[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]

January 14, 2000

The Honorable Bill Richardson
Secretary of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585-1000

Dear Secretary Richardson:

On May 26, 1994, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) submitted to the Secretary of Energy Recommendation 94-1, dealing with the need to stabilize and safely store large amounts of fissionable and other nuclear material that for safety reasons should not be permitted to remain unremediated. The Board was especially concerned about specific liquids and solids in spent fuel storage pools, reactor basins, reprocessing canyons, processing lines and various defense facilities remaining in the manufacturing pipeline when pit production was terminated in 1988. On August 31, 1994, Secretary O'Leary agreed with and accepted the recommendation. On February 28, 1995, Secretary O'Leary forwarded to the Board the Department of Energy's (DOE) plan for implementation of the Boards recommendation on this issue. Subsequently, on December 28, 1998, you forwarded to the Board a revision to Secretary O'Leary's original Implementation Plan for Recommendation 94-1.

During the past year, the Board and its staff have been closely following and noting further slippage in the time table for meeting the dates set forth in the Implementation Plan. While a great deal has been accomplished in meeting the safety objective set forth in Recommendation 94-1 particularly with regard to those materials that constituted the most imminent hazards, the Board is concerned that severe problems continue to exist and delay the implementation of Recommendation 94-1. After careful consideration, the Board has concluded that the progress being made in certain of the stabilization activities addressed by Recommendation 94-1 does not reflect the urgency that the circumstances merit and that was central to the Board's recommendation.

The Board will continue to follow and urge DOE to implement Recommendation 94-1. In addition, the Board, on January 14, 2000, unanimously approved Recommendation 2000-1 which is enclosed for your consideration.

42 U.S.C. § 2286d(a) requires that after your receipt of this recommendation, the Board promptly make it available to the public in DOE's regional public reading rooms. The Board believes the recommendation contains no information that is classified or otherwise restricted.

To the extent this recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have it promptly placed on file in your regional public reading rooms.

The Board will also publish this recommendation in the Federal Register.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway
Chairman

Enclosure

c: Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.

 


DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
RECOMMENDATION 2000-1 TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2286a(a)(5)
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended


Dated: January 14, 2000

Background

It is now almost six years since the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) transmitted to the Secretary of Energy its Recommendation 94-1 entitled, "Improved Schedule for Remediation in Defense Nuclear Facilities Complex." That Recommendation pointed to the existence of large quantities of unstable fissionable material and other radioactive material that had been left in the production pipeline following termination of nuclear weapons production. These materials required prompt conversion to more stable forms, to prevent deterioration leading to inevitable spread of radioactive contamination. Further, some of the material was in such a state that serious safety problems could be expected in a very short period of time if remediation did not take place.

The Recommendation identified safety problems posed by plutonium both as metal and in chemical compounds, and plutonium-bearing materials such as residues and spent nuclear fuel. Most of this material was and still is at three sites: Savannah River, Hanford, and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS). A substantial amount of spent nuclear fuel also existed at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. In the Implementation Plan responding to the Recommendation, the Department of Energy (DOE) justifiably saw fit to add to the sources of concern the enriched uranium solution stored at the Savannah River Site, accumulated from processing of spent nuclear fuel, and the highly radioactive uranium-233 in the decommissioned Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The highly enriched uranium solution, amounting to many thousands of gallons of liquid, is stored outside the H-Canyon in large tanks where over a period of time precipitation resulting from freezing, chemical changes, or evaporation of liquid could produce sediments posing a threat of accidental criticality. The MSRE has been shut down for many decades, and deterioration, the onset of which had already been detected, could in time release its radioactive material into the environment.

Materials Stabilized Since the Recommendation

In the years since the Recommendation, progress has been made at defense nuclear facilities in remediating the most hazardous material. Most sites have repackaged plutonium metal and oxides that had been left in containers in contact with plastic that could become a source of hydrogen gas. Deteriorating spent nuclear fuel elements stored in the 603 Basin at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory have been moved to the 666 Basin where control of water purity is much better. Substantial amounts of spent nuclear fuel elements and nuclear targets stored in basins at the Savannah River Site have been chemically processed and plutonium and other radioactive material so extracted have been stored. Most of the plutonium in solution at the Savannah River Site has been converted to metal and along with other plutonium metal at the Site has been packaged in seal-welded containers with inert atmospheres by means of the bagless transfer system. Almost all of the plutonium-bearing solutions in facilities at the RFETS have been chemically treated to remove the plutonium, which has then been stored as more stable oxide. Numerous drums containing radioactive residues, mostly at the RFETS, have been vented to prevent buildup of pressure by gas liberated through chemical reactions and by effects of radioactive decay. Though non-technical problems continue to plague actions to store nuclear waste in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility in New Mexico, some storage at that site has taken place, and presumably momentum will build toward highly important shipment of more material to that disposal site. In these ways, most of the very immediate concerns prompting the Recommendation have been eased.

Furthermore, after a long period when it seemed that little was being accomplished, progress has been made toward cleanup of the important K-East and K-West fuel storage basins at the Hanford Site. Remediation of many of the cleanup problems at the RFETS has taken on momentum after a long initial period when little was accomplished. Some of the most notable advances have been made by arrangements to ship plutonium-bearing material to the Savannah River Site and to WIPP.

Approximately 300,000 liters of plutonium solution in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site have now been converted to metal in the FB-Line. This material is stored in approximately 80 welded stainless steel cans that will serve as the inner containers to meet DOE-STD-3013. Plutonium solutions resulting from stabilization of Mark-31 spent nuclear fuel have also been converted to metal, and along with the preexisting metal items in the FB-Line, are also stored in similar DOE-STD-3013 inner containers.

Problems Remaining

Severe problems continue to impede other remedial measures that had been promised in the original Implementation Plan issued by the Secretary of Energy in response to Recommendation 94-1, and in Revision 1 to that Plan as issued on December 28, 1998. For a variety of reasons, many of them stated below, most of the remaining milestones in the Implementation Plans will not be met. Among the remaining problems are the following:

The above are not all of the materials referred to in Recommendation 94-1, but they are the major ones for which remediation schedules have fallen well behind those contemplated by the Recommendation and by the original Implementation Plan.

Fiscal Problem

The most common reason given for failure to meet schedules has been insufficient financial support. That being so, the Board does not understand why the Department of Energy has not obeyed the statutory requirement in the Atomic Energy Act as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2286d(f)(2),

(2) If the Secretary of Energy determines that the implementation of a Board recommendation (or part thereof) is impracticable because of budgetary considerations, or that the implementation would affect the Secretary's ability to meet the annual nuclear weapons stockpile requirements established pursuant to section 91 of this Act [42 U.S.C. § 2121], the Secretary shall submit to the President, to the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate, and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report containing the recommendation and the Secretary's determination.

In any case, simultaneous implementation of all elements of Recommendation 94-1 to schedules previously committed seems to be impossible under present circumstances allegedly because of budgetary constraints. Given this fiscal reality, DOE is faced with the need to:

  1. advise Congress and the President of the shortfall in funds to satisfy all the safety enhancements to meet Recommendation 94-1, and

  2. prioritize and schedule tasks to be undertaken with available funds according to consideration of risks.

Recommendation

In the Board's view, material remaining in liquids generally poses the greatest hazard, because of higher possibility of dispersal and because of potential criticality. Among these liquids the highly enriched uranium solutions stored in tanks outside the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site require the most attention because of criticality concerns. Following the solutions in importance are unstabilized plutonium oxides and plutonium metal remaining in containers with normal atmosphere, especially at locations in moist climates. Closely following in importance are various plutonium-bearing residues which are not as well isolated or packaged as they should be. Accordingly, the Board recommends the following technical actions in descending order of priority. 

  1. Stabilize the uranium solution in tanks outside the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site, to remove criticality concerns. This should not await plans to convert the uranium to fuel for Tennessee Valley Authority's nuclear reactors.

  2. Remediate the highly-radioactive solutions of americium and curium in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site. The currently-planned deferral of vitrification of this material is highly undesirable.

  3. Remediate the solution of neptunium now stored in H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site.

  4. Convert remaining plutonium solutions to stable oxides or metals, and subsequently package them into welded containers with inert atmosphere. The principal remaining solutions are in H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site, and the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site.

  5. Treat the plutonium-bearing polycubes at PFP to remove and stabilize the plutonium.

  6. Continue stabilization of spent nuclear fuel at Savannah River.

  7. Stabilize and seal within welded containers with an inert atmosphere the plutonium oxides produced by various processes at defense nuclear facilities, and which are not yet in states conforming to the long-term storage envisaged by DOE-STD-3013. These oxides are found at the F Area of the Savannah River Site, the RFETS, the Plutonium Finishing Plant at the Hanford Site, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  8. Enclose existing and newly-generated legacy plutonium metal in sealed containers with an inert atmosphere. Removal of loose oxide should of course take place just before sealing.

  9. Remediate and/or safely store the various residues which are found at all three of the production sites, as well as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.


It is assumed that the schedule for remediation of the spent fuel in the K-Basins at the Hanford Site will continue as currently planned.

The ordering of priorities should not be understood as implying a lack of importance attached to those lower in the sequence. It is simply a recognition that under the circumstances the greater hazards should be addressed first and with greatest firmness. All elements of the original Recommendation 94-1 retain their importance and none are to be considered unessential.

Also, the Board's staff has been discussing with DOE staff an ordering of tasks subject to Recommendation 94-1 in accordance with ease of their performance. Those actions which can readily be conducted within present resources should certainly go forward, as long as items of high safety priority receive the proper attention.

The severity of the problems which are the subject of this Recommendation and Recommendation 94-1 and the urgency to remediate them argue forcefully for the Secretary to avail himself of the authority under the Atomic Energy Act to "implement any such Recommendation (or part of any such Recommendation) before, on, or after the date on which the Secretary transmits the implementation plan to the Board under this subsection." See, 42 U.S.C. § 2286d(e). The Board suggests that the Secretary avail himself of this provision.

In addition, because stabilization of materials remaining from the Weapons Production Program continues to be of such importance, the Board recommends that:

  1. An estimate be made of the total funding shortfall for timely completion of all 94-1 commitments according to the accepted Implementation Plans, and
  1. Congress and the President be notified of the shortfall in accordance with statutory    requirements.

John T. Conway
Chairman