

Report No. 05-INTEL-13
May 27, 2005

**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Waiver Report



DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE

**Forensic Capabilities and Incident Reporting
Related to Air Defense Actions**

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Acronyms (U)

BCS-F	Battle Control System - Fixed
CMOC	Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center
CONR	Continental U.S. NORAD Region
DSEL	Dynamic Synchronization Event Log
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
JADOC	Joint Air Defense Operations Center
NEADS	Northeast Air Defense Sector
NCS	NORAD Contingency Suite
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

May 27, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS
AND INFORMATION INTEGRATION/CHIEF
INFORMATION OFFICER

SUBJECT: Report on Forensic Capabilities and Incident Reporting Related to Air
Defense Actions (Report No. 05-INTEL-13) (U)

(U) We are providing this report for review and comment.

(U) DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all issues be resolved promptly. Management did not comment on the draft report. We request that management provide comments by June 27, 2005. Management comments should indicate concurrence or nonoccurrence with the finding and each applicable recommendation. Comments should describe actions taken or planned in response to agreed-upon recommendations and provide the completion dates of the actions. State specific reasons for any nonoccurrence and propose alternative actions, if appropriate.

(U) If possible, please provide management comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [REDACTED]@dodig.smil.mil. Copies of the management comments must contain the actual signature of the authorizing official. We cannot accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, they must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

(U) We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to [REDACTED] at (703) 602-[REDACTED] (DSN 332-[REDACTED]) or me at (703) 604-[REDACTED] (DSN 664-[REDACTED]). See Appendix D for the report distribution. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

Handwritten signature of Thomas F. Gimble in black ink.

Thomas F. Gimble
Deputy Inspector General
for Intelligence

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Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. 05-INTEL-13
(Project No. D2004-DINT01-0229.001)

May 27, 2005

**Forensic Capabilities and Incident Reporting
Related to Air Defense Actions (U)**

Executive Summary (U)

(U) Who Should Read This Report and Why? DoD officials who work with air defense and have responsibility for reporting on actions taken in response to air incidents should read this report because it discusses the current forensic capabilities and incident reporting process. For the purpose of this report, forensic capabilities are defined as the capabilities that allow for the recreation of actions taken and information available during a significant event.

(U) Background. On May 23, 2003, DoD officials testified to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) regarding the DoD's response to the terrorist hijackings. In its testimony, the DoD presented the times when the Federal Aviation Administration notified the North American Aerospace Defense Command of the hijackings and how DoD responded. There were four statements that the 9/11 Commission staff later concluded were inaccurate. In March 2004, DoD notified the 9/11 Commission that the May 2003 testimony was inaccurate. In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission requested the DoD Inspector General and the Department of Transportation Inspector General perform an inquiry into whether the testimony was knowingly false. As part of our review, we assessed DoD's ability to capture and report on future significant events. This report only addresses current reporting capabilities. A joint report from the DoD Inspector General and Department of Transportation Inspector General will address the 9/11 Commission's concerns regarding the May 2003 testimony.

(U) Results. DoD did not accurately report to the 9/11 Commission on the air defense response to the September 11, 2001 hijackings. The inaccuracies in part, resulted because of inadequate forensic capabilities and insufficient actions taken to ensure complete and accurate reporting of the events related to the 9/11 hijackings. Although improvements have been made subsequent to September 11, 2001, DoD might not be able to sufficiently capture and report on actions taken in response to a future significant air event. Expanded forensic capabilities should be put in place and a more robust investigation requirement established, otherwise the DoD will be vulnerable to Congressional, public, and judicial scrutiny if it is necessary to respond to future significant events. The DoD should establish and install standardized forensic capabilities to include data, voice, and video where possible at U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command locations, the National Military Command Center, and the Joint Air Defense Operations Center. Also, the DoD should develop and implement procedures for investigating and reporting on significant events similar to the September 11, 2001 incident.

(U) Management Comments. We did not receive management comments to the draft of this report issued March 18, 2005. The Director, Joint Staff provided unsolicited comments concurring with the need to implement the report recommendations. We request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer comment on this report by June 27, 2005.

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Background (U)

(U) The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a binational military organization established in 1958 by the U.S. and Canada to monitor and defend North American airspace. NORAD monitors, validates and warns of attack against North America by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles. NORAD also provides surveillance and control of the airspace of the U.S. and Canada. The area of responsibility ranges from Clear, Alaska, to the Florida Keys, and from St. John's Newfoundland, to San Diego, California. Prior to September 11, 2001, NORAD was focused on aerospace threats outside the borders of the U.S. and Canada. The focal point was not terrorism in the domestic airspace. The events of September 11, 2001 expanded the focus to now include domestic airspace. NORAD's defense of the interior air space is part of Operation Noble Eagle.

(U) NORAD consists of three regions: Alaskan NORAD Region, Canadian NORAD Region, and the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR). CONR is further broken into three sectors (hereafter referred to as the Air Defense Sectors): Western Air Defense Sector at McChord Air Force Base, Washington; Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) at Rome, New York; and Southeast Air Defense Sector at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. Supporting the NORAD mission, the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC) assists the air sovereignty mission for the U.S. and Canada, and if necessary, serves as the focal point for air defense operations to counter enemy bombers or cruise missiles. CMOC is instrumental in Operation Noble Eagle as it assists the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in responding to any threatening or hostile domestic aircraft. As part of Operation Noble Eagle, the Joint Air Defense Operations Center (JADOC) located at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., monitors the air traffic in the National Capitol Region. The National Military Command Center (NMCC) is the nation's focal point for continuous monitoring and coordination of worldwide military operations. The NMCC directly supports Combatant Commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President in the command of U.S. armed forces in peacetime, contingencies, and war.

(U) The Congress and the President established the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (hereafter referred to as the 9/11 Commission) to investigate the facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In May 2003, representatives of DoD and FAA testified to the 9/11 Commission. The testimony set forth the times at which the FAA became aware that each flight was hijacked; the times at which NEADS was notified of the hijackings; and how DoD responded.

(U) The 9/11 Commission staff later concluded that significant aspects of the testimony were incorrect. The testimony contained inaccurate accounts related to when DoD was notified of each hijacking and why the fighter jets were scrambled. In March 2004, DoD notified the 9/11 Commission by letter and in subsequent testimony that the May 2003 testimony was inaccurate. In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission requested an inquiry by the DoD Inspector General and the Department of Transportation Inspector General into the inaccurate testimony.

Forensic Capabilities and Incident Reporting (U)

(U) DoD did not accurately report to the 9/11 Commission on the response to the September 11, 2001 hijackings. The inaccuracies resulted in part, because of insufficient forensic capabilities. Further, sufficient emphasis was not placed on investigating and reporting actions taken in response to the hijackings. As a result, the veracity of the DoD Official's testimony was questioned. Although improvements have been made subsequent to September 11, 2001, DoD might not be able to sufficiently capture and report on actions taken in response to a future significant air event.

Recreation of Events (U)

(U) On September 18, 2001, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the DoD published a timeline of NORAD's response to the commercial airliner hijackings. The timeline included when the FAA notified NEADS of each hijacking, when the fighter jets were given the order to scramble, when the jets were airborne, airline impact time, and the fighter distance from the impact location. The published timeline was based, in part, on efforts that began on September 13, 2001 by the NORAD Public Affairs Office to collect information to construct a timeline of the events. According to the NORAD Director of Public Affairs, all information used to create the timeline was gathered from CONR and NEADS.

(U) We could not determine who specifically at CONR or NEADS was responsible for creating the timeline. We were able to conclude that information flowed from NEADS through CONR to NORAD via faxes and emails. According to officials interviewed, the timeline was established using hand written logs, Radar Evaluation Squadron data, preliminary transcripts from the audiotapes, and personal recollection of events.

(U) In May 2003, DoD officials testified to the 9/11 Commission. CONR officials using the DoD September 2001 press release timeline, as well as additional information from personal recollections prepared the briefing used for the testimony. The DoD presented the times when the FAA notified NEADS of the hijackings and how the DoD responded. As a result of the testimony, there were four statements that the 9/11 Commission staff later concluded were inaccurate.

- (U) Testimony indicated that the FAA notified NEADS at 9:16 a.m. that United Flight 93 was hijacked. The actual time was 10:07 a.m.
- (U) Testimony indicated that the FAA notified NEADS of the hijacking of American Flight 77 at 9:24 a.m. The actual time was 9:34 a.m.

- (U) Testimony indicated that fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base, Virginia were scrambled in response to the hijacking of United Flight 93 and American Flight 77. The 9/11 Commission later determined that the fighters were scrambled in response to an erroneous report that American Flight 11 was heading south toward Washington, D.C.
- (U) Testimony indicated that officials were tracking United Flight 93 and intended to intercept the aircraft if it approached Washington, D.C. In fact, DoD officials were not aware that United Flight 93 was hijacked until after the flight crashed.

(U) Appendix B provides a description of the events associated with each flight as determined by the 9/11 Commission.

Forensic Capabilities (U)

(U) Our review determined that the lack of adequate forensic capabilities was one of the factors that led to the creation of the erroneous press release and testimony. For the purpose of this report, forensic capabilities are defined as the capabilities that allow for the recreation of actions taken and information available during a significant event. These capabilities include logs, video and audio recordings, and storage of radar information. We also determined that while significant upgrades to forensic capabilities have been made, there are still deficiencies that might prevent DoD from reporting accurately on the actions taken and the justification for a response to future significant events.

(U) **Electronic Logs.** According to the CONR Commander, it was difficult to reconstruct the events of September 11, 2001 due to the absence of a standardized, region-wide log system. Historically, watch centers have used hand-written logs to keep legal and historic records of events taking place during the watch period. The logs were archived in hardcopy form and the legibility of the writing in the books was not always reliable. This was the case on September 11, 2001.

(U)



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(U) [REDACTED] Reconciling log times between various commands on when events happened was a significant problem experienced as part of the timeline development.

(U) If the DoD is going to rely on the use of logs as a form of evidence, then there needs to be standardization within the DoD of the type and format of the log. There also needs to be a mechanism in place to confirm that times at each location are synchronized. Further, appropriate retention of the logs will be critical in order to reconstruct an event if one occurs.

(U) **Video Recording.** After the initial testimony to the 9/11 Commission, the CONR Commander realized the importance of having a forensic capability within the CONR Air Operations Center and initiated a short-term fix, which included installation of video recording devices. There are [REDACTED] monitors and [REDACTED] video cameras currently being used and CONR has the capacity to record up to [REDACTED] video channels.

[REDACTED] The data is stored on hard drives and backed up [REDACTED]. Video recording adds to the creditability of evidence available to document how a critical decision, such as scrambling fighters, was made. However, the system installed at CONR does not provide sufficient clarity to enable an accurate reconstruction of events.

(U) **Audio Recording.** DoD's ability to report on its response to the September 11, 2001 hijackings was impacted by insufficient audio recording capabilities throughout the organizations involved. Key positions at NEADS, such as the mission crew commander, and the weapons and identification technicians have audio recording capabilities. On September 11, 2001, these positions were recorded using a Dictaphone taping device. However, NEADS personnel encountered a problem while trying to transcribe the tapes and the tapes were not used to construct the press release nor used in reporting on the events of September 11, 2001 until the 9/11 Commission staff members reviewed the tapes.

[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(U) **Data Recording.** Personnel at the Air Defense Sectors monitor, identify and track potentially hostile aircraft through radar inputs. On September 11, 2001, the Air Defense Sectors were only concerned with identifying and tracking aircraft originating outside the U.S. and Canada.

[REDACTED] NORAD has devised both short term and long term fixes, which are described below.

(U) **NORAD Contingency Suite (NCS).** The NCS was designed to connect FAA radars throughout the United States to the Air Defense Sectors allowing the sectors to see, identify, and track all U.S. air traffic. NCS was a short-term fix until a permanent solution could be developed. NCS bypassed testing and used commercial off-the-shelf products.

[REDACTED] The ability to reconstruct exactly when planes were identified and what tracking was done could be critical in reconstructing and reporting on a future incident.

(S) [REDACTED]

(U) Table 1 provides an overview of the current forensic capabilities at CMOC, CONR, the Air Defense Sectors, JADOC, and the NMCC.

Table 1. Forensic and Recording Capabilities (U)

(S)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S)


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Incident Reporting (U)

(U) Sufficient emphasis was not placed on investigating and reporting actions taken in response to the hijackings. Although improvements have been made, such as additional reporting guidance, DoD may not be able to report accurately on a future significant event. Commanders throughout DoD did not place a high priority on developing accurate information regarding the events of September 11, 2001. DoD relied on NORAD to develop information to be reported to the press and subsequently to the 9/11 Commission. However, after September 11, 2001, NORAD officials primarily focused their efforts on identifying and correcting operational weaknesses. Gathering information related to the events of September 11, 2001 was considered to be an additional duty. Consequently, the events were neither adequately reported nor documented. There were no files maintained at CONR or NORAD tracking how the information reported was developed. Once Operation Noble Eagle began, NORAD, CONR, and NEADS did not have adequate staff to execute their expanded air defense mission. All administrative functions that could be were terminated and personnel were reassigned to operational duties. For example, the historian for NEADS was pulled from his duties of collecting data for historical purposes and placed in the Operation Center working with the radars. Senior officials were working extended shifts.

(U) Further, preparation of the testimony given to the 9/11 Commission was focused on the information developed immediately after the event. Steps were not taken to check the accuracy of the information. The emphasis immediately after September 11, 2001 on improving the air defense posture is understandable. However, the need for accurate information regarding the events of September 11, 2001 should also have been recognized and responsibility for developing and documenting the source of information should not have been tasked as an additional duty. Nor should the responsibility have been placed on a command element that did not have direct access to all the information available. Personnel at CONR did not have direct access to CMOC and NMCC information. Such direct access to information would be easily available to Joint Staff or Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel.

(U) Subsequent to September 11, 2001, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff took action to improve incident reporting by issuing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.03B, "Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Report," July 28, 2003.

 Further, maintenance of sufficient records to support the information reported is not required. Lack of such requirements contributed to the inaccurate information presented to the 9/11 Commission and the impression that information was knowingly presented inaccurately.

Conclusion (U)

(U) The DoD must do everything possible to be in the position to reconstruct all elements related to another event similar to September 11, 2001. The need for forensic capabilities to understand what happened during a significant event is critical. If more emphasis had been placed on determining exactly what happened and why Commanders responded as they did on the morning of September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission may not have questioned the veracity of DoD's testimony. We recognize that actions have been taken to improve forensic capabilities; however, the short-term improvements have limitations that may affect the quality and accuracy of incident reporting. If expanded forensic capabilities are not put in place and a more robust investigation requirement is not established, DoD will be vulnerable to Congressional, public, and judicial scrutiny if it is necessary to respond to a future significant event.

Recommendations (U)

(U) We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer:

1. (U) Establish and install standardized forensic capabilities to include logs, video, and audio recordings and storage of radar information where possible at U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command locations, the National Military Command Center, and the Joint Air Defense Operations Center.
2. (U) Develop and implement procedures for investigating and reporting on significant events similar to the September 11, 2001 incident. Procedures should include the appointment of an independent investigation team and the archiving of all pertinent records related to the incident.

Management Comments Required (U)

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer did not comment on the draft of this report. The Director, Joint Staff provided unsolicited comments concurring with the need to implement the report recommendations. For the full text of the Director, Joint Staff comments see the Management Comments sections of this report. We request that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer provide comments on the final report.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology (U)

(U) We reviewed the process and forensic capabilities used for creating the press release timeline and for preparing the testimony provided to the 9/11 Commission. We also reviewed the current and planned forensic capabilities and incident reporting at CMOC, CONR, NEADS, South East Air Defense Sector, JADOC, and the NMCC. We toured each facility and were briefed on their current structure as well as future upgrades. In addition, we reviewed documentation and regulations that pertain to domestic conferencing procedures and reporting procedures. Specific instructions included the Department of Defense Directive 4660.3, "Secretary of Defense Communications," April 29, 1996; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.01A, "Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions," December 20, 2002; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.03B, "Joint Reporting Structure Event and Incident Report," July 28, 2003; North American Aerospace Defense Command Instruction 10-19, "NORAD Aerospace Reporting System (ARS)," January 2, 2002; and NORAD/U.S. Northern Command Instruction 10-112, "Domestic Conferencing Procedures," September 1, 2004.

(U) We interviewed officials from NORAD, CONR, NEADS, the South East Air Defense Sector, the NMCC, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the Office of the Joint Chief of Staff, and the DoD General Counsel.

(U) We performed this review from September 2004 through March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

(U) We did not review the management control program because the scope was limited to the specific issues identified by the 9/11 Commission.

(U) **Use of Computer-Processed Data.** We did not use computer-processed data to perform this review.

Prior Coverage (U)

(U) No prior coverage has been conducted on forensic capabilities and incident reporting of air defense during the last 5 years.

Appendix B. Summary of Hijacked Events (U)

(U) From November 2002 through July 2004, the 9/11 Commission reviewed 2.5 million pages of documentation and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals. From this, the 9/11 Commission was able to create an accurate depiction of the events associated with each hijacked flight. In March 2004, the NORAD Commander sent a letter to the 9/11 Commission agreeing with their assessment of events.

(U) **American Airlines Flight 11.** American Flight 11 departed from Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts at 7:59 a.m. Just before 8:14 a.m., all communications and flight profile data were normal and American Flight 11 had its last routine communication. Sixteen seconds after that transmission, American Flight 11 was instructed to climb to 35,000 feet. That message and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledged. At 8:21 a.m., American Flight 11 turned off its transponder. At 8:37 a.m., FAA's Boston Center personnel contacted NEADS and at 8:40 a.m. a decision-maker at NEADS was on the phone. At 8:46 a.m., NEADS scrambles fighter jets from Otis Air Force Base in search of American Flight 11 and the jets were airborne at 8:53 a.m. Also at 8:46 a.m., American Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. At 9:21 a.m., FAA's Boston Center personnel informed NEADS that American Flight 11 was still in the air heading towards Washington, D.C. At 9:24 a.m., NEADS ordered the scramble of fighter jets from Langley Air Force Base. Radar data shows the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30 a.m.

(U) **United Airlines Flight 175.** United Flight 175 departed Logan International Airport at 8:14 a.m. At 8:42 a.m., the crew completed their report on a "suspicious transmission" overheard from another plane (which turned out to have been Flight 11) just after takeoff. This was United Flight 175's last communication with the ground. At 8:47 a.m., United Flight 175 changed transponder codes twice within a minute. At 8:51 a.m., the flight deviated from its assigned altitude, and a minute later FAA's New York Center personnel began repeatedly trying to contact United Flight 175. At 9:03 a.m., United Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United Flight 175, came in a phone call from FAA's New York Center to NEADS at 9:03 a.m.

(U) **American Airlines Flight 77.** American Flight 77 departed Dulles International Airport, Herndon, Virginia at 8:20 a.m. At 8:51 a.m., American Flight 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication. At 8:54 a.m., the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south. Two minutes later the transponder was turned off and even primary radar contact with the aircraft was lost. At 9:34 a.m., FAA's Washington Center personnel informed NEADS that American Flight 77 was lost. At 9:37 a.m. American Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon.

(U) United Airlines Flight 93. United Flight 93 departed from Liberty International Airport, Newark, New Jersey at 8:42 a.m., more than 25 minutes later than scheduled. At 9:27 a.m. after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United Flight 93 acknowledged a transmission from FAA's Cleveland Center. At 9:28 a.m., United Flight 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. At 9:39 a.m., the FAA Cleveland Center overheard another announcement indicating that there was a bomb on board. United Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03 a.m. NEADS first received a call about United Flight 93 from the military liaison at the FAA Cleveland Center at 10:07 a.m.

Appendix C. Domestic Conferences (U)

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Appendix D. Report Distribution (U)

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Office of the Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Chief Financial Officer
Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief
Information Officer
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff

Department of the Navy

Naval Inspector General
Auditor General, Department of the Navy

Department of the Air Force

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force
Commander, Air Combat Command

Combatant Commands

Commander, U.S. Northern Command/ North American Aerospace Defense Command

(U)

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Congressional Committees and Subcommittees

Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Chairman and Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee
on Appropriations
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Government Reform
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

(U)

Director, Joint Staff Comments (U)



SECRET
THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

DJSM-0589-05
23 May 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR
GENERAL

Subject: Report on Forensic Capabilities and Incident Reporting Related to Air
Defense Actions (Project No. D2004-DINT01-0229.001) (U)

1. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject report.¹ We concur
with the following comment.

(U) Page 7, 1st paragraph, last two sentences. Delete and replace with:
"Data recording capability for the BCS-F is currently under development in
order to provide forensic capability following a significant air event."

(U) REASON: Clarity, based on development of a data recording capability
for Battle Control System-Fixed.

2. (S) [REDACTED]

3. (U) The Joint Staff point of contact is [REDACTED], USN;
J-3/DDAT/HD-HD; 703-693 [REDACTED]

NORTON A. SCHWARTZ
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff


Reference:

- 1 DoD DAIG (IA) memorandum, 18 March 2005, "Report on Forensic
Capabilities and Incident Reporting Related to Air Defense Actions
(Project No. D2004-DINT01-0229.001) (U)"

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Team Members (U)

(U) The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence prepared this report. Personnel of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report are listed below.

Thomas F. Gimble



Department of Transportation Inspector General Team Members



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