[US LETTERHEAD]

March 4, 2002

The Honorable John T. Conway
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The following is provided in response to your October 15, 2001, letter, concerning integrated safety management issues for the Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Operations Office (OR) and its Environmental Management (EM) contractor, Bechtel Jacobs Company (BJC). The Department regrets the lateness of our response.

The Department recognizes and takes full ownership for its safety management issues and as its highest priority, has been focused on establishing a basis for continued operations required to maintain limited activities in a safe condition and for implementation of compensatory measures and controls. The Department recognizes that some of the improvements required are associated with adopting a new, more rigorous culture related to nuclear safety and contractor management and, as such, will take longer than has been anticipated. This response identifies recent actions taken by DOE to improve the nuclear safety posture under the Oak Ridge Operations Office and the Bechtel Jacobs Company. This response does not, however, include a comprehensive corrective action plan. Because of recent management reassignments and anticipated program restructuring, new expectations are being established that will impact the final corrective action plan. Additionally, I believe the assessment of root causes has not been fully addressed to my satisfaction. Rather than further delay a response to the Board, this letter should be viewed as an interim status report with the commitment to provide the Board with periodic briefings and/or status reports to assist your understanding and evaluation of our progress.

Following are some of the key actions taken since the receipt of your letter:

  1. On October 15, 2001, the DOE Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM) rescinded all delegations of authority, previously delegated to the Oak Ridge Operations Office. EM issued new authorities on November 20, 2001, retaining the approval for the authorization basis for all Category 3 and higher nuclear facilities within the EM program.


  2. The OR Manager formally revoked Integrated Safety Management (ISM) system verifications for both OR and BJC on November 1, 2001. The Department is identifying ISM deficiencies and flaws in the process used during the initial certification and assessing root causes for this area. DOE believes strongly that continued work is needed to support long-term and lasting gains. Consequently, our integrated corrective action plan will identify near and longer term improvement actions. But clearly, the OR/BJC feedback and continuous improvement mechanisms were not operative and headquarters/field managers did not effectively assess leading indicators. In addition, Oak Ridge's limited use of external reviewers may have contributed to a lack of objectivity during the previous ISM implementation


  3. An independent DOE headquarters review, led by Mr. Dae Chung of the Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), completed an assessment of Safety Basis Authorization and Approval Basis for Oak Ridge Operations Office and the Bechtel Jacobs Company in January 2002. This review was comprehensive and identified many deficiencies in the area of nuclear safety management processes. This report is included herein and we offer to brief the Board on its results.


  4. Regarding the adequacy of the safety bases for nuclear facilities under the Oak Ridge Operations Office, in early analysis DOE acknowledges that a fully compliant Authorization Bases (AB) program for OR and its contractors against l0CFR830 is at least 12 months away. Consequently, we must rely upon compensatory measures to support continued safe nuclear operations. To support such a position the Department recently completed a management review of safety requirements, existing safety documentation, while also assessing a review of the adequacy of those controls for individual facility operated under the BJC contract, including those at Paducah and Portsmouth. As a result many activities were suspended or curtailed and compensatory measures and controls were implemented. Currently, a team of highly qualified nuclear safety experts is conducting safety-basis walk-downs and presenting their results to a Senior OR review panel for validation of conclusions. The panel has either accepted the existing implementation and controls or recommended additional compensatory measures where appropriate. The results from this effort will form the basis for the OR Manager to accept a defined minimum safe posture for the BJC Category 2 and 3 nuclear facilities. A final report is being prepared and will be forwarded to the Board by March 15, 2002.


  5. On February 14, 2002, the Assistant Manager for EM approved the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the East Tennessee Technology Park - Radiation Criticality Accident Alarm System. This approval resolved the criticality alarm system deficiencies and also provided a one-time extension to the Limiting Conditions of Operations for Building K-29. Both of these approvals were provided contingent upon completion of the contractor's implementation plans and the DOE verification prior to resumption of operations.


  6. The Oak Ridge Operations Office and BJC are completing a comprehensive review of the Work Smart Standards set for the BJC contract against the 109 orders of interest. The result of this review is the identification of 25 directives that are applicable to the work scope currently performed by BJC, but were not previously and directly included in the contract. Of these 25 directives, the requirements for 14 directives are included through contract equivalencies, such as prime contract clauses and/or ISMS descriptions in the BJC contract. Because these requirements are being substantively met, OR plans to modify the BJC contract using a Type 1 change control process or directed change. Of the remaining directives, OR requested incorporation of four directives into the BJC contract on January 28, 2002, [DOE 5480.19, 5480.20A, 420.1 Change 3 (Section 4.2 Fire Protection) and DOE STD 1120.98]. A letter from BJC with a revised WSS set incorporating these four directives was submitted on February 28, 2002. The review also identified one directive, 10 CFR 830 Part B, that is required by regulation and for which BJC has submitted an implementation plan to OR. Finally, six directives contain requirements that are not included in the current BJC contract (DOE Orders 425.1, 433.1, 460.1, 460.2, 5400.1, 420.1, and 5480.4). A rough order magnitude cost assessment has been prepared for implementation. The analysis and cost associated with implementation of these six directives is expected to represent a Type II change revision or bilateral agreement with the contractor and will be evaluated using ORO O 250, Chapter V. If a Type II revision process is required DOE and BJC line managers, subject matter experts and workers will evaluate the issues and recommend contract modifications.

    7. In addition to the above, the Office of Environmental Management performed an independent evaluation of the adequacy of the BJC contract to properly manage performance for the given statement of work. Mr. Michael Weis, EM, performed this review during February 2002 and found the contract to be adequate, but offered a number of recommendations related to contract management practice improvements. His report is being completed and will be made available to the Board by March 15, 2002. The Office of Environmental Management will perform a verification of the OR/BJC WSS set review when the final report is issued.

  7. The Department agrees with the Board that our technical competencies to support management of nuclear operations for both our federal and contractor ranks need strengthening. The Oak Ridge Operations Office is reviewing its responsibilities in its Functions Responsibilities and Authorities Manual against required technical competencies to identify gaps. The Oak Ridge Operations Office expects to mitigate these deficiencies in technical competency through details of Federal and contractor individuals as well as staff augmentation. As a compensatory measure both OR and BJC are adding qualified, but temporary, personnel from sites such as Savannah River and Rocky Flats to support ongoing operations and corrective actions. The OR Manager appointed a Senior Facility Representative for major facilities to provide additional technical support to the OR Assistant Manager for Environmental Management. The Bechtel Jacobs Company augmented its contract team with several qualified safety basis professionals from BJC subcontractors, other Bechtel or Jacobs' sites, and from their respective corporate offices. Additionally, progress is being made toward obtaining additional full-time resources for both OR and BJC. For example, OR hired a nuclear criticality safety engineer, who began work in February 2002 and BJC hired a senior nuclear safety specialist with both DOE and Nuclear Regulatory Commission experience who also reported in February 2002.

We continue to assess the effectiveness of our management and our technical competencies, both within the Federal and contractor ranks. Recognizing that measurable and fundamental change is necessary, the Department expects to announce modifications in the reporting relationships between headquarters and the field as well as changes in our respective management teams. We will continue to keep you informed of our progress in addressing the concerns at Oak Ridge Operations Office and Bechtel Jacobs Company. The Oak Ridge Operations Office will forward an integrated corrective action plan to the Board by April 19, 2002.

We are prepared to brief the Board at your convenience on our progress to date. If you have further questions, please contact me on 202-586-7700.

Sincerely,

Robert G. Card

Enclosure