By David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins

“The unstoppable spread of information networking and know how gives rise to the need for a new edge – one that utilizes but transcends networks – by developing people, teams, and decisionmaking methods that convert information into better choices and outcomes. We call this new edge ‘battle-wisdom.’” – Battle-Wise

The United States is well on its way to integrating the use of information networks into its warfighting doctrine. At the same time, adversaries are leveraging networking technologies and concepts to further their aims. Although many of these adversaries are technologically inferior to U.S. firepower, their use of network-centric concepts can potentially affect the costs of war. The mutation of Al Qaeda after 9/11 and the ongoing insurgency in Iraq provide a glimpse of what U.S. forces are likely to face in the future. As a result, military operations are likely to grow even more complex, stressful, ill-defined, and politically sensitive than they have been in the past.

One result of this trend is that junior ranks of enlisted personnel and officers are being given increasing levels of responsibility. Decisions that were once made by colonels are being made by captains and majors, and the consequences of those decisions can have a global impact. At the same time, adversaries are using networks to make the lives of U.S. soldiers even more difficult. How can U.S. forces respond to these challenges? The answer is by improving the ability of soldiers to make quick, accurate, and reliable decisions through a combination of more timely reasoning and more reliable intuition – the former to make use of networked information and the latter to overcome the diminished utility of experience when faced with novel and complex situations. The authors argue that current and future operational environments call for the integration of reasoning and intuition into “battle-wisdom.” Battle-wise individual, teams and forces are able to create time-information advantages by making swift but sound decisions in the heat and fog of combat.

Few would disagree that having more battle-wise soldiers is a good idea. The hard part is determining what needs to be done to create, develop and retain battle-wise forces. The results of the analysis fall into three broad categories: (a) improving the cognitive abilities of individual war-fighters; (b) reforming command and control to harness these abilities; and (c) enhancing the collective cognitive power of teams.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.

First printing, July 2006.

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