently fragile. There is pressure to deal too quickly with "hard" issues that could cause negotiations to break down, while a decline in domestic political support within South Korea could easily undermine the process. Another major obstacle to the process is the long period of time required for the institutions and societies of both countries to adapt to the prospect of reunification. The recent slowdown in the South Korean economy is yet another problem.

Snyder concludes with four points: South Korea's willingness to provide the North with economic assistance makes this process unique; since South Korean aid is dependent on public opinion, North Korea will have to make concessions or risk losing the assistance; since North and South

Korea are the primary actors in this drama, it will take considerable time for the two sides to truly reconcile; and reconciliation on the peninsula will affect other reconciliation efforts in Asia either by providing an example for joint cooperation or by spurring renewed confrontation.

The second case study also features Korea but in this instance focuses on South Korea and its historically sensitive relationship with Japan. Victor Cha, the author of “Hypotheses on History and Hate in Asia: Japan and the Korean Peninsula,” asserts that since the end of the Cold War Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have reconciled themselves to a point that a fundamental “identity change” has occurred in their relationship. He argues that material (as distinguished from emotional) imperatives such as security, democratization (especially on the Korean side), and economic development have forced Japan and the ROK to engage in episodic cooperation. Cha finds evidence of the fundamental change in the relationship between Japan and the ROK in statements made by Kim Dae Jung and Keizo Obuchi during their summit meeting in 1998—statements that emphasized the positive aspects of the two countries’ relations while expressing admiration for each other’s accomplishments.

The case of Japan and the ROK may help to inspire a new way of thinking about historical enmity in international relations. Cha outlines the following seven lessons drawn from his hypothesis on reconciliation: reconciliation is driven by material imperatives; an apology is necessary, but not sufficient, for reconciliation to begin; reconciliation is a two-way street; no formula for reconciliation will succeed—the process is a natural one; institutional linkages between the reconciling countries are essential; domestic legitimacy is key; and regional precedent is useful.

Whereas Japan’s relations with the ROK have improved since the end of the Cold War, its relationship with China has actually worsened in recent years. In “Reconciliation between Japan and China: Problems and Prospects,” Daqing Yang notes that Japan’s and China’s perceptions of each other’s attitudes toward historical issues have seriously deteriorated, creating a problem that has significant implications for the foreign policy of both countries.

While many analysts agree that the 1982 textbook controversy brought the problem of historical perception into the open, there is no general agreement about its underlying cause. Instead, there are three theories.

The first places blame on contemporary Chinese tactics of realpolitik, that is, the tendency of China to play the “history card” to leverage Japanese concessions. The second argues that Japanese right-wing revisionism and collective amnesia are at the root of the problem. The third avoids a purely domestic analysis by looking at the relationship’s bilateral dynamics along with broader international trends such as generational changes in Japan and China, a global rise in nationalism, and the phenomenon of re-dressing historical injustices.

Yang notes that, when discussing the prospects for solving historical issues between Japan and China, one must take into account the fact that the relationship between the two countries is now entering a phase of “competition and coexistence.” It is in the national interest of both countries to prevent the relationship from becoming a rivalry and to work toward creating a political environment conducive to solving history issues. Both short- and long-term solutions—ranging from official to track-two and track-three exchanges in historical research and educational programs—must be implemented to effect changes in the social and political systems of the two countries. Equally, for reconciliation to be lasting, the process must be carried out not only between governments but also between individuals and between and within civil societies.

Masahiro Wakabayashi turns the spotlight on interethnic reconciliation in his case study, “Overcoming the Difficult Past: Rectification of the 2-28 Incident and the Politics of Reconciliation in Taiwan.” Wakabayashi argues that, as the process of democratization has advanced, the Taiwanese people have shown a growing desire to settle past accounts, particularly with regard to past acts of oppression such as the “2-28 Incident.” This bloody episode began on February 27–28, 1947, when Nationalist (Mainlander) troops cracked down on native Taiwanese protesters; between eighteen and twenty-eight thousand people are estimated to have been killed. The incident had two important ramifications for Taiwanese society: first, it deprived native Taiwanese of the ability to protest persecution at the hands of the Mainlanders; second, it marked the start of ethnic conflict in Taiwan.

The process of settling past accounts began in 1987 with a small movement, which expanded incrementally to involve larger numbers of legislators. The process culminated in the enactment of an ordinance in 1995 to compensate the victims and establish a memorial foundation.

Wakabayashi notes that these attempts at settling the 2-28 Incident have inspired discussions on other sensitive historical issues such as the White Terror campaign. He warns, however, that while the process of settling past accounts has allowed more open discussion, the issue of whether this process has led to real ethnic reconciliation remains unclear as the Mainland minority continues to retain great influence in various spheres of Taiwan's society. Wakabayashi concludes that ethnic reconciliation in contemporary Taiwan is still unstable.

The situation in Cambodia is perhaps less encouraging than that in Taiwan. As Nayan Chanda points out in "Cambodia: Unable to Confront the Past," at first glance Cambodia appears to have achieved a remarkable degree of reconciliation, but a closer look reveals that the country needs a three-way reconciliation process to heal the wounds caused by three decades of war and genocide. The first axis of reconciliation must be between the victims and their oppressors; the second, between the minority Vietnamese living in Cambodia and the Khmers; and the third, between Cambodia and Vietnam.

The possibility of a mixed international court trying the Khmer Rouge is stronger today than in the past due to a combination of external pressures and growing internal demands, but the outcome, Chanda contends, may still fall short of a fair trial of all the responsible leaders. There is certainly a need for a special tribunal both to ascertain the facts about what the Khmer Rouge did and to facilitate national soul searching so as to prevent a recurrence of similar atrocities in the future. Chanda suspects, however, that even if a tribunal were to be held, it would not, owing to the corrupt nature of Cambodia's judiciary system, go beyond establishing a few facts related to the killing. The fundamental difference between what the Cambodia government wants (i.e., social stability) and what the nongovernmental and international communities desire (i.e., a public trial and convictions) adds to Chanda's rather pessimistic outlook.

Such pessimism may apply equally to the case of East Timor. In "East Timor: A Nation Divided," Todung Mulya Lubis examines the impact of the substantial human rights abuses that occurred in East Timor under Indonesian administration, even after the referendum on independence was passed in September 1999. The legal process for prosecuting the perpetrators of these violations and crimes remains unclearly defined to this

day. Lubis asserts that this will undoubtedly delay the settlement of the East Timor issue.

He argues that reconciliation is the key to resolving the East Timor problem and to avoiding disintegration or separatism. The reconciliation process is beginning to take place, with the creation of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor, which will deal with relatively minor offenses committed between 1974 and 1999. For the process to be sustainable, however, historical truths must be revealed and incorporated into the country's future teaching of its history. In addition, legal prosecution of the parties directly involved in crimes against humanity during the pre- and post-referendum periods must continue.

Unfortunately, the trials being held in Jakarta have at times appeared farcical. As Lubis explains, in the current geopolitical climate, the international will to bring the members of the Indonesian military and police elites to justice has waned significantly. By allowing misconceptions regarding the role of the military and the United Nations in the East Timor massacres to go unchecked, the trials threaten to have widespread negative implications for reconciliation in other parts of the Indonesian archipelago. Lubis asserts that the solution of the East Timor problem does not rest with the East Timorese alone and should be a critical concern for the entire international community.

In the final case study, "Aboriginal Reconciliation, Asian Australians, and Some Heretical Thoughts," Greg Sheridan argues that for reconciliation to take place between aboriginal Australians and the Australian nation as a whole, less emphasis should be placed on symbols of reconciliation and more time should be devoted to substantive rectification of the way in which aborigines are treated in Australian society today. Sheridan outlines the historical and contemporary contexts in which Australia's native population has sought redress for injustices committed against them. But, while admitting that aborigines have suffered grave human rights abuses in the past and continue to be disadvantaged in terms of health, education, life expectancy, and other factors, Sheridan asserts that some of the aborigines' demands are counterproductive. He argues that little progress has been made on symbolic issues precisely because aboriginal demands in this category conflict with the deep-seated Australian belief in the universality of citizenship.

Sheridan concludes by admonishing the aborigines to follow the example of Asian Australians. Although he admits that the circumstances and history of discrimination against the aborigines and Asians are quite different, he points out that Asians have worked within the Australian system to improve their situation. And while their participation in society is far from complete, Asian Australians' willingness to focus on issues of substance, rather than on symbolic ones, has won them considerable success and the acceptance of their fellow citizens. He conjectures that aboriginal Australians would, therefore, do well to accept mainstream, modern Australian society and to de-emphasize symbols that undermine national principles. Insistence on a stance that runs counter to the beliefs of most Australians increases the threat of a majority backlash and risks civic exhaustion and a general lapse into disregard for aboriginal issues.

Drawing Lessons

As noted at the outset, the purpose of the essays in this volume is not only to improve our understanding of the impact of painful historical issues on international and interethnic relations but also to learn from the experiences of others how we might best come to terms with the past and transform conflict into cooperation. Fortunately, the case studies offer many lessons for the future, revealing a variety of common patterns, themes, and key elements in efforts to promote reconciliation in very different circumstances. These lessons, which are discussed in detail in the concluding chapter, include the following.

1. *Human rights violations are a universal human experience.* Large-scale, serious human rights violations of the kind that inspire and sustain long-standing grievances occur in all societies. We should not seek the causes of our historical problems in supposed ethnic "traits"; no ethnic group or nation has a monopoly on cruelty or on suffering.
2. *"Our" history is everyone's history.* While each community's or ethnic group's history is in an obvious sense its own, it is also part of the history of all ethnic and national groups and of the world as a whole. It is dangerous to try to describe one's own country's history as if it were completely self-contained and entirely detached from world history.

3. *Reconciliation over the past is a process.* Reconciliation is necessarily a long-term process. Unless the process is begun, however, no visions of peace or coexistence will be able to endure and no links between civil societies will be able to develop.
4. *There is no universal formula.* We must analyze and take into account the specific circumstances under which each violation of human rights took place. There is no universal formula for reconciliation.
5. *Reconciliation must be a joint effort by victimizers and victimized.* Efforts toward reconciliation will not take root unless they are made by both the victimizers and the victimized, working in collaboration.
6. *Use a forward-looking, realistic approach.* Moralistic arguments are not an effective way to transcend the problems of the past. Instead, we need more discussion on how to resolve these problems realistically with a common vision.
7. *Cultivate democracy.* In order for reconciliation to take firm root, it is important for all the societies involved to expand and strengthen their democratic institutions.
8. *The approach should be based on multilateralism and regionalism.* Efforts to promote bilateral reconciliation should reinforce multilateral and regional cooperation to nurture a “culture of dialogue” and a “custom of dialogue.”
9. *Political leadership is key.* Whatever vision is pursued, the process of reconciliation over the past will not move forward without appropriate political leadership.
10. *Individual initiative is essential.* Ultimately, however, the key to success in the reconciliation process lies in the commitment of people at the individual level.
11. *Our behavior should reflect the kind of nation we hope to build.* Facing up to history and transcending the lingering troubles of the past are not tasks to be approached passively. The way in which we tackle these issues will itself make up part of our country’s national identity. Loving one’s country or ethnic group should not mean idealizing it and its past. Ultimately, the task of reconciliation requires the kind of grace that arises in individuals at the intersection of heartfelt remorse and heartfelt forgiveness.