

1 Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Our first witness  
3 this morning is Dan Glenn, Manager of the Pantex Site  
4 Office, who is an employee of DOE/NNSA [National  
5 Nuclear Security Administration]. And, Dan, I will  
6 put in the record your background, which will go into  
7 the record prior to your speaking.

8 Welcome, Dan.

9 MR. GLENN: Thank you, sir.

10 Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman and  
11 members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety  
12 Board, and members of the audience.

13 Thank you for this opportunity to provide  
14 testimony on the Pantex Site Office's current  
15 practices for oversight and management of our  
16 management and operating contractor activities at the  
17 Pantex Plant.

18 Transition from the long-standing roles  
19 and responsibilities to the re-engineered NNSA  
20 presents some challenges, but these challenges are  
21 needed as we strive to improve the effectiveness, the  
22 efficiency, and most importantly the safety of our  
23 site operations. I fully support the NNSA re-  
24 engineering effort and believe that the appropriate  
25 level of contractor oversight to ensure adequate

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1 protection of the health and safety of the public and  
2 the workers within the Pantex Plant community will  
3 continue after this re-engineering is completed.

4 The Site Office has three primary  
5 responsibilities, all of which help ensure that  
6 contractor operations are conducted in a safe and  
7 environmentally sound manner. They are: first of all,  
8 complying with legal requirements; secondly,  
9 administering the M&O [management and operating]  
10 contract, and; thirdly, monitoring the contractor  
11 performance.

12 It is imperative that Pantex Plant is in  
13 compliance with all statutory requirements. During  
14 the budget review process each year, a concerted  
15 effort is made to ensure that the sufficient resources  
16 are allocated to the work required to comply with the  
17 laws. Several of these laws serve as drivers to  
18 assure appropriate federal oversight of the contractor  
19 work in such areas as environmental compliance and  
20 financial procedures.

21 Through the NNSA re-engineering effort, we  
22 have added more formality to the way in which the M&O  
23 contracts are administered. All the Site Managers  
24 went through an intense contracting officer training  
25 program earlier this year and were issued contracting

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1 officer warrants after completion. As such, I am now  
2 the focal point for directing the contractor to  
3 perform work at the Pantex Plant.

4 To assist me in administering the  
5 contract, I have appointed contracting officer  
6 representatives both within the Pantex Site Office and  
7 at Headquarters. There are a total of 12 contracting  
8 officer representatives assigned to the contract at  
9 the Pantex Plant.

10 I've also hired two contract specialists,  
11 one of whom is a warranted contracting officer and the  
12 other is scheduled to receive his warrant in December  
13 of this year. They will assist me in administering  
14 the day-to-day contract activities.

15 Implementation of this process has  
16 enhanced contractual control and formalized  
17 communication and tasking of work to the contractor.

18 Information is provided to me from a  
19 number of sources regarding contractor performance.  
20 Facility Representatives play an important role in  
21 monitoring contractor work activities, but they are  
22 [the] only way in which we monitor overall  
23 performance. In addition to Facility Representatives,  
24 I also rely on subject matter experts [SME] within the  
25 Site Office to monitor contractor activities on a

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1 daily basis in their respective areas of  
2 responsibilities. I have subject matter experts in  
3 areas such as systems engineering, authorization basis  
4 [AB], occupational safety, radiological safety,  
5 explosive safety, environmental compliance, safeguards  
6 and security, projects, legal, and business areas.

7 In addition to our own oversight, I  
8 receive input on contractor performance from various  
9 external sources, to include NNSA Headquarters, the  
10 DOE Office of Independent Oversight and Performance  
11 Assurance [OA], and other federal and state government  
12 entities. Agencies such as Environmental Protection  
13 Agency [EPA], the Texas Commission on Environmental  
14 Quality, and the State of Texas Bureau of Radiation  
15 Control, all of which are concerned with various  
16 environmental aspects of the Pantex Plant, perform on-  
17 site reviews.

18 The Office of Inspector General [IG] and  
19 the General Accounting Office [GAO] also conduct  
20 audits of various activities at the Plant and provide  
21 reports on contractor performance. It is not  
22 anticipated that there will be any changes in the  
23 foregoing reviews as a result of the NNSA re-  
24 engineering effort.

25 And one tenet of the NNSA re-engineering

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1 effort calls for placing more accountability for  
2 operating the Plant in a safe and environmentally  
3 sound manner with the contractor. As such, the  
4 contractor has been charged with developing and  
5 implementing a more robust internal assessment  
6 program. To strengthen its assessment program, the  
7 contractor has done several things to include:

8 (a) Developing and implementing the  
9 Contractor Assurance System [CAS] which places  
10 emphasizes both on self-assessments and independent  
11 assessments;

12 (b) The establishment of nuclear safety  
13 officers who are responsible for the in-depth  
14 knowledge and execution of the Authorization Basis and  
15 other safety documents for facilities and processes  
16 that involve nuclear, nuclear explosive, and non-  
17 nuclear hazardous operations, and;

18 (c) Increasing the size and involvement of  
19 their Quality Assurance [QA] staff.

20 Another tenet of the NNSA re-engineering  
21 effort involves enhancing the Pantex Site Office  
22 oversight of contractor operations. There is a  
23 significant amount of work performed by the federal  
24 employees that I rely on as input to assess contractor  
25 performance. Some of this work is routinely recognized

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1 as conforming to the conventional oversight programs,  
2 such as the current reporting reviews, duty officer  
3 assignments, Facility Representative assessments, ES&H  
4 program assessments. However, the day-to-day  
5 operations of the Site Office encompass significantly  
6 more work, which often is not recognized for the in-  
7 depth contractor assessments that they are.

8 As the Site Office Manager, it is my  
9 responsibility to review and evaluate much of the  
10 contractor's performance via the required approval or  
11 disapproval of program documents. For example, as the  
12 approval authority for the Site Safeguards and  
13 Security Plan, the Documented Safety Analysis, the 10-  
14 Year Comprehensive Site Plan, the Master Authorization  
15 Agreements, Emergency Management Plan, and the  
16 delegated authorities associated with the Energy  
17 Systems Acquisition Approval Board, my staff performs  
18 in-depth reviews and assessments of the information  
19 and related actions contained in each of these  
20 documents. All of this work constitutes a significant  
21 effort on the part of the federal employees to oversee  
22 the contractor's operations. The results of this  
23 work, along with additional inputs, serve as input to  
24 a formal annual assessment via the Performance  
25 Evaluation Plan. Many elements in this plan are

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1 specifically dedicated to effective safety program  
2 performance. When evaluating the oversight programs  
3 of the Site Offices, I believe it is essential to  
4 recognize not only the conventional oversight  
5 mechanisms, but also the efforts that are a direct  
6 result of fulfilling our day-to-day responsibilities.

7 To further bolster our oversight program,  
8 we are in the process of developing and implementing  
9 a Line Oversight Plan, which is intended to enhance  
10 and formalize our assessment activities. The newest  
11 part of this development is development of an  
12 integrated assessment plan.

13 To date functional assessments have been  
14 performed, but they weren't well-coordinated,  
15 resulting in either redundancies or lapses. Better  
16 integration with our own staff, BWXT reviews, and the  
17 external reviews should not only provide the desired  
18 efficiency gains, but also improve the overall quality  
19 of our assessment program. We will continue to  
20 utilize Facility Representatives and subject matter  
21 experts in the Plant as they will provide input  
22 through readiness assessments, QA surveys, duty  
23 officer coverage, safety system evaluations, safety  
24 basis review teams, nuclear explosive safety reviews,  
25 and business and budget reviews.

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1           In conjunction with developing the line  
2 oversight plan, we are shoring up our self-assessment  
3 program.       The Pantex Site Office has six  
4 organizational elements that will be involved in the  
5 self-assessment program.   Self-assessments of the  
6 safeguards and security function are already well  
7 established and functioning, and the business function  
8 has recently developed its program.

9           The other Site Assistant Managers will  
10 have self-assessment programs established and  
11 implemented by the FY04 [Fiscal Year 2004]. This  
12 effort will include updating our local procedures to  
13 establish program requirements based on applicable  
14 orders or NNSA guidance.

15           As the various oversight and assessment  
16 programs identify findings and issues that require  
17 corrective actions, they are forwarded to the  
18 contractor or assigned to the appropriate Site Office  
19 organization for action. Tracking of these actions is  
20 currently accomplished by the cognizant Assistant Area  
21 Manager's organization. Both paper and electronic  
22 processes are used. BWXT Pantex is in the process of  
23 acquiring new issues management software that should  
24 be installed by December of 2004. This software  
25 system is being purchased to support the new line

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1 oversight/Contractor Assurance System program at  
2 Pantex. We are coordinating with BWXT to have access  
3 to that system and will use it in the future to  
4 provide one common system for the Plant with  
5 appropriate isolation between the federal and the  
6 contractor data.

7 I'd like to spend a few minutes talking  
8 about the staffing activities and departments at the  
9 Site right now.

10 To perform our mission, each Site was  
11 allocated a personnel ceiling, or what we call full  
12 time equivalents [FTE] during the NNSA re-engineering  
13 process. The Sites were charged with developing and  
14 implementing a managed staffing plan which outlined  
15 the organizational structure and personnel required to  
16 do its work. In developing the Pantex Site Office  
17 managed staffing plan, I took advantage of  
18 recommendations made by several workload reduction  
19 initiatives to streamline work, as well as some  
20 initiatives that were in the process at the Pantex  
21 Site Office and within the contractor's organization.

22 Two initiatives underway were: first of  
23 all, building up the Quality Assurance staff by the  
24 contractor, and; developing and implementing their  
25 contractor assurance system. The Pantex Site Office

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1 managed staffing plan showed an increase of personnel  
2 in the business and project management areas to handle  
3 the additional responsibilities being placed in these  
4 areas.

5 Staffing level has remained fairly  
6 constant in the areas of safeguards and security,  
7 authorization basis and environment safety and health.  
8 We are planning slight reductions in the areas of QA  
9 and Facility Representatives.

10 Our intent was not to back away from the  
11 current level of oversight until we could verify our  
12 contractor had implemented and we had validated the  
13 essential elements of the Contractor Assurance System.  
14 However, in actuality, we have experienced some  
15 unplanned reductions in the Site Office due to  
16 transfers and retirements prior to validating the full  
17 Contractor Assurance System. We are managing to those  
18 impacts via prioritization of our work while we  
19 attempt to fill our vacancies.

20 The Pantex Site Office managed staffing  
21 plan reflects a FTE ceiling of 82. Currently I have  
22 70 personnel on board and we're actively recruiting to  
23 fill those vacant positions. We are a technically  
24 focused organization. Of the 70 personnel I have on  
25 board, 44 of them are in the technical qualification

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1 program. Of those 44, 33 are fully qualified under the  
2 qualification program, 8 are in process of completing  
3 our requirements for qualification. And we are in the  
4 process of developing and issuing qualification  
5 standards on three.

6 Many of the staff on the TQP [Technical  
7 Qualification Program] also possess other  
8 qualifications such as certified professional  
9 engineers, certified hazardous materials manager,  
10 certified safety professional, and certified  
11 environmental manager.

12 In addition to the 44 in the technical  
13 qualification program, 13 other personnel are also  
14 engaged in professional certification programs to  
15 include personnel in the safeguards and security,  
16 Quality Assurance, contracts and procurement, and  
17 property management.

18 There are several areas where I have  
19 requested part-time technical support from the NNSA  
20 Service Center. These areas have been identified  
21 because they demand specific expertise, and the Site's  
22 workload does not warrant a full-time position. The  
23 specific technical areas I have requested are:  
24 criticality safety, Software Quality Assurance,  
25 seismic engineering, and the assessment of the

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1 contractor's training programs.

2 I recognize the Board's concern with the  
3 decrease in the number of Facility Reps at the Pantex  
4 Site Office, and I would like to share my perspective  
5 regarding our FR [Facility Representatives] needs.

6 As some of you are aware, I began my  
7 career in DOE as Facility Rep for the production  
8 reactors at the Savannah River Site Office. That  
9 experience solidified in my mind the benefit and the  
10 need to have federal employees on the floor who have  
11 unencumbered access to all areas of the Plant and have  
12 technical understanding of the contractor's work  
13 activities and processes. Over a period of years, I  
14 have also come to recognize that the Department and  
15 its contractors have significantly improved the  
16 formality of its operations since the inception of the  
17 FR program.

18 In my opinion, it is appropriate for the  
19 NNSA to utilize the flexibility inherent in the FR  
20 standard for Sites to re-evaluate the effectiveness  
21 and the staffing levels of their FR programs. I led  
22 the Workload Reduction Initiative Team charged with  
23 developing guidance for the NNSA Facility Rep program.  
24 I volunteered for this assignment because: first, I'm  
25 one of the few senior managers in DOE and NNSA who

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1 qualified and held the position as a Facility  
2 Representative, and; second, I believe that I would  
3 provide invaluable input to ensuring that FR program  
4 remained effective and viable.

5 I want to make it very clear I fully  
6 support the FR program and rely on it to manage my  
7 site. However, I believe there is room for improving  
8 the effectiveness and the efficiency of FR program  
9 while also providing reasonable adjustments to account  
10 for the significant maturation of the contractor's  
11 conduct of operations which has taken place over the  
12 last ten years.

13 The FR Program Implementation Guidance is  
14 intended to better focus the Facility Rep's attention  
15 on the proper implementation of technical safety  
16 requirements while ensuring the contractor continues  
17 to protect the workers from standard industrial  
18 hazards. Efficiencies are gained through a better  
19 integration and prioritization of our Site Office  
20 subject matter experts resources, not through the  
21 cessation of contractor oversight.

22 It is accurate to say that the manner in  
23 which I have distributed by staffing allocation does  
24 not provide substantial backup capabilities in the  
25 Facility Rep ranks. Nevertheless, I submit that the

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1 Site Offices by design have breadth with little depth.  
2 We are an organization that must possess diverse  
3 technical expertise with very little redundancy.  
4 Although redundancy does provide additional  
5 confidence, it is not mandatory to provide reasonable  
6 assurance of contractor performance.

7 By integrating my staff's subject matter  
8 expert oversight capabilities with an effective  
9 Contractor Assurance System, I believe the Facility  
10 Rep staffing level is appropriate at Pantex. We will  
11 continue to evaluate our organizational needs and make  
12 any adjustments as part of our continuous improvement  
13 process.

14 The Pantex Site Office is in frequent  
15 communications with Headquarters personnel, either  
16 through email, telephone conferences, meetings as we  
17 carry out our mission. On a monthly basis, I provide  
18 the Administrator with an update of activities that  
19 are going on at the site. I also include in this  
20 communication any issues or concerns which I believe  
21 he should be aware of. I usually receive an immediate  
22 response from the Administrator.

23 I also participate in a weekly conference  
24 call with the NNSA Acting Chief Operating Officer  
25 where information regarding activities at the various

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1 site and Headquarters is exchanged.

2 I also participate in the periodic  
3 Leadership Coalition meetings that are led by the  
4 Administrator. The Leadership Coalition consists of  
5 the Administrator and representatives from his  
6 immediate staff, Deputy and Association  
7 Administrators, Site Managers and Service Center  
8 Director.

9 In addition, my staff is in frequent  
10 contact with Headquarters personnel regarding their  
11 areas of responsibility to include: (a) weekly  
12 televideo conferences with NA-12 & 13 [NA-12: Military  
13 Application and Stockpile Operations; NA-13: Program  
14 Integration] regarding the programmatic activities;  
15 (b) monthly telephone conferences with the Associate  
16 Administrator for Facilities and Operations; (c)  
17 weekly telephone conferences with the Office of  
18 Business Operations; (d) weekly conferences with  
19 Office of Planning, Programming, Budget and  
20 Evaluation. In addition to these scheduled calls, the  
21 Site Office personnel are in frequent contact with  
22 Headquarters personnel to provide information or seek  
23 guidance. All of the aforementioned forms of  
24 communications and contacts serve to help NNSA  
25 Headquarters be informed on an ongoing basis of the

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1 activities at my Site.

2 I'd also like to spend a few moments  
3 talking about the Columbia Investigation Report and  
4 the actions that we have taken.

5 Upon receiving the copy of the Columbia  
6 Investigation Report, I distributed it to my senior  
7 staff and made it mandatory reading for my technical  
8 managers. I also provided a copy to the BWXT Plant  
9 Manager and his Deputy and commenced a dialogue with  
10 him on the report.

11 I believed that the lessons learned  
12 identified in the report were extremely important for  
13 both NNSA and the contractor managers at the Plant to  
14 understand. Therefore, I convened an offsite meeting  
15 with my technical managers and BWXT Pantex technical  
16 managers to discuss the implications and  
17 recommendations outlined in the report.

18 The offsite meeting focused on Chapters 6,  
19 7, 8, and 10 of this report. The meeting was  
20 structured in such a way that a brief summary of each  
21 chapter was presented, which was followed by an open  
22 discussion by all participants. The meeting concluded  
23 with a brainstormed listing of critical success  
24 factors that are both necessary and sufficient to  
25 improve the safety throughout all the Pantex

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1 operations.

2 The next steps include condensing this  
3 list into a concise list of factors that will be  
4 further developed into Pantex-specific actions to be  
5 undertaken in the near future.

6 Areas that have captured my attention are  
7 the concept of the normalization of deviance, and the  
8 role and effectiveness of the independent safety  
9 organizations. We are taking a serious look at the  
10 events surrounding this tragedy and those conditions  
11 that contributed to the accident in a sincere effort  
12 to apply the lessons learned to our own operations.

13 In conclusion, I believe that the  
14 identified federal oversight of contractor activities  
15 at the Pantex Plant resulting the NNSA re-engineering  
16 is sufficient to ensure safe and environmentally sound  
17 operations. A portion of the Pantex Site Office re-  
18 engineering actions is based on placing increased  
19 accountability on the contractor. As such, the  
20 contractor is charged with developing and continuing  
21 to improve a Contractor Assurance System to formalize  
22 the manner in which it would bolster its internal  
23 oversight activities.

24 The contractor initiated the  
25 implementation on their plan on October 1, 2003, with

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1 full implementation scheduled for October 1, 2004.

2 I am monitoring the effectiveness in the  
3 Contractor's Assurance System in relationship to its  
4 staffing decisions I made during our re-engineering  
5 efforts based on a robust Contractor Assurance System.  
6 I will make internal staffing adjustments or request  
7 additional resources if I am not convinced that the  
8 CAS is working as intended or the Service Center  
9 support is available as I desire it.

10 Again, I would like to thank you for the  
11 opportunity to share my perspective on the NNSA re-  
12 engineering effort. And I am available for any  
13 questions.

14 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Thank you, Dan.

15 Dr. Eggenberger?

16 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: You made a  
17 reference to what you needed was the appropriate level  
18 of oversight. What is the appropriate level of  
19 oversight?

20 MR. GLENN: The appropriate level of  
21 oversight is to have an understanding of all the work  
22 activities that my contractor performs at the site so  
23 that there is not a situation where I would find that  
24 the federal staff is unaware of either contractor work  
25 activities or the programs that they use to do that.

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1 That does not mean that my federal staff is aware of  
2 every single activity that takes place, but there is  
3 a process in place that assures that we sample, we are  
4 made aware of issues, and that we develop corrective  
5 actions to address those deficiencies that come up.

6 So, as long as there is input in the  
7 different functional areas that make its way up  
8 through the system and are evaluated in all the  
9 different work activities, then I consider that  
10 sufficient oversight.

11 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: Do you need to  
12 be overseen?

13 MR. GLENN: Sir, the work that we do is  
14 very important for the nation, and it includes there  
15 inherent risk associated with that. Because of those  
16 risks, the direct answer is yes. I think we talked  
17 about that's one of the lessons from the Columbia  
18 accident investigation. You get redundancy in the  
19 oversight.

20 I welcome external reviews of my work  
21 activity at the site. I want to make sure that I'm  
22 doing the best job for the citizens of this country.  
23 So any review is welcomed, and we try to take the  
24 lessons or the recommendations that come from those  
25 reviews and improve our operations.

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1 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: What is that  
2 appropriate level of oversight on you; have you  
3 thought about that?

4 MR. GLENN: Well, it would include sort of  
5 the same type of activities that I set for the  
6 oversight for overseeing my contractor. It is that  
7 anyone that looks at the Pantex Site Office should be  
8 able to take a look at our methods, our processes that  
9 we use to determine: have they covered all the  
10 functional areas? Are they aware of security aspects?  
11 Are they aware of the weapons disassembly aspects?  
12 Are they aware of the industrial hygiene program?  
13 Those kind of questions external oversight should look  
14 at the Pantex Site Office and convince themselves  
15 that, yes, the Pantex Site Office is aware of all the  
16 programs, they are looking at areas that are important  
17 for the safe operation of the site. And they should  
18 be able to then assess whether they filled their voids  
19 in the scope of the oversight that I'm doing or if  
20 there are -- I mean, we will always find differences  
21 in the depth that you go into the oversight as far as  
22 opinions from different groups. But I think the most  
23 vital part in assessment: have we, as a Site Office,  
24 covered the adequate breadth of it.

25 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: Now, you made

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1 a list of oversight activities both by yourself and by  
2 Headquarters, and you kind of went through that list;  
3 Facility Representatives, SMEs out of your office, the  
4 broad issue of just NNSA Headquarters not details, GAO  
5 IG, and it went on. It was a long list.

6 Now, how does that list fit together into  
7 the appropriate oversight program? Just a list of  
8 things, in my view, isn't very useful.

9 MR. GLENN: Yes, sir. I think the --

10 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: That's why I  
11 asked what is appropriate oversight, and I was hoping  
12 that you would come up with an oversight model or an  
13 oversight theory, and I hadn't heard that yet. So  
14 maybe you might want to --

15 MR. GLENN: Sir, the Pantex Site Office is  
16 responsible for overseeing all the work activities.  
17 My oversight program needs to cover all of that. I  
18 don't rely on external Sites to fill complete areas  
19 that my Site doesn't cover. What I do rely on is that  
20 the external oversight, to take a look at the areas  
21 that my Site is looking at and determine if that's  
22 sufficient or not.

23 The GAO, IG, those topics come in. Many  
24 times those topics are identified for other reasons.  
25 What we do is we take those reports, we look at those

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1 recommendations to determine, "Do I need to make  
2 changes to my oversight program to enhance or redirect  
3 it so that they cover the voids that are there?" But  
4 I believe that the Site Office oversight needs to  
5 cover and needs to stand on its own, and then all  
6 those other items that I mentioned are the  
7 redundancies that are built into the system to make  
8 sure that there aren't voids in it.

9 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: One way maybe  
10 of looking at it is that maybe somebody could divide  
11 what you do at Pantex into two things: one associated  
12 with operations, and one associated with  
13 infrastructure, engineering and analysis. And, of  
14 course, engineering and analysis overlap into both the  
15 operation itself and the infrastructure part of the  
16 operation.

17 Now, you said that you're weak on some of  
18 the infrastructure items in the form of certain  
19 experts that you need in order to do those kinds of  
20 things. And you would expect to get them from another  
21 source, such as this Albuquerque -- I forget what the  
22 word.

23 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Service Center.

24 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: Service Center  
25 operation.

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1 I'm going to give you an example and then  
2 I'm going to be quiet. We put together a list of  
3 things that the Board has unearthed and that you have  
4 unearthed and Headquarters has unearthed that the  
5 contractor did not unearth across NNSA. And the  
6 bottom line for that list is the necessity of having  
7 a coordinated and well structured oversight program.

8 Now, the thing that irritates the Board is  
9 that the Board finds things. You know, we're a little  
10 entity and we shouldn't find anything. We're not  
11 oversight. We just find things. Let me give you an  
12 example. This is an example that didn't cost very  
13 much money, and it's very small but it's highly  
14 important. And this is called the roof cracking issue  
15 in 12-64 [a Pantex Plant facility]. You're familiar  
16 with that?

17 MR. GLENN: Yes, sir.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: Okay. That  
19 was first talked about formally by us in June of 1998.  
20 Informally, it was talked about earlier. That is an  
21 infrastructure issue and a safety issue. Okay? They  
22 were both safety issues.

23 You are not staffed to deal with the  
24 analysis and issues that were bound in the roof  
25 cracking situation. The Department was not. The

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1 Department is not. You are not. We've been hassling  
2 with this simple sophomore engineering problem for  
3 five years. It's five years. And finally something  
4 has come about that.

5 Those things should never happen in an  
6 oversight operation that understands what's important  
7 and how things work. It's just very irritating that  
8 things like this happen.

9 So we can go down each one of these other  
10 items also. And my message to you is: I think you  
11 need to give it some thought on what oversight you  
12 really need and what oversight needs to be given to  
13 you on your operation. And Headquarters certainly  
14 should give a lot of thought to this.

15 The disbanding of the technical group in  
16 Headquarters just doesn't fit with what I just  
17 discussed.

18 So that's all I want to say. And I just  
19 think that you don't have the situation under control  
20 yet. The two things -- operations: you do a  
21 reasonable job at operations. The engineering and  
22 infrastructure needs a lot of help.

23 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dr. Mansfield?

25 DR. MANSFIELD: My concerns are similar,

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1 and some of the examples that I might cite are equally  
2 familiar. Some problems that you run into are just  
3 too hard to do and you're not expected to have, for  
4 instance, a nationally known lightning expert. But  
5 the Department is supposed to have one if it's going  
6 to carry on nuclear weapon activities. You know, the  
7 Department has got to be self-sufficient, and they've  
8 got to be able to provide you with what you need when  
9 you need it. And you have to have, not considerable  
10 certainty, not a warm feeling, but absolute certainty  
11 that you're going to be able to get the technical help  
12 from wherever, from Sandia or from the Service Center.

13 My worry is that as you dilute your  
14 technical capability by relying more on the CAS -- and  
15 I think it is a dilution, it's certain diminution if  
16 not a dilution -- it becomes harder and harder for you  
17 to recognize what you don't know.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: That's right.

19 DR. MANSFIELD: And that frightens me.

20 Furthermore, at your level you know this  
21 is something of a zero sum game. I mean, BWXT has to  
22 add capability or take the reassigned capability to do  
23 the CAS system while you're lowering your number of  
24 people and diminishing them of FTEs that did similar  
25 things before. You're relying on the CAS system to

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1 tell you what your own people told you before.

2           The next step up the chain is that  
3 Headquarters no longer has the capability to really do  
4 technical analysis and oversight to find out what's  
5 going on. They're relying on your understanding of --  
6 BWXT's understanding of what the problems and  
7 solutions are. Diminution of your technical  
8 capability in the Site Office coupled with essentially  
9 the elimination of it at Headquarters is really  
10 frightening to me. And especially when it's manifest  
11 in the fact that you say that you talk to Headquarters  
12 weekly and your people talk to them weekly. It would  
13 seem to me the more appropriate time would be hourly;  
14 that somebody at Headquarters would always be bugging  
15 you about the status of some corrective action.

16           I could just imagine if, say, Naval  
17 Reactors [NR] would have written testimony like yours.  
18 Can you imagine [Admiral] Rickover's organization  
19 allowing any shipyard to say that I'll talk to you  
20 weekly? I mean, they were talking to them all the  
21 time. Every issue has got somebody at Headquarters  
22 that tracks it.

23           For instance, on MoveRight, the problems  
24 with MoveRight that became obvious almost as soon as  
25 we started implementing it. Who at Headquarters did

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1 you notify? Who at Headquarters bugs you on this?  
2 That's an important enough program. You're relying on  
3 it, and you're relying on it. I'm pointing to Mr.  
4 Glenn and Mr. Mallory. You're relying on it for an  
5 important safety function. It's mysteriously failing  
6 in ways that might have been fixed during its design  
7 but weren't.

8 You know, this is sort of like a failing  
9 brazing in a sea water system, right? Headquarters in  
10 the Naval Reactor program would never, never let that  
11 go without daily attention. Who at Headquarters was  
12 providing daily attention to you on MoveRight?  
13 Anybody?

14 MR. GLENN: When the issues happened at  
15 the Plant, I contacted Dr. [Everet] Beckner and Dave  
16 Beck. They were my primary interfaces on the  
17 operational issues that occurred. What we've done is  
18 the contractor's put together a whole plan. The  
19 issues with MoveRight were the overall movement of  
20 material at the site program. We've identified those  
21 problems, and we are trying to -- you know, they are  
22 working on those issues.

23 DR. MANSFIELD: Yes, I realize that. But  
24 that's the answer that I expected. But did, for  
25 instance, Dr. Beckner or Mr. Beck say, "I want you to

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1 be in contact everyday with such-and-such?" Fill in  
2 the name; who's the name? Who at Headquarters knows  
3 enough about software assurance to make sure that  
4 you're doing the problem right and that Beckner knows?

5 MR. GLENN: There wasn't a name on --

6 DR. MANSFIELD: That's the answer. That's  
7 the answer I expected. I want to point out that the  
8 situation we're designing normally will have nobody at  
9 Headquarters that will be technically on top of fixing  
10 things when major safety issues comes up. You will  
11 have someone and they will be, you know, as good as  
12 you can make them. But let it be noted that  
13 Headquarters, who is singularly responsible for the  
14 safe operation of the system, doesn't have anybody.

15 Now, would that happen in Naval Reactors?  
16 I just don't think so.

17 The fundamental point that I'm getting at  
18 is that you changing the system or DOE and NNSA is  
19 changing the system, making you change the system, in  
20 ways that are very much in the direction opposite of  
21 what organizations that did difficult engineering have  
22 found worked very well.

23 You mentioned [chapters] 6, 7, 9, and 10  
24 of the Challenger report. But Chapter 11 is even more  
25 instructive in the technical characteristics of

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1 engineering management organizations that have proved  
2 correct in the past.

3 I want to point out that I'm far from  
4 being happy that this is going to work or satisfied  
5 that this isn't going to work. Because it's too much  
6 different, too unlike engineering management  
7 organizations that have worked in the past.

8 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dr. Matthews?

9 DR. MATTHEWS: Yes. Dan, I want to pursue  
10 the line of questioning on risk and balancing safety  
11 and productivity as they've talked about.

12 You talked about risk in the draft policy.  
13 And in Ambassador Brooks' testimony, they said that  
14 the NNSA plans to focus oversight and resources on the  
15 highest risk facilities. Pantex, obviously, has some  
16 pretty high risk facilities and operations. And I  
17 wondered if you could sort of cite what today's three  
18 highest risk activities are, and give me some ideas of  
19 how you assess those risks, what processes you use to  
20 assess those risks, and what criteria you use to  
21 prioritize them?

22 MR. GLENN: In general, the three highest  
23 risks are dealing with the direct weapons operations  
24 we do. And those risks are the thermal, the  
25 electrical, and mechanical insult to the weapon.

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1           We have developed our authorization basis  
2           for individual weapons activities that go through the  
3           hazard analysis. That then gets reviewed by the  
4           safety review team in federal staff with laboratory  
5           participation. That then gets approved by me as the  
6           risk acceptance official, and in that document, as you  
7           know, we develop the controls that are then  
8           implemented as a result of that. So I would say all  
9           the risks or essentially the highest level risk are  
10          associated with the nuclear explosive operations. And  
11          we think we have that well defined.

12                 Along with that is assessment of the  
13          facility design and support; where we do that work  
14          activity. Again, in compliance with the 10 CFR 830  
15          [Nuclear Safety Rule] requirements to establish an  
16          authorization basis for the whole site, we have also  
17          worked through a lot of modules that define both the  
18          facility design and the general natural phenomenon  
19          events that occur at the site so that the work that we  
20          are doing recognizes the environment that it's being  
21          done in. And we try to establish the controls to  
22          mitigate or to prevent, put accident mitigators into  
23          the process.

24                         Did that answer?

25                         DR. MATTHEWS: Well, sort of. I thought

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1 you'd be a little more specific in your answer, but  
2 that's okay.

3 Do you use a classic risk base process for  
4 looking at consequence and likelihood when you  
5 identify [risks]? Because the reason I'm getting to  
6 this is that your resources are going to be focused on  
7 those high risk activities, and so there has to be a  
8 good solid basis for deciding where you put your  
9 limited resources.

10 MR. GLENN: Yes. I think we do use the  
11 standard and the risk assessment techniques identified  
12 on DOE Standard 3009 [Preparation Guide for U.S.  
13 Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility  
14 Safety Analysis Reports], which is primarily a "what  
15 if" technology and then some individual cases of  
16 further risk analysis. But, yes, most of those are  
17 with the focus on the mechanical insults. The threats  
18 exist in all three areas; the thermal, electrical, and  
19 mechanical. So we have devoted a lot of our attention  
20 on interrupting the mechanical threats to the weapon  
21 primarily. Do more of that early in the process on  
22 those.

23 DR. MATTHEWS: And so I assume you'll  
24 focus your oversight in those areas primarily?

25 Okay. Now, as you said, you're now the

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1 risk acceptance official.

2 MR. GLENN: Yes.

3 DR. MATTHEWS: You're also the contracting  
4 officer. Therefore, you have both the responsibility  
5 for safety and programmatic delivery and security, I  
6 assume, in there?

7 MR. GLENN: Correct.

8 DR. MATTHEWS: So you've got to balance  
9 those three major activities. And so I was curious,  
10 how you going to do that balancing? How you going to  
11 make that decision whether to take a risk, put more  
12 resources on it? You know, and as part of that what  
13 are your three primary programmatic mission  
14 deliverables, too, so you've got that down? So how do  
15 you make that balance? Are you the decision maker or  
16 does it go up to Headquarters? And how do you get the  
17 data to make sure you don't miss something and the  
18 like?

19 MR. GLENN: That's a large question. See  
20 how I can do to answer that.

21 The balance, first of all, my nuclear  
22 operations experience gives me some -- my personal  
23 opinion on what is an acceptable risk and what passes  
24 the acceptance factor of formality of operations. And  
25 I use that a lot when I weigh the decisions that come

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1 in.

2 Along with that, we have the formal  
3 development of the authorization basis that identifies  
4 the probability, the number of what is the probability  
5 of this specific accident occurring. So I can look at  
6 those numbers and focus attention on the ones that are  
7 more probable than others.

8 Now, to balance that so that there's a  
9 balance that goes on with understanding the  
10 uncertainty of those calculations and the consequences  
11 of those. And let's say I use my own personal  
12 judgment, I use the results of the formal hazard  
13 analysis process, and then we use the comments that  
14 come in externally on the work activity that we're  
15 doing to also assess that.

16 Now, you were saying that the three  
17 primary mission is to -- again, I tried to identify  
18 that early in my talk. My job as the Site Manager, I  
19 have to comply with law, and that covers all aspects  
20 of it. You know, I am expected to accomplish a  
21 mission at the site, too, and there are specific  
22 documents that define how many of our product is. And  
23 we consider that important to the Chief. And then we  
24 also assess the overall performance and recognition of  
25 the safety programs already working. Are we seeing

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1 the reduction in the total reportable incidents over  
2 time? So we focus on that on the program level.

3 In there comes security, too. And as is  
4 often the case they're contradicting or conflicting  
5 priorities. Security changes don't necessarily  
6 promote some of the mission production. But we weigh  
7 that again. Under the security side I have analysis,  
8 vulnerability analysis, things that are performed that  
9 put it in a pretty good perspective for me. And then  
10 I figure out what I am comfortable with. And I always  
11 have the option of not authorizing the work to be  
12 accomplished.

13 And what we are seeing right now is a  
14 delay in authorization of some of this work. Some of  
15 these in the reductions that we have because we've  
16 lost folks and things and the transition that we see,  
17 we're not turning our back to looking at the activity.  
18 What is happening is it's taking us longer to convince  
19 ourselves we understand it, and that's delaying some  
20 of the work product. But that's where we weigh that,  
21 and that's where it's coming out is delay in some  
22 schedule aspects as we work through making sure that  
23 we understand all aspects of the problem.

24 DR. MATTHEWS: So, for example, would you  
25 delay disassembly in favor of applying the seamless

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1 safety type of rigging to that unit?

2 MR. GLENN: Yes. I mean, we have done  
3 that. Again, it's a balance of the work. If the work  
4 doesn't present any unique hazard, and there is a plan  
5 to improve, step-wise improvement of the process down  
6 the road, we do take a look at that. We assess is  
7 there a need to stop that work to make enhancements  
8 now, or can it wait? And we do make those judgments.  
9 Those judgments are reflected in an integrated weapons  
10 activity plan that we developed that prioritize our  
11 work to focus on our conventional high explosive  
12 weapons first and then the work secondly.

13 DR. MATTHEWS: Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Anything else?

15 DR. MATTHEWS: No.

16 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dan, let me say, as you  
17 correctly pointed out the Board has been a strong  
18 advocate the Facility Reps program. And personally,  
19 I've always looked upon you as an excellent example of  
20 the success of that program. You as a former Facility  
21 Rep are now a key manager in one of, I'd say, one of  
22 the most important sites and work that the DOE is  
23 responsible for. So I've looked upon the Facility Rep  
24 programs not only of the DOE having the eyes and ears  
25 of their people right down on the deck plates knowing

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1 what's going on, but as a training program. Because  
2 we've always supported the idea of the Site Reps  
3 should not be kept in that position, but be given  
4 opportunities to move up the chain. And that's what  
5 we've been encouraging.

6 So it's a little bothersome to me when I  
7 see you're being given more responsibility out at the  
8 site, much more responsibility, and with less people.  
9 You're being cut back on the numbers of people you  
10 have at the same time you're being given more  
11 responsibility. And where are you looking for more  
12 people? Business management. QA is where you're  
13 cutting back, Quality Assurance. And the Facility Rep  
14 program at your site, you're cutting back. So you're  
15 cutting back across the line on total numbers of  
16 people to do the work and the place now you're putting  
17 your emphasis is business management.

18 You're looking to the contractor to be  
19 responsible for QA. Well, the contractor has that  
20 responsibility right today. For the contractor to now  
21 be told he has to improve or get improved in that  
22 area, that's his responsibility right from the  
23 beginning under the current way of operations. But  
24 it's bothersome to me when I see what I think I see is  
25 a cutback in your technical competence people and

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1 reliance more on the contractor in that area, which is  
2 the safety area. And particularly, as I say, if we  
3 start cutting back on Facility Reps, we're not  
4 training the personnel that we're looking for. And  
5 we're not advancing, as the Congress asked us to do,  
6 to try to improve the technical competence. And  
7 that's one of the reasons we've been such strong  
8 support of the Facility Rep program.

9 Now, let me ask you, you're going to  
10 depend upon Albuquerque, apparently. Now, you have a  
11 problem and you don't have the technical competence  
12 now. Can you order them at Albuquerque to send you  
13 somebody, or do you have to go to Headquarters and say  
14 please arrange for somebody from Albuquerque to come  
15 help me? How are you going to get this assistance  
16 that you're going to be needing?

17 MR. GLENN: As you know, right now we're  
18 in the transition of the Service Center. The goal and  
19 the vision of that is I am responsible for, again,  
20 overseeing all the work activity; specific expertise  
21 that I just don't have and ones that need to remain  
22 current. Software Quality Assurance is a classic  
23 example of that.

24 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Yes.

25 MR. GLENN: That is --

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1 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: So, can you order them  
2 to come and help you?

3 MR. GLENN: The intent is, yes, I pick up  
4 the phone to the Service Center and say I need this  
5 technical expertise at the Site. Send them to the Site  
6 Office, and then --

7 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. And they tell  
8 you, I'm sorry, they're tied up right now on something  
9 else. Maybe next month I can send the guy over  
10 because he's working on something else. Now, can you  
11 say no, I want him right now, and I have to then  
12 comply with your request?

13 MR. GLENN: I then go to that person's  
14 supervisor up to the Service Center Manager and if I--

15 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: And he tells you the  
16 same thing? I mean, we're having problems like that  
17 with the Laboratories.

18 MR. GLENN: Yes.

19 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: You need help from the  
20 Laboratory, and you call the Laboratory for  
21 assistance. And that's one of the problems we've been  
22 trying to solve with, "We're the Laboratory; we'll  
23 get around to it sometime." So I see the same problem  
24 developing that we've had with the Laboratories giving  
25 you the assistance you need in a timely manner.

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1 You're going to have the same thing, I think, of  
2 getting that kind of assistance. The first thing,  
3 you're going to have to find the guy who supposedly is  
4 at the Service Center, which they don't have right  
5 now. So you're already cutting back on your technical  
6 competence, in my opinion, and looking to the Service  
7 Center that doesn't have them yet. So you're already  
8 into a program which has not been put together yet.

9 So I also --

10 VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: Yes.  
11 Furthermore, on our little example of the roof  
12 cracking issue. Evidently for five years, that meant  
13 nobody understood at your Site the importance of that  
14 issue. So, therefore, you are deficient in the  
15 technical capabilities to realize that you have a  
16 problem. And, so, if you can't recognize a problem,  
17 how can you ask for the people even?

18 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: No. Let's move on.

19 We would like see -- first off, the fact  
20 that you are getting all this, in my opinion,  
21 additional responsibility at the Site. It seems to me  
22 that's where you need more technical competence to  
23 help you, not less.

24 You wanted to say something?

25 DR. MANSFIELD: Yes. I'd like to explore

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1 another Pantex issue in this regard, and that is  
2 especially the notion of accepting risk.

3 Current authorization basis limits you to  
4 a single weapon operation within a bay or cell --  
5 within a bay, anyway. There's a proposal that says a  
6 certain weapon that be at stage one while working on  
7 another. Okay. We have been -- beg your pardon?  
8 Yes, you'll see why.

9 The issue we've been examining is how  
10 you're doing the Safety Analysis for that,  
11 particularly the risk assessment and controls. The  
12 proposal, apparently, is that since the initiating  
13 accident is essentially so unlikely as not to be  
14 worried about, that no controls are required to  
15 protect the second weapon from anything that might  
16 happen to the first because the probably of anything  
17 happening to the first is very small. We strongly  
18 question that, and we think you ought to, also.

19 And so my questions to you are: do you  
20 believe that the risk analysis in its current state  
21 conforms, for weapon staging in a bay, conforms to the  
22 requirements of [DOE Standard] 3009? And the second  
23 question is who at Headquarters is aware of the  
24 importance of this issue and has given you any  
25 direction on it?

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1 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: I'd hold off a bit on  
2 this. We will discuss this more with you at a later  
3 date on the particular problem we're facing right now  
4 on that matter. You know what the matter is?

5 MR. GLENN: Yes, sir. Would you like me  
6 to respond now?

7 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Well, if you can do it.  
8 I don't want to get into classified --

9 DR. MANSFIELD: Oh, no. This is not --

10 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: I understand. But you  
11 were getting into areas I would --

12 MR. GLENN: As the Site Manager, I'm very  
13 aware of the details of that topic. I have been in  
14 conversation with Dr. Beckner and Dave Beck on that  
15 continuously for the last several months on that. I  
16 have a very clear picture in my mind of what the  
17 threat is and how it should be analyzed, and I look  
18 forward to presenting that with respect to --

19 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Yes. We will get  
20 together with you on that matter.

21 Dan, let me say before I turn over to Mr.  
22 Mallory, I think you're trying to do a good job, and  
23 you are doing a good job now -- and with all the  
24 responsibilities you have on your shoulders, more help  
25 there. And to the extent that we can, we want to be

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1 helpful to you. But I think, as I said before, you in  
2 my mind personify one of the best in the DOE program  
3 coming up through the Facility Rep program and  
4 assuming the responsibilities that you've taken on  
5 down at Pantex. And I'd say this is one of the  
6 toughest jobs that DOE has, and you have that job for  
7 DOE. So I want to thank you for the effort and what  
8 you've been doing today.

9 MR. GLENN: Thank you, sir. We certainly  
10 appreciate your insights. And I guarantee you, we are  
11 thinking very hard and long about these changes.

12 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: All right. Now we'll  
13 turn to Mr. Michael Mallory, who is the General  
14 Manager at BWXT Pantex. And also, Mike, we will put  
15 in the record a résumé of your background and  
16 experience.

17 MR. MALLORY: Okay.

18 Thank you for the opportunity to speak  
19 today regarding the Contractor Assurance System at  
20 BWXT Pantex. I am Mike Mallory, the President and  
21 General Manager of BWXT Pantex, which is the M&O  
22 contractor of the Pantex Plant for the Department of  
23 Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration.

24 BWXT Pantex is responsible for five core  
25 missions at Pantex: (1) We evaluate, retrofit, and

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