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Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined' which 
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Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives: 

June 2005: 

Afghanistan Security: 

Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future 
Plans Need to Be Better Defined: 

GAO-05-575: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-575, a report to the Committee on International 
Relations, House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

After more than two decades of war, Afghanistan had no army or 
functioning police and, before September 11, 2001, was a haven for 
international terrorists. In April 2002, the United States and several 
other nations agreed to reform the five pillars of Afghanistan’s 
security sector–creating an Afghan army, reconstituting the police 
force, establishing a working judiciary, combating illicit narcotics, 
and demobilizing the Afghan militias. As the leader for the army 
pillar, the United States has provided about $3.3 billion. For the 
German-led effort to reconstitute the Afghan police, the United States 
has provided over $800 million. We examined the progress made, and 
limitations faced, in developing the army and police forces. We also 
identified challenges that must be addressed to complete and sustain 
these forces.

What GAO Found: 

As of March 2005, Defense had trained more than 18,300 Afghan combat 
troops—over 42 percent of the army’s projected total of 43,000—and 
deployed them throughout the country. During 2004, the Department of 
Defense significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training. 
However, Defense efforts to fully equip the increasing number of combat 
troops have fallen behind, and efforts to establish sustaining 
institutions, such as a logistics command, needed to support these 
troops have not kept pace. Plans for completing these institutions are 
not clear. 

Germany and the United States had trained more than 35,000 police as of 
January 2005 and expect to meet their goal of training 62,000 police by 
December 2005. However, the Department of State has just begun to 
address structural problems that affect the Afghan police force. 
Trainees often return to police stations where militia leaders are the 
principal authority; most infrastructure needs repair, and the police 
do not have sufficient equipment—from weapons to vehicles. Furthermore, 
limited field-based mentoring has just begun although previous 
international police training programs have demonstrated that such 
mentoring is critical for success. Moreover, the Afghan Ministry of the 
Interior (which oversees the police force) requires reform and 
restructuring. Finally, neither State nor Germany has developed plans 
specifying how much the program will cost and when it will be completed.

Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces and 
concurrent progress in the other pillars of security sector reform, 
Afghanistan could again become a haven for terrorists. However, 
establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly 
take years and substantial resources. Available information suggests 
that these programs could cost up to $7.2 billion to complete and about 
$600 million annually to sustain. Furthermore, the other lead nations 
have made limited progress in reforming Afghan’s judiciary, combating 
illicit narcotics, and demobilizing the militias.

Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and State develop more 
detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police 
forces. GAO also recommends that the Secretaries work to help ensure 
that progress in the other security pillars is congruous with the army 
and police programs. Defense, Justice, and State generally concurred 
with the report’s recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-575.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact David Gootnick, (202) 512-
3149 or GoodnickD@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

U.S. Training of Afghan Combat Troops Has Outpaced Efforts to Equip and 
Sustain Them: 

Difficult Conditions Have Hampered Reconstituting of Police and State 
Does Not Have an Overall Plan to Complete the Effort: 

Efforts to Complete and Sustain the Afghan Army and Police Face Major 
Challenges: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and Police by Non-U.S. 
Donors: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

Tables: 

Table 1: U.S. Support for the Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 
2002- 2006: 

Table 2: Number of Afghan Police Reported Trained as of January 2005 
and Training Targets for December 2005: 

Table 3: Estimated Value of Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and 
Police by Non-U.S. Donors: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: 

Figure 2: Afghan Army Commands and Police Training Centers: 

Figure 3: Kabul Military Training Center: 

Figure 4: Defective Boot Purchased Locally and an Afghan Soldier 
Wearing Sandals: 

Figure 5: Police Regional Training Center in Jalalabad-Dining Facility 
and Classroom Building: 

Figure 6: Jalalabad Police Station: 

Figure 7: Heavy Weapons Cantonment Site Outside Kabul: 

Abbreviations: 

State/INL: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs: 

OMC-A: Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan: 

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 

Letter June 30, 2005: 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Lantos: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on International Relations: 
House of Representatives: 

After more than two decades of war left Afghanistan without an army or 
a functioning police force, the country became a haven for 
international terrorists, including the al Qaeda terrorist group that 
attacked two U.S. cities on September 11, 2001. Since ousting the 
Taliban regime from Afghanistan in 2001, the United States has spent 
almost $3 billion to help reconstruct this poor and ethnically divided 
country.[Footnote 1] However, pervasive internal security threats-- 
including terrorists, ethnic and regional militias commanded by 
powerful warlords, and a large trade in illegal narcotics--continue to 
undermine efforts to rebuild Afghanistan's shattered economy, 
government, and infrastructure. The United States and allied nations 
maintain more than 28,000 combat and support troops in Afghanistan to 
counter these threats.[Footnote 2]

To help Afghanistan provide for its own security, the United States and 
several other nations agreed at a conference in December 2002 to help 
create multiethnic, professionally trained Afghan national army and 
police forces.[Footnote 3] Donor nations also agreed to help establish 
a working judicial sector, combat the narcotics trade, and demobilize 
Afghanistan's militias. As leader of the effort to create the new army, 
the United States provided approximately $3.3 billion during fiscal 
years 2002 through 2005 toward the goal of eventually establishing a 
70,000 man force that includes 43,000 ground combat troops. The 
Department of Defense facilitates the training and equipping of the 
Afghan army through its Combined Forces Command's Office of Military 
Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) in the capital city of Kabul. As the 
largest donor for the reconstitution of the national police, which is 
led by Germany, the United States provided about $804 million during 
fiscal years 2002 through 2005 for police training, equipment, and 
infrastructure. The Department of State oversees the U.S. police effort 
through its Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs (State/INL) in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, 
with assistance from the Department of Justice. In its fiscal year 2006 
budget request, the executive branch has requested nearly $60 million 
for the Afghan police but, according to Defense officials, no 
additional funds for the Afghan army. 

To review the status of U.S. efforts to strengthen Afghanistan's 
security, we (1) examined the progress made, and limitations faced, by 
the United States and other donor nations in building Afghanistan's 
national army; (2) examined the progress made, and limitations faced, 
by the United States and other donor nations in reconstituting 
Afghanistan's national police forces; and (3) identified challenges 
that the United States, other donor nations, and Afghanistan must 
address to complete and sustain the Afghan army and police forces. To 
address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent Defense and State 
planning, funding, and evaluation documents for the Afghan army and 
police programs. We discussed these programs with cognizant officials 
from the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State in Washington, 
D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, we traveled to Herat and 
Jalalabad to view Afghan army facilities and a police training site, 
respectively, and to meet with cognizant U.S. and Afghan officials. We 
also met with government officials from Germany and other key donor 
nations. We determined that the data provided to us were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. (See app. I for a more 
complete description of our scope and methodology.)

We conducted our review from January 2004 through May 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

The United States has made important progress in training and deploying 
Afghan army combat troops but has not fully addressed limitations that 
impede its progress in establishing a self-sustaining Afghan army. 
Defense has established programs for recruiting and training battalions 
of ethnically mixed combat troops, including a field-based mentoring 
program. In 2004, as security concerns persisted, Defense significantly 
accelerated Afghan combat troop training, and as of March 2005 more 
than 42 percent of the army's total projected combat strength of 43,000 
troops was deployed in strategic locations throughout the country. 
However, OMC-A's efforts to fully equip the increasing number of combat 
troops being trained have fallen behind. In addition, OMC-A's efforts 
to establish institutions needed to support these troops have not kept 
pace with the accelerated training program. Plans for the completion of 
these institutions are not clear. Nonetheless, U.S. trainers and other 
military officials have stated that Afghan combat troops generally 
perform well in small units, despite some shortcomings. 

Germany and the United States have made progress in training individual 
Afghan policemen and policewomen but have not addressed many 
limitations impeding the reconstitution of a national police force. As 
of January 2005, the Department of State and Germany have trained more 
than 35,000 police and expect to meet their goal of training 50,000 
national and highway police and 12,000 border police by December 2005. 
However, trainees face difficult working conditions. They return to 
district police stations that need extensive reconstruction or 
renovation; militia leaders are often the principal authority; and they 
lack weapons, vehicles, communications, and other equipment. In 
addition, the police training includes limited field-based training and 
mentoring, although previous international peacekeeping efforts showed 
that such mentoring is critical to the success of police training 
programs. Furthermore, the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (which 
oversees the police force) faces several problems, including corruption 
and an outdated rank structure, that require reform and restructuring. 
Finally, neither State nor Germany have developed an overall plan 
specifying how or when construction tasks and equipment purchases will 
be completed, how much the buildup of the police will cost, and when 
the overall effort to reconstitute the police will be finished. 

The United States, other donors, and the new Afghan government face 
significant challenges to establishing viable Afghan army and police 
forces. Although Defense and State have not yet prepared official cost 
estimates, the army and police programs could cost up to $7.2 billion 
to complete and about $600 million annually to sustain. Moreover, slow 
progress in resolving other Afghan security problems--the lack of an 
effective judiciary, the substantial illicit narcotics industry, and 
the continued presence of armed militias--threaten to undermine overall 
progress made toward providing nationwide security and ensuring the 
stability of the Afghan government. 

We are recommending that the Secretaries of Defense and State develop 
detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police 
forces, including clearly defined objectives and performance measures; 
milestones; funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the 
results achieved. In addition, we are recommending that the Secretaries 
work with the other lead nations to help ensure that progress in the 
other pillars of Afghan's security reform is congruous with the 
progress made in the army and police programs. In both cases, we 
recommend that the Secretaries report their progress to the Congress. 
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Departments of Defense and 
State generally concurred with our recommendations, but both stated 
that appropriate reporting mechanisms are already in place. The 
Department of Justice strongly concurred in regards to the Afghan 
police training program and noted that its expertise could be more 
effectively utilized. 

Background: 

Afghanistan, a mountainous and land-locked country in central Asia, is 
one of the poorest countries in the world. More than 60 percent of its 
population is illiterate. Afghanistan lacks effective nationwide 
communications, banking, and transportation systems. Its estimated per 
capita gross domestic product for 2003 was about $700. The 
International Monetary Fund estimates that Afghan government revenues 
will average $387 million per year during 2005 through 2008--less than 
half of its projected average annual expenditures for government 
salaries and operations of $879 million. Afghanistan remains dependent 
on other nations for support; international assistance provided 93 
percent of Afghanistan's $4.75 billion budget for 2005. 

Afghanistan's economic plight is partially the result of its long 
history of war and civil strife. Afghanistan's ethnically mixed 
population is due to its location on historical invasion and trade 
routes. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only 
after waging a prolonged and destructive war against Afghan resistance 
groups. Following a protracted civil war, most of Afghanistan fell 
under the control of the fundamentalist Taliban group by 1998. Under 
the Taliban, Afghanistan became a haven for terrorists, and, as a 
result, the United States and a coalition of its allies invaded 
Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Afghanistan's security institutions, including its national army, 
police, and judiciary, collapsed or were severely damaged prior to the 
U.S. occupation. During the Taliban rule the army disintegrated and was 
superseded by various ethnic and regional militias. The Afghan national 
police force, which was organized as a two-track system of career 
officers and largely untrained conscripts who served for 2 years, had 
also declined over the past 25 years. 

Afghanistan continues to face significant internal threats. Widespread 
trade in opium and heroin provides drug producers and traffickers with 
the resources and motivation to resist efforts to curb the illicit 
narcotics industry. Taliban fighters and terrorist groups remain active 
in parts of the country, and attacks on civilian reconstruction workers 
have prompted some international assistance groups to leave the 
country. Regional warlords maintain thousands of militia fighters who 
could be used to challenge the authority of Afghanistan's new central 
government. 

To help Afghanistan address such threats, the United States and several 
other donor nations met in Geneva, Switzerland, in April 2002. At the 
conference, the donors established a five-pillared security reform 
agenda and designated a donor country to take the lead in reforming 
each pillar. The United States volunteered to lead the army reform 
effort, and Germany volunteered to lead the police reform effort (see 
fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Five Pillars of Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Army: 

At a December 2002 conference (Bonn II) near Bonn, Germany, the Afghan 
government and the donor nations agreed that the new Afghan army should 
be ethnically balanced, voluntary, and consist of no more than 70,000 
individuals (including all civilian and Ministry of Defense personnel). 
They also agreed that the army's commands should be located in Kabul 
and other geographically strategic locations. The Afghan government and 
the donors did not set a deadline for the completion of the army. 

Following the Bonn II conference, U.S. Defense planners, in conjunction 
with Afghan officials, developed a force structure for the army that 
includes (1) 43,000 ground combat troops based in Kabul and four other 
cities, (2) 21,000 support staff organized in four sustaining commands 
(recruiting, education and training, acquisition and logistics, and 
communications and intelligence), (3) 3,000 Ministry of Defense and 
general staff personnel, and (4) 3,000 air staff to provide secure 
transportation for the President of Afghanistan.[Footnote 4] According 
to Defense, the mission of the new army will include providing security 
for Afghanistan's new central government and political process, 
replacing all other military forces in Afghanistan, and combating 
terrorists and other destructive elements in cooperation with coalition 
and peacekeeping forces. As of May 2005, Defense's target date for 
completing the army is the fall of 2009. 

U.S. efforts to establish the army are led by Defense, with support 
from State. The Defense-staffed Office of Military Cooperation- 
Afghanistan (OMC-A) in Kabul oversees the development of the Afghan 
army's force structure, decision processes, and garrisons, and provides 
equipment. OMC-A works closely with Task Force Phoenix, which is a 
joint coalition task force charged with training Afghan army battalions 
at the Kabul Military Training Center and elsewhere in the country. The 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S. Central Command provide planning 
and other support, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is constructing 
facilities for the Afghan army's central and regional commands (see 
fig. 2). In Washington, D.C., the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
uses Defense and State funds to provide financial and administrative 
support for OMC-A. The agency purchases services and equipment 
requested by OMC-A through the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command 
and transfers funds to OMC-A to allow it to procure services and 
equipment from local vendors. 

Figure 2: Afghan Army Commands and Police Training Centers: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Police: 

Afghanistan's police reform process began formally in February 2002, 
when Germany, as the leader for this sector, convened a conference in 
Berlin to discuss international support for the Afghan police. 
Subsequently, donor nations agreed to establish a multiethnic, 
sustainable, and countrywide 62,000-member professional police service 
that is fully committed to the rule of law. The overall goal of the 
program is to enhance security in the provinces and districts outside 
of Kabul. They did not set a deadline for completing the police. 

U.S. support for the police sector is overseen by State/INL in 
Washington, D.C., and by staff at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. State has 
a contract with DynCorp Aerospace Technology to train and equip the 
police, advise the Ministry of Interior, and provide infrastructure 
assistance, including constructing several police training centers (see 
fig. 2). Defense has also provided infrastructure and equipment to 
police in border regions. In addition, Germany has a training program 
for police officers at the Kabul Police Academy and has convened 
several donors' conferences. Germany also tracks pledges and projects 
implemented by various donors. Furthermore, various donors established 
the United Nations' Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan to help 
ensure that the police are paid regularly and are issued adequate 
equipment. 

U.S. Support: 

The United States has provided approximately $4.1 billion during fiscal 
years 2002 through 2005 to support the Afghan army and police 
force.[Footnote 5] In the President's budget request for fiscal year 
2006, the administration has requested an additional $58.5 million for 
the Afghan police program but, according to Defense officials, no 
additional funds for the Afghan army. (See table 1.)

Table 1: U.S. Support for the Afghan Army and Police, Fiscal Years 2002-
2006: 

Dollars in millions. 

Afghan army: 

State[A]; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $74.9; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $191.4; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $434.4; 
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $421.4; 
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $0; 
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $0; 
Total: $1,122.1. 

Defense[B]; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $4.3; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $156.2; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $285.0; 
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $429.3; 
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $1,285.0; 
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $0; 
Total: $2,159.8. 

Subtotal; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $79.2; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $347.6; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $719.4; 
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $850.7; 
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $1,285.0; 
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $0; 
Total: $3,281.9. 

Afghan police: 

State[C]; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $26.6; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $0; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $160.0; 
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $65.0; 
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $360.0; 
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $58.5; 
Total: $670.1. 

Defense[D]; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $0; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $0; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $47.0; 
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $7.8; 
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $137.3; 
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $0; 
Total: $192.1. 

Subtotal; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $26.6; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $0.0; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $207.0; 
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $72.8; 
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $497.3; 
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $58.5; 
Total: $862.2. 

Total; 
Fiscal year: 2002: $105.8; 
Fiscal year: 2003: $347.6; 
Fiscal year: 2004: $926.4; 
Fiscal year: 2005 (estimated): $923.5; 
Fiscal year: 2005 Supplemental (estimated): $1,782.3; 
Fiscal year: 2006 (proposed): $58.5; 
Total: $4,144.1. 

Source: Departments of Defense and State. 

[A] Most of State's funds for the Afghan army come from its Foreign 
Military Financing program. Foreign Military Financing funds are 
administered by Defense through its Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency, which provides funds, equipment, and services for the army 
through OMC-A. State also supports the Afghan army through its Peace 
Keeping Operations program (from which the salaries for Afghan troops 
are financed) and International Military Education and Training 
program. 

[B] Defense funds for the Afghan army are drawn from three principal 
sources: 

The Afghan Freedom Support Act (P.L. 107-327), as amended, states that 
the President may exercise his drawdown authorities (as authorized 
under section 506 (A) (2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) by 
supplying Afghanistan with defense services, articles, and education 
"acquired by contract or otherwise." Under this provision, OMC-A has 
been given authority to spend U.S. Army operations and maintenance 
funds to train and equip the Afghan army. During fiscal years 2002 
through 2004, approximately $287 million was drawn down via such 
contracts by Defense. In addition, under section 506 (A) (2) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, approximately $11 million 
in military trucks and armored personnel vehicles were drawn down from 
Defense for the Afghan army. For more details on such drawdowns, see 
Foreign Assistance: Reporting of Defense Articles and Services Provided 
through Drawdowns Needs to Be Improved, [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-1027] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
20, 2002). 

The Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for Defense and for the 
Reconstruction Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, (P.L. 108-106), and the 
Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2005 (P.L. 108-287) 
authorize Defense to use U.S. Army operations and maintenance funds for 
several purposes, including training and equipping the new Afghan armed 
forces. Defense has provided a total of $440 million in such funds for 
the Afghan army. 

The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending September 
30, 2005, and for other purposes (P.L. 109-13) authorizes Defense to 
provide up to $1.285 billion in assistance to the Afghan army. Of this 
amount, $290 million will be used to reimburse the U.S. Army for costs 
incurred to train, equip, and provide related assistance to the Afghan 
army. 

[C] State has supported the Afghan police through programs managed by 
its Bureau for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement 
Affairs. Of the $160 million that State provided in 2004, $50 million 
was drawn from fiscal year 2003 Emergency Response Funds. 

[D] Defense has supported the Afghan police with counternarcotics 
funding provided through its Office for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict, as authorized by the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriation Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2004, (P.L. 108-106). Defense also drew on approximately 
$17 million in Commanders Emergency Response Program funds to support 
police projects. 

[End of table]

Other Donor Support: 

More than 40 nations and international organizations have also provided 
funds, equipment, and training to support the Afghan army and police. 
As of March 2005, other donors had provided about $193 million to 
supplement U.S. efforts to create the Afghan army and about $246 
million for reconstituting the Afghan police. (See app. II for more 
information on other donors' support for the army and police.)

Allied and multilateral forces: 

Pending the creation of functioning Afghan army and police forces, more 
than 28,000 foreign troops operate in Afghanistan. These include about 
18,000 U.S. troops, an estimated 1,900 troops from other members of the 
coalition, and over 8,300 peacekeepers from the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). In August 2003, NATO assumed control over the 
International Security Assistance Force in response to a United 
Nations' mandate to provide security in the Kabul area and to support 
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. In addition, NATO's members agreed 
to begin establishing provincial reconstruction teams in northern and 
western Afghanistan. Although NATO has had difficulty persuading 
nations to provide the resources needed for these teams, it has 
established seven provincial reconstruction teams. After taking control 
of a team sponsored by Germany in Kabul, NATO announced in June 2004 
that it would also assume control of four additional teams in northern 
Afghanistan. These teams are sponsored by the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and the Netherlands. British and German officials informed us that 
their teams focus primarily on reconstruction and have limited roles in 
providing direct security for local Afghans and in working with the 
Afghan army and police. On May 31, 2005, NATO took control of two 
additional provincial reconstruction teams in western Afghanistan. They 
are sponsored by Italy and the United States. 

U.S. Training of Afghan Combat Troops Has Outpaced Efforts to Equip and 
Sustain Them: 

Defense, with the government of Afghanistan, has established programs 
for recruiting and training battalions of Afghan combat troops. OMC-A 
significantly accelerated Afghan combat troop training in 2004, and 
over 42 percent of the army's total projected combat strength of 43,000 
soldiers was deployed throughout the country. However, OMC-A's efforts 
to fully equip the increasing number of combat troops have fallen 
behind. In addition, OMC-A's efforts to establish the institutions 
needed to support these troops have not kept pace, and plans for their 
completion are not clear. Despite some shortcomings, OMC-A personnel 
and the embedded trainers we met with told us that Afghan combat troops 
have generally performed well under U.S. supervision. 

The United States Has Established Recruiting Effort: 

Defense, in conjunction with the government of Afghanistan, is 
establishing recruiting stations in each of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. 
To help ensure that the army is ethnically balanced, Defense attempts 
to form new battalions[Footnote 6] for training with volunteers drawn 
from Afghanistan's major ethnic groups.[Footnote 7] Information 
provided by OMC-A indicates that the army as a whole generally reflects 
the country's balance of major ethnic groups.[Footnote 8]

While many of those initially recruited left the army before competing 
their terms, by late 2004 the army's attrition rate had dropped to 1.1 
percent per month.[Footnote 9] While attrition appears to have abated, 
U.S. and Afghan officials told us that soldiers often leave their units 
without permission for as long as 2 weeks to take their pay home to 
their families. The officials attributed these unauthorized absences to 
the lack of an Afghan national banking system and the absence of 
significant penalties for such absences from the volunteer Afghan army. 

Army Troops Receive Basic and Field Training: 

OMC-A and Task Force Phoenix have established programs for training 
Afghan army troops in battalions at locations including the Kabul 
Military Training Center (see fig. 3) and in the field. Battalions now 
receive 14 weeks of training at the center and elsewhere, including 
training for officers and noncommissioned officers. According to Joint 
Chiefs of Staff planners, this training includes 6 weeks of basic 
training, 6 weeks of advanced individual training, and 2 weeks of 
collective training. The program also includes training on human rights 
and the laws of war, as well as specialized training for some troops in 
tank maintenance, logistics, and medical skills. OMC-A and Task Force 
Phoenix officials informed us that the Afghan army now conducts basic 
training classes. U.S. officials also stated that France and the United 
Kingdom have helped train Afghan army personnel. 

Figure 3: Kabul Military Training Center: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Training at the Center is followed by training in the field. OMC-A 
embeds a team of U.S. trainers and mentors in each battalion to help 
achieve full operational capability. The embedded team accompanies the 
battalion into the field and provides leadership, tactical training, 
and logistical support. As originally envisioned, embedded trainer 
teams were to include 16 U.S. officers and noncommissioned officers and 
remain with battalions for 2 years. 

Defense Accelerated Training: 

At OMC-A's recommendation, Defense accelerated its training of Afghan 
combat troops throughout 2004 by more than doubling the number of 
battalions in basic training at a given time. As a result, OMC-A had 
deployed more than 42 percent of the army's total projected combat 
strength at commands throughout the country as of March 2005. OMC-A 
projects that it will complete basic training for all 43,000 combat 
troops by the fall of 2007. 

Defense time frames for building the Afghan army were in flux 
throughout 2004. As security concerns persisted, OMC-A accelerated the 
training and fielding of combat troops.[Footnote 10] In January 2004, 
OMC-A increased the number of battalions in training at one time from 
two to three; in May 2004, it began training four battalions; and, as 
of the end of January 2005, it was training five. These concerns also 
prompted Defense and the Afghan government to change their plans for 
establishing the army's four regional commands. At the beginning of 
2004, they had planned to establish the four regional commands in 
sequence, with the fourth command to be established in 2006. By May 
2004, Defense and the Afghan government had decided to establish all 
four regional commands by the end of September 2004, with as few as 150 
troops stationed at each one. 

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff planning staff, as of March 
2005, more than 18,300 troops--over 42 percent of the army's total 
projected combat strength of 43,000 men--had completed basic training. 
Having fully staffed the Kabul central command with about 10,500 
troops, OMC-A assigned the remaining 7,800 troops to the four regional 
commands.[Footnote 11] It plans to field combat troops to the regional 
commands as quickly as possible to provide more security for 
Afghanistan's parliamentary elections (currently planned for September 
2005). Accordingly, it increased the number of combat troops assigned 
to regional commands by more than 18 percent between February and March 
2005. 

In early 2005, OMC-A projected that it would complete basic training 
for the remaining 24,700 combat troops by the fall of 2007 if it 
continued to train five battalions at once. However, in May 2005, OMC- 
A proposed increasing the number of combat troops in the planned force 
structure from 43,000 to 46,000 and projected that it could train the 
additional 3,000 combat troops by the fall of 2007. Although OMC-A is 
seeking permission to begin training six battalions at once, it has not 
been able to fully equip the units already trained and faces a shortage 
of embedded trainers. 

Afghan Army Is Experiencing Equipment Shortages: 

According to U.S. Defense and Afghan army personnel, Afghan army units 
are experiencing equipment shortages. U.S. embedded trainers and other 
defense personnel informed us that Afghan soldiers have had to cope 
with shortages of useable uniforms, boots, communications gear, 
infantry weapons, ammunition, and vehicles.[Footnote 12] Embedded 
trainers provided us with examples of poorly made uniforms and boots 
and told us that Afghan army units must use old and often faulty small 
arms and ammunition. OMC-A logistics personnel confirmed that Afghan 
battalions do not have needed vehicles. Embedded trainers told us that 
the equipment shortages have negatively affected the army's 
effectiveness and discipline. 

OMC-A is responsible for managing efforts to supply the army's rapidly 
growing combat element needed equipment, but it has had difficulty 
establishing requirements and complying with security assistance 
procedures to fulfill those requirements. Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency and U.S. Army Security Assistance Command personnel informed us 
that in many cases OMC-A had not provided them with adequately prepared 
requests and forecasts of future requirements in a timely manner. For 
example, Defense Security Cooperation Agency staff noted that OMC-A 
required almost a year to establish specific requirements for a 
standard light tactical vehicle to transport Afghan troops.[Footnote 13]

OMC-A and other Defense personnel told us that several factors 
complicate OMC-A's efforts to project the army's requirements and to 
use the defense security assistance process. These include the numerous 
changes that OMC-A made in its plans to build the army, including 
accelerating the number of battalions in training and establishing the 
regional commands simultaneously in 2004. OMC-A officials also noted 
that the involvement of nascent Afghan army units in combat and the 
lack of historical data on material usage rates further complicated 
their efforts to project requirements. In addition, Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, and State 
officials in Washington, D.C., and OMC-A officials told us that OMC-A 
has not had adequate numbers of personnel trained in security 
assistance procedures to support its efforts. OMC-A officials stated 
that OMC-A has never been staffed at more than about 71 percent of its 
approved personnel level.[Footnote 14] They also noted that Defense 
efforts to train OMC-A personnel in defense security assistance 
procedures and preserve the institutional knowledge of lessons learned 
from former personnel are constrained by the rotation of Air Force, 
Navy, and Marine personnel from OMC-A after as few as 4 
months.[Footnote 15]

To address some shortages of needed equipment, OMC-A bought items 
directly from non-U.S. vendors.[Footnote 16] However, it sometimes 
purchased faulty items because it did not take adequate steps to ensure 
their quality. For example, OMC-A purchased combat boots from regional 
vendors to support the new higher basic training rate of five 
battalions. OMC-A officials told us that many boots proved to be 
defective because OMC-A had given vendors too much latitude in filling 
their contracts. U.S. trainers told us that Afghan troops sometimes 
wore sandals during operations in mountainous, difficult terrain 
because their boots had failed (see fig. 4). OMC-A personnel informed 
us that they now use a broader array of local vendors, set more 
stringent specifications, and employ Afghan civilians to inspect the 
quality of locally procured goods. 

Figure 4: Defective Boot Purchased Locally and an Afghan Soldier 
Wearing Sandals: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Defense has also experienced difficulties in obtaining adequate 
supplies of serviceable Soviet-era equipment. Early in the Afghan army 
program, Defense decided to equip the army with donated and salvaged 
Soviet weapons and armored vehicles. It did so because (1) such 
equipment was widely used by the former Afghan army and by Afghan 
militias and (2) several coalition nations once allied with the former 
Soviet Union were willing to provide equipment from their arsenals. 
However, much of the donated and salvaged equipment proved to be worn 
out, defective, or incompatible with other equipment. For example, 
Defense officials abandoned plans to use Soviet armored personnel 
carriers after they determined that the vehicles had been manufactured 
to differing standards depending on the country of origin. Defense and 
State officials also informed us that the demobilization of Afghan 
militias had yielded fewer serviceable Soviet AK-47 assault rifles and 
ammunition caches than anticipated. In response, OMC-A has cannibalized 
serviceable parts from the assault rifles obtained to make usable 
weapons and has purchased more weapons than originally planned. Defense 
and State officials informed us that they are stepping up efforts to 
obtain donations of serviceable arms. 

Number of Embedded Trainers Does Not Meet Needs: 

OMC-A's acceleration of the number of battalions in basic training has 
strained its embedded trainer team program. By increasing the number of 
battalions in training from four to five, OMC-A's requirement for 
embedded trainers increased from about 410 to nearly 700. Because it 
was unable to obtain the additional trainers from the military services 
in a timely manner, Task Force Phoenix reassigned officers from other 
duties in Afghanistan. It also temporarily reduced the number of 
embedded trainers assigned to a battalion from 16 to 12. 

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Afghanistan desk, another 192 
trainers will be needed if OMC-A increases the number of battalions in 
basic training to six. Because individuals with the skills needed to 
serve as trainers are in demand in other theaters, increasing the 
training rate to six battalions could require Defense to reassign U.S. 
personnel in Afghanistan to serve as embedded trainers.[Footnote 17]

OMC-A's need for more embedded trainers could further increase if it 
determines that individual battalions are not yet ready to operate 
without trainers. While some battalions have already operated with 
embedded trainers for longer than the initially planned 2-year period, 
OMC-A has not yet fully implemented recently developed criteria for 
assessing a battalion's readiness to operate without trainers. As of 
May 2005, none of the Afghan battalions had graduated from the embedded 
trainer program. 

Sustaining Institutions Are Lagging and Plans for Their Completion Are 
Not Clear: 

OMC-A's efforts to establish sustaining institutions (such as an 
acquisition and logistics command) needed to support the combat troops 
have not kept pace with the accelerated basic training program. The 
Afghan army currently consists almost entirely of infantry forces that 
cannot sustain themselves. At the beginning of 2005, Defense planners 
envisioned that the army would need 21,000 support personnel in four 
sustaining commands to provide essential services to the army's combat 
elements. However, as of March 2005, it had assigned only 1,300 
personnel to the sustaining commands. In an apparent attempt to address 
this shortfall, OMC-A proposed, in May 2005, that the number of 
personnel assigned to these commands be reduced from 21,000 to 14,000 
and that the time frames for completing these commands be extended from 
the end of 2008 to the fall of 2009. 

Without fully functioning sustaining commands, the Afghan army will 
continue to rely on OMC-A, embedded trainers, and other U.S. military 
forces for acquisition, logistics, communications, and other key 
support functions. OMC-A informed us that it would continue to sustain 
the Afghan army on an interim basis to ensure the rapid introduction of 
Afghan army combat units. According to Defense officials, they plan to 
use $210 million from the 2005 emergency supplemental to help ensure 
that the sustaining commands can keep pace with the fielding of combat 
units. 

To ensure that the Afghan army's combat elements are fully trained and 
supplied and can readily communicate with one another, OMC-A would have 
to recruit, train, and organize at least 12,000 individuals for the 
sustaining commands. To ease the difficulty of doing so in a largely 
illiterate country that has had little exposure to U.S. logistical 
practices, OMC-A may recruit former militia fighters with logistics 
experience. However, Defense plans for ensuring that these sustaining 
commands are fully functional by the fall of 2009 are not clear. 
Defense has not yet adopted plans that would guide OMC-A's efforts to 
complete these commands nor have Defense planners in the United States 
and OMC-A reached agreement on an overall concept of operations for the 
Afghan army. 

Afghan Troops Said to Perform Well Despite Shortcomings: 

Defense officials in Afghanistan, including representatives of the U.S. 
combat operations command, told us that U.S.-trained Afghan troops had 
accompanied U.S. forces in operations against terrorist groups, helped 
restore stability in Herat in response to riots and clashes between 
militias, assisted in providing security for Afghanistan's first 
democratic presidential election, and protected army infrastructure 
construction sites around Afghanistan. U.S. embedded trainers we met 
with near Kabul and in Herat, as well as U.S. combat officers, praised 
the quality, morale, and motivation of the Afghan troops in conducting 
these operations. For example, they noted the speed with which Afghan 
units were able to mobilize for transportation to Herat and their 
ability to quell civilian rioters.[Footnote 18] The commander of OMC-A 
told us that coalition forces have sought out opportunities to work 
with Afghan troops. According to U.S. embedded trainers and OMC-A 
officials, the multiethnic Afghan army units typically have developed 
good relations with Afghan citizens in different parts of the country. 
None reported significant evidence of ethnic discord within the army. 
However, U.S. Defense personnel informed us that Afghan troops and 
officers have not yet gained significant experience in battalion-level 
operations. They also noted the army's command processes are limited by 
the high rate of illiteracy among the troops. 

Difficult Conditions Have Hampered Reconstituting of Police and State 
Does Not Have an Overall Plan to Complete the Effort: 

Germany--the lead nation for rebuilding the Afghan police--and the 
United States have trained thousands of Afghanistan police officers and 
patrolmen and expect to meet training targets for end of 2005. However, 
many trainees return to difficult working conditions, including police 
stations where resources are inadequate and militia leaders are still 
the principal authority, and they receive limited opportunities for 
follow-up training or mentoring. Furthermore, Afghan's Ministry of the 
Interior, which oversees the Afghan police, faces pervasive problems 
that require reform or restructuring. Finally, neither State nor 
Germany has an overall plan delineating what is needed to complete the 
rebuilding of the police sector. 

Donors Expect to Meet Police Training Targets: 

As of January 2005, Germany and the United States had trained more than 
35,000 national, highway, and border police, and they expect to meet 
the overall goal of training 62,000[Footnote 19] by December 2005 (see 
table 2). The United States initiated its police training program in 
Afghanistan in 2003 because of concerns that the German training 
program was moving too slowly and was concentrating on officers. 
Initially, the U.S. program focused on training police patrolmen (and 
some women) to establish a national police presence for the Afghan 
presidential elections.[Footnote 20] The U.S. program has emphasized 
meeting specific training targets set by the Afghan government in 
consultation with U.S. and German governments.[Footnote 21]

Table 2: Number of Afghan Police Reported Trained as of January 2005 
and Training Targets for December 2005: 

Afghan police role[A]: National police; 
Police reported trained as of January 2005[B]: 33,903; 
Training target for December 2005: 47,400. 

Afghan police role[A]: Highway police; 
Police reported trained as of January 2005[B]: 220; 
Training target for December 2005: 2,600. 

Afghan police role[A]: Border police; 
Police reported trained as of January 2005[B]: 1,151; 
Training target for December 2005: 12,000. 

Afghan police role[A]: Total; 
Police reported trained as of January 2005[B]: 35,274; 
Training target for December 2005: 62,000. 

Source: State/INL data (includes German officer training data). 

[A] National police fill the traditional role of community law 
enforcement. Highway police focus on road security outside of Kabul. 
Border police are responsible for border protection and control. 

[B] State/INL could not readily identify the numbers of officers versus 
patrolmen and women by police role. 

[End of table]

The United States employs a "train the trainer" approach. More than 800 
Afghans who have completed a 3-week instructor development course 
conduct the training with DynCorp advisors. The basic training consists 
of an 8-week course for new recruits and a 2-week program for veteran 
police. Highway and border police receive 2 weeks of additional 
specialized training. U.S. trainers have also developed a shortened 
training program to accommodate illiterate recruits. According to 
State/INL and DynCorp officials, the Afghan police trainees are 
generally eager to learn and they support the idea of a national police 
force dedicated to the rule of law. In addition, according to these 
officials, attrition rates have been low. 

Germany's chief role in rebuilding the police has been to refurbish the 
Kabul Police Academy near Kabul and establish a permanent training 
program there for commissioned and noncommissioned Afghan police 
officers.[Footnote 22] The program, which began in August 2002, 
provides 3 years of training for officers and 1 year of training for 
noncommissioned officers. According to a German Ministry of Interior 
official, as of January 2005, 41 officers and 2,583 noncommissioned 
officers had completed the full German program, and an additional 4,880 
commissioned and noncommissioned officers had received short-term 
specialized training. According to this same official, Germany plans to 
train an additional 4,950 commissioned and noncommissioned officers at 
the Academy and the regional training centers by December 2005. 

Although the Bonn II agreement calls for a multiethnic police force, 
the Afghan government, Germany, and the United States do not track the 
ethnicity of police trainees. German and State officials reported that 
they had received no complaints about the ethnic composition of police 
units or deployments or their interaction with minority populations. 
However, neither had systematically surveyed the impact of ethnicity on 
police performance, relying instead on anecdotal accounts. 

DynCorp completed construction of the Central Training Center for 
Police in Kabul in May 2003, and in 2004 it constructed and began 
training at seven regional centers across the country. (Fig. 5 shows 
the police training center in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.) The Department 
of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program developed the curriculums, which include such topics as crime 
investigation, operational police skills, and human rights. 

Figure 5: Police Regional Training Center in Jalalabad-Dining Facility 
and Classroom Building: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Police Face Difficult Working Conditions: 

A number of difficult conditions hamper the effort to rebuild the 
police in Afghanistan. Newly trained police often return to community 
police stations staffed by poorly trained, illiterate conscripts or 
former militia members who have little loyalty to the central 
government. According to State/INL and Defense officials, many of the 
untrained officers remain loyal to local militias in an environment 
dominated by ethnic loyalties. Working with untrained colleagues, newly 
trained policemen often find it difficult to apply the principles they 
learned during training. For example, according to several DynCorp 
trainers, some recently trained police were forced to give their new 
equipment to more senior police and were pressured by their commanders 
to participate in extorting money from truck drivers and travelers. 
U.S. and other donor officials told us that many police resort to 
corrupt practices, in part because their salaries are low and 
inconsistently paid. The Afghan Ministry of the Interior has limited 
awareness over police operations outside of Kabul and has not 
systematically vetted existing police staff for human rights violations 
or corruption, which complicates the ministry's efforts to support and 
oversee the police. 

In addition, police across Afghanistan confront shortages of equipment. 
According to a 2002 German government assessment, less than 10 percent 
of the police had adequate equipment, and U.S. and other donor 
government officials noted that the police are often outgunned by 
militias, criminals, and drug traffickers because they lack adequate 
numbers of weapons or ammunition supplies. According to DynCorp, the 
Ministry of the Interior has approximately 36,500 serviceable rifles 
and pistols on hand, mainly seized weapons. DynCorp officials estimate 
that the police need an additional 48,500 side arms, 10,000 automatic 
rifles, and 6,250 machine guns. Through March 2005, trainees were not 
receiving firearms training, because the United States and the other 
donors had not yet provided weapons and ammunition. Further, DynCorp 
officials estimated that the Afghan national police have approximately 
3,000 serviceable vehicles and require an additional 7,400 vehicles. 
Most police do not perform routine patrols because they lack adequate 
numbers of vehicles and the fuel to operate them. State/INL officials 
reported that police often rely on civilian complainants for 
transportation during law enforcement investigations. 

Moreover, poor infrastructure conditions hamper police work. According 
to the 2002 German government assessment, approximately 80 percent of 
police infrastructure was destroyed. According to a Defense estimate, 
varying degrees of construction or renovation are needed for more than 
800 buildings among Afghanistan's provincial police stations, district 
police and border police brigade stations, and subdistrict and village 
level stations.[Footnote 23] State/INL officials reported that criminal 
suspects are sometimes detained in private residences because most 
police stations lack secure holding facilities or reliable electricity 
and drinking water and have only rudimentary office furniture and 
equipment. On our visit to a Jalalabad police station (see fig. 6), we 
observed prisoners in a communal holding facility with dirt floors and 
rudimentary toilet facilities. We also noted that police manning a 
nearby guard tower were sleeping outside between their shifts. 

Figure 6: Jalalabad Police Station: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In addition, although the U.S. government recently constructed a 
communication network that links the provincial headquarters with the 
Ministry of Interior, police at the provincial, district, and 
subdistrict levels are generally unable to communicate with police in 
other locations. DynCorp officials estimate that the police need 420 
base radios for district and border stations, more than 10,400 mobile- 
vehicle mounted radios, and 20,700 hand-held radios. 

Limited Follow-Up Training, Mentoring, or Evaluation of Trainees: 

In early 2005, DynCorp deployed police trainers to the field for the 
first time--12 outside of Kabul and 4 at a district headquarters in 
Kabul. International peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East 
Timor have shown that such training is critical to the success of 
similar programs.[Footnote 24] Field-based training and mentoring 
allows trainers to build on classroom instruction and provide a more 
systematic basis for evaluating police performance. Nevertheless, the 
German, U.S., and Afghan governments have only limited ability to 
evaluate police trainees' performance after graduation--especially in 
the more remote areas of Afghanistan. State/INL officials cited the 
high costs, the security threat to training personnel stationed in the 
field, and the difficulty of recruiting sufficient numbers of 
international police as impediments to implementing a countrywide field-
based program. OMC-A estimates a first-year cost for implementing a 
countrywide training and mentoring program at approximately $160 
million. 

Nonetheless, U.S. government and other donor officials reported overall 
improvements in police performance since the training programs began 
and noted that public attitudes toward the police are becoming more 
positive. According to U.S. officials, police played a stabilizing role 
before and during the presidential elections in October 2004. For 
example, according to U.S. military personnel, police confiscated 
weapons and explosives in 12 separate incidents on election day in 
Jalalabad. However, according to OMC-A officials, police failed to 
control a riot that occurred after the Afghan government removed the 
provincial governor from power in Herat in August 2004. As a result, 
the Afghan army was called in to restore order. 

Afghan Ministry of the Interior Undergoing Reform: 

The Afghan Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for managing 
the country's national police force, faces a number of problems that 
require reform or restructuring. According to State/INL and DynCorp 
officials, these problems include pervasive corruption; an outdated 
rank structure overburdened with senior level officers; lack of 
communication and control between central command and the regions, 
provinces, and districts; pay disparity between the army and the 
police; and a lack of professional standards and internal discipline. 
To address these problems, State embedded 30 DynCorp advisors within 
the ministry at the end of 2004 and drafted a comprehensive reform 
program. According to ministry and State officials, the reform package 
was accepted by the Afghan Government, and implementation has begun. 
The ministry adopted a new, streamlined organizational structure to 
address command and control problems, including a new rank structure 
with salaries commensurate with responsibilities. The ministry also 
created a professional standards unit (similar to an internal affairs 
unit) that is responsible for disciplining corrupt or underachieving 
officers throughout the police force. DynCorp officials stated that the 
operation of this unit will be critical to the success of the police 
reform effort. However, according to DynCorp officials, the overall 
reform program will require more than a year to implement and will not 
produce results across the country for several years. 

The Ministry of the Interior has not yet reformed its police pay 
system. Patrolmen generally are paid $30 to $50 per month, less than 
the $70 per month new army recruits are paid and often less than day 
laborers can earn on construction sites. According to DynCorp 
officials, patrolmen's salaries are insufficient to support a family's 
living expenses and often cause policemen to resort to corruption to 
augment their income. Ministry officials told us that they are aware 
that low salaries are hurting the professionalism of the police force 
and that they are working to institute a new salary structure. 

State and Germany Do Not Have an Overall Plan for Reconstituting the 
Afghan National Police: 

In 2003, Germany developed a strategy paper that assessed the condition 
of the police and proposed ways to reconstituting the police sector. 
However, this strategy was not widely circulated and was not adopted by 
other donors, including the United States; State/INL officials told us 
that they could not provide us a copy of the German strategy because 
they did not possess a copy themselves. According to cognizant German 
officials, Germany has viewed its role as one of advising and 
consulting with other donors and the Afghan government rather than as 
the major implementer or funding source for the police sector. 

State has not developed a plan for addressing the overall requirement 
of equipping and fielding a fully functioning police force by a stated 
end date. Budget estimates produced (at our request) by DynCorp provide 
a partial listing of essential elements for building the police-- 
personnel, equipment, facilities and communication equipment--through 
2006 that totals more than $580 million. However, State has not 
specified how or when these equipment purchases and construction 
projects will be completed; what additional infrastructure, equipment, 
and training are needed; how much the total buildup of the police will 
cost; and when the overall effort to build the Afghan police will be 
finished. 

In addition, State did not have adequate staff in Kabul to manage the 
day-to-day activities of the police program, hampering State's effort 
to plan for and execute the rebuilding of the Afghan police. In 2003, 
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul had one full-time staff member assigned to 
manage the police program. When this person left to take another 
position with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, State used a series 
of temporary duty staff in 2004 and 2005 to manage the program, 
employing one temporary staff member for more than 6 months to manage 
both the Embassy's police and counternarcotics programs.[Footnote 25] 
According to the temporary-duty official, because of understaffing she 
was limited in her ability to oversee and monitor the program, 
dependent on DynCorp contractors for progress reports and management 
support, and unable to attend many donor and other coordination 
meetings. In January 2005, to help address this problem, State/INL 
established a Narcotics Affairs Section in Kabul to oversee the U.S. 
police and counternarcotics programs. At the time, one full-time U.S. 
direct-hire employee and one personal services contractor were 
assigned. 

Efforts to Complete and Sustain the Afghan Army and Police Face Major 
Challenges: 

The United States, other donors, and the new Afghan government face 
significant challenges to their plans to establish viable Afghan army 
and police forces. Completing and sustaining the army and police will 
cost several billion dollars over the next decade. Moreover, slow 
progress in resolving other Afghan security problems could undermine 
the prospects for effective army and police forces. 

Long-Term Costs Unclear but Likely to Be Substantial: 

Defense and State have not clearly defined the long-term costs of 
completing the army and police programs. However, available information 
suggests that these institutions could cost up to $7.2 billion to 
complete and about $600 million per year to sustain. 

* Defense has not clearly defined the cost of completing the Afghan 
army. However, in November 2004, OMC-A officials indicated that 
completing the army could cost another $5.4 billion (in fiscal year 
2005 dollars).[Footnote 26] Future funding would be used to fully 
supply the Afghan army with equipment and vehicles; train Afghan 
troops; complete the regional and sustaining commands; and provide the 
capability to safely transport the Afghan president by air. However, 
these funds would not suffice to provide the army with the capability 
to airlift large numbers of troops from one part of the country to 
another. OMC-A officials told us that adding this capability could cost 
as much as $3 billion.[Footnote 27]

* State has not clearly defined the cost of reconstituting the police. 
However, our analysis of State and Defense planning documents suggest 
that completing the police program could cost between $800 million and 
$1.8 billion.[Footnote 28] Most of these funds would pay for 
construction and equipment, including more than $500 million to 
construct police stations and buildings; about $100 million for trucks, 
buses, and other vehicles; and more than $85 million to provide each 
patrolman a weapon, uniform, ammunition, and related gear. 

Similarly, Defense and State have not clearly defined the annual cost 
of sustaining the completed army and police forces. OMC-A officials and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff planners told us that sustaining the completed 
Afghan army could cost at least $420 million (in 2005 dollars) 
annually. The majority of these costs would be for general equipment 
repair, maintenance, supplies, medical support, salaries, and food. 
DynCorp police planning documents project that maintaining police force 
operations could cost $180 million annually (in 2005 dollars). Of this 
amount, about $100 million would cover personnel costs. The rest would 
pay for fuel, vehicle replacement and maintenance, ammunition, and 
facilities upkeep. 

The United States has not committed to pay for creating and sustaining 
the army and police. To date, the United States has been the major 
contributor to Afghan's security sector reform, providing about 90 
percent of funding for the Afghan army and the largest share of funding 
for police, judiciary, and counternarcotics efforts. At the same time, 
other nations have not demonstrated the willingness to provide the 
funds that may be needed to complete and sustain these forces. For 
example, while the United States has provided the $277 million it 
pledged at a 2004 police donor conference, as of March 2005, the other 
donor nations had provided only about half of the $73 million that they 
pledged at the same conference. Also, donors have provided the United 
Nations Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan with about $60 million 
of the $149 million pledged for April 2004 through March 2005. 

Slow Progress in Addressing Other Pillars Could Undermine Afghan 
Security: 

The ability to field fully functioning Afghan army and police forces is 
dependent on concurrent success in the other security sector reform 
pillars. The lack of an effective judicial sector, the substantial 
illicit narcotics industry, and the continued existence of armed 
militias threatens to undermine overall progress toward providing 
nationwide security and the stability of the Afghan government. 

Afghanistan Lacks Effective Judicial Sector: 

Establishing a working judiciary based on the rule of law is a 
prerequisite for effective policing. However, according to donor 
officials, few linkages exist between the judiciary and the police, and 
the police have little ability to enforce judicial judgments. In 
addition, judges and prosecutors are not being exposed to police 
training and practices, and the police training curriculum does not 
include instruction on criminal law and procedure. Moreover, according 
to U.S. embassy officials, the Afghan judiciary has not yet acquired 
the political authority needed to adjudicate a criminal or drug case 
against a high-level political or warlord figure. 

Supported by the United States, other donors, and international 
organizations, Italy--the lead nation for reforming the judiciary--has 
followed a three-pronged strategy: (1) developing and drafting legal 
codes, (2) training judges and prosecutors, and (3) renovating the 
country's physical legal infrastructure. The Italian government has 
provided approximately $10 million annually to support the judicial 
reform, and the United States has provided approximately $28 million 
for fiscal years 2003 through 2004. However, according to Italian and 
U.S. government officials, the reform program is under funded and 
understaffed. 

Italy and the other donors have made some progress in promoting reform. 
These include drafting a new criminal procedure code, training several 
hundred judges, and renovating courthouses. However, these 
accomplishments address only a small portion of Afghanistan's overall 
need for judicial reform. Afghanistan's judicial sector is currently 
characterized by a conflicting mix of civil, religious, and customary 
laws, with few trained judges, prosecutors, or other justice personnel. 
Furthermore, its penal system is nonfunctioning, and its buildings, 
official records, and essential office equipment and furniture have 
been damaged extensively. U.S. and donor officials informed us that 
progress in rebuilding the judicial sector lags far behind the other 
security pillars and that the reform effort is being undermined by 
systemic corruption at key national and provincial justice 
institutions. 

Illicit Narcotics Industry Threatens Government Authority: 

The production and trafficking of illicit narcotics poses a serious 
challenge to the Afghan government's authority. According to the United 
Nations, Afghanistan produces almost 90 percent of the world's illicit 
opium, generating revenues equivalent to about 60 percent of 
Afghanistan's gross domestic product for 2003. According to State, 
narcotics revenues breed corruption at virtually all levels of the 
Afghan government while providing resources to Taliban remnants, drug 
lords, and other terrorist groups. Solving the narcotics problem in 
Afghanistan is widely seen as critical to achieving security in 
Afghanistan. 

The United Kingdom is leading international counternarcotics efforts in 
Afghanistan and is trying to persuade other nations to contribute to a 
new Afghan counternarcotics trust fund. From 2002 to 2004, the United 
States obligated approximately $380 million and assisted the 
counternarcotics efforts by training Afghan narcotics interdiction 
units, constructing border and highway checkpoint facilities, and 
supplying operational support and nonlethal equipment to Afghan 
eradication teams. For fiscal year 2005, the United States has provided 
about $966 million for a counternarcotics program that includes public 
information, alternative livelihoods, law enforcement, interdiction, 
and eradication campaigns. The goal of the new U.S. program is to 
ensure that narcotics production and drug trade do not subvert efforts 
to rebuild the Afghan police and army. 

Although the president of Afghanistan took several counternarcotics 
initiatives at the end of 2004,[Footnote 29] the decree banning opium 
production has been weakened by the Afghan government's lack of a 
transparent criminal justice system and the underequipped, 
decentralized police force. The Afghan government's eradication force 
and provincial forces have undertaken only marginal crop destruction in 
a few locations. U.S. officials stated that these eradication efforts 
have had no material effect on the quantity of opium produced. In 
addition, U.S. proposals for large-scale aerial eradication programs 
have been resisted by Afghan government officials and other 
international donors. According to U.S. officials, opium is being 
produced in record amounts in all 34 provinces, and a centrally trained 
and directed Afghan counternarcotics force would likely face 
significant opposition from provincial drug lords and many citizens. 
Although U.S. and internationally sustained counternarcotics and 
security programs could potentially reduce the amount of opium produced 
over time, State officials expect that drug processing and trafficking 
will continue until security is established. 

Militias Have Not Been Fully Reintegrated: 

Although the number of known militia fighters has been reduced in 
recent months, the disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating of 
members of Afghanistan's once-dominant militias is not complete. While 
many militias are under the nominal authority of the Afghan Defense 
Ministry, they pose a threat to the stability of the Afghan government 
and its ability to extend control throughout Afghanistan. Of concern, 
according to Japanese officials, is that former combatants may be 
attracted by the higher salaries provided by militia leaders in the 
illegal narcotics industry. 

To help the Afghan government disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate 
militia fighters, donor nations established the Afghan New Beginnings 
Programme in early 2003. Under the auspices of Japan and the United 
Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, the program oversaw the 
demobilization of more than 34,000 former combatants by January 2005. 
The program also oversaw the seizure or destruction of more than 90 
percent of the heavy weapons formerly controlled by militias (see fig. 
7). Defense is providing transportation for heavy weapons and is 
monitoring the surrender of militias' small arms and light weapons. 
Also, the U.S. Agency for International Development donated $4 million 
to the Afghan New Beginnings Programme in fiscal year 2005. 

Figure 7: Heavy Weapons Cantonment Site Outside Kabul: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

However, the program's success is not assured. According to U.S. and 
Japanese government officials responsible for monitoring the 
demobilization process, the total number of troops still belonging to 
militias and other armed factions remains unknown.[Footnote 30] In 
addition, U.S. troops monitoring and assisting in the disarmament 
process reported that the Afghan government has collected only limited 
numbers of poor-quality assault rifles and that better quality weaponry 
may still be held by the former combatants and their commanders. 

Former combatants have limited employment opportunities when they leave 
the militias and attempt to reintegrate into society. As of January 
2005, only one reintegration center in Kabul provided vocational 
training to former combatants. Although Afghanistan plans to open 
another seven regional centers by early 2005, the eight centers 
together can retrain only 2,000 students per year. 

Conclusions: 

Without strong and self-sustaining Afghan army and police forces, 
international terrorists could again create a haven in Afghanistan and 
jeopardize donor efforts to develop the country. However, Afghanistan 
remains dependent on other nations for support--international 
assistance provided over 90 percent of Afghanistan's $4.75 billion 
budget for 2005. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Afghan 
government revenues will average less than $400 million per year 
through 2008--less than half its projected expenditures just for 
government salaries and operations. 

The United States has provided over $4.1 billion since 2002 to help 
create a new Afghan army and reconstitute Afghanistan's police force. 
Despite initial progress, the United States and the other donors 
continue to face numerous challenges. Although Defense has succeeded in 
training and fielding thousands of Afghan combat troops, it has not 
been able to fully equip them and it has lagged in establishing the 
institutions the Afghan army needs to sustain itself. Similarly, while 
State has trained thousands of police, it has just begun to address the 
structural problems that affect the Afghan police force. In addition, 
neither Defense nor State has fully addressed how and when Afghanistan 
will be able to sustain its completed security forces. 

Establishing viable Afghan army and police forces will almost certainly 
require years of effort and the investment of additional resources. 
Available information suggests the army and police programs could cost 
up to $7.2 billion to complete and an estimated $600 million annually 
to sustain. However, Defense and State have not developed detailed 
plans, performance measures, cost estimates, or milestones for 
completing and sustaining these forces. Moreover, progress in the other 
pillars of Afghan's security reform is critical to eventually 
sustaining and maximizing the effectiveness of the Afghan army and 
police forces. Yet, reform of the Afghan judiciary lags behind the 
other security pillars, trafficking in illicit narcotics remains a 
challenge to the Afghan government's authority, and thousands of 
militia fighters have not been disarmed and reintegrated into society. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Because of Afghanistan's prolonged conflict and its limited financial 
resources, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State 
develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan army 
and police forces. The plans should include clearly defined objectives 
and performance measures; milestones for achieving stated objectives; 
future funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the results 
achieved, including transitioning program responsibility to 
Afghanistan. The Secretaries should provide this information to the 
Congress when the executive branch next requests funding for the Afghan 
army or police forces. 

In addition, because reform in the other pillars of the Afghan security 
sector--building an effective judiciary, curbing the production and 
trafficking of illicit narcotics, and disarming and reintegrating 
militia fighters--is critical to the success of the army and police 
programs, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State work 
with the other lead donor nations to help ensure that progress in the 
other pillars is congruent with the progress made in the army and 
police programs. The Secretaries should regularly report to the 
Congress, but no less than annually, on the progress made in addressing 
these other security pillars. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State provided written 
comments on a draft of this report. See appendixes III, IV, and V, 
respectively. We also met with cognizant officials from Defense and 
State to discuss their comments and observations. Both departments 
provided technical comments and updates that we incorporated throughout 
the report, as appropriate. Overall, Defense, Justice, and State found 
the report helpful, thorough, and accurate. 

Justice characterized the Afghan police training program as extremely 
important and enormously complex. It shared our concerns that more 
detailed plans for the creation of a sustainable and effective Afghan 
police force must be developed. Justice went on to note that its 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program is 
providing critical support to the Iraqi Police Service and has assisted 
other police training programs around the world, but has almost no role 
in the ongoing efforts to assist the Afghan police. 

Although Defense and State generally concurred with our 
recommendations, both suggested that existing reporting requirements 
addressed the need to report their plans for completing and sustaining 
the Afghan army and police forces. Defense indicated that detailed 
plans will allow it to effectively manage already scarce manpower and 
resources and should foster deliberate and proactive long-term planning 
with State. State noted that coordination efforts have characterized 
these programs since inception and will continue. 

We do not dispute that current law, including the Afghan Freedom 
Support Act of 2002, as amended, and the fiscal year 2005 emergency 
supplemental, mandate a number of reports on Afghanistan. However, our 
analysis of past Defense and State reporting--both internally and to 
the Congress--indicates that the departments do not have detailed plans 
for equipping and fielding fully functioning Afghan army and police 
forces by a stated end date. We continue to believe that developing and 
following such plans and ensuring concurrent progress in the other 
security pillars is essential to the overall future success of the 
Afghan security effort. Whatever reporting mechanisms Defense and State 
choose, the departments need to specify what their objectives are and 
how they will assess progress, when the effort to build the Afghan army 
and police will be completed, and what future funding will be needed. 
In addition, in light of the Justice comments, we encourage State to 
take advantage of Justice's police training expertise in developing its 
detailed plans for completing and sustaining the Afghan police program. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 
from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this 
report to interested congressional committees and to the Secretaries of 
Defense and State. We will also make copies available to others on 
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3149 or [Hyperlink, GootnickD@gao.gov]. Key 
contributors to this report were Al Huntington, Pat Dickriede, Reid 
Lowe, Pierre Toureille, Eve Weisberg, and Joe Zamoyta. 

Signed by: 

David Gootnick, Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To examine the progress made, and limitations faced, by the United 
States and other donor nations in creating a new Afghan national army, 
we reviewed documents obtained from several offices and agencies in the 
U.S. Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff/J-5 
(Office of Strategic Plans and Policy's Afghanistan Desk), U.S. Central 
Command, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Middle East, Asia and 
North Africa division), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army 
Security Assistance Command, the Office of Military Cooperation- 
Afghanistan, and Task Force Phoenix. We also reviewed documents from 
State's Bureau of South Asian Affairs. Our review of these documents 
provided us with information concerning the program's structure, 
current time frames and objectives, progress, limitations, and funding 
status. In addition, we met with the following various cognizant 
officials to discuss the progress made and limitations faced by the 
United States: 

* In Washington, D.C., we met with officials from the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, and the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. At State, we met with officials from 
State's South Asia and Political-Military Affairs bureaus. In Tampa, 
Florida, we met with officials of the U.S. Central Command, which has 
military oversight for Afghanistan. 

* We attended a meeting on the status of Afghan military construction 
projects at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Transatlantic Programs 
Center in Winchester, Virginia, which oversees the Corps' construction 
projects in Afghanistan. 

* We attended a 3-day conference in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania, where 
representatives from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the U.S. 
Army Security Assistance Command, and the Office of Military 
Cooperation-Afghanistan discussed problems that were impeding security 
assistance to the Afghan army. 

In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met with officials of the Combined Forces 
Command, the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, and Task Force 
Phoenix; U.S. embedded trainers; and the Afghan Deputy Minister of 
Defense. Also in Afghanistan, we traveled to Herat, where we met with 
U.S. embedded trainers, the commander of the Afghan army's regional 
command, and some Afghan army troops. 

To examine the progress made, and limitations faced, by the United 
States and other donor nations in reconstituting the Afghan national 
police, we reviewed relevant documents on police program planning, 
resources, and implementation. We analyzed documents from State's 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs/Resource Management 
Office to obtain a detailed costs and funding sources. Defense's Office 
of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict provided us with 
planning materials on the police-related counternarcotics program, as 
well as funding documents for this program. In addition, we reviewed 
the U.S. curricula for Afghan police training provided to us by the 
Department of Justice. We also examined documentation from the United 
Nations Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan to obtain an overview 
of funding from non-U.S. donors. We reviewed German government 
documents on the German strategy for the Afghan police, German police 
program, and its funding information. We also met with the following 
cognizant officials to discuss the progress made, and limitations 
faced, by the United States and the other donors: 

* In Washington, D.C., we met with officials from State's Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs who focus on police 
training and the rule of law, as well as with officials from State's 
South Asia Bureau. At Justice, we spoke with officials from the 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. We 
also met with representatives of DynCorp Aerospace Technology--the 
State contractor for the Afghan police program. At Defense, we met with 
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Office for 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. 

* In New York City, we held discussions with representatives of the 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations' Civilian Police 
Division and with officials from the United Nations Law and Order Trust 
Fund for Afghanistan. 

* In Afghanistan, we met with U.S. embassy officials overseeing the 
police training program, officials at the Afghan ministry of Interior, 
and representatives of the German embassy charged with overseeing 
Germany's police program. In addition, we traveled to Jalalabad to meet 
with DynCorp police trainers and Afghan police personnel; we also 
toured a police training facility and inspected an Afghan police 
station. 

To identify future challenges that the United States, other donor 
nations, and Afghanistan must address to complete and sustain the 
Afghan army and police forces, we reviewed documents prepared by 
Defense, State, the government of Afghanistan, foreign donor 
governments, and international organizations. We also met with Defense, 
State, and DynCorp officials in the United States and Afghanistan to 
obtain information concerning the potential future costs of the army 
and police programs. In Afghanistan, we met with officials at the 
embassies of Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan to discuss the Afghan 
judiciary, the Afghan narcotics problem, and the continued presence of 
militia fighters, respectively. In the United Kingdom and Germany, we 
met with officials from those nations' ministries of foreign affairs 
and defense to discuss overall Afghan security issues. In Belgium, we 
met with U.S. officials at the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization in Brussels, Belgium, and with officials at its 
Supreme Headquarters for Allied Powers in Europe in Mons, Belgium, to 
discuss their perspectives on the challenges posed by the Afghan 
security situation. 

To determine the reliability of the funding data, Afghan army troop 
data, and Afghan police training data obtained from Defense and State 
officials, we compared multiple reports and sources and interviewed 
cognizant officials regarding the controls and checks they used to 
compile the data. 

* To help confirm the completeness and consistency of U.S. and 
international funding data, we compiled and compared data from multiple 
sources--Defense, State, Justice, and other donor countries--with 
information from cognizant U.S. agency officials and donor country 
officials in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. We used a questionnaire 
to address the accuracy of the data; the security of the databases 
used; and the limitations, if any, of the data. We also compared the 
funding data to appropriations and authorization legislation, 
congressional budget requests, and reports to the Congress. Although we 
did not audit the funding data and are not expressing an opinion on 
them, based on our examination of the documents received and our 
discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the 
funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this engagement. 

* To assess the reliability of the data regarding the number of Afghan 
troops assigned to Afghan army commands, we discussed with Defense 
officials how they check data from the commands and compared it with 
information from embedded trainers and payroll records. To assess the 
reliability of the data regarding the number of Afghan police trained, 
we interviewed State officials who received data from DynCorp, Justice, 
and the German Ministry of Interior to determine how they verify the 
data; we also compared the various information sources provided to us. 
However, because of the security situation in Afghanistan, we could not 
independently verify or test the army and police training information 
at field locations. Nevertheless, based on our assessments of the data 
provided and our discussions with the cognizant officials, we concluded 
that the Afghan army troop data and Afghan police training data 
provided to us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 
report. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and Police by Non-U.S. 
Donors: 

Forty-one non-U.S. donors have provided approximately $439 million in 
cash, equipment, and services for the Afghan army and police (see table 
3). Approximately $193 million was donated to supplement U.S. efforts 
to build the Afghan army, and about $246 million was provided for the 
Afghan police program (see table 3). Six donors--the Czech Republic, 
the European Union, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the World 
Bank--provided almost 65 percent of the total donations. 

* For the Afghan army, over $52 million was donated in cash and an 
estimated $141 million was donated in weapons, ammunition, vehicles, 
infrastructure support, communications equipment, medical equipment, 
and clothing.[Footnote 31]

* For the Afghan police, over $120 million was donated in cash to the 
United Nations' Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan,[Footnote 32] 
and an estimated $126 million was donated in equipment, construction 
assistance, and training. 

In addition, Defense estimates that approximately $24 million of 
military equipment was recovered from the demobilization of militias 
and other salvaged equipment in Afghanistan. 

Table 3: Estimated Value of Assistance Provided to Afghan Army and 
Police by Non-U.S. Donors: 

Dollars in millions. 

Albania; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $*. 

Australia; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0; 
Police (as of January 2005): $1; 
Totals: $1. 

Belgium; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $*. 

Bosnia; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $1. 

Bulgaria; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $17; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $17. 

Canada; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2; 
Police (as of January 2005): $10; 
Totals: $12. 

China; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0; 
Police (as of January 2005): $2; 
Totals: $2. 

Croatia; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $4; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $4. 

Czech Republic; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $59; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $59. 

Denmark; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*; 
Police (as of January 2005): $
*; 
Totals: $*. 

Egypt; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $2. 

European Union; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0; 
Police (as of January 2005): $86; 
Totals: $86. 

Finland; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0; 
Police (as of January 2005): $
*; 
Totals: $*. 

France; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $5; 
Police (as of January 2005): $20; 
Totals: $25. 

Germany; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1; 
Police (as of January 2005): $68; 
Totals: $69. 

Greece; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $2. 

Hungary; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $9; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $9. 

Iceland; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $1. 

India; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $10; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $10. 

Ireland; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0; 
Police (as of January 2005): $1; 
Totals: $1. 

Italy; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $*. 

Japan; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0; 
Police (as of January 2005): $20; 
Totals: $20. 

Kazakhstan; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $*. 

Liechtenstein; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0; 
Police (as of January 2005): $*; 
Totals: $*. 

Netherlands; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0; 
Police (as of January 2005): $8; 
Totals: $8. 

New Zealand; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $*; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $*. 

Norway; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1; 
Police (as of January 2005): $5; 
Totals: $6. 

Pakistan; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $2. 

Poland; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $1. 

Qatar; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $5; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $5. 

Romania; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $8; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $8. 

Russia; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $1. 

Slovenia; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $2. 

South Korea; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $1. 

Spain; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $2; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $2. 

Switzerland; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1; 
Police (as of January 2005): $1; 
Totals: $2. 

United Arab Emirates; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $3; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $3. 

Ukraine; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $1; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $1. 

United Kingdom; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $20; 
Police (as of January 2005): $2; 
Totals: $22. 

World Bank; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $0; 
Police (as of January 2005): $22; 
Totals: $22. 

Other; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $32; 
Police (as of January 2005): $0; 
Totals: $32. 

Total; 
Army[A] (as of March 2005): $193; 
Police (as of January 2005): $246; 
Totals: $439. 

Source: GAO analysis of data from the U.S. Central Command and U.S. 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Afghan army) and the German 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Afghan police). 

*Less than $500,000. 

[A] Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Mongolia, Romania, South Korea, 
and the United Kingdom also provided military trainers to the Afghan 
army. 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY: 

WASHINGTON DC 20301-2800: 

In reply refer to: 05/007846-ME: 

Mr. David Gootnick: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 
US General Accounting Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Gootnick: 

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report (05-575), `AFGHANISTAN SECURITY: Efforts to Establish Army and 
Police Have Made Progress But Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined,' 
dated May 11, 2005 (GAO Code 320240, 320278). 

DoD acknowledges receipt of the draft report, and we concur with the 
report in principle. Our response to the recommendations posed by GAO 
is attached. 

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. My point of contact on this matter is LTC Brett Floro. He may 
be contacted by email: brett.floro@dsca.mil or by telephone at (703) 
604-6626. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

JEFFREY B. KOHLER: 
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USAF: 
DIRECTOR: 

Attachments As stated: 

GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED MAY 11, 2005 GAO-05-575 (GAO CODE 320240, 
320278): 

"AFGHANISTAN SECURITY: EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH ARMY AND POLICE HAVE MADE 
PROGRESS BUT FUTURE PLANS NEED TO BE BETTER DEFINED"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO RECOMMENDATIONS: 

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretaries of Defense 
and State develop detailed plans for completing and sustaining the 
Afghan army or police forces. The plans should include clearly defined 
objectives and performance measures; milestones for achieving stated 
objectives; future funding requirements; and a strategy for sustaining 
the results achieved, including transitioning program responsibility to 
Afghanistan. The Secretaries should provide this information to the 
Congress when the executive branch next requests funding for the Afghan 
army or police forces. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. Detailed plans will allow the 
Departments to effectively manage already scarce manpower and resources 
to meet the Combatant Commander's requirements. While there are 
situations beyond U.S control which will impact on established plans, 
detailed plans with specific requirements should foster deliberate and 
proactive long-term planning between the Departments. The Department of 
Defense also recommends that the information to be provided to Congress 
be incorporated into existing reporting requirements of the recently 
enacted FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Act. Also, the Department 
suggests that funding for Afghanistan security forces be made available 
until expended to ensure funding availability corresponds with ongoing 
multi-year programs. 

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretaries of Defense 
and State work with the other lead donor nations to help ensure that 
progress in the other pillars is congruent with the progress made in 
the army and police programs. The Secretaries should regularly report 
to the Congress, but no less than annually, on the progress made in 
addressing these other security pillers. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report): 

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. While we have made great strides training the 
Afghan National Army, it is only one of the five pillars. For the 
Government of Afghanistan to operate effectively, the other pillars 
must be built, trained and sustained. Additionally, all five pillars 
must develop close working relationships and learn to integrate their 
actions among themselves. 

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice: 

U.S. Department of Justice: 
Criminal Division: 
International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Programs: 
Washington, D.C 20530: 

June 16, 2005: 

David Gootnick, Director: 
International Affairs and Trade (IAT): 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO): 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Gootnick,

The Department of Justice greatly appreciates the opportunity to 
comment on this document, and lauds GAO's efforts to address an 
extremely important and enormously complex program initiative. 

We strongly support GAO's statement that "[w]ithout strong and self- 
sustaining Afghan army and pol ice forces and concurrent progress in 
the other pillars of security sector reform, Afghanistan could again 
become a haven for terrorists. " Further, we share GAO's concerns that 
more detailed plans for the creation of a sustainable and effective 
Afghan police force must be developed posthaste - to include "clearly 
defined objectives and performance measures; milestones; funding 
requirements; and a strategy for sustaining the results achieved."

The Department's International Criminal Investigative Training 
Assistance Program (ICITAP) is uniquely qualified to develop, implement 
and manage such a large-scale program effort. ICITAP is the USG's lead 
implementing agency in the area of international law enforcement 
development and training worldwide with 19 years of unequaled 
experience in over 50 countries. In Iraq for example, ICITAP has 
provided critical support to the development of the Iraqi Police 
Service since May of 2003. ICITAP and the Department's law enforcement 
components work directly with Multi-National Security Transition 
Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the U.S. Embassy's Senior Law Enforcement 
Advisor, who serves as the principal deputy of the MNSTC-I Civilian 
Police Assistance and Training Team (CPATT). ICITAP has not only 
participated in the leadership of CPATT since inception, but it has 
developed and/or delivered roughly 15 distinct basic, advanced or 
specialized police training courses, and has over 330 International 
Police Trainers (IPTs) actively deployed in Iraq and Jordan in support 
of these efforts. ICITAP has operational oversight of the mentoring 
program, which includes up to 500 U.S. police liaison officers deployed 
by the Department of State. 

ICITAP currently has almost no role in on-going program efforts to 
assist the Afghan police forces. While the report notes that ICITAP 
developed curricula for the Afghanistan mission, it does not speak to 
this matter, and it does not clearly articulate the role the Department 
and ICITAP should play in future program efforts. We continue to be 
dedicated to interagency cooperation and the ultimate success of the 
USG's mission in Afghanistan, but are concerned that our expertise is 
not being utilized - much to the detriment of the USG's efforts. 

We believe GAO's recommendations should include consideration of the 
USG's operational law enforcement interests that are directly tied to 
U.S. national security. In that light, the Department of Justice should 
logically have a prominent role in developing and training the Afghan 
police forces and rule of law institutions, both from a national 
security and a best practices perspective. Any ambiguity in this area 
could be detrimental to the development of the Afghan police forces, 
the emerging Afghan democracy, and our national security interests. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

R. Carr Trevillian, IV: 
Deputy Director: 

cc: Bruce C. Swartz: 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General: 
Criminal Division: 
Department of Justice: 

[End of section]

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer: 
Washington, D.C. 20520: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "AFGHANISTAN 
SECURITY: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress But 
Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined," GAO Job Code 320240. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Ron 
Packowitz, Afghanistan Desk Officer, Bureau of South Asian Affairs at 
(202) 647-1113. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Sid Kaplan (Acting): 

cc: GAO - Terry Hanford; 
SA - Christina Rocca; 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report "AFGHANISTAN SECURITY 
- Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress But Future 
Plans Need to Be Better Defined" GAO-05-575 GAO Code 320240: 

The Department of State has reviewed the draft report and the GAO's 
recommendations. We concur in the recommendation that the Department of 
State and Department of Defense develop more detailed plans for 
completing and sustaining the Afghan army and police. We also concur in 
the recommendation to work with other lead nations. Such internal and 
international coordination efforts have characterized these training 
programs since they were established and will be continued. 

The U.S. Government's security assistance mission, providing support 
for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, Border Police, 
and Highway Patrol, is rapidly helping the Afghan government build 
capacity to provide public security. Our goal is to develop competent, 
professional security forces with sufficient training, equipment, 
infrastructure, institutional capacity, and organizational structure. 
Our support for the Afghan army and police is doing just that, and we 
are pleased that FY 2005 supplemental funds will allow us to increase 
our assistance in these vital efforts. 

While the Department agrees with the recommendations noted in the first 
paragraph above, we respectfully disagree with the recommendation for 
new reporting to Congress. Currently mandated reports from the 
Department of State on Afghanistan are quite comprehensive, and include 
a report due later this year that will describe "the procedures of the 
Department of State and Department of Defense to ensure the 
coordination of police and army training efforts.." We believe we can 
address the GAO's concerns in our currently mandated reports. 

[End of section]

(320240, 320278): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] For a detailed discussion of efforts to reconstruct postwar 
Afghanistan, see our report Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating 
Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in 
U.S. Strategy Needed, GAO-04-403 (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2004). 

[2] These forces include about 8,300 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
peacekeepers. 

[3] The conference's final communiqué, also known as the "Bonn II" 
Agreement, supports efforts started under the Bonn Agreement of 
December 2001 to promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, 
stability, and respect for human rights in Afghanistan. 

[4] As currently planned, the air wing would not be able to transport 
large numbers of Afghan troops from one part of the country to another. 

[5] About $1.4 billion of this amount was provided during fiscal years 
2002 through 2004, of which more than $980 million had been obligated 
and more than $511 million had been expended as of January 2005. Over 
$1.8 billion of this amount is part of the fiscal year 2005 emergency 
supplemental which was enacted into law on May 11, 2005. 

[6] An Afghan battalion consists of about 610 men. 

[7] According to Defense officials, volunteers are vetted through 
community elders and State. Ex-militia fighters may enlist on an 
individual basis, but United Nations reports indicate that less than 2 
percent had done so as of February 2005. 

[8] According to the U.S. government, as of January 2004, the ethnic 
composition of the Afghan population was 42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent 
Tajik, 9 percent Hazara, 9 percent Uzbek, and 13 percent "other." 
According to OMC-A, as of February 15, 2005, the ethnic composition of 
the Afghan army was 49 percent Pashtun, 21 percent Tajik, 6 percent 
Hazara, 3 percent Uzbek, and 22 percent "other" (the total of the 
individual percentages is greater than 100 percent due to rounding). 
Individual units vary in their ethnic balance. According to OMC-A, at 
least two battalions have no or very few Uzbek troops. 

[9] Defense fielding plans for the army assume an attrition rate of 2 
percent per month. Soldiers absent for more than 60 days are dropped 
from the army's rolls. 

[10] The security concerns included factional unrest in Herat in March 
and August 2004, as well as violence preceding Afghanistan's first-ever 
democratic presidential election in October 2004. 

[11] The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is constructing facilities at 
these locations. As of January 2005, funding provided to the Corps for 
this effort totaled $740 million. 

[12] One embedded trainer informed us that he has had to rely on a cell 
phone that he purchased at a U.S. retail outlet to communicate with his 
unit during operations. 

[13] The light tactical vehicle is essentially a modified pickup truck 
that would replace four different types of vehicles now used by the 
army. These vehicles were donated by the United Arab Emirates, Germany, 
and Greece. OMC-A officials told us that these donations helped fill 
the Afghan army's early requirement for transportation but are now 
complicating the army's logistics situation. 

[14] At the time of our work in Afghanistan, Defense had allocated OMC- 
A 211 military positions and 95 contractor and civilian positions. 

[15] According to OMC-A, Air Force personnel were assigned to 
Afghanistan for 4 months, Navy and Marine Corps personnel for 6 months, 
and Army personnel for 12 months. Defense officials in the United 
States informed us that Air Force personnel may now be assigned to fill 
certain critical positions for as long as 12 months. 

[16] OMC-A requested and received offshore procurement waivers between 
fiscal years 2002 and 2005 to spend up to $596 million to procure non- 
U.S. items overseas. 

[17] Defense officials informed us that NATO members may contribute 
embedded trainers in the future. 

[18] In 2004, Afghan troops were flown to Herat on U.S. military and 
allied aircraft. 

[19] The target numbers were derived by considering the security needs 
and population density of geographic areas, as well as the expected 
organizational structure of the police. 

[20] More than 20,000 police were trained before the Afghan 
presidential elections in October 2004. 

[21] The United States assumed responsibility for the border police 
when Norway and Germany did not follow through on commitments to 
provide the training. Norway provided some funding for the renovation 
of the border police academy. 

[22] Commissioned and noncommissioned officers constitute the police's 
upper and intermediate ranks, respectively, while patrolmen are lower 
level. 

[23] The fiscal year 2004 supplemental provided Defense's Office for 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict $73 million to support 
Afghan border security, law enforcement, and counter narcotics efforts. 
The program was refocused in the spring of 2004 to concentrate on 
police infrastructure and capabilities in southern and southeastern 
Afghanistan. 

[24] According to officials from the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, field-based training of local police by international 
police trainers was key to establishing professional police forces in 
these countries. 

[25] By contrast, Defense's Combined Forces Command had assigned up to 
10 personnel to a law enforcement planning cell to prepare for a 
possible Defense role in the police buildup. 

[26] OMC-A officials stated that the total cost of the army program 
would be at least $7 billion. The United States and other donors have 
already provided approximately $1.6 billion for the army through fiscal 
year 2004. 

[27] Adding a larger air wing would also require English-language 
training for a greater number of Afghans if the air wing were equipped 
with U.S. manufactured aircraft. 

[28] The higher estimate includes an expanded field-based training 
program, additional civilian staffing, an aviation capacity, and a 
doubling of the Afghan border police from the current plan of 12,000 to 
24,000. 

[29] Two days after Afghanistan's December 2004 presidential 
inauguration, the president of Afghanistan launched a counternarcotics 
campaign. The president appointed a cabinet-level minister for 
counternarcotics and created a subcabinet interagency working group 
that includes the Afghan counternarcotics, interior, finance, and rural 
development ministries. 

[30] Estimates of the total number of militia fighters and other armed 
factions operating in Afghanistan in 2002 have ranged from 100,000 to 
over 1 million. 

[31] OMC-A and U.S. Central Command calculated the value of donated 
resources and services in U.S. dollar equivalents in the year donated. 
These figures do not include the value of donors' training teams or 
support to the Kabul Military Training Center. 

[32] Donors reported the monetary value of their donations to the 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the year they provided the 
donations. 

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