[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]
August 14, 200l
Mr. Steven V. Cary
Acting Assistant Secretary
for
Environment, Safety and
Health
Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585-0119
Dear Mr. Cary:
The staff of the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) observed the pilot Phase II assessments
of confinement ventilation systems conducted at the Savannah River Site’s
H-Canyon on June 18-22, 2001, and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on
July 16-20, 2001. These assessments
were conducted in accordance with the Implementation Plan for the Board’s
Recommendation 2000-2,Configuration Management of Vital Safety Systems. The staff made several observations that the
Board believes could be used to strengthen the Criteria Review and Approach
Document (CRAD) for future Phase II assessments. The enclosure to this letter summarizes the staffs observations
and is provided for your information and use.
Sincerely,
Chairman
c: Mr. Michael J. Oldham
Mr. Ralph E. Erickson
Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.
Enclosure
Enclosure
Observations of the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (Board’s) staff on the Recommendation 2000-2,
Configuration Management, Vital Safety Systems Pilot Phase II Assessment
of Confinement Ventilation Systems at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).
On June 18-22 and July 16-20,
2001, the Board’s staff provided oversight of the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s)
assessment of confinement ventilation systems at SRS and LLNL. As the initial Phase II assessments
performed in accordance with the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 2000-2,
these assessments served as a proof test for the Criteria Review and Approach
Document (CRAD) titled Assessment Criteria and Guidelines to Ascertain the
Current Condition of Confinement Ventilation Systems. The assessment at the SRS H-Canyon was conducted in accordance
with Commitment 11 of the Implementation Plan as the first of two pilot Phase
II assessments. A second pilot
assessment was conducted at LLNL, Building 332. The pilot assessments will be used to enhance or modify the
assessment criteria and guidelines before the field office managers are given
the responsibility for carrying out the Phase II assessments at the remaining
facilities. The Phase II assessment
teams have documented their conclusions and recommendations. The following
additional observations made by the Board’s staff during the pilot assessments
at SRS and LLNL are provided as input to strengthen the CRAD for future
assessments:
•
While both the
implementation plan and the guiding principles contained in the
lead-in
material for the CRAD called for evaluating degradation of the system over its
service life the assessment criteria did not specifically call for this
evaluation. Therefore, the H-Canyon pilot
assessment did not address the ability of the confinement ventilation system to
perform its safety functions reliably during its remaining lifetime. The CRAD was revised before the second pilot
and the review of Building 332 at LLNL was therefore more thoroughly
conducted. However some inconsistencies
between guiding principles and the assessment criteria still exist. In addition, an in depth review is merited
to ensure consistency between the implementation plan and the CRAD.
•
LLNL created
detailed documentation supporting Phase I reports that were conducted
earlier. While this was not required as
a part of the Phase I reviews, they provided invaluable assistance during the
conduct of the Phase II review.
Therefore, the CRAD should be revised to ensure they are made available
to the assessment team.
•
System
walkdowns are specifically called for in the CRAD to assess existing material
conditions and physical layouts. During
the H-Canyon pilot assessment, the system walkdowns were limited to system
“tours” and provided only an overview for the assessment. During the LLNL review discussions among the
Board’s staff, the assessment team, and site personnel indicated that more
clarification is needed in the CRAD as to what is required to adequately
perform the system walkdowns.
•
The purpose for
these pilot assessments was to evaluate the CRAD being developed for
confinement ventilation systems that are important to safety. SRS, LLNL, and several other sites have
divided the confinement ventilation system, as well as other safety systems,
into several subsystems that are listed as vital safety systems. These vital safety systems may be
safety-class, safety-significant, or defense-in-depth systems. The physical boundaries of the Phase II review
must encompass each of the vital safety systems and their necessary support
systems that make up the safety system being evaluated (e.g., confinement
ventilation systems). This physical
boundary must be clearly communicated to the assessment team before the start
of the review. In addition, those
supporting systems that are called for to ensure that the vital safety systems
remain operable need to be listed as vital safety systems and need to be
reviewed as appropriate in accordance with the implementation plan.
•
Preparation of
the team leader and members is crucial.
Adequate time has to be allotted for this preparation, and the necessary
system-specific information (e.g., drawings) and training needs to be included. In addition adequate time needs to be
allocated for the performance of the review.
The CRAD specifically references a three week period for the
preparation, conduct, and reporting of these assessments. While it is not clear that the CRAD needs to
reference a specific time period, it does need to be more specific as to what
is intended to occur during this time period.
•
When the
assessment team observes challenges to future operations (e.g., leaks, cracks),
these should be documented so the facility can take action to ensure that
appropriate compensatory measures are in place, and needed repairs are made in
a timely manner.
•
While the
authorization basis should not be reconstituted, a mechanism ought to be in
place for documenting and communicating any problems in the authorization basis
that are noted during the assessment.
•
It proved very
beneficial to have teams that were comprised of experts in the area being
reviewed, in this case confinement ventilation systems, and that the team
leaders had excellent administrative skills.
It may be useful to develop and use a cadre of experts and team leaders
to perform these reviews. In this
regard, a senior, trained DOE employee should lead the assessment team, and be
involved in selecting and training members of the team. Consideration should be given to developing a
Team Leader’s Handbook similar to that used for the integrated safety
management system verifications, although less detail may be required.
•
While the
systems reviewed at SRS and LLNL do not depend heavily upon software for
control, many electro-mechanical systems do.
A review of the CRAD is merited to determine what changes are necessary
to ensure that software is adequately verified and validated to support the
operability of the vital safety system.