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entitled 'Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative 
Requirements for First Stryker Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues 
Remain for Future Brigades' which was released on December 12, 2003.

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Report to Congressional Committees:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

December 2003:

Military Transformation:

The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade 
Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades:

GAO-04-188:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-188, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Army continues to transform units, known as Stryker brigades, 
into lighter, rapidly deployable, and more capable forces. Because 
Stryker brigades are an entirely new design, the fiscal year 2002 
National Defense Authorization Act required the Army to conduct an 
evaluation of the design, to include deployment of the brigade and 
execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential 
threats. The act also required the Secretary of Defense to certify 
that the evaluation results indicate the design is both operationally 
effective and suitable.

As one in a series of reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored 
the evaluation to assess (1) whether the Army and the Secretary of 
Defense met legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated both 
the operational effectiveness and suitability of the brigade’s 
design, (3) what the brigade’s performance was during the evaluation, 
and (4) how the Army plans to mitigate issues identified during the 
evaluation.

What GAO Found:

The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met the 
legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National Defense 
Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan for conducting an 
operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; obtained the 
plan’s approval from the Department of Defense Director of Operational 
Test and Evaluation; and from April through May 2003, the brigade 
deployed to the evaluation sites and conducted combat missions across 
the full spectrum of potential threats—from major theater of war to 
security and stability operations. In September 2003, OSD certified to 
Congress that the brigade design is both operationally effective and 
suitable. The Army has deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq.

The Army developed an evaluation plan and established a control cell 
that used independent evaluators to monitor and collect data on the 
brigade’s performance. The cell compiled and analyzed the data and 
submitted a report to the I Corps commander, who declared the design 
as operationally effective and operationally suitable. The commander 
noted that performance difficulties were due to an accelerated 
fielding schedule and inadequate training time. The U.S. Forces 
Command endorsed the report.

GAO determined, based on its observations and analyses, that the 
brigade’s performance showed strengths and weaknesses. The brigade 
could perform as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its 
capabilities. The brigade’s strengths were its ability to conduct 
combat missions, including deployment using different transportation 
modes and the ability to use the Stryker vehicle’s speed and agility. 
The weaknesses related to staff planning, digital system usage, 
sustainment, and executing company-level combat missions. Contractors 
were also used ineffectively. GAO concluded that the primary cause of 
the weaknesses was insufficient training proficiency.

The Army is implementing a plan to mitigate most operational 
evaluation issues. The Army concluded that the issues were largely 
training related, although some were related to design or equipment. 
The brigade, in preparation for deployment to Iraq, conducted 
additional training to address the issues the Army and GAO identified. 
The brigade’s training performance indicates that these issues are 
being mitigated. The Army is addressing the training and equipment 
issues for the first Stryker brigade; however, it has deferred some 
critical issues that have implications for future brigades.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO recommends that OSD direct the Army to complete all mitigation 
efforts and apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the brigade 
design to future Stryker brigades. In commenting on a draft of this 
report, OSD concurred with the recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-188.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact William M. Solis at 
(202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the Stryker 
Brigade:

Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter Experts 
to Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade's Design:

Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses during the 
Operational Evaluation:

Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational Evaluation 
Issues, but Deferred Issues Have Implications for Future Brigades:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments:

Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107-107 Concerning Limitations 
on Army Transformation Actions:

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and 
Operational Capabilities by Critical Tasks:

Appendix IV: Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical Tasks:

Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities Compared to 
Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks:

Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key 
Operational Capabilities:

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Related GAO Products:

Figures:

Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the Southern 
California Logistics Airfield:

Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training 
Center:

Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles, 
Louisiana:

Figure 4: Road March:

Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward Landing Strip:

Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at Geronimo 
Forward Landing Strip:

Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded Terrain at the Joint Readiness 
Training Center:

Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon:

Figure 9: Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center:

Figure 10: Alternate Supply Point at the National Training Center:

Abbreviations:

FBCB2: Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below:

OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

December 12, 2003:

Congressional Committees:

During fiscal year 2003, the Army continued to transform its force to 
one that is lighter, more rapidly deployable, and able to effectively 
operate in various environments and across the full spectrum of threats 
from small-scale contingencies to a major theater of war. Two of six 
planned Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are currently undergoing the 
Army's initial transformation efforts--one brigade, which has been 
deployed to Iraq, and another brigade, which is co-located at Fort 
Lewis, Washington. The brigades are an entirely new organizational 
design, and questions have arisen regarding their combat effectiveness. 
In the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act,[Footnote 1] 
Congress required:

* the Secretary of the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of the 
brigade that includes deployment of the brigade to the evaluation site 
and brigade execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of 
potential threats and operational scenarios;

* the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of 
Defense to approve the operational evaluation plan; and:

* the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on the 
operational evaluation.

The statute further limited deployment of the brigade and procurement 
of vehicles beyond the third brigade until 30 days after the Secretary 
of Defense submits the report and certifies that the results of the 
operational evaluation indicate that the design for the Stryker Brigade 
Combat Team is operationally effective[Footnote 2] and operationally 
suitable.[Footnote 3] (See appendix I for the statutory provisions 
concerning these limitations on Army transformation actions.):

On the basis of the authority of the Comptroller General, we monitored 
and assessed the Army's efforts to conduct an operational evaluation of 
the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team --the Third Brigade of the Second 
Infantry Division --as required by the fiscal year 2002 National 
Defense Authorization Act. Our objectives were to assess (1) whether 
the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met 
legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated both the 
operational effectiveness and the operational suitability of the 
brigade's design, (3) what the brigade's performance was during the 
operational evaluation, and (4) how the Army plans to mitigate issues 
identified during the operational evaluation.

In our assessment of the Army's Stryker brigade operational evaluation, 
we reviewed the Army's operational evaluation plan and its associated 
execution plan, and we observed the exercises held at the National 
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Readiness 
Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We observed the deployment of 
the Stryker brigade, as well as execution of certain combat missions. 
Upon completion of the operational evaluation and the Army's 
compilation of its data sources, we reviewed and analyzed the Army's 
database that consisted primarily of evaluator comments to assess the 
brigade's performance. (See appendix II for the full text of the scope 
and methodology.) We are providing this report, another in a planned 
series related to Army transformation, to you because of your 
committees' oversight responsibility. Related GAO products concerning 
transformation are listed at the end of this report.

Results in Brief:

The Army and OSD met the legislative requirements of the fiscal year 
2002 National Defense Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan and 
conducted an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; it 
obtained the plan's approval from the Department of Defense Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation;[Footnote 4] and OSD submitted a report 
to Congress and certified the results of the operational evaluation. 
The Army conducted a deployment to the operational evaluation site from 
Fort Lewis, Washington, to the National Training Center and onto the 
Joint Readiness Training Center; these deployments incorporated various 
methods, including rail, sea, air, and ground movements. The Army's 
operational evaluation, held from April 1, 2003, through May 28, 2003, 
included the conduct of combat missions across the full spectrum of 
potential threats, to include scenarios in a major theater war 
environment as well as security and stability operations. Finally, on 
September 17, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense certified that the 
operational evaluation's results indicated that the initial Stryker 
brigade's design is operationally effective and operationally suitable.

The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational 
parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities. 
The organizational parameters and operational characteristics were the 
essential elements in assessing both the operational effectiveness and 
the operational suitability of the first Stryker brigade's design. In 
doing so, the Army established a control cell that developed a data 
collection plan, analyzed the results, and wrote an operational 
evaluation report. The Army used independent evaluators trained in 
Stryker brigade doctrine to monitor and observe the brigade's 
performance. The evaluators provided subjective commentary as to how 
the brigade performed in accordance with key organizational parameters 
and key operational characteristics. The data were compiled and 
analyzed, and a report was submitted to the I Corps commander. The I 
Corps commander assessed the report's findings and determined that the 
brigade's design is operationally both effective and suitable, but 
noted that the brigade had experienced difficulties in demonstrating 
some of the key operational capabilities. The difficulties were 
primarily attributed to an accelerated fielding schedule and a lack of 
adequate training time. The Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command, 
endorsed the report's findings.

Based on our observation of events and analysis of the data collected 
in accordance with the Army's plan, the brigade demonstrated that it 
could perform as designed, but it did not consistently demonstrate its 
capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. The strengths 
were illustrated by the brigade's ability to deploy using different 
transportation systems and the individual unit's ability to take 
advantage of the speed, agility, and maneuverability of the Stryker 
vehicle. With regard to weaknesses, the brigade had difficulties in (1) 
mastering staff operations, which reduced the ability of the brigade to 
use all of its assets as intended; (2) using its digital systems, which 
resulted in inconsistent and incomplete maintenance of a common 
operating picture; (3) conducting supply operations, which challenged 
the brigade to sustain itself; and (4) executing company-level combat 
missions, which reduced its overall combat power. Additionally, 
contractors were used ineffectively because units used them improperly 
or did not provide the support necessary to ensure their effective use 
in providing maintenance support to the brigade. Our analysis of the 
data concluded that insufficient training proficiency was the primary 
cause of these weaknesses, thus inhibiting the brigade from achieving a 
full demonstration of its capabilities.

The Army has developed a plan that when fully implemented will mitigate 
most issues identified in the operational evaluation, and the plan 
addresses the weaknesses we identified from our analysis of the 
evaluation results. However, the plan does not fully address design and 
equipment issues that have implications for future brigades. The Army's 
immediate focus in implementing the plan was to resolve issues relating 
to training and equipment that affected the brigade's ability to deploy 
to Iraq and defer the remaining issues for future consideration, some 
of which have implications for the future brigades. To mitigate the 
training issues and to prepare for deployment to Iraq, I Corps 
developed and implemented training events, including a command post 
exercise to train the staff and a brigade field training exercise that 
emphasized platoon and company unit operations. Observer-controllers 
from the Joint Readiness Training Center observed the brigade's 
performance during these events, provided feedback, and conducted 
informal after-action reviews focusing on lessons learned from 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. After the training, the brigade commander and 
senior Army officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation 
told us that they had no reservations regarding the brigade's 
proficiency or ability to deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq. 
However, one design issue that has not been completely addressed that 
has implications for the current and future brigades involves the 
current vehicle of the reconnaissance squadron operations officer--it 
is not as mobile or as survivable as the Stryker vehicle used by the 
reconnaissance squadron commander. The mitigation plan includes a 
short-term solution for the initial brigade of shifting a Stryker from 
elsewhere for the operations officer but no long-term solution. 
Regarding equipment, one equipment issue involved the fact that not all 
Stryker vehicles have the digital system called Force XXI Battle 
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). This system increases a commander's 
ability to position troops and conduct combat operations. The issue is 
that only one-half of the Stryker vehicles in each infantry platoon 
currently have the FBCB2 system. The mitigation plan calls for 
procuring a sufficient number of FBCB2 systems for the initial Stryker 
brigade, but the plan does not address if FBCB2s will be procured to 
equip all Stryker vehicles in the future brigades. All identified 
issues --training, design, and equipment --and the related mitigation 
efforts provide valuable lessons learned for future brigades.

We are recommending that, to assist the Stryker brigade's 
transformation efforts, the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 
of the Army to develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on 
those issues not addressed prior to deploying the brigade and apply, as 
applicable, adjustments made to the training, equipment, and design of 
the brigade to future Stryker brigades.

In commenting on a draft of this report, the department concurred with 
our recommendations.

Background:

The Army continues to transform its forces toward its goal to be more 
strategically responsive and to dominate across the full spectrum of 
military operations --from small-scale contingencies to a major theater 
war. The transformation efforts, which began in 1999, attempted to 
balance lethality, mobility, and survivability with the capabilities 
required for responsiveness, deployability, sustainability, and a 
reduced in-theater footprint. The Army chose an armored wheeled 
vehicle, designated as the Stryker, as its primary combat platform and 
began to transform six existing brigades to Stryker Brigade Combat 
Teams. The Third Brigade of the Second Infantry Division was selected 
as the initial Stryker Brigade Combat Team.

According to the Army, the core qualities of the new brigade design are 
high mobility at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; an 
ability to achieve decisive action through the use of dismounted 
infantry that is supported by organic direct and indirect fire 
platforms; and an enhanced situational understanding of the 
battlefield. As an early-entry force, the brigade is expected to have 
sufficient built-in combat power to conduct immediate combat operations 
upon arrival in theater if required. Also, the brigade was designed to 
accept additional forces that can expand the core tasks and functions 
that already reside within the brigade or that execute tasks that do 
not reside within the brigade (e.g., adding armor, field artillery, air 
defense, additional engineers, or aviation). The brigade was also 
designed to adopt a new training regimen that allows a faster 
deployment to any type of contingency; in contrast, current Army units 
receive an alert for a mission, train for the mission-specific 
requirements, and then deploy.

Congress has supported the Army's transformation efforts, but since the 
Stryker brigade is an entirely new design, members of the Senate and 
House Committees on Armed Services agreed that the Army must conduct an 
evaluation that indicated that the brigade's design is operationally 
effective and operationally suitable. The requirement for an 
operational evaluation was formalized in the fiscal year 2002 National 
Defense Authorization Act. For the evaluation, the Army modified an 
existing training exercise at the Joint Readiness Training Center at 
Fort Polk, Louisiana, and added a data collection apparatus, a 
deployment schedule, and an additional training event at the National 
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The Army uses training 
exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National 
Training Center to increase the combat proficiency of its units and to 
identify training deficiencies that need to be addressed. The training 
exercises are conducted under stressful conditions against an opposing 
force emulating combat scenarios anticipated in war. By Army 
regulation, training deficiencies identified during the rotations and 
subsequent retraining are not indicators of unit failure. The Army 
conducted the evaluation from April through May 2003.

The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the Stryker 
Brigade:

The Army and OSD met the requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National 
Defense Authorization Act to, respectively, plan and conduct an 
operational evaluation of the Stryker brigade and certify the 
evaluation results. The Army met the requirements by (1) obtaining 
approval of the evaluation plan by the Department of Defense Director 
of Operational Test and Evaluation, (2) deploying the brigade to the 
evaluation site, and (3) conducting combat missions across the full 
spectrum of potential threats. The act also made additional vehicle 
procurement and brigade deployment contingent upon a certification that 
the brigade's design is operationally effective and operationally 
suitable. OSD has provided the certification to Congress.

The Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
approved the Army's operational evaluation plan on March 28, 2003. The 
Army's primary objective was to comply with the legislation by 
assessing the initial Stryker brigade's design for operational 
effectiveness and operational suitability according to the unit's 
organizational and operational concept and its current modified table 
of organization and equipment. A secondary objective was to conduct a 
readiness assessment[Footnote 5] of the unit's ability to conduct 
combat operations according to Army doctrine.

The Army deployed to the operational evaluation site when it conducted 
a multimodal movement from Fort Lewis to the National Training Center, 
Fort Irwin, and onto the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, 
Louisiana. The operational evaluation was held from April 1, 2003, 
through May 28, 2003. To accomplish these strategic and operational 
moves, the Army used various methods, including rail, sea, air, and 
ground movements. Due to current world military operations and the 
limited number of available aircraft, the Army was restricted from 
moving the entire brigade combat team by air.

During the operational evaluation, the brigade conducted combat 
missions across the full spectrum of potential threats. The 
evaluation's scope included the brigade field training exercise at the 
National Training Center and a certification exercise during a Joint 
Readiness Training Center rotation. The evaluation was constructed so 
that the brigade conducted a series of combat missions against an 
opposing force in both major theater of war and small-scale contingency 
environments. For example, the scenario at the National Training Center 
was optimized for the higher end of combat where the brigade conducted 
operations against mechanized forces. At the Joint Readiness Training 
Center, the brigade's mission was optimized for small-scale 
contingencies where the brigade conducted operations in noncontiguous 
areas and in complex urban terrain. Throughout the operational 
evaluation's events, the brigade was augmented with aviation, military 
police, and armor.

On August 19, 2003, the Acting Secretary of the Army forwarded a 
memorandum requesting that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress 
the operational evaluation report prepared by the Army following the 
evaluation and certify that the results of the evaluation indicate that 
the Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division's design is operationally 
effective and operationally suitable. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
on September 17, 2003, certified to Congress that the results of the 
operational evaluation indicated the design for the initial Stryker 
brigade is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The Army 
has deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq.

Army Evaluated Key Operational Aspects and Used Subject Matter Experts 
to Assess Effectiveness and Suitability of the Brigade's Design:

The Army developed an evaluation plan that assessed key organizational 
parameters, mission training plans, and key operational capabilities. 
The Army also established an Operational Evaluation Control Cell 
(Control Cell) to coordinate the assessment activities and used subject 
matter experts and observers as independent evaluators to assess the 
operational effectiveness and suitability of the brigade.

According to the Army, the key organizational parameters and 
operational capabilities were the essential elements in assessing the 
brigade's design for operational effectiveness and operational 
suitability. The mission training plans provided the tasks, conditions, 
and standards to assess operational readiness as defined by the key 
operational capabilities. The eight key organizational parameters are:

* achieve balance between capabilities for strategic responsiveness and 
requirements for battle-space dominance,

* balanced full spectrum utility,[Footnote 6]

* reduced sustainment requirements,

* minimize the brigade's personnel and logistical footprint,

* commonality of vehicular platforms,

* reach-back,

* embedded unit-based capabilities, and:

* internetted combined arms to company-team level.

The nine key operational capabilities are:

* mobility,

* dismounted assault and the close fight,

* enhanced situational understanding and information superiority,

* holistic force protection and survivability,

* lethality,

* force effectiveness,

* reach/reach-back,

* joint/multinational/interagency interoperability, and:

* full spectrum flexibility and augmentation.

The key organizational parameters and operational capabilities are 
defined by the brigade's organizational and operational concept 
document of June 2000.[Footnote 7]

The evaluation linked these key characteristics to the brigade's six 
critical training requirements and then to the brigade's mission 
training plans. Army planners had determined that for an effective 
operational evaluation, the events must focus on 10 specific brigade 
level tasks extracted from the brigade mission training plans. 
Appendixes III, IV, and V illustrate the evaluation's integration of 
key organizational parameters and operational capabilities, mission 
training plans, and critical training requirements. (See appendix VI 
for the definition of key organizational parameters and operational 
capabilities.):

The Army established a Control Cell to manage the activities needed to 
conduct the evaluation. Participants included individuals from the I 
Corps staff, the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command's Brigade 
Coordination Cell, the Army Test and Evaluation Command,[Footnote 8] 
and a team of contractors. The Control Cell developed an execution plan 
and provided it to the Department of Defense Director of Operational 
Test and Evaluation for review.

During development of the operational evaluation execution plan, the 
Department of the Army provided additional guidance to Forces Command 
and directed that the evaluation also assess the ability of the Stryker 
brigade to receive logistical support from echelon above brigade 
support elements. Initially, the Army had planned to informally assess 
this capability. However, after we recommended to the Secretary of 
Defense[Footnote 9] that external logistics support be an element of 
the evaluation, the Army included this in its execution plan. To 
address these concerns, the Control Cell's execution plan included an 
evaluation of the echelon above brigade support elements, including the 
logistics concepts such as contractor support, reach-back, and 
configured loads. Real-world events limited the number of assets 
available to allow for continuous aerial resupply, so the Control Cell 
compensated by using limited aerial resupply and, when aircraft were 
not available, used notional aerial resupply that included the use of 
time delays to replicate transport time. For both types of resupply, 
the echelon above brigade elements would distribute supplies in 
configured loads to the Stryker brigade for disbursement.

Prior to the conduct of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell 
instructed and certified subject matter experts[Footnote 10] from 
proponent schools and observer-controllers from the training centers as 
primary data collectors. The instruction familiarized the data 
collectors on the Stryker brigade organization, capabilities and 
doctrine, and the combat training centers' rules of engagement and 
safety guidelines. Officials from the Army's Test and Evaluation 
Command provided instruction on data collection procedures and use of 
data collection tools such as personal digital assistants. 
Additionally, the Control Cell formed a team composed of members of the 
Training and Doctrine Command's Brigade Coordination Cell that also 
collected data throughout the operational evaluation.

Data collected for the operational evaluation included observations and 
comments from subject matter experts, observer-controllers, and team 
members from the Brigade Coordination Cell. These observations and 
comments occurred while the data collectors observed the brigade's 
performance during the various combat missions. Additional data sources 
included after-action reviews, surveys, and key personnel interviews. 
The Army's Operational Test Command also retrieved digital 
instrumentation data. All of these data sources were retrieved every 24 
hours and validated by officials of the Army's Operational Test Command 
and the Control Cell. The Control Cell established a review group to 
authenticate the data and develop initial insights based on 
observations that emerged as the events progressed.

Upon completion of the operational evaluation, the Control Cell 
analyzed all the data sources and submitted a report of its findings to 
the I Corps commander. The I Corps commander concluded that the brigade 
had met or adequately met each of the requirements associated with the 
key organizational parameters and key operational capabilities. The 
Army defined "adequately met" as the brigade's design was operationally 
effective and operationally suitable but had some deficiencies, or 
issues. The report was submitted to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces 
Command, who endorsed the report's findings. Although the I Corps 
commander assessed the brigade's design as operationally both effective 
and suitable, the operational evaluation report noted that the Stryker 
brigade experienced difficulties in demonstrating some of the key 
operational capabilities, which were primarily attributed to an 
accelerated fielding schedule and a lack of adequate training time.

Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses during the 
Operational Evaluation:

Based on our observations of the brigade's performance at the two 
combat training centers and our analysis of data collected during the 
evaluation, the brigade performed as designed but did not consistently 
demonstrate its capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. 
In certain areas, the Stryker brigade demonstrated its strengths, 
including both the ability to conduct strategic and operational 
deployments and to maneuver about the battlefield using the Stryker 
vehicle. The operational evaluation also demonstrated weaknesses in the 
areas of staff planning, usage of digital systems, sustainment of the 
brigade, and established company-level combat procedures. Civilian 
contractors were also used ineffectively to support the units. Our 
analysis indicated that the Stryker brigade's training proficiency was 
the primary cause of these weaknesses.

Stryker Brigade Demonstrated That It Is Deployable:

Our observations and analysis of the data indicated that the Stryker 
brigade demonstrated the ability to conduct strategic and tactical 
deployments using different transportation systems such as rail, 
ground, and various sea vessels and aircraft. Upon arrival at each 
destination, the brigade showed the ability to reassemble into a combat 
configuration in a timely manner. Once reconfigured, units of the 
Stryker brigade also demonstrated the ability to conduct immediate 
combat operations. It should be noted, however, that while the tactical 
deployment of the Stryker vehicle by C-130 aircraft was demonstrated, 
the Army has yet to demonstrate under various environmental conditions, 
such as air temperature and airfield altitude, just how far Stryker 
vehicles can be tactically deployed by C-130 aircraft.

The brigade used commercial air, rail, and ground transportation to 
move personnel and equipment from Fort Lewis to Fort Irwin. While at 
the National Training Center, we observed the brigade conduct a 
tactical movement by moving a Stryker infantry company with its 
personnel, supplies, and 21 Stryker vehicles via C-130 aircraft from 
Southern California Logistics Airfield to an austere desert airfield on 
Fort Irwin about 70 miles away. (Figure 1 shows a Stryker vehicle being 
loaded at the Southern California Logistics Airfield, and figure 2 
shows the Stryker exiting from a C-130 aircraft at the National 
Training Center.) Upon landing, the infantry company unloaded the 
vehicles from the aircraft, reconfigured them for combat missions, and 
moved onward to a staging area. All Stryker variants could reconfigure 
into combat capable modes within their designated time standard, except 
the medical variant. Based on our observation of the event, we agree 
with the Army that the insufficient crew size was the reason why the 
medical variant, with its extra external boxes, could not be 
reconfigured within the time standard. However, if the brigade had 
trained to reconfigure the Stryker variants, this situation would have 
been apparent and should not have occurred.

Figure 1: Stryker Vehicle Being Loaded onto a C-130 at the Southern 
California Logistics Airfield:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 2: Stryker Exiting a C-130 Aircraft at the National Training 
Center:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The Stryker brigade demonstrated strategic movement when it deployed 
brigade elements by rail, sealift, and C-17 aircraft from the National 
Training Center to a staging area located at Chennault Industrial 
Airpark, located in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Two battalion equipment 
sets moved by Fast Sealift Ship from San Diego, California, to Lake 
Charles Seaport, while a third battalion's equipment, including all 
current Stryker variants, moved by C-17 aircraft from Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma, to a staging area at the England Air Park in Alexandria, 
Louisiana. (Figure 3 shows a Stryker being unloaded from a Fast Sealift 
Ship.) Elements of the Stryker brigade that unloaded at the Lake 
Charles Seaport moved to the Chennault Industrial Airpark and then 
conducted a road march to the Joint Readiness Training Center to begin 
combat operations. We observed the staging area as the brigade 
assembled and prepared for its road movement to the training center. 
Figure 4 shows the road march to the training center.

Figure 3: Stryker Exiting a Fast Sealift Ship at Lake Charles, 
Louisiana:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 4: Road March:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Tactical deployment was demonstrated when C-17 aircraft transported an 
infantry company from Lake Charles to Geronimo forward landing strip, 
an austere dirt airfield at the Joint Readiness Training Center. The C-
17 aircraft landed at the forward landing strip, and the infantry 
company demonstrated the ability to quickly unload its vehicles and 
personnel by moving to the tactical assembly area in about 10 minutes. 
(Figure 5 shows a C-17 aircraft at Geronimo forward landing strip.) A 
Stryker infantry company also demonstrated the ability to travel into 
combat operations in a C-130 aircraft. (Figure 6 shows the loading of 
an infantry company and its vehicles onto C-130 aircraft at Geronimo 
forward landing strip.) The Stryker infantry company--consisting of 21 
Strykers and 5 other trucks and trailers; 188 soldiers; and 3 days of 
food, water, ammunition, and fuel to support the company--traveled from 
Geronimo to Essler airfield using 7 C-130s flying 25 sorties over a 
distance of about 100 miles. Upon landing at the Essler airfield, the 
company moved to a tactical assembly area and onward to conduct a 
combat operation.

Figure 5: C-17 at Geronimo Forward Landing Strip:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 6: Stryker Company and Troops Loading a C-130 at Geronimo 
Forward Landing Strip:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Its Ability to Quickly Maneuver about the 
Battlefield:

The Stryker vehicle demonstrated speed, agility, and extensive 
maneuverability during the execution of the brigade's combat missions 
during the operational evaluation. Because of its maneuverability, the 
Stryker vehicle allowed individual units to react and move around the 
battlefield much more quickly than light and mechanized infantry units, 
allowing individual units to accomplish tasks in minutes compared to 
hours. When used properly, the Stryker vehicle enabled the brigade to 
outmaneuver and overpower opposing forces. The performance of the 
Stryker brigade at both training centers indicated that with its 
vehicles, it could move faster as compared to both conventional and/or 
nonmotorized infantry as well as infantry units equipped with the 
Bradley fighting vehicle.

At the Joint Readiness Training Center, the Stryker vehicle performed 
well in urban areas and in wooded terrain. (Figure 7 shows the Stryker 
maneuvering in wooded terrain.) The speed of the vehicle enabled the 
infantry companies to quickly arrive in urban areas, giving them the 
ability to surprise the enemy and overcome urban objectives. The attack 
on the "town" of Shugart-Gordon illustrated that the Stryker was able 
to move quickly using a route that included very restrictive terrain. 
(Figure 8 shows the town of Shugart-Gordon.) The Stryker easily moved 
through the rough terrain and made it to the objective, giving the 
company commander the ability to rapidly transport soldiers during the 
assault. The speed of the Stryker allowed one particular company to 
arrive at the objective early and surprise the enemy. In another 
instance, the capabilities of the vehicle allowed Stryker units to 
rapidly pursue and decisively engage unconventional forces that were 
more mobile than U.S. Army light infantry units. The Stryker vehicles' 
speed allowed the infantry units to fix and destroy the enemy, despite 
the enemy's efforts to leave the battlefield.

Figure 7: Stryker Maneuvering in Wooded Terrain at the Joint Readiness 
Training Center:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 8: Town of Shugart-Gordon:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

At the National Training Center, the Stryker vehicle demonstrated its 
ability to accelerate quickly and maneuver over the desert terrain to 
deliver infantry personnel to their objective. Our analysis shows that 
the Stryker vehicle moved more quickly and much quieter than the 
opposing forces' vehicles, giving the brigade a substantial tactical 
advantage over the enemy. When operating in extremely rugged and steep 
terrain, the Stryker did lose some of its mobility advantage and had 
difficulty in maneuvering as quickly as the opposing forces' vehicles. 
Despite the loss of this advantage, the Stryker vehicle was nonetheless 
mobile enough to allow a company to quickly reposition and destroy a 
platoon of guerrilla forces running through rough terrain. The 
Stryker's speed enabled the infantry unit to quickly move into its 
attack position after changes in the battlefield. Because of this 
speed, the vehicle potentially provides a commander more time to react 
since less time is spent moving from one location to another.

Brigade's Staff Performance Was Inconsistent:

On the basis of our analysis of the data, as a collective organization, 
the brigade staff[Footnote 11] was unable to consistently perform in 
accordance with Army doctrine, hindering the ability of the Stryker 
brigade to first fully see and then understand the battle space. Staff 
processes, both the integration of the entire staff and those internal 
to specific sections, affected the ability of the brigade to produce 
and execute synchronized plans. The Stryker brigade did display the 
ability to integrate and collect information, but not consistently. The 
observer-controllers generally identified training time as the primary 
cause for the weaknesses.

Army doctrine prescribes a manner in which staffs should develop battle 
plans. This military decision-making process requires incorporation of 
all staff elements in a collective effort to synchronize all of the 
brigade's assets. Although the brigade staff gained experience and 
improved by going through the process over the course of the 
evaluation, they did not consistently integrate all of the staff 
sections and key subsections, including information operations, fire 
support, and intelligence. Because all of these assets were not 
incorporated into the planning process, the brigade had difficulty in 
using its capabilities according to doctrine.

The Stryker brigade displayed the ability to integrate information from 
multiple sources. However, managing the flow of the information and 
disseminating it throughout the brigade was difficult. For example, the 
brigade Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron 
provided more information than the brigade staff could process. Because 
the staff's proficiency level to manage the information was low, the 
ability to analyze and present a common operational picture was 
reduced.

The staff's performance affected all units within the brigade. 
Commanders were not given well-developed planning products, including 
an accurate initial picture of the enemy and the enemy's anticipated 
actions, as well as tools that enabled the application of all of the 
brigade's organic combat capability. Although they were still able to 
conduct combat missions, the brigade did not perform to the best of its 
capabilities.

Synchronization of the brigade's intelligence collection effort was 
inconsistent. Unlike traditional Army units, the Stryker brigade has a 
very robust intelligence collection capability that includes unique 
tools such as unmanned aerial vehicles; nonlethal effects capabilities 
such as civil affairs, psychological operations, and legal personnel; 
and a Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition squadron. 
Because the efforts were not synchronized, intelligence collection 
assets were not consistently used in an efficient manner, resulting in 
areas not being observed or other areas receiving redundant coverage. 
Also, the reconnaissance squadron sometimes operated independently of 
the brigade's guidance, resulting in a failure to obtain needed 
information.

Using the Digital Systems Proved Difficult for the Brigade:

The operational evaluation demonstrated that the brigade had not 
mastered the use of its digital systems. The proper use and employment 
of the various digital systems increase the commanders' ability to 
position troops and conduct combat operations. However, our analysis 
shows that a combination of either not using established procedures or 
not having established procedures, as well as a lack of familiarity 
with the systems, prevented full exploitation of the systems' 
capabilities.

During the evaluation, a lack of familiarity with the systems and a 
lack of standardized procedures contributed to the brigade's inability 
to fully maximize the capabilities of its digital systems. Brigade 
leaders and staff struggled with acquiring data and interpreting it in 
a timely manner. If the staff had properly used the various digital 
systems, the commanders' ability to position troops and conduct combat 
operations would have been increased.

Digital systems were not available for all elements of the brigade, 
including augmenting units. Not all staff sections and subsections 
possessed the FBCB2 system,[Footnote 12] hindering staff planning 
operations. At the platoon level, only the platoon leader and platoon 
sergeant Stryker vehicles are equipped with the FBCB2 system. Further, 
when infantry personnel dismount, they have no direct digital 
connectivity to the FBCB2 system. As a result, the non-FBCB2-equipped 
Stryker vehicles and dismounted infantry did not possess the same level 
of situational awareness that Stryker vehicles equipped with the FBCB2 
system did. Additionally, augmenting units such as armor and aviation 
did not arrive with the FBCB2 system, so the brigade attached a liaison 
element equipped with the system. Because the augmenting units did not 
have the system, the Stryker brigade had to provide analog control 
measures so that the augmenting unit would know the brigade's plan.

The FBCB2 system was not consistently updated to provide a current view 
of the battle space. Although the FBCB2 system automatically tracks the 
location of vehicles equipped with the system, enemy positions and the 
location of friendly dismounted infantry must be entered manually. 
While this capability exists, updating this information was not 
consistently done.

The brigade did not consistently use predesignated formats in the FBCB2 
system, affecting the information flow into other systems. To 
communicate with the Army Battle Command System, the FBCB2 system has a 
predesignated message format. Units found these formats cumbersome and 
opted instead to use either analog means or the free-text feature in 
the system. Not using the predesignated format made updating the other 
systems inefficient, because operators had to transfer information from 
the free text into the Army Battle Command System. Additionally, 
because free text did not automatically update the information in the 
other systems, the view of the battle space was inaccurate.

Not using the information available in the FBCB2 system was also an 
issue. For example, there were several instances where individual 
Stryker vehicles and an entire Stryker unit conducted movement through 
a minefield that had been entered into the system. These movements 
either delayed combat operations or resulted in casualties. Another 
example was movement of unit vehicles down a route that was congested. 
The system provided the unit information that the route was congested; 
yet the driver ignored the information and moved down the route.

Sustaining the Brigade Was Challenging:

During the evaluation, the brigade experienced difficulties in 
conducting supply operations because components within the brigade did 
not or were unable to follow the established procedures. Support to the 
Stryker brigade is distribution based, meaning that instead of keeping 
supplies on hand, the brigade is designed to receive a near-continuous 
flow of anticipated supplies through the supply chain. The areas of the 
supply chain assessed were the organic sustainment provided by the 
brigade support battalion and the external logistics support provided 
by the echelon above brigade. Because these two support areas are 
linked, supply requests from the brigade impact the ability of the 
echelon above brigade elements to provide the necessary anticipatory 
logistics. Conversely, incorrect supplies sent from the echelon above 
brigade elements to the brigade affected the ability of the brigade to 
distribute supplies to its units. When units made proper requests, the 
process worked correctly. However, the inability to make proper 
requests affected the ability of the entire supply chain to provide 
support to the brigade.

Difficulties in maintaining a flow of supplies began at the individual 
unit level and affected the entire logistics flow. We determined 
through our analysis of the observer-controller comments that units had 
difficulty adapting to the just-in-time system. Commanders were 
uncomfortable maintaining supplies below 50 percent of their full 
operational requirement and, during those situations, often placed 
emergency resupply requests to the brigade support battalion. Units 
also had difficulty using the digital systems to request resupply 
because they lacked familiarity with the systems, connectivity issues 
impeded performance, or reporting formats did not adequately address 
their logistics needs. While the units were able, at times, to adopt 
work-around solutions, the effect was a disruption of the intended flow 
of supplies.

The brigade support battalion struggled to perform its dual function of 
acting as a conduit for its requests and the distribution point for 
supplies between the echelon above brigade support structure and the 
brigade. One difficulty faced by the support battalion was the need to 
reconfigure supplies received from the echelon above brigade support 
structure. Unit supply requests did not adequately reflect its needs; 
therefore, the anticipatory loads sent from the echelon above brigade 
support structure did not contain the correct supplies in the correct 
amounts and configurations. As a result, the brigade support battalion 
had to reconfigure the supplies it had available as well as those that 
it had received. Supply distribution occurred as available, as opposed 
to a set schedule, resulting in the support battalion having 
insufficient transportation assets to deliver all needed supplies in a 
timely manner. Figure 9 shows the brigade support battalion at the 
National Training Center.

Figure 9: Brigade Support Battalion at the National Training Center:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The brigade also had difficulty providing supplies to units when the 
support battalion was moving to a new location. The evaluation showed 
that when stationary, the support battalion successfully established 
alternate supply points for brigade units. (Figure 10 shows an example 
of an alternate supply point at the National Training Center.) However, 
when the support battalion moved, the brigade did not adequately 
provide for alternate distribution points. Had this issue been 
addressed, the brigade would have had the ability to adequately supply 
its units during the support battalion's relocation.

Figure 10: Alternate Supply Point at the National Training Center:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Stryker Companies Had Problems Executing Combat Missions:

Although Stryker companies were able to exercise and achieve some 
degree of success conducting combat operations at both training 
centers, many of their capabilities were not consistently used. Areas 
of concern included tracking dismounted infantry, performance of 
antitank systems, and challenges linking fire support elements to the 
artillery battalion. Our analysis of the data showed that limited 
training time and a lack of standard operating procedures contributed 
to the companies' inability to consistently use their combat 
capabilities. Placing more emphasis on the planning and rehearsal of 
operations, as well as developing and practicing internal tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, could mitigate these deficiencies.

Tracking dismounted infantry was an area of concern. Dismounted 
infantry squads do not carry digital systems, so units can only 
maintain awareness of dismounted infantry locations by entering reports 
from analog systems into digital systems. Uncertainty about the 
location of dismounts hindered the ability of companies to use their 
mortars, reducing the overall application of their combat power. 
Despite the inability to track dismounts noted in observer-controller 
comments, one unit at the National Training Center was able to rapidly 
update the location of dismounts into the digital systems by using a 
process it had developed, indicating that this issue can be corrected.

Performance of antitank systems had mixed results. At the National 
Training Center, observer-controller comments were overwhelmingly 
supportive of the Javelin system, noting how it provided the dismounted 
infantry the capability to destroy armored forces. However, at the same 
time, observer-controllers at both training centers expressed concerns 
that the brigade antitank company and the organic mobile gun system 
platoon, consisting of a substitute Stryker antitank system, were not 
positioned properly to optimize their capability. The cause for this 
was attributed to a lack of situational understanding.

Fire support elements, the link between infantry units and the field 
artillery battalion, also faced challenges in requesting and delivering 
brigade-level indirect fires. At both training centers, brigade units 
were not using their digital capabilities. Instead of using the 
digitized artillery command, control, and communication system, fire 
supporters were using radios and plain text messages on the FBCB2 
system to call for fires, which required soldiers at the receiving end 
of the request to enter the information manually and increased the time 
to deliver fires. Observer-controllers at both training centers 
identified contributing factors such as a lack of a detailed digital 
standard operating procedure for fire supporters and the lack of 
familiarity and experience with the digitized artillery command and 
control system.

Contractors Were Not Always Used Effectively:

Although in most instances contractor contributions were positive, our 
analysis identified instances where the contractors were used 
ineffectively because units used them improperly or did not provide the 
support necessary to ensure their effective use.

Unit personnel perform regularly scheduled routine maintenance on their 
vehicles and equipment systems according to Army standardized 
maintenance manuals and unit operating procedures. However, the Stryker 
brigade requires a significant use of contractors to maintain and 
repair the unit's newest systems, such as the Stryker vehicles and 
their remote weapon systems, and the digitized FBCB2 system. Use of 
contractors to maintain and repair the Army's newest systems is not 
unique to the Stryker brigade. For example, we previously reported that 
the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Iraq with around 60 contractors 
to support the division's digitized equipment.[Footnote 13] Within the 
Stryker brigade, contractors are placed in combat repair teams and 
generally co-located with the individual battalions and in sections 
within the brigade support battalion with the primary mission of 
maintaining specific systems according to the support contract awarded. 
The brigade is to provide the contractors with necessary support, 
including rations, water, and equipment items such as night vision 
goggles and protective clothing.

During the evaluation, contractors assigned to the battalion combat 
repair teams responded quickly to maintenance issues. These personnel 
were commended for their ability to quickly fix damaged Stryker 
vehicles and for reducing the amount of time a vehicle was unavailable 
to the unit for combat operations. As a result of the contractors' 
responsiveness, some units relaxed their emphasis on unit-level 
maintenance and became overly dependent on the contractors. In 
analyzing the data, we found instances where contractors were used 
ineffectively. For example, we found that some units bypassed standard 
Army maintenance procedures and requested contractor support to conduct 
maintenance that should have been conducted by the unit's organic 
maintenance personnel.

We also noted that transporting the contractors to support the 
reconnaissance squadron proved difficult because the squadron was 
spread across the battlefield and was responsible for the largest 
operational area. The brigade placed contractors in combat repair teams 
that were, in turn, attached to the individual battalions. The 
battalions are responsible for the contractors' security, logistics, 
and transportation. The location of the combat repair teams on the 
battlefield determines the ability of the contractors to get quickly to 
where they are needed.

Also, contractors could not be used in some instances because the 
brigade did not provide the contractors with night vision goggles, 
impeding their ability to move to units during periods of limited 
visibility. Additionally, protective clothing and equipment for the 
contractors were not provided, which precluded the contractors from 
performing their responsibilities after chemical attacks. The 
mitigation plan addresses those issues relating to not using 
contractors effectively.

Insufficient Training Proficiency Primary Reason for Operational 
Evaluation Weaknesses:

Our analysis of the data collected during the operational evaluation 
indicated that the brigade's training proficiency was insufficient to 
fully demonstrate the brigade's entire capabilities across the full 
spectrum of combat missions. The comments from the observer-controllers 
and subject matter experts confirmed this conclusion because their 
comments generally identified training as a major contributor to the 
identified weaknesses. Moreover, the Army's final operational 
evaluation report identified training as a limitation of the 
operational evaluation. The brigade had never trained as a brigade-
sized unit until it reached the National Training Center and only three 
of six battalions had undergone an external evaluation prior to the 
rotation. According to the Army, the Stryker brigade needed 15 weeks of 
unit training after receiving its last vehicles and this did not occur. 
In fact, the brigade was still receiving Stryker variants at the end of 
the National Training Center exercise.

In May 2002,[Footnote 14] we reported that Fort Lewis training 
officials would have preferred a full 6 months to train after receiving 
most of the new Stryker vehicles. This also did not occur. Most 
brigades in the Army begin training for their deployment to a combat 
training center, such as the National Training Center, 4 to 6 months 
ahead of time. We also reported that the need to train Stryker brigade 
soldiers in digital systems was posing a challenge because the 
brigade's design requires digitization to maintain the critical 
situational awareness capability. These systems use sophisticated 
technology that allows the soldiers to achieve superior battlefield 
information enabling them to engage the enemy long before coming into 
contact. Our analysis of the operational evaluation concludes that 1 
year later, the brigade still had not mastered the use of its digital 
systems.

Army Risk Management Plan Will Mitigate Most Operational Evaluation 
Issues, but Deferred Issues Have Implications for Future Brigades:

The Army is implementing a risk management plan to mitigate most issues 
identified in the operational evaluation, which generally correspond 
with the weaknesses we identified. The Army concluded that the issues 
were largely training related, but it also identified a few as design 
or equipment related. Although the Army developed, and is implementing, 
a plan that will mitigate most of the identified issues, the Army's 
immediate focus was to resolve those training and equipment issues that 
affected the brigade's ability to deploy to Iraq. It deferred for 
future consideration the remaining issues and decisions that have 
implications for the future brigades.

Based on its analysis of the operational evaluation report, the Army 
first developed a matrix that assigned a risk level to issues and 
determined whether issues would preclude the Stryker brigade from a 
scheduled deployment or could be addressed in the future. It then 
developed a mitigation plan to address all issues identified.

To mitigate the identified training issues and to prepare for the 
brigade's deployment to Iraq, I Corps developed and implemented an 8-
week modular predeployment training event that included a command post 
exercise to train the staff and a brigade field training exercise that 
emphasized platoon and company operations. The training addressed four 
general issues identified from the operational evaluation:

* Army Battle Command System interoperability and connectivity,

* staff operations and synchronization,

* application of doctrine in unit operations, and:

* subordinate unit specific training.

Furthermore, the command post and field training post exercises were to 
ensure that the brigade:

* was proficient in stability and support operation tasks as specified 
by the combatant commander,

* validated the interoperability of newly fielded systems and 
equipment,

* validated the integration of newly assigned soldiers and leaders and 
attached units such as the assigned aviation task force,

* exercised the staff planning and battle command process using the 
digital and communications systems to refine the staff planning 
process,

* exercised distributed logistics in a complex environment, and:

* exercised force protection and accountability of contractors on the 
battlefield.

To help the brigade achieve the training objectives, U.S. Forces 
Command provided observer-controllers from the Joint Readiness Training 
Center to provide feedback and conduct informal after-action reviews 
focused on lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. A senior 
training center official stated that 40 to 50 percent of the observer-
controllers had participated in the operational evaluation segment held 
at the Joint Readiness Training Center. During the command post 
exercise, the observer-controllers viewed the planning and execution of 
the brigade and battalion staffs, and during the field training 
exercise, they viewed the conduct of assigned company-level combat 
missions.

After completing the training, the brigade commander assessed the 
brigade as fully trained to perform its combat tasks. The brigade 
commander concluded the brigade was:

* completely retrained on those issues identified from the operational 
evaluation with a focus on applicability to planned missions in Iraq 
and:

* fully prepared to deploy.

After the training events were completed, we discussed the brigade's 
level of training and readiness with the brigade commander and senior 
Army officials responsible for Stryker brigade transformation. All 
reported no reservations regarding the proficiency of the brigade and 
its ability to deploy and conduct combat operations in Iraq. One senior 
training official opined that the Stryker brigade is as well trained as 
any unit he has observed and that the unit can operate in any threat 
environment. Moreover, the issues the Army identified in its risk 
management matrix and exercised during its predeployment training 
addressed the weaknesses we identified in our observations and analysis 
of the operational evaluation. The brigade's performance indicates that 
the issues and weaknesses are being mitigated.

However, the Army is not fully addressing the potential brigade design 
and the brigade equipment issues identified from the operational 
evaluation, which were not included in the predeployment training, 
although the issues have implications for future brigades. According to 
the Army staff, the issues that were nondeployment related are still 
under consideration. One identified design issue that has both 
deployment and long-term implications was associated with the mobility 
and survivability of the reconnaissance squadron operations officer. 
Currently, this staff officer's mobile command post is a High Mobility 
Multi-Wheeled Vehicle. The operational evaluation concluded that the 
operations officer could not sustain the mobility pace of the 
reconnaissance commander and the commander's Stryker vehicle. The 
evaluation also concluded that the threat requires armored protection 
for this key individual. The short-term solution is to consider 
providing a Stryker vehicle to the operations officer from brigade 
maintenance spares or other sources, such as another unit in the 
brigade. The mitigation plan includes no long-term solution, including 
purchasing additional Strykers. This issue is being considered through 
normal Army processes to determine a long-term solution that may affect 
requirements for future brigades.

An equipment issue that is not addressed in the mitigation plan, but 
has implications for future brigades, is that not all Stryker vehicles 
are equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. Only 
two of the four Stryker vehicles in each platoon are currently equipped 
with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The operational 
evaluation concluded that all infantry platoon Stryker vehicles need to 
be equipped with the FBCB2 system and other digitized equipment. The 
Army had previously recognized the need because the brigade's modified 
table of organization and equipment currently authorizes the equipment. 
However, the Army's mitigation plan calls for procuring sufficient sets 
for only the initial Stryker brigade; it does not address plans for the 
follow-on brigades.

Conclusions:

The operational evaluation provided the Army its first opportunity to 
exercise and evaluate the capabilities of the Stryker brigade as a 
whole. By completing the evaluation and certifying the design, the Army 
and OSD met the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for fiscal year 2002. However, as the results of the operational 
evaluation illustrated, issues with the brigade's training, design, and 
equipment exist. The training issues arose because operating with a new 
unit design requires time to develop skills, which the accelerated 
fielding schedule did not allow. In preparation for deployment to Iraq, 
the Army mitigated most of these training issues, but it deferred 
resolution of some design and equipment issues and their respective 
decisions for future consideration. It is important that all issues be 
resolved, including those that affect future brigades, such as 
provision of Stryker vehicles for reconnaissance squadron operations 
officers and procurement of FBCB2 systems and other digitized equipment 
for the infantry platoons' Stryker vehicles. Passing on lessons learned 
from the operational evaluation provides the Army the opportunity to 
ease the transformation process for future Stryker brigades by ensuring 
that the units have the proper training and all necessary equipment. As 
we have stated previously, taking action now to address such issues and 
passing on the remedies learned could enhance the chances that future 
brigade formations will be accomplished smoothly.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To assist the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams' transformation efforts, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Army to:

* develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues 
not addressed prior to deploying the brigade and:

* apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the training, design, and 
equipment of the brigade to future Stryker brigades.

Agency Comments:

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 
concurred with our recommendations and outlined actions the Army is 
taking in implementing them.

In responding to our recommendation that the Army develop a plan to 
complete mitigation efforts on those issues not addressed prior to 
deploying the brigade, the department stated that the Army has 
developed and is executing plans for the various issues identified in 
the operational evaluation and that once the armor installation is 
completed in November-December 2003 in Kuwait, the Army will have 
completed all of the mitigation efforts identified in our report.

With regard to our recommendation that adjustments made to the 
training, design, and equipment of the first brigade are applied, as 
applicable, to future brigades, the department concurred that 
adjustments were necessary and would be applied to future Stryker 
brigades. The department stated the Army had created a Third Brigade, 
Second Infantry Division deployment team, comprised of representatives 
from across the Army, and that its scope included material requirements 
for the First Brigade, Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division (the Army's next 
Stryker brigade) and future Stryker brigades. Regarding proposed 
changes to the Stryker brigade's structure, the Army is reviewing 
possible design changes through its Documentation Assistance and Review 
Team to determine the appropriate solution. The department states that 
the Army will use this same process regarding issues identified from 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. The department also commented that the Army 
designated Fort Lewis, Washington, as the Army's Center of Excellence 
responsible for concept development, lessons learned, and the source 
for technical and tactical expertise for future Stryker brigades and to 
assist the Army in distributing lessons learned from the Stryker 
brigades.

Appendix VII contains the full text of the department's comments.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Acting Secretary of the Army, and the Director, Office of Management 
and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. 
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 
512-8365. Major contributors to this report were Reginald L. Furr, Leo 
B. Sullivan, Robert Ackley, Timothy A. Burke, M. Jane Hunt, and Jim 
Melton.

William M. Solis: 
Director: 
Defense Capabilities and Management:

Signed by William M. Solis: 

List of Congressional Committees:

The Honorable John W. Warner: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Ted Stevens: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Duncan Hunter: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Jerry Lewis: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations 
House of Representatives:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Provisions from Public Law 107-107 Concerning Limitations 
on Army Transformation Actions:

Public Law 107-107-Dec. 28, 2001:

SEC. 113. LIMITATIONS ON ACQUISITION OF INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLES AND 
DEPLOYMENT OF INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS.

(h) OPERATIONAL EVALUATION - (1) The Secretary of the Army shall 
conduct an operational evaluation of the initial interim brigade combat 
team. The evaluation shall include deployment of the team to the 
evaluation site and team execution of combat missions across the full 
spectrum of potential threats and operational scenarios.

(2) The operational evaluation under paragraph (1) may not be conducted 
until the plan for such evaluation is approved by the Director of 
Operational Test and Evaluation of the Department of Defense.

(i) LIMITATION ON PROCUREMENT OF INTERIM ARMORED VEHICLES AND 
DEPLOYMENT OF IBCTs. - (1) The actions described in paragraph (2) may 
not be taken until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the 
Secretary of Defense -:

(A) submits to Congress a report on the operational evaluation carried 
out under subsection (h); and:

(B) certifies to Congress that the results of that operational 
evaluation indicate that the design for the interim brigade combat team 
is operationally effective and operationally suitable.

(2) The limitation in paragraph (1) applies to the following actions:

(A) Procurement of interim armored vehicles in addition to those 
necessary for equipping the first three interim brigade combat teams.

(B) Deployment of any interim brigade combat team outside the United 
States.

(3) The Secretary of Defense may waive the applicability of paragraph 
(1) to a deployment described in paragraph (2)(B) if the Secretary -:

(A) determines that the deployment is in the national security 
interests of the United States; and:

(B) submits to Congress, in writing, a notification of the waiver 
together with a discussion of the reasons for the waiver.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:

To determine whether the Army's conduct of the Stryker brigade's 
operational evaluation met the legislative requirements, we focused our 
efforts on understanding the operational evaluation plan and its 
implementation. We obtained and analyzed the Army's operational 
evaluation plan and its associated execution plan. We interviewed 
officials and analysts involved in both the design and evaluation of 
the plan from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Office of the 
Secretary of the Army; Headquarters, Department of the Army; Army 
Forces Command; Army Training and Doctrine Command; Army Test and 
Evaluation Command; and I Corps, Fort Lewis. We held discussions with 
the Commanders of the Operations Groups at the National Training Center 
and the Joint Readiness Training Center to discuss their perspective 
regarding the operational evaluation.

To determine how the Army conducted the operational evaluation, we used 
information from the Army's operational evaluation plan and execution 
plan and monitored the conduct of the operational evaluation. We 
reviewed the training procedures and attended the training sessions for 
the data collectors and subject matter experts administering the 
training events at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness 
Training Center. We also reviewed the data collection, transfer, and 
validation processes. We attended nightly briefings that were provided 
to the I Corps leadership from officials of each of the two training 
centers. We observed various training activities such as an attack at 
the National Training Center and the tactical movements by ground and 
air deployments at the Joint Readiness Training Center, as well as 
other events such as the commander's combined arms rehearsal prior to 
the brigade moving to the training site at the Joint Readiness Training 
Center.

To assess the brigade's performance during the operational evaluation, 
we evaluated information from the Army's data collectors and from our 
visits to the two training centers to observe training events. For the 
deployment portion of the evaluation, we observed various deployment 
events including the loading and unloading of Stryker vehicles from C-
130 aircraft at the National Training Center; the brigade staging area 
at Lake Charles, Louisiana; and the unloading of Stryker vehicles from 
C-17 aircraft at the Joint Readiness Training Center. We also observed 
the loading of a Stryker company's personnel, vehicles, and supplies 
into C-130 aircraft as the personnel conducted intratheater movement to 
a different training area at the Joint Readiness Training Center. 
Because of their doctrinal expertise and the fact that they provide 
feedback to all Army units that go through the training centers, we 
monitored transmissions and attended meetings held by observer-
controllers and operations officials at both training centers. During 
these meetings, discussions were held regarding the performance of the 
brigade and any difficulties the brigade was experiencing. To gain 
perspective on the Army's analytical process, we attended and 
participated in scheduled insight meetings that discussed the training 
events and observations that occurred over the previous 24 hours. We 
also discussed the evaluation events with officials from the Army's 
Test and Evaluation Command, as well as representatives from the 
Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and 
the Institute for Defense Analysis.

We obtained and analyzed the database that the Army used to draw its 
conclusions. Using the database, we determined that the most direct 
commentary on the Stryker brigade's performance of its individual key 
operating capabilities came from observer-controller comments. We 
reviewed the comments as grouped by the individual operational 
capabilities and, after identifying the most salient issues, developed 
seven themes that incorporated all nine of the key operating 
capabilities. These themes are ability of the Stryker brigade to 
deploy, mobility of the Stryker vehicle, brigade and battalion staff 
performance, use of digital systems, employment of the new sustainment 
concept, execution of combat missions, and contractor support.

Regarding the Army's actions to mitigate the identified operational 
evaluation training deficiencies, we reviewed the training methodology 
developed to overcome the deficiencies and held a discussion with 
senior Army officials regarding the brigade's operational readiness. We 
did not observe the activities conducted during the command post 
exercise or the field training exercise. However, we discussed the 
results of the exercises with senior Army officials.

Our review was performed from October 2002 to October 2003 in 
accordance with generally accepted government audit standards.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Stryker Brigade Organizational Parameters and Operational 
Capabilities by Critical Tasks:

Key Organizational Parameters: 

Balance between Strategic Responsiveness and Battle Space Dominance; 
Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct 
Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area 
Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Balanced Full Spectrum Utility; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct 
Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & 
Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: 
Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Reduced Sustainment Requirements; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; 
Conduct Battle Command: No; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & 
Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: 
Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Minimize Personnel and Logistical Footprint; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: 
Yes; Conduct Battle Command: No; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed 
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the 
Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Commonality of Vehicular Capabilities; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; 
Conduct Battle Command: No; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed 
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the 
Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Reach-back; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; 
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; 
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Embedded Unit-based Capabilities; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; 
Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense 
& Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: 
Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Internetted Combined Arms to Company Team Level; Deploy/Redeploy by 
Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous 
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; 
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Key Operational Capabilities: 

Mobility; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; 
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; 
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: 
No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed 
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the 
Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information Superiority; 
Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct 
Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area 
Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Holistic Force Protection and Survivability; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: 
Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed 
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the 
Brigade: No; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Lethality; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; 
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; 
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Force Effectiveness; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct Battle 
Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive 
Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the 
Force: Yes. 

Reach-back; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; 
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; 
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Joint/Multinational/Interagency/Inter-operability; Deploy/Redeploy by 
Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous 
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; 
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: 
Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed 
Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the 
Brigade: No; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Source: U.S. Army.

X = annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Critical Training 
Task List (CTTL).

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Mission Training Plan Tasks Compared to Critical Tasks:

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Establish a Digital Command Post; Deploy/
Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous 
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; 
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct Urban Operations; Deploy/Redeploy 
by Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous 
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; 
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct a Tactical Road March; Deploy/
Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct 
Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area 
Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct an Attack; Deploy/Redeploy by 
Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous 
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; 
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct a Defense; Deploy/Redeploy by 
Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous 
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; 
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct Area Security Operations; Deploy/
Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct 
Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area 
Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Plan Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance Operations; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: No; Conduct 
Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & 
Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: 
Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct Command and Control of 
Operations; Deploy/Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; 
Conduct Simultaneous Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; 
Area Presence: Yes; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Sustain the Force; Deploy/Redeploy by 
Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous 
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: Yes; Area Presence: Yes; 
Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Mission Training Plan Tasks: Conduct Strategic Deployment; Deploy/
Redeploy by Air: Yes; Conduct Battle Command: Yes; Conduct Simultaneous 
Distributed Offense & Defensive Operations: No; Area Presence: 
No; Sustain the Brigade: Yes; Protect the Force: Yes. 

Source: U.S. Army.

X = annotates central tasks represented by the 10 essential mission 
training plan tasks.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Stryker Brigade Parameters and Capabilities Compared to 
Essential Mission Training Plan Tasks:

[See PDF for image]

Source: U.S. Army.

X= annotates Parameter and Capability represented by Mission Training 
Plan Essential task.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Definitions of Key Organizational Parameters and Key 
Operational Capabilities:

The Stryker brigade's organizational and operational concept document 
defines the unit's essential organizational characteristics, or 
parameters, that the brigade was evaluated against. The document also 
defines the unit's essential operational characteristics, or 
capabilities, that the brigade was evaluated against.

The eight key organizational parameters are defined below.

* Achieve Balance Between Capabilities for Strategic Responsiveness and 
Requirements for Battle-Space Dominance: The organization must balance 
deployability, sustainability, and its in-theater personnel footprint 
against its combat requirement for lethality, mobility, and 
survivability. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team must approach the 
deployability standards of a light brigade while arriving with the 
punch and staying power approaching that of a mechanized formation.

* Balanced Full Spectrum Utility: The Stryker brigade is deliberately 
optimized for early entry small-scale contingencies, but it also is 
required to be prepared to participate as a "guarantor combat force" in 
stability and support operations to permit peacekeeping and stability 
forces to carry out their missions in a secure environment. Similarly, 
the Stryker brigade must be prepared to fight as a component within a 
division or corps structure in a major theater of war.

* Reduced Sustainment Requirements: The Stryker brigade must have 
sustainment requirements well below that of a heavy force.

* Minimize Brigade's Personnel and Logistical Footprint: There is an 
imperative for expanding the combat elements and reducing the support 
capabilities. Strategic deployability and demand reduction must be 
enhanced, while maintaining a robust combat capability.

* Commonality of Vehicular Platforms: A common platform for combat, 
combat support, and combat service support echelons enables 
deployability, demand reduction, and sustainment efficiency. Common 
platforms must also be highly mobile and capable of intratheater 
deployment by C-130 aircraft.

* Reach-back: To enable the Stryker brigade to maintain a deployable 
structure with a minimized logistics footprint, it must be able to 
reach-back and access those functions that can be accomplished by 
higher-echelon or out-of-theater organizations. It is both an 
organizational and operational principle.

* Embedded Unit-Based Capabilities: Military intelligence, signal, 
engineer, antitank, artillery, and combat service support elements have 
been tailored specifically to the unique requirements of the unit's 
mission set. For the Stryker brigade, analysis demonstrates that 
mission capabilities are best enhanced if they are embedded within the 
unit's organic organization. Attaching divisional elements to a Stryker 
brigade unnecessarily enlarges the brigade's deployment requirements 
and theater footprint and introduces different vehicle types and 
equipment sets into the structure, violating the principle of 
commonality and increasing sustainment and infrastructure 
requirements.

* Internetted Combined Arms to Company-Team Level: An operational 
analysis for the Stryker brigade indicates that, within the environment 
of complex/urban terrain, force effectiveness is best enhanced and the 
requirement for responsive mutual support is best satisfied through 
internetted combined arms to company-team level, i.e., to a degree 
beyond traditional practice.

The nine key operational capabilities are defined below.

* Mobility:

* Strategic - Organized, equipped, and configured to support a goal of 
deploying the brigade in 96 hours from first wheels up. (Ninety-six 
hours was originally a requirement.):

* Operational - Capable of intratheater lift by ground/sea or by U.S. 
Air Force family of tactical aircraft. (Concept document specifies C-
130 aircraft.):

* Dismounted Assault and the Close Fight: Achieves tactical decision by 
means of combined arms at the company/team level focused on dismounted 
assault, supported by direct fires, and on the integration of mortars, 
artillery, mobility support, and joint fires/effects.

* Enhanced Situational Understanding and Information Superiority: This 
is the fundamental force enabler across all Stryker brigade battlefield 
operating systems and the foundation of risk mitigation with respect to 
brigade vulnerabilities, particularly the lack of armor protection.

* Holistic Force Protection and Survivability: Overall, the Stryker 
brigade must meet force protection challenges through the holistic 
application of a variety of capabilities, including early warning; 
situational understanding; avoidance of surprise; deception; rapid 
mobility; signature control; nontemplateable operations; avoidances of 
enemy fires; mutual support; use of cover and concealment; and 
implementation of innovative tactic, techniques, and procedures.

* Lethality: The Stryker brigade possesses a robust array of direct and 
indirect fire systems to shape the battle space and achieve decision in 
the close fight inherent within complex and urban terrain, greater than 
current light brigades.

* Force Effectiveness: Although the Stryker brigade must have the 
capability to achieve/maintain information superiority, it will not 
always enjoy combat platform superiority. The Stryker brigade will 
offset the platform limitations of its medium-weight platforms through 
the holistic integration of all other capabilities, particularly the 
internetted actions of the combined arms company teams.

* Reach/Reach-back: The capability of the Stryker brigade to exploit a 
multitude of nonorganic resources to accomplish its assigned missions. 
The Stryker brigade executes reach-back on a routine, deliberate basis 
as a combat power and sustainment multiplier in five primary areas: 
fires and effects, intelligence and information, planning and analysis, 
force protection, and sustainment.

* Joint/Multinational/Interagency Interoperability: The Stryker 
brigade will benefit from exploiting the knowledge and capabilities 
residing within multinational forces; U.S. interagency organizations 
operating in the theater; and other international, local, 
nongovernmental, and private organizations involved in the crisis, 
conflict, or instability.

* Full Spectrum Flexibility and Augmentation: The Stryker brigade will 
have the requisite capabilities to achieve decision in conjunction with 
the joint fight in low-end contingencies such as current operations in 
the Balkans. If conditions escalate, requiring additional capabilities 
that do not reside within the Stryker brigade, it will receive 
augmentation. The Stryker brigade may participate in major theater of 
war operations as a subordinate element within a division. Again, 
adjustments to the task organization, including augmentation, will be 
required in a major theater of war environment.

[End of section]

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000:

PERSONNEL AND READINESS:

Mr. William M. Solis:

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:  
U. S. General Accounting Office:

Washington, D. C. 20548-0001:

Dear Mr. Solis:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the General 
Accounting Office draft report GAO-04-188, "MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: 
The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker Brigade 
Design Evaluation But Issues Remain for Future Brigades," dated October 
23, 2003 (GAO Code 350347).

We appreciate the opportunity to review this draft report and concur 
with its recommendations.

Sincerely,

Joseph J. Angello, Director:

Signed by Joseph J. Angello:

Readiness Programming & Assessment:

Attachment:

GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED October 23, 2003 GAO CODE 350347/GAO-04-188:

"MILITARY TRANSFORMATION: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements 
for First Stryker Future Brigades Design Evaluation But Issues Remain 
for Future Brigades":

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION 1: To assist the Stryker brigade combat teams' 
transformation efforts, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of 
Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan that 
completes the mitigation efforts on those issues not addressed prior to 
deploying the brigade. (p. 22/GAO Draft Report):

DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. The Army has 
developed and is in the process of executing mitigation plans for the 
various issues identified in the final Operational Evaluation Report. 
Several of the issues as stated in the GAO Report were training related 
and were addressed and corrected with the completion of the Stryker 
Brigade's training plan in October 2003. Once the armor installation is 
completed in November-December 2003 in Kuwait, the Army will have 
completed all of the mitigation efforts identified in the GAO report.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of Army to apply, as applicable, adjustments made 
to the training, design, and equipment of the brigade to future Stryker 
brigades (p. 22/GAO Draft Report.):

DoD RESPONSE: DoD concurs that adjustments needed to be made to the 
training, design, and equipment of the future Stryker brigades. To that 
end, the 3rD Brigade 2"a Infantry Division Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
(SBCT) Deployment Tiger Team, a team comprised of representatives from 
across the Army, has expanded its scope to include the materiel 
requirements for 1/25 SBCT deployment, as well as all future SBCTs. In 
addition, many of the proposed changes to the SBCT structure are 
currently being reviewed through the Documentation Assistance and 
Review Team (DART) process. For example, the issue associated with the 
STRYKER vehicles for the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target 
Acquisition (RSTA) Operations Officer and Troop was introduced in the 
DART process in September 2003. The Army is reviewing this possible 
shortcoming in design to determine the appropriate solution. The Army 
also plans to use the DART process to review future issues identified 
through the OIF deployment. In June 2002, Ft Lewis, Washington was 
designated as the Army's Center of Excellence for concept development, 
lessons learned and source for technical and tactical expertise for 
future interim (Stryker) force units. This function will assist the 
Army in distributing the training lessons learned based on the 
experiences of 3/2 and 1/25 SBCT.

[End of section]

Related GAO Products:

Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army 
Stryker Brigades. GAO-03-801. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.

Military Transformation: Army's Evaluation of Stryker and M-113A3 
Infantry Carrier Vehicles Provided Sufficient Data for Statutorily 
Mandated Comparison. GAO-03-671. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.

Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment of External Logistic Support Should 
Be Documented for the Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's 
Operational Evaluation Plan. GAO-03-484R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 
2003.

Military Transformation: Army Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of 
Future Interim Brigade Combat Teams. GAO-02-442. Washington, D.C.: May 
17, 2002.

Military Transformation: Army Has a Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its 
Transformation but Faces Major Challenges. GAO-02-96. Washington, D.C.: 
November 16, 2001.

Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapons Systems 
Challenges. GAO-01-311. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Section 113, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2002, P. L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001).

[2] Operational effectiveness is determined by the brigade's ability to 
successfully accomplish full spectrum missions as well as, or better 
than, current forces. This requires the capability to achieve decisive 
action through close combat, centered primarily on dismounted infantry 
assault.

[3] Operational suitability is determined if the brigade's design 
supports the tasking of the brigade to the type of missions and 
environments that the brigade's concept document indicates is 
appropriate for it. This requires organizing and equipping the force to 
provide high strategic, operational, and tactical mobility.

[4] The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation is the principal 
advisor to the Secretary of Defense concerning operational testing, 
including assessments of operational effectiveness, suitability, and 
survivability of the items tested.

[5] The readiness assessment was based on the evaluation of the mission 
training plan and the associated critical tasks. These tasks were 
evaluated as Go/No Go based on defined standards.

[6] This refers to the brigade's capability in the full spectrum of 
combat. See appendix III.

[7] The organizational and operational concept document provides a 
detailed framework for the definition of fundamental operational 
precepts, capabilities, and organizational constructs. The concept 
document is the basis for the development of mission training plans, 
training strategies and support packages, evaluation plans, and field 
manuals.

[8] The Army Test and Evaluation Command is the Army's independent 
operational test activity and is responsible for overall management of 
the Army test and evaluation programs.

[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Army Stryker Brigades: Assessment 
of External Logistics Support Should Be Documented for the 
Congressionally Mandated Review of the Army's Operational Evaluation 
Plan, GAO-03-484R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2003).

[10] Subject matter experts are usually commissioned officers and 
noncommissioned officers who have extensive experience with the studied 
equipment, recent unit experience, and a background as a trainer or in 
training development.

[11] Brigade and battalion staffs are generally organized into 
sections. These sections are numbered S-1 through S-6 and represent 
functions such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, civil 
affairs, and signal operations.

[12] FBCB2 is a digitized system that uses sophisticated information 
technology that allows Stryker brigade personnel to achieve superior 
battlefield information enabling them to engage the enemy long before 
coming into contact.

[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Operations: Contractors 
Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately 
Addressed in DOD Plans, GAO-03-695 (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2003).

[14] U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army 
Actions Needed to Enhance Formation of Future Interim Brigade Combat 
Teams, GAO-02-442 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2002).

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