[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]
May 5, 1995
Dr. Victor H. Reis
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
Department of Energy
Washington, D.C. 20585
Dear Dr. Reis:
Staff members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) visited the
Savannah River Site tritium facilities and the Pantex Plant facilities to review storage
and handling of tritium reservoirs. The results of these reviews indicated problems in
storage, handling, and overall coordination of tritium activities.
The purpose of these visits was to review the ability of the facilities to safely
manage the increasing number of tritium reservoirs being returned to the Department of
Energy from the Department of Defense. In particular, the reviews focused on compensatory
measures to be implemented with regard to expired reservoirs, i.e., reservoirs that have
exceeded their limit life and have an increased probability of leaking. The results of
these reviews identify potential safety issues with current work practices for safe
storage and handling of tritium reservoirs, particularly with regard to the expired
reservoirs. The enclosed reports provide a synopsis of the observations made during the
reviews and are forwarded for your consideration.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
c: Mr. Mark Whitaker, EH-9
Dr. Mario Fiori, Manager SR Operations Office
Mr. Gerald Johnson, Director Amarillo Area Office
Enclosures
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
March 23, 1995
MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director
COPIES: Board Members
FROM: Michael J. Merritt
Subject: Savannah River Site (SRS), Review of Tritium Reservoir
Storage and Handling, March 13-15, 1995
1. Purpose: This trip report documents a Board staff review of the
storage and handling of tritium reservoirs at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Tritium
Facilities. The visit included Board staff members Michael Merritt, Ronald Barton and
William Yeniscavich during the period March 13-15, 1995.
2. Summary: The Board's staff conducted a review of tritium reservoir
storage and handling at the SRS tritium facilities. Reservoirs that have exceeded their
limit life (expired) have an increased potential for leaking due to increasing internal
pressure and material degradation. Even though Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC),
the SRS contractor, has implemented measures to help protect the reservoirs and mitigate
leaking reservoirs (handling procedures and leaking reservoir response drills), the staff
believes that placing the highest risk reservoirs in secondary containment would be
prudent. Shipping containers and other facility engineered barriers (e.g. glove boxes) are
available for this purpose.
3. Background: Stockpile reduction and dismantlement have resulted in
a large backlog of reservoirs that are being returned to SRS for unloading. During the
last several months, the Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories (the design agencies
for tritium reservoirs) have worked closely with the Albuquerque Operations Office,
Savannah River Operations Office (SR), and WSRC to identify and prioritize unloading
"high risk" reservoirs that have exceeded their limit life. There are several
hundred of these reservoirs currently in storage at SRS and, based on the projected influx
of reservoirs and the capacity to unload reservoirs, a large inventory of these reservoirs
will remain for several years.
Material degradation of the reservoirs occurs due to helium embrittlement.
Embrittlement into the inner wall of the reservoirs is due to diffusion of deuterium and
tritium into the walls and the buildup of helium due to tritium decay. The concentration
distribution of these elements in the reservoir wall is calculated at WSRC using a
finite-difference program and experimentally obtained data on solubilities and
diffusivities. The predicted thickness of the brittle layer on the inside surface of field
service reservoirs, at the end of stockpile life, is a maximum of 0.020 inch. No
confirmation of the calculated distributions is made by measurements on actual field
exposed or shelf storage reservoirs. In addition, drop tests are being conducted at WSRC
on virgin reservoirs and the results will be adjusted for the calculated brittle layer on
the inner wall. The current storage of these reservoirs does not provide defense in depth
for protection of workers and release to the environment. Reservoir leakage could result
in worker exposure, environmental release and contamination of operating tritium
facilities. For this reason, the staff believes that providing a secondary containment for
high risk reservoirs is both prudent and achievable. Robust reservoir shipping containers
(designed to contain a reservoir leak) are available and provide maximum protection from
leaking reservoirs. Facility containments in Building 233-H (RTF) could also provide
protection for workers and the environment.
4. Discussions/Observations: Based on increased concern for reservoir
integrity, DOE/SRand WSRC have locally implemented DOE/Albuquerque's Reservoir Age
Management Program (RAMP) at SRS Tritium Facilities. This program identifies and tracks
individual reservoirs using the Automated Reservoir Management System (ARMS). This system
is intended to ensure that reservoirs are unloaded in order of highest risk and to provide
control for inventory limits for building 233-H (RTF). DOE/SR and WSRC stated that
although the nominal unloading capacity in 233-H is 288 reservoirs per month, the actual
number of RAMP reservoirs unloaded is only a fraction of the capacity. The RAMP unloading
is constrained by various requirements including Department of Defense mission
requirements, facility logistics, facility inventory limits and reservoir reuse
requirements. WSRC is in the process of developing a formal guidance document to ensure
optimization of reservoir unloading.
Reservoirs from retired weapons and active weapon component exchange are received in
Building 234-H for unpackaging and transfer to storage. The majority of reservoirs are
stored in the 217-H vault while awaiting unloading in Building 233-H. While in storage,
the only barrier between the tritium and the workers and the environment is the integrity
of the reservoir. Radiation monitors in the facilities provide retrospective indication of
a leaking reservoir, and although personnel are trained to respond, identifying the source
could be difficult and tritium release would continue until containment was established.
The number of reservoirs in storage is expected to increase into 1996 and all expired
reservoirs are not expected to be unloaded until 1998.
Handling of tritium reservoirs and response to abnormal situations at SRS tritium
facilities are controlled by procedures. Staff observation of handling operations
indicated compliance with the facility procedures and formality of operations. Minor
inconsistencies between facility procedures were observed in the use of anti-contamination
clothing. Review of emergency response procedures and a drill for a leaking reservoir
revealed a lack of proficiency, lack of adherence to procedures, and procedure
deficiencies. The procedural response to a leaking reservoir does not provide the
responders with sufficient guidance to contain a leaking reservoir in a timely manner. The
response procedures are predicated on knowing the source of the tritium that cannot always
be verified. Therefore, during the drill the shift manager instructions were in conflict
with the response procedure and operator response was delayed unnecessarily. In addition,
the WSRC critique of the drill failed to identify these deficiencies and primarily
emphasized the positive aspects of the drill.
Due to the large number of tritium filled reservoirs being stored and handled by SRS
facilities, and the increased potential for leaks, the staff believes that the use of
secondary containments for the highest risk expired reservoirs would be feasible.
Additional training and drills for facility personnel are needed to improve proficiency to
respond to a leaking reservoir. These measures could reduce the consequence for this
potential hazard. The staff also believes that helium distribution measurements could be
made on selected reservoirs to confirm the calculated distributions and that field exposed
reservoirs in the drop test program would more closely represent expired reservoirs.
5. Future Staff Actions: The staff will continue an integrated review of tritium storage and reservoir issues as well as review of reservoir storage and handling operations at the Pantex plant.