Number 156, January 1999
The Current Nuclear Dialogueby Leon Sloss
Conclusions
There is no consensus among U.S. experts
about the future role of nuclear weapons. As a result, clear policy to guide the future
direction of nuclear programs is lacking. One view emphasizes the dangers of
nuclear weapons to the United States and seeks further reductions and other measures to
make nuclear weapons less legitimate. However, only the most extreme wing of this view
believes that abolition is practical in the foreseeable future. Another view emphasizes the continuing
salience of nuclear weapons in deterrence and emphasizes the importance of maintaining an
infrastructure and competent personnel that would permit reconstitution of nuclear forces
in the future if necessary. Future U.S. nuclear policy and posture
are likely to be shaped more by budget constraints than arms control as in the past.
Barring any major change in the international scene, a gradual erosion of the U.S. nuclear
posture seems likely. This will be welcomed by some, decried by others, and ignored by
most. Official U.S. Policy and Programs At the end of the Cold War the Soviet
military threat to Western Europe disappeared, and with it the principal rationale for
U.S. nuclear policy. Since then the United States has been searching for a coherent policy
as a basis for planning future nuclear forces. This search involving a small circle of
experts received little public attention until the recent nuclear tests by India and
Pakistan dramatized the emergence of a new nuclear order with implications far beyond
South Asia. However, the U.S. policy community remains deeply divided over the future role
of nuclear weapons. U.S. nuclear weapons policy has tried to
recognize new realities while preserving many Cold War era principles. The nuclear posture
retains thousands of nuclear weapons, many on a high state of alert. A multibillion dollar
research program continues to develop a ballistic missile defense system for U.S.
territory, but technical uncertainties about the feasibility and cost persist. The new realities are reflected in a
series of concrete actions: sharply lower budgets for nuclear missions; substantial
reductions in deployed nuclear forces; reductions in the alert status of strategic bombers
and theater nuclear weapons; and reorganization and reorientation (and renaming) of
several Cold War agencies such as the former Strategic Air Command. The United States has
also ceased nuclear testing and the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The nuclear
relationship with Russia has undergone a metamorphosis from confrontation to cooperation,
although elements of distrust and suspicion remain. Under the so-called Nunn-Lugar
legislation, a series of measures have been taken to reduce the possibility that Russia
will export nuclear weapons and knowledge, while improving the safety of those weapons
that still remain in its stockpile The legacy of the Cold War is a stockpile
of more than 5,000 strategic weapons, deployed on missiles and bombers. Such high levels
remain because the Russian Duma (parliament) has failed to ratify the START II Treaty,
which would reduce strategic forces further, and the United States has been unwilling to
make reductions without reciprocity from the Russians. Future acquisition planning is
directed at extending the life of current weapons systems as far as possible into the
future. Declaratory policy also retains a Cold War flavor. Official descriptions of the
roles and missions of nuclear weapons have changed little. In public statements nuclear
weapons remain an important element in deterrence, not just against old threats from
Russia and China but new threats from potential proliferators. While current policy
focuses on deterring nuclear attacks and threats, a window has been left open to deter
chemical and biological threats. The administration has resisted pressures from many
non-nuclear states and the arms control community to declare an unambiguous policy of
"no first use," and it has been cool to ideas for further de-alerting of nuclear
forces. View Alpha: Nuclear Weapons are a Threat As for unofficial views, there is one
perspective (View Alpha) which sees the continued existence of large inventories of
nuclear weapons primarily as a threat to U.S. security. In this view there are few
strategic benefits to the United States in retaining nuclear weapons and many risks in a
world in which nuclear weapons are proliferating to states that have little experience in
the management of such a dangerous military tool. Alphas are also gravely concerned about
the possibility of an accident or unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon as the
management and control of Russian nuclear forces erode. They believe that U.S. interests
are best served if we can lead the world as rapidly as possible toward lower and less
ready-to-use nuclear postures. Abolitionism, the extreme expression of this view, is
considered impractical, even embarrassing, by those who hold more moderate views. Moderate
Alphas acknowledge that nuclear weapons still have a role to play in deterrence of other
nuclear weapons, and expect the process of dismantling nuclear forces to take many years.
Alphas seek to exert steady pressure along this path, primarily through arms control.
Adherents of this view include the traditional arms control community, some moderate
politicians (e.g., Sam Nunn) and many military officers who subscribe to parts of this
agenda. There is a widespread military view that maintaining nuclear weapons is an
operational headache and a fiscal albatross. As the Defense Department faces the growing
costs of maintaining START I forces, as mandated by Congress, the pressure to move
promptly toward START II levels grows. View Beta: Nuclear Weapons Have Continuing
Utility The second perspective (View Beta) sees
continuing utility for nuclear weapons and a broader deterrent role. Betas are concerned
about what they perceive as the long-term erosion of U.S. nuclear capabilities. This view
has been articulated in some detail in a recent study jointly sponsored by the National
Defense University and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (U.S. Nuclear Policy in
the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements, Center for
Counterproliferation Research, Washington, DC, 1998). The study contains several
new perspectives on the future role of and requirements for nuclear weapons. In contrast
to the Alpha view, the authors of this study believe that nuclear weapons will retain
utility, principally as a deterrent to weapons of mass destruction (not just nuclear
weapons) for the indefinite future. The study emphasizes the need for a robust nuclear
infrastructure in the long term. Infrastructure includes production facilities, a research
and development establishment, and a cadre of skilled personnel, both military and
civilian. It also proposes to focus arms control efforts on dialogues between the nuclear
states designed to increase transparency and develop specific stabilizing measures, rather
than on broad international treaties and massive reductions. This perspective includes
some who voice extreme views against the CTB and the ABM Treaty. Specific Issues These two broad perspectives divide on
several issues that constitute the heart of the current nuclear dialogue: 1. The size of the future stockpile While there are several variants,
generally the Alphas advocate reductions in the total nuclear stockpile to a few hundred
weapons over 10-15 years The Betas would retain deployed
strategic weapons at START III levels (i.e., 2,000-2,500 deployed weapons) for at least
some time. There is a significant difference between
the two views on what to limit. The Alphas would attempt to reduce and limit total
weapons, while acknowledging that verification and control would be extremely difficult.
The Betas believe that, for the foreseeable future, limits on total inventories, while
desirable, are probably not practical due to verification difficulties. Furthermore, the
Betas are more concerned about the dangers of de-militarizing large stocks of fissile
material in Russia with limited accountability. 2. The importance of nuclear
infrastructure Alphas believe that infrastructure
should be reduced as the stockpile is reduced so as to leave no temptation or capability
for rearmament. They see no requirement for production facilities or design capabilities
for weapons the nation should not design or build. Betas place high priority on a robust
infrastructure. The NDU/LLNL study talks about a total force posture that includes
infrastructures. In this view the total posture becomes more important as forces are
reduced. Infrastructure is seen as both an element of deterrence and as a necessary hedge
for a very uncertain future. The view recognizes that maintaining hedges can lead to
unwanted competition. It advocates discussions among nuclear states to develop mutual
understandings as to what might be an appropriate hedge posture. 3. How best to promote strategic stability The Alpha View is driven by the
conviction that the United States and Russia must set an example by reducing their nuclear
arms and de-legitimizing nuclear weapons to the extent possible. Alphas place emphasis on
traditional arms control. In addition, they are strong supporters of less traditional
measures, such as cooperative threat reduction and de-alerting of strategic forces. The Beta View is skeptical of
traditional arms control as a means for enhancing strategic stability. It emphasizes the
development of a strengthened strategic dialogue among nuclear states and the sharing of
warning data with Russia. The Betas strongly oppose de-alerting, doubting that it solves
any strategic problem and fearing reductions in the readiness of U.S. nuclear forces. 4. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty The Alphas view the CTBT as an essential
element in curbing proliferation and urge early U.S. ratification of the Treaty and strong
support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Beta View sees the CTBT as a
potential threat to a viable long-term nuclear posture as current weapons age. However,
all but the most extreme fringes of the Beta View accept the CTBT as a "done
deal." 5. Maintaining nuclear competence The Alphas do not see the maintenance of
nuclear competence as a major problem if most nuclear forces are going to be phased out
over 15-20 years. For Betas, maintaining nuclear
competence in the military services, the laboratories, and industry is a serious concern
for the long term, particularly given the importance they place on nuclear infrastructure.
6. Deterring chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) The Alphas strongly oppose a role for
nuclear forces in deterring use of CBW. Restricting the role of U.S. nuclear weapons is
central to their approach. Furthermore, they believe that current U.S. superiority in
conventional forces is an adequate deterrent to CBW. The Betas believe that deterring the use
of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, particularly by so-called "rogue
states," is an important continuing role for nuclear forces, although most who hold
this view see nuclear weapons as an adjunct to other capabilities. 7. Stockpile stewardship Alphas view the Stockpile Stewardship
Program as an important assurance that the United States can maintain a reliable stockpile
under a CTBT. However, Alphas believe the United States should be able to reduce its
effort as the nuclear posture declines. Betas support stockpile stewardship, but
are concerned that the program has not yet proven that it can continue to provide high
confidence in stockpile reliability and safety over the long term without testing. 8. Modernization of the stockpile For Alphas, modernization of the
stockpile is inconsistent with reducing reliance on nuclear weapons. Betas contend that modernization is
inevitable if the role of nuclear weapons has an indefinite future. 9. Ballistic missile defense (The ABM
Treaty) The Alphas believe that stability
requires maintenance of the ABM Treaty for the indefinite future. They tend to see the
Treaty as more important than improving missile defenses. The Betas are convinced that the growth
of new threats requires expansion and modernization of missile defenses. The extreme Beta
View favors ending U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty. The more moderate view supports an
attempt to negotiate changes to accommodate new missile defense programs. Some Hidden Issues 1. Non-strategic nuclear forces
(NSNF)The Russians retain thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons which are a
source of concern to both Alphas and Betas. These concerns center on the adequacy of
Russian controls over their non-strategic stockpile, the resultant risk of accidents, and
the leakage of nuclear capabilities to third parties. They are not covered by any existing
arms control agreement, although in 1991 Gorbachev undertook to reduce Russian theater
nuclear weapons and withdrew all those in Eastern Europe as Soviet troops withdrew. At the
Helsinki Summit in 1994, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that NSNF should be
considered in START III. However, how tactical nuclear weapons should be dealt with
remains a major issue. One view, often supported by Betas, is that NSNF should be
addressed in numerical terms. But, the United States has little to offer to induce the
Russians to reduce their significant stockpile, and in recent years a number of Russian
leaders have announced that the Russians were placing more importance on NSNF in their
strategy. Another position, which tends to be favored by Alphas, would emphasize
transparencytrying to generate more information on the size and location of the
Russian stockpile. But the Russians seem likely to resist transparency and want to link
limits on U.S. sea-based cruise missiles and advanced conventional munitions to any
agreement on NSNF. 2. Non-nuclear strategic forcesSome
experts, particularly Betas, believe that there will be a continuing role for long-range
bombers and missiles in non-nuclear missions. For example, technology will permit
stand-off delivery of bombs and missiles with considerable precision, and the desire to
avoid risk to friendly forces makes such tactics attractive. Advocates for preserving a
role for long-range non-nuclear systems are concerned about the impact of strategic arms
control agreements on that role. For example, numerical limits on bombers and cruise
missiles, proposed in order to limit nuclear forces, also could limit non-nuclear systems
unless those limits are carefully drawn. However, arms control provisions that provide a
"loophole" for U.S. non-nuclear systems also provide similar opportunities for
others. There are difficult tradeoffs. Future Prospects The prospects, at least for the next
several years, are for a U.S. nuclear posture and policy that lie somewhere between the
Alpha and the Beta views. However, we expect budget considerations to replace arms control
as the major driver of the nuclear posture. With strong pressures to increase the U.S.
defense budget, it seems unlikely that DOD officials or Congress will continue to spend
funds to support strategic forces that seem likely to exceed Russian forces that are
rapidly deteriorating. Nevertheless, the U.S. administration
shows no inclination to adopt radical reductions or de-alerting of nuclear forces or
changes in nuclear doctrine as advocated in the Alpha View. It seems to have adopted the
view of the Betas that nuclear weapons will be around indefinitely. However, it is
unlikely to take aggressive steps to shore up nuclear infrastructure and protect a
reconstitution capability, as Betas advocate. The future of the stockpile stewardship
program remains uncertain. There is no longer a strong nuclear program constituency in the
Defense Department, and in Congress only a handful of members show an active interest. In
the absence of a major new threat from abroad, future administrations will likely pursue
the current path of maintaining a nuclear deterrent while minimizing the cost. This path
seems destined to lead to a gradual erosion of nuclear competence, which could make it
more costly and more time-consuming to reconstitute nuclear forces should that need arise
in the future. Some events could alter this prognosis.
Neither Russia nor China seems capable of becoming a "peer competitor" in the
traditional sense for several decades. That is, they are unlikely to have the military
technology and global reach that characterizes U.S. forces today. However, either Russia
or China or several rogue states could adopt asymmetric strategies to deter or discourage
U.S. involvement in their neighborhood. Such strategies could involve the use or
threatened use of weapons of mass destruction. Military operations against the United
States, utilizing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, cannot be ruled out in the
future, and any such use could change the strategic landscape radically. A major new
external challenge could dramatize the need for a modernized nuclear deterrent.
The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars and conferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.
Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk
Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE
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