1

Introduction

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WHY A STUDY OF MULTIPARTY MEDIATION?

Since the early 1990s, the nature of warfare has changed radically. The proxy battles—fought between armed troops—that characterized the Cold War have given way to bloody civil and intercommunal conflicts in such places as Haiti, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Congo/Zaire, Congo-Brazzaville, Liberia, Bosnia, and Central Asia. Yet at the same time as these internecine conflicts have increased in number, there has also been an increase in the appetite for negotiated settlements, as witnessed in Northern Ireland, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, South Africa, Namibia, and Mozambique. Together, these two developments have inspired a third: namely, a growing role for the international community in peacekeeping and peacemaking, and especially in mediating political agreements in seemingly intractable conflicts.

This book examines the nature of third-party mediation in violent conflict as perceived by individuals who have worked to bring peace or prevent war in conflict zones around the world. Recognizing the changing complexion of both war and peacemakers, the volume includes official and non-official attempts to mediate conflicts in circumstances of great complexity—

with complexity understood to be not just a function of conflict, with its many causes and consequences, but also a function of the response.

The international response to conflict often entails multiple mediators as well as other third-party actors such as peacekeeping forces, development agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and lone operators. Such a profusion of actors has often made peacemaking efforts messy, difficult, and even chaotic. The vicious nature of many contemporary conflicts, however, and the high costs for the international community of failing to prevent or end war make it critical to manage these third-party interventions—to understand current mediations, their consequences, and the requirements for leadership and cooperation in these joint, or at least contiguous, ventures.

Management in these circumstances is not a matter of establishing a line of command and responsibility. Organizing the diverse third-party peacemaking entities is a lot like organizing cats. As anyone who has lived with them can tell you, cats cannot be organized. Independent beings, they will do what they choose to do, gazing at your efforts to organize them with mild curiosity, or simply ignoring you. Gaining a cat's cooperation is a complicated matter of setting a course the cat might find reasonable and employing incentives (food often works) that persuade it at least to give your idea some thought. The volume's title, *Herding Cats,* is borrowed from Richard Solomon's chapter on Cambodia. The title refers to the challenge facing any principal mediator entering into a conflict: how to make a cohesive whole out of the independent third-party peacemaking initiatives, building on the positive results of earlier mediations, keeping simultaneous interventions by different actors from canceling each other out, bringing along the many interests that lie behind the third-party endeavor, organizing the handoff to a successor. In this aspect of his or her work, the mediator faces an array of highly autonomous individuals and organizations, such as special representatives of powerful states or of the UN secretary-general, high-level politicians, and committed individuals who are privately funded and accountable to no government or international organization. Like cats, these independent agents rarely feel an obligation, or even a desire, to cooperate and they retain the ability to walk away from the mediation or to launch competing initiatives. The mediator cannot force these other third parties to collaborate but must persuade them to enter into a working relationship that reinforces rather than undermines the peacemaking mediation.

The wealth of willing third parties may be a boon to international peacemaking, but it raises serious management issues about how and why these multiparty interventions come about; whether and how they are coordinated;

who provides leadership; what determines the level of commitment in terms of human and financial resources; and who is responsible for keeping an already mediated settlement on track and preventing the collapse of the agreement lest it become orphaned.

The presence or availability of different mediators at varying stages of a conflict raises another series of questions. Are some mediating agents particularly effective during one phase of the conflict and less effective during other phases? Do these mediation efforts during different phases of a conflict—assuming that there is more than one—build on one another? Or do they constitute a series of ad hoc attempts at peacemaking whose success depends not on any cumulative effort but on the effectiveness of the mediator or the weariness of the different warring factions?

As more countries and institutional actors become involved in mediation, a judicious assessment is required not only of their comparative institutional strengths and weaknesses, but also of how to encourage complementary efforts and how to coordinate the process when one actor or institution is handing off the responsibilities for mediation to others. In addition, we need to know more about the main obstacles to achieving coordination and coherence among different mediators in such settings and the means to overcome the problems faced by multiple mediators working without a common script to mediate a negotiated resolution to conflict.

THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS OF MEDIATION EFFORTS

As Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War reminds us, mediation has a long history in international relations.[1] The Greeks frequently resorted to mediation to avert violent conflict. So too did the Romans and the Italian city states of Renaissance Italy. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648), which led to the origins of the modern state system, arguably increased the need for mediation because of the anarchical nature of international society and the obvious limitations of international law as an instrument for resolving disputes between states.[2]

The past fifty years have seen an increase in the demand for mediators, partly because the international system changed profoundly during that period: the end of World War II, the emergence of the bipolarity of the Cold War, the rapid decolonization of vast areas of the globe, and the shift to the post–Cold War era. During the Cold War, mediators were used to positive effect in a number of major international crises. Over the years, the United States played a key role in successive mediation attempts to end the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors[3] and in various regional crises around the globe such as southern Africa.[4] The Soviet Union was

only sporadically involved in mediation, notably in Tashkent in 1966 when it attempted to broker a settlement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.[5]

Representatives of international and regional organizations also used their "good offices" on occasion to mediate an end to various conflicts, as in the efforts of the secretary-general of the United Nations to mediate an end to the Iran-Iraq war or successive rounds of UN mediation in Cyprus.[6] Even middle powers such as Canada and Algeria had their moments as mediators on the world stage. Canada played an important intermediary role in the 1956 Suez crisis. Algerian representatives played a vital role in helping to mediate an end to the U.S. hostage crisis in Iran.[7] But these instances of middle-power mediation tended to be the exception rather than the norm. At the same time, mediated interventions by the United Nations or regional organizations were hampered by the U.S.-Soviet rivalry.[8]

During the Cold War there were also various instances of mediation carried out by nongovernmental officials or representatives of various religious or secular institutions. The Vatican, for example, played a key role in mediating an end to the century-long dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel.[9] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Quakers were involved in various humanitarian mediations in Africa's civil wars in the 1960s and 1970s.[10] However, mediated interventions of this kind were rare and generally confined to humanitarian objectives such as negotiating a temporary cease-fire that would allow food and medicine to be ferried to those in need.

A number of important developments in international politics have changed both the content and the nature of international mediation. Some of these developments can be traced to the end of the Cold War and bipolarity, but others are reflective of a more general trend of civil society engagement in the processes of international conflict management and resolution. First, the end of the Cold War has freed to some extent international organizations from their bipolar constraints and allowed them to take on new roles in mediation and conflict management.[11] Regional organizations, and coalitions of small and medium-sized powers, have also become more active as mediators, facilitators, and conflict managers.[12] Even in those situations in which great powers have intervened as a result of domestic political pressure or threatened national interests, there is seemingly a greater willingness to share the costs of intervention—military and political—with other states and international actors.[13]

Second, the widespread presence of religious, humanitarian, and development NGOs in countries and regions of conflict has created a third tier

of actors beyond states and international organizations. NGOs not only seek to alleviate the plight of refugees and other victims of violent conflict but also see themselves as having the capacity, expertise, and knowledge to initiate a process of dialogue between warring parties and factions.[14] In some instances, outside governments, wishing to intervene politically to stop the fighting, are willing to support these groups because they offer an entry point into the conflict.

Third, the renewed interest in mediation as an instrument of conflict management is prompted by the recognition that civil or intercommunal conflict is not easily dealt with by other modes of conflict management, such as international legal tribunals, arbitration, or even the use of force, which is costly and has obvious limitations as an instrument of third-party intervention.[15] Mediation represents a relatively low-cost alternative between the choices of doing nothing and large-scale military intervention.[16]

Finally, it is arguably the case that international norms are changing. There does appear to be a growing sentiment that something must be done to prevent further eruptions of wide-scale intercommunal violence that threaten regional stability. Some of these sentiments are fueled by the media and the publicity given to the victims of genocide and civil war on television.[17] But there is also a growing sense of moral responsibility premised on the recognition that the international community has an interest in advancing human rights, democracy, and the rule of law because strengthening them will contribute to the development of a more peaceful and stable international order.[18]

THE ELUSIVE DEFINITION OF MEDIATION

Definitions of mediation are as various as mediators themselves. Most, however, include the idea of a process undertaken by an outside party to bring or maintain peace. Some concentrate on the negotiation process itself. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval state that "mediation is best thought of as a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find by themselves."[19] Richard Bilder differentiates between the relatively passive activity of providing good offices and the more proactive role of the mediator: "Good offices and mediation are techniques by which the parties, who are unable to resolve a dispute by negotiation, request or agree to limited intervention by a third party to help them break an impasse. In the case of good offices, the role of the third party is usually limited simply to bringing the parties into communication and facilitating their negotiations. In the case of mediation, the mediator usually plays a more active part in facilitating communication

and negotiation between the parties and is sometimes permitted or expected to advance informal and nonbinding proposals of his or her own."[20]

In his attempt to define mediation, Jacob Bercovitch puts forward a wide interpretation while still linking it to the negotiation process: "Mediation is . . . a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law."[21]

James Laue broadens the reach of the mediator to include assisting "the parties in their negotiations or other problem-solving interaction,"[22] a theme that Christopher Mitchell takes up in his definition of mediation as "intermediary activity . . . undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior."[23]

The same range of definition appears in discussions of negotiation, and the activities that lead to negotiation. I. William Zartman uses the term "prenegotiation" to describe the activities engaged in after one party has decided that negotiation is an option but before the actual negotiation takes place.[24] This term has the virtue of delimiting by time and activity actions directly relevant to a negotiation. However, prenegotiation does not capture all the practices undertaken before and after a negotiation by official and nonofficial bodies to bring parties to a realization that negotiation is an option, and to keep them committed to the negotiated agreement after it has been reached. Harold Saunders's neologism, "circum-negotiation," defined as "the tasks apart from negotiation that have the purpose of beginning, sustaining, and nourishing a process by changing relationships and paving the way for negotiation or other peaceful steps to resolve conflict,"[25] attempts to encompass these many practices. Pertinent to this volume, many of the tasks he identifies are precisely those undertaken by third parties in order to support movement toward and commitment to a settlement.[26]

The question of which organization makes the most effective mediator at which point in the conflict cycle is addressed in depth in the next chapter of this book. It is important to point out, however, that the answer to that question depends in part on which definition of mediation is used. For instance, if the definition of mediation includes a broad array of actions to build a constituency for peace, then many organizations, including nonofficial actors, are important to the mediation effort at every phase of the conflict cycle. If, on the other hand, the definition includes an ability to

mobilize international resources and political will and to offer incentives and threats to warring parties to change their behavior, then state actors will be the principal players with nonofficial organizations operating at the margins.

MULTIPARTY MEDIATION

One of the reasons that scholars continue to debate the definition of mediation and its range of activities is that the practice of mediation is evolving in response to changing circumstances. The increase in peacemaking efforts and in the variety of organizations and individuals who undertake them has stretched the meaning of mediation. A U.S. president appoints a special envoy for East Africa who may play a valuable role in preventing conflict by embodying both great power and international interest in keeping the peace and by using that leverage to stop an escalation in violence. A humanitarian NGO, using a combination of education, persuasion, and focused deployment of resources, plays a pivotal role in inducing local agencies to implement portions of a peace treaty. While these may not be examples of mediation in the narrow sense, they are political interventions between warring parties in support of political solutions to contested issues.

Along with an expansion in the numbers and activities of third-party intervenors in conflict, there has been a rise in what we call "multiparty mediation"—situations involving multiple mediators, whether sequential, simultaneous, or "composite" mediatory actors such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This aspect—the added layers of complexity for all the parties involved in a mediated negotiation—complicates any mediator's job, raising the question of who is in charge of the mediation and offering parties alternative venues for their lobbying. It can also, however, mean opportunity for moving a peace process forward, as using an alternative channel may allow stalled talks to restart or may serve to develop support for already negotiated options.

Multiparty mediation refers in this volume to attempts by many third parties to assist peace negotiations in any given conflict. These attempts may occur sequentially—one institution at a time—over the life of the conflict, or may occur simultaneously, involving many different mediators with various institutional bases on the ground at the same time, as happened in 1997 in Zaire. Diplomatic interventions by intergovernmental organizations or coalitions are in themselves multiparty mediations. In these circumstances, the mediation is on behalf of a number of sovereign states, each of which has its own objectives, interests, priorities, and domestic constraints.

Multiparty mediation may also refer to a number of attempts at mediation by different actors over the life cycle of the conflict. In the early stages of a conflict, for example, nonofficial groups may be the only third parties active in the attempt to bring groups together or to alert the international community to the need for preventive diplomacy or some kind of action. If the conflict has escalated to full-scale violence, however, mediation may be undertaken by an international organization or by a representative of a national government who has the necessary influence and ability to move the parties to the conflict toward a negotiated solution. After a conflict is over or a negotiated settlement has been reached, many outside organizations may be involved in a postconflict situation, sustaining implementation of agreements reached by the parties, as has been the case in Bosnia.

To recap, multiparty mediation may be undertaken by international or regional organizations, national governments, and nongovernmental organizations. It may also be undertaken by a collective body such as a coalition of states that represent more than one set of national interests. The mediations undertaken by a range of institutions may occur simultaneously or sequentially, and may involve a variety of mediators who intervene in the conflict at different times. Our definition of multiparty mediation therefore includes an important temporal component and is intended to suggest that more than one mediator may be involved in a conflict at any given point in time or over the total life cycle of the conflict itself. The concept of multiparty mediation refers to simultaneous interventions by more than one mediator in a conflict, interventions by composite actors such as regional organizations or contact groups, as well as sequential mediated interventions that again involve more than one party.[27]

The term "multiparty," therefore, has a triple meaning, and we recognize at the outset that the range of issues associated with multiparty interventions in a sequential setting may well differ from those where various mediators intervene in the same conflict at the same time. That being so, we also recognize that some conflicts may include mediated interventions that comprise both components, that is, simultaneous and sequential interventions that occur during more than one phase of the conflict.

PRACTITIONER CASE STUDIES IN MULTIPLE MEDIATION

The case studies in this volume reflect a wide range of real, hands-on experience about mediation in complex settings and, through this experience, aim to provide answers to theoretical and practical questions.

Our hope is that such cases will serve to illustrate how multiple mediation works or does not work, and to stimulate further attention to the special

requirements and best practices attendant on success. In looking to lessons about multiparty mediation, we have tried to promote a dialogue between practitioners and academics on the obstacles and achievements of multiparty mediation. In doing so, we have posed a number of questions to the practitioners, asking them to reflect on their mediation experience.[28]

Some of those questions were pragmatic and related to institutional settings and various political and bureaucratic constraints on the mediator. Other questions, in varying degrees, were intended to shed light on some of the broader debates in the policy and scholarly literature about mediation bargaining strategies, operational and organizational settings, and effectiveness.

The case studies were selected for the insights that they could give into the complexities of mediating in a multiparty setting. There is a broad geographical sweep, extending from Peru and Ecuador, El Salvador, and Haiti through Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Tajikistan, the Middle East, Angola, Zaire, Mozambique, and Burundi to Cambodia and the South China Sea. To reflect our belief that mediation can be an effective peacemaking mechanism throughout the conflict cycle, we have also selected examples that show how diplomatic intervention can (a) prevent conflict from erupting, (b) intervene in an active conflict in order to bring about a settlement, and (c) facilitate the implementation of a negotiated agreement.

The cases also include a variety of institutional bases for the mediation effort. A number are cases of political intervention by a single state, using all the persuasive and dissuasive resources available to a unitary actor, well illustrated by James Baker's description of putting together the Madrid peace talks. Others, such as the Zairean and Cambodian cases and the Lusaka phase of the long Angolan conflict, describe the mediation from the point of view of a coalition of single states acting alone or in support of a UN effort. In these cases, the resources of the individual states still affect the mediation, but more indirectly. Although they can be effective, these coalitions also run the risk of breaking down over differences among the coalition partners and often depend, as the Namibia/Angola case shows, on the commitment and determination of a single state to carry the effort forward.

Some of the chapters describe mediation by international actors composed of—and ultimately representing—member states, as was the case with the United Nations in El Salvador, and Aldo Ajello's experience in Mozambique. These organizations often compensate for a lack of actual resources through their moral suasion and their access to powerful member states. How credible this position is depends on many factors: how important

it is to the conflict parties to have a multilateral—not state-based—stamp of approval; the mediator's ability to satisfy the organization's member states; and their capacity to move their sometimes cumbersome organizations along. And finally, some of the cases—for instance, Harold Saunders's chapter on the nonofficial dialogue process in Tajikistan—illustrate the powerful, but mostly indirect, role that nongovernmental organizations can play in mediation, reflecting their ability to use their long-term relationship building to give voice—and sometimes action—to a civil desire for peace.

Chapter 2 will outline two basic conceptions of mediation—as third-party-assisted negotiation and as a force for change of perception on both individual and societal bases. Those two conceptions permeate the cases in this volume. While a number of the writers, for instance, James Baker, Paul Hare, and Alvaro de Soto, reflect an understanding of mediation as outside assistance to a negotiation, tied specifically to the prenegotiation and negotiation periods, several other writers, including Harold Saunders, Paul Arthur, Andrea Bartoli, Max van der Stoel, and Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, reflect a broader interpretation of the mediator's role and the essential tasks performed by mediating bodies. Although most of the writers do indeed concentrate on a negotiation process, they evince an awareness that a mediated settlement is only partly achieved inside the negotiation chamber, and that many an agreement has fallen apart because the mediator and the parties failed to prepare their publics for peace.

That said, this volume represents the collective experience of individuals who were involved in a specific type of conflict intervention, that is, the part that operationally intervenes as mediator directly between warring parties or between others who are closely connected to the warring parties. We are not in this project attempting to cover the entire range of potential conflict management interventions, many of which feature lead roles for track-two groups and individuals with potential impact on all phases of the conflict. Rather, we are focusing on multiparty mediation efforts of the track-one variety—involving official organizations—or of a variety that might be termed "track-one-and-a-half," which would involve nonofficial organizations acting with the blessing and tacit or open support of the track-one—or the official—effort.

We are also not attempting to join the debate on the ethics of mediation. Serious ethical considerations are involved in the decision to offer or to accept to provide mediation services in someone else's conflict as well as in the decision not to intervene, especially for those actors who are in a position to make a real difference. Equally, ethical consequences are involved in the formulation of the mediation strategy, in the composition of

the mediation team, in the selection of which parties to include in the negotiations, or in the broader activities that sometimes fall under the heading of mediation. Many chapters in this book do take up these issues, either directly or indirectly. The lessons drawn from the individuals reacting to specific circumstances in specific conflicts demonstrate the choices that have to be made between peace and justice, between punishing warmongers and gaining their support for the negotiations, between sticking with a messy negotiation and walking away from a potentially explosive peace settlement, between personal inclination and the unpalatable alternatives that many conflicts present.

These ethical questions, as well as the hundreds of strategic and practical decisions that the case studies describe, highlight a fact that is lost when reading about these mediatory efforts in the media or in scholarly journals. Mediation is a very personal activity and reflects not only the individual capabilities of the mediator or the mediation team, but also the personal credibility and relationships that the third party develops with the parties to the conflict. Although we focus in this book on the institutional capacity to mediate conflicts, we are always aware that it is the personal attributes of the individual mediators plus their interaction with their institutions that really define the mediation effort.

One of the important subthemes of this volume is the importance of the exchange between academics and practitioners in understanding mediation. The insights that come out of the case studies are lessons learned by individuals who struggled with similar questions and situations. They arrived at their answers not in the abstract but through developing strategies and testing their ideas in the high-stakes laboratory of conflict intervention. Scholars, however, have added a great deal to our understanding about mediation and the mediation process, including possible intervention points and appropriate techniques. The volume, therefore, will move between these two worlds. Chapter 2 will review the scholarly literature, examining some of the main analytical approaches to the study of mediation and developing some of the ideas that arise from this scholarly research. The third chapter is different from the second, returning to the practitioner world. It has its origin in a daylong discussion among chapter authors on important elements of mediation. The juxtaposition of chapters 2 and 3 illustrates the different perspectives and interests of the academic and practitioner communities, but also points to a few areas of convergence and many areas for further research. At the end of the volume, chapter 25—the conclusion—will take up themes from both chapters and offer our thoughts on requirements for effective mediation in a multiparty setting.

In between the introductory chapters and the conclusion lie the case studies. Chapters 4 through 24 contain a wealth of stories, insights, and reflections from individuals who have worked and continue to work to bring peace to conflicts around the world. This collection of cases constitutes a rich source of material for both academics and practitioners, providing the basis for further inquiry and research into the practice of peacemaking, as well as inspiring and instructing mediators in the difficult craft of making peace in complex international conflicts.

In order to emphasize the point that there are many opportunities for third-party mediation in the course of a conflict, we have broken the cases into three groups: mediation to prevent conflict from breaking out, mediation during or after hot conflict to assist in the actual peace negotiations, and mediation during the settlement and postconflict phase to help in the implementation of a peace agreement. A number of chapters straddle the lines defined by the table of contents, treating, for instance, both the mediation of a settlement and implementation issues. However, our tripartite structure allows us to examine when and why different third-party mediators are able to gain entry and play effective peacemaking roles over the entire life cycle of a conflict, and thereby adds to our understanding of what works and what does not work in a multiparty mediation. In addition, in order to allow the reader to quickly grasp key elements, a short summary precedes each case history, describing the context of the intervention, the principal players, and significant outcomes.

NOTES

1. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War,* trans. Thomas Hobbes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

2. Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Willie, "Some Contextual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (1991): 7–17.

3. Efraim Inbar, "Great Power Mediation: The USA and the May 1983 Israeli-Lebanese Agreement," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (1991): 71–84; Sidney Dawson Bailey, *Four Arab–Israeli Wars and the Peace Process* (London: Macmillan, 1990); Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Jeffrey Z. Rubin, ed., *Dynamics of Third-Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

4. Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992); David R. Smock and Chester A. Crocker, eds., *African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995); Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri, *Mediation in Southern Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1993).

5. Thomas Perry Thornton, "The Indo-Pakistani Conflict: Soviet Mediation in Tashkent, 1966," in *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, ed. Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 141–171.

6. Diane Bendahmane and John MacDonald, eds., *Perspectives on Negotiation* (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Service Institute, 1986).

7. Bousetta Allouche, "La mediation des petits états: Retrospective et perspective," *Etudes Internationales*, no. 25 (June 1994): 213–236; Gary Sick, "The Partial Negotiator: Algeria and the U.S. Hostages in Iran," in *International Mediation in Theory and Practice,* ed. Touval and Zartman, 21–66; Warren Christopher et al., *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, a Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1985).

8. Raimo Vayrynen, "The United Nations and the Resolution of International Conflicts," *Cooperation and Conflict* 20, no. 3 (1985): 141–171; Oran Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967).

9. Thomas Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

10. C. H. Mike Yarrow, *Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978); David P. Forsythe, "Humanitarian Mediation by the International Committee of the Red Cross," in *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, ed. Touval and Zartman, 233–250.

11. Barry M. Blechman, "Emerging from the Intervention Dilemma, " in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, ed. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 287–296; J. William Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); J. William Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Kjell Skjelsbaek, "The UN Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (1991): 99–115.

12. Ruth Wedgwood, "Regional and Subregional Organizations in International Conflict Management," in *Managing Global Chaos*, ed. Crocker and Hampson, with Aall, 275–286.

13. Amitai Etzioni, "Mediation as a World Role for the United States," *Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (summer 1995): 75–87.

14. Thomas G. Weiss, *The United Nations and Civil Wars* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1996); Christopher Mitchell, "The Process and Stages of Mediation," in *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa,* ed. Chester A. Crocker and David R. Smock (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 139–159; Hizkias Assefa, *Mediation of Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies—the Sudan Conflict* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987); I. William Zartman, ed., *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995).

15. Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," in *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, ed. Jacob Bercovitch (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1996), 11–35;

Richard B. Bilder, "Adjudication: International Tribunals and Courts," in *Resolving International Conflicts,* ed. Bercovitch, 155–190; Michael Brown, *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).

16. Jacob Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies, and Conditions of Successful Outcomes," *Cooperation and Conflict* 21, no. 3 (1986): 155–168.

17. Warren P. Strobel, *Late Breaking Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

18. David Cortright, *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); Lori Fisler Damrosch, *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993); Tom Hadden, "The Role of International Agencies in Conflict Resolution: Some Lessons from the Irish Experience," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 18, no. 4 (1987): 567–572.

19. I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation in the Post–Cold War Era," in *Managing Global Chaos*, ed. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 446.

20. Richard Bilder, "International Third-Party Dispute Settlement," in *Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map,* ed. W. Scott Thompson and Kenneth M. Jensen, with Richard N. Smith and Kimber M. Schraub (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992), 198.

21. Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediation in International Conflict," in *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques,* ed. I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 130.

22. James Laue, "Contributions of the Emerging Field of Conflict Resolution," in *Approaches to Peace*, ed. Thompson and Jensen, with Smith and Schraub, 314.

23. C. R. Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 287.

24. I. William Zartman, "Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions," in *Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation*, ed. Janice Gross Stein, (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 1–17.

25. Harold Saunders, "Prenegotiation and Circum-negotiation," in *Managing Global Chaos*, ed. Crocker and Hampson, with Aall, 421.

26. These tasks include being "instigator, communicator, persuader, organizer, precipitator, legitimizer, convenor, moderator, manager, funder, teacher, idea formulator." Ibid., 425.

27. For further discussion, an excellent synopsis of the challenges of multiparty mediation can be found in Louis Kriesberg, "Coordinating Intermediary Peace Efforts," *Negotiation Journal* 12, no. 4 (October 1996): 341–352. Clive Archer, "Conflict Prevention in Europe: The Case of the Nordic States and Macedonia," *Cooperation and Conflict*, no. 29 (December 1994): 367–386; Victor H. Umbricht, *Multilateral Mediation: Practical Experiences and Lessons* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989).

28. These questions include:
  • What were the aims and objectives of the mediated intervention and at what points in the conflict cycle did it occur?

- How and why did the individual or organization get involved in this particular conflict?

- What were the practical difficulties, dilemmas, or obstacles in the third party's efforts to carry out its mandate and meet its objectives?

- In the case of intergovernmental mediations, how did the involvement of a number of different governments affect the mediation effort?

- Did the objectives change during the course of the mediated intervention and why?

- Which actors or parties did the mediator work with most closely?

- How did that mediator see his or her role in relation to other third parties who were involved in the conflict? To the extent there was collaboration or cooperation, was it successful or not?

- Was mediation successful or not and why? What broader lessons about the conditions for successful mediation can be drawn from the case at hand and from the particular experience of that third party?