

Report to Congress

Submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227 (c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163)

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Introduction

This report is submitted consistent with section 1227(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109-163) concerning United States Policy in Iraq. The Report covers current military, diplomatic, political, and economic measures that are being or have been undertaken to complete our mission in Iraq successfully. The Report is organized into the following areas: (1) current mission and measures taken to support it; (2) Iraqi progress towards a sustainable political settlement; (3) conditions necessary for a transfer of security responsibility; (4) Iraqi Security Forces capacity and readiness, which contribute to the transfer of security responsibility; (5) criteria used to evaluate progress in that area; and (6) our plan for successfully completing the mission.

The United States is engaged in a comprehensive approach regarding Iraq that involves the integrated efforts of the entire United States Government, the Iraqi government, and Coalition governments. This approach promotes the active participation of the United Nations, other international organizations, and supportive regional states. Our goals in Iraq remain to help the Iraqi people build a democratic, representative government that respects civil rights and has security forces capable of maintaining order and defending the country from terrorists and foreign fighters. As noted in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI), our approach outlines goals and measures progress along three tracks: political, economic, and security. The United States seeks to advance the three tracks concurrently as each is integral to success in Iraq.

Against a backdrop of continued sectarian violence and terrorist activity aimed at derailing the establishment of a government under the new constitution, Iraq's leaders and the Iraqi people achieved a critical milestone May 20, 2006, by completing the government formation process. Iraqi leaders came together in agreement on a national unity government despite insurgent and terrorist efforts. While the Iraqi economy continues to grow, the United States has a vital role to play in helping Iraq secure additional assistance and debt relief from the international community that will be critical to rebuilding Iraq. The insurgency remains a pressing problem in Iraq, despite the death of al-Qaida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), however, continues to train, develop, and contribute to the readiness of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Iraq is making

steady progress in standing up robust forces loyal to the legitimate Iraqi government and able to fight terrorists, as well as giving Iraqi forces responsibility for securing their territory. There is progress, but the new Iraqi government will continue to need U.S. political, economic, and security assistance. As President Bush stated after his June 13 trip to Iraq, “By helping this new government succeed, we’ll be closer to completing our mission, and the mission is to develop a country that can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself, and a country that is an ally in the war on terror. We’ll seize this moment of opportunity to help the Prime Minister. We’ll defeat our common enemies. We’ll help build a lasting democracy in the heart of the Middle East, and that will make Americans and Iraqis and the world more secure.”

Since the inaugural report under section 1227(c) of April 6, 2006, Iraq has made steady progress on government formation. The Council of Representatives (CoR), by a two-thirds vote, elected the Presidency Council (i.e., the President and two Vice-Presidents) and the Speaker of the CoR and two Deputy Speakers. The Presidency Council subsequently designated the candidates for Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers. This nomination signaled the start of a constitutionally-mandated 30-day period in which the Prime Minister-designate was required to name his cabinet.

Prime Minister-designate Nuri al-Maliki met the May 22 constitutional deadline by naming his Council of Ministers on May 20, with the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers also serving temporarily as the Ministers of Defense and Interior, and the Minister of State for National Security Affairs. The CoR also approved the cabinet on May 20. At the same time, Maliki presented his government program to the CoR and received its approval. This government program outlines a framework for the government that seeks to strengthen civil society, ensure women’s participation in the public sphere, and develop a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq that guarantees the rights of all its citizens. When he presented his government, Prime Minister Maliki reassured Iraqis that the government is committed to upholding the rule of law, promoting Iraqi unity and national reconciliation by establishing a new Ministry of National Dialogue, protecting and increasing Iraq’s resources, and using those resources to benefit all Iraqis. On June 8, the Prime Minister submitted, and the CoR approved, candidates for the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and Minister of State for National Security Affairs. Prime Minister Maliki’s cabinet is remarkably inclusive, with participation from parties that

received 86 percent of the votes in the December elections, and with broad membership from all major ethnic and denominational groups.

Among the political challenges that Iraq will face in the coming months will be the implementation of the National Reconciliation Plan, passage of enabling legislation for the constitution, a constitutional amendment process, and possible provincial elections.

The new Iraqi government will have both successes on which to build, and major issues to confront. Iraq's economy has grown from \$18.9 billion in 2002 to \$33.2 billion in 2005, including 2.6 percent real GDP growth in 2005. The International Monetary Fund projected GDP growth of 10.4 percent for 2006. The Iraqi currency remains stable, and new private companies continue to be created. International economic assistance has come primarily from the United States,¹ but other donors have pledged \$13.5 billion in economic aid since 2004, of which more than \$3.5 billion has been disbursed. This aid has been critical in helping Iraq boost overall economic growth and rehabilitate its infrastructure, which in 2003 (i.e., before the insurgency and before the international community had a better understanding of the degree to which the previous regime neglected Iraq's critical infrastructure) the World Bank and UN estimated would cost about \$55 billion. Iraq has achieved significant progress on debt relief. To date, sovereign and commercial creditors reached debt relief agreements with Iraq that will eventually reduce Iraq's foreign debt by more than \$50 billion, or about 40 percent of its estimated \$125 billion in external debt. The United States Government is urging the new government to step up its engagement with key, non-Paris Club creditors from the Gulf States to seek debt relief for Iraq at terms at least comparable to the Paris Club's 80 percent reduction.

The new government's immediate economic challenges will include carrying out the reforms agreed to in its landmark December 2005 Stand-by Agreement with the International Monetary Fund, including reducing fuel subsidies and improving its budget oversight and execution. The new

¹ To date, Congress has appropriated \$20.9 billion for relief and reconstruction programs in Iraq through IRRF 1 and IRRF 2. In addition, Congress has appropriated \$1.3 billion for the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), \$710 million for training and equipment, and \$5.4 billion for the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF). The Congress has approved the Administration's FY 2006 Supplemental request for Iraq, which includes approximately \$1.5 billion for additional programs to support Iraq's development and transition to self reliance and \$3.7 billion for Security Forces. The FY 2007 budget request of \$771 million for Iraq programs is currently being considered by Congress.

government has announced that one of its top priorities will be to improve the delivery of essential services, particularly electricity. The government took an important next step along the reform path by raising prices of fuel products in June. Iraq also needs to develop a modern market economy, restructure the banking sector, improve the efficiency of the oil-sector, build capacity to manage the economy, fight corruption, and improve the investment climate and business environment.

Developing effective national and local governance in Iraq remains a necessary component of transitioning to Iraqi self-reliance and defeating the insurgency. The new Constitution devolves more responsibility to the governorates (provinces), which under Saddam Hussein, had no ability or experience in exercising governmental authority. In this regard, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), led by the United States and various Coalition partners, are designed to provide training and development efforts at the provincial level and provide a link between provincial-level and national-level efforts. Five PRTs are currently operational, including PRT Tamim (Kirkuk), PRT Ninewa (Mosul), PRT Babil (Hillah), PRT Baghdad, and PRT Anbar (Ramadi). Recruiting for additional PRTs is underway; as many as eight would be U.S.-led, with the others led by Coalition partners or Iraqis. The UK agreed to lead a PRT in Basrah and other partners are considering leading or supporting roles. These Coalition-led PRTs follow a functional structure similar to those led by the United States.

Progress has been made in fighting terrorism, neutralizing the insurgency, and standing up forces loyal to the government. The death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi on June 7 was an important victory against terror. More successes followed when U.S. and Iraqi forces carried out hundreds of raids that led to successful action against scores of terrorists along with the recovery of large amounts of valuable intelligence.

Less than a week after Zarqawi's death, Prime Minister Maliki launched the largest Iraqi-led security operation since Saddam's ouster three years ago. Tens of thousands of Iraqi soldiers and police supported by U.S. troops began Operation Together Forward on June 14. The government forces fanned out across Baghdad setting up checkpoints, inspecting motorists, and extending the city's curfew by four and a half hours. Prime Minister Maliki also signaled that security was his number one priority by traveling to Basrah as one of his first official acts as Prime Minister.

The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), under a United Nations Security Council mandate, leads the effort to assist Iraq on the security track. The military mission in Iraq is essential to achieving the President's goal of a peaceful, unified, stable, democratic, and secure Iraq. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) continues to train, develop, and contribute to the readiness of ISF, including forces in the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Iraq is making steady progress in standing up robust forces loyal to the legitimate Iraqi government and able to fight terrorists, and giving Iraqi forces responsibility for securing their territory. On June 19, Prime Minister Maliki announced that the southern province of Muthanna would be the first to transition to full Iraqi responsibility for security.

U.S. forces and our international partners are working to defeat terrorists and to train and equip the Iraqi Security Forces to enable them to assume security responsibility. U.S. forces will not depart Iraq until the right conditions are met. As the recent upturn in violence has hindered our efforts to engage fully with Iraqi partners, we are reminded that a certain baseline of security is a necessary prerequisite for moving forward on political and economic tasks essential to achieving the right conditions on the ground.

As the ISF stand up and achieve an acceptable level of training and readiness to maintain public order, we will adjust our military presence. This will not necessarily be a linear path, and there will be fluctuations according to conditions and specific situations. As Iraqis make security and political progress, the United States Government will discuss with Iraq's new government further possible adjustments.

Progress along the political, economic, and security tracks is part of an integrated approach by which the United States Government, together with the international community, is helping Iraq build a new nation with a constitutional, representative government that respects human rights and has security forces adequate to maintain domestic order and prevent Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists.

I. The current military mission and the diplomatic, political, economic, and military measures that are being or have been undertaken to successfully complete or support that mission;

In fulfillment of its mandate under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546 and extended by UNSCR 1637, which was reviewed on June 15, MNF-I, in partnership with the Iraqi government, conducts full-spectrum counter-insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize the enemy. MNF-I also helps the Iraqi government organize, train, and equip the ISF in order to create and maintain a security environment that permits Iraq's political and economic development.

(A) Efforts to convince Iraq's main communities to make the compromises necessary for a broad-based and sustainable political settlement;

The United States remains engaged with Iraqi political, religious, and civil society leaders to assist in the transition from government formation to governing. The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) supports a national compact as a means to separate terrorists opposed to the political process from insurgents willing to stop fighting and participate in Iraq's political process; to develop opportunities for all Iraqis to partake in the political process; and to build effective and stable national institutions that will facilitate Iraq's full integration into the international community. These efforts are part of a long-term strategy to expand political participation and build consensus on issues that have long divided Iraqi communities, expanding political space for all groups to participate, and encouraging Sunni participation in a new democratic process.

Efforts in recent months focused on supporting the establishment of a national unity government representative of all spectrums of Iraqi society and the selection of a capable and qualified cabinet. These efforts included active and direct engagement from the highest levels of the United States Government as well as focused military operations to create the security environment necessary for free political expression and participation. This work culminated in the establishment of a unity government that, for the first time, benefited from the active participation of all of Iraq's major communities.

The Iraqi people met two critical milestones in their country's democratic advancement this period. On April 22, 2006, the CoR elected, by a two-thirds vote, the leadership positions of the executive and legislative branches of the new government, including Jalal Talabani as President and Tariq al-Hashimi and Adil Abd al-Mahdi as Vice-Presidents. The CoR also

elected Mahmud Mashhadani as their Speaker and Khalid Attiya and Arif Tayfur as Deputy Speakers. The Presidency Council subsequently nominated Nuri al-Maliki as Prime Minister-designate and Salaam Zawba'i and Barham Salih as Deputy Prime Ministers-designate. This nomination signaled the start of a constitutionally mandated 30-day period in which the Prime Minister-designate was required to name his cabinet. On April 26, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld traveled to Iraq to meet with the new Iraqi leadership and encourage the Prime Minister-designate to select expeditiously cabinet members who were capable ministers committed to working to build a better future for all Iraqis and to implementing the policies critical to the advancement of the Iraqi people.

On May 20, 2006, Prime Minister-designate Maliki met the constitutional deadline by naming his cabinet, with the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers also serving temporarily as the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and State (for National Security Affairs), and having it approved by the CoR by a majority vote the same day. The CoR also approved the Prime Minister's ambitious government program that outlined a framework for the government that seeks to preserve Iraq's unity, strengthen civil society, ensure women's participation in the public sphere, and develop a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq that guarantees the rights of all its citizens. The United States has committed to assist the Iraqi government to develop and implement this ambitious plan.

Cabinet positions were filled by consensus among Iraq's major political parties. Prime Minister Maliki sought capable individuals with no sectarian or militia ties to fill the three security portfolios. Prime Minister Maliki worked closely with his new government and leaders from various parties to come to a consensus on the nominees for the three security posts. On June 8, 2006, after additional negotiations and compromise, the Prime Minister presented his nominees for the security portfolios. The CoR approved the appointments by a majority confirming Jawad al-Bulani as Minister of Interior, Abd al-Qadr Muhammad Jassim al-Mufraji as Defense Minister, and Shirwan al-Waili as Minister of State for National Security Affairs. The resulting cabinet is remarkably inclusive, with participation by parties winning 86 percent of the votes cast in the December elections, with broad membership from all major ethnic and denominational groups.

The United States worked closely with the new Iraqi national unity government and all segments of the Iraqi community to encourage the sustainable political compact that helped make the unity government possible. Ambassador Khalilzad, complemented by efforts by the UN and other states, offered advice and assistance to Iraqi leaders during the cabinet formation process. Embassy Baghdad repeatedly recommended that key ministries must be in the hands of those who would unify Iraq and not seek to divide it based on sectarian agendas.

The national unity government represents the culmination of the political process outlined in the Coalition Provisional Authority's Transitional Administrative Law and the June 2004 UNSCR 1546. In three years, Iraq has gone from a repressive dictatorship to an inclusive government chosen by a freely elected parliament under a popularly ratified constitution. The national unity government, with broad-based buy-in, is the direct result of the efforts of Iraqi leaders, with the United States and the international community, to expand participation in the political process. The success of these efforts can be seen in the fact that Iraqi leaders have had to bargain and compromise at every stage of the government formation process.

Despite the successes of the Iraqi government, there are still many challenges that lie ahead to address the pressing needs of the Iraqi people, particularly coping with terrorist and sectarian violence, and building government capacity and rule of law. Prime Minister Maliki stated that the new government is committed to upholding the rule of law, promoting Iraqi unity and national reconciliation, protecting and increasing Iraq's resources, and using those resources for the benefit of all Iraqis. His government program outlines a framework within which these goals will be achieved and also establishes new goals to be met in the coming years. Additional major political benchmarks for the coming year include the implementation of the National Reconciliation Plan, passage of enabling legislation for the constitution, a constitutional amendment process, and possibly provincial elections.

(B) Engaging the international community and the region in efforts to stabilize Iraq and to forge a broad-based and sustainable political settlement;

The United States is working with the Iraqi government to engage Iraq's neighbors and the international community on the future of Iraq and the stability of the region. A sustained dialogue with key international partners remains a critical element in assisting Iraq's nascent democracy. In this context, Prime Minister Maliki announced June 30 that he would travel to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates to promote his national reconciliation plan and encourage international support for Iraq.

The President, Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and other senior officials also have encouraged Arab and international support for Iraq. The Secretary of State, for instance, has reached out to Arab leaders to encourage a larger diplomatic presence in Iraq. The Arab League issued a strong statement following its November 2005 "Preparatory Meeting for the National Accord Conference" calling for all Iraqi parties and Arab states to support Iraq and respect the political will of the Iraqi people. The United States welcomes the planned Arab League-sponsored Iraqi National Accord Conference this summer in Iraq as an opportunity for Iraqis inside and outside of government to discuss the many crucial issues facing their country and support a process of national reconciliation. Since the November 2005 meeting, the Arab League has opened its office in Baghdad and appointed Mukhtar Lamani as its envoy.

Following the formation of the new Iraqi government, the European Commission announced it will make available €200 million in assistance. The EC presented the following breakdown of its assistance: improving the quality of life of Iraqis (€10 million); furthering democracy in Iraq (€40 million); promoting good governance (€40 million); and a reserve (€10 million) to continue supporting the reconstruction of the country in 2006. The Commission will also soon expand its presence in Baghdad and will nominate a Head of Delegation. With the new government in place, the Commission expects to launch negotiations for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement in the near future. On June 20, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, met with Iraqi Vice-President Adil Abd al-Mahdi to discuss strengthening Iraq's relations with the international community, particularly the EU. Solana confirmed the EU's support for the new constitutionally-elected government, underlined the importance of national reconciliation, and reiterated the EU's readiness to engage with Iraq and assist in the process of reconstruction. At the U.S.-EU Summit in June, President Bush and his EU counterparts agreed to

redouble efforts to assist the Iraqi government in enhancing security, economic reform, and the political process.

On June 26, Iraqi Vice-President Adil Abd al-Mahdi traveled to Paris to meet with French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy. This marked the first high-level exchange of visits between Iraq and France by the Maliki government.

World leaders welcomed the formation of a constitutional Iraqi government, the first full-term administration since Saddam Hussein was ousted in 2003. Official public statements from the following governments and organizations congratulated Prime Minister Maliki and the newly formed government: Arab League; European Union; G8 Foreign Ministers; United Nations; UNSYG; Albania; Algeria; Australia; Austria; Brazil; Bulgaria; Canada; China; Croatia; Czech Republic; Egypt; Estonia; France; Germany; India; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kuwait; Malta; New Zealand; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Poland; Russia; Slovenia; Slovakia; Spain; Sweden; Turkey; United Arab Emirates; Ukraine; United Kingdom; United States; and Yemen. Additionally, many countries conveyed their congratulations privately as well as providing other material support to the new Iraqi government.

Aside from the 34 nations who contribute to stability and security operations in Iraq (which include the United States, MNF-I members, UNAMI protection force, and NATO), the larger international community continued in a spirit of partnership in both the political and economic arenas to support Iraqi government institutions and the Iraqi economy. The United States Government helped to identify expanding and changing roles for international partners, such as securing or encouraging commitments by international partners in the PRT effort. The United States also raised awareness of the need for the international community to make public statements of support for the new Iraqi government, exchange high-level visits, disburse pledged assistance, provide debt relief, and make additional contributions to Iraq's economic reconstruction and development.

The United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI) remained integrally involved in Iraq and provided humanitarian assistance, reconstruction support, human development, and donor coordination. The United States remained engaged in discussions with the United Nations, urging continued support for the political process and an enhanced presence

supporting expanded activities in Iraq. The United States Government also continues to encourage an expanded World Bank presence in Iraq and welcomed the May 16 announcement that the Bank's international staff would be returning to Baghdad.

(C) Strengthening the capacity of Iraq's government ministries;

Under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) I and II, the United States provides a range of assistance to increase Iraqi capacity. The IRRF funds several projects which have an ongoing impact on building the capacity of Iraqi Ministries, including: assisting the Ministry of Finance in preparing and implementing banking and financial reforms; helping the Ministry of Trade prepare documents necessary to be considered for accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and establishing an investment promotion agency; assisting the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to develop a social safety net and viable pension system; providing assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture in the development of a national water strategy and implementing pilot programs in wheat and animal husbandry; improving the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Health to deliver care and fight disease; and developing an Education Management Information System for the Ministry of Education to improve management of human and physical resources. The United States Government also has dedicated significant resources to rehabilitating and building new infrastructure, while working alongside the staff at the Ministries of Electricity, Municipalities and Public Works, Water Resources, and Oil to improve the ability of their national, regional, and local staff to operate and maintain United States Government-funded facilities, systems, and equipment on a sustainable basis.

While all of these activities improved the capacity of Iraqi ministries to manage their own portfolios at various levels, it has become increasingly apparent that a broader program was needed to focus directly on improving the capacity of key ministries to carry out core functions, such as strategic planning, budgeting, training, and managing a personnel system.

To address that need, the United States established the National Capacity Development Program (NCDP), which helps the new Government of Iraq strengthen the core functions necessary for the efficient administration of its key national ministries, the Prime Minister's Office, Inspectors General of the participating ministries, and anti-corruption

organizations such as the Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) and the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA). The NCDP is currently working with \$25 million in reallocated IRRF funds; \$125 million in support was requested and received in the 2006 supplemental, and \$25 million was requested in the 2007 budget. The program is organized into two phases to enable rapid response to short-term priorities while at the same time building the foundation for long-term needs. Ministry Assistance Teams, composed of experts from the Mission, Iraqis, as well as donors, provide policy and programmatic advice and work jointly with the ministries to develop and resolve ministry priorities. The MATs are designed to strengthen the confidence and self-reliance of the Iraqi government. The MATs and the NCDP are supported by the Prime Minister, and he has designated an Iraqi lead in his office. The longer-term NCDP track will focus on building core curriculum in Iraqi training institutions, civil service reform, and other broad goals.

The Embassy completed detailed scopes of work for projects to meet urgent capacity building needs in specific ministries. The United States Government will provide immediate support to ministries as well as long-term capacity-building assistance in the core functions (financial management, human resources, strategic planning, leadership and communications). The contract will also increase the capacity of national public administration centers to train ministry employees.

The United States continues to work with other donors to coordinate efforts with Iraq. Donors such as the European Commission and development institutions such as the World Bank have expressed interest in supporting similar initiatives with related ministries.

(D) Accelerating the delivery of basic services;

Reconstruction has faced insurgent attacks that have driven up the cost of doing business, both in terms of financial costs and human resources. Despite this and other unanticipated challenges, the United States Government, in cooperation with the Iraqi government, has rehabilitated water and sewage services and immunized children against infectious diseases. Work in the oil and electricity sectors, moreover, has also been affected by decades of mismanagement, corruption, decay, dilapidated and insufficient infrastructure, and poor maintenance. Targeted attacks on Iraq's infrastructure by terrorists who seek to undermine the Iraqi government and

call into question its ability to provide essential services for the Iraqi people, as well as dramatic increases in the demand for electricity and fuel driven by subsidized prices, also have contributed to the challenges. U.S. assistance programs helped to build or refurbish the basic infrastructure that will enable Iraqis to significantly expand the delivery of basic services. In addition to ongoing projects, this expansion will be further enhanced by improvements in Iraqi capacity, subsidy and pricing reforms, and a decrease in infrastructure attacks.

Under the IRRF II, the U.S. has programmed \$4.2 billion for electricity, \$2.1 billion for water, \$1.7 billion for oil, \$739 million for the health sector, and \$99 million for education. The initial focus of these activities was to restore large electricity and water plants neglected by the former regime, with the expectation that rehabilitating existing plants and/or building new plants would be a down payment on what would have to be a larger, long-term program to strengthen Iraqi infrastructure and a stable base for Iraq's economic growth. Most of these projects are well underway, and nearly all of the large infrastructure projects are expected to be completed by the end of calendar year 2006. These projects already have a significant impact on the lives of average Iraqis. IRRF I and II projects have added, rehabilitated or maintained more than 2,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity generation capacity on the grid, improved access to fresh water, benefiting 3.7 million Iraqis, and improved access to sewage treatment services, benefiting 5.1 million Iraqis. Approximately 32 percent of Iraq's 14,121 school buildings were rehabilitated or refurbished, 60,000 teachers have been trained, and 8.7 million new textbooks were provided to Iraqi school children. It is also estimated that nearly all Iraqi children have been inoculated against crippling diseases such as polio and measles and hundreds of health clinics throughout Iraq have been rehabilitated.

Iraq's crude oil production has recently increased significantly above 2002 pre-war levels. In June 2006, production has averaged 2.3 million barrels a day, above the 2002 average of 2.0 million barrels per day.

The United States continues to work with Iraq to improve its ability to sustain critical infrastructure. An initial \$121 million was previously allocated to the electricity sector to support sustainable operations for generation facilities, while a \$25 million USAID program supported operations and maintenance in twelve water and sewage treatment plants. The United States Government allocated \$180 million of IRRF to continue

sustainment efforts in the electricity and water sectors and provide support to additional sectors (\$110 million in the water sector, \$61 million in the electricity sector, and \$9 million in the combined areas of communications/transportation/health) to help Iraq sustain its infrastructure. These programs are expected to have a significant impact on the long-term viability of existing infrastructure and keep these Iraqi plants online, thereby improving the levels of service offered to average Iraqis.

Congress approved the Administration's request for \$355 million in the FY 2006 supplemental legislation to continue both sustainment and capacity development efforts at plant-level facilities. With these enacted funds, the Administration also requested \$154 million in the FY 2007 budget, thereby continuing a comprehensive program to help Iraq maintain its essential service infrastructure for years to come. Coupled with the capacity development program, these funds will help build Iraqi capacity to sustain their infrastructure and make tough policy choices required to provide services and fill demand.

(E) Securing the delivery of pledged economic assistance from the international community and additional pledges of assistance;

The United States is working very closely with Iraq and international donors to maximize international assistance. Prime Minister Maliki has asked the UN, in close cooperation with the World Bank, to play a lead role with his government in developing a Compact between the international community and the Iraqi government and people. The Prime Minister envisions a Compact in which Iraq will undertake a series of reforms in exchange for more robust political and financial support from the international community. On June 14, after returning from his trip to Iraq, the President announced that the United States will actively support these endeavors.

At the October 2003 Madrid International Donors' Conference, donors other than the United States pledged over \$13.5 billion in assistance. President Bush, in a press conference after returning from Baghdad on June 14, announced that the United States will reach out to those who pledged assistance to Iraq and encourage them to fulfill their pledges of support. This includes \$8 billion in assistance from foreign governments and up to \$5.5 billion in lending from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be disbursed over four years (2004-2007). Since Madrid,

donors have pledged an additional \$850 million to support Iraq's reconstruction and development.

As of June 2006, over \$3.5 billion of the pledges of non-U.S. assistance has been disbursed. Approximately \$2.7 billion of this was from other governments either in bilateral projects or through the World Bank and the UN-administered International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), and the remainder was from multilateral institutions. Donor government "disbursements" are defined here as the funds from donor government treasuries. There are currently 102 IRFFI projects (92 UN, 10 World Bank) in various stages of completion in the water, electricity, education, health, and other sectors. At the end of May, of the total \$914 million in the UN Trust Fund, \$613 million had been committed to specific projects, and \$490 million disbursed. Of the \$457 million pledged to the World Bank Trust Fund, \$385 million has been committed to specific projects, \$90 million in contracts have been awarded, and \$55 million disbursed.

In addition, the IMF approved \$436 million in balance-of-payments support through its Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) program in September 2004. It approved a \$685 million in balance-of-payments support as part of its precautionary Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) for Iraq in December 2005. Iraq has not asked for any disbursements thus far under the SBA.

The Government of Iraq sets the priorities for reconstruction and assistance programs. The United States and other donors work closely with the Iraqi government and with each other to ensure that the projects and programs are not duplicative, and that they are integrated with the Iraqi government's development planning. Since the Madrid conference in 2003, there have been four meetings of the IRFFI Donors' Committee, which have been instrumental in improving donor coordination. In July 2005, the Iraqi government set up a Baghdad Coordination Group (BCG) with United States embassy representatives to improve further donor coordination. The BCG meets frequently, and has developed synergies between donor programs in several areas.

Reduction of Iraq's external debt burden to sustainable levels, another top priority for Iraq's economic development, is a key component of U.S. donor coordination. In November 2004, the Paris Club group of creditors

agreed to forgive, in phases, 80 percent of the approximately \$40 billion in Iraqi debt held by its members. As of June 1, 2006, 17 of 18 members of the Paris Club had signed bilateral debt agreements with the Iraqis implementing the 2004 Paris Club agreement. It is our understanding that Russia and Iraq have agreed, in principle, on debt relief terms and will finalize an agreement shortly. The United States itself went beyond Paris Club terms and has forgiven 100 percent of the \$4.1 billion in U.S.-held Iraqi debt. In total, over \$32 billion in Iraqi debt either has been forgiven, or will be forgiven, by Paris Club creditors, provided Iraq meets agreed-upon conditions [i.e., successful completion of three years under a program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)]. Some non-Paris Club members also have provided debt relief on Paris Club or better terms. The United States continues to encourage all non-Paris Club countries to provide debt reduction to Iraq on terms at least comparable to those offered by the Paris Club. Iraq has made little progress in engaging the Gulf countries and other large non-Paris Club creditors on debt relief, although we will continue to work the issue with the new Iraqi government in the coming months. Iraq has made excellent progress in dealing with its commercial and other official external creditors on terms comparable to Paris Club terms. Of Iraq's approximately \$22 billion estimated total commercial debt, creditors accounting for \$18.4 billion worth of commercial debt have accepted offers at Paris Club-comparable terms, which will result in approximately \$15 billion in debt reduction. Efforts to reconcile and achieve Paris Club-comparable debt relief for the remaining amount continue.

The United States, in coordination with the Iraqi government, actively encourages its international partners and allies to make new pledges of assistance, and bilateral or multilateral aid, as well as to disburse existing pledges committed to Madrid in 2003. The United States is in regular high-level and working-level contact with current and prospective international donors. Since January 2006, new assistance pledges include 200 million Euros (approximately \$240 million) from the European Commission and \$10 million from Germany, \$2.38 million from Spain, and \$0.99 million from New Zealand.

The World Bank Board approved the first concessional loan under its "International Development Association" (IDA) program that will, among other things, help alleviate school overcrowding and lay the groundwork for educational reform in November 2005. In May 2006, the World Bank announced plans to open an office in Iraq headed by a Country Director,

whom it is working to have on the ground in Iraq with staff, possibly, as early as the end of the summer. A World Bank office on the ground in Baghdad will be an important step forward in implementing World Bank-run programs and overall donor coordination.

On March 28, Japan announced \$655 million in concessional yen loans for three projects: Umm Qasr Port Rehabilitation; Irrigation Sector Development; and Al-Mussaib Thermal Power Plant Rehabilitation. Finalization of the loans is pending with the new Government of Iraq.

(F) Training Iraqi Security Forces and transferring additional security responsibilities to those forces and the Government of Iraq;

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces continue to increase in size and capability, and are increasingly taking over lead combat responsibility from Coalition forces.

Progress in the transfer of security responsibility to the ISF is gauged through a variety of key measures. These include the number of trained and equipped ISF personnel and the readiness assessments of operational units. MNF-I continues to support and assist the ISF as they move toward conducting fully independent operations and achieving security self-reliance.

Key measures of training progress include:

1. Training, equipping, and fielding of Security Forces personnel continues;

As of June 26, 2006, 116,100 MOD personnel have been trained and equipped to include 114,700 in the Iraqi Army, Support Forces, and Special Operation Forces. The total has reached 84 percent of the MOD authorized force strength. The Iraqi Air Force, with 600 trained and equipped personnel has achieved 37 percent of its authorized strength. The Iraqi Navy is at 70 percent of its authorized strength, with 800 trained and equipped personnel. The MOI has trained and equipped 152,300 personnel, representing 81 percent of its authorized end strength, to include police, National Police and border forces. The MOD and the MOI are on track to complete initial training and equipping of 100 percent of their authorized end-strength forces by the end of December 2006, at which time the initial

build-up will be completed and efforts will focus on replacing losses. The total number of Iraqi soldiers and police who have completed initial training and equipping is approximately 268,400, an increase of about 28,400 since the April 2006 report.

2. The number of Iraqi units able to take the lead in combat operations against the insurgency continues to increase;

Missions planned and led by Iraqi forces continue to be carried out throughout the country. As of June 26, 114 Iraqi Army, Special Operations, and Strategic Infrastructure Battalions conduct counter-insurgency operations. They represent 91 percent of the Army authorized battalions. Eighty-one of these battalions are assessed to be capable of independent operations or leading military operations with Coalition support. All 28 authorized Iraqi National Police battalions are in the fight, with two battalions controlling their area of responsibility.

As previously mentioned, the death of al-Zarqawi dealt a blow to the insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and led to more successes against dozens of terrorists and the acquisition of valuable intelligence. Prime Minister Maliki launched Operation Together Forward June 14 in which ISF had the lead with the support of U.S. troops.

3. More Iraqi units are assuming the security lead in their territory;

Three divisions, 18 brigades, and 71 battalions of the ISF now have lead security responsibility in their respective areas of operation. The ISF have security responsibility for 60 percent of Baghdad and for 30,000 square miles of the country. As of June 26, the MOD, MOI, or the Ministry of Finance has assumed control of 41 Forward Operating Bases from Coalition forces.

The Secretary of Defense's quarterly report to Congress, "Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq," provides more extensive measurements and indicators of the training and performance of ISF and of the security environment more generally.

II. Whether the Iraqis have made the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement that is essential for defeating the insurgency in Iraq;

The Iraqi efforts to stand up a broad-based government and then to launch a reconciliation initiative underscore their readiness to take the critical decisions and make compromises to achieve a political solution to the country's violence. Iraqi leaders from all major parties worked to establish an inclusive government. However, the delay in forming the national unity government demonstrated the obstacles that remain in furthering understanding and trust between political groups. Continuing high levels of terrorist activity and an increase in sectarian violence impeded national reconciliation efforts. Although agreement on the new government took longer than many would have liked, it is important that Iraqi political leaders worked together to forge alliances and compromises with people they previously considered political enemies. Against this highly polarized political landscape, Iraqi leaders made difficult compromises and negotiated the establishment of a new Iraqi government that represents all segments of the population.

The establishment of a national unity government, with broad-based representation of all of Iraq's communities, is the direct result of efforts by Iraqi leaders, with United States and other international assistance and advice. This has been an ongoing process, and at every stage Iraqi leaders have had to bargain, negotiate, and compromise. The focus will now shift from government formation to governing. The United States will remain actively engaged in helping the new government to sustain and advance its national political compact. Key political events over the next year include, but are not limited to, the implementation of the National Reconciliation Plan, possible provincial elections, a constitutional amendment process, and the passage of enabling legislation for the constitution, in areas such as the judiciary and natural resource management.

Political and diplomatic efforts have been ongoing for three years. U.S. policy has been designed specifically to expand avenues of participation and ensure representation from all major communities in Iraq. Iraqis, with U.S. support, decided that only by meeting targets and moving the process forward would they be able to bring all Iraqi communities into the process. The ability of Iraqis to establish the institutions of a broadly-based political system shows their commitment to move forward at each step

in the political transition and made the establishment of a unity government possible.

In the spirit of reconciliation, MNF-I and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, working with the Government of Iraq, have released 2,500 detainees marked for discharge in June. The release generated a positive response from the Sunni political leadership and reinforced the stance of the new government as a "national unity" government representing all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. On June 25, Prime Minister Maliki delivered his National Reconciliation Plan to the CoR, announcing a reconciliation effort that included prisoner releases, debaathification, and a limited amnesty. The Prime Minister has made clear that there will be no difference in amnesty terms for those who killed Iraqis or Coalition members. The United States continues to work with the Iraqi government on improving the security situation in Iraq, including Baghdad and Basrah, and on promoting national reconciliation and the rule of law.

Coinciding with the detainee releases will be the closure of Abu Ghraib prison. Abu Ghraib prison will be empty of prisoners when it is returned to the control of the Iraqi Ministry of Justice.

III. Any specific conditions included in the April 2005 Multi-National Force-Iraq campaign action plan (referred to in United States Government Accountability Office October 2005 report on Rebuilding Iraq; DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq), and any subsequent updates to that campaign plan, that must be met in order to provide for the transition of additional security responsibility to Iraqi Security Forces;

Following the publication of the October 2005 GAO report, the President published the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI). The NSVI provides a broader and more developed set of indicators of progress in Iraq than indicators linked to the narrower issue of conditions in the MNF-I campaign action plan for transition of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. Consistent with the NSVI, MNF-I and Embassy Baghdad updated the Joint Campaign Plan in April 2006.

As Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, Coalition forces will increasingly move to supporting roles. In some cases, this may allow

for shifts in our levels of effect, personnel reductions or delaying scheduled deployments, based upon conditions, not any arbitrary timeline. As the security, political, and economic situation evolves, we will maintain sufficient forces on the ground to help Iraq consolidate and secure its gains.

The Iraqi government, jointly with military and political leadership of the United States and Coalition partners in Iraq, assesses when conditions permit handing over security responsibility for specific areas from Coalition forces to the Iraqi civil authorities. The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR), whose principal members include the Iraqi Ministers of Defense and Interior, the Iraqi National Security Advisor, the U.S. Ambassador, the U.K. Ambassador, the Commanding General of MNF-I, and the Deputy Commanding General of MNF-I, developed criteria to guide the transfer of security responsibility. The Ministerial Committee for National Security acknowledged these criteria on February 3, 2006. Conditions necessary to transfer security responsibility are evaluated both in provinces and provincial capitals. Recommendations for transfer include an assessment of conditions in four categories:

- the ability of Coalition forces to reinforce the ISF if necessary;
- readiness and capabilities of ISF;
- levels of present and projected insurgent activity; and
- the readiness and capabilities of relevant government institutions.

The recommendation to transfer security responsibility will be based on an assessment of the specific situation in any province or provincial capital, in the context of the overall security environment. On June 19, Prime Minister Maliki announced that the southern province of Muthanna would be the first to transition to full Iraqi responsibility for security.

IV. To the extent that these conditions are not covered under paragraph III, the following should also be addressed:

(A) The number of battalions of the Iraqi Armed Forces that must be able to operate independently or to take the lead in counter-insurgency operations and the defense of Iraq's territory;

The Iraqi government, together with the Coalition, has identified a force structure to maintain a security environment in Iraq that will provide a basis for transitioning Iraq to security self-reliance. The authorized end-

strength force structure of the Iraqi Armed Forces is approximately 137,000 personnel, manning one Iraqi Ground Forces Command, 10 divisions and 36 brigade headquarters, 114 Army and special operations battalions, six Air Force squadrons, three Navy squadrons, and 19 combat support battalions. As of June 26, 2006, 116,100 personnel or 84 percent of the authorized end-strength has been trained and equipped. With the initial focus on establishing combat units, attention is now shifting toward the logistics backbone needed to facilitate independent operations. One hundred and six Iraqi Army and Special Operations battalions are now conducting counter-insurgency operations with 81 battalions assessed as capable of operating “in the lead” or independently. Sixty-nine MoD battalions control their own areas of responsibility and ISF have conducted more independent operations than MNF-I in three of the last five months.

There is no specific threshold for the number of Iraqi Armed Forces battalions that must be in the lead before the number of U.S. forces in Iraq can be reduced. As Iraqis take on more responsibility for security, Coalition forces will increasingly move to supporting roles. In some cases this may allow for personnel reductions or delay previously scheduled deployments. Arbitrary deadlines or timetables for withdrawal of U.S. forces – divorced from conditions in Iraq and the region – would be a strategic error as this would suggest to the enemy they can simply wait to win.

(B) The number of Iraqi special police units that must be able to operate independently or to take the lead in maintaining law and order and fighting the insurgency;

The Ministry of Interior forces consist of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), National Police (formerly the Special Police, comprising the Police Commandos, Public Order Police, and the Mechanized Police), the Emergency Response Unit, Department of Border Enforcement, and the Center for Dignitary Protection.

The end-strength force structure for all Ministry of Interior forces is 188,200 trained and equipped personnel manning two division headquarters, nine brigade headquarters, 12 Public Order battalions, 12 Commando battalions, three mechanized battalions, and one Emergency Response Unit. The force structure plan is designed to enable a stable civil-security environment in which a prosperous economy and a democratic and representative government that respects and promotes human rights can

evolve. As of June 26, 152,300 Ministry of Interior security personnel, or 81 percent of the authorized end strength of 188,200, have been trained and equipped. This includes 107,000 IPS personnel and 45,300 other Ministry of Interior forces, such as 27 National Police Force battalions and one Emergency Response Unit conducting operations with three of these units assessed capable of operating in the lead or independently. There is no specific threshold for the number of Iraqi special police units that must be judged capable of operating independently or in the lead before U.S. force levels can be reduced.

(C) The number of regular police that must be trained and equipped to maintain law and order; and

The end-strength force structure of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is 135,000 trained and equipped personnel. This is considered the minimum number of IPS required in the current environment rather than a threshold whereby U.S. force levels can be reduced. As of June 26, over 107,000 IPS, or 79 percent of the authorized end-strength, have been trained and equipped. These IPS personnel work alongside the 45,300 other Ministry of Interior forces described in the previous section.

The IPS, the primary civilian police organization in Iraq, continues to improve in its mission to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide local-level security. The IPS is responsible for security measures in over 130 districts and nearly 900 stations throughout Iraq. There is a critical need to continue development of the IPS into a professional, effective civilian police force that utilizes modern policing techniques and respects the rule of law and human rights. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) continues to work closely with the Ministry of Interior to improve the performance and professionalism of the IPS. Police Transition Teams (PTTs) mentor and assist the IPS in local station houses and regional headquarters, evaluating progress and instituting the necessary training and development to bring these forces up to a more professional level.

(D) The ability of Iraq's federal ministries and provincial and local governments to independently sustain, direct, and coordinate Iraq's security forces;

The development of institutional capability within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) to ensure effective civilian

oversight, direction, resourcing, and sustainment of the Security Forces is also critical to Iraqi security self-reliance. A main line of operation for Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) has been the management of programs to build ministerial capacity at the MOD and MOI. In February, MNSTC-I awarded a contract to provide civilian experts to work side by side with Iraqi officials within these ministries. Although they made significant progress under difficult conditions, the changes in government, the lack of continuity in ministerial leadership, as well as intimidation and assassination of key senior officials, hindered their overall effort. Now that a new government has been formed, MNSTC-I is positioned to assist the new leadership of these ministries in developing their organizations further.

Ministerial capacity in critical departments such as personnel management, budget, finance, and logistics continues to be less than fully functional in the Ministries of Defense and especially Interior. The security ministries are working to strengthen their chains of command and reduce militia and criminal influence. Some militia members may have infiltrated the Iraqi Security Forces, such as the police, and may be using their uniforms and positions of power to serve interests other than the Government of Iraq. This creates a complex problem whose resolution must be part of the overall militia plan. A plan is being developed to assist Iraqi leaders with the militia problem, including establishing a comprehensive civil-led political-security hierarchy. Solutions will require addressing militias at the local, provincial, and national levels simultaneously. It will also require a continued focus on standing up and building local respect for ISF in areas currently under militia control. A viable reintegration plan will require political, economic and educational reforms designed to help members of these groups transition back into society. Recent confirmation of the Ministers of Defense and Interior should facilitate this process.

V. The criteria to be used to evaluate progress toward meeting such conditions necessary to provide for the transition of additional security responsibilities to the Iraqi Security Forces;

Security transition will occur when four criteria are met:

- Implementation of Partnerships—MNF-I and its Major Subordinate Commands must establish and maintain partnerships across the entire spectrum of Iraqi Security Forces units, from battalion through to ministerial level;
- Achievement of Iraqi Army Lead (IAL)—Process during which Iraqi Army units progress through stages of capability from unit formation to the ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations;
- Attainment of Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC)—Iraqi civil authorities satisfy the conditions required to assume control and exercise responsibility for the security of their respective provinces. This is achieved by attaining the previously mentioned four criteria: the ability of Coalition forces to reinforce the ISF if necessary; readiness and capabilities of ISF; levels of present and projected insurgent activity; and the readiness and capabilities of relevant government institutions; and
- Iraqi Security Self-Reliance—The Government of Iraq achieves PIC (or a combination of PIC and IAL) throughout Iraq; and the government, through its security ministries, is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces.

These criteria are not sequential. Iraqi forces do not have to assume the lead in each governorate before Coalition forces may begin transfer of provincial control in governorates where all conditions, including Iraqi Security Forces lead for security, have already been established.

VI. A plan for meeting such conditions, an assessment of the extent to which such conditions have been met, information regarding variables that could alter that plan, and the reasons for any subsequent changes to that plan;

In consultation with the military commanders in Iraq, the Government of Iraq, and Allies, the Secretary of Defense advises the President on the appropriate level of U.S. Forces in Iraq and the surrounding theater of operations. These conditions include, but are not limited to, key elements of the MNF-I Campaign Plan—such as the increasing leadership of Iraqi Security Forces in counter-insurgency operations and ownership of areas of responsibility—and progress in the political process. Acting on the advice of his military commanders and the Secretary of Defense, the President

decided to delay the early May 2006 deployment of a brigade sized unit from Germany to Iraq.

Again, arbitrary timetables for withdrawal of Coalition forces—divorced from conditions in Iraq and the region—would be a serious strategic error, as they would suggest to the enemy that they can simply wait to win. No war has ever been won on a timetable, and neither will this one be. Lack of a timetable, however, does not mean that the Coalition’s posture in Iraq is static. On the contrary, the Coalition continually adjusts its posture and approaches as conditions evolve and Iraqi capabilities grow.

In addition to the above descriptions of the plan for meeting conditions, please reference National Strategy for Victory in Iraq at www.whitehouse.gov and Report to Congress, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” May 26, 2006, at <http://www.defenselink.mil/>, pages 63-65.

For additional details on Iraqi Security Forces training, performance, and progress reference February 17, 2006, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” <http://www.defenselink.mil/>, pages 46-62.

For more specific force generation and force requirement information, reference the classified annex to the Report to Congress, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.”

For additional information on reconstruction, assistance, and the delivery of essential services, please reference the 2207 Quarterly Report to Congress on The Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/2207>, or for general information on the status of political, economic, and security efforts, the Weekly Status Report, <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/2006/c16536.htm>.