[DNFSB LETTERHEAD]
December 16, 2002
The Honorable Jessie Hill Roberson
Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585-0113
Dear Ms. Roberson:
The staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board (Board) recently conducted a review of the implementation of the
Board’s Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital Safety
Systems, at the Hanford Site on October 29–31, 2002. During this review,
the staff noted significant problems in the implementation of this
recommendation on the part of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) operations
offices and their contractors.
Specifically, the qualification and training programs for DOE subject
matter experts on vital safety systems lacked the rigor required for these
individuals to provide effective oversight of the contractors. The system engineering program at Fluor
Hanford was weak, with few requirements for training and qualifying a system
engineer. Additional efforts are also
required by the DOE offices and their contractors to institutionalize the
performance of the assessments identified in the DOE Implementation Plan for
Recommendation 2000-2.
The site has informed the staff that
corrective actions are being implemented to address most of these
deficiencies. The Board believes the
enclosed report, prepared by the Board’s staff, may be of value in improving
the implementation of Recommendation 2000-2 at the Hanford Site.
Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
c:
Mr. Roy Schepens
Mr. Keith A. Klein
Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.
Enclosure
DEFENSE
NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Staff Issue Report
November 27,
2002
MEMORANDUM FOR:
J.
K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
COPIES: Board
Members
FROM: D.
Burnfield
SUBJECT: Status of Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration Management, Vital Safety Systems, Hanford
This report presents observations resulting
from a review of the progress made on implementing the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board’s (Board) Recommendation 2000-2, Configuration
Management, Vital Safety Systems, at the Hanford Site. The review addressed the Department of
Energy’s (DOE) subject matter expert (SME)/system engineer program, the
contractors’ system engineer programs, and the status of Phase II assessments. The review was conducted October 29–31, 2002, by members of the Board’s staff D.
Burnfield, C. Shuffler, M. Sautman, and D. Grover, assisted by outside expert
D. Volgenau.
Background. The
Implementation Plan for Recommendation 2000-2 includes commitments to improve
the competence of DOE and contractor engineering personnel, as well as to
perform summary (Phase I) and detailed (Phase II) assessments of the material
condition and operability of vital safety systems (VSS) and the programs that support
them (e.g., maintenance and engineering).
DOE’s Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) and Office of River Protection
(ORP) and their respective contractors have been working to implement and
improve programs designed to meet the requirements of the Recommendation 2000-2
Implementation Plan.
Discussion. The
staff’s observations are summarized below:
DOE’s Subject Matter Expert Programs—DOE-RL and ORP have both established SME
programs. However, neither program is
fully developed. Differences between
the programs exist, but DOE-RL and ORP share individual SMEs for some areas and
disciplines. DOE-RL has assigned 10
people as SMEs by functional area, and considers them to be well qualified. Most of these individuals have strong
technical backgrounds. However, site
specific qualification requirements have not been established, although they
are being considered. There is no
succession plan for existing SMEs, and there is little SME presence in the
field. How the SMEs will interact with
the facility representatives and assist in contractor assessments remains to be
defined.
The ORP SME program is especially
immature. SMEs only recently have been
assigned by safety system area (e.g., ventilation, electrical) and technical
discipline (e.g., mechanical, radiological protection, nuclear safety). SME roles and responsibilities are being
formalized, and site-specific qualification requirements are being
considered. ORP management considers
SME responsibilities to be a collateral duty, and as such has assigned two
facility representatives as SMEs. Given
the level of effort and responsibility that the Board believes will be required
of SMEs, this action would detract from safety duties of the facility
representatives.
Contractors’ Systems Engineering Programs—Both Fluor Hanford and CH2M Hill
Hanford Group, Incorporated (CHG), have
established a system engineering program.
However, the two programs vary significantly with regard to their
apparent effectiveness and ability to meet DOE requirements. CHG has a robust system engineering program
for the tank farms project, with many sound practices in place. This program was fully implemented as of
August 2002. Although areas remain in
which increased emphasis and further improvement are required, management
appears cognizant of these areas and is working aggressively to improve the
program. Examples of program strengths
include: (1) clearly defined roles and
responsibilities, (2) a comprehensive training and qualification program for
system engineers and their backups, (3) inclusion of defense-in-depth systems
in addition to VSSs, and (4) the conduct of quarterly system material
assessments (system health reports).
Fluor Hanford’s system engineering program,
on the other hand, suffers because of inadequate guidance and definition of
requirements at the corporate level. In
effect, the site engineering discipline appears to be decentralized, and Fluor
Hanford was unable to demonstrate that this does not weaken its effectiveness
across the Hanford Site. The six
individual Fluor Hanford projects are essentially left to formulate their own
system engineering programs and establish associated standards. The result is a large variation in the
quality of system engineering programs across the projects. Some examples of the shortcomings of the
system engineering programs of individual projects include the following: (1) qualification programs for system
engineers lack key elements or adequate requirements in such areas as system
knowledge, training in the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process,
authorization basis documentation, and requalification specifics; (2) component
and system performance, reliability, and availability trending is not formally
accomplished, although the data are available; (3) two VSSs in one project were
found not to have a responsible system engineer assigned; and (4) system
engineers are not required to conduct periodic material assessments or system
walkdowns.
System Engineering Program of Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)—PNNL has one facility of interest with regard to Recommendation 2000-2—the Radiochemical Processing Laboratory,
Building 325. This facility is a
Category 2 nuclear facility that contains several systems designated as
safety-significant. Most of these systems
have received recent upgrades to improve reliability and operability, and there
are plans to complete similar improvements for the remaining systems. A qualified building engineer serves full
time as the system engineer for these systems, and a qualified individual is
available to serve as a backup in case of the building engineer’s absence. Certification for the building engineer
requires systems and procedural knowledge, including certification in subordinate
building qualifications. However, an understanding
of safety basis documentation, the processing of USQs, and configuration
management is not required by the PNNL process, even though the current
building engineer is well qualified in these areas. There is no formal requirement for the building engineer to
periodically assess the operability, reliability, and material condition of the
safety systems. However, the building
engineer indicated that he spent about 4–6 hours each
week walking down his systems.
Phase II Assessments at the Hanford Site—CHG and Fluor Hanford appear to be working
to implement the principles of Recommendation 2000-2. However, neither DOE nor its contractors have institutionalized a
process for conducting Phase II-like system
assessments, although PNNL and Fluor Hanford are examining how to
incorporate such assessments into their existing assessment processes. DOE-RL conducted five Phase II
assessments. The contractor
subsequently developed corrective actions for all findings, and DOE is tracking
the actions taken. Future assessment
plans are being discussed with Fluor Hanford.
ORP conducted Phase II assessments of three VSSs. Although several programmatic opportunities
for improvement were found, no significant findings associated with the
material condition of systems or components were made. This lack of findings is a concern, since
the system health reports recently instituted by the contractor have noted a
number of material deficiencies. ORP
had not compared the results of its assessments to the results of the system
health reports to determine how best to improve its assessment process. CHG has taken aggressive action to resolve
the assessment findings, and has committed to improving technical rigor and to
completing four additional assessments of VSSs in 2003.
During a walkdown of the ventilation system
of the AY Tank Farm with DOE and contractor representatives, the Board’s staff
noted some areas for improvement. The
system engineer had been assigned for about 3 years. The system became operational in 1998. The Board’s staff saw only minor degradation in the material
condition of the system, but noted that several differential pressure gauges
either were missing calibration stickers or had stickers that indicated a
past-due calibration date. Two motor
control valves, used to control pressure and flow rate, also had expired
calibration dates. Neither the system
engineer nor the facility manager was familiar with the policy and procedures
for gauge and valve calibration. The
system engineer appeared to be generally knowledgeable about the system, but
demonstrated some weaknesses in knowledge of the particulars of system
components and of the cause for a recent component failure. Procedurally, a system engineer is expected
to conduct and document a routine walkdown of assigned systems each week. A review of the system engineer’s records
revealed that weekly walkdowns had not always been documented.
Criticality Safety Training for Fissile
Material Handlers (FMH)—The
staff reviewed the criticality safety training for FMHs at the Plutonium
Finishing Plant (PFP). The training
program appeared to be well organized and encompassed the features necessary to
ensure solid training in criticality safety, not only for FMHs, but also for
managers, team leaders, and those whose work places them in proximity to
fissile material. Included in the
training are formal classroom sessions with written exams, self-study, and an
on-the-job checklist that includes practical factors, an oral examination, and
an operational evaluation. In addition
to initial training and qualification, there are formal requirements for
continuing training and recertification.
The roles and responsibilities are clearly articulated for all involved
in the training and qualification program.
In addition to the governing PFP directive, however, Fluor Hanford has
established detailed site-wide requirements for this training, and it is not
clear that the PFP directives have been reviewed for compliance with the latest
edition of the site directive.