Summary

During the 1995 round of base closures, the Pentagon's recommendations to close surplus military bases were generally sound, although GAO questions the reasonableness of specific recommendations. For example, some excess facilities were spared only because of high up-front shutdown costs. GAO singles out the Air Force process as particularly subjective and poorly documented. Also, the Navy did not consistently apply Defense Department (DOD) criteria when it decided to retain some facilities because of the economic impact their closure would have on local communities. Meanwhile, DOD's estimate of $1.8 billion in annual savings did not take into account potentially costly environmental cleanup activities at military bases. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Military Base Closures: Analysis of DOD's Process and Recommendations for 1995, by Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General for National Security and International Affairs Programs, before the Base Closure and Realignment Commission. GAO/T-NSIAD-95-132, Apr. 17, 1995 (15 pages).

GAO found that: (1) its preliminary estimate of net savings from base closures and realignments is about $17.3 billion over 20 years, but environmental restoration of closed facilities could offset these savings; (2) there have been discrepancies between DOD cost models and budget data; (3) DOD needs to pursue more cross-service use of facilities in order to achieve infrastructure reductions; (4) the 1995 DOD base realignment and closure (BRAC) process is generally sound and well documented, but some recommendations are questionable and should be given further consideration by the BRAC Commission; (5) DOD and the military services have improved the BRAC process by improving their cost and savings estimates and comparisons between units; (6) the Air Force's BRAC process continues to be too subjective and relies too heavily on preliminary cost considerations; (7) DOD infrastructure reductions have not matched its reductions in funding, personnel, and force structure; (8) DOD will continue to have excess capacity and infrastructure after the 1995 BRAC round; (9) DOD believes its fiscal year (FY) 1996 budget represents a 39-percent reduction from its FY 1985 budget; and (10) DOD needs a mechanism to handle changes and problems arising out of earlier BRAC rounds after BRAC authorization expires.