Federalism Could Hold Iraq Together
There's hope for the draft constitution and stability, but the main ethnic groups must accept decentralization
by Jonathan Morrow
(First published by Newsday on October 21, 2005. Reprinted with permission.)
Amid contrasting claims of triumph and despair that surround Iraq, Saturday's referendum on the draft constitution reveals a complex reality. From six trips to Iraq to work with its constitutional drafters, my personal judgment is that the country is messy and difficult, but the prospects for stabilization are not without hope. As we wait for the final word on the ballot outcome from Iraq's Independent Electoral Commission, some popular myths are being proved false.
One myth is that Iraqis are laying a firm basis for their constitutional democracy. Early reports that Iraqi voters have approved the draft constitution are encouraging, and reports that voter turnout was relatively high—around 65 percent—are also good. But it is also true that one large minority in Iraq, the Sunni Arabs, voted overwhelmingly against the draft. This means the constitution has thus far not met a basic test: broad-based consensus.
A second myth is that Sunni Arabs, because they voted, are now part of the political process. That Sunni Arabs voted is a good thing, even if they voted against the constitution. Voting is addictive; they may vote again. But they rejected a federalist governmental model at this referendum, and they may continue to reject federalism by refusing to participate in the December parliamentary election for a federal government.
Another myth is that this constitution is the next step in the breakup of Iraq. This is also wrong. The constitution prescribes a very loose federalism and gives large powers to Kurdistan; to any future southern, predominantly Shia federal region, and to existing governorates. But federalism, far from breaking up a country, is more likely to hold it together.
Look at India, Spain, South Africa and Canada. In each of these countries, federal and decentralized constitutional structures bridge major differences in ethnicity and culture. Given the strong ethnic and sectarian identity of Iraqi Kurds and Shia, the choice in Iraq was never between centralism and regionalism, but regionalism or nothing.
A fourth myth is that this constitution will deepen sectarian divisions in Iraq, fueling the insurgency. Not necessarily. There are many moderate Sunni Arabs who are beginning to see that Iraq needs to be a federation. Indeed, in July and August most of the Sunni Arab constitutional negotiators understood the need to recognize Kurdish autonomy and the need for non-Kurdish geographic federal units to form. The problem was an all too brief constitutional process that gave little time for leaders to enable their constituents—Sunni Arab voters—to understand what federalism is. With time and effort, Sunni Arabs can be led to overcome their fear of federalism, embrace this constitution and deprive the insurgency of a support base.
Still another myth is that this constitution paves the way for Iraq to become a theocracy. Also not likely. The constitution prescribes that Islam will be a main source of legislation and prohibits laws from contradicting Islamic principles. But these prescriptions will be interpreted by a Federal Supreme Court that must be approved by two-thirds of elected Iraqi legislators - too many for the Islamists to control. Islam will clearly, therefore, not be the only source of legislation. In any event, those laws on which Islam impacts most heavily—including criminal law and family law - will be influenced by policy that is regional, not national. No Shia Iraqis, however conservative, want another Iran.
A final myth is that if the constitution can be amended, then the Sunni Arabs can be brought on board. Unlikely. The deal this week to establish a commission to review the constitution after the next election apparently brought in one of the Sunni Arab groups, the Iraq Islamic Party. But it is not a panacea. If the Kurds and Shia Arabs are prepared to concede anything significant next year, why haven't they made these concessions already?
Casting aside these misconceptions, the task at hand is clear. The Kurdish and Shia politicians must show their Sunni Arab brothers that federalism can deliver Sunni Arabs true self-government, a proportionate share of oil wealth and a stake in Baghdad politics. The United States, which pressed for a constitutional timetable that gave little opportunity for consensus-building, must now make the effort to work with Sunni Arab communities—not just the elites—on these issues.
And, in turn, the Sunni Arabs themselves must work to shake off their nostalgia for a centralized Iraqi state. It is that nostalgia, more than anything else, that provides the ideology for the insurgency and gives a springboard to the religious lunacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other foreign terrorists.
The days of Sunni Arab hegemony in Iraq are a thing of the past, and a centralized Iraq is in nobody's interest right now - least of all the Sunni Arab minority. For all Iraqis, strategizing within the terms of federalism is the way forward.
The views expressed here are not necessarily those of USIP, which does not advocate specific policy positions.
