



CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
*Strategy Essay
Competition*

Essays
2003

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Foreword

Transformation—which means making sure the Armed Forces stay effective and relevant—is not simply fielding new technology, although technology is certainly important. Transformation only occurs when there are changes in the ways in which we think, look at the future, and interact as a joint community. As American physicist Richard Feynman observed: “The great difficulty is in trying to imagine something that you have never seen, that is consistent in every detail with what has already been seen, and that is different from what has been thought of. . . . That is indeed difficult.”

The following essays were written by people who are not afraid of this difficult work. The first essay examines the legitimacy of preemptive war; the second examines the relationship among terrorism, Islam, and the political environment in the Middle East; and the final one examines the conditions for building a lasting peace, postconflict.

All three essays are timely as we continue to wage the global war on terrorism. While brave servicemen and women have achieved many successes against this threat, many challenges remain. To meet them, we must confront one certainty: the national security environment today is changing, and as a result we must adapt our thinking.

The threat is changing, even as these essays go to press. Although we have disrupted their sanctuaries and leadership, terrorists are flexible and shrewd, looking for alternative ways to attack those who value freedom. There are still authoritarian regimes working to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

The concept of joint warfighting is changing as well—for the better. More and more systems, plans, and processes are being born joint. Joint warfighting is expanding to include other U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and a variety of governmental and even nongovernmental

organizations. We still have much work to do, but we are moving in the right direction, thanks in large part to dedicated men and women who are not afraid to explore new and better ways of thinking about national security and military strategy.

Joint professional military education provides an invaluable opportunity for the whole joint team—including those in uniform, civilians from Department of Defense and other agencies, corporate partners, and allies—to forge new relationships, debate, research, and think. These outstanding essays represent just a fraction of all the tremendous thought and hard work that took place over the past year. I commend all of you who have taken the time to think about difficult issues to better serve the Nation and defend freedom. I challenge you to continue the debate on the future national security environment and the transformation of the Armed Forces to better respond to that environment.

RICHARD B. MYERS

Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Unlikely Partners: Preemption and the American Way of War

Christopher S. Owens

The September 2002 publication of *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* represents for the Bush administration a significant departure from previous strategies, particularly the stated willingness to apply military force in a preemptive manner to counter threats “before they are fully formed.”¹ The administration justifies this new posture by emphasizing the changes in defending the Nation against a more diverse enemy with access to and the willingness to use “dangerous technologies.” The National Security Strategy lists the attributes that would make rogue states potential candidates for preemption;² previous administrations applied many of these same attributes to the Soviet Union, and the parallel is significant. Yet those previous administrations, though they at times considered preemption against the Soviet Union, did not openly espouse it as an option. What makes the current situation different is the increased likelihood that rogue states will use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the United States, its allies, or other innocent countries. To the administration, this justifies consideration of unprecedented means to remove that threat.

Does the administration’s declared willingness to preempt really constitute a break with the American way of war? Is preemption legitimate? Do the new threats cited in the National Security Strategy justify a policy of preemption? What second-order consequences can we expect, both from enunciation of preemption and from its potential execution?

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher S. Owens, USMC, won first place with this essay, written while attending the Marine Corps War College. He has served as commanding officer of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 and currently is assigned to the faculty of the Marine Corps War College.

During the Cold War, the United States relied on deterrence to keep major wars from breaking out. Nuclear weapons were a last resort. But the overarching competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has ended, as has the influence that competition held over smaller states. Those smaller states now have more freedom of action, and ambitious leaders looking for asymmetric advantages are less constrained in their development of military capabilities. Already, countries such as Iraq have proven that they will use those weapons if they deem it advantageous. Even without employing WMD, regimes may use them to deter or threaten the United States and other potential enemies. In many ways, the United States finds itself less secure now than when the Soviet menace was predominant. Proliferation and the growing influence of violent ideologies have combined to form a new threat, less containable because it is less understood, less prone to deterrence because it is less predictable.

In that context, preemptive use of military force is a legitimate option for the United States. But such a policy does constitute a departure from the traditional American way of war, and any American strategist considering preemptive action must understand that. To legitimize preemption, the administration must establish certain preconditions. It must take preemptive action only after weighing the political costs of such actions against the objective to be achieved, and it must make a concerted effort to justify its actions in the domestic and international arena. The United States must adhere to traditional just war criteria and accepted international law for any contemplated use of force, but especially when using preemptive force. Preemption may be legitimate, but only in exceptional cases and not in the vast majority of conflicts brewing at any given time around the world, regardless of U.S. interests.

What Is Preemption?

Also described as anticipatory self-defense, preemption occurs when one state attacks another out of a genuine fear of impending attack. Preemption excludes retaliation, as well as first strikes for other motives, such as material gain or settling grievances.

Legitimate preemption implies an imminent threat. The more remote the threat, the harder it is to justify a preemptive strike, as historical examples below will demonstrate. Some scholars distinguish between *preemptive* war and *preventive* war, the latter implying a longer-term threat that is growing to a point where a country becomes vulnerable to

attack or is in a position of strategic weakness.³ The distinction between the two can be important in establishing a claim of legitimate right to preempt, as preventive wars are far more difficult to legitimize. Witness the universal condemnation and consequences that followed the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese strike was not preemptive, as the United States was not poised to attack Imperial Japan, but rather preventive due to American military expansion in anticipation of war.

Military force characterizes preemption. The Bush administration, since release of the current National Security Strategy, has pointed out that preemption does not necessarily require the application of military force but could include arrests, sanctions, and so forth.⁴ Nevertheless, it is the specifically stated use of military force preemptively that has generated controversy, and for which the most careful considerations of likely consequences must be made.

Is Preemption Legal?

International law generally acknowledges that a state need not wait until a blow is struck before it takes positive action to defend itself. Hugo Grotius, a 17th-century leader in the development of international law, stated that it is “lawful to kill him who is preparing to kill.”⁵ Emmerich de Vattel echoed that sentiment while limiting its application. He cautioned that while a state “may even anticipate the other’s design, [it must be] careful however, not to act upon vague or doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming itself the aggressor.”⁶

The United Nations (UN) Charter further narrowed the use of preemptive force by nations under international law. The preamble declares that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.” Article 2(4) states, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”⁷

Later articles empower the UN Security Council with the sole authority to decide what constitutes a threat to or breach of the peace, and what, if any, military actions will be authorized to counter a breach.⁸

Article 51, however, acknowledges the right to act in self-defense before the issue can be brought before the Security Council:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.⁹

The wording of Article 51, while seemingly straightforward, generated two basic interpretations of the right of self-defense. The restrictive view holds that member states may exercise the right of self-defense only if an armed attack occurs, prohibiting or severely limiting the legitimacy of preemptive attacks. On the other hand, the expansionist view focuses on the stated inherent right and holds that no nation should be forced to endure a first strike before defending itself, especially against an enemy capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Without a threat of anticipatory self-defense (preemption), a strategy of deterrence is seriously hindered.¹⁰ Finally, the argument goes, the frequent deadlocks of Security Council deliberations provide nations little confidence that collective action will be taken in time to prevent an aggressor from attacking.¹¹

Modern Conflict

Despite a general acknowledgment of its legitimacy, true preemption is extremely rare in history. Excluding surprise attacks carried out for other motives—even though the attacks may be cloaked in claims of anticipatory self-defense—few examples of legitimate preemption remain.

For instance, regimes often mask aggressive purposes behind claims of legitimate preemption. In 1940, Germany claimed anticipatory self-defense in its attack of Norway, declaring its need to protect itself from British occupation of that country. This defense was presented at the Nuremberg trials, but, even though Great Britain was shown to have intentions to occupy the Norwegian coast, the International Tribunal concluded that Germany did not know of those intentions; therefore, the legitimacy of the invasion was rejected.¹²

Germany in 1914 is said by some scholars to have launched a preemptive attack against France to remove that threat so that she could then attack Russia (also preemptively) before she could complete mobilization. However, France was not preparing to attack Germany and would have had no reason to if Germany did not attack Russia; therefore, the legitimacy of Germany's preemption can be rejected.

A preemptive attack that nears the criteria for anticipatory self-defense is the Israeli strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear complex in 1981. The Israelis stated that Osirak was intended to produce nuclear weapons, that Iraq had refused the International Atomic Energy Agency's attempts to inspect the reactor, that Iraqi president Saddam Hussein stated that the reactor and its products were for use against the "Zionist enemy," and that diplomatic efforts to stop Iraqi production of nuclear weapons had

failed.¹³ However, since the reactor was not yet operational, the threat lacked immediacy. Israel argued that humanitarian considerations required destruction of the facility before it went on line so as to preclude the spread of radiation to nearby Baghdad. Immediacy was created in the plant's scheduled opening the following month. Israel claimed that it could delay preemptive action no longer.¹⁴ Besides the question of an imminent threat, Israel's decision to attack hinged on Saddam's intention to use the plant to build nuclear weapons and use them against Israel. While Saddam's true intentions may never be determined, Israel failed to convince a skeptical world that it faced a clear and imminent threat from the Iraqi facility.

Perhaps a better example of a limited preemptive attack was Great Britain's destruction of the French fleet moored at Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria, in 1940 to keep it from falling into German hands following the German victory in France. While it was subsequently revealed that Germany did not intend to seize the fleet,¹⁵ the threat must be considered through the eyes of the threatened state. As England was already at war with Germany, the threat posed by the French ships was a reasonable conclusion and created a degree of immediacy. The loss of French lives complicated British efforts to rally Free French elements against Germany, but Britain perceived that the threat posed by the fleet outweighed that consequence.¹⁶ An interesting parallel also exists with the German claim of preemption that same year in Norway. Britain could not have known that the Germans planned to seize the fleet since they did not plan to do so. Germany's claim of preemption was denied while Great Britain's, though it enraged France, was allowed to pass without international condemnation, thus highlighting the importance of international perceptions of the threat.

Two examples in the 20th century come closest to meeting the definition of legitimate preemption. The first was China's intervention in Korea after UN forces approached the Yalu River in 1950. After the defeat of North Korea's offensive into South Korea, China warned that the advance of U.S. forces across the 38th parallel constituted an unacceptable threat. Then, as those forces reached the Chinese border, China intervened to remove that threat. It can be argued that the actual threat to China was not an imminent U.S. or UN attack on China proper, but rather the longer-term irritant of a unified, democratic Korea backed by U.S. troops (preventive war).¹⁷ But like Britain's concern over the French navy at Mers-el-Kebir, legitimate preemption hinges on a reasonable fear

of being attacked, not necessarily the actual likelihood of that attack. In China's case, both the rapid approach of UN forces to the Chinese border and the strident anticommunist rhetoric of the U.S. Government in general, and of General Douglas MacArthur in particular, could have created the fear of a continued attack into Manchuria. Until China's records are opened for scrutiny, the world will not know for sure if its entry into the Korean War was truly based on the fear of UN attack. However, China's subsequent actions indicate that it was satisfied with removing the threat from its border and ensuring a buffer state remained between it and U.S.-allied South Korea. This strengthens the case that the Chinese attack was both preemptive and legitimate.

The second and probably best example of legitimate preemption is the Israeli attack on Egyptian forces to open the Six-Day War in 1967. During the latter part of May 1967, it became obvious to Israeli leaders that Egypt, aided by its Arab allies, intended to attack Israel. Egypt massed forces in the Sinai, expelled UN observers, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Egyptian president Gamel Abdel-Nassar openly stated that Egyptian aims were nothing short of the destruction of the state of Israel.¹⁸ Syria aligned itself with Egypt, and once Jordan entered the alliance as well, Israel faced possible war on three fronts. Certain of attack once Egypt achieved its desired strength in the Sinai, Israel attacked first, destroying much of Nasser's air forces on the ground and disrupting the impending Egyptian attack. Israel's decision to preempt was based on the fear of the consequences of awaiting a certain Egyptian attack. Israel attacked a clear and imminent threat, a textbook case of legitimate preemption.

Why Is Preemption Rare?

Two fundamental reasons limit preemption to only the most dire of circumstances. The primary reason is the enormous political disadvantage to the side firing the first shot. True preemption can be difficult to prove after the fact, and a government goes to great lengths to portray itself as the victim of aggression rather than the instigator of war. Maintaining a defensive posture until attacked greatly aids the effort to gain international support and deny support to an adversary.¹⁹

This distinction is important if the rival state is a peer competitor, but perhaps even more so if the state contemplating preemption is weaker. For a state dependent on external support during wartime, a decision to preempt entails tremendous risk. In 1967, Israel delayed its

decision to preempt well after Egyptian intentions were known. Meanwhile, negotiations continued with France, Great Britain, and the United States to ensure support in the event Israel had to attack first.²⁰ American support was so critical that a preemptive attack was postponed repeatedly until a yellow light was given by the Johnson administration.²¹ It is also important to note that while Israel expected attacks from Syria and Jordan, its preemptive attack was directed solely at the most imminent threat, Egypt.²² This self-imposed restraint strengthens the claim of legitimate preemption while highlighting the political risk entailed in a decision to preempt.

In 1973, Israel again found itself with unambiguous warning of an impending Egyptian attack, but this time chose not to preempt out of a fear of loss of U.S. support. Israel felt it had to prove that it was the victim of aggression, “even if this ruled out pre-emptive action and handicapped us in the military campaign.”²³ The losses suffered by Israel during the opening hours of the war were severe, but U.S. support of Israel, both diplomatic and material, helped Israel turn the tide and defeat Egypt and her allies.

Even states clearly starting a war for aggressive purposes usually attempt to depict themselves as victims of aggression. While these attempts are often transparent to the outside world, they can benefit the aggressor state at home. Germany’s claim of a Polish attack in the early hours of September 1, 1939, fooled few outside the Third Reich, but it helped Adolf Hitler solidify domestic support for his aggressive campaign. The role of victim can be as important within a country as without.

In fact, loss of domestic support often has a disastrous effect on a regime’s prosecution of a war. In extreme cases it can spark a revolution, as in Russia in 1917. Partial loss of domestic support can still affect the outcome of a war, as it did when North Vietnam successfully convinced many Americans that it was the victim of American aggression. This success masked Hanoi’s acquisitive goals in Southeast Asia, aided the antiwar movement within the United States, and eventually overshadowed President Johnson’s domestic agenda and ended his bid for a second term in 1968.²⁴

A second reason for the rarity of preemptive wars is that the fear of being attacked preemptively leads nations to avoid provocative actions (of which preemption is the most extreme) in times of crisis. In other words, the consequences of entering a preemptive war are so serious that leaders will “try to decrease the dangers of preemptive war by

taking actions intended to alleviate the opponent's fear of a surprise attack."²⁵ During the Cold War, hot line communications available to leaders of the United States and Soviet Union ensured that one side's actions were not unintentionally provocative. American and Soviet moves during the Cuban Missile Crisis show how seriously each side took the dangers of the first use of military force. The Soviets on several occasions during the Cold War were convinced that America was about to attack them, yet they did not take preemptive action either against the United States or its European allies.²⁶

A decision not to preempt is not just a Cold War or nuclear age phenomenon. Joseph Stalin in 1941 refused to take preventive measures, even defensive ones, despite overwhelming evidence that Germany was preparing to invade the Soviet Union. Evidence shows that Stalin feared provoking Hitler into attacking, and he instead clung to the small hope that Germany did not plan to invade. In July 1990, frontline Kuwaiti troops were given annual leave only days before the Iraqi invasion in order to avoid any provocation of Saddam Hussein.²⁷

The American Way of War

Examples of legitimate preemption in modern warfare are rare; for the United States, they are nonexistent. America has a reputation for its willingness to defend itself abroad only after receiving the enemy's first assault. History is replete with examples of how America waited for the enemy to strike first before returning fire. This stance excluded preemptive attacks under all but the most limited circumstances and can be traced back at least as far as the *Caroline* affair. In 1837, British forces crossed the Niagara River into the United States and destroyed a commercial U.S. vessel allegedly supplying Canadian rebels. Secretary of State Daniel Webster demanded an apology and indemnification for the attack, stating that preemption was allowed only in the most limited of circumstances. If claiming the right of anticipatory self-defense, "It will be for that government to show a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."²⁸

The United States has traditionally held to Webster's stance on preemption and the restrictive interpretation of Article 51 criteria for self-defense. It has relied on deterrence, and normally has awaited an enemy's first blow before going to war. This was feasible because, at least prior to the nuclear age, the United States could absorb an attack and still expect to win, and maintaining the moral high ground was key to

domestic, if not international, support. With the onset of the Cold War and a potential nuclear foe, the likelihood that a preemptive strike would generate a much wider war became a key reason for restraint. Finally, a restrictive view of preemption avoided setting a precedent that would allow other states to start wars by claiming their own right to preempt.

Both the fear of sparking a wider conflict and the desire to avoid being labeled the aggressor played into decisionmaking during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. President John Kennedy approved a “quarantine” of Cuba to remove the threat of Soviet nuclear missiles rather than unleash a preemptive strike as recommended by some on his Executive Committee. Attorney General Robert Kennedy argued that the United States could not afford to be seen as having conducted a “Pearl Harbor in reverse,”²⁹ worried about the likelihood of a third world war as well as entering such a conflict as the apparent aggressor. In the end, the action was labeled a quarantine rather than a blockade so as to avoid giving a pretense for war over a blockade. Even while internal debate continued, diplomatic efforts between the United States and the Soviet Union helped achieve an acceptable solution, in which America removed its missiles from Turkey in exchange for the Soviets dismantling the Cuban missiles.³⁰ A decision to launch a strike against the missile sites would not have been legitimate preemption, due to the lack of an immediate threat (the ballistic missiles had not been installed yet) and the availability of effective options short of military force.

Interestingly, the Cuban Missile Crisis has been used as precedent by both those backing the current stance on preemption and those criticizing it. In the current National Security Strategy, President Bush uses Kennedy’s words from 1962 as an endorsement of preemption:

Neither the United States nor the world community can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world, he said, where the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril.³¹

On the other side of the argument, Senator Ted Kennedy argues that the decision to reject a preemptive strike against the missile sites in 1962 showed the wisdom of refraining from preemption and the likely consequences of acting rashly in a crisis.³² Regardless, the incident shows the extremely critical step that a decision to preempt would constitute at a time when preemption was not yet a stated option. The deliberations of

the Kennedy administration also show that preemption *was* a considered option, had the quarantine not been effective.

A restrictive interpretation of the right of self-defense in Article 51 has helped the United States deescalate crises around the world by denying the right of states to act preemptively. This was demonstrated by the Reagan administration in its condemnation of the Israeli strike on Osirak. With the current National Security Strategy, this has begun to change. Already, Australia has embraced preemption in the wake of the bombing of the nightclubs in Bali.³³ More recently, Japan announced that it “would attack North Korea if [Japan] had evidence that Pyongyang was preparing to launch ballistic missiles.”³⁴ Would Japan wait until it knew whether the missiles were aimed at Japan, or that they were not simply part of another test? Would Japan have issued this warning of preemptive action had not the Bush administration done so first? As the warnings issue back and forth, the North Koreans themselves may decide to preempt if they believe they are imminently threatened by a strike against their nuclear capabilities.

Similarly, countries elsewhere may decide to state their need to preempt in order to remove a longstanding threat. India and Pakistan have long been on the verge of open conflict, actually going to war several times. With both countries openly possessing nuclear weapons, both the incentive to preempt and the likely consequences increase significantly.

Perhaps the current National Security Strategy simply states a willingness to employ an option that has always existed, but which until now has always been rejected. But does this stated willingness imply that the bar above which preemption is legitimate is now lower? Or is the endorsement of preemption simply a new means of deterrence? Advances in communication, financial, and explosive technologies and the mixing of radical ideologies with weapons of mass destruction and nonmilitary weapons such as civilian airliners used to create mass casualties have created less-predictable enemies. Troops do not need to be mobilized or massed on borders if mobile, nuclear-tipped missiles can be readied and launched in secret. Non-uniformed fighters can blend with the citizens of an enemy nation as they prepare and carry out large-scale attacks made more deadly with the use of chemical, biological, or enhanced explosive technology. Rapid communication and navigation capabilities allow attacks to be coordinated from afar and enable an attacker to mass effects without massing forces. Unprecedented threats may indeed require unprecedented strategies.

But preemption not based on careful consideration of motive, means, and alternatives could have a high cost. To be responsible to the international community, the administration must define not only when preemption is legitimate, but also when it is not. It also must increase its efforts to resolve other pending and future conflicts peacefully, an even greater imperative if preemptive actions have been used to solve our own conflicts. Otherwise, the abuse of preemption by other nations is a likely consequence, and America will stand accused even if not directly involved in the conflict.

Principles for Legitimacy

Preemption can be legitimate, but it poses numerous challenges—moral, political, and practical. It makes sense, then, to develop a set of principles to guide deliberations on preemption. These will assist in maintaining the moral high ground traditionally valued by the United States when it goes to war; generate international and domestic support for military actions; prevent wider, protracted conflicts; and avoid setting dangerous precedents. The seven principles described below follow the conclusions drawn from the historical examples listed above but also account for the changing nature of the threat now facing the United States and its allies.³⁵

1. *There must be a clear indication that an aggressor intends to attack the United States or its allies.*³⁶ An adversary's possession of the capability to attack does not justify anticipatory self-defense; unless intent can be demonstrated, it implies that other means of resolving the pending conflict have not been exhausted. A preemptive attack in such a case would risk condemnation for an unwarranted act of war. Some groups, such as al Qaeda, have already signaled their intentions to attack the United States. Others, such as North Korea, have issued threats that remain ambiguous or contingent on events. Clear intent to attack must be concluded before preemption can be legitimate.

2. *The attack must be imminent.*³⁷ In an era of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and suitable delivery vehicles, *imminence* becomes a topic of debate, and it must be recognized that the combination of capability and intent may intersect to rapidly create a crisis situation and justification for preemption. Nevertheless, without a strong certainty that the adversary was about to initiate an attack, the United States would be open to accusations of unwarranted aggression. Imminence implies that no time remains for other options, short of military

action, to be attempted. It is on this factor alone that the legitimacy of preemptive military action is likely to be judged.

3. *There must be a just cause.* Before a decision to preempt is made, the administration must ensure its cause is just.³⁸ This is not simply to say that removal of a threat to the United States or its allies would constitute just cause. To qualify, the good to be achieved through a successful strike or campaign must outweigh the evil that the action will necessarily produce, to include the possibility of a larger and protracted war. The impact on neutral and friendly countries must be considered as well. In other words, is the removal of the threat worth the destruction, cost, and second-order consequences that will likely follow? In this, it is critical that we understand our enemy and his intentions, motivations, and fears, those of allies on both sides, and those of neutrals and fence-sitters in the region.

4. *The United States must have "right intentions."*³⁹ Just as important as having a just cause is having the right intentions. Particularly, war aims must be in line with the just cause. For instance, regime change may not be a legitimate goal if the threat to the United States or its allies is of a limited nature. Rather, the goal should be to remove the imminent threat and deter further aggressive action on the part of the enemy. If that goal cannot be attained short of regime change, then the latter could be considered a legitimate objective of a preemptive attack.

5. *Preemptive action must be proportionate in means.* The action taken must demonstrate proportionality in means as well as ends. Leaders must respect the limits of what military force can be expected to accomplish, and use no more force than necessary. While an extended effort may be required to remove the threat, actions and effects must be limited to those objectives that give the threat its importance. A disproportionate use of force that results in unnecessary destruction and suffering may prolong the conflict, create a renewed threat among its victims, overshadow the legitimate purpose of the preemption, and discredit the preempting nation.

6. *Domestic support is crucial, and international support important.* Congressional support should be secured beforehand if possible, and immediately after initiation of hostilities only if time does not allow prior consultation with Congress. As the most direct representatives of the people, Congressional consent is imperative.⁴⁰ This is not done for political gain but out of an acknowledgment of Constitutional obligations and the importance of public support to sustain the effort. If a case cannot be

made to sway Congress, military action may be considered to be outside the sphere of legitimacy.

International support for U.S. actions should be sought. Perception control during the conflict will be a key to lasting success.⁴¹ In Vietnam, the political isolation of the United States and the success of North Vietnam in controlling perceptions led to a loss of not only international support but also domestic support. It is reasonable to expect that the United States will not build a complete international consensus for any preemptive action it might take, but it will be important to generate international support for the American cause and inhibit support for its adversary. The administration must make every effort to get its story out to the world, and in particular into the affected region. As much as the United Nations may be maligned for its reluctance to endorse forceful measures, it must be recognized that much of the world looks to the UN as the only impartial arbiter of international conflict. In order to make a convincing case, it may also be necessary for the United States to release sensitive information about the threat to be neutralized, the benefits of taking action now, and the consequences of vacillating. In the present debate over Iraq, the administration made a strong case before the UN for Iraqi noncompliance, but failed to convince many that the cost of delaying war outweighed the benefits of an immediate military solution. While the loss of support from traditional allies may have been somewhat offset by a “coalition of the willing,” the campaign became much more challenging to plan and execute.

7. *A sustained effort must be anticipated.* Finally, while preemption could involve as little as a single strike, preemptive actions must be undertaken only if the administration and the country are willing to sustain the effort for however long it is needed until success is achieved.⁴² Military action must be accompanied by a realistic and supportable plan for the peace to follow. Whether it involves the rehabilitation of a chastened enemy or the rebuilding of a nation after the destruction of its leadership, the responsibility for those actions cannot be shirked once the fighting is complete. While any such plan devised before conflict begins will necessarily have to be modified as the conflict progresses, the analysis conducted beforehand will help ensure that a framework is laid for the conduct of the ensuing peace.

Conclusion

Preemption remains a legitimate strategic option for the United States, provided that the administration follows strict guidelines such as those described above. The consequences of a decision by the world's remaining superpower to act in a preemptive manner will likely restrain the United States from firing the first shot unless rigorous criteria are met. On the other hand, no nation should be required to wait for an enemy's first blow before defending itself, especially in an era of weapons of mass destruction held by groups unconstrained by protocols of the past. The demonstrated American willingness to preempt may well deter all but the most determined adversary, and in the long run may achieve some national objectives, even if, or especially if, the preemptive option is never exercised.

Notes

1. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 2.

2. National Security Strategy, cover letter, 13–14.

3. Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," *International Security* 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995), 6.

4. Staff Report, "Caveat Pre-emptor: Pre-emption is easier said than done, but it is gradually being defined," *The Economist* (June 22, 2002), accessed at <<http://www.economist.com>>.

5. David M. Ackerman, *International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2002), 2.

6. *Ibid.*

7. The Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4), accessed at <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter>>.

8. *Ibid.*, Articles 39, 41, and 42.

9. *Ibid.*, Article 51.

10. John R. Henriksen, *International Claims to Anticipatory Self Defense: A Juridical Analysis* (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 1981), 10.

11. Ackerman, 4.

12. Henriksen, 20.

13. *Ibid.*, 62–63.

14. *Ibid.*

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38. St. Thomas Aquinas set three criteria for *Jus ad Bellum*, the first of which is a just cause, described in O’Brien, 20. Also, the requirement to consider other aspects such as motives, fears, and so forth, was inspired by Strange, 47–63.
39. St. Thomas Aquinas, quoted in O’Brien, 30.
40. Taken from St. Thomas’ principle that only competent authority can conduct just wars. In the case of the United States, this must include Congress as well as the President. See O’Brien, 16.
41. Strange, 39–42. This could also be considered an extrapolation of St. Thomas’ requirement for competent authority to conduct war, as the international community increasingly looks to the United Nations or other multilateral bodies as the only competent authorities for the conduct of war.
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New Century, Old Problems: The Global Insurgency within Islam and the Nature of the War on Terror

Grant R. Highland

With the United States occupying the sole position of leadership in the world by virtue of economic and military strength, it has increasingly found itself in situations where the demands of global and regional stability have been placed squarely on the shoulders of national leaders. Faced with the prospect of ethnic, religious, cultural, and nationalistic clashes that are no longer held in check by the two superpowers, and given the increased threat posed by transnational actors, every agency involved in the application of national power has struggled to develop policies to guide them through the minefield posed by the fractious nature of the “new world disorder.”¹

The attacks of September 11, 2001, however, galvanized the sluggish bureaucratic machinery and served as a focal point to provide some clarity and direction for American national security strategy. With respect to transnational, or global, terrorism, the United States has delineated the steps it intends to take, most notably:

- disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations through direct action against terrorists with global reach and against any group or state sponsor of terrorism that attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction

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- exercise the right of self-defense if necessary by acting preemptively against such terrorists
- support moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation.²

While these steps seem to cover several aspects of national power and the application of that power across the spectrum of international interaction, they do not clearly identify an enemy. In fact, nowhere in any of the literature addressing global terrorism does identification of the enemy proceed any further or with any greater specificity than the mention of al Qaeda and other known terrorist organizations. Whether this has occurred as a result of a political desire to avoid turning the current conflict into a clash of civilizations as envisioned by Samuel Huntington, or because the transnational nature of some of these organizations makes it difficult to identify a traditional enemy in the nation-state sense, the fact remains the United States has been unable, or unwilling, to adequately describe the enemy or the nature of the war currently being waged.

But the time has come for the United States to face the reality that has long been festering throughout the Middle East but has been wished away for over 80 years, a reality that has manifested itself in a global Islamic insurgency embodied and led by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. If the United States fails to identify the war on terror as essentially a counterinsurgency effort, then combatant commanders will never be able to accurately assess the ways, means, and ends necessary for victory, nor will they be able to properly identify the enemy center of gravity. To that end, this essay seeks to provide a better understanding of terrorists through an analysis of the framework within which they operate. Next, based on an understanding of enemy motivations, an analysis of the nature of the war and the strategy utilized by the enemy will place the conflict within a strategic and operational framework to determine possible courses of action. Finally, options to address the threat will be highlighted.

The Enemy

Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.

—Sun Tzu³

Much has been written regarding al Qaeda's organization, ideology, and strategy, but much of the analysis seems to be incomplete. In fact,

U.S. interpretation of al Qaeda ideology is perhaps the greatest analytical failure facing strategy and policy planners in their war against terrorism. Indeed, the politically motivated U.S. rhetoric to limit the conflict to a war against terrorism versus an ideological struggle of immense proportion not only limits the scope of the conflict, but also perhaps falsely constrains what might constitute victory in the future. Whether guilty of viewing the problem through the prism of Western ideals and cultural mores or of simply taking a politically expedient step to avoid escalating the situation into a true clash of civilizations, the United States has analogized the conflict to such an extent that it may be impossible to view the strategic landscape as it truly exists. As Michael Vlahos asks in his remarkable and insightful essay, *Terror's Mask: The Insurgency Within Islam*, "Can we defeat an enemy that we are afraid to name?"⁴

In addition to the question above, the central question that needs to be asked is: Does the ideology espoused by Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda followers truly represent a fringe or radical doctrine that can be discredited amongst the greater Muslim population, or does it touch on something much deeper and more central to Islamic identity and orthodoxy? To answer this question, combatant commanders must not only see al Qaeda as it sees itself, but also as other Muslims see it. Although the United States has branded al Qaeda a terrorist network as though it was a cartel of criminal gangs, it enjoys the support, sometimes passive though it may seem, of millions of Muslims across the globe. As such, it is critical to ask what the relationship between Islamist militants and Muslim societies is.⁵

Historical Context. Whereas Western culture views history in linear, quantifiable terms of past, present, and future and relies heavily on analysis as the coin of this rational, quantifiable realm, the Muslim culture views history as a never-ending story where the time-space continuum represents an ongoing narrative of existence. For them, the past, present, and future is all one, an ever-present mythos that informs their existence and view of the world around them. Thus, when Muhammad came out of the desert in the 7th century as a holy man with a message to unite all Arabs under the word and law of Allah, the story of his journey and ultimate success became part of the mytho-heroic continuum of Islamic identity.⁶ Indeed, whenever the *Ummah*, or Muslim people, lost its way, great leaders would sweep out of the wilderness:

There was Ibn Tumart leading Berber and Tuareg zealots out of the bleak Sahara. There were the *Mahdi* storming out of the desert Sudan to

overthrow Gordon and his *Raj* at Khartoum. There was Babur too, brand-ancestor of Pakistan, sweeping down from Afghan mountains. Then came the pious Mamluk Baybars, last scourge of the Crusaders, and of course the chivalrous Saladin, whose *jihad* wrested Jerusalem from infidel Frank.⁷

And now Osama bin Laden has picked up the mantle of *jihad* and immersed himself in the never-ending, ahistorical story of Islam. That this story has been so passionately and so often replayed is not surprising. What is surprising is how the West dismisses its claim and forgets as well the leitmotif of an *Ummah* that has lost its way.⁸ The emergence of a leader, therefore, as is happening now, creates the anticipation of an imminent renewal of the *Ummah*. As Vlahos asserts, "Renewal in Islam is thus civilizational rather than simply theological: by seeking to purify the *Ummah*, its goals are as much political as religious."⁹

So what does *jihad*, the central message of bin Laden's fatwas, mean within this context, and why does it resonate so strongly among the Muslim population? Many in the Western world, perhaps in an effort to interpret the Koran through Western religious mores, believe *jihad* to simply define a spiritual struggle of good versus evil within each individual. But in addition to Vlahos, Middle Eastern scholars such as Bernard Lewis interpret *jihad* differently. As Lewis states:

One of the basic tasks bequeathed to Muslims by the Prophet was *jihad*. This word, which literally means "striving," was usually cited in the *Koranic* phrase "striving in the path of God" and was interpreted to mean armed struggle for the defense or advancement of Muslim power. In principle, the world was divided into two houses: the House of Islam [*Dar Al-Islam*], in which a Muslim government ruled and Muslim law prevailed, and the House of War [*Dar Al-Harb*], the rest of the world, still inhabited and, more important, ruled by infidels. Between the two, there was to be a perpetual state of war until the entire world either embraced Islam or submitted to the rule of the Muslim state.¹⁰

Similarly, 16th-century Ottoman scholar Ebu's Su'ud described *jihad* in terms that have changed little over the centuries:

... *jihad* is incumbent not on every individual but on the Muslim community as a whole. Fighting should be continual and should last until the end of time. It follows therefore that peace with the infidel is an impossibility, although a Muslim ruler or commander may make a temporary truce if it is to the benefit of the Muslim community to do so. Such a truce is not, however, legally binding.¹¹

Jihad, then, both spiritual and physical, fits into the mytho-heroic framework of Islamic orthodoxy and therefore is a force within Islam that can create a society dedicated to God's service.

This becomes an important factor for several reasons. First, from the perspective of many Muslims, this is a time of crisis for Islam. The *Ummah* is not only threatened by the Western powers, or *Dar Al'Harb*, but by the "apostate," or *murtad*, rulers within the *Dar Al'Islam* itself. Second, jihad is a path to renewal within Islam, but that renewal requires armed as well as spiritual struggle. Third, no one is exempt from the struggle, because Islam is threatened at its very heart. Finally, this collective defense of the *Dar Al'Islam* creates a sense of unity for all Muslims; a celebration of the eternal struggle or continuum mentioned earlier that identifies Islamic experience in mytho-heroic terms.¹² In a very real and practical sense, then, Islamic law, or *shari'a*, as it applies to jihad, highlights the centrality of perpetual struggle as a condition of the religion. It does not make provision for relations with the infidel, except insofar as it benefits the *Ummah*, and so provides an existential concept of life—the heart of Islam's ethos—which leaves no room for any point of view or way of life other than Islam. This is not the radical ideology of Islamist fundamentalists. This is the nature of Islam.¹³

As a result, it is easy to see how Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda view themselves. Like Muhammad before him, he is the warrior prodigal with his band of *mujahidin*, sweeping out of the desert to renew a degenerate Arabia—an Arabia run by a subverted kingdom, which in turn is run by foreign infidels. And how do Muslims view al Qaeda? Vlahos lists what he believes those perceptions to be:

- Their status in the Islamic imagination as warrior poets and ascetic men of God is revered.
- Their heroic journey places them close to the spirit of Muhammad.
- Their quest to renew Islam and defend against an infidel invader gives them high authority within Islam.
- Some have differences with the means, but accept the fighter's role in jihad.
- There is more sympathy for al Qaeda than for the established regimes.
- There is no greater task at this time for Islam and its *Ummah*.¹⁴

If this, then, is how the enemy views the struggle, is the current U.S. focus on the military and financial arms of al Qaeda's organization

enough to ensure lasting victory? What is the nature of the current war, and how do al Qaeda operations fit within that framework?

The Nature of the War

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.

—Carl von Clausewitz¹⁵

If jihad, as described above, is a central tenet of Islam and a rallying cry for those dispossessed Muslims who feel the very core of their faith is under attack, how then would one characterize the nature of the war currently being waged? While the United States has characterized the conflict as a war on terrorism, the subtext of the rhetoric is a war on violently militant factions within Islam. This narrow definition of the enemy as a criminal subset of a greater cultural whole, however, has created a U.S. strategy of limited means to achieve its ends and fails to identify the greater threat.

Al Qaeda, on the other hand, with the nominally passive, often-times active, support of the global Muslim population, is waging a total war against the United States, Israel, and the secular (*murtad*) regimes in the Middle East in an effort to renew the *Ummah* and reestablish the caliphate and universal *shari'a* under its rule. Ralph Peters perhaps puts it most succinctly in his essay, "Rolling Back Radical Islam," when he states, "We are not at war with Islam. But the most radical elements within the Muslim world are convinced that they are at war with us. Our fight is with the few, but our struggle must be with the many."¹⁶ While this statement is somewhat off the mark regarding core Islamic belief and its role in support of al Qaeda, it is germane in that al Qaeda is the fighting arm of an Islamist insurgency that is growing within greater Islam. But does shifting the language of conflict away from terrorism toward one of insurgency recalibrate America's strategic compass? Can something like al Qaeda even be considered an insurgent organization in the traditional sense?

The image normally associated with insurgency is one that involves an uprising of a group against the established government within the political and geographic boundaries of a specific state. Examples include the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru, or the Vietcong in Vietnam. There have been, however, a few examples of

global, or civilizational, insurgencies that mirror to some degree the Islamist insurgency occurring today. Some examples would include Christianity under Roman rule, the Protestant Reformation under Catholic rule, and Nazism under the Weimar Republic (though ostensibly political at first blush, the Nazis nevertheless had a religio-political agenda of global proportion). If al Qaeda can truly be viewed as an insurgent movement rather than simply a terrorist organization, then combatant commanders will be forced to consider the conflict in the broadest possible terms. What is the dynamic path of insurgencies? How do they achieve their goals? What is the calculation of victory and defeat in political struggle outside classic warfare?¹⁷

Most insurgencies follow a classic vector that has a beginning, middle, and end, and they exhibit characteristics that can be considered universal. First, at the heart of any insurgency is the primacy of legitimacy and political cachet.¹⁸ It is the goal of any insurgency to overturn the status quo and establish its own political agenda, and it is here that al Qaeda has struck a nerve within the Middle Eastern psyche and tapped into a deep reserve of antipathy and despair that has served to heighten its standing within the Muslim community. Facing overwhelming poverty, economic stagnation, poor educational opportunities, and repressive regimes, Muslims throughout the Middle East have simmered with rage as they found their once-great culture placed on the back burner of history as the Western juggernaut took primacy on the world stage. It is in this environment of uncertainty and rage that Osama bin Laden's call for a return to traditional Muslim values and caliphate rule under *shari'a* has fallen on a receptive audience ready to travel back to its roots in a time of crisis. Although transnational in his efforts, bin Laden has delineated a very clear political goal for his desired end-state that resonates throughout the Muslim world. As a result, the political unrest of the Middle East, coupled with the Islamic orthodoxy described earlier, has established Osama bin Laden as a legitimate warrior for the cause of Islam and, by virtue of *shari'a*'s inextricable link to Islamic governance, his political cachet as well.

The second characteristic shared by most insurgencies is the importance of effective psychological warfare, or the propaganda war for the "hearts and minds" of the people.¹⁹ As noted above, the Middle East provides fertile ground in which to sow the seeds of rebellion, and no one has capitalized more on the regional potential for recruitment than al Qaeda. Indeed, so much importance is placed on spreading its message and

vision to the Muslim world that al Qaeda has made media and publicity one of its four operational committees, co-equal with the military, finance and business, and fatwa and Islamic study committees in its organizational hierarchy.²⁰ Manipulating and exploiting mass media and information technologies to garner support for his mission, Osama bin Laden has waged an information warfare campaign drawing on Islamic orthodoxy and the mytho-heroic *Zeitgeist* described earlier that has effectively denied combatant commanders counterinformation warfare access to the Middle Eastern population. In essence he has made it a battle for the “hearts and souls,” versus the “hearts and minds,” of his target audience, severely limiting possible U.S. response in the region. Lacking any credibility in the Muslim community’s eyes, the U.S. counterinsurgent rhetoric espousing economic development, nation-building, and democratization may not be germane to meeting the regional, yet revolutionary, strategy of al Qaeda that emphasizes the idealized return to fundamental religious values and the rejection of both technological and political modernity.²¹

The third characteristic, and perhaps the most thorny for combatant commanders to contend with, is the use of protraction on the part of insurgents to buy time in an effort to erode the legitimacy of the target government(s), while by default gaining increased legitimacy for their own cause. As Vlahos puts it:

While the established and legitimate [governments] must have as their goal the destruction of the insurgent movement, the insurgency needs only to survive to deny the established authority its goal . . . Insurgencies thus can play a waiting game, because the longer they survive the more their authority grows, and the weaker the strategic position of the establishment becomes.²²

Al Qaeda, and more importantly bin Laden, have demonstrated remarkable resilience and resistance to U.S.-led efforts to curb their ambitions. Their deeply clandestine nature and sophisticated vetting of potential recruits have aided in maintaining the organization in the shadows, while their hit-and-run tactics continue to remind both enemies and allies alike of the long-term viability of the organization and its ability to flout the best efforts of those it seeks to overthrow. The longer the organization and its charismatic leader endure, the greater its following will become as more and more Muslims across the globe see resistance and jihad not as abstract theological dreams, but as legitimate and effective means to give action to their collective disenfranchisement and anger.

The fourth, and final, characteristic shared by most insurgencies is the reliance on unconventional forces, tactics, and strategies.²³ At least at inception, every insurgency has begun its struggle from a position of weakness in almost every sense, from manpower, to military strength, to popular support, to financial solvency. Armed only with an idea or ideal, a small band of loyal followers, and conviction in their cause, these embryonic insurgent movements had no choice but to resort to unconventional warfare in order to gain the legitimacy and political standing necessary to affect their aims. But while Mao Tse Tung may have written the book on insurgent warfare, it is Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda who have raised those theories to a whole new realm of possibility.

The United States, and indeed the world, is well aware of the litany of operational successes al Qaeda has enjoyed over the past 23 years. Utilizing and exploiting a potent blend of high-technology and low-technology means of communication and warfare, as well as a sophisticated and complex organizational structure, al Qaeda represents the new wave of insurgent actors; transnational, or super-empowered, individuals no longer bound by traditional nation-state borders, and capable of organizing insurgency on a global scale. With the proliferation of information technologies as well as sophisticated weaponry, to include weapons of mass destruction, the global, or civilizational, insurgents of today have tools at their disposal that make them every bit as formidable as any rogue state and far more dangerous to the establishment than those insurgencies that have gone before them.

In today's environment, the unpredictable and virtually undetectable nature of al Qaeda, coupled with the lethality presumably at its disposal, makes it and any future movements that follow in its footsteps the greatest challenge to national and global security for the foreseeable future. By virtue of guerrilla tactics and strategies and the U.S. response to the threat, the enemy has gained that most coveted of all insurgent prizes: legitimacy. Whether the United States calls al Qaeda terrorist, criminal, or murdering is irrelevant. The fact that al Qaeda has forced America to respond speaks louder to bin Laden's target constituency than any rhetorical semantics the United States can proffer.

If combatant commanders accept the notion that the current war on terror is a civilizational insurgency requiring a counterinsurgency strategy, what might that strategy look like, and what might it entail?

Altering the Strategic Landscape

Some would argue that the case presented thus far presents a monolithic view of Islam that simply does not exist. As Middle Eastern scholar Judith Miller points out, "Islamic movements themselves are increasingly divided by personal rivalries, ideological differences, and disputes over money."²⁴ While this is undoubtedly true, it is also true that in times of crisis, individuals bound by some commonality will band together in collective defense when threatened by external forces. This fits with the Muslim tradition of revolution and renewal mentioned earlier and describes a cultural/religio-political unity that transcends minor dogmatic differences between, say, Sunni and Shia orthodoxies. This would explain why Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda have enjoyed such freedom of movement across cultural and religious boundaries throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. How then, when faced with a civilizational insurgency that appeals to the existential unity of the global Muslim populace, do combatant commanders reframe the war to address the threat without escalating the conflict into a full-blown clash of civilizations?

One approach would be to adopt classic counterinsurgency techniques to garner victory. Within this realm, combatant commanders could adopt three courses of action that could be undertaken either in series or in parallel: counter-organizational targeting; counter-leadership targeting; or the indirect approach, or capturing "the hearts and minds" of the target constituency. All three strategies, whether taken as singular approaches or as parallel means to attack the problem, have had their successes in the past.

As applied to al Qaeda, a case could be made that the United States has embarked on a *de facto* counterinsurgency campaign through its efforts to target elements of the organization while simultaneously attempting to eradicate its leadership. While this approach has produced noticeable effects, it arguably ignores the most critical element in the successful conduct of the war, namely the passion of the Clausewitzian trinitarian analysis. As long as Muslim passions run high based on the perceived threat to Islam the United States represents, can America ever truly claim victory in the war, or will the seeds of hatred and discontent continue to germinate in the fertile soil of the Middle East? What if the United States was successful in eradicating al Qaeda? Would victory then be assured, or would it merely be the removal of a piece of the greater cancer?

If the combatant commanders were to reject that strategy as ultimately failed in its logic, what next? Much scholarly attention has been paid to the coordination of all instruments of national power to address the current situation. Simultaneous application of the diplomatic, informational/public relations, military, and economic means of enticement, coercion, appeal, and promise has gained great popularity among those seeking a comprehensive approach to national security. While arguably better than the counter-organizational targeting solution, does it achieve the ultimate U.S. ends?

In the diplomatic realm, it is becoming increasingly difficult to determine what constitutes friend and foe. While the United States may gain advantage with a particular leader in the region one day, that same leader may espouse anti-American polemic the next in an effort to deflect the growing dissatisfaction and unrest of the citizenry. Ironically, these leaders, who are too entrenched and brutal to be immediately overturned but are too weak to survive without U.S. support, seem to be engaged in a delicate high-wire act between reliance on America versus the condemnation such support brings from their publics. The only thing current diplomacy could ever hope to achieve in such a mutable, untenable, and shifting environment is the short-term bolstering of an increasingly fragile status quo.

In the propaganda war, U.S. prospects are even more grim. As previously mentioned, Osama bin Laden has captured the hearts and souls of the Muslim population. How, then, could the infidel United States ever hope to capture popular opinion? First, all is not lost when considering Muslim populations outside the Middle East. While Arabia may be the seat of Muslim holiness and the focus for U.S. foreign policy analysts, much can be done with regard to the millions of Muslims residing throughout the rest of the world. As Peters asserts:

It is time to shift our focus and our energies, to recognize, belatedly, that Islam's center of gravity lies far from Riyadh or Cairo, that it is in fact a complex series of centers of gravity, each more hopeful than the Arab homelands. On its frontiers, from Detroit to Jakarta, Islam is a vivid, dynamic, vibrant, effervescent religion of changing shape and gorgeous potential.²⁵

This is not to suggest the United States should give up its hopes for the Middle East. Rather, it describes a possible course of action where combatant commanders can exert influence in their various areas of responsibility beyond the Middle East. Where Islam has been fused with

preexisting orthodoxies and dogma in areas such as India and Indonesia, the United States stands a good chance of mitigating the potential for civilizational struggle by capitalizing on the already mutable and adaptable nature of each culture's unique approach to religious interpretation. But again, while this strategy may pay long-term strategic dividends, does it answer the threat posed by al Qaeda and the Middle Eastern insurgency?

Finally, the military and economic portions of the equation have been intensely applied to the Middle East over the past 40 years with obviously less than desirable results. Economically, America has played an ironic high-wire act of its own. Devoting the largest portion of its foreign aid (roughly \$4 billion) to Israel, the United States allocates the next largest amount (roughly \$2 billion) to Egypt. If Washington is seeking lasting peace and stability in the Middle East, what message does this policy send to the Muslim populace who rarely, if ever, benefit from the largesse deposited in their leaders' pockets? Is it any wonder the Arab street exhibits frustration with what it perceives to be Washington's peace-through-bribery?

And what of U.S. military intervention in the region? Far from being prescient with regard to international relations, it rather resembles a myopic, stopgap, thumb-in-the-dike approach to maintaining the status quo. Why? Because the United States is unwilling to address the fundamental crisis facing the Middle East today and would rather "kick the can" as long as possible to maintain favorable conditions for trade in this economically vital region. But the leaky dike is coming dangerously close to running out of thumbs, and Washington needs to decide what course of action comes next.

Naturally, the United States needs to continue its pursuit of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden in an effort to decapitate the insurgency's leadership while enhancing security at home. Keeping al Qaeda on the run allows the United States time to focus on the truly critical aspect of the conflict, the true strategic challenge.

If Washington wishes to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East, then it will have to finally confront the insurgency occurring within Islam. As noted earlier, traditional counterinsurgency techniques employed by the United States, either knowingly or unwittingly, have proven inadequate, indeed counterproductive, against the growing Islamist tide. Perhaps now is the time to begin preparing the battlespace for a bold new initiative to remove the external preoccupation of the insurgents and allow their dissatisfaction to revert to internal concerns.

Perhaps in the very near future it will be in the American best interest to allow the collective Muslim ethos in the Middle East to fulfill its mytho-heroic legacy and embark on a campaign of renewal for the *Ummah*.

This approach is obviously fraught with risk and would require quiet, covert, indeed inspired, U.S. preparation to ensure its success. Aggressive cooperation, diplomacy, and economic support should be offered to those states moving toward reform. By aiding states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, Yemen, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the potential for attacking al Qaeda's center of gravity—disaffected Muslims throughout the world—would be manifest in those populations that found their own brand of renewal within the construct of Islam without abrogating modernity. By allowing the citizens of these moderating nations to determine their own political future within the guidelines of Islam, while assiduously supporting them through all facets of national power, a real possibility could emerge to stem the Islamic insurgency through the example of success in these states. This would effectively defuse the hate-filled ideology of al Qaeda and diminish its appeal.

With regard to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the time has come for the United States to make it unequivocally clear that it is behind moderate nations in the region regardless of any economic hardships. It is no longer a matter of “supporting corruption or inviting chaos”; indeed, both are abundant as it is. Rather, a shift in political priority must take place to convince Muslims of Western concern and empathy for their attempts at self-determination and improvement of their condition.²⁶

Conclusion

While the war on terror at first blush seems an intractable and overwhelming conflict with no clear course for victory, quite the opposite is true. In the final analysis, war is war, and insurgency is insurgency. Regardless of the year, the technology, or the surface motives, conflict boils down to the basic need to exert political dominance over another entity.

In the case of the current war on terror, the enemy the United States needs to confront is not al Qaeda per se, but rather the conditions that gave rise to al Qaeda in the first place. Those conditions are what provide al Qaeda its source of strength, its legitimacy, and its manpower. If the United States were to attack that center of gravity through the means described above, then the insurgents would no longer have that support base and would eventually be driven into ineffectual isolation.

More importantly, however, it would disarm future bin Ladens through a Muslim-led renewal of the *Ummah* consistent with Islamic law in the context of the modern world. Like the Reformation, Islam will eventually have to come to terms with the changing world and either learn to adapt and moderate as necessary, or be continually plagued by idealists like Osama bin Laden. In any event, if a cultural shift within Islam is going to take place, it is going to have to be coincident with a political shift in Washington. The time has come where the status quo is no longer adequate for the vital interests of the people of the Middle East or America. Indeed, vital U.S. interests should necessarily shift away from resources and encompass those very people just mentioned in a vigorous struggle for their hearts, minds, *and* souls. Only then can lasting peace and true victory be declared.

Notes

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4. Michael Vlahos, *Terror's Mask: The Insurgency Within Islam* (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 1.
5. *Ibid.*, 7.
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7. *Ibid.*
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19. *Ibid.*, 73.
20. Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 57.
21. Sloan, 78.
22. Vlahos, 4.
23. Sloan, 75.
24. Judith Miller, *God Has Ninety-Nine Names* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 472.
25. Peters, 6.
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What Kind of Peace? The Art of Building a Lasting and Constructive Peace

James B. Brown

The two most important factors influencing the peaceful resolution of conflict are the conduct of the combatants who won the victory in the first place and the type of peace that is imposed after the conclusion of combat. The only conflict that is truly worth the price in blood, resources, and the severe opportunity costs imposed on all parties is one that results in a lasting peace. Carl von Clausewitz wrote that victory is often a short-lived experience, that “even the ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”¹ A *lasting peace* is one that transcends the perpetual cycle of conflict and delivers a condition that is ultimately acceptable to the people of both the former warring parties. There is a tendency, however, to fail to see a conflict through to a lasting peace. The elation of winning in war quickly gives way to other concerns and pursuits. The peace that was so hard fought is sacrificed on the altar of short-term self-interest; frequently, the victorious nation becomes unwilling to see the conflict through to complete resolution.

A study of warfare in the past century reveals three types of peace: punitive peace, adoptive peace, and constructive peace. A *punitive peace* is one that punishes losing parties in an effort to keep them down and to make them pay the costs of war. In an *adoptive peace*, the victor adopts the losing country as a client state and takes on all the responsibilities of “parenting” the former enemy. A *constructive peace* is a

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peace where the victor works to restore the sovereignty of the vanquished with a new form of self-government. Constructive peace also requires the investment of tremendous resources to help the losing party rebuild and achieve economic independence as well as to ensure that the needs of the people are met. Constructive peace is counter-intuitive in that it means working to help build a new government after much effort to destroy the old one. Constructive peace also significantly lengthens deployment times for soldiers and officials who already have given much to achieve victory. However, the fruit of constructive peace is worth the costs and effort. The end-state of a truly constructive peace is a sovereign, successful state with a representational government that acts in the interest of its own people and interacts successfully with the community of nations.

The issue for the future employment of the military instrument of foreign policy is not how to win. We have thoroughly mastered this task far better than any other force in world history. The issue for America today is how to win a victory that lasts and to arrive at a peace that is enduring and worth the effort. Operations directed toward winning the peace have been called constabulary, peace enforcement, nation-building, and peacekeeping operations. The United States has achieved total dominance on the battlefield through years of dedicated study, training, and practice. It is now time to turn our national energies toward establishing a similar capability to ensure lasting peace in those places where we choose to employ the military instrument of foreign policy.

Military Dominance

The United States has spent billions of dollars to build institutions to train, equip, and field the finest armed forces in the world. The long-term benefits of the military academies, training centers, and staff and war colleges where the art of war is studied and where our leaders are raised and educated have all had the desired effects. The professional Armed Forces of the United States are the undisputed best in the world. Fighting jointly, they have achieved a synergy and world reach that have proven them to be the finest fighting force ever to exist in the history of world affairs. The defeat of the Taliban inside Afghanistan in the winter of 2002 and the removal of Saddam Hussein's government from Iraq within only 3 weeks in April 2003, at the end of extended lines of communication and with little support from bordering nations, demonstrate that the United States has the capability to form ad hoc alliances and to defeat any regime in the world. However, Clausewitz wrote in his

foundational treatise *On War* that a nation's power is reflected in more than just its government and its military; it is reflected in the will of its people as well. Complete victory occurs when the government, its military, and the will of its people have all been defeated.²

The United States has demonstrated a tremendous amount of national will to achieve the position of military leadership that it enjoys today. In fact, in the wake of operations in Kosovo, concern has grown in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that the United States is outpacing the military capabilities of its European allies to a point where it is increasingly difficult for them to operate with American forces.³ Despite our military dominance, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, show that the open society of the United States has vulnerabilities as well. Likewise, the United States may be able to operate where necessary, but cannot be everywhere at once. The U.S. military is roughly half the size that it was in 1989, but it is now involved in significant long-term operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If military dominance means an ever-increasing number of long-term overseas commitments, then the cost of our dominance will, at some point, exceed our resource capabilities. This will ultimately lead to the physical culmination of our force capabilities and our national will to enforce distant peace abroad. The United States must master employing the military tool of foreign policy in a manner that achieves military objectives and that also arrives at a peace that must not always be guaranteed by the long-term presence of American military forces in theater.

History shows examples of premature victories where a nation terminated hostilities before defeating all three elements of the Clausewitzian triangle. These victories have been enforced by punitive peace, which sought to keep the old regime of the opposing country down and in fact only made them more committed to right the ignominious defeat that they had suffered. Germany's defeat in World War I and Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War both fall into this category.

Punitive Peace

At the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, German Foreign Minister Otto von Bismarck tried to achieve a peace that would unify Germany as the uncontested leader of Europe and ensure long-term protection from "French cultural imperialism."⁴ Bismarck was the father of modern punitive peace, arguing that "An enemy, whose honest friendship can never be won, must at least be rendered somewhat less

harmful.”⁵ He did this by imposing indemnities of five billion francs on France to pay for the costs of the war. In addition, Germany took control of the Alsace and Lorraine regions of France (which included the fortress cities of Metz and Strasbourg). At the conclusion of World War I, France not only got its territory back but also occupied the German industrial valley of the Ruhr, imposed severe economic and military restrictions, and enforced even larger reparations on the German government (20 billion gold marks worth of material, property, and cash).⁶

The result was the punitive peace of the Versailles Peace Treaty—a treaty that Henry Kissinger called “too onerous for conciliation but not severe enough for permanent subjugation.”⁷ Germany was given a new democratic government, but the severe punitive sanctions of the treaty (territory, reparations, occupation, military limitations) fatally wounded the Weimar Republic at birth and ensured the economic demise of Germany and its exercise in democracy by 1933. The cost of enforcing the treaty in the meantime continued to wear on the willpower of the French and British. Ultimately, a policy of appeasement was chosen over the cost of continuing to impose the harsh restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. Germany was far more motivated to work around the limitations of the treaty and to right the wrongs of the past loss than the Allies were willing to oppose its attempts at regeneration. The punitive peace of Versailles failed in the long run to keep Germany down and resulted in a much bloodier war than the first “war to end all wars”!

This pattern was again repeated in the first Gulf War, where the conditions of victory had been achieved in kicking Iraq out of Kuwait, but the continued existence of the Iraqi regime represented a regional threat. The method of ensuring that Iraq would not be a continued threat to the region was a punitive peace that included military weapons prohibitions that were to be policed by United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors, economic sanctions to ensure that oil was only sold to pay war reparations and to provide for food and humanitarian support, and limitations on air sovereignty to ensure that minorities in Iraq were not oppressed by air attacks from the Iraqi regime.⁸ These limitations had some of the desired effects, but in the long run, they required more willpower than many of the key coalition members were willing to bear on a sustained basis. As the cost of imposing restrictions on Iraq wore down allied willpower, the Iraqi regime worked to bypass and violate the limitations in pursuit of regional hegemony. The result was literally a repeat of the same appeasement that had allowed Nazi Germany to grow

back into a dominant regional power in the mid-1930s. But for American and British will to enforce the required disarmament on Iraq in March 2003, the Iraqi regime may well have become a dominant regional power with nuclear and chemical weapons of massive destruction.

The peace in Kosovo has likewise been a punitive peace that was imposed on the Slobodan Milosevic regime of Yugoslavia in 1999 to end its continued ethnic cleansing and human rights violations in Kosovo. Under the provisions of UN Resolution 1244, the multinational forces of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) are in Kosovo to support “a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo” while also respecting the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”⁹ The open-ended commitment of American and allied forces to the KFOR to ensure that the provisions of UN Resolution 1244 are upheld has no defined end-state or exit strategy. The cost of maintaining a presence in Kosovo is at some point going to exceed the interests of the nations present, and some sort of solution for the province and its status as either an independent state or continued province of Serbia is going to have to be decided. Fortunately, Serbia overthrew Milosevic in a peaceful revolution in October 2000, but his overthrow and the election of a new president did not change the basic position of the Serbian government that Kosovo must remain a part of Serbia.¹⁰ The recent assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic on March 12, 2003, illuminates some of the deep internal problems that Serbia faces as she wrestles with the problem of Kosovo.¹¹

A punitive peace promises retribution for the wrongs committed by the defeated state. At times, it can also mean the exploitation of “spoils for the victor,” such as impounded property and reparations and the payment of claims. The challenge of a punitive peace is that it offers no preferred end-state for the occupying and the occupied power; rather, it ensures an enforced condition. Regarding Kosovo, for example, German General Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, the KFOR commander from November 1999 to May 2000, stated, “the political implications of the U.S. forces pulling out of the Balkans would immediately create a situation where the fighting would resume.”¹² The imposition of a punitive peace always seems to make the most sense at the time of the original commitment. However, the fidelity of the *long-term* willpower to see the impositions of the peace through requires a “marriage” between the imposing state and the conditions of the punitive peace, “until interest do they

part.” Clausewitz stated that the value of the object must be equal to the duration of the effort and the cost of the effort.¹³

The basic problem with a punitive peace is that as the time approaches infinity, so does the cost. The sustained willpower required to see through a punitive peace is frequently too much to bear in the long run. What is most ironic is that a punitive peace often creates an aura of persecution in the defeated state that leads to another armed conflict to see the issues through to completion. This was certainly the fact in both Germany and Iraq. The Kosovo situation has yet to be fully resolved, but the peace there has been very tenuous at times, even with the presence of the KFOR. It is far more advisable for nations to pay the cost up front and see a conflict through to a conclusion where the enemy regime is completely defeated and a punitive peace is not required.

Adoptive Peace

An adoptive peace exists when the victor nation assumes an adoptive relationship with the vanquished or supported state. Adoption brings a sense of maternal pride in the support of a state in one’s own likeness. However, maternal pride fades over time as the adopted state fails to wean itself off of the continual support of the guardian state. In place of creating sovereign states, countries created or supported through an adoptive peace tend to languish as client states—demanding a never-ending flow of resources and protective guarantees from their guardians. American examples of adoptive peace can be found in South Korea and South Vietnam. South Korea is probably the most successful example of an adoptive peace, but the nation is still dependent on American presence over 50 years after the end of the Korean conflict.

South Vietnam is an example of an adoption gone bad, where the continual application of resources from the guardian state over a 14-year period not only failed to provide the desired peace but also cost 58,000 American lives and practically bankrupted the United States of the national will to defend peace elsewhere. Both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts were fought for high moral values—to defend democracies, albeit very tenuous ones at the time, from Communist aggression. Vernon Walters said of Vietnam: “It seemed to me . . . to have been one of the noblest and most unselfish wars in which the United States has ever participated.”¹⁴ Harry Summers argues in his book, *On Strategy*, that our primary problem in Vietnam was the fact that we chose to fight a limited war and did not carry the fight to the enemy. We chose rather to try to

prop up South Vietnam using a defensive strategy of attrition. One of the characteristics of an adoptive peace is that it is often the child of a limited conflict—where the source of conflict has not been finally resolved between the warring states.

In the former fortress city of East Berlin, there was a large monument that the Russians had erected depicting a towering Russian soldier clutching a child (representing the future of Germany) while smashing a swastika with a sword. The image was a beautiful expression of intent, but the Soviets never let go of the child and in effect kept it from growing to be a successful sovereign state. The year 1989 brought the collapse of not only East Germany, but also of every other Soviet satellite state in Europe. Moscow had another debacle with adoptive peace in Afghanistan where it invaded and established a communist state in 1979. The ensuing war to sustain this government not only failed at great cost but also had an even more detrimental effect on the Soviet Union than Vietnam did on the United States.

An adoptive peace can be an effective means for trying to expand a region of influence or defensive protection. This adapts well to strategic models such as the domino theory, where it is believed that the fall of one state can lead directly to the fall of its neighbor. There are several significant disadvantages to adoptive peace. First, it is very costly over time and requires the extensive forward stationing of military forces. Second, it requires a significant diplomatic effort to continue to mentor and lead the development of the adopted country. Finally, one of the heaviest burdens of an adoptive peace is that it stunts the growth and development of the dependent state while exacting significant resources from the parent state.

Constructive Peace

Germany and Japan in the post-World War II era are seen as the prime examples for a successful constructive peace. General Douglas MacArthur is, in many respects, the father of building a constructive peace. After accepting the Japanese surrender, MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, personally led the reconstruction of Japan. This task was not an easy one by any measure. MacArthur himself said of his position: “My professional military knowledge was no longer a major factor. I had to be an economist, a political scientist, an engineer, a manufacturing executive, a teacher, even a theologian of sorts.”¹⁵ Fortunately, MacArthur had been a commander in occupied Germany after

World War I, and combining that experience with his extensive knowledge of the Pacific, he came to the following conclusion:

Military occupation was not new to me. I had garrisoned the west bank of the Rhine as commander of the Rainbow Division at the end of World War I. At first hand, I had seen what I thought were basic and fundamental weaknesses in prior forms of military occupations: the substitution of civil by military authority; the loss of self-respect and self-confidence by the people; the constantly growing ascendancy of centralized dictatorial power instead of localized and representative system; the lowering of the spiritual and moral tone of a population controlled by foreign bayonets; the inevitable deterioration in the occupying forces themselves as the disease of power infiltrated their ranks and bred as a sort of race superiority. If any occupation lasts too long, or is not carefully watched from the start, one party becomes slaves and the other masters. History teaches, too, that almost every military occupation breeds new wars of the future.¹⁶

Empowered with his experience and intense vision for building a democratic and independent state, MacArthur artfully mastered the incredible intricacies of statecraft while reducing significant barriers within the Japanese society. His emancipation of women was a groundbreaking cultural leap for the Japanese. At the same time, he honored the Japanese by giving to them the authority to attend to tasks that others felt the victorious American Army should accomplish. For example, he had the Japanese Army oversee its own demobilization. He also honored the culture of his country of occupation and worked tirelessly in the interest of the people he was to govern as well as the country of his origin. MacArthur fostered the environment in which the major reforms of an empire and feudal society that had never known *demokrashi* were accomplished within just 8 months. In April 1946, the Japanese elected their first national Diet, which included 38 women and 628 other various members from independent, liberal, progressive, social democrat, and even communist parties.¹⁷ By May of 1947, the Diet's adopted constitution went into full effect and is still in effect today, 56 years later.

A study of MacArthur's success in Japan showcases certain principles that should be considered if we hope to repeat the Japanese miracle elsewhere. These principles are unity of command, commitment, guardianship, sovereignty, cultural understanding, security, material support, and mutual respect.

Fortunately for MacArthur, he had some benefits that present-day leaders may not expect. He had complete unity of command within

Japan, and he had a reasonable amount of control of the international press. When trying to recreate the type of success in postwar Japan, one needs to consider how to create empowering conditions for a transitional leader. MacArthur was appointed the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers after having completed his military campaign in the Pacific. His prior relationship with his subordinates saved him the time required for staff-building. He had a clear picture of the situation in Japan and never ceased to study and interact with the people he was trying to support.

MacArthur's personal commitment to Japan's success was shown through his respectful conduct of the Japanese surrender followed by his practically unguarded entrance onto the Japanese mainland. MacArthur artfully employed his mastery of the spoken word, his understanding of Oriental culture, and his gift for public dramatics, through which he continually honored the Japanese people, while spurring them to dramatic change. His unity of command allowed him to achieve unity of purpose and to synchronize all elements of power to support his objectives in Japan which were:

First destroy the military power. Punish war criminals. Build the structure of representative government. Modernize the constitution. Hold free elections. Enfranchise the women. Release political prisoners. Liberate the farmers. Establish a free labor movement. Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppression. Develop a free and responsible press. Liberalize education. Decentralize the political power. Separate the church from state.¹⁸

The success of the Japanese people in meeting these objectives was facilitated by the air of trust that MacArthur and the members of his constabulary force were able to establish. Trust cannot be demanded; it is earned. It was earned in the small incremental actions of the 152,000 American and 38,000 British constabulary forces that worked to ensure a safe and secure environment for the restoration of services. The security of the nation is the first great task for the construction of any peace, for without security, no endeavor has much chance of success.

In addition to the security needs of the defeated state, the nation's material needs must be immediately met. Defeated states generally suffer from a lack of food, power, water, and other public services to help get the people moving in a positive direction. MacArthur made an impassioned defense to the U.S. Congress of his use of Army funds to feed the Japanese when he told them: "To cut off Japan's relief supplies in this situation would cause starvation to countless Japanese—and starvation breeds

mass unrest, disorder, and violence. Give me bread or give me bullets.”¹⁹ MacArthur got more bread.

In postwar Europe, the situation was similar but even more problematic in that the total destruction of the economy spanned the borders of all European countries. According to Vernon Walters, who personally assisted Ambassador William Averell Harriman in distributing Marshall Plan aid, the devastation in Europe was not just physical; it was spiritual as well. “The breakdown of governments, the severe winters and above all, the feeling that they could not get out of this morass by themselves had sapped the will of the Europeans to recover;”²⁰ Walters said.

Regarding the issue of sovereignty in post-defeat years, MacArthur worked tirelessly in Japan to help that nation reestablish its own sovereignty. This is where adoptive and constructive peace efforts part paths toward significantly different end-states. The leader of any interim government needs to be a guardian, but successful guardianship leads to the independence of the supported state. MacArthur pointed out that sometimes his duties as the protector of the Japanese brought him into conflict “even at times against the great nations I represented.”²¹ An interim leader must be a faithful guardian of the state that he and his team are trying to assist and at the same time must balance the political concerns and interests of the home country.

MacArthur won the respect of the people of Japan through his personal leadership and interaction with the Japanese. He also worked to grow mutual respect by encouraging and arranging for Japanese official parties to visit the United States. Bringing Japanese to the United States allowed them to see the society that the Americans came from and to better understand the interaction of local and state government as well as our free market economy.

One of the principles of constructive peace is that we expose people to the American way of life and then allow them to collectively choose what sort of democracy they want to create for themselves. Constructive peace is focused on the end-state of a free and independent state. As this point approaches, the presence of peacekeeping constabulary forces can be dramatically reduced. In Germany and Japan, there was an overriding interest in protecting both nations from Communist aggression. The Cold War years saw the U.S. return to stationing ready forces in Europe, in addition to constabulary forces. The threat of Communist aggression in large measure drove the interest of the United States to be willing to support the tremendous costs of rebuilding Japan and implementing the Marshall Plan

for the reconstruction of Europe. According to Walters, “A historic movement was at hand. For the first time in human history, a nation, the United States, was about to finance its competitors back into competition with it.”²² In the long run, this investment paid off for the entire free world, but one wonders: if there had not been a “red menace,” would we have had the wisdom to invest as much as we did?

Constructive peace is expensive not just in terms of dollar resources but also in the initial commitment of troops to secure the country, plus the talented personnel who must deliver humanitarian aid to relieve suffering and then the tools for reconstruction. In Korea, General Matthew Ridgway was very damning of the long-term effects of constabulary duties on the readiness of the soldiers who were called to combat duty in Korea:

On orders from the highest levels, we had hamstrung our Army forces. They were purely on occupational duty, their primary mission was to function, not as soldiers, but as policemen, and they were not trained for combat, for such training would have interfered with their police duties. . . . The state of our Army in Japan at the outbreak of the Korean War was inexcusable.²³

General Ridgway’s observation is a clarion call to ensure that our forces are kept combat-ready in spite of the extended time committed to peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. Those forces deployed to more hostile peace enforcement missions, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, tend to still draw combat training value out of the hostile and combat nature of their duties, but the training opportunities begin to wane as the peace is attained. A survey of the opinions of senior commanders (at the rank of colonel and general) who have led soldiers in recent peacekeeping operations found that both the leadership and soldier experiences in peace enforcement missions were very beneficial for training units to be more effective in asymmetrical type warfare that is endemic to the war on terrorism.²⁴ Improved training methods and simulations also help combat crews to be able to work on combat proficiency, even in peacekeeping operations. One must never overlook, however, that there is an associated opportunity cost for every mission taken on, and peacekeeping missions do create a certain degradation in the combat readiness of units for high-intensity combat. Peacekeeping missions should not be looked on as a distraction from warfighting readiness, but as the final, and perhaps most meaningful, act of a successful war campaign.

Major Challenges

To replicate the successes of Japan and Germany in Afghanistan, Iraq, or in future conflicts, we must not only master the principles of these successful efforts but also come to grips with significant differences that exist in today's geopolitical environment. The first entity to consider: the United Nations today represents the mature community of nations. If the desired end-state is to help a state rejoin the community of nations as a productive member, it makes sense to have that community share in the burdens of assisting the reconstruction and reintegration process. That community should be included in the process at some point in order to help the reemerging state integrate back into the community. It also represents a tremendous body of expeditionary assistance in everything from statecraft to education and healthcare. Every situation will be different in some regard, but part of the desired end-state is that the flag of the assisted country will be flying at the United Nations.

The second major difference that exists in the contemporary environment to a much greater degree than in the post-World War II era is the presence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are committed to worldwide humanitarian relief. Examples of some of the most reputable are the famous Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). While these two are exemplary organizations, any outfit that shows up and calls itself an NGO has to be reckoned with in one way or another. The most proficient of these groups are wonderful and highly capable, but they work for their supporters and some of them tend to leave when the media limelight fades. There are literally thousands of NGOs, and some of them lack the high moral standards and capabilities of the ICRC or Doctors Without Borders.

Each NGO has its own agenda—which may or may not mesh with the envisioned end-state for a conflicted region or nation. In addition, they do not want to be overly identified with any one nation or appear to be allied with any side in a conflict. Finally, some NGOs may be secretly, or even overtly, hostile to your interests. Some are actually used as a cover for illicit or terrorist organizations—either knowingly or without the knowledge of the parent organization. Generally, the role that the United States will play with NGOs in a constructive peace scenario is to provide them a safe environment for their activities and to incorporate the contributions that they are making to an overall plan. This can prove risky, as NGOs that do not share your view for an end-state get their noses under your tent in the peacekeeping operation. If NGOs are found

to be providing comfort to hostile operations, the United States or the agency overseeing the peace operation should move to limit their access and support of their activities in the operational area. NGOs will frequently contract with local workers, and covert activities can be carried on without the knowledge of the parent organization. Providing accurate and timely information to the parent on illicit activities can possibly serve to create a change in the leadership on the ground and a better relationship.

The importance of meeting regularly with NGOs and learning where they will be operating is critical to ensure not only that you do not duplicate efforts but also that you take measures to provide for their members' security. While NGOs do not typically want military forces to secure their convoys, they also will not operate if their safety is threatened. Recently in Afghanistan, a group of Taliban gunmen working under direct orders of a Taliban leader (who apparently walks on an artificial leg provided by the Red Cross) killed a Red Cross worker and destroyed the vehicles laden with aid that the worker was escorting to a remote part of the country. As a result of this attack, the Red Cross pulled out its 150 foreign workers and suspended operations in Afghanistan.²⁵ Aid organizations have the right to pull out whenever they want to and will often do so without previously informing peacekeeping forces of their plans.

While working with NGOs can prove supremely frustrating, working with them is far preferable to working without them. This is an area requiring improved focus, and the U.S. military is already taking the initiative in Afghanistan to experiment with the employment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that combine a small security force with civil affairs teams and money to contract for assistance to complete needed assistance projects. The PRTs are designed to stay in the project area and will give NGOs the opportunity to work in the same geographic area with an increased sense of safety. Still, many NGOs fear that any appearance of alignment with the United States or peacekeeper forces challenges their independent legitimacy and makes them a target "in tandem with" the American government.²⁶ The development of PRTs is just one step in the campaign to find a means of working more effectively with NGOs. Ultimately, there should be improved relationships and deepened, shared commitments that will serve the needs of the NGOs and the people whom they are there to aid.

The third major difference that leaders must contend with in today's peacekeeping world is the existence of an around-the-clock worldwide media. Military and political leaders consistently monitor

news networks not only to see how the media is interpreting events but also because the news media will often report events prior to their own staffs informing them of an occurrence. This effect has been called “the CNN factor” since the first Gulf War, when the Cable News Network broadcast the war live to the entire world. In Vietnam, the United States won a stunning battlefield victory in the famous North Vietnamese Tet Offensive of 1968, but the battle had strategic negative effects on American willpower to continue the war due to the graphic pictures of American casualties that were televised at home. That same television effect has become almost instantaneous now, and a photograph on a magazine cover or an image on the nightly news can have more effect than a tactical victory in the field.

In an environment of building a constructive peace, the leader of the effort needs to manage information effectively and keep the media informed of new initiatives and challenges as they are met. The greatest threat to a synchronized plan for reconstruction is that investigator-type reporting can disrupt the plan by drawing the attention of the world, and that of the reconstruction force, to whatever problem the camera lens sees in a given day. The reconstruction team needs to have a realistic picture of the situation on the ground and an effective and agile plan to accomplish the mission. This effort requires very effective public affairs support and an open and positive relationship with the media. The media is a tremendous force for political will in the country that is rebuilding, in the community of nations, and in the coalition countries that are largely funding the rebuilding efforts. An effective leader works with the media to report the faithful efforts of the reconstruction team and to be attuned to areas in which his team does, in fact, need to focus more attention. MacArthur’s gifts in theatrics and the spoken word were very effective tools in leading and resourcing the effort to rebuild Japan. Any leader who tries to achieve similar results today would need to employ a deftly skilled hand in working with today’s media to help lead and resource a sustained and successful rebuilding effort.

Choosing the Right Leader

Personal leadership is everything. Once the course of a constructive peace has been chosen, the most significant decision to be made is— who will lead this noble and supremely difficult effort? The leader needs to be one who has an effective staff and who can synchronize the efforts of peacekeeper forces with the multidisciplinary functions of those

organizations that are participating in the rebuilding efforts. A leader with significant military experience is a natural choice, since peacekeeping goes hand in hand with military operations, but the leader does not have to be military. The leader does need to be able to exercise unity of command over all assets under his or her control. Most importantly, he or she has to connect mentally and spiritually with the people of the country that is being rebuilt. Trust is the most critical commodity in helping a defeated country to rebuild and establish its own sovereignty. MacArthur's comment about the skills that he needed to muster within himself certainly included a daunting list of skills that can be somewhat minimized by an effective staff as long as the leader can effectively lead the effort and connect with both the people he or she is there to serve and the media who will report so closely on the effectiveness of the efforts.

Conclusion

In commenting on the fall of Communism, Mikhail Gorbachev told Henry Kissinger in 1989: "Knowing what was wrong was easy. Knowing what was right was the hard part."²⁷ This is the challenge of peace. We can look back and critique what went wrong, but can we look into the future and see how to build what is right? The experience of the United States over the past century has shown the long-term costs of imposing both punitive and adoptive peace. There may be times when national interest dictates the imposition of a punitive or an adoptive peace, but this needs to be done with the understanding that the conflict is not likely to be resolved and that there will be a significant long-term cost to sustain this type of peace. The introduction of the constructive peace has been a uniquely American product, enabled by American industrial capacity, but fueled by American values that hold that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."²⁸ It is in the core human values that Americans hold so dear, where freedom is valued more than life, that the United States finds the national will to invest in establishing a constructive peace with its former enemies. A constructive peace is not just the right thing to do; it is also the smart thing to do, since it is the best way to create a community of nations where peace may endure.

The third great endeavor to establish a constructive peace is now under way in Iraq, thanks to a tremendous amount of effort and planning in the months leading up to the Second Gulf War. However, steps should be taken to incorporate constructive peace operations into our military's

institutional psyche. The undisputed dominance of the U.S. military was, in part, achieved through the maintenance of military institutions where war is studied and leaders are trained. In addition, the professionalization of the volunteer armed forces has been a 30-year project that has been resourced with the best equipment and advanced research to ensure continued dominance. The Armed Forces of the United States are now 6 years into a deliberate campaign to transform their capabilities to continue to become a lighter and more worldwide deployable force. Included in this campaign of transformation should be a campaign to institutionalize the study of achieving a lasting peace. This is not a question of beating our swords into ploughshares and our spears into pruning hooks;²⁹ it is, rather, one of maintaining the sharpest sword and building the best ploughshare possible. We must continue to maintain our military superiority, but it is time to match the intellectual energy and physical effort of our military capabilities with a like commitment to mastering the elements of statecraft and achieving a lasting and constructive peace.

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 80.

2. *Ibid.*, 90.

3. The issue of the growing capabilities gap is discussed in David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999).

4. Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 478.

5. *Ibid.*, 479.

6. See the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, accessed at <<http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/versailles.html>>

7. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 242.

8. United Nations Resolution 687, April 2, 1991, specifies the disarmament, reparations, and other provisions of the punitive peace that was enforced upon Iraq. In U.S. News & World Report, *Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf Conflict* (New York: Times Books, 1992), 432–437.

9. Annex 1, point 8, to United Nations Resolution 1244, June 10, 1999; accessed at <<http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm>>.

10. “Popular Revolt Sweeps Yugoslav Opposition Into Power; President Milosevic Concedes Defeat,” in *Facts on File 2000 New Services* (New York: World Almanac, 2001), 729–730.

11. For more information on the current position of Serbia on Kosovo, see <<http://www.srbia.sr.gov.yu/news/>>.

12. Klaus Reinhardt, as quoted in Edith B. Wilke and Beth C. DeGrasse, *A Force for Peace: U.S. Military Commander's Views of the Military's Role in Peace Operations*, June 1999, accessed at <http://www.ptlef.org/A_Force_For_Peace.html>.

13. Clausewitz, 92.

14. Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (New York: Doubleday, 1977), 409.

15. Douglas A. MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: Da Capo, 1985), 281–282.

16. Ibid., 282.
17. See William Manchester, *American Caesar* (New York: Dell, 1978), 592.
18. MacArthur, 282–283.
19. Ibid., 307.
20. Walters, 170.
21. MacArthur, 283.
22. Walters, 172.
23. Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier* (New York: Harper Collins, 1956), 190–191.
24. Edith B. Wilke and Beth C. DeGrasse, *A Force for Peace and Security: U.S. and Allied Commander's Views of the Military's Role in Peace Operations and the Impact on Terrorism of States in Conflict*, February 2002, accessed at <http://www.ptlef.org/A_Force_for_Peace_&_Security.html>.
25. Kathy Gannon, "Taliban Looks to Reclaim Control," *The Washington Times*, April 8, 2003, 14.
26. Chris Kraul, "U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics In Afghanistan," *Los Angeles Times*, April 11, 2003, 1.
27. Kissinger, 798.
28. The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, accessed at <http://www.archives.gov/exhibit_hall/charters_of_freedom/declaration/declaration_transcription.html>.
29. See Isa. 2:4: "He shall judge among the nations, and decide among many people. And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

The 22^d Annual Competition

On May 22 and 23, 2003, the National Defense University convened a panel of judges at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC, to evaluate the entries in the 22^d annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Contest. The 2003 judges were:

John R. Ballard, Naval War College
Ian Beckett, Marine Corps War College
Charles C. Chadbourn III, Naval War College
Roger J. Channing, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Terry L. Deibel, National War College
Lieutenant Colonel Marsha Kwolek, USAF, Air War College
James A. Mowbray, Air War College
Patricia S. Pond, U.S. Army War College
Colonel Robert Roland, USA, Industrial College of the
Armed Forces
Joseph L. Strange, Marine Corps War College
Robert H. Taylor, U.S. Army War College
David A. Tretler, National War College

The three winning essays are published in this volume, *Essays 2003*. The winning authors were presented with certificates signed by the Chairman, as well as gift certificates for books of their choice, provided through the generosity of the National Defense University Foundation.

The 2003 competition was administered by Robert A. Silano, Director of Publications and Editor of *Joint Force Quarterly*, in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, with the assistance of William R. Bode, General Editor, NDU Press, and George C. Maerz, Jeffrey D. Smotherman, and Lisa M. Yambrick, members of the editorial staff of NDU Press.

A complete list of the entries in the 2003 competition follows.

Air War College

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel F. Baltrusaitis, USAF, *Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution: Never Divide the Fleet?*

Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Brice, USAF, *Strategic Surprise in an Age of Information Superiority: Is It Still Possible?*

Lieutenant Colonel Arnel B. Enriquez, USAF, *The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy: A New Use-of-Force Doctrine?*

Lieutenant Colonel Theresa Giorlando, USAF, *Military and the Media: A Comparison Between Kosovo and the War on Terrorism*

Lieutenant Colonel Russell J. Handy, USAF, *Opening the Aperture: Ending Service "Branding" of U.S. Unified Commands*

Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Newberry, USAF, *Spacepower as a Coercive Force*

Lieutenant Colonel James G. Welton, USAF, *Implementing Effects-Based Operations: Redefining the Role of the JTCB*

Marine Corps War College

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. Breen, USAF, *Securing a Strategic Foothold for the Future: Transforming American Presence in Turkey*

Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Kirpes, USAF, *American Soft Power and the Middle East: Finding the Right Stuff of Temptation, Not Menace*

James E. Olson, Department of State, *Improving Arab Military Effectiveness: A Cultural Study*

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher S. Owens, USMC, *Unlikely Partners: Pre-emption and the American Way of War*

Commander Kevin G. Quigley, USCG, *Engagement or Containment: Preparing for a Post-Castro Cuba*

Lieutenant Colonel Jay D. Walker, USMC, *United States Foreign Policy: Cuba, Time for a Change*

National War College

Lieutenant Colonel Arden B. Dahl, USAF, *Joint Close Air Support: Turning a New Joint Leaf*

Lieutenant Colonel Brian J. Hearnberger, USMC, *Transforming Security Screening with Biometrics*

Lieutenant Colonel Carl W. Hunt, USA, *Transforming Intelligence: Improving Inference through Advanced Simulations*

Commander Debra O. Maddrell, USN, *Quiet Transformation: The Role of the Office of Net Assessment*

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald J. Manley, USA, *The Posse Comitatus Act Post-9/11: Time for a Change?*

Wendela C. Moore, Department of State, *Stability Operations: A Core Warfighting Capability?*

Roger J. Moran, Department of State, *Confronting Genocide in Africa*

Adrian Wolfberg, Defense Intelligence Agency, *To Transform into a More Capable Intelligence Community: A Paradigm Shift in the Analyst Selection Strategy*

College of Naval Warfare

Lieutenant Colonel (P) James B. Brown, USA, *What Kind of Peace? The Art of Building a Lasting and Constructive Peace*

Lieutenant Colonel James J. Buckley, USMC, *China and Taiwan: A Different Focus for America's Strategic Future*

College of Naval Command and Staff

Major Scott F. Benedict, USMC, *Fighting Another Banana War: Campaign Planning in the Horn of Africa*

Lieutenant Commander Francis X. Castellano, USN, *Effects-Based Command and Control: An Alternative Organizational Structure for the Joint Force Commander*

Lieutenant Commander Grant R. Highland, USNR, *New Century, Old Problems: The Global Insurgency within Islam and the Nature of the War on Terrorism*

Major Sean L. Jersey, USAF, *Twenty-First Century Warfare: Combat Operations at the Speed of Light*

Lieutenant Commander Brendan R. McLane, USN, *After Saddam: Applying Lessons Learned in Post-War Austria to Interim Government in Iraq*

U.S. Army War College

John R. Basehart, Department of the Army, *Transformation of Special Operations: Reducing Joint Friction*

Lieutenant Colonel Billy J. Buckner, USA, *International Criminal Court: A Watershed in International Relations*

Lieutenant Colonel James D. Hooks, USMC, *National Security Policy Review: Republic of Cuba*

Edward L. Kirkpatrick, Department of the Navy, *Interoperability and a Standard Joint Logistics Data Exchange within the Department of Defense*

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Martin, USAF, *The Air Force's Transformation to an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) Using the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) Construct: A Work in Progress*

Lieutenant Colonel Laurie McCabe, USAR, *Continuum of Capability: Army's Force Structure Transformation*

Commander Lawrence J. Stein, USN, *The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review: A First Step in Transformation or Just a Paper Tiger?*

Colonel Louis G. Yuengert, USA, *CSA Manning Initiative: What Happened to It and Why?*