January 24, 2002, DOE letter forwarding a report documenting completion of Commitments 17 and 18 in Implementation Plan 2000-2. Commitment 17 calls for Federal expertise to ensure effective oversight of contractor safety systems at defense nuclear facilities. Commitment 18 calls for a report identifying DOE needs for Federal technical personnel and means of addressing critical technical skill gaps.

[DOE LETTERHEAD]

January 24, 2002

The Honorable John T. Conway
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, NW
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Consistent with the Department of Energy's (DOE) Implementation Plan for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital Safety Systems, I am forwarding a report documenting completion of Commitments 17 and 18.

Commitment 17, originally to be completed in March 2001, called for DOE to identify needed Federal expertise, and survey the staffing necessary to ensure effective oversight of contractor safety systems at Defense Nuclear Facilities. Commitment 18, originally to be completed in April 2001, called for DOE to compile a report identifying DOE needs for Federal technical personnel and the means of addressing critical technical skill gaps. The enclosed report provides the information called for in these two commitments.

An extensive effort was undertaken to compile data associated with the Federal staff that performs technical oversight of safety systems, to determine if critical technical skill gaps exist, and to provide a means to address these gaps. Through this analysis almost 31 additional Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) have been determined to be needed to provide the necessary and sufficient oversight of contractor safety systems.

The majority of the technical skill gaps are in mechanical engineering, fire protection, electrical engineering, instrumentation and control, and criticality. Two-thirds of the skill gaps reside within four Field and Area Offices: Office of River Protection, Los Alamos Area Office, Oakland Area Office, and Y-12 Area Office. These gaps can be partially addressed in the near-term using technical expertise available at Headquarters and Albuquerque, using DOE support service contractors, and using the Authorization Basis (AB) and Facility Representative (FR) staff at the sites. Other long-term actions may be warranted. These include: 1) accelerating hiring actions to close technical gaps, 2) cross training and qualifying existing Technical Qualification Program (TQP) qualified personnel to develop them into safety system experts, or 3) transferring (at an appropriate time) existing safety system experts from closure sites to sites that have technical skill gaps. The Federal Technical Capabilities Panel plans to continue to monitor this area.

Based upon the enclosed report, I believe that Commitments 17 and 18 are completed and propose that they be closed.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (803) 952-2486 or have your staff contact Mr. Patrick W. McGuire at (803) 952-4016.

Sincerely,

Roy J. Schepens
Chairman
Federal Technical Capability Panel

Enclosure - [DOC] [PDF]

cc w/enclosure:
S. Gary (EH-1), HQ
M. Whitaker (S-3.1), HQ

bcc w/ enclosure: (copies sent electronically)
R. W. Poe, DOE-OR
C. D. West (ME-511), HQ
K. L. Boardman, DOE-AL
C. Wu, DOE-AL
E. B. Blackwood (EH-24), HQ
P. M. Golan (EM-l), HQ
L. L. Piper, DOE-RL
T. W. Smith, DOE-ID
T. M. Dirks (ME-50), HQ
S. A. Mellington, DOE-NV
E. L. Wilmot (NA-12), HQ
R. R. Kopenhaver, DOE-OAK
N. Brown, DOE-OH
S. E. Tower, DOE-RF
R. J. Schepens, DOE-SR
P. W. McGuire, DOE-SR
J. A. Turi (SC-80), HQ
E. C. Hughes (EH-21), HQ