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Report to Congressional Requesters:



December 2002:



Mass Transit:



Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges:



GAO-03-263:



GAO Highlights: 



Highlights of GAO-03-263, a report to Congressional Requesters:



December 2002:



MASS TRANSIT: 



Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges:



Why GAO Did This Study:



About one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation 

systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked. In 

light of the history of terrorism against mass transit and the 
terrorist 

attacks on September 11, GAO was asked to examine challenges in 
securing 

transit systems, steps transit agencies have taken to improve safety 
and 

security, and the federal role in transit safety and security. To 
address 

these objectives, GAO visited 10 transit agencies and surveyed a 

representative sample of transit agencies, among other things.



What GAO Found: 



Transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security 
of 

their systems since September 11, such as conducting vulnerability 

assessments, revising emergency plans, and training employees. 
Formidable 

challenges, however, remain in securing transit systems. Obtaining 

sufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit 

systems as safe and secure as possible, according to GAO survey results 

and interviews with transit agency officials.  Funding security 

improvements is problematic because of high security costs, competing 

budget priorities, tight budget environments, and a provision 
precluding 

transit agencies that serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more 

from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. 

In addition to funding challenges, certain characteristics of transit 

agencies make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. 

For example, the high ridership and open access of some transit systems 

makes them attractive for terrorists but also makes certain security 
measures, 

like metal detectors, impractical.  Moreover, because all levels of the 

government and the private sector are involved in transit decisions, 

coordination among all the stakeholders can pose challenges. 



While transit agencies are pursuing security improvements, the federal 

government’s role in transit security is expanding. For example, the 

Federal Transit Administration (FTA) launched a multipart security 

initiative and increased funding of its safety and security activities 

after September 11.  In addition, the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act gave the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

responsibility for the security of all transportation modes, including 

transit. TSA anticipates issuing national standards for transit 
security. 

As the federal government’s role expands, goals, performance 
indicators, 

and funding criteria need to be established to ensure accountability 
and 

results for the government’s efforts.



Figure: 



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



What GAO Recommends: 



To provide transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit 

security enhancements, GAO recommends that the Secretary of 
Transportation 

consider seeking a legislative change to allow all transit agencies to 
use 

federal urbanized area formula funds for security-related operating 
expenses. 

GAO also makes several other recommendations to the Secretary of 

Transportation. 



The Department of Transportation generally agreed with the report’s 
findings 

and agreed to carefully consider GAO’s recommendations.



www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-263.



To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click on 

the link above.For more information, contact Peter Guerrero, at (202) 

512-2834 or guerrerop@gao.gov.



Contents:



Letter:



Results in Brief:



Background:



Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Making Transit Systems 

Secure:



Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Enhance Security:



Federal Government’s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments:



Appendixes:



Appendix I: GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall Results:



Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:



Appendix III: Selected Survey Results:



Services Provided by Transit Agencies Surveyed:



Ridership of Transit Agencies Surveyed:



Operating and Capital Budgets of Transit Agencies Surveyed:



Security of Transit Agencies Surveyed:



Funding Sources for Transit Safety and Security Needs of Transit 

Agencies Surveyed:



Acts of Extreme Violence against Transit Agencies Surveyed:



Surveyed Transit Agencies’ Safety and Security Assessments:



Emergency Plans of Transit Agencies Surveyed:



Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:



GAO Contacts:



Acknowledgments:



Table:



Table 1: Profiles of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited, 2000:



Figures:



Figure 1: Ridership by Transit Mode, 2000:



Figure 2: Sources of Funding for Transit Operating and Capital 

Expenses, 2000:



Figure 3: Funding Authorized by TEA-21 for the Urbanized Area Formula 

Program and All Other Federal Transit Programs, 1998-2003:



Figure 4: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems 

Worldwide, 1997-2000:



Figure 5: Most Significant Challenge to Securing Transit Systems as 

Reported by Surveyed Agencies:



Figure 6: Emergency Drill in Progress:



Figure 7: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Training 

Tunnel:



Figure 8: FTA’s Expenditures on Safety and Security Activities, 2000-

2003:



Figure 9: Diagram of a Risk Management Approach:



Figure 10: Location of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited:



Figure 11: Types of Transit Services Offered by Surveyed Transit 

Agencies:



Figure 12: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Number of Unlinked 

Passenger Trips in Fiscal Years 2000 - 2001:



Figure 13: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Size of Their 

Operating and Capital Budgets, Fiscal Year 2001:



Figure 14: Types of Security Used by Transit Agencies in Large and 

Small Urbanized Areas:



Figure 15: Sources of Funds for Operating Expenses Used by Transit 

Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:



Figure 16: Sources of Funds for Capital Expenses Used by Transit 

Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:



Figure 17: Acts of Extreme Violence during the Past 5 Years at Transit 

Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:



Figure 18: Types of Assessments Performed by Transit Agencies:



Figure 19: Types of Coordination Specified in Transit Agencies’ 

Emergency Plans:



Figure 20: Types of Emergency Situations Addressed in Transit Agencies’ 

Emergency Plans:



Abbreviations:



APTA: American Public Transportation Association:



DOD: Department of Defense:



FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:



FTA: Federal Transit Administration:



GAO: General Accounting Office:



ISTEA: Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991:



TSA: Transportation Security Administration:



TEA-21: Transportation Equity Act for the 21ST Century:



Letter:



December 13, 2002:



The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes

Chairman, Committee on Banking, 

 Housing, and Urban Affairs

United States Senate:



The Honorable Jack Reed 

Chairman, Subcommittee on 

 Housing and Transportation

Committee on Banking, Housing,

 and Urban Affairs

United States Senate:



Over a year has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001, realigned our national priorities. While most of the early 

attention following these attacks focused on airport security, emphasis 

on the other modes of transportation has since grown. Moreover, 

terrorist events around the world have shown that mass transit systems, 

like other modes of transportation, are often targets of attack. For 

example, roughly one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target 

transportation systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly 

attacked.[Footnote 1] In May 2002, the Department of Transportation 

issued a terrorist threat advisory to the transit industry indicating 

that subway systems were a possible target. The industry remains in a 

heightened state of alert.



Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the 

nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies 

provide transit services, such as buses, subways, ferries, and light 

rail, in the United States. Each workday, about 14 million Americans 

ride on some form of transit. Because the effectiveness of transit 

systems depends on their accessibility, security measures common in 

aviation are difficult to apply. Furthermore, government agencies at 

the federal, state, and local levels and private companies share 

responsibility for transit safety and security and are involved in 

making transit decisions.



This report examines transit safety and security at the federal and 

local levels. In particular, the report describes (1) challenges in 

securing mass transit systems, (2) steps transit agencies have taken to 

enhance safety and security, and (3) the federal role in transit safety 

and security. To address these issues, we visited 10 transit agencies 

across the country, including the Capital Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority in Austin; Chicago Transit Authority; Central Florida 

Regional Transit Authority in Orlando; Los Angeles County Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority; Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Council; 

New York City Transit; Regional Transportation District in Denver; San 

Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit; San Francisco Municipal Railway; and 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in the District of 

Columbia. We selected these agencies because they represent different 

geographical areas and operate transit systems of different sizes and 

modes. In addition, we surveyed a random sample of all transit agencies 

throughout the nation that are eligible to receive federal urbanized 

area formula funds[Footnote 2] to obtain additional information on 

safety and security issues. We received responses to our survey from 

155 of 200 transit agencies, for an overall response rate of 78 

percent. Our survey results are generalizable to our sample population. 

The survey instrument and overall results are included in appendix I. 

(See app. II for a more detailed discussion of our report’s scope and 

methodology.):



Results in Brief:



Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems 

secure because, in part, certain characteristics make them both 

vulnerable and difficult to secure. For example, the high ridership of 

some transit agencies makes them attractive targets for terrorists but 

also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors, 

impractical. The high cost of transit security improvements also 

creates challenges for transit agencies. Although some security 

improvements, such as closing bus doors at night, have little or no 

cost, most improvements require substantial funding. For example, the 

total estimated cost of the identified security improvements at 8 of 

the 10 transit agencies we visited is over $700 million. According to 

our survey results and our interviews with transit agency officials, 

insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making their 

transit systems as safe and secure as possible. Funding security 

improvements is challenging for a number of reasons including tight 

budget environments, competing budget priorities, and a prohibition on 

transit agencies that serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more 

from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. 

This prohibition prevents transit agencies that serve large urbanized 

areas from using federal funds for security-related operating expenses, 

such as security personnel. Finally, our site visits and survey results 

show that coordination among all transit stakeholders pose challenges. 

Our discussions with transit agency and local government officials and 

our survey revealed substantial coordination on emergency planning 

among transit agencies and local governments; however, transit agencies 

reported some challenges, such as limited awareness of terrorist 

threats to transit and lack of coordination among various local 

agencies. Furthermore, coordination of emergency planning among transit 

agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal levels 

appears to be minimal.



Despite the formidable challenges in securing transit systems, transit 

agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their 

systems. The transit agencies we visited were implementing strategies 

to improve both safety and security before September 11; however, the 

terrorist attacks on September 11 elevated the importance of security-

related activities. As a result, the transit agencies we visited and 

surveyed have implemented new security initiatives or increased the 

frequency of existing activities since last September. For example, 

many agencies have assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional 

training on emergency preparedness, revised emergency plans, and 

conducted multiple emergency drills. Several agencies we visited have 

also implemented innovative practices to enhance safety and security, 

such as training police officers to drive buses and implementing an 

employee suggestion program to solicit ideas for improving security.



The federal government’s role in transit security is evolving. For 

example, although the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has limited 

authority to oversee and regulate transit security, it launched a 

multipart security initiative after September 11. In addition, the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation 

and gave it responsibility for all modes of transportation; however, 

TSA has yet to exert full responsibility for the security of any 

transportation mode other than aviation. TSA and FTA are currently 

developing a memorandum of agreement that will define each agency’s 

roles and responsibilities for transit security. TSA will also be 

transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of the 

recently passed Homeland Security Act (HR 5005). Although most of the 

transit agencies we visited said FTA’s security initiative has been 

useful, they would like the federal government to provide more 

assistance to support transit security, such as more information, help 

in obtaining security clearances, increased funding, and more security-

related research and development. When considering the federal 

government’s role in funding transit safety and security initiatives, 

policymakers will need to address several issues, including (1) 

determining the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security; (2) 

developing federal funding criteria; (3) establishing goals and 

performance indicators for federal efforts in transit security; and (4) 

selecting the appropriate federal policy instruments (e.g., grants and 

regulations) to deliver assistance that may be deemed necessary by 

policymakers.



To give transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit 

security improvements, we are recommending that the Secretary of 

Transportation consider seeking a legislative change to allow all 

transit agencies, regardless of the size of the urbanized area that 

they serve, to use urbanized area formula funds for security-related 

operating expenses. We are also making several other recommendations 

that are designed to promote accountability, direct finite federal 

resources to the areas of highest priority, and help transit agencies 

obtain intelligence information. We provided the Department of 

Transportation with a draft of this report for their review and 

comment. Department of Transportation officials generally agreed with 

the report’s findings and conclusions and agreed to carefully consider 

the report’s recommendations as the Department continues working to 

improve transit security around the country.



Background:



In 2000, mass transit systems provided over 9 billion passenger trips 

and employed about 350,000 people in the United States.[Footnote 3] The 

nation’s transit systems include all multiple-occupancy-vehicle 

services designed to transport customers on local and regional routes, 

such as bus, trolley bus, commuter rail, vanpool, ferry boat, and light 

rail services, and are valued at a trillion dollars. As figure 1 shows, 

buses are the most widely used form of transit, providing almost two-

thirds of all passenger trips.



Figure 1: Ridership by Transit Mode, 2000:



[See PDF for image]



Note: Ridership data for 2000 are preliminary. Percentages do not add 

to 100 percent because of rounding.



[A] Heavy rail is an electric railway that can carry a heavy volume of 

traffic. It is characterized by high speed and rapid acceleration, 

passenger rail cars operating singly or in multicar trains on fixed 

rails, separate rights-of-way from which all other vehicular and foot 

traffic are excluded, sophisticated signaling, and high-platform 

loading. Most subway systems are considered heavy rail.



[B] “Other” includes a variety of transit modes such as ferryboat, 

vanpool, and demand response (i.e., paratransit).



[End of figure]



A number of organizations are involved in the delivery of transit 

services in the United States, including federal, state, and local 

governments and the private sector:



* FTA provides financial assistance to transit agencies to plan and 

develop new transit systems and operate, maintain, and improve existing 

systems. FTA is responsible for ensuring that the recipients of federal 

transit funds follow federal mandates and administrative requirements. 

FTA’s Office of Safety and Security is the agency’s focal point for 

transit safety (freedom from unintentional danger) and security 

(freedom from intentional danger).



* State and local governments also provide a significant amount of 

funding for transit services. As figure 2 shows, state and local 

governments provide funding for over 40 percent of transit agencies’ 

operating expenses and about a quarter of their capital expenses. 

According to statute,[Footnote 4] states are also responsible for 

establishing State Safety Oversight Agencies to oversee the safety of 

transit agencies’ rail systems.



* Transit agencies, which can be public or private entities, are 

responsible for administering and managing transit activities and 

services. Transit agencies can directly operate transit service or 

contract for all or part of the total transit service provided. About 

6,000 agencies provide transit services in the United States, and the 

majority of these agencies provide more than one mode of service. 

Although all levels of government are involved in transit security, the 

primary responsibility for securing transit systems has rested with the 

transit agencies.



Figure 2: Sources of Funding for Transit Operating and Capital 

Expenses, 2000:



[See PDF for image]



Note: Operating and capital expense data for 2000 are preliminary.



[A] “Other” includes taxes levied directly by transit agencies and 

other dedicated funds, such as tolls and advertising.



[B] Directly generated expenses include nongovernmental funding, 

subsidies from the nontransit sectors of a transit agency’s operations, 

taxes levied directly by a transit agency, and bridge and tunnel tolls.



[End of figure]



FTA administers a number of programs, both discretionary and formula 

based, that provide federal funding support to transit agencies. The 

largest of these programs is the urbanized area formula grant program, 

which provides federal funds to urbanized areas (jurisdictions with 

populations of 50,000 or more) for transit capital investments, 

operating expenses, and transportation-related planning. As figure 3 

shows, the urbanized area formula grant program accounts for almost 

one-half of the total authorized funds for all transit programs under 

the Transportation Equity Act for the:



21ST Century (TEA-21).[Footnote 5] Recipients of urbanized area formula 

funds are required to spend at least 1 percent of these funds to 

improve the security of existing or planned mass transportation systems 

unless the transit agencies certify that such expenditures are 

unnecessary.[Footnote 6]



Figure 3: Funding Authorized by TEA-21 for the Urbanized Area Formula 

Program and All Other Federal Transit Programs, 1998-2003:



[See PDF for image]



Note: Totals represent guaranteed and nonguaranteed funding.



[End of figure]



Restrictions on the use of urbanized area formula funds for operating 

expenses have changed over the years. When the urbanized area formula 

program was created in 1982,[Footnote 7] funds could be used by transit 

agencies, regardless of an area’s population, for operating expenses 

with certain limitations.[Footnote 8] However, during fiscal years 1995 

to 1997, an overall cap was placed on the total amount of these formula 

grants that could be used for operating expenses. In fiscal year 1995, 

the cap was $710 million, and in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 it was $400 

million. With the passage of TEA-21 in 1998, the restrictions on 

urbanized area formula funds were again changed. Specifically, TEA-21 

prohibits transit agencies that serve urbanized areas with populations 

of 200,000 or more from using urbanized area formula funding for 

operating expenses. According to FTA officials, the prohibition was 

instituted because policymakers believed the federal government should 

only pay for the construction of mass transit systems, not their 

operations. The legislative history of TEA-21 indicates that the 

Congress allowed transit agencies serving urban areas with populations 

of less than 200,000 to continue to use urbanized area formula funds 

for operating expenses so that they would have sufficient funding 

flexibilities.



Throughout the world, public surface transportation systems have been 

targets of terrorist attacks. For example, the first large-scale 

terrorist use of a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 in the Tokyo subway 

system. In this attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a 

subway train, killing 11 people and injuring about 5,500. In addition, 

according to the Mineta Transportation Institute,[Footnote 9] surface 

transportation systems were the target of more than 195 terrorist 

attacks from 1997 through 2000. As figure 4 illustrates, buses were the 

most common target during this period.



Figure 4: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems 

Worldwide, 1997-2000:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Making Transit Systems Secure:



Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems 

secure. Certain characteristics of transit systems, such as their high 

ridership and open access, make them both vulnerable to attack and 

difficult to secure. The high cost of transit security improvements, 

coupled with tight budgets, competing needs, and a restriction on using 

federal funds for operating expenses (including security-related 

operating expenses such as additional security patrols) in large urban 

areas creates an even greater challenge for transit agencies. Moreover, 

because of the numerous stakeholders involved in transit security, 

coordination can become a problem.



Characteristics of Transit Systems Pose Security Challenges:



According to transit officials and transit security experts, certain 

characteristics of mass transit systems make them inherently vulnerable 

to terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. By design, mass transit 

systems are open (i.e., have multiple access points and, in some cases, 

no barriers) so that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In 

contrast, the aviation system is housed in closed and controlled 

locations with few entry points. The openness of mass transit systems 

can leave them vulnerable because transit officials cannot monitor or 

control who enters or leaves the systems. In addition, other 

characteristics of some transit systems--high ridership, expensive 

infrastructure, economic importance, and location (e.g., large 

metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)--also make them attractive 

targets because of the potential for mass casualties and economic 

damage. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make transit 

agencies difficult to secure. For example, the number of riders that 

pass through a mass transit system--especially during peak hours--make 

some security measures, such as metal detectors, impractical. In 

addition, the multiple access points along extended routes make the 

costs of securing each location prohibitive.



Further complicating transit security is the need for transit agencies 

to balance security concerns with accessibility, convenience, and 

affordability. Because transit riders often could choose another means 

of transportation, such as a personal automobile, transit agencies must 

compete for riders. To remain competitive, transit agencies must offer 

convenient, inexpensive, and quality service. Therefore, security 

measures that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or 

otherwise cause inconvenience could push people away from transit and 

back into their cars. Our discussions with transit agency officials and 

our survey results indicate that striking the right balance between 

security and these other needs is difficult. For example, as shown in 

figure 5, 9 percent of survey respondents reported that the most 

significant barrier to making their transit systems as safe and secure 

as possible is balancing riders’ need for accessibility with security 

measures.



Figure 5: Most Significant Challenge to Securing Transit Systems as 

Reported by Surveyed Agencies:



[See PDF for image]



Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.



[End of figure]



Funding Security Improvements Is a Key Challenge:



Funding security improvements is a key challenge for transit agencies. 

Our survey results and our interviews with transit agency officials 

indicate that insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in 

making transit systems as safe and secure as possible. Moreover, our 

survey results indicate that the most common reason for not addressing 

items identified as needing attention through safety and security 

assessments is insufficient funding. Factors contributing to funding 

challenges include high security costs, tight budgets, competing budget 

priorities, and a provision prohibiting transit agencies in large 

urbanized areas from using federal urbanized area formula funds for 

operating expenses, such as security training.



Transit security investments can be quite expensive. While some 

security improvements are inexpensive, such as removing trash cans from 

subway platforms, most require substantial funding. For example, one 

transit agency estimated that an intrusion alarm and closed circuit 

television system for only one of its portals would cost approximately 

$250,000--an amount equal to at least a quarter of the capital budgets 

of more than half the transit agencies we surveyed. According to our 

survey results, the top three safety and security funding priorities of 

transit agencies regardless of size are enhanced communication systems, 

surveillance equipment, and additional training. The transit agencies 

we visited have identified or are identifying needed security 

improvements, such as upgraded communication systems, additional 

fencing, surveillance equipment, and redundant or mobile command 

centers. Of the 10 transit agencies we visited, 8 had developed cost 

estimates of their identified improvements. The total estimated cost of 

the identified security improvements at the 8 agencies is about $711 

million. The total cost of all needed transit security improvements 

throughout the country is unknown;[Footnote 10] however, given the 

scope of the nation’s transit systems and the cost estimate for 8 

agencies, it could amount to billions of dollars.



Transit agency officials told us that they are facing tight budgets, 

which make it more difficult for their agencies to pay for expensive 

security improvements. According to most of the agencies we visited, 

the weakened economy has negatively affected their revenue base by 

lowering ridership, tax revenues dedicated to transit, or both. In 

particular, 8 of the 10 agencies we visited reported that ridership has 

dropped this year, primarily because of the slow economy. The decreased 

ridership levels have lowered fare box revenue. In addition, state and 

local sales taxes, which provide revenue for many transit agencies, 

have declined with the weakened economy and reduced the transit 

agencies’ revenue, according to a number of transit agency officials.



Other competing funding needs also present a challenge for transit 

agencies. Given the tight budget environment, transit agencies must 

make difficult trade-offs between security investments and other needs, 

such as service expansion and equipment upgrades. For example, an 

official at one transit agency stated that budget shortfalls and 

expenditures for security improvements have delayed some needed capital 

projects and reduced the budgets for all departments--except the safety 

and security budget. Similarly, an official at another agency reported 

that his agency is funding security improvements with money that was 

budgeted for nonsecurity projects. According to our analysis, 16 

percent of the agencies we surveyed view balancing safety and security 

priorities against other priorities as the most significant challenge 

to making their systems as safe and secure as possible.



Officials from some transit agencies we visited also reported that the 

funding challenges are exacerbated by the current statutory limitation 

on using urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. The 

urbanized area formula program provides federal funds to urbanized 

areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) for transit 

capital investments, operating expenses, and transportation-related 

planning. The program is the largest source of federal transit funding. 

As mentioned earlier, TEA-21 prohibits transit agencies in large 

urbanized areas (jurisdictions with populations of 200,000 or more) 

from using urbanized area formula funding for most operating expenses. 

This prohibition limits many agencies’ ability to use FTA funds for 

security-related operating expenses. For example, transit agencies in 

large urbanized areas cannot use their urbanized area formula funds to 

pay for security training or salaries for security personnel, among 

other uses. Officials from a number of agencies we visited said this 

prohibition was a significant barrier to funding needed security 

improvements, although several agency officials also noted that the 

elimination of this prohibition would be helpful only if additional 

funding were provided. Given the declining revenue base of some transit 

agencies, however, the prohibition compounds the budgetary challenges 

of securing transit systems.



Coordination Is Key to Transit Security but Presents Challenges:



Coordination among all stakeholders is integral to enhancing transit 

security, but it can create additional challenges. Numerous 

stakeholders are typically involved in decisions that affect transit 

security, such as decisions about its operations and funding. As we 

noted in our testimony before the Subcommittee on Transit and Housing 

in September and in previous reports, coordination among all levels of 

government and the private sector is critical to homeland security 

efforts, and a lack of coordination can create problems, such as 

duplication of effort.[Footnote 11] In addition, the national strategy 

for homeland security recognizes the challenges associated with 

intergovernmental coordination but emphasizes the need for such 

coordination. According to our site visits and our survey results, 

coordination of emergency planning is generally taking place between 

transit agencies and local governments, despite some challenges; 

however, such coordination appears to be minimal between transit 

agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal levels.



We found that transit agencies and local governments are coordinating 

their emergency planning efforts. Our survey results indicate that 77 

percent of transit agencies have directly coordinated emergency 

planning at the local level; moreover, 65 percent of agencies surveyed 

believe they have been sufficiently integrated into their local 

government’s emergency plans. Likewise, 9 of the 10 transit agencies we 

visited said they are integrated to at least a moderate extent into 

their local government’s emergency planning. Officials from these 9 

transit agencies noted that their agencies are included in their local 

government’s emergency planning activities, such as emergency drills, 

tabletop exercises, planning meetings, and task forces. For example, 

when Minneapolis held an emergency drill that simulated a biological 

attack on the city, Metro Transit transported “victims” to hospitals, 

even taking some victims to out-of-state hospitals because the local 

hospitals were at capacity. Transit agency and local government 

officials said their past experiences with weather emergencies and 

special events, like Super Bowl celebrations, had helped establish good 

working relationships. According to the officials, these past 

experiences have demonstrated the types of support services transit 

agencies can provide during emergencies, including evacuations, triage 

centers, victim transport, and shelters. However, officials said these 

working relationships are usually informal and undocumented. For 

example, the majority of the transit agencies we visited did not have a 

memorandum of understanding with their local government.



Although transit agencies are generally active participants in 

emergency planning at the local level, they nevertheless face some 

coordination challenges. According to our survey results, some of the 

most significant challenges in coordinating emergency planning at the 

local level are insufficient funding, limited awareness of terrorist 

threats to transit, and lack of time. Similar concerns were often 

raised during our meetings with transit agencies. For example, one 

agency official noted that his agency operates in over 40 jurisdictions 

and that coordinating with all of these local governments is very time 

consuming.



In contrast to the local level, coordination of emergency planning 

among transit agencies and governments at the regional, state, and 

federal levels appears to be minimal. Most of the transit agencies we 

visited reported limited coordination with governments other than their 

local government. Our survey results reveal a similar pattern. For 

example, 68 percent of transit agencies we surveyed have not directly 

coordinated emergency planning at the regional level; 84 percent have 

not directly coordinated emergency planning at the state level; and 87 

percent have not directly coordinated emergency planning at the federal 

level. As we have noted in past reports on homeland security, the lack 

of coordination among stakeholders could result in communication 

problems, duplication, and fragmentation. Without coordination, 

transit agencies and governments also miss opportunities to 

systematically identify the unique resources and capacities that each 

can provide in emergencies.



Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Enhance Security:



Prior to September 11, all 10 transit agencies we visited and many of 

the transit agencies we surveyed were implementing measures to enhance 

transit safety and security, such as revising emergency plans and 

training employees on emergency preparedness. Transit agency officials 

we interviewed often noted that the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo 

subway system or their agency’s experiences during natural disasters 

had served as catalysts for focusing on safety and security. Although 

safety and security were both priorities, the terrorist attacks on 

September 11 elevated the importance of security. (See app. III for 

select survey results, which includes information on the emergency 

planning and preparedness of the transit agencies we surveyed. 

Differences and similarities of transit agencies in large urbanized 

areas to those in small urbanized areas are also presented.):



Since September 11, transit agencies have taken additional steps to 

improve transit safety and security. Officials from the agencies we 

visited told us their agencies have been operating at a heightened 

state of security since September 11. According to agency officials and 

our survey results, many transit agencies in large and small urbanized 

areas have implemented new safety and security measures or increased 

the frequency or intensity of existing activities, including the 

following:



* Vulnerability or security assessments: Many transit agencies have 

conducted vulnerability or security assessments. For example, all 10 of 

the agencies we visited and 54 percent of the agencies we surveyed said 

they had conducted a vulnerability or security assessment since 

September 11. The purpose of these assessments is to identify potential 

vulnerabilities and corrective actions or needed security improvements. 

Improved communication systems, more controlled access to facilities, 

and additional training were some of the needs identified in the 

assessments of the agencies we visited.



* Fast-track security improvements: Security improvements planned or in 

process prior to September 11 were moved up on the agenda or finished 

early. For example, one agency, which was putting alarms on access 

points to the subway ventilation system before September 11, completed 

the process early.



* Immediate, inexpensive security improvements: Removing bike lockers 

and trash cans from populated areas, locking underground restrooms, and 

closing bus doors at night were among the immediate and inexpensive 

improvements that agencies made.



* Intensified security presence: Many agencies have increased the 

number of police or security personnel who patrol their systems. 

Surveillance equipment, alarms, or security personnel have been placed 

at access points to subway tunnels, bus yards, and other nonpublic 

places. Employees have also been required to wear identification cards 

or brightly colored vests for increased visibility. For example, 41 

percent of the transit agencies we surveyed have required their 

personnel to wear photo identification cards at all times since 

September 11.



* Increased emergency drills: Many agencies have increased the 

frequency of emergency drilling--both full-scale drills and tabletop 

exercises. For example, one agency we visited has conducted four drills 

since September 11. Agencies stressed the importance of emergency 

drilling as a means to test their emergency plans, identify problems, 

and develop corrective actions. Figure 6 is a photograph from an annual 

emergency drill conducted by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority.



Figure 6: Emergency Drill in Progress:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



* Revised emergency plans: Agencies reviewed their emergency plans to 

determine what changes, if any, needed to be made. For example, 48 

percent of the agencies we surveyed, regardless of the size of 

urbanized area served, created or revised their emergency plans after 

September 11. In addition, some agencies we visited updated their 

emergency plans to include terrorist incident protocols and response 

plans.



* Additional training: Agencies participated in and conducted 

additional training on antiterrorism. For example, all 10 of the 

agencies we visited had participated in the antiterrorism seminars 

sponsored by FTA or the American Public Transportation Association. 

Similarly, 59 percent of all transit agencies we surveyed reported 

having attended security seminars or conferences since September 11.



Transit Agencies Also Adopt Innovative Practices to Enhance Safety and 

Security:



Some of the agencies we visited have also implemented innovative 

practices in recent years to increase their safety, security, and 

preparedness in emergency situations.[Footnote 12] Through our 

discussions with transit agencies, we identified some innovative safety 

and security measures, including the following:



* Police officers trained to drive buses: Capital Metro in Austin, 

Texas, trained some of the city police officers to drive transit buses 

during emergencies. The police officers received driver training and 

were licensed to drive the buses. If emergencies require buses to enter 

a dangerous environment, these trained police officers, instead of 

transit agency employees, will drive the buses.



* Training tunnel constructed: The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority constructed an off-site duplicate tunnel, complete with 

railcars, tracks, and switches, to simulate an emergency environment 

for training purposes. (See fig. 7.):



* Employee suggestion program implemented: New York City Transit 

implemented an employee suggestion program to solicit security 

improvement ideas. If an employee’s suggestion is adopted, he or she 

receives a day of paid leave.



Figure 7: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Training 

Tunnel:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Federal Government’s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving:



The federal government’s role in transit security is evolving. FTA has 

expanded its role in transit security since September 11 by launching a 

multipart security initiative and increasing the funding for its safety 

and security activities. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act gave TSA responsibility for transit security; however, 

TSA’s role and responsibilities have not yet been defined. Although the 

transit agencies we visited were generally pleased with FTA’s 

assistance since September 11, they would like the federal government 

to provide more assistance, including more information and funding. As 

the federal government’s role in transit safety and security 

initiatives evolves, policymakers will need to address several issues, 

including (1) the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security, 

(2) federal funding criteria, (3) goals and performance indicators for 

the federal government’s efforts, and (4) the appropriate federal 

policy instrument to deliver assistance deemed appropriate.



FTA Has Limited Authority but Has Initiated a Variety of Transit Safety 

and Security Activities:



FTA has limited authority to regulate and oversee safety and security 

at transit agencies. According to statute, FTA cannot regulate safety 

and security operations at transit agencies.[Footnote 13] FTA may, 

however, institute nonregulatory safety and security activities, 

including safety-and security-related training, research, and 

demonstration projects. In addition, FTA may promote safety and 

security through its grant-making authority. Specifically, FTA may 

stipulate conditions of grants, such as certain safety and security 

statutory and regulatory requirements, and FTA may withhold funds for 

noncompliance with the conditions of a grant.[Footnote 14] For example, 

transit agencies must spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula 

funds on security improvements.[Footnote 15] FTA is to verify that 

agencies comply with this requirement and may withhold funding from 

agencies that it finds are not in compliance.[Footnote 16] FTA 

officials stated that FTA’s authority to sponsor nonregulatory 

activities and to stipulate the conditions of grants is sufficient for 

the safety and security work they need to accomplish.[Footnote 17]



Despite its limited authority, FTA had established a number of safety 

and security programs before September 11. For example, FTA offered 

voluntary security assessments, sponsored training at the 

Transportation Safety Institute, issued written guidelines to improve 

emergency response planning, and partially funded a chemical detection 

demonstration project, called PROTECT, at the Washington Metropolitan 

Area Transit Authority. Although FTA maintained both safety and 

security programs before September 11, its primary focus was on the 

safety rather than the security programs. This focus changed after 

September 11.



In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, FTA launched a 

multipart transit security initiative last fall. The initiative 

includes security assessments, planning, drilling, training, and 

technology:



* Security assessments: FTA deployed teams to assess security at 36 

transit agencies. FTA chose the 36 agencies on the basis of their 

ridership, vulnerability, and the potential consequences of an 

attack.[Footnote 18] Each assessment included a threat and 

vulnerability analysis, an evaluation of security and emergency plans, 

and a focused review of the agency’s unified command structure with 

external emergency responders. FTA completed the assessments in late 

summer 2002.



* Emergency response planning: FTA is providing technical assistance to 

60 transit agencies on security and emergency plans and emergency 

response drills.



* Emergency response drills: FTA offered transit agencies grants up to 

$50,000 for organizing and conducting emergency preparedness drills. 

According to FTA officials, FTA has awarded $3.4 million to over 80 

transit agencies through these grants.



Security training: FTA is offering free emergency preparedness and 

security training to transit agencies through its Connecting 

Communities Forums. These forums are being offered throughout the 

country and are designed to bring together small-and medium-sized 

transit agency personnel with their local emergency responders, like 

local firefighters and police officers. The purpose of the forums is to 

give the participants a better understanding of the roles played by 

transit agencies and emergency responders and to allow the participants 

to begin developing the plans, tools, and relationships necessary to 

respond effectively in an emergency. In addition, FTA is working with 

the National Transit Institute and the Transportation Safety Institute 

to expand safety and security course offerings. For example, the 

National Transit Institute is now offering a security awareness course 

to front line transit employees free of charge.



Research and development: FTA increased the funding for its safety-and 

security-related technology research and has accelerated the deployment 

of the PROTECT system.



FTA also increased expenditures on its safety and security activities 

after the attacks of September 11. To pay for its multipart security 

initiative, FTA reprioritized fiscal year 2002 funds from its other 

programs and used a portion of the Department of Defense and Emergency 

Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2002 (DOD supplemental), which 

provided $23.5 million for transit security purposes.[Footnote 19] 

Specifically, FTA will put about $18.7 million of the DOD supplemental 

toward its multipart security initiative.[Footnote 20] As a result of 

these actions, FTA’s expenditures on its safety and security activities 

has increased significantly in recent years. As figure 8 shows, if FTA 

receives the amount of funding it requested for fiscal year 2003, 

FTA’s:



expenditures on safety and security activities will more than double 

since fiscal year 2000--increasing from $8.1 million to $17.9 

million.[Footnote 21]



Figure 8: FTA’s Expenditures on Safety and Security Activities, 2000-

2003:



[See PDF for image]



Note: Data include actual and planned expenditures on program 

activities and oversight. It does not include funding for grant 

programs.



[End of figure]



TSA’s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving:



TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, 

including transit. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created 

TSA within the Department of Transportation and defined its primary 

responsibility as ensuring security in all modes of 

transportation.[Footnote 22] The act also gives TSA regulatory 

authority over transit security, which FTA does not possess. Since its 

creation last November, TSA has primarily focused on improving aviation 

security in order to meet the deadlines established in the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act. As a result, TSA has not yet exerted full 

responsibility for security in other modes of transportation, such as 

transit.



TSA’s role in transit security is evolving. For transit security, the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act does not specify TSA’s role 

and responsibilities as it did for aviation security.[Footnote 23] For 

example, the act does not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain 

transit security requirements. Similarly, although the President’s 

National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the federal 

government will work with the private sector to upgrade security in all 

modes of transportation and utilize existing modal relationships and 

systems to implement unified, national standards for transportation 

security, it does not outline TSA’s or the Department of Homeland 

Security’s role in transit security.[Footnote 24] TSA will be 

transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of the 

recently passed Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).



To define its roles and responsibilities in transit security, TSA is 

currently working with FTA to develop a memorandum of 

agreement.[Footnote 25] According to FTA and TSA officials, the 

memorandum of agreement will define the roles and responsibilities of 

each agency as they relate to transit security and address a variety of 

issues, including separating safety and security activities, 

establishing national standards, interfacing with transit agencies, and 

establishing funding priorities. For example, TSA officials said they 

expect to mandate a set of national standards for transit security. 

Consequently, the memorandum of agreement would articulate the roles 

and responsibilities of TSA and FTA in establishing these standards.



TSA and FTA have not finalized the timetable for issuing the memorandum 

of agreement. TSA and FTA officials originally planned to issue the 

memorandum of agreement in September 2002. However, according to FTA 

officials, the issuance was delayed so that the memorandum could 

incorporate and reflect the administration’s fiscal year 2004 budget 

request. According to TSA officials, FTA and TSA would like to issue 

the memorandum of agreement by January 2003. Although TSA and FTA are 

informally coordinating transit security issues, the memorandum of 

agreement will formalize their relationship, help prevent duplication 

of effort, and help TSA manage the shared responsibilities involved in 

securing the nation’s transportation system.



Transit Agencies Said the Federal Government Should Provide More 

Information and Assistance:



The transit agencies we visited were generally pleased with the 

assistance FTA has provided since September 11. Officials from these 

agencies added, however, that the federal government could do more in 

helping them secure their transit systems. They suggested, for example, 

that the federal government provide additional information on a number 

of issues, invest more in security-related research and development, 

help obtain security clearances, and supply increased funding for 

security improvements.



Officials from the transit agencies we visited reported a need for the 

federal government to disseminate additional information on topics 

ranging from available federal grants to appropriate security levels 

for individual agencies. A recurring theme was for the federal 

government to establish a clearinghouse or similar mechanism that 

maintains and disseminates this type of information. Specifically, 

officials expressed a need for the federal government to provide 

additional information on the following topics:



* Intelligence: Transit officials from a number of agencies stated that 

the federal government should provide additional information on threats 

to their transit agencies or cities. Officials also commented that 

“real time” information on attacks against other transit agencies would 

be useful.



* Best practices: A number of officials said that information on 

transit security best practices would be beneficial. According to FTA 

officials, the assessments of the 36 transit agencies are helping them 

identify best practices.



* Federal grants: Officials from several transit agencies suggested 

that information on available grants that can be used for transit 

safety and security improvements would be useful, noting that locating 

these grants is challenging and time consuming. For example, an 

assistant general manager stated that she spends too much of her time 

searching the Internet for grants available for transit.



* Level of security: Transit officials from a few agencies told us that 

it would be helpful for the federal government to provide information 

on the appropriate level of security for their agencies. For example, 

officials at one agency questioned whether they needed to continue to 

post guards--24 hours a day, 7 days a week--at the entrance and exit of 

their tunnel, a practice instituted when the Department of 

Transportation issued a threat advisory to the transit industry in May 

2002. Similarly, our survey results indicate that determining the 

appropriate level of security is a challenge for transit agencies.



* Cutting-edge technology: Officials from a number of agencies said 

that the federal government should provide information on the latest 

security technologies. For example, officials from one agency said that 

such information is needed because they have been bombarded by vendors 

selling security technology since September 11; however, the officials 

said they were unsure about the quality of the products, whether the 

products were needed, or whether the products would be outdated next 

year.



* Decontamination practices: Several transit agency officials expressed 

a need for information on decontamination protocols. For example, one 

agency official noted that information is needed on how to determine if 

the system is “clean” after a chemical or biological attack.



According to FTA officials, FTA is developing two mechanisms to better 

disseminate information on intelligence, best practices, and security-

related issues to transit agencies. First, FTA is launching a new 

secure Web site to post best practices and allow for the exchange of 

security-related information. In September 2002, FTA invited 100 

transit agencies to register to use this Web site, which utilizes the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) secure Web site technology called 

Infragard. Second, FTA is funding the transit Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center, which will disseminate intelligence information to 

transit agencies. The Center will initially be available for the 

largest 50 agencies. The schedules for launching or expanding the 

Center to other transit agencies have not been established.



Officials from several of the agencies we met with also said that the 

federal government should be investing more in security-related 

research and development. Agency officials noted that individual 

transit agencies do not have the resources to devote to research and 

development. Moreover, the officials said this is an appropriate role 

for the federal government, since the products of research and 

development endeavors should benefit the entire transit community, not 

just individual agencies. FTA’s Office of Technology is currently the 

agency’s focal point for research and development and is responsible 

for identifying and supporting technological innovations, including 

safety and security innovations. According to FTA documents, the Office 

of Technology’s obligations for safety and security technologies have 

increased from $680,000 in fiscal year 2000 to an estimated $1.1 

million in fiscal year 2002. FTA’s fiscal year 2003 budget request 

includes about $4.2 million for the Office of Technology’s safety and 

security technologies, representing a 272-percent increase from fiscal 

year 2002. FTA is also conducting 13 research projects on a variety of 

security-related issues, such as updating its guide for security 

planning, developing material for a security awareness campaign, and 

working on decontamination procedures for public transportation.



A number of transit officials also expressed a need for the federal 

government to help them obtain security clearances. As we have reported 

in our previous work on homeland security, state and local officials 

have characterized their lack of security clearances as a barrier to 

obtaining critical intelligence information.[Footnote 26] The 

inability to receive any classified threat information could hamper 

transit agencies’ emergency preparedness capability as it apparently 

did at one of the transit agencies we visited. In this agency’s city, a 

bomb threat was made against a major building, but because the transit 

agency officials did not have the necessary security clearances, the 

FBI did not inform them of this threat until about 40 minutes before 

the agency was asked to help evacuate the building. According to 

transit agency officials, the lack of advance notice negatively 

affected their agency’s ability to respond, even though, in this case, 

the threat was not carried out. Proposed legislation (H.R. 3483) 

provides that the Attorney General expeditiously grant security 

clearances to governors who apply for them and to state and local 

officials who participate in federal counterterrorism working groups or 

regional task forces. FTA has offered to help transit agencies join 

their local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force to better access 

intelligence information, but it has not made assisting transit 
agencies 

with security clearances part of their security activities.[Footnote 
27]



Officials from the transit agencies we visited also said that 

additional federal funding is needed. As noted earlier, many of the 

transit agencies we visited are experiencing tightened budgets, which 

make it more difficult for them to fund safety and security needs. 

Moreover, according to our survey results, insufficient funding is the 

most significant obstacle agencies face in trying to make their systems 

more safe and secure. The Congress has already made additional funding 

available for transit security purposes--about $23.5 million through 

the fiscal year 2002 DOD supplemental. FTA’s fiscal year 2003 budget 

request also includes $17.9 million for safety and security 

expenditures.



Critical Decisions Remain about the Federal Government’s Role in 

Funding Transit Security Improvements:



Important funding decisions for transit safety and security initiatives 

remain. Due to the expense of security enhancements and transit 

agencies’ tight budget environments, the federal government is likely 

to be viewed as a source of funding for at least some of these 

enhancements. These improvements join the growing list of security 

initiatives competing for federal assistance. Based on our past work on 

homeland security issues, site visits to transit agencies, and survey 

results, we believe that several issues will need to be addressed when 

the federal government’s role in funding transit safety and security 

initiatives is considered. These issues include (1) determining the 

roles of stakeholders in funding transit security, (2) developing an 

approach to distribute federal funds, (3) establishing goals and 

performance indicators for the federal government’s efforts, and (4) 

selecting the appropriate federal policy instrument to deliver 

assistance.



The roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in funding transit 

safety and security need to be determined. Since all levels of 

government and the private sector are concerned about transit safety 

and security, determining who should finance security activities may be 

difficult. Some of the benefits of transit systems, such as employment 

and reduced congestion, remain within the locality or region. In 

addition, private companies that own transit systems could directly 

benefit from security measures because steps designed to thwart 

terrorists could also prevent others from stealing goods or causing 

other kinds of economic damage. Given the importance of transit to our 

nation’s economic infrastructure, some have argued that the federal 

government should help pay for protective measures for transit. Transit 

officials we spoke with said that the federal government should provide 

additional funding for security needs. Fifty-nine percent of transit 

agencies in large-and small-urbanized areas responding to our survey 

said they plan to use federal funds to pay for their top three security 

priorities. Additionally, TSA and FTA officials said they would seek 

additional resources for transit security.[Footnote 28] The current 

authorizing legislation for federal surface transportation programs, 

TEA-21, expires on September 30, 2003. The reauthorization of TEA-21 

provides an opportunity to examine stakeholders’ roles and 

responsibilities for transit security, including federal funding 

responsibilities.



Since requests for funding transit security improvements will likely 

exceed available resources, an approach for distributing the federal 

dollars is needed. Transit agency officials we met with identified a 

number of possible federal funding criteria, including ridership 

levels, the population of the city the transit agency serves, 

identified vulnerabilities of the agency, the potential for mass 

casualties, and assets of the agency (e.g., tunnels and bridges). In 

general, the transit agency officials we spoke with believed the 

federal government should direct its dollars to agencies that are most 

at risk or most vulnerable to a terrorist attack--a criterion 

consistent with a risk management approach. A risk management approach 

is a systematic process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the 

criticality (or relative importance) of assets to better support key 

decisions linking resources with prioritized efforts for results. 

Figure 9 illustrates that the highest risks and priorities emerge where 

the three parts of a risk management approach overlap. For example, 

transit infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset, 

vulnerable to attack, and a likely target would be at most risk and 

therefore would be a higher priority for funding compared with 

infrastructure that was only vulnerable to attack.



Figure 9: Diagram of a Risk Management Approach:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



We have advocated using a risk management approach to guide federal 

programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other 

threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of 

highest:



priority.[Footnote 29] FTA and TSA have not developed funding criteria 

or an approach to distribute funding for transit security. However, the 

agencies have the needed information to apply a risk management 

approach. For example, FTA obtains threat information from a variety of 

sources, including the FBI, and is in the process of identifying the 

most critical transit infrastructure. In addition, FTA has 

vulnerability information from the security assessments it recently 

performed. Moreover, according to TSA officials, TSA used a risk 

management approach to recently distribute grants to seaports and is 

researching best practices for using risk management assessments.



In addition to a funding approach, goals and performance indicators 

need to be established to guide the federal government’s efforts in 

transit security. These critical components can influence all 

decisions--from launching new initiatives to allocating resources--as 

well as measure progress and ensure accountability. The Congress has 

long recognized the need to objectively assess the results of federal 

programs, passing the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 

(commonly referred to as the Results Act). The Results Act required 

agencies to set strategic and annual goals, measure performance, and 

report on the degree to which goals are met. However, goals or outcomes 

of where the nation should be in terms of transit security or other 

national security programs have yet to be defined. For example, as we 

reported this summer, the National Strategy for Homeland Security does 

not establish a baseline set of performance goals and measures for 

assessing and improving preparedness.[Footnote 30] Moreover, the goals 

and measures for transit safety and security in the Department of 

Transportation’s current strategic plan were developed before September 

11 and focus more on safety and crime than on terrorism. Consequently, 

they do not reflect today’s realities or the changing role of the 

federal government in transit security. Given the recent and proposed 

increases in security funding, such as the DOD supplemental that 

provided about $23.5 million for transit security, as well as the need 

for real and meaningful improvements in preparedness, establishing 

clear goals is critical to ensuring both a successful and a fiscally 

responsible effort. Moreover, performance indicators are needed to 

track progress toward these established goals.



Another important consideration is the design of policy instruments to 

deliver assistance. Our previous work on federal programs suggests that 

the choice and design of policy instruments have important consequences 

for performance and accountability. The federal government has a 

variety of policy tools, including grants, loan guarantees, 

regulations, tax incentives, and partnerships, to motivate or mandate 

state and local governments or the private sector to help address 

security concerns. The choice and design of policy tools can enhance 

the government’s capacity to (1) target the areas of highest risk to 

better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most pressing 

needs, (2) promote the sharing of responsibilities among all parties, 

and (3) track and assess progress toward achieving national goals. 

Regardless of the tool selected, specific safeguards and clear 

accountability requirements, such as documentation of the terms and 

conditions of federal participation, are needed to protect federal 

interests.



Conclusions:



Securing the nation’s transit system is not a short-term or easy task. 

Many challenges must be overcome. FTA and the transit agencies we 

visited have made a good start in enhancing transit security, but more 

work is needed. Transit agencies’ calls for increased federal funding 

for security needs join the list of competing claims for federal 

dollars and, as a result, difficult trade-offs will have to be made. 

Since requests for federal assistance will undoubtedly exceed available 

resources, criteria will be needed for determining which transit 

security improvements merit any additional federal funds. To ensure 

that finite resources are directed to the areas of highest priority, 

the criteria should be in line with a risk management approach. In 

addition to helping distribute funds, establishing a risk-based funding 

approach would inform congressional decision making and demonstrate to 

the Congress that the funds will be managed efficiently. Moreover, as 

the federal government’s role in transit security expands--whether 

through additional funding or the setting of national standards by TSA-

-it is important that goals and performance indicators are established 

to guide the government’s efforts in transit security.[Footnote 31] 

These components are needed to ensure accountability and results.



The upcoming reauthorization of the surface transportation authorizing 

legislation provides an opportunity to examine the role of the federal 

government, including its funding responsibilities, in transit 

security. However, transit agencies cannot wait for the new authorizing 

legislation to implement transit security improvements and are moving 

forward with improvements to enhance the security of their system and 

passengers. The federal government could assist transit agencies as 

they press forward with their security initiatives by allowing all 

transit agencies, regardless of the size of the population it serves, 

to use urbanized area formula funds for security-related operating 

expenses. Although eliminating the prohibition on urbanized area funds 

would not provide additional funding, it would give agencies increased 

flexibility in financing transit security enhancements so that they 

could decide, for example, to use their federal dollars to pay for 

additional security patrols instead of a new rail car. This additional 

flexibility would be especially helpful given the high costs of transit 

security improvements and the declining revenues of many agencies. 

Additionally, the Department of Transportation could help transit 

agency officials obtain timely intelligence information so that they 

can make better informed decisions about their agency’s emergency 

planning and response. The transit Information Sharing and Analysis 

Center is a positive step in providing some transit agencies timely 

intelligence information. The Department of Transportation could take 

other steps as well, including helping transit agency officials obtain 

security clearances, to further enhance the sharing of critical 

intelligence information to transit agencies.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



To provide transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit 

security improvements, we recommend that the Secretary of 

Transportation consider seeking a legislative change to allow all 

transit agencies, regardless of the size of the urbanized area they 

serve, to use federal urbanized area formula funds for security-related 

operating expenses. To discourage the replacement of state and local 

funds with federal funds, any legislative change should include a 

requirement that transit agencies maintain their level of previous 

funding.



To help transit agencies enhance transit security, to guide federal 

dollars to the highest priority, and to ensure accountability and 

results of the federal government’s efforts in transit security, we 

also recommend that the Secretary of Transportation take the following 

actions:



* Develop and implement strategies to help transit agency officials 

obtain timely intelligence information, including helping transit 

agency officials obtain security clearances.



* Develop clear, concise, transparent criteria for distributing federal 

funds to transit agencies for security improvements. The criteria 

should correspond to a risk management approach so that federal dollars 

are directed to the areas of highest priority.



* Establish goals and performance indicators for the department’s 

transit security efforts in order to promote accountability and ensure 

results.



Agency Comments:



We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this 

report for review and comment. Department of Transportation officials, 

including the Deputy Administrator of the Federal Transit 

Administration, provided oral comments on the draft on November 22, 

2002. The officials generally concurred with the report’s findings and 

conclusions. Moreover, they stated that the Department of 

Transportation will carefully consider our recommendations as it 

continues working to improve transit security. The officials also 

provided two minor clarifications on TSA’s authority over transit 

security and the expected issuance date of the memorandum of agreement 

between TSA and FTA, which we incorporated into the report.



We conducted our review from May through October 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.



As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the 

contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it 

until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of 

this report to the Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of 

the Federal Transit Administration, the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget, and interested congressional committees. We will 

make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report 

will be available at no charge on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 

contact me on (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix IV.



Signed by Peter Guerrero:



Peter Guerrero

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:



[End of section]



Appendix I GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall Results:



This appendix presents our survey instrument and overall results. 

Unless otherwise noted, we report the number of respondents for each 

question and the weighted percentage of respondents who selected each 

answer for each question.



[See PDF for image]



[End of section]



Appendix II Scope and Methodology:



To address our objectives, we visited 10 transit agencies across the 

country, including the Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority in 

Austin; Chicago Transit Authority; Central Florida Regional Transit 

Authority in Orlando; Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority; Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Council; New York City 

Transit; Regional Transportation District in Denver; San Francisco Bay 

Area Rapid Transit; San Francisco Municipal Railway; and Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in the District of Columbia. We 

selected these agencies because they represent different geographical 

areas and operate transit systems of different sizes and modes. (See 

fig. 10 and table 1.) During our site visits, we interviewed key 

officials from the transit agencies and the respective city governments 

and reviewed the transit agencies’ emergency plans.



Figure 10: Location of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Table 1: Profiles of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited, 2000:



Transit agency: Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority (CMTA); 

Urban area served: Austin, TX; Population

served[A]: 604,621; Service area (sq. miles): 572; Services provided: 

Heavy rail:  ; Services provided: Light rail:  ; Services provided: 

Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked 

trips[C]: 130,640.



Transit agency: Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority 

(LYNX); Urban area served: Orlando, FL; Population

served[A]: 1,357,852; Service area (sq. miles): 2,538; Services 

provided: Heavy rail:  ; Services provided: Light rail:  ; Services 

provided: Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday 

unlinked trips[C]: 70,546.



Transit agency: Chicago Transit Authority (CTA); Urban area served: 

Chicago, IL--Northwestern IN; Population

served[A]: 3,708,773; Service area (sq. miles): 356; Services provided: 

Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail:  ; Services provided: 

Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked 

trips[C]: 1,562,105.



Transit agency: Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority (LACMTA); Urban area served: Los Angeles, CA; Population

served[A]: 8,450,001; Service area (sq. miles): 1,423; Services 

provided: Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail: x; Services 

provided: Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]:  ; Average weekday 

unlinked trips[C]: 1,281,375.



Transit agency: Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Council (Metro 

Transit); Urban area served: Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN; Population

served[A]: 2,265,788; Service area (sq. miles): 1,105; Services 

provided: Heavy rail:  ; Services provided: Light rail:  ; Services 

provided: Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]:  ; Average weekday 

unlinked trips[C]: 243,987.



Transit agency: New York City Transit (NYCT); Urban area served: New 

York, NY--Northeastern NJ; Population

served[A]: 7,322,000; Service area (sq. miles): 322; Services provided: 

Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail:  ; Services provided: 

Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked 

trips[C]: 8,206,391.



Transit agency: Regional Transportation District (RTD); Urban area 

served: Denver, CO; Population

served[A]: 2,400,000; Service area (sq. miles): 2,406; Services 

provided: Heavy rail:  ; Services provided: Light rail: x; Services 

provided: Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday 

unlinked trips[C]: 259,703.



Transit agency: San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART); 

Urban area served: San Francisco--Oakland, CA; Population

served[A]: 829,156; Service area (sq. miles): 103; Services provided: 

Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail:  ; Services provided: 

Bus:  ; Services provided: Other[B]:  ; Average weekday unlinked 

trips[C]: 310,268.



Transit agency: San Francisco Municipal Railway (MUNI); Urban area 

served: San Francisco--Oakland, CA; Population

served[A]: 792,049; Service area (sq. miles): 49; Services provided: 

Heavy rail:  ; Services provided: Light rail: x; Services provided: 

Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked 

trips[C]: 713,266.



Transit agency: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA); 

Urban area served: Washington, D.C.--MD--VA; Population

served[A]: 3,363,031; Service area (sq. miles): 945; Services provided: 

Heavy rail: x; Services provided: Light rail:  ; Services provided: 

Bus: x; Services provided: Other[B]: x; Average weekday unlinked 

trips[C]: 1,169,806.



[A] Population information comes from 1990 census data.



[B] “Other” includes trolleybus, cable car, demand response, and 

vanpool.



[C] Unlinked trips are the number of passengers who board public 

transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they board 

vehicles no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from their 

origin to their destination. :



Source: National Transit Database.



[End of table]



In addition to our site visits, we surveyed a sample of 200 transit 

agencies. The sample from which we drew our population consisted of all 

transit agencies throughout the nation that are eligible to receive 

federal urbanized area formula funding, according to the most up-to-

date list of eligible agencies provided by the National Transit 

Database. The results of our mail survey are generalizable to this 

population, which we refer to as our sample population.



We stratified our sample population into two groups--agencies that 

serve urbanized areas with a population of 200,000 or more (large 

urbanized areas); and agencies that serve urbanized areas with a 

population of 50,000 to 199,999 (small urbanized areas). We 

distinguished between these two strata because agencies that operate in 

large urbanized areas are prohibited from using federal urbanized area 

formula funds for operating expenses, whereas agencies in small 

urbanized areas are not prohibited from using FTA funds for operating 

expenses. We randomly selected 100 agencies from each stratum to 

survey.



Our overall survey response rate was 78 percent. However, we excluded 9 

surveys from our analysis after determining that these transit agencies 

were outside the scope of our review for one of the following reasons: 

they had gone out of business (3); they were subsidiaries of other 

agencies included in our sample (2); or they did not provide bus, 

customized community transport, rail, subway, or ferryboat services 

(e.g., they only provide vanpool service) (4). The reported survey 

results are based on the responses of the subpopulation of 146 agencies 

within the scope of our review.



To help design our survey instrument, we reviewed surveys on transit 

safety and security conducted by FTA, the American Public 

Transportation Association (APTA), and the Transportation Cooperative 

Research Program. We also obtained input from Department of 

Transportation, FTA, and transit agency officials; and representatives 

from APTA and the Mineta Transportation Institute. After developing the 

survey instrument, we pretested the content and format of the survey 

with officials from several transit agencies and made necessary 

revisions. All returned questionnaires were reviewed, and we called 

respondents to obtain information when questions were not answered or 

clarification was needed. All data were double-keyed and verified 

during data entry, and computer analyses were performed to identify any 

inconsistencies or other indications of error. A copy of the mail 

questionnaire is included in appendix I.



All sample surveys are subject to sampling error--that is, the extent 

to which the survey results differ from what would have been obtained 

if the whole population had been observed. Measures of sampling error 

are defined by two elements, the width of the confidence intervals 

around the estimate (sometimes called the precision of the estimate) 

and the confidence level at which the intervals are computed. Because 

we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our 

sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have 

drawn. Moreover, because each sample could have provided different 

estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular 

sample’s results as a 95-percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or 

minus 5 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the 

actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have 

drawn. As a result, we are 95-percent confident that the confidence 

intervals for each of the mail survey questions includes the true 

values in the sample population.



All percentage estimates from the mail survey have sampling errors of 

plus or minus 10 percentage points or less, unless otherwise noted. In 

addition, other potential sources of error associated with surveys, 

such as misinterpretation of a question and nonresponse, may be 

present, although nonresponse errors should be minimal.



Finally, in addition to our site visits and survey, we analyzed agency 

documents and interviewed transit agency officials, industry 

representatives, and academic experts. We analyzed FTA budget data, 

safety and security documents, and applicable statutes and regulations. 

We reviewed research on terrorism and attended transit security forums 

sponsored by APTA and FTA. Finally, we interviewed FTA, TSA, and 

Department of Transportation officials and representatives from APTA, 

the National Governors Association, the Mineta Transportation 

Institute, RAND Corporation, the University of California at Los 

Angeles, and the Amalgamated Transit Union.



We conducted our review from May through October 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.



[End of section]



Appendix III Selected Survey Results:



This appendix provides our analysis of the responses we received to 

selected questions from our survey of 200 transit agencies in the 

United States. (See app. I for the overall survey results and our 

survey instrument.) This analysis provides information about the 

characteristics, including both general and safety-and security-

related characteristics, of the transit agencies surveyed. Differences 

in the characteristics of transit agencies in large urbanized areas 

(populations of 200,000 or more) and transit agencies in small 

urbanized areas (populations between 50,0000 to 199,999) are also 

presented.[Footnote 32]



Services Provided by Transit Agencies Surveyed:



The transit agencies we surveyed provide a variety of transit services, 

including bus, rail, and ferryboat. Although a mix of services is 

provided by the surveyed transit agencies, bus is by far the most 

common transit service provided. (See fig. 11.) Our survey results also 

indicate that there are some differences between transit agencies in 

large urbanized areas and transit agencies in small urbanized areas. 

For example, transit agencies in large urbanized areas offer more types 

of services than transit agencies in small urbanized areas. 

Additionally, transit agencies in large urbanized areas were more 

likely to provide rail services than transit agencies in small 

urbanized areas and were the only agencies to provide subway service.



Figure 11: Types of Transit Services Offered by Surveyed Transit 

Agencies:



[See PDF for image]



[A] Customized community transport is characterized by (1) vehicles 

that do not usually operate over a fixed route or on a fixed schedule 

and (2) vehicles that may be dispatched to pick up several passengers 

at different pick-up points before taking them to their respective 

destinations and may even be interrupted en route to these destinations 

to pick up other passengers. For our survey, we classified paratransit 

and demand response as forms of customized community transport.



[B] “Other” includes inclined plane service, connecting shuttle 

service, vanpools, and special events service.



[End of figure]



Ridership of Transit Agencies Surveyed:



The transit agencies we surveyed reported that they provided almost 10 

billion unlinked passenger trips[Footnote 33] in fiscal years 2000 and 

2001. Specifically, according to the agencies, they provided a total of 

4.7 billion unlinked passenger trips in fiscal year 2000 and 4.9 

billion trips in fiscal year 2001. Our survey results also indicate 

that transit agencies in large urbanized areas carry more passengers 

than transit agencies in small urbanized areas. For example, the 

majority of transit agencies in small urbanized areas reported that 

they provided fewer than 1 million passenger trips in fiscal year 2001, 

while the majority of transit agencies in large urbanized areas 

provided more than 1 million passenger trips. Moreover, 7 percent of 

the transit agencies in large urbanized areas stated that they provided 

more than 100 million passenger trips in fiscal year 2001. No transit 

agency that we surveyed in a small urbanized area served that number of 

passengers. (See fig. 12.):



Figure 12: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Number of Unlinked 

Passenger Trips in Fiscal Years 2000 - 2001:



[See PDF for image]



Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.



[End of figure]



Operating and Capital Budgets of Transit Agencies Surveyed:



According to our survey results, transit agencies in large urbanized 

areas typically have bigger operating and capital budgets than transit 

agencies in small urbanized areas. (See fig. 13.) In particular, 57 

percent of the transit agencies in large urbanized areas have operating 

budgets of more than $10 million, while 10 percent of transit agencies 

in small urbanized areas have operating budgets of comparable size. 

Additionally, 32 percent of the transit agencies in large urbanized 

areas have capital budgets of more than $10 million. In comparison, 

none of the transit agencies in small urbanized areas that we surveyed 

had capital budgets of that magnitude.[Footnote 34]



Figure 13: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Size of Their 

Operating and Capital Budgets, Fiscal Year 2001:



[See PDF for image]



Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.



[End of figure]



Security of Transit Agencies Surveyed:



Most transit agencies we surveyed either contract with a security 

service (35 percent) and/or have established agreements with local or 

state police (34 percent) to provide security for their property. 

However, our survey did reveal some differences between transit 

agencies in large and small urbanized areas in terms of their transit 

properties’ security, as shown in figure 14. For example, of the 

transit agencies we surveyed, only those agencies in large urbanized 

areas had their own transit police officers.



Figure 14: Types of Security Used by Transit Agencies in Large and 

Small Urbanized Areas:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Funding Sources for Transit Safety and Security Needs of Transit 

Agencies Surveyed:



Our survey results show that all transit agencies we surveyed rely on a 

variety of federal, state, and local sources to fund safety and 

security expenses. As figure 15 shows, transit agencies in large and 

small urbanized areas identified local funds as the most common source 

of funding for safety and security operating expenses. A notable 

difference between transit agencies in large and small urbanized areas 

appears in their use of FTA funds. In particular, 62 percent of 

agencies in small urbanized areas identified FTA funds as a source of 

funds for safety and security operating expenses, while 23 percent of 

agencies in large urbanized areas identified this as a source. In 

contrast to safety and security operating expenses, we found that the 

most common source of funds for safety and security capital expenses is 

FTA funds. (See fig. 16.):



Figure 15: Sources of Funds for Operating Expenses Used by Transit 

Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Figure 16: Sources of Funds for Capital Expenses Used by Transit 

Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Acts of Extreme Violence against Transit Agencies Surveyed:



The majority of the transit agencies we surveyed do not believe they 

are likely targets for acts of extreme violence. In particular, 62 

percent of transit agencies we surveyed believe they are unlikely or 

very unlikely to be the target of an act of extreme violence in the 

next 5 years. By contrast, 6 percent of the transit agencies we 

surveyed consider the likelihood of an act of extreme violence on their 

property likely or very likely. Thirty-one percent of the transit 

agencies we surveyed believe they are as likely as not to experience an 

act of extreme violence on their property in the next 5 years.



In addition, the majority of the transit agencies we surveyed have not 

experienced an act of extreme violence on their property in the past 5 

years. Specifically, 66 percent of the transit agencies we surveyed 

said that they have not experienced acts of extreme violence on their 

systems. However, the agencies that have experienced acts of extreme 

violence have encountered a variety of situations. (See fig. 17.):



Figure 17: Acts of Extreme Violence during the Past 5 Years at Transit 

Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Surveyed Transit Agencies’ Safety and Security Assessments:



Seventy-five percent of the transit agencies we surveyed have conducted 

an assessment of their transit system. As figure 18 shows, the majority 

of the assessments have focused on general safety and security issues, 

not necessarily on the transit systems vulnerability to a terrorist 

threat or act of extreme violence. Seventy-seven percent of the 

agencies reported that their assessments have identified items needing 

action; however, the majority of these agencies indicated that a 

variety of factors have limited their ability to resolve the identified 

problems. According to these transit agencies, insufficient funding, 

the need to balance security and safety priorities with other 

priorities, and insufficient staff time or availability to complete 

action items were the top reasons why identified needs have not been 

addressed.



Figure 18: Types of Assessments Performed by Transit Agencies:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Emergency Plans of Transit Agencies Surveyed:



Sixty-six percent of all surveyed agencies have emergency plans. In 

general, our survey results indicate that the majority of the agencies’ 

emergency plans describe protocols for a number of emergency 

situations, such as natural disasters, reported bomb threats, and 

explosive devices. Moreover, our survey results also indicate that the 

majority of all agencies’ plans specify coordination with other 

entities, such as local police departments, and most agencies have 

shared their plans with other entities.



However, our survey results reveal that transit agencies in large 

urbanized areas have more comprehensive emergency plans than agencies 

in small urbanized areas, in terms of both the level of coordination 

with other entities and the number of scenarios addressed by the 

plans.[Footnote 35] For example, as figure 19 shows, the emergency 

plans of agencies in large urbanized areas specify coordination with 

the media more often than plans of agencies in small urbanized areas. 

Furthermore, as figure 20 shows, the emergency plans of agencies in 

large urbanized areas address more emergency situations--such as an 

explosive device on the transit property--than the emergency plans of 

agencies in small urbanized areas.



Figure 19: Types of Coordination Specified in Transit Agencies’ 

Emergency Plans:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Figure 20: Types of Emergency Situations Addressed in Transit Agencies’ 

Emergency Plans:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



[End of section]



Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contacts:



Peter Guerrero, (202) 512-2834

Susan Fleming, (202) 512-4431:



Acknowledgments:



In addition to those named above, Karin Bolwahnn, Nikki Clowers, 

Michelle Dresben, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Michele Fejfar, David Hooper, 

Wyatt R. Hundrup, Hiroshi Ishikawa, and Sara Ann Moessbauer made key 

contributions to this report.



FOOTNOTES



[1] Congressional Research Service, Transportation Issues in the 107th 

Congress, (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002).



[2] The federal urbanized area formula program provides federal funds 

to urbanized areas (jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) 

for transit capital investments, operating expenses, and 

transportation-related planning.



[3] According to the American Public Transportation Association, its 

2000 ridership data are preliminary.



[4] 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5330.



[5] P.L. No. 105-178 (1998). TEA-21 is the current authorizing 

legislation for federal transit programs.



[6] 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5307 (d)(1)(J)(i) and (ii).



[7] Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, P.L. 97-424.



[8] Specifically, urbanized areas with populations over 1 million could 

use up to 80 percent of their urbanized area formula funds for 

operating expenses; urbanized areas with populations between 200,000 

and 1 million could use up to 90 percent; and urbanized areas with 

populations of less than 200,000 could use up to 95 percent.



[9] Congress, as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation 

Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), established the Mineta Transportation 

Institute. The Institute focuses on international surface 

transportation policy issues as related to three primary 

responsibilities: research, education, and technology transfer.



[10] Because about 40 percent of the transit agencies we surveyed could 

not provide cost estimates for their identified safety and security 

needs, we cannot provide an aggregated estimate for the surveyed 

transit agencies.



[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in 

Securing Transit Systems, GAO-02-1075T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 

2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Effective 

Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to Success, GAO-02-1011T 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2002); and U.S. General Accounting Office, 

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and 

Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy 

for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).



[12] All of these practices, except for New York’s program, were 

implemented before September 11, 2001.



[13] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5324(c).



[14] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5324(c) and 49 U.S.C. sec. 5330.



[15] 49 U.S.C. sec. 5307(d) (1)(J)(i) and (ii).



[16] According to FTA officials, FTA verifies that agencies spend at 

least 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds on security 

improvements during its triennial review. FTA’s triennial review is a 

full review and evaluation of grantees’ performance in carrying out 

projects, including specific references to compliance with statutory 

and administration requirements.



[17] FTA also has authority to enter into “other agreements” with 

transit agencies to introduce innovative methods for safety and 

security on negotiated terms and conditions more favorable to 

nonfederal participants than are authorized under FTA contracts, 

grants, or cooperative agreements under 49 U.S.C. sec. 5312(d), and FTA 

may work with other federal agencies in developing defenses and 

responses to terrorist incidents.



[18] A professional team of antiterrorism, transit operations, and 

emergency response experts conducted each assessment.



[19] Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 

for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United 

States Act 2002 (P.L. 107-117, H.R. Conference Report 107-350). The DOD 

supplemental also provided $39.1 million to the Washington Metropolitan 

Area Transit Authority for region-wide security requirements, including 

$5 million for protective clothing and breathing apparatus, $2.2 

million for completion of the fiber optic network project, $15 million 

for a chemical emergency sensor program, and $16.9 million for 

increased employee and facility security. On August 2, 2002, the 

President signed into law the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for 

Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United 

States (P.L.107-206, H.R. 4775), which set aside $15 million for grants 

to enhance security for intercity bus operations.



[20] The remaining $4.8 million of the DOD supplemental was dedicated 

to the replacement of buses and kiosks in New York destroyed in the 

terrorist attacks.



[21] Budget data include FTA’s actual and planned expenditures on 

program activities and oversight. It does not include funding for grant 

programs.



[22] P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).



[23] For more information on TSA’s role in aviation security, see U.S. 

General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Transportation Security 

Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-

971T(Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002).



[24] The strategy states that the Department of Homeland Security will 

coordinate closely with the Department of Transportation, which will 

remain responsible for transportation safety.



[25] TSA is developing memorandums of agreement with all modal 

administrations in the Department of Transportation.



[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces 

Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2002); and U.S. General Accounting Office, 

Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership 

Sought, GAO-02-490T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 2002).



[27] According to the Department of Transportation, the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act gives TSA the authority to disclose 

sensitive security information to approved officials from federal, 

state, and local governments and the private sector on a “need to know” 

basis, even if the officials do not have clearances.



[28] TSA will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security 

as part of the recently enacted Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).



[29] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk 

Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T 

(Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001); and U.S. General Accounting 

Office, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help 

Prioritize and Target Program Investments, GAO/NSIAD-98-74. 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 1998).



[30] GAO-02-1011T.



[31] TSA will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security 

as part of the recently enacted Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).



[32] Unless otherwise noted, all estimates by size of agency have 

sampling errors of plus or minus 13 percentage points or less.



[33] Unlinked passenger trips are the number of passengers who board 

public transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they 

board vehicles no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from 

their origin to their destination.



[34] Depending on the fiscal year, between about one-third and two-

thirds of the agencies we surveyed could only provide estimates of the 

amount of their total operating and capital funds that were spent on 

safety and security activities. Furthermore, additional analysis raised 

questions about data reliability. Therefore, we cannot reliably 

determine the percentage of the agencies’ capital and operating budgets 

that are used for safety and security activities.



[35] In this section, estimates by size of agency have sampling errors 

of plus or minus 16 percentage points or less.



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