[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]
July 17, 2001
Mr. David E, Beck
Acting Deputy Administrator
for Defense
Programs
Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Dear Mr. Beck:
The staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board (Board) has reviewed the safety basis for the Joint Actinide Shock
Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) facility at the Nevada Test Site. The enclosed report on JASPER by the Board’s
staff is provided for your use and information. The staff found that the preliminary hazard categorization of the
facility as Hazard Category 3 has been reduced to Radiological. This change in the hazard categorization was
achieved by applying design and operational features of the facility components
to mitigate a release without identifying those features as a Technical Safety
Requirement (TSR). These components
rely on active engineered systems and administrative controls to properly
function as described in the JASPER Hazard Analysis Report.
A preliminary review of the existing safety basis
indicates that mitigating components are adequately designed and proceduralized
to ensure safety. However, because
these components are not formally credited as safety related components
controlled by a TSR, it is not clear that they will be maintained to the same
level of quality over time. The Board
believes that a configuration and operational control system such as the
Department of Energy’s TSR process, as mandated by the Nuclear Safety
Management rule, needs to be implemented to avoid degradation and potential
reduction in safety.
The Board requests a briefing on the hazard
categorization of the JASPER facility.
If the TSR process is not to be used, as in the current safety basis,
this briefing should also address the configuration and operational control of
mitigating components.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
c: Kathleen A,
Carlson
Mrs.
Camille Yuan-Soo Hoo
Mr. Mark
B, Whitaker, Jr.
Enclosure
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Staff Issue Report
June 4,2001
MEMORANDUM FOR: J.
K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
COPIES: Board
Members
FROM: J.
Deplitch
SUBJECT: Joint
Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility
This report documents a review of the Joint Actinide
Shock Physics Experimental Research (JASPER) facility at the Nevada Test Site
(NTS), performed by the staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Board). The Board’s staff has been
reviewing the preparations, identification and analysis of hazards and
controls, and development of a safety basis for the facility during the past
year. Members of the staff F. Bamdad,
J. Blackman, J. Deplitch, and T. Huntley participated in the review.
Background. The JASPER facility is being developed and
will be operated by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) at NTS to
conduct shock physics experiments on special nuclear material and other
actinide materials. JASPER will use a
two-stage, light-gas gun to shoot projectiles at actinide materials to study
fundamental physical properties of the materials. Projectile velocities will
range from 1 to 8 kilometers per second, inducing pressures of up to 6
megabars. The project will support the
Stockpile Stewardship Program by providing physics data necessary to meet
milestones in campaigns of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of Defense
Programs, including: primary certification, dynamic materials properties, and
material lifetimes.
The JASPER facility is located at Able Site in Area 27
of NTS. Construction and facility
modifications started in April 1999 and were completed in September 1999. The gas gun, systems, and components were
installed in 2000. Prestart testing of
the gas gun, support systems, and diagnostics began in March 2001. The facility is expected to be operational
around August 2001.
Hazard Category.
A number of radionuclides-including plutonium-238; plutonium-239; various
isotopes of uranium; and, to a lesser degree, other actinides may be used as
target materials in the shock physics experiments. The experiments will use up to 2.5 grams of plutonium-238 and 50
grams of plutonium-239; the threshold values for a Hazard Category 3 nuclear
facility in DOE standard 1027-92 are 0.036 and 8.4 grams, respectively. A preliminary hazard analysis of JASPER
determined the facility to be Hazard Category 3. The DOE standard, however, allows that if the form, location,
dispersibility, and interaction with available energy sources can reduce the
unmitigated release of plutonium below the threshold values, the facility may
be categorized as a Radiological nuclear facility.
As documented in the JASPER Hazard Analysis Report
(HAR), LLNL has determined that the JASPER facility is a Radiological facility
based on the existence of a secondary confinement system and several procedural
controls. The HAR takes advantage of
components of the gas gun, such as the primary target chamber and the secondary
confinement chamber, to mitigate a release.
LLNL treats these components as passive barriers. However, the HAR and documents available to
the Board’s staff do not demonstrate the reliability of these components to
mitigating a release, mainly because the systems are not categorized as safety
systems, and sufficient configuration control is not provided to demonstrate
their claimed reliability.
Additionally, these components rely upon several support systems, such
as gas systems, a computer control system, and administrative controls, to
function as designed. The HAR also
inappropriately applies a leak path factor to the components to mitigate a
release from these apparent design features. Based on the current analysis, the
hazard categorization does not appear to be appropriate.
Hazards and Controls. The JASPER
HAR does not adequately analyze hazards and identify and analyze controls. The HAR applies the “what-if” technique to
identify possible accident scenarios.
Several possible failure modes of the primary target chamber, secondary
confinement chamber, and support systems, as well as the resulting
consequences, have not been addressed. For example, it is not adequately demonstrated that a projectile
would not penetrate the primary target chamber and result in a release of the
radioactive material in excess of the analyzed scenarios. Credit is taken for controls that are not
identified as safety systems to prevent the potential for such events. The probability of accidents does not appear
to be adequately supported by data. The
contractor believes the equipment relied upon for confining the hazards would
prevent such events; as mentioned earlier, however, these components are not
designated as safety systems. Additionally, the adequacy and reliability of
controls is not addressed sufficiently.
Safety Basis. LLNL has determined that the H.AR and the
collection of system design descriptions (SDDs) constitute the safety basis for
JASPER. However, the HAR and SDDs do
not adequately describe the hazards, accident scenarios, and controls
associated with the operation.
Additional technical support documents are needed to adequately verify the
analysis of hazards and accident scenarios, and to identify the controls relied
upon for safety and their pertinent system design specifications and criteria.
No Technical Safety Requirements have been identified
for this hazardous operation. As currently
categorized, the operation is exempt from compliance with Subpart B of the
Nuclear Safety Management rule (i.e., Safety Analysis Report, Unreviewed Safety
Question, Technical Safety Requirements), DOE review and approval of the safety
basis for this activity will not be required.
However, DOE is expected to review safety management practices at JASPER
and to authorize the scope of activities at the facility through the Real
Estate/Operations Permit. It is prudent
before DOE readiness assessment reviews proceed for: (1) the contractor to
identify the controls that are relied upon for safety of the operation in a TSR
document to be made part of the authorization basis of the facility, and (2)
for DOE to assess and approve the adequacy of the controls and their
configuration management.