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| Defense Nuclear Facilities |
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| Safety Board |
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A General Description
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Board) is an independent organization within the executive branch chartered with the
responsibility of providing recommendations and advice to the President and the Secretary
of Energy regarding public health and safety issues at Department of Energy (Department)
defense nuclear facilities. In operation since in October 1989, the Board reviews and
evaluates the content and implementation of health and safety standards, as well as other
requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the
Department's defense nuclear facilities.
The Board consists of five Board members appointed by the President for staggered
five year terms. The Board is supported by almost 100 technical and administrative staff personnel and an annual budget of $22 million. The Board's enabling legislation authorizes a staff of up to 150 personnel. The Board headquarters is located in Washington D.C., at 625 Indiana Avenue NW. Ten Board staff personnel are currently on
two-three year rotational assignment at the following DOE sites: Los Alamos, Livermore, Pantex, Hanford, Oak Ridge, and
Savannah River.
Formal written recommendations to the
Secretary of Energy are the most powerful mechanism used by the Board for advising the
Department with regard to safety. Since its inception the Board has issued
48 recommendations, an average of 3 per year. For each recommendation, the Secretary must
provide a response which accepts or rejects the recommendation and, if accepted, provide
an implementation plan to resolve the acknowledged issues. To date, the Secretary of
Energy has accepted every Board recommendation, though three were accepted with conditions
or exceptions described in the Department's acceptance letters. Of the
48 recommendations
issued, as of December 2006, 13 are open and the Department continues work on the associated
implementation plans. The Board's trend since 1995 has been toward a reduced
reliance on formal recommendations and an increased use of discussions with the
Department's executive management, public hearings, and written correspondence.
In addition to formal recommendations, the
Board has a variety of other authorities and powers for interacting with the Department;
these include: 1) conducting public hearings, 2) issuing subpoenas for the attendance of
witnesses and production of evidence, 3) formally requesting information or establishing
reporting requirements, 4) stationing on-site resident inspectors, and 5) conducting special
studies. The Board and its staff annually
conduct about 200 site visits of an average duration of 2-3 days. The Board communicates
with the Department through trip reports, requests for information, other written
correspondence, and meetings. The Board transmits a total of about 100 pieces of
correspondence annually to senior Department management at headquarters and field offices.
The Department and the Board share the
common goal of ensuring adequate protection of public and worker health and safety and the
environment at defense nuclear facilities. To accomplish this goal, the Department's
policy has been to: fully cooperate with the Board; provide access to information
necessary for the Board to accomplish its responsibilities; thoroughly consider the
recommendations and other safety information provided by the Board; consistently meet
commitments to the Board; and conduct interactions with the Board in accordance with the
highest professional standards. Experience has shown that the involvement and interaction
of the Department's executive management with the Board is essential for resolving safety
issues. The Office of the Departmental Representative to the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, reporting to the Deputy Secretary, manages the
Department's overall interface with the Board and provides advice and direction for
resolving identified safety issues.
The most significant and challenging safety issues being tracked
by the Board are: 1) stabilizing excess nuclear
material to achieve safe, stable states for interim and long-term storage pending ultimate
disposition, 2) systematically implementing a consistent safety management system which
integrates safety into management and work practices at all levels so that work can be
accomplished while protecting the public, the worker, and the environment,
3)
assessing existing facilities, major modifications, and new projects to
ensure an adequate confinement strategy is implemented, 4) establishing
comprehensive technical requirements for nuclear material packaging, 5)
ensuring effective DOE oversight, and 6) integrating safety into design
and construction early in the process. These are long-term issues
which will take a dedicated, multi-year effort to successfully resolve.
This Site Last Updated: Thursday, January 08, 2009
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