
The Mitterrand
Legacy and the Future
of French Security
Policy

Ronald Tiersky



JFQ

JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly is a professional military journal published under the auspices of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, to promote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces. ***JFQ*** focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, operations conducted by the unified commands, and joint force development.

The journal is a forum for examining joint and combined warfare and exchanging ideas of importance to all services. ***JFQ*** appeals to a wide audience across the defense community with an interest in the nature and history of joint warfighting.

TO ORDER A SUBSCRIPTION, cite ***Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)*** and send your check for \$21.00 (\$26.25 foreign), or provide your VISA or MasterCard number and expiration date, to Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15220-7954. You may also place orders by FAX: (202) 512-2233.

THE MITTERRAND LEGACY AND THE FUTURE OF FRENCH SECURITY POLICY

RONALD TIERSKY

McNair Paper 43
August 1995

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Washington, DC

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

- *President:* Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, USAF
- *Vice President:* Ambassador William G. Walker

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

- *Director & Publisher:* Dr. Hans A. Binnendijk

Publications Directorate & NDU Press

Fort Lesley J. McNair , Washington, DC 20319-6000

- Phone: (202) 475-1913 □ Facsimile: (202) 475-1012
 - *Director & Managing Editor:* Dr. Frederick T. Kiley
 - *Vice Director & General Editor:* Major Thomas W. Krise, USAF
 - *Chief, Editorial & Publications Branch:* Mr. George C. Maerz
 - *Senior Editor:* Ms. Mary A. Sommerville
 - *Editor:* Mr. Jonathan W. Pierce
 - *Editor for this issue:* Ms. Mary A. Sommerville
 - *Editorial Assistant:* Ms. Cherie R. Preville
 - *Distribution Manager:* Mrs. Myrna Myers
 - *Secretary:* Mrs. Laura Hall
-

From time to time, INSS publishes McNair Papers to provoke thought and inform discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the post-Cold War era. These monographs present current topics related to national security strategy and policy, defense resource management, international affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and coalition operations.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations, expressed or implied, are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. Government agency. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this publication may be quoted or reprinted without further permission, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC. A courtesy copy of reviews and tearsheets would be appreciated.

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISSN 1071-7552

Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. BACKGROUND | 1 |
| France and Post-Cold War European Security | 1 |
| Mitterrand's Legacy | 8 |
| 2. CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE | 13 |
| The New Nexus of Security and Integration | 13 |
| The Security Concern of Muslim Fundamentalism .. | 22 |
| The <i>Crise des Fondements</i> : Gaullism, National Interest, and European Security | 24 |
| Bosnia, France, and European Security | 29 |
| 3. SOME FRENCH MILITARY TRENDS | 31 |
| Force Development: The 1995-2000 Military Plan .. | 31 |
| Mitterrand's Nuclear Legacy | 36 |
| The Nuclear Test Moratorium | 38 |
| 4. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS | 41 |
| The Balladur Cohabitation Government | 41 |
| A French-British Defense Axis? | 44 |
| Developing the OSCE | 48 |
| An Inter-African Peacekeeping Force? | 50 |
| 5. AFTER MITTERRAND | 55 |
| | |
| NOTES | 59 |
| APPENDIX: Selected 1994 White Paper Maps | 65 |
| ABOUT THE AUTHOR | 67 |

THE MITTERRAND LEGACY AND THE FUTURE OF FRENCH SECURITY POLICY

1. BACKGROUND

FRANCE AND POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY

The French are trying to move with the times in post-Cold War European security developments. In spite of President François Mitterrand's own hesitations and ambivalences in the transition from Cold War to post-Cold War European frameworks, the French are an active source of proposals, diplomacy, and military engagement in peacekeeping.

Bloody and devastating conflict in former Yugoslavia has already demonstrated that, contrary to understandable if naive optimism at the Cold War's end, the way forward will not be simple or easy. It has been shown that cruelty and human suffering on a mass scale—military and civilian deaths, organized rape as a tool of war, widespread hunger, deliberate creation of civilian war refugees, the ferocity of “ethnic cleansing”—are still possible in Europe. Even if the Bosnian wars have remained localized, Sarajevo was only a few hundred kilometers from the December 1994 Budapest Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting of 53 states. This seemed reassuringly far away to some delegations, frighteningly near to others.

Nevertheless, although European military dangers still must be taken seriously, the post-Cold War *Zeitgeist* is neither Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) nor some “back to the future” scenario of continually multiplying conventional wars, such as led to World

2 THE MITTERRAND LEGACY

War I. The problems of organizing post-Cold War Europe into a stable and reliable security framework are neither as simple as the initial optimists believed nor as intractable as the pessimists naturally assume. The objective situation is, in any case, that a restructured, reliable post-Cold War European security system remains to be built. More mass suffering, and even national disasters, could occur if the dangers to peace and negotiated settlement of conflicts in the new, whole Europe are not dealt with successfully.

What the French do in these matters is important. France is a key actor in European security. It is a substantial, independent nuclear power. Because of its multifaceted special relationship with Germany, as well as its growing dealings in defense matters with Britain, France is today at the center of European political ties and peacekeeping enterprises, as well as part of the plans for a European Union (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). France's agreement is also vital to NATO's post-Cold War evolution, which includes the determination of the relationships between the United States and Europe; between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU); between NATO and the WEU, and the "Partnership for Peace" states; and among NATO, the OSCE, and the United Nations.

France will play, as it has for four decades, a complex role in Atlantic security structures, and therefore in American security interests in Europe. France will likewise play a crucial role in any purely European organization of European security, whether in cooperation with the United States in relation to NATO, or in the context of U.S. disengagement from Europe.

In contrast to four decades of European security configurations when negotiations occurred against a backdrop of American security protection, post-Cold War plans must be worked out in radically different circumstances. At the very least, American security leadership can, for better or worse, no longer be taken for granted by western Europeans, nor, as Clinton administration policy has indicated, will future American governments necessarily *want* to lead in European security matters, even if U.S. leadership is solicited by the Europeans. This is one implication of the Clinton administration's agreement that NATO's logistical, communications, and other equipment might be used in out-of-area military

operations by the WEU, without U.S. participation, according to the "separable but not separate" doctrine.

France's role and weight in European security obviously cannot be understood without considering the influence of other states' interests and policies. This is to say only that looking at any particular state's policy through its own lens tends to magnify the importance of that country. What one has, therefore, is an intellectual problem requiring a sense of analytical and conceptual balance, so that a study of French policy, for example, doesn't become by definition francophile or francophobic.

American security policy, furthermore, exhibits a venerable tradition of distrusting France in security matters. The French may be seen as cynical, tricky, or pompously self-important and unjustifiably nationalistic. To take a celebrated example, this pessimistic American view of France was put forward by Harry Hopkins, FDR's emissary in discussions with General de Gaulle just prior to Yalta, from which the Free French leader was to be excluded. In de Gaulle's *War Memoirs*, which must be the classic account of this incident,¹ Hopkins observes that the French had let down their allies in the 1930s, became defeatist and appeasement-oriented, the result of which was Vichy. How, Hopkins asked de Gaulle, could Americans, in "the stupefying disappointment we suffered when we saw France collapse and surrender in the disaster of 1940," be expected any longer to have confidence in the French?

De Gaulle replied that he, better than any other Frenchman, of course understood American disappointment with previous French military and defense policy which he himself had denounced with so little success in the 1930s. But now, despite the success of the Resistance and of de Gaulle's leadership, the French had reason to believe that the Americans, who "after all took three years to get into the First World War and two years for the second war." "The French," he told Hopkins, "have the impression that you no longer consider the greatness of France necessary to the world and to yourself."²

The French have reciprocated U.S. distrust, and de Gaulle wrote the books on the subject.³ Power is power, and geopolitical inequalities will plague even such strong historical ties as the French-American relationship. France's national situation is, as always since World War I, the problem of maximizing its security, its influence, and diplomatic room to maneuver, in a geopolitical

4 THE MITTERRAND LEGACY

position of inferiority relative both to principal allies and potential adversaries. French-American disagreements are, in general, as intrinsic as European-American clashes, and a sense of perspective about conflicts of interest is a pre-condition for gauging basic commonalities of value and purpose.

At the same time, a geopolitical sensitivity guards against the naivete that tends to be inherent in idealist and moralist foreign policy traditions. National interest is justifiably paramount in any state's security policy. Security and defense are, naturally, the first priority of any state. Properly understood, this fact is both a cause of war and yet paradoxically a possibility for peace. The French, in their insistence on the primacy of the nation and the nation-state, are sometimes frustrating for American policy, but the French desire to "exist" is a healthy factor in the international system as a whole, one which, among other things, serves to keep Americans awake to the fact that American perceptions and interests are not necessarily those of the world.

In terms of policy, the French are finding, like Americans, Germans and other allies, that indications of what needs to be done in post-Cold War Europe are complex, leading off in more than one direction. For example, in terms of institutions and European security architecture, how should NATO be constituted and its mission defined in the post-Soviet, post-Cold War world of European security? Who should be full members and who should be only "partners," to use the new term,? Would NATO's security mission be served best by expansion or by remaining with the traditional membership, augmented by Partnership for Peace relationships with former adversary countries?

What should the European Union be asked to do for European security in the coming period? Should the EU have its own frank and free-standing defense and security institutions—the "European pillar" of NATO finally realized—or should the Western European Union and the projected EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy be kept subject to NATO, in order to keep the U.S. present and deeply implicated in European security problems, from the point of view of European and French interests?

In terms of contingency plans, perhaps the lesson learned from the wars in former Yugoslavia is that it is better to intervene early, or, if possible, preventively. Or maybe it is best to let warring groups wear themselves down before attempting peacemaking,

because, as Bosnia has shown once again, when enemies want war, want to kill rather than to negotiate, outsiders will find it very difficult, not to say risky, to end the violence or even to foster a durable armistice.

But dealing with ambiguous situations with an array of self-contradictory means and ends is nothing new in European security. Even during the Cold War, when the designation of dangers and adversary was clearest, strategic options always had to be evaluated and tradeoffs calculated.

As has been pointed out numerous times, today the Soviet Union's disappearance, a great gain in the Cold War's end, is itself the source of post-Cold War confusion. The new French military doctrine, in theorizing "the lack of a designated adversary," shows how the USSR's disappearance is a solution and simultaneously a new problem for European security.

But this paradox, resulting from the containment strategy's success, is no reason to "miss the Cold War," in John J. Mearsheimer's overused term. It is hard to see that such a claim is more than a dangerous intellectual game. The Cold War was a struggle well worth fighting and funding. Governments and their militarics ought to be facing the new security problems with the resolve that comes from knowing that the Cold War job, despite all problems and crises, was carried through successfully.

Basic issues in the European security dilemma can be formulated easily enough. Will the Atlantic alliance and the NATO military structure evolve adequately to deal with post-Cold War security problems in Europe, or are the bonds in NATO fraying irrevocably, with the integrated command structure fated either to disappear or to evolve into uselessness and irrelevance? Against this background, should the development of a "European defense identity" and a European Union "common foreign and security policy" be hastened or slowed, the one or the other for precisely the same reasons?

With regard to France, some key questions arise:

- What kind of a coalition partner will the French be in the future?
- Will France, given the tortuous history of its NATO participation, be an even more reluctant partner, or on the contrary more open and accommodating?

6 THE MITTERRAND LEGACY

- How will France's alliance availability be affected by the change from a MAD nuclear standoff of two superarmed alliances to localized post-Cold War conflicts where peacekeeping and/or conventional military engagement, with attendant risks to life, are the issues?
- Where are French soldiers likely to show up—the southern Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, in Arab Middle Eastern or North African countries—and what will be their missions?

The French, whether their particular policies are successful or not, are on many scores the most active European state in working to adapt to the new situation. The French are not changing, however, in how they perceive their geopolitical situation and the international context. They want to exist in the strategic framework and influence major decisions, while recognizing American predominance, along with the other big powers. French foreign policy, as one high Elysee official put it to this writer, is not built per se on resentment of American geopolitical strength. Overall American predominance and leadership, is, for the French, an accepted given. But American policy must respect French policies and French goals, or naturally there will be friction.

The French are not, or not as often as American policymakers may think, cynical obstructionists searching for “prestige,” for “grandeur” or simply trying to have it both ways. On specific European security issues French policy may still play the gadfly or the heroic resister, but overall—from the Cuban Missile crisis to the Euromissile crisis to *Desert Storm*—the French have shown themselves to be dependable partners who, in turn, see themselves as very often frustrated or confused by American policies or by shifts in American policies. One of de Gaulle's legacies in French political life is to have inspired a high sense of French responsibility for security matters. François Mitterrand, as shown in this paper, has certainly been the most *gaullien* of de Gaulle's successors.

Harsh European-American disagreements about what to do regarding the Bosnian wars mesmerized public European security discussions in the second half of 1994. However, it would be a serious mistake to allow allied frustrations in dealing with the human and military problems in Bosnian to monopolize, not to say deform, new thinking about European security at a critical time.

Nevertheless, the December Budapest CSCE meeting ended up a diplomatic disaster because of Bosnia when the Russian Government would not allow any resolutions (which required unanimity) stipulating that Serbia was the aggressor. Even a passionate plea by German chancellor Helmut Kohl for the primacy of humanitarian assistance did not convince the Bosnian Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic to allow a unanimous resolution for a cease-fire and food and medical aid to his people, because it did not stipulate that the Serbs were the aggressors against his internationally recognized state.

Had the Bosnian dispute not taken up such a large place in debates at the CSCE (now the OSCE), the portentous disagreement between Russia and the Western allies about NATO's plans to expand into eastern Europe, in effect to the Russian border, would have appeared even more central. For example, this is an issue that threatens to stir the pot in Russia's tense domestic politics, and OSCE participants understood that the potential renewal of a nationalist, aggressive Russia is the single most dangerous security threat facing Europe in the next decade and after.

Despite this, the Bosnian tragedy and the dramas regarding Russia's democratic development are not all there is on the French plate regarding European security matters. In a positive sense, there has been movement in French policy toward long-term European Union security evolution, as well as a much-noticed French-American rapprochement both bilaterally and to some extent also within NATO. These are part of trends running deeper than circumstantial disagreements, as President Jacques Chirac reaffirmed in the first days after taking office in May 1995; they make up an important part of the evolving post-Cold War European security regime.

Possibly, hard though it may be to imagine today, EU inaction in Bosnia may turn out to be a moral-practical vaccination of the big European powers against the temptation to duck early action and preventive peacekeeping in future conflicts. The terrible human costs of inaction have been demonstrated, and in various European capitals there has been much talk about the future of preventive diplomacy, as opposed to peacekeeping after a conflict has flared.⁴ As Machiavelli said, a war not fought is often only a war postponed, and the maladies of "renationalization" and the aversion of rich and

safe societies to cataclysms of “far-off peoples of whom we know little” need not be inevitable.

MITTERRAND'S LEGACY

President François Mitterrand was the living link between France's Cold War and post-Cold War security policy. Generally speaking, Mitterrand's leadership in foreign and security policy was impressive.⁵ His masterful security policy performance during his first term (1981-88), gave way to much criticized hesitations and uncertainties during the transition from Cold War to post-Cold War problems. Yet overall, Mitterrand's legacies in foreign and security policy are a source of some confidence to the new President Chirac.

There are two parts to the issue of evaluating François Mitterrand's legacy in French security policy:

- The heritage of 14 years of French policy. Not everything was Mitterrand's responsibility, and, given France's interests, much of what he did would have been done, better or worse, by any French president.
- What aspects of the legacy are particularly Mitterrand's work? Did Mitterrand's own views, for example, prolong certain policies that otherwise would likely have been changed? Will certain of his policies, controversial or inadequate, be rapidly changed after his departure from office? Are there notable Mitterrand policies likely to characterize French security policy for a long time?

Heritage

The Fifth Republic's “elected monarch” is normally in full charge of foreign and defense policy. Even in periods of “cohabitation,” when a president must live with an opposing parliamentary majority and thus prime minister, he has the most influence in the high politics of security policy.

The 1993-95 conservative Edouard Balladur government was the second period of “cohabitation” in the Fifth Republic. In 1986-88, the conservative prime minister was, of course, Jacques Chirac. The political and institutional effects of cohabitation on foreign and security policy are an important subject in this analysis, bearing on what is consensus policy and what is subject to partisan debate in France's role in establishing the structures of post-Cold War

Europe. It is worth noting, if only in passing, that President Mitterrand has made a constitutional success of cohabitation, whereas commentators had for years argued that such power-sharing by left and right in national office would end in crisis.⁶

Mitterrand's Own

The second aspect of the Mitterrand legacy is those areas in which he left a personal imprint on French policy. The first area is NATO, where Mitterrand was particularly *gaullien*, combining an intransigent watchfulness regarding the principle of national independence of decision with a large pragmatism, especially in times of crisis. De Gaulle's behavior in the Cuban Missile crisis, his immediate and complete solidarity with JFK and American policy, is the classic example here. In Mitterrand's case, his strong policy during the Euromissile crisis, evident above all in his 1983 Bundestag speech, showed him in full support of the Alliance when circumstances were critical. Later, in the Gulf War, Mitterrand's policy was similar: a complete engagement in the fight, including putting French troops under American command, but only after French diplomacy had tried unnervingly until the very last minute to short-circuit a war against Iraq through "lone ranger" diplomacy.

Along with these moments of alliance solidarity, the expression of France's most basic international commitments, President Mitterrand maintained a tight personal vigilance over French disengagement from the integrated military command, doing so against a growing, though still minority, opinion in the defense community that France should move closer to the integrated command structure. For example, Balladur several times gave indications of favoring a further French rapprochement with NATO. Nevertheless, there is no strong belief that France should rejoin the integrated command. The gains from doing so, primarily military cooperation and technical knowledge, would be outweighed, if not in the minds of the military then in high government circles, by political losses: France's special diplomatic status, political influence, and world prestige.

President Mitterrand, to illustrate the French dance in NATO, finally permitted French participation in NATO discussions of specific peacekeeping operations, allowing defense minister François Léotard to attend a Military Committee meeting in Seville. At the last minute, however, he stopped Chief of Staff Admiral

10 THE MITTERRAND LEGACY

Jacques Lanxard from attending a regular planning session of the same committee. The difference was a distinction between a particular mission France had accepted and regular alliance planning. Overall, Mitterrand showed a skillful, typically *gaullien* calibration of French behavior in NATO: solidarity in critical circumstances combined with principled detachment from the integrated command, even if the behavior and results may only have seemed quirky, or “French,” to France’s partners.

Will this policy will change under President Chirac? There is little evidence that the French would find reason to rejoin the NATO integrated command outright. On the other hand, there is a widely shared opinion in the French security community that general closer cooperation with NATO would be useful, without giving up France’s position and leverage from the exterior. Even if not decisive, this separate status is a useful arrow in the French diplomatic quiver.

The second area in which Mitterrand put his own stamp on French security policy was in the nuclear arena.⁷ Mitterrand was a deterrence purist, resisting any deviance from a doctrine of absolute deterrence—meaning a modernized nuclear arsenal combined with a total refusal to envisage (at least publicly) what to do if deterrence failed.

French deterrence policy during the Mitterrand years continued to be a version of the Gaullist strategy of massive retaliation. The French, at the level of doctrine at least, separated their own nuclear policy from NATO’s and especially from the U.S. doctrine of flexible response. In the logic of French doctrine, flexible response made all war in Europe, nuclear and conventional both, more likely. Mitterrand was not John Foster Dulles, however, and it is an open question whether the French pure deterrence doctrine could have existed absent the covering umbrella of American extended deterrence. Pure deterrence was not only the most efficient or effective deterrence strategy for a second-rank nuclear power such as France, it also expressed an intransigent refusal to be dictated to by larger powers, so the rejection of flexible response was another *gaullien* stance.

The new post-Cold War French military strategy, outlined in the Balladur government’s 1994 White Paper on defense, reflects striking changes (few of which have as yet been put into full effect) in both France’s nuclear and conventional force doctrines. French

nuclear doctrine has to take into account the lack of a designated adversary, and conventional force doctrine must recognize that the post-Cold War French military requires a doctrine of engagement as opposed to its essential Cold War role of acting as a tripwire for engagement of the *force de frappe* (nuclear deterrent force). Two questions arise about Mitterrand's legacy in these matters:

- Will the French nuclear force be maintained at previous levels (this includes the issue of a possible Europeanization of national nuclear strategy)?
- What is the future of Mitterrand's nuclear moratorium?

2. CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE

THE NEW NEXUS OF SECURITY AND INTEGRATION

In previous studies, a tentative conceptualization of the change from Cold War to post-Cold War security issues was offered. During the Cold War period, “security” and “integration” divided European countries neatly into blocs; within each bloc, security and integration basically overlapped. In post-Cold War Europe, however, there is a new nexus of security and integration, beyond Yalta and beyond Cold War frameworks. In earlier papers, this new nexus could be described only in abstract terms; today it is taking practical form on the ground.⁸

One great issue today will be the consequences of European Union enlargement: first the incorporation of Austria, Sweden, and Finland as of January 1, 1995, and later, perhaps within 10 years, three eastern “Visegrad” states—the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Five years after the Berlin Wall was breached, Europe remains economically divided between East and West, even as the political-military barriers have dropped.

Without a doubt, such a geographic enlargement of membership and such a shift in the EU's center of gravity, imply serious strategic consequences for the European Union, not merely economic but geopolitical. From the French point of view the risk in enlargement is that the French-German axis will weaken and that France will find itself in some ways cut off from its special German partner, isolated with the southern and western countries it has to an extent represented or embodied in European negotiations—Spain, Italy and Portugal. Were this to come to pass, it would be dangerous to global European security and bad for Germany itself, which needs a strong French partner.⁹

The French now well understand there is no question of not going ahead with a massive EU expansion, perhaps to 20 or 25 or

even more member states. But French arguments anchor the position that centrifugal forces, created by the welcome destruction of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communist regimes, need to be countered, lest the EU end up unravelled, totally unbalanced, and with a resentful western and southern wing.

In October 1994, President Mitterrand, in his last bilateral meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, emphasized that these problems of cohesion in the wake of enlargement were real and had to be addressed. A new European Union effort had to be made to provide additional economic aid for the southern and mediterranean EU countries of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece; the disadvantageous impact of EU enlargement on Spain and other less-developed southern and western countries is a genuine new issue requiring attention if the EU is to avoid a geographical and geopolitical tilt toward becoming the Germanic zone that France, as much as any other member state, does not want. Manuel Marin, a Spaniard now in charge of the EU development aid programs, even quantified Mediterranean claims: "The east received [last year] five times as much [EU] aid, although the south supplies much of Europe's oil and gas and has sent many more immigrants to work. . . . It's time to re-establish the balance."¹⁰

In addition, these southern Mediterranean states cannot help but consider as a kind of "security" issue the economic backwardness and poverty of the North African Muslim countries, meaning the mass migration, now and later, that threatens economic and social equilibrium in several European Union countries. From the time of his 1981 Cancun speech, Mitterrand argued that the best European security policy regarding the prospect of mass in-migration from African countries would be to promote local economic development, because development would provide the reasons for potential immigrants to stay home. If it worked this would be a plausible economic and political analysis and a good rationale for generous aid from the richer countries to foster local production and markets. Thus far, however, it has not been implemented wide enough to make a difference in the level of discomfort and danger to the southern EU countries.

The EU Commission has just conjured up a proposal for a new EU-African "Economic and Security Pact," which would begin by doubling aid to North Africa, with \$7 billion total asked for over a 5-year period. Another aspect of this pact is to include the North

African countries in the world's largest free-trade zone, based on the EU but including the CIS countries (and now Norway) by the year 2010. As many as 40 countries could be members, making a free-trading population of perhaps 800 million.

This plan was discussed at the December 1994 European Council meeting in Essen, Germany, which wound up the 6-month German presidency of the EU Council, with France to take over for the first 6 months of 1995.

German leaders and elites are not eager about this Mediterranean-African aspect of the free-trade zone project because, as usual, they would have to finance a significant part of Community aid and development funds, and also because their priority for the next period will continue to be the east, meaning their own new eastern German states in addition to the eastern European and former Soviet countries undergoing critical transitions. Against the French emphasis on aid to the EU's south-west areas and to North Africa, the German perception is that the main European security issue, as was seen at the CSCE Budapest meeting in December, ought to be attention to the East, in order to prevent any renewal of east-west divisions and tensions if an economic wall were to replace the Berlin Wall. Like the French, German leaders describe Germany's new eastern policy as a cultural-historical duty, and that the eastern economies are, in addition, more adaptable and hopeful than the economies of Portugal, Southern Italy, and North Africa. For the Germans it is an historic opportunity to be seized, a chance to encourage political democracy and market economies, in addition to a particularly German historical duty of solidarity with peoples who have suffered so much from German aggression.

In any case, what is clear is that French thinking about security is moving out beyond strictly military questions of nuclear deterrence and political-military alliance. The post-Cold War situation has moved security thinking in all the major states beyond a single-minded focus on deterrence into a larger, more complex geopolitical-geo-economic framework. At the same time the French will realize that France is not the only player and that the country needs economic partners as well as defense and diplomatic allies. The French-German tandem remains a double priority for France: French economic prosperity depends on the German partner, and French political-diplomatic-security clout depends on Germany's

continued French priority. To the extent that each genuinely continues to depend on the other, the Franco-German symbiosis forged in the crucible of Cold War is one of the new crucial geopolitical facts of life.

In reality and conceptually, European security and European integration are, in the post-Cold War era, no longer such distinct subjects as they were during four decades of Cold War. They now overlap to a considerable extent. In addition, security and integration have both become Eurowide in their frame of intellectual reference, even if the EU and NATO are not yet Eurowide institutions. All this is represented in the widespread rhetoric of avoiding a new division of Europe.

Conceptually, now more than ever it makes sense to understand European security and European integration as two parts of a single issue, partially separate and based on different premises, but also partially overlapping and based on common premises. On the one hand, integration—membership in the European Union—is in itself a major security guarantee and even a sufficient security guarantee for almost any country.¹¹ Conversely, military security, in the form of NATO membership (and perhaps in the future “Partnership for Peace” membership) implies at least a semiplausible case for membership in the EU. This is shown in the wide geographical dispersion of countries asking for EU membership—that is, for some kind of integration with the western countries as well as some kind of security. (That full membership will be difficult or impossible for many countries is demonstrated by the current situation of NATO-member Turkey, which is being denied EU entry. A simple free-trade area with the EEC is being offered these countries as a consolation option.) In any case, if deepening of the EU continues, the European Union must be increasingly conceptualized as a new kind of international community with two main characteristics: integration (economic, political) and security (political-military).

How successfully did Mitterrand's policies deal with the transition from Cold War to post-Cold War Europe? The French president did not foresee communism's total collapse and the astonishingly sudden end of divided Europe. He was one of European government's most sophisticated and knowledgeable political leaders, yet his decades of experience had been confined to the Cold War European system. He hadn't expected that German

unification might occur in his lifetime, let alone while he was in office.

His much-criticized uncertainties and political hesitations about German unification and the Soviet Union's collapse were therefore understandable, though a few other leaders did better (Chancellor Kohl and the Bush-Baker-Scowcroft team). In the end, however, his historical prejudices and errors of judgment did not become disastrous mistakes, because France was not at the center of events. Once Helmut Kohl decided to go full speed ahead, France was not in a position to alter German unification, let alone the fate of the Soviet Union. Geography and the lack of deep pockets made France a second-level player in deciding the end of Europe's division in practical terms. Mitterrand's hesitations did endanger German confidence in French policy, but the future of French-German relations encompasses much more than this, and Helmut Kohl has seemed much inclined to stress the positive with his French partner.

François Mitterrand's European policy from 1981 to 1995 set certain parameters for the future in French politics and is a consequential legacy Jacques Chirac will have to deal with. It is highly unlikely, Chirac's anti-Maastricht electoral rhetoric to the contrary, that he could pursue a radically different European policy anyway. Public opinion in the center, where he has to govern, would be against it. Plus his first meeting with a foreign leader was with Helmut Kohl, which served to indicate Chirac's intentions.

Mitterrand inherited a substantial European legacy and a few large new European commitments from Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the most important being the European Monetary System (EMS) organized by Giscard and Helmut Schmidt in 1977. The 1970s recessions made Giscard's term a time of Europessimism and Euroskepticism, however. Mitterrand's presidency was, by contrast, a watershed. After the Mitterrand era, no politician who hopes to be president of France can be frankly against Europe. The questions are now "what kind of" Europe and "how much" Europe, not "whether" Europe.

New prime minister Alain Juppé said recently, "A lot will happen based on the place France will take in Europe, and Europe in the world."¹² The endgame of the Uruguay Round negotiations, in which French policy won out on agriculture and on the "cultural exception," had much to do with French diplomacy rallying its

European Union partners. Force of conviction and power of persuasion—Juppé himself is probably the strongest example—counted a lot.

The end of Europe's division found the French lagging behind the Germans in thinking positively in terms of a "Europe" larger than the Community. Recently, however, the French have enunciated a continentwide European idea; Mitterrand called it a "confederation." It is indeed a vision of a "Big Europe," but it is a stratified concept: a Europe of concentric circles, as Balladur put it, with "variable geometry" and variable degrees of membership and responsibility, with a "hard core" (France, Germany and Benelux), and anchoring all, the "Franco-German tandem" as the core of the core. This vision of a single "Big Europe," even if stratified and emphasizing the EU, signals France's willingness to make concessions in order to avoid a second Yalta, this time an economic division of Europe.

Within this broad view, the French priority is to emphasize the smaller Europe, at least some of whose governments are serious about creating a single currency and a common foreign and security policy, the two essential goals of the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, despite sharing the German view that a Big Europe is inevitable, French policy in practical terms has been less enthusiastic about how quickly to accept new members into the EU.

The affluent Nordic countries pose only relatively modest problems in their new membership, but to admit a big agricultural country such as Poland quickly into the EU would mean either fundamental changes in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which still benefits French farmers heavily and is still an important factor in French presidential election politics, or it would mean the CAP's bankruptcy and the collapse of EU budgetary negotiations. If, on the other hand, the next enlargement can be put off for 5 or 10 years, the French farmers' bloc, about one million mainly small farmers, is forecast to decline demographically by half, given the rate at which small farmers are being forced out of business. Time can thus ease the conflicts of interest and principle in the next rounds of negotiation. What is not possible in practical terms today may change within a foreseeable future, though Eastern Europe's advocates argue that the delay would be too much for the potential new members themselves.¹³

Mitterrand came to believe that full, if gradual, EU expansion is necessary, because any version of a "Little Europe," advanced, affluent, and isolationist, would eventually prove a sure road to European-scale political disaster. A durable post-Cold War European equilibrium could not, he said, be built on such a second Yalta, which would set up a rich and powerful western European Community fending off insecure, struggling democracies in the east. Expansion is also necessary, the French concluded, if only because France's principal partners in the EU want it, albeit for different reasons or with different calculations. German hopes are quite different from British calculations about the consequences of expansion on the Union. But, as Alain Juppé said, the EU "could not simply keep saying no forever."

In any case, European Union expansion cannot include Russia as a full member. Geographically this would take the EU's border to Vladivostok, making a mockery of the idea of Europe as a geographical and historical-cultural entity. Further, because Russian economics and politics cannot meet EU standards—the *acquis communautaire*—all the Union's established policies and bargains would be threatened or ruined by the need to prop up such a gigantic exception.

Even the idea of *la grande Europe* is not meant to encompass the entire Eurasian continent, including all of Asiatic Russia and the former Soviet republics. And this doesn't even mention the other potential large EU expansion issue—the Muslim countries of the Maghreb and Mashrek southern Mediterranean—which raises the problems not only of geography and level of development, but also of religion and culture.

The Copenhagen European Council drew up a list of 10 countries that might become members after the Nordic enlargement: the six countries of central and eastern Europe, the three Baltic states, and Slovenia. To this list, Cyprus and Malta need to be added, and, sooner or later, the issue of the Balkan countries will need to be faced.

As far as "architecture" goes, foreign minister Juppé and prime minister Balladur drew a distinction between member states and "partner" states. The latter category includes Russia and the former Soviet republics, as well as the southern Mediterranean countries.

Among the member states themselves, a second distinction is made. The *acquis communautaire* includes the customs union, the

single market, common monetary policies, and political cooperation. Much more than a simple free-trade zone, it is a network of pooled sovereignty and solidarity, evolving a shared identity in dealings with the rest of the world. Among the member states, an inner concentric circle (in fact, a third distinction) resembles a "hard core," those countries that participate in the maximum of EU common arrangements. The hard core should not be seen as an exclusive club, yet its criteria will tend to keep its membership low. For example, the EMU treaty, as stated in the treaty agreement itself, won't have all the member states in the single currency system, at least to start with. And in terms of security policy, the WEU today doesn't comprise all the EU member states, nor does the Eurocorps, even in concept.

Accepting varying degrees of participation—expressed as concentric circles or as a variable geometry Europe or as a Europe at "two speeds" or more—has become a premise of French policy. In French debate, the image of concentric circles has been opposed to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) idea of a hard core. But Mitterrand said, plausibly, that the basic idea is the same or close, and during the campaign Chirac said that CDU committee chairman Karl Lamers found his views on Europe quite acceptable. The opposition of concentric circles and a hard core is not the way the issues are posed in reality. The question is whether or not the principle (or fact) is accepted that there are, and will be, differences in degrees of participation in the EU. One of Chancellor Kohl's favorite maxims expresses the same thought: In EU development, the caboose can't be allowed to lead the train.

Thus during Mitterrand's two terms, a center-right, center-left French policy consensus on European integration emerged. Whatever the image used to express it, and whoever was stating it, the European Union is a blend of elements, a collection of intergovernmental, confederal and federal aspects within a larger pan-European mix of organizations of the EU and associated states, and includes economic, political, and security aspects.

The extreme right, the Communists, and a few fringe electoral groupings, including part of the ecologists, are outside the consensus, but there is broad center-right center-left agreement on a pragmatic, nondogmatic general view, and on the idea that doctrinal debates ought to be avoided so long as practical progress remains possible. The consensus is bipartisan because it unites the

moderate left with the moderate right—the Socialists, the UDF and a significant part of the neo-Gaullists. Certain RPR neo-Gaullists (the best known is Philippe Séguin) propose an alternative policy, less integrationist, more social and populist, less committed to the “strong franc” policy, but their appeal is limited.

The European Union has little chance of ever becoming a super-state, notwithstanding whatever federal aspects it may ultimately have. French policy has never taken up the idealistic federalist idea that the Commission should become the Union's government, with the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (the latter as a sort of European Bundesrat) sharing the tasks of democratic and parliamentary control of this government. The European nation-states will survive, and EU policymaking will remain centered in the Council rather than the Commission. The European Union will continue to be a hybrid institutional framework.

Given this conception of the institutions, how should the EU function? Above all else, the French want to maintain the European Council in a superior position in decisionmaking. Federalism, the transfer of authority to the Commission or to the Parliament, should be kept within limits shaped by the Council, in policies on what classes of decisions will be made by a qualified majority voting and which will continue to require unanimity. This focus on the Council differentiates French from German policy. The Germans have sought more powers for the Commission and the Parliament. Indeed, each EU government tends to propose its own political system as the model for European integration. In French-German terms, this is a still centralized and executive-dominated French system, as contrasted with the genuinely federal German system, in which the Chancellor must consult regularly and seriously with other power centers.

France, along with other states, wants qualified majority voting weights to be revised for the process of admitting new member states, to avoid ad hoc majorities blocking action. It also wants a larger role and a longer term for the Council presidency, to emphasize the large states' weight and to provide a stronger EU presence in international relations. Mitterrand seemed genuinely in favor of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), because the EU loses influence to the extent it meets its foreign partners with 15 different voices. France, of course, will try to take the leading diplomatic role in the CFSP.

The EU Commission is likely to see a reduction of the exceptional authority it had during the Delors era, but the European Parliament is likely to be given additional if still limited legislative authority. The French want to maintain its capacity of initiative in proposing legislation and directives so long as its legal and political subordination to the European Council is made clearer. A uniform electoral system is one reform that would add to the Parliament's standing, and a reform of its decisionmaking procedures, which the Maastricht treaty's complicated procedures made more rather than less chaotic, is in order. Another project is to give national parliaments a role in the democratic control of the Commission and other EU institutions. The British and Danish laws are examples of national parliamentary review of EU laws, as is the new initial review power of French parliamentary scrutiny.

In sum, one of Mitterrand's European legacies is a series of French proposals for refining EU political and administrative institutions in the intergovernmental conference set to begin at the end of 1996. The facts of "variable geometry" and "concentric circles of commitment" are, like it or not, the model for the future. At the same time, the inner circle, the "hard core," should not be thought of as closed, if other member states can meet the requirements.

As Jacques Chirac indicated in the first few days of his presidency, French-German joint initiatives and prior consultations and agreement on all major decisions remain the French method in EU politics. The 1996 conference should be more than a mere touchup of Maastricht's inadequacies. It has to be a sort of "refounding" in which French-German agreements will be the central basis for negotiation.¹⁴

THE SECURITY CONCERN OF MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM

For France and other NATO governments, the end of the Cold War has brought about a *crise des fondements* (*crisis of fundamental principles*), an evident irrelevance of Cold War French security doctrine and strategy. The most important military redefinitions involve what used to be East-West relations in Europe, but another revision of security perspectives is occurring in French reactions to militant Islamic fundamentalism— whether in the form of hostile

fundamentalist opposition movements or fundamentalist states, including repercussions on French metropolitan territory.

How or whether Islamic fundamentalist threats translate into specific French military security policies remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the shift of attention from the East to the South is now a part, albeit minor, of the French security policy debate. Yet even if the Islamic fundamentalist danger were to become a major security priority for western European countries, the question remains whether this would be a defense/military problem or a more general cultural and geopolitical clash, a conflict that may be very real without ever being fought militarily.¹⁵ For France itself, on the other hand, there can be clear danger to civilians in certain Muslim countries—Algeria is the obvious example at the present time—as well as a danger of terrorist acts in Paris and other French cities.

In addition, threats to reliable oil supplies, in conjunction with Islamic fundamentalism, could become a military/security issue once again. This might take the form of fundamentalist threats to fragile, oil-rich Muslim regimes such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Saddam Hussein's secular militaristic regime manipulates a population in which orthodox Islam and Islamic fundamentalism remain capable of being inflamed. Its recent mobilization of military force near the border with Kuwait shows that, however weakened, it still has ambitions for an imperial role in the region.

Military plans for allied cooperation in operations such as the Gulf War are still not satisfactory. In the Gulf war the French, according to a Defense Ministry official, "were simply improvising." French military thinking lacked contingency plans for the kind of coalition thrown together by American leadership.

George Bush's success in getting so many different governments into the multilateral force derived from several sources—the national interest of states, a sense of obligation, personal relations and others. In the French case, Mitterrand's policy was *gaullien*, that is, independent diplomatic action as long as possible (*viz.* the controversial French diplomatic efforts at the United Nations), but when engagement is made, it is unstinting.

Today, debates about European security affect EU internal negotiations on enlargement as well as on other subjects. Certain French attitudes are not shared by German views of what the EU's security priorities ought to be, and this split is complicated by

disagreements between France and Germany, in the EU and NATO, over how to deal with the Bosnian wars.

Could NATO dissolve, or be redefined into irrelevance? De Gaulle once compared the European Community and NATO:

The (Rome) treaty constitutes a permanent and definitive engagement of the six states, whereas NATO is a circumstantial organism, born from the Soviet threat and fated to disappear one day, when the threat will have disappeared itself.¹⁶

So the terms of NATO's post-Cold War predicament—adaptation or disappearance—are not new.

THE *CRISE DES FONDEMENTS*: GAULLISM, NATIONAL INTEREST, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Put together by the Balladur conservative government, the 1994 French White Paper on Defense begins its “Defense Strategy” chapter with:

France today has no designated adversary. Her strategy remains essentially defensive. Refusal of war and of conventional and nuclear battle, which are the foundation of deterrence doctrine, will continue to guide strategy. This remains one of the bases of the indispensable national consensus in defense affairs.¹⁷

As with nearly all the European Union countries, post-Cold War French security is no longer a matter of preventing attacks on the national territory, even if strategic defense debate must continue to analyze the hypotheses that this could change again. With regard to NATO member countries, both the so-called “liberal peace” among democratic states and the negative peace based on the balance of power among heterogenous states are relevant.

In French Cold War security strategy, the doctrinal use of conventional military forces was part of, and totally subordinated to, the strategy of nuclear deterrence. The fate of French conventional forces in the so-called “nuclear deterrence maneuver” was summed up, in a lethal quip, as “sacrifice of the First Army.” The First Army's purpose in Germany was, in other words, to serve

as a hostage whose destruction would “manifest the enemy's intentions.” If the outgunned First Army were ever attacked and destroyed by an invading Soviet force, this would be taken to mean that the Soviets were heading for French territory. The First Army's sacrifice was a tripwire, the justification to begin nuclear retaliation. However, pure deterrence thinking created the presumption that none of this would ever happen.

In post-Cold War military thinking, conventional forces are liberated from their “sacrificial” role in Cold War strategy. The assigned military task of conventional forces today is intervening somewhere abroad, earlier or later, to prevent or stop conflicts that conceivably could threaten the metropole. In this definition of security risks, conventional forces become the central element in French military planning for foreseeable security dangers, albeit against the background of the permanent overall guarantee of nuclear deterrence.

The French nuclear force, whose specific military use is now impossible to state, will without a doubt be maintained, but subject to constant budgetary pressures. At least in principle, this should increase technological cooperation with British nuclear capabilities and the likelihood of a European deterrence doctrine for French and British nuclear forces, which would, however, still remain under national command.

French strategy today thus must envisage “much more diverse scenarios than in the past. . . . Above all, a different balance is emerging between deterrence and engagement in our force missions, which changes, in part, the role of conventional forces.”¹⁸ The reformed French strategy eschews two possible extremes: either “a strategy built exclusively on making a sanctuary of the national territory” or “an option oriented exclusively toward missions involving peacekeeping and maintenance of international order...Only a balanced model, guaranteeing (French) independence and permitting our participation in international stability” will fulfill the requirements of the post-Cold War era.¹⁹

French military missions, rather than preparing for the potential Cold War “major clash,” must be constructed in terms of “prevention and management of long crises, of variable intensities . . . most often occurring at a considerable distance from the national territory. . . . And in the great majority of cases,” this means the engagement of French military forces “in concert with partners or

allies, in multinational coalitions.”²⁰ Altogether, “The priorities in the definition of the role of conventional arms are now inverted in relation to the 1972 White Paper definition, because of the geostrategic changes. . . . Conventional means are called on now in certain cases to play a strategic role themselves.” At the most, nuclear deterrence will guarantee that conventional forces won’t be outflanked. The role that conventional forces played during the Cold War is thus now played by nuclear forces. There is no break in strategy, but an evolution in the respective roles of nuclear and conventional means as a function of different scenarios.²¹

The Balladur government’s White Paper gives six scenarios of possible French military deployments in post-Cold War conditions:

- A regional conflict not affecting France’s vital interests
- A regional conflict threatening French vital interests
- An attack on the national territory outside metropolitan France
- The need to implement bilateral defense agreements
- Operations of peacekeeping and the guarantee of international law
- Resurgence of a major threat to western Europe.²²

The major innovation in this framework, as far as military political culture is concerned, is scenario 2. Already today this scenario is conceivable, the White Paper says, on the European continent itself, referring presumably to the potential for a European crisis that would indirectly involve Russia. But it could also apply, in the longer term, to the Mediterranean, as well as to the Near and Middle East. In such a situation the French response is to be multinational, within the Atlantic alliance, the WEU, or, in the future, the European Union. French nuclear deterrence could conceivably come into play to accompany the engagement of French conventional forces. In any case, says the White Paper, “The possession of nuclear weapons gives France a special place in any coalition, whatever the level of its participation.”²³

So the new scenarios in French defense strategy are not the security dilemmas of the homeland directly threatened with nuclear war, but a more broadly based European collective security, founded on some mix of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and other security tools, including nuclear deterrence. This new idea of military security is one important reason why the often-derided plan for an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

is unlikely simply to be dropped, whether or not NATO remains France's and Europe's primary security system.

The well-known French strategist General Lucien Poirier, in a recent book, *La Crise des Fondements* ("The Crisis of Basic Security Premises") gives a weighty Gaullist view of the increasing burden of European defense initiatives on a strictly national defense:

One of the characteristics of the *gaullien* genius is to begin from what was blindingly self-evident to the Capetian kings just as it is for the Republic: There is no authentic policy and, by deduction, no military strategy, other than for a people sure of its uniqueness, who, against all vicissitudes, affirms its will to preserve its being and continuity. . . . The Government's decision . . . to publish a defense white paper to replace that of 1972 officially recognized the historical break (of the Cold War's end) and its consequence, the crisis of basic (strategic) premises. The document's title confirms what I had forecast: The 1994 White Paper on Defense, is no longer, as in 1972, on *national* defense. The castration of the title is significant.²⁴

The national defense problem for the French in the post-Cold War era is to find the right balance between a politically and financially desirable Europeanization of security and a fundamental maintenance of national responsibility for national defense, including civilian support and legitimacy.

In what Poirier calls the "second nuclear age," French nuclear weapons are more than ever of political rather than deterrence significance. Nuclear weapons still serve the purpose of making a sanctuary of national territory, but the old concept of *dissuasion du faible au fort* (deterrence of the stronger by the weaker power) has become irrelevant for some indeterminate period.²⁵

Faced with this "crisis of basic security premises," French defense planners must develop a credible doctrine and strategy for what Poirier calls a "transition period" characterized by "a posture of strategic waiting:" an attitude of readiness with no clearly defined adversary.

In particular, French defense thinking must into take account the devaluation of nuclear weapons as military factors—France's main Cold War defense asset—in the post-Cold War era.²⁶ If French nuclear weapons were not warfighting instruments but rather the means of deterrence, if nuclear weapons existed not to make war

but to prevent war, then the disappearance of a designated enemy creates a dilemma of nuclear justification, and the need to recreate credible premises for maintaining a significant nuclear arsenal.

The reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the treaties between the United States and the USSR-CIS states is one result of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism. The 1992 START II agreement fixes a ceiling on warheads of between 3,000 and 3,500. There is no military reason not to prefer the lower number to the higher, and no obvious reason not to go even lower; some responsible experts have publicly suggested numbers as low as 300-1,000 for further disarmament.

What would be the lowest reasonable size of the U.S. or Russian arsenal? Whatever the lowest safe number of warheads could be in sheer military terms, it cannot be as low as it would be without the existence of sizable nuclear arsenals among the other publicly acknowledged nuclear powers: France, Britain, and China. No American or Russian Government would reduce nuclear forces so near to the levels of the second-rank nuclear countries that U.S.-Russian nuclear dominance is put into question. This does not exclude a widened nuclear disarmament negotiation in the future, in which *all* the nuclear powers, secondary powers included, would reduce simultaneously. But there is surely a limit, even if it cannot be precisely specified, below which nuclear stockpiles won't be allowed to go. Such speculation must also take into account the eventual development of other sorts of weapons which will put nuclear weapons themselves into a different perspective. So for the French, the main role of its nuclear force in the foreseeable future will be not as a military deterrence but as a weapon of political status, whose desirability is attested by the very tendency to nuclear proliferation itself.²⁷

However, even heavyweight *gaullien* defense thinkers such as Lucien Poirier add that France must not turn its successful policy of national nuclear independence and refusal of nuclear disarmament into "an eternal refusal" of nuclear alliance with other states as part of the larger process of European integration. "If the conditions came together for giving up definitively the status of *autonomous* nuclear power—meaning the definition of a European identity, thus of permanent common interests—France could agree to integrate its nuclear forces in a system of collective defense . . . not a simple "no" but a "yes if."²⁸

BOSNIA, FRANCE, AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

The Bosnian war has brought out sharp differences in tactical and strategic views among the NATO and EU partners. The failure thus far of all strategies for peacemaking has allowed each government, France included, to continue to believe its own ideas are the best, or at least no worse than those of any other government.

European-American differences, besides intensifying ineffectiveness, indirectly raised the question of an independent European defense and security policy. It is a matter of European desires for the military capacity to act independently of the United States in European problems, and also of European recognition of a developing American mood—neoisolationist or unilateralist—to avoid being dragged, by NATO obligations, into commitments neither the American people, the President, nor the Congress wants to take on.

When the Iraqi army unexpectedly mobilized again on the Kuwaiti border in 1994, one American editorialist wrote about transatlantic disagreements:

The U.S. cannot conduct one policy through NATO and the West Europeans conduct another, so if the Europeans want their own policy they need the military means to carry it out. NATO has command, staff, forces and operating systems in place. The WEU has nothing or next to nothing. The encounter in recent days with a divided NATO has shaken up people who in the past ignored the WEU.²⁹

The U.S.-European gap has been widened also when there is a Russian-Western European convergence of views, in opposition to American positions. The Europeans and Russians have opposed lifting the embargo and arming the Bosnian Muslims, and they have argued that, since Iraq has complied significantly with U.N. resolutions, sanctions against it should be lifted.

The transatlantic policy dilemmas of expanding NATO were brought out even in the process of choosing a successor to Manfred Woerner, who died in August 1994, as NATO's secretary general. The leading candidacy, that of Willy Claes, Belgian foreign minister and a Flemish socialist, raised basic questions about the direction of the alliance: Was he sufficiently Atlanticist for those

who want the United States to stay active in European security? Was he sufficiently expansion minded or, for others, sufficiently against expansion?

Part of the problem at the time was that the main player, the United States, had not yet made a clear commitment to the transformation of NATO that expansion would entail. The "Partnership for Peace" idea was, at the moment, as much a way to buy time as it was a real commitment to expansion (as the history of the PFP proposal as a compromise within the American Government makes clear). The much clearer U.S. signal in favor of expansion at the CSCE December 1994 meeting is still just a signal and not a fact. For one thing, the significance of Russian objections, raised forcefully then and later by Boris Yeltsin, needs still to be decoded. A "cold peace," in Yeltsin's ominous term, is not necessarily inevitable. Mitterrand was reluctant to move quickly to NATO expansion, although not against it in principle. Two factors work against French support for rapid expansion of NATO. First, the French want to mollify Russian sensibilities; even a Russia not entirely stabilized might be helpful to French policy. Second, membership in the European Union for the eastern European states may be less disruptive, to the Russians and internationally, than would NATO's expansion. Linking the eastern European states to an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy would suit the French hope of putting European development before Atlantic relations.

As for allied difficulties in dealing with the war in Bosnia itself, the Chirac government in its first few weeks raised the level of French engagement and rhetoric and also of French casualties on the ground. The new French leadership thus arrived with intensified determination to deal with Bosnia's agonies, but no one can predict whether events will favor or frustrate the French desire to invigorate attempts to stop the fighting there.

3.

SOME FRENCH MILITARY TRENDS

FRENCH FORCE DEVELOPMENT: THE 1995-2000 MILITARY PLAN

Comparatively speaking, French military forces have been the least reduced of any major EU country in the post-Cold War period, and only France among the NATO members increased defense spending in 1994. These facts fit with the French intention to be the European Union's leading military actor, with the diplomatic leverage this confers. However, the Chirac government's plans to make the fight against unemployment top priority and to increase social spending may make it impossible to continue this level of defense spending.

In the 1995-2000 5-year plan, drafted by the Balladur government, the French military is to focus on acquiring two new categories of equipment. The first is the construction of a large transport aircraft, the creation of a significant national airlift capacity for troop and equipment projection. The second is aerial reconnaissance capabilities.

In the Gulf War, the French, to their intense dissatisfaction, had to rely completely on American logistics, on American transport planes, and on American aerial reconnaissance. By contrast, during the Cold War, *not* to have such equipment not only saved money, it had the further geopolitical advantage of keeping the United States engaged. NATO, given the programmed European insufficiencies, couldn't function without American equipment, and the French once again had to rely on American troop transporters for the Rwanda intervention—but now this glaring inability to implement national policy is less acceptable. In the “Second Nuclear Age,” when conventional forces have recovered a warfighting justification in French military doctrine, it makes

strategic and political sense for France to build a significant logistics capacity.

In aerial reconnaissance, the Gulf War highlighted French reliance on American assets, and the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia underlined the same point. The late 1994 Iraqi military mobilization on the Kuwaiti border showed once again the French and European lack of aerial reconnaissance capabilities. *Le Monde* headlined an article "The Logic of Force in Iraq: While Baghdad and Washington Continue on a War Footing, the Europeans Have No Choice but to Follow Along with the U.S." The article reflected the irritation of certain government and military officials; for example, Balladur's defense minister François Léotard said that France and the Europeans generally had no independent means to "verify, let alone contest" American information about the military situation on the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. French authorities were obliged to accept at face value the information Americans gave them, culled by U.S. satellites and spy planes:

The lack of national, if not European, means of permanent observation in the region obliges the French to depend on American sources, as well as on their use—perhaps self-interested and perhaps exaggerated—by Bill Clinton, as he attempts to improve the credibility of his administration at the midpoint of his presidential term.³⁰

The British were instantly at America's side in countering Saddam's mobilization, and the French only slightly less so.³¹ Saddam's move was especially reckless, given that the Gulf war allies of 1990 were at that very moment debating in the Security Council over lifting the embargo on Iraq (France and Britain in favor, the U.S. against).

The French had only 15 officers in the U.N. control mission on the ground in Kuwait, with no long-range espionage equipment. This left the French military blind and deaf in the crisis, without reconnaissance of their own to inform policy makers in Paris. The same French and European deficiency had been evident in the Gulf crisis of 1990-91; in the meantime, little had been done to give the French military what it asked for. The all-weather optical reconnaissance satellites Helios 2 and the radar espionage Osiris system, which France is proposing to build with European partners,

won't be ready before the year 2000—and the projects may be put off or modified, given German and Spanish hesitation.

Europeans believe American policymakers shade the truth when it is in U.S. interest (or a president's partisan interest) to do so. In future situations they may want to verify American information but lack the means to do so. Nonetheless, despite a tendency to think that President Clinton had electoral motives to inflame the crisis, the French unambiguously blamed Saddam Hussein for precipitating the test of nerves on the Kuwaiti border, as when the Iraqi leader menacingly vowed “decisive” action if the U.N. Security Council did not act by its October 1994 meeting to show Iraq the beginning of the end of the international trade and arms embargo against it.

When *Le Monde* commented that Saddam's reckless action “provided the Americans with the occasion to extend their influence in the Gulf region,” several American editorialists replied. William Safire, for example, wrote:

Saddam will have support in the Security Council. Russian intelligence chief Yevgeny Primakov is Saddam's longtime ally; Russia will support the lifting of sanctions, if only to make possible the repayment of \$6 billion owed Moscow by Iraq. Foreign Minister Alain Juppé is salivating at the prospect of France resuming business with its best oil source . . . France or Russia care little that Saddam continues to try to strangle Iraq's Kurdish minority and starve its Shiites, or will surely circumvent arms inspections at the first opportunity. What does cause them to hesitate is Saddam's continued claims of ownership of Kuwait. . . . By creating a threat, Saddam makes possible his grand concession: If we will let bygones be bygones, he will not make war. Paris may even extract 'recognition' of Kuwait and claim a diplomatic triumph, deserving of instant trade relations.³²

Charles Krauthammer made an even blunter analysis of French motives and reliability:

Unfortunately, the administration appears to be abandoning this idea (of a no-tank zone in Iraq along the border with Kuwait) because of Security Council opposition. In particular, France is opposed. So what? The United States bore the brunt of the Gulf War. It will bear the brunt of any future war. . . . The French don't like it? They should be told, in the most delicate diplomatic language, to stuff it. (That's

what diplomats are for.) . . . If the United Nations will not impose a no-tank zone, America should impose it unilaterally.³³

By contrast, *The Economist* pointed out why the situation was not so open to American unilateralism:

The Russians, not coalition partners in a military sense but crucial to the allies' success in the Gulf war, are now much less inclined to accept American hegemony in sensitive regions such as the Middle East. France—until Mr. Husscin's recent performance—had begun to oppose America's policy of keeping a full range of economic sanctions against Iraq...Even Britain's old intimacy with the United States has been imperiled by differences over Bosnia and to a lesser degree, over Northern Ireland.³⁴

Despite indications that the French military may be quite active in various kinds of missions in the post-Cold War period, the Balladur government announced military budget cuts that, contrary to its own defense White Paper, will affect the French air force most of all. A 1994 National Assembly defense committee report on the draft military budget for 1995 emphasized the degree to which the air force will be reduced. Signed by Olivier Darrason, a center-right deputy from the Bouches-du-Rhone, the report puts together several telling facts.³⁵

In terms of military installations, the report observes that since 1984 15 air bases have been closed. Downsizing could well continue with a pending proposal to eliminate "one or several big air hub centers." In terms of training, the report notes that beginning in 1995 the air force will have to reduce by 3 percent the total number of its flying hours. Whereas the U.S. Air Force average is approximately 250 flying hours per year per pilot, and the United Kingdom's is 220 hours, French air training will sink further below their current annual average of 180 flying hours per pilot. This lack is all the more worrisome, says the report, given the upsurge of international crises calling for air power—combat and transport units—first of all in multilateral operations. In Bosnia, for example, the French share of air operations is second only to the United States. In 1993, foreign missions made up about 17 percent of the French air force's activity, requiring 20 percent of the air force's active pilots, really about 40 percent given leaves and other requirements.

It is paradoxical, then, that the air force, according to new plans, will have to downsize more than the two other services. At the end of the 1995-2000 military plan, active air force personnel will have shrunk by 3 percent, whereas French Army personnel will have increased by close to 6 percent and the navy by about 0.5 percent. Darrason argues that downsizing and budget cuts will inevitably damage air force efficiency, just when it has become the service called on to respond rapidly at great distances.

Cuts in the budget for equipment will also have a serious effect on the air force. The defense White Paper speaks of a French air force of approximately 400 combat aircraft, whereas Germany, the United Kingdom, and even Taiwan now have 620, 590, and 480 respectively, while France currently has 415. The report further asserts that if beginning in 1998 the air force is supposed to order only 16 Rafale fighter planes per year, the result will be "an air force of 320 planes." It would be necessary to order 20 Rafale planes per year beginning in 1997 to hold the goal of 400 planes on active duty. Furthermore, at the end of the decade the air force will face the problem of trying to finance two large weapons systems, the Rafale and the large transport plane to replace the Transall by the year 2003. The two budgets, about Fr. 200 billion for the Rafale program and Fr. 345 billion for the transport plane, will presumably end up in competition with each other for financing. The report concludes that the government must simply increase the air force budget, proposing the goal of the same rate of budget growth as for the French Army.

At the same time, following up on other White Paper commitments, in mid-December 1994 feasibility studies were started on three new long-range, precision-guided missile programs. The first two are an anti-infrastructure (e.g., anti-airfield) Apache missile, to be built by the Matra-Defense group, and a supersonic antiship missile (the ANNG, a successor to the Exocet) that Aerospatiale will construct. The two companies are supposed to work in tandem on the projects, and other European industrial groups may be invited to participate. Additionally, in January 1995 a decision was taken to launch a French cruise missile program, akin to the American Tomahawk system.

In making these projects public, Defense Minister Léotard commented that they were the first significant implementation of the 1994 White Paper's new strategy statement: the emphasis shifts

between conventional and nuclear forces by planning for autonomous use of French conventional forces in a battlefield warfighting strategy, separate from the enterprise of nuclear deterrence that, until further notice, has a purely theoretical character.³⁶ How the Chirac government intends to face the problems of choosing French weapons systems, and financing them, will be among the early major policy decisions.

MITTERRAND'S NUCLEAR LEGACY

Classic French nuclear deterrence strategy has been rendered pointless by the disappearance of the plausible military enemy, the USSR. A wide consensus remains on the value of deterrence, which President Chirac quickly and officially reaffirmed. The development of a new post-Cold War French strategic outlook will take time, requiring the remolding of military and public opinion.

President Mitterrand's deterrence doctrine, the commitment to pure deterrence, had not varied at all when he left office. The sole purpose of French nuclear weapons is defensive, to ensure the survival of the national territory and France's vital interests. No doubt Mitterrand's private thinking evolved considerably, especially in envisaging a European doctrine for the French and British nuclear forces, but to have put into question French nuclear doctrines would have been quite destabilizing.

The Gaullist nuclear doctrine of making France a "sanctuary" prohibited any broader view of nuclear deterrence, in particular any idea of a European deterrent or even the extension of French nuclear protection to German territory. However, in Giscard d'Estaing's presidency and through the two Mitterrand terms, unofficial and semiofficial statements made clear that France's vital interests begin not at the French border or even at the Rhine, but further east. Given the Soviet military strategy of a rush to the Channel, the nuclear protection of Germany would be vital to the protection of France.

In discussions leading up to the Maastricht Treaty's call for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), President Mitterrand publicly suggested (the first time any French president had gone so far) that France's nuclear deterrent could be reconceived as part of a European deterrent. His words indicated he had already made the adjustment in his own mind, that what was unthinkable in Gaullist orthodoxy has gradually become conceivable, not least because a

European deterrence doctrine is justifiable as a natural extension of the European integration process. If there is going to be a CFSP in the European Union, the possibility of pooling nuclear deterrence, meaning a French-British nuclear guarantee, is bound to be raised. The bumpy situation in European integration since the signature of the Maastricht Treaty has pushed this particular issue into the background, but it will rise again.

In October 1994, French Chief of Staff Admiral Lanxade publicly echoed Mitterrand's recent trial balloon statements. At a ceremony marking the 30th anniversary of the first (practice) nuclear alert by Mirage IV planes,³⁷ Lanxade talked of a European defense based on the extension of national deterrence doctrine and strategy to the European level. This would be desirable militarily, he said, but a maturation process is necessary in public and military opinion, because a European deterrent would require "a qualitative leap" in the nature of political decisionmaking in the European Union. Practical negotiations might be premature at this point, he added, but the theoretical sharing out of risks and responsibilities raised by "the joint possession of nuclear weapons" might be discussed now. Preliminary French-British talks have indeed already begun on the possibility of harmonizing nuclear submarine patrols.

Financing the French nuclear force will be an increasing problem in the coming years. With no "designated adversary," a smaller *force de frappe* could become a political priority. On the other hand, making a success of the CFSP—i.e., French-British nuclear cooperation and nuclear cooperation with the United States as well—means the French nuclear force will survive the peace.

A second deterrence debate is the question of whether French nuclear weapons could have a role in meeting potential dangers from the "south"—using warfighting nuclear weapons as a deterrent against rogue states. Practically, this would mean retention of French tactical nuclear weapons (Hadès) and the development of a range of new precision, battlefield nuclear weapons.

Several respected defense specialists have in the past few years called for such a change.³⁸ The division of opinion on this matter is not left-right, but rather within all of the major political parties. Pascal Boniface, an academic specialist and consultant on defense issues, argues passionately against any warfighting doctrine of nuclear weapons use, and also against any French development of

small, precision weapons to deter potential rogue state threats. Such developments are not necessary, he argues, because Hadès already exists and larger French weapons would be just as effective, if need be, in deterring new nuclear proliferation states and/or “crazy” leaders who are expansionist and ruthless, but not suicidal.

THE NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM

President Mitterrand announced in April 1992 that France would begin a formal moratorium on further nuclear tests. His May 1994 Elysée speech gave a wide-ranging account of his calculations, including how far he hoped the moratorium would go.

He said first, the standing French nuclear arsenal, comprising about 500 warheads, had reached a level of *sufficiency*. The *force de frappe*, especially its submarine component, had unquestionable credibility and strike force. Second, by launching a moratorium France would take a leadership position in nuclear politics, playing the sort of world role to which French policy traditionally had aspired. Third, resisting further nuclear proliferation had become an urgent matter again (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and India). Facing up to this dilemma required two successful diplomatic negotiations: extending and expanding the nonproliferation treaty and, in 1996, reaffirming the ban on nuclear testing in an agreement that would be universal and verifiable. If the world's acknowledged nuclear powers unilaterally moved to stop testing, said Mitterrand, their credibility would rise in asking nonnuclear states to remain so.

While in the opposition Mitterrand had for years opposed nuclear weapons and the *force de frappe*; gradually during the 1970s he changed his views. Through deft use of deterrence-friendly Socialist leadership colleagues such as Charles Hernu, later Mitterrand's first minister of defense and one of his tutors on security issues, he was able to bring the internally divided and defense-inexperienced new “Epinay” Socialist party, refounded in 1971, to endorse both nuclear weapons and deterrence strategy.

The position of pure deterrence Mitterrand adopted was, however, an endorsement of nuclear defense he could make while asserting that he was not abandoning his previous convictions against any warfighting strategy or actual use. (And the pure deterrence strategy was made more feasible by the overarching

umbrella of American/NATO extended deterrence.) The 1992 moratorium thus was a way for Mitterrand to leave, at least in appearance, a left-wing legacy that harked back to his 20 years of antinuclear convictions from the initiation of the *force de frappe* in the 1960s. Indeed, the Mitterrand moratorium had a comforting political effect among Socialist activists who had always been uncomfortable with the Socialist party's change of policy.

Unlike certain socialist leaders of the past, Mitterrand himself had never been a pacifist. As a young soldier, he had fought, been wounded, and been taken prisoner. Pierre Péan's recent bestselling book, *Une Jeunesse Française: François Mitterrand, 1934-1947* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), showed in much detail that the escaped prisoner and future president had a controversial passage as a minor Vichy bureaucrat in 1942-43, before embarking on a significant and dangerous career in the Resistance. In fall 1944, General de Gaulle appointed him, at the age of 26 and his Vichy service notwithstanding, to be one of 15 Resistance leaders in charge of organizing the so-called "government of the secretaries general" to establish Free French administrative structures. In 1956, as a Fourth Republic interior minister faced with Algerian attacks on French colonies, Mitterrand replied notoriously to those who wanted negotiations with revolutionary forces, "The only negotiation is war."

In the May 1994 speech, Mitterrand stressed that he had made the decision on the moratorium alone, to underline the president's sole responsibility in nuclear matters. Guarding the credibility of French nuclear deterrence was a baseline of any French president's constitutional duty. Decisions to follow France in adopting a moratorium were announced by the Russian, American, and British governments. Mitterrand, whose had first announced a moratorium only for the remainder of 1992, then declared that France would not resume nuclear testing so long as no other power did. China broke the 5-power moratorium with a test in June 1994.

Mitterrand's Elysée speech argued that, contrary to speculation that his successor would be obliged by military considerations and political pressures to order a new round of testing, this would not happen for two reasons: because France could not afford to be seen as the government reviving preparations for nuclear war, and because it would "offend all the countries who don't have nuclear arsenals." One obvious qualification for a permanent French halt

would be, he said, that none of the other major nuclear powers resume testing.

In the PALEN program the French are seeking but do not yet have simulation capacity. The Balladur government asked President Mitterrand to authorize a series of underground tests to perfect simulation techniques, but the president replied instead with a presidential directive to find ways to develop simulation techniques without any more actual tests. This, like the moratorium, was Mitterrand's way of leaving behind a political and technological challenge in nuclear matters.

The successful outcome in May 1995 of negotiations for an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) creates added pressure on the new Chirac government not to resume underground testing. Some nonnuclear governments dragged out accepting NPT extension as a way to lobby for simultaneous commitments from the nuclear powers on the test ban treaty renegotiation scheduled for 1996.

According to internal government documents in the Elysée archives, French military and scientific advisors told the Mitterrand-Balladur cohabitation government that another year or two without testing is tolerable without harming French nuclear capability. The Balladur government might have tried to renew testing after its arrival in 1993, but in the cohabitation political situation Balladur did not push the constitutionally delicate issue of whether the prime minister or the president would have the final word on nuclear testing. It was one of the few disagreements on an important issue between the prime minister and Mitterrand. President Chirac thus arrives in office already faced with a decision on whether to authorize new tests at the Mururoa site, perhaps a series of 10 tests that could be finished early enough, say by May 1996, so as not to complicate renegotiation of the test ban treaty.

4.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

THE BALLADUR “COHABITATION” GOVERNMENT

A second political cohabitation of left and right in the French government, which resulted from the 1993 elections, raised questions not only about President Mitterrand's moratorium on nuclear testing but also about decisionmaking in security policy generally speaking. The conservative parliamentary victory in 1993 was overwhelming. Political conflicts could have escalated to the point of raising constitutional issues.

This would not be a French version of American “gridlock,” given the differences between the hybrid presidential/parliamentary French system and the pure presidential American system. An understanding of French security policy, today and in the future, requires some knowledge of institutional/constitutional development at the summit of the executive branch.

The Mitterrand-Balladur cohabitation brought the question of constitutional authority in foreign and security policy to the fore in August-September 1994, on the occasion of a general meeting of French ambassadors in Paris, a sort of short course to review governmental policies with French emissaries.³⁹ Before France's ample ambassadorial corps, first President Mitterrand, then Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, then Prime Minister Balladur defined French foreign policy.

In terms of substance, the three leaders, loyal to the spirit of cohabitation, gave basically identical versions of French policy. The essential point of controversy was Prime Minister Balladur's seeming claim to a larger role in foreign policy overall, including defense and security policy, than was customary in cohabitation rhetoric. Balladur tried to legitimize the idea that French foreign policy was a “shared domain” between president and prime

minister, thus constantly negotiated, rather than part of the Gaullist presidency's traditional "reserved domain."

Mitterrand, opposing the thesis of shared responsibility for defining the fundamental lines of foreign policy, anchored his interpretation in the Fifth Republic's constitution:

[The realm of] foreign affairs, part of the numerous functions of my job, is among the most important and the most clearly defined by the constitution. . . . I intend to preserve very exactly the various divisions of the tasks of the executive, because this [division of powers] is a safeguard for the Republic and for democracy.

Balladur had earlier put the matter differently, saying that "the government, in agreement with the president of the Republic, has conducted France's foreign relations."⁴⁰ An outsider unfamiliar with cohabitation's ambiguous constitutional rules might not perceive much drama here, but in the first cohabitation between Mitterrand and the Chirac government of 1986-88, the president's usual control of current foreign policy, as opposed to strategic decisions on defense and security affairs, had been quickly dragged by Chirac under the prime minister's aegis. Mitterrand during the first cohabitation retained authority, one could say, just where new policies least often arise, though in this sense he was still in charge of national defense, NATO affairs, European integration principles, and G-7 business. But otherwise, Jacques Chirac was suddenly running the day-to-day decisions of French foreign policy, excepting an inevitable gray area in between current and long-term matters, where he and the president either had to agree or decide to avoid a decision. The threat of policy deadlock, with its background menace of constitutional crisis, hung over the first months of the Mitterrand-Chirac cohabitation (as it did not in the Mitterrand-Balladur relationship).

Balladur, with his strong majority in parliament, dealt scrupulously with President Mitterrand, and their personal and political relationships were businesslike if not genuinely cordial. Unlike Chirac's initial enthusiasm in 1986 for confrontation with Mitterrand, hoping to benefit politically from taking the initiative clearly and quickly out of the president's hands, Balladur's style let a new, more pluralistic configuration develop at the top of the French Government's decisionmaking process. There were several

cases where Balladur received deserved credit: the final success of the GATT negotiations is the most emphatic of these. International compromises on agricultural prices and on the "cultural exception" were widely seen as victories for French (i.e., Balladurian) negotiating strategy, though some observers believed that American negotiators had decided to give the French a few victories to make the overall accord possible. Otherwise, the French, as well as several other governments who semiclandestinely supported French positions, threatened to block the entire agreement.

Mitterrand at one point seemed to think that Balladur was taking unearned credit for Operation *Turquoise*, the French humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in the summer of 1994. Originally, Balladur, along with Defense Minister François Léotard, had in fact been skeptical, while Mitterrand, following the strong lead of Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, prevailed in the discussions.

Why were three speeches necessary at the ambassador's meeting rather than a single main speech by the president? The fact that there were three speeches was as important as the content. The conservatives wanted the facts of cohabitation to be acknowledged. The show of cohesion, with a few disagreements, such as the moratorium on nuclear testing, reaffirmed France's constitutional order and the capacity of a cohabitation government to organize France's defense and foreign relations.

The two cohabitations were thus very different. In 1986-88, personality and policy clashes produced the lowest common policy denominator. In 1993-95, the highest common denominator often prevailed instead. "Cohabitation," for all its ungainliness, thus turns out to be a flexible set of rules, rather than a recipe for head-on collision. Lines of authority and influence shift regularly without constitutional crisis, and government ministers can emerge with new power and authority. In the usual configuration of security policy, the lead is taken by the duo of president and prime minister, with the president clearly in the driver's seat. In Mitterrand's 1986-88 cohabitation with Jacques Chirac there was a foreign policy triangle with the Mitterrand/Chirac battle deciding everything, and Jean-Bernard Raimond, a civil servant serving as foreign minister, merely carrying out instructions.

Conversely, in 1993-95 the situation was a three-way (and more) game of foreign policy. Above all, the very active and

respected foreign minister, Alain Juppé, now prime minister, acquired a real power of initiative and a margin of discretion.

The Rwanda intervention is an important example of this. The French decision finally to send a humanitarian military mission had been Juppé's idea. He had taken soundings internationally and resolved that France had to act alone, when no other government would get involved. Juppé also knew that President Mitterrand had more than one reason to endorse a French intervention. One was France's history of relations with Rwandan governments, not to say French responsibility for the deadly current situation because of its arming and financing of the Hutu-led government. A second reason was Mitterrand's personal political relationships with Rwandan leaders and a record of involvement of his two sons in dealings there, the object of widespread rumors. Once the foreign minister and the president were in sync, Prime Minister Balladur had to go along. François Léotard was also reluctant about the Rwanda mission, but the defense minister doesn't decide foreign policy against the foreign minister, especially when the president's inclination is weighing in the balance as well.

An important question for the next phase is who, the president or the prime minister and the government, will have the last word, and in what subjects, in deciding France's policies regarding the 1996 intergovernmental European Union conference, which will update the Maastricht Treaty. Constitutionally, is the organization of the EU a matter solely of high presidential authority? Or, as is plausible, are EU decisions, which are neither totally foreign nor domestic policy, a grey area of shared presidential and prime ministerial competence? Since the recent presidential elections produced a conservative president who, with the existing conservative majority, reestablishes the heretofore usual Fifth Republic system, the answer seems clear. Nevertheless, President Chirac is likely to take into account Prime Minister Juppé's views and, through Juppé, the cabinet's.

A FRENCH-BRITISH DEFENSE AXIS?

The French-British military connection is growing in significance. This might be thought a natural continuation of the logic of European integration, but it is so only to the extent that the U.K.

Government is prepared to resolve ambivalence about Britain's European commitment.

In recent months, rifts with the United States over policy in Bosnia have convinced many British leaders that the United Kingdom has, or is developing, a security stake in Europe outside NATO. The British seem, for example, willing to take the Eurocorps more seriously, when as little as 6 months ago this was not the case; participation in European military cooperation has developed or accelerated in all three branches of the U.K. armed forces.

The first French-British military cooperation involved coordinated nuclear submarine patrols of NATO territory in 1993. It was also the simplest cooperation to mount and the most symbolically important, since nuclear missile submarines are the most invulnerable and potent element of nuclear deterrence. One might see this as the beginning of a long-range plan for a European doctrine for French and British nuclear forces, as discussed above.

With regard to army cooperation, in September 1994, France and the United Kingdom signed their first bilateral agreements linking army forces with foreign mission goals, which involved the French Rapid Action Force (FAR) and the British Field Army. The latter is made up of about 157,000 troops, consisting of all the land-based units in England capable of being deployed abroad. The FAR consists of about 45,000 troops in four divisions. The agreement implies exchanges of units, joint training, and joint exercises. The "twinning" (*jumelage*) charter was signed in Tidworth, England, by General Philippe Morillon, commander of the FAR, and General Richard Swinburn, commander of the British Field Army. Morillon was the main instigator, building on the considerable French-British cooperation fostered when he was in command of the Blue Helmet U.N. troops in Bosnia in 1992-93. The need for multilateral crisis forces is patent. In March 1995, one of the first joint working experiences involved simulated military exercises on maps, which will necessitate debate of military doctrine and tactics.

In late November 1994, it was announced that France and Britain would create a joint air command. Meeting in Chartres, President Mitterrand and Prime Minister John Major said the point was really to consolidate existing agreements rather than to make some new institutional leap forward. Both leaders were at pains to

say that bilateral relations, especially in security affairs, were much better than they had been for years. In the background of the air command agreement and the earlier accord on army forces was an implicit tradeoff in which the United Kingdom was accepting France's desire for more European defense, while French discomfort with the German CDU-CSU parliamentary study on EU structure indicated that France could be a British ally opposing excessive federalism in the Union.

The agreement established a French-British EuroAir Group, with about a dozen officers to plan joint rapid response peacekeeping and humanitarian air operations. Successful French-British experience in Bosnia, at the organizational level if not in actual peacekeeping, had been a stimulus to this undertaking. The group, with a French general at the head, will be based in High Wycombe, England. The site, the location of a NATO air command, is a further French gesture toward the British. John Major stressed that Britain's greater commitment to European defense should not be seen as contrary to NATO, which, in the usual language, "must remain the bedrock of Western security structures." Mitterrand commented that creating the joint air command showed that pragmatic progress was possible even when principles were still debated, which reflects his longstanding strategy on European integration as a whole. The two governments also agreed on a joint initiative to train and provide logistical support for a proposed African peacekeeping force that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has agreed to establish, albeit without enthusiasm.

Finally, a working group was set up to study possible British participation in producing a European long-range military transport aircraft, the Future Large Aircraft, on which France is already working with four other EU countries—Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. For the French, a British decision to join this Airbus consortium project and eventually to buy the plane when ready in the early 21st century would be a key test of U.K. future commitment to a serious European defense as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty.⁴¹

As for the basis of French-British cooperation in nuclear and strategic defense, in the year 2000 the two states will together field an operational force of between 500 and 1,000 warheads at any given moment.⁴² Given their quantity and quality, and given the

American and Russian reductions, it will be, to say the least, a credible deterrent against any major competing force. (The grim Soviet Cold War quip about the French deterrent was prescient: "If the *force de frappe* is a joke, for us it is increasingly less funny.") This new credibility implies, as Bruno Tertrais notes, two major innovations:

- The concept of an effective French-British deterrent for Europe must be taken more seriously.
- The minimal deterrence French and British strategies—"sufficiency" as opposed to a reduced form of MAD—is increasingly more a *political* choice rather than the result of technical or financial incapacities.

As for the possible points of French-British nuclear cooperation, Tertrais points to several. The first is coordination of the zones and schedules of submarine patrols, which would be especially important if the number of European nuclear submarines on patrol at any given time were reduced to three (for example, if Britain no longer maintained the policy of having one submarine at sea at any given moment). Second would be limited cooperation in nuclear targeting, to assure maximum coverage while allowing central targets to be foreseen by both forces. A third area of cooperation would involve penetration of strategic defenses, especially the use of MIRVing and the sharing of information and intelligence systems. Other venues might be permanent submarine visits and/or stationing on the partner's territory.

Overall, British policymakers seem gradually to be letting go of the increasingly illusory special British-American relationship in defense and security matters. The government of John Major has had to recognize that American policy no longer takes so much care about consulting with Britain (which was simply ignored in several recent American decisions) and that the Clinton administration has stepped back from substantial and costly new involvements in post-Cold War European security problems.

On the other hand, the Clinton administration has, as opposed to Bush-Baker European policy, been compatible with post-Cold War French thinking: relaunch of momentum for an independent European security structure, combined with continued if reduced U.S. engagement on the continent. By the same dialectical logic, the Clinton administration security policy has been a positive influence in the emergence of a French-British axis undergirding a

European defense. If France wants a primary European defense partner, for several years to come it can only be Britain.

DEVELOPING THE OSCE

Sleeping institutions, if allowed to repose long enough, either die or, sometimes, are given new life. The Western European Union is one good example. Its past Secretary, General Alfred Cahan, became expert in coy regret over the WEU's sudden reactivation in the late 1980s, protesting that he "had expected to spend a few more quiet years organizing pleasant conferences, before sliding easily into a gentleman's retirement." Now, as the WEU was taken up by the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, he was obliged back into serious business!

The dormancy of the much younger CSCE (now the OSCE) was never so total as that of the WEU in the 1960s and 1970s, and it lasted only a few years, as opposed to the WEU's four decades of slumber. The OSCE's hope of invigoration is to become an umbrella organization for pan-European security, not a military alliance with an effective decisionmaking process but an overarching forum for security negotiations and peacekeeping. The OSCE's virtue is that it ranges from Vancouver to Vladivostok, containing the North American NATO countries as well as Russia, plus the former Soviet bloc countries of eastern Europe and Russia's "near abroad" former Soviet republics. The OSCE's defect is, of course, precisely the consequence of its virtue—inclusiveness. With 53 members and a decisionmaking rule of unanimity, anything the organization does will be only the lowest common denominator of agreement.

In terms of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, the December 1994 52-nation meeting in Budapest was the occasion to sign an agreement aimed at building a stronger organization specializing in preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping.

The primacy of NATO's role in guaranteeing security for western Europe is to be understood as in no way affected by the soft emphasis on OSCE. It is a question of how to deal with problems outside the NATO area. OSCE activation has been supported, at least with lip service, by the United States and NATO allies. Since it already includes NATO members and the former Soviet bloc countries, it can debate without raising difficult questions of new

memberships in NATO (though Russian objections to rapid NATO expansion were a main point of conflict at the December 1994 meeting). On the other side, Russian policy is vaguely trying, with little chance of success, to subordinate NATO to the OSCE. This would give it not veto power but some right of oversight over the Atlantic alliance. One of the points about which Presidents Clinton, Mitterrand and other NATO leaders, were clear at the December 1994 meeting was precisely that no outside country, namely Russia, would decide who is and is not going to be a member of NATO.

The new security function of an activated OSCE is to avert or dampen quickly future conflicts in eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, Bosnia being the obvious example. The OSCE would play a larger role in mediating conflicts, protecting embattled minorities and providing peacekeepers to work in areas like Georgia, Chechenya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The December meeting's one practical decision was in fact to mount an OSCE operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.⁴³

American officials said that upgrading the OSCE's role should make NATO expansion less politically controversial by signaling to Russia that the NATO allies mean to include them in future European security arrangements. In the OSCE, Russia is, with the United States, a dominant power, and thus to emphasize the OSCE is to demonstrate, believably or not, that western plans for post-Cold War European security arrangements are not anti-Russian. The OSCE's inclusiveness also means that increasing its importance would involve no new dividing line in Europe. And obviously a stronger OSCE is intended not only to reassure Russia, but also to constrain its ambitions by creating a European-based security forum to which Russia, as a consequence of membership, would be accountable. True, Russia (and every member country) has a veto in OSCE, but voting is not the most important aspect of participation.

At the December OSCE meeting, the Russians, though they had been briefed on the plans for NATO expansion, were surprised by the U.S. timetable—that a study of practical requirements for expansion should be ready within a year. It seems that France, as well as Germany and Britain, were also caught unawares by American insistence on moving ahead so quickly with expansion. Dislike of having one's hand forced was responsible for the hard talk from President Yeltsin and for Foreign Minister Kozyrev's

unexpected refusal to sign Russia's Partnership for Peace agreement. After all, the Eastern European former Soviet bloc states are themselves the most enthusiastic advocates of NATO expansion. Russian opposition to eastern European autonomy would have seemed an unacceptable throwback to the bad old days of the Cold War.⁴⁴

The major Western European powers (France, Britain, and especially Germany) hoped to mollify Russian sensibilities by stressing that "intensive partnership" with Russia and Ukraine would accompany NATO expansion, avoiding what Yeltsin at the meeting called the risk of creating "new poles of opposition." President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, and Prime Minister John Major all were at pains to emphasize that no one wants to see any new fault lines drawn in the European landscape.

One mitigating factor is that NATO's expansion is mixed up with EU expansion, which Russian policy finds less difficult to accept. Russian interests can benefit from economic growth and direct aid generated by EU expansion, whereas NATO's expansion involves power and reputation, which seems much closer to a zero-sum game, another defeat for Russia.

AN INTER-AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE?

An example of French desires to reduce France's burdens by multilateralizing responsibilities is a November 1994 proposal, at President Mitterrand's last French-African summit, for an inter-African peacekeeping force. Although not likely to be realized soon, the idea is to combine units from participating African states into a force that will have legitimacy for action over a wide area of the continent, with logistical support from France and perhaps also Britain. Because many African regimes do not want to have to deal with such an institution, a peacekeeping force will be difficult to put together, and even more difficult to sustain politically and militarily. Response from African participants at the Biarritz conference was thin.

However this may be, the proposal in itself re-emphasizes how French security thinking is moving toward multilateralism, burden-sharing and cost limitation, not only in European security but also in traditional French African responsibilities.

The multinational African peacekeeping force proposal was floated in the wake of the belated, unilateral French intervention in Rwanda in summer 1994. The unexpectedly successful French effort to create safe zones for fleeing refugees had seemed a risky burden and an awesome task. The French clearly want to avoid finding themselves alone in any such future crisis.

But France could not avoid taking a lead. The enterprise went remarkably well for the French, in the sense that initial international suspicion of neocolonialism, and the Tutsi accusation that the French were out to protect their former Hutu proteges, were quickly muted. Not least important, there were few French casualties and the operation in Rwanda was widely agreed to be a success, which earned the French some moral credit. It was clearly humanitarian and it required only a small contingent, soon withdrawn in favor of U.N. forces. But the long-run French responsibility in the Hutu-Tutsi slaughter, and in the future of Rwanda as a whole, remains a somber issue.

In fact, nowhere has the conflict between progressive-sounding rhetoric and reason of state in President Mitterrand's foreign policy been more apparent than in Africa. Mitterrand arrived in office with a Socialist and *tiers-mondiste* (Third-World orientation) record of calling for an end to France's neocolonial relationships with French-speaking African states. Particularly detestable was the heritage of Gaullist-Giscardist dealings with African dictators.

One of Mitterrand's first international sallies as president was the Cancun conference on Third World development (October 1981). He gave a grand speech, calling for more and less self-interested aid from the North. By creating new markets and trading partners, prosperity in Third World economies would be good for the developed countries also. Incentives would increase for potential immigrants to stay home, and customers for Northern exports would have more money to spend. At least theoretically, Mitterrand's Cancun declaration was an astute combination of economics and morality.

However, a year or two into Mitterrand's first term, his refusal of traditional French ways of doing business in Africa had to be relaxed. His first minister for cooperation, Jean-Pierre Cot, resigned in protest, moving on to a prominent position in the Socialist European Parliament group. Another sign of Mitterrand's turnabout was a nepotistic appointment, a few years later, of his

inexperienced son, Jean-Christophe, as the Elysee's African policy advisor. There ensued a range of questionable dealings and relations by the son which damaged his father's reputation. Upon leaving his father's employ in 1988, the son pursued a range of private business dealings in Rwanda and other African states in which his family name was certainly not irrelevant.

In the end, François Mitterrand's African policy was one of his main personal commitments and his main downfall in international affairs. It is possible, nevertheless, still to defend French action in Africa, if only as the best that could be made of a bad business. In William Pfaff's judgment,

It is true that in some respects Europe has never left Africa. France's presence in Western and Central Africa still evokes hostility from American and British commentators and many non-Francophone Africans, and there undoubtedly is much to criticize in a policy whose ruling principle has been stability above all else. However, the overall judgment must also be that French Africa for more than three decades has been the Africa that worked, the place where life for ordinary Africans has been markedly better than where the old colonial powers, as one commentator put it, "absconded with no forwarding address." France today is probably the only European country that might, if invited, consider a major commitment to the rehabilitation of a former colony. It would be better if the European Union as an institution, which insists it wants an international role for "Europe," would collectively assume such responsibilities in cooperation with Africans in an effort to arrest the continent's decline.⁴⁵

The 50 percent devaluation of the Central African Franc (CAF) carried out in January 1994 indicates that even here, in the national "back yard," a French retreat is underway. A hard decision accepted by the 13 African Francophone governments, it has provoked a new beginning of economic growth, about 5 percent on average, after several years of negative growth.⁴⁶ The financial amputation was extremely painful. No longer willing to finance its role of neocolonialist patron, the French state, by devaluing the CAF, slashed its subsidy of African government budgets, hitting both state subsidy of consumption and all aspects of government spending. On the one hand, Francophone African living standards were suddenly cut drastically, mainly of the less well off and the poor, because the price of daily purchases had depended on an

overvalued CAF. But the devaluation also limits the extent to which France's subsidy of the CAF has indirectly subsidized African wars, the Tutsi-dominated CAF-supported government in Rwanda being only the most recent case yet.⁴⁷

The beginnings of new economic growth in francophone Africa have fostered criticism of the lag in French African policy in the 1980s. Devaluation of the CAF should have occurred in the middle of the 1980s, when the collapse of raw materials prices stopped growth. France has a heavy responsibility in this costly delay, because while France was encouraging economic austerity in the zone (as in France itself), French policy simultaneously signalled the contrary by continuing vast subsidies to African government budgets and by paying their World Bank debts. This safeguarded the position of French business in the various francophone countries, but it also underpinned dictatorial governments.

The IMF and the World Bank finally censured this lack of political courage in French policy when it made devaluation of the CAF a condition for new aid. The Balladur government, with Mitterrand's approval, accepted the IMF-World Bank condition; the result was very hard on African consumers. Francophone African governments, however, saw total aid jump from 6 billion francs in 1993 to 17 billion in 1994, to which significant debt rescheduling was added. Nevertheless, the francophone African economic situation remains tenuous, to say the least, and putting the franc zone economically and financially on a stable footing will be a long-term process. And, above all, as *Le Monde* editorialized, "So long as [the francophone states] are characterized by weak government, development will remain delicate."⁴⁸

At the Franco-African Biarritz summit, President Mitterrand was asked to sum up the results of his African policies over 14 years. Mitterrand replied, with evasive precision, "I am not leaving office with the sentiment of a failure in Africa." This meant, he said, that "the job of African development is so huge, so long term, and with such obstacles, that no single government or country is responsible." There was no failure, in other words, because the goal was never success. It was a skillful, unsatisfying response, leaving room only for discussion of specific cases. Mitterrand, on the most dramatic issue, repeated his denial of French responsibility in the Hutu-organized massacres of Tutsi tribesmen in Rwanda. Yet he sounded less categorical than previously, as if he wanted to

recognize that others might see greater French responsibility than he, as France's president, could admit.

5. AFTER MITTERRAND

For France in the Mitterrand era, 1960s-style Gaullist policies of maximum feasible national independence and autonomy were impossible. Gaullist thinking of a 1960s style became increasingly counterproductive to the main goal of Gaullist policy: serving the national interest.

In the Mitterrand years it became clear that to follow de Gaulle's example, rightly understood, means not to be "Gaullist" in the anachronistic sense of sticking, whatever the consequences, to the policies of the 1960s. To be inspired by de Gaulle is to be *gaullien*, which means, along with a high national ambition, precisely *not* to be bound to outworn schemas and shibboleths. De Gaulle's Gaullism was, as Stanley Hoffmann long ago defined it, "an attitude, not a policy."

François Mitterrand, on this distinction, has been the most *gaullien* of France's leaders since de Gaulle.⁴⁹ His European policy derived from a genuine "great ambition" for France, in which European integration and security are parts of an overall design. This does not necessarily mean any particular structure but an overarching intuition of how best to achieve France's national interests. In other words, circumstances have changed so as to make a much more integrated "Europe" necessary to the French national interest than was the case in the 1960s. To recognize and draw the proper conclusions from this fact, this is *gaullien* insight that neo-Gaullists of today—Jacques Chirac or others—may or may not have.

This does not mean that virtually any successful policy for France would be *gaullien*. Misguided policies may be "successful" in the sense of working but producing bad consequences. Much of Mitterrand's "socialist" economic experiment of 1981-82 could, for example, be put in this category. What is at issue in the distinction is the difference between the statesman and the mere politician, between, on the one hand, a genuine vision of France's higher

interests in the new European order and, on the other hand, a preoccupation, conscious or not, with elections and popularity.

The French are still French, and French foreign and security policies are still capable of unpleasantly surprising even France's closest allies. But Americans, in the post-Cold War situation and a quarter-century after de Gaulle, can understand more easily than in the past that French foreign policy attitudes are the result of France's particular position in international relations, combined with the national ambition to matter, to exist in the international system.

Mitterrand's *gaullien* insight was that deeper forms of European integration, contrasted with de Gaulle's concentration on intergovernmental cooperation and on alliances as diplomatic elevators, could magnify French means, and thus reduce the gap between means and ends, even as the process changes the ends themselves.

Given German economic and financial power in post-Cold War Europe, only a French-German tandem can lead in terms of both ambition and constancy. This is why the *gaullien* mentality is ruffled when an American president singles out Germany as the U.S. "partner in leadership." Germany, in the French calculation, cannot be the first power in Europe except in partnership with France, which will be thereby also the first power.

Mitterrand's legacy is, in short, to have taken French geopolitical thinking a necessary step beyond de Gaulle's legacy. De Gaulle might well have approved, for, as he said, everything depends on "the circumstances," and these have changed.

Nevertheless, the French often still seem unsure of themselves, sometimes including even Mitterrand himself. There is still, even after Mitterrand, a question about French self-confidence, about how strong France can be, how much of a player French policy wants to be internationally, and how large an ambition the country's political, economic and cultural elites want to cultivate. And in this regard, de Gaulle's memory is a factor of permanent stimulus and intimidation in French politics. François Mitterrand's heritage is not only success and failure, but also a demonstration that a *gaullien* policy attitude still is possible.

"La dissuasion, c'est le president, donc moi" (Deterrence is the president, thus me). This famous Mitterrand phrase, in all its *gaullien* sense of responsibility, or arrogance, symbolized French

deterrence strategy in the Mitterrand years, 1981-95. Will Mitterrand's successor fill the same bill? It is quite possible that as future presidents struggle with the job, François Mitterrand's legacy will look increasingly impressive.

NOTES

1. See de Gaulle's *War Memoirs*, vol. 3, ch. 2, "Status" (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1959). The French title "Le rang"—rank—better conveys de Gaulle's meaning.

2. *Ibid.*, 760-763.

3. A superior new transcription of years of de Gaulle's closed-door and personal conversations, based on notes taken by a Gaullist spokesman and minister has just been published: Alain Peyrefitte, *C'Etait De Gaulle* (Paris: Editions de Fallois-Fayard, 1994). The book is especially good on foreign policy and security affairs. The author is usually able to give two or three versions of every major de Gaulle policy, in which the same explanation is put different ways. This volume goes up through spring 1963. A second volume is scheduled.

4. It is also possible to argue that early action might have produced, or will produce, worse results, embroiling NATO powers in a quagmire.

5. Ronald Tiersky, "Mitterrand's Legacies," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1), January-February 1995, 112-21.

6. For an analysis of cohabitation in institutional and political terms, see Ronald Tiersky, *France in the New Europe: Changing Yet Steadfast* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), chs. 3-5. It could be argued that former prime minister Eduoard Balladur was just as responsible as Mitterrand for avoiding crises 1993-95. But, besides Chirac's open challenges to presidential prerogatives in 1986, the fact remains that the president is the one who must accept the relinquishing of most power and prerogatives.

7. President Mitterrand's May 5, 1994, speech at the Elysee is the best single summary of his views on nuclear weapons and deterrence doctrine. Available from the Elysee Press Service.

8. Ronald Tiersky, "European Security and European Integration: The New Nexus," CES Conference of Europeanists, March 1990; "European Security, European Integration and American Interests in the Post-Cold War Era," unpublished SCDC/NDU paper, September 1990; and "Thinking Like the French: France and America's Future as a European Power," unpublished NDU paper, August 1992.

9. William Drodziak, *International Herald Tribune*, October 31, 1994, 1.

10. *Ibid.* Skeptics would point out that the EU South is richer than the East, and that it has been getting much EU regional and structural fund aid already for 25 years. Conservative and market-oriented economists add that reduction of transfers might well make these nations stronger in the long run, by squeezing off dependency and eliminating EC subsidy of counterproductive economic policies. Another result could be to strengthen the EU by eliminating a source of interregional contention.

11. Explaining Norway's no vote in the referendum on joining the EU, Geir Lundestad, the director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute and professor of international history at the University of Oslo, wrote as follows: "Our history is an . . . important factor. Norway is a young nation. 'Union' is a dirty word, conjuring up 500 years of unequal union with Denmark and Sweden. On the Continent, on the other hand, it is an honorable word used in connection with efforts for integration, large and small. It is important that Norway did not become independent until 1905 and that nationalism was strengthened rather than weakened during World War II . . . Finland and most of the East European countries are even younger than Norway, but in their cases nationalism and enthusiasm for the Union go hand in hand. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the weakening of Russia, they can finally make their own choices. *EU membership is a matter of defending themselves against a possible new Russian threat*" (emphasis added). In the International Herald Tribune, December 14, 1994. The point is simple and clear: Integration in the EU equals national security because EU states could not countenance military force used against any member state, whether that state is a member of a corresponding military alliance or not.

12. See the substantial policy article by Alain Juppé, "Repenser l'Europe," *Le Monde*, November 18, 1994, 1.

13. The December 1994 Essen EU summit adopted a less-than-rigid timetable for membership of the eastern European countries. Though the six countries involved all have free-trade agreements with the EU, excluded from them are agriculture and other "sensitive sectors," which, so argue the east Europeans, rules out nearly all their competitive products. "They give us free trade in super computers and satellites but shut us out from everything we could make a profit on," said one former Polish official. "It is no surprise that our deficit with the EU keeps on growing." *Daily Telegraph*, November 25, 1994, 15.

14. Alain Juppé, "Repenser l'Europe." *Le Monde*, November 18, 1994, 8.

15. See Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72(3)(Summer 1993): 22-49, and the great debate it set off.

16. Peyrefitte, 116.

17. *Livre Blanc Sur la Defense 1994* (Paris: Editions U.G.E. 10/18, 1994), 89.

18. *Ibid.*, 90.

19. *Ibid.*, 91.

20. *Ibid.*, 92.

21. *Ibid.*, 94-5.

22. Ibid., 109-19.
23. Ibid., 111-12.
24. Lucien Poirier, *La Crise des Fondements* (Paris: Economica, 1994), 5-6. Poirier was a leading voice in creating Gaullist nuclear strategy, in the 1960s. In addition to his own books, he translated Liddell Hart into French, *Histoire Mondiale de la Strategie* (Paris: Plon, 1962).
25. A French defense joke has it that, given governments run by Saddam, Gadhafi etc., *la dissuasion du faible au fort has become la dissuasion du faible au fou* (deterrence of the crazy by the weak).
26. See also Pascal Boniface, *Contre le Revisionnisme Nucleaire* (Paris: Editions Ellipses, 1994).
27. Poirier, 38.
28. Poirier, 39.
29. William Pfaff, *International Herald Tribune*, November 28, 1994, 4.
30. Jacques Isnard, "Logique de force en Irak," *Le Monde*, October 12, 1994, 1,3.
31. The United States quickly dispatched 40,000 troops, 33 warships and nearly 600 aircraft to the Gulf, in spite of the significant operation which was underway in Haiti. The British were the first of the allies to put troops on the ground in Kuwait. Close to 1,000 British troops, led by commandos of the Royal Marines, got to Saudi Arabia on October 12, while two British warships moved in close to the Kuwaiti coastline. The French nearly as quickly said they would contribute a military contingent "if necessary."
32. William Safire, *International Herald Tribune*, October 11, 1994, 6.
33. Charles Krauthammer, *International Herald Tribune*, October 15-16, 1994, 10.
34. *The Economist*, October 15, 1994, 62. But, in reply it could be said that Safire and Krauthammer were making the point that the United States can act despite such factors.
35. See the report and the summary article by Jacques Isnard in *Le Monde*, November 1, 1994, 11.
36. See *Le Monde*, December 17, 1994, 15.
37. On October 1, 1964, a squadron of four Mirage IV planes was, by presidential command, ordered to a practice nuclear alert status for the first time. The French nuclear air force includes, in addition to some still active Mirage IV planes, the ground-based nuclear missiles set into the Albion Plateau site in Provence. Mitterrand recently settled an argument, for the time being, over whether the land-based missiles ought to be kept, given

their vulnerability and expense. Land-based missiles were, he said, a factor tying the French people emotionally, through the symbolism of national territory, to national defense.

38. These include Jacques Baumel, the neo-Gaullist National Assembly defense specialist; Jean-Louis Gergorin, former head of the French policy planning staff and since a highly-placed executive at Matra; and even the Socialist former interior minister Pierre Joxe. See Pascal Boniface, *Contre Le Revisionnisme Nucleaire*, 49-52ff.

39. This repeat innovative short-course for France's 189 ambassadors was Alain Juppé's idea, the first having been held in 1993.

40. *Libération*, September 2, 1994, 2.

41. In mid-December 1994, however, the British government announced a decision to order 25 U.S. C-130J Hercules military transport, because they are scheduled to be ready in 1996, whereas the Future Large Aircraft will take a decade and cost nearly twice as much as the \$37.5 million American plan. Trade Secretary Michael Heseltine and British Aerospace had lobbied the government for the European plane, with the argument that buying from American-owned Lockheed would damage the United Kingdom's aerospace industry (British Aerospace is the U.K. participant in the European project), as well as the future British participation in European projects. (*International Herald Tribune*, December 18, 1994, 2.) The optimistic French view of this development is that the British simply required some new planes rapidly, but this neither means that the U.K. is stepping out of the European program, nor that it won't buy the European plane when it is ready. The total British requirement will be four to five times the size of this first purchase.

42. This section is based on Bruno Tertrais, *L'Arme Nucléaire Après la Guerre Froide*, 214-17.

43. Another possible example cited of future peacekeeping is a potential conflict between Hungary and Romania over Romania's treatment of its large Hungarian minority. An OSCE intervention could include diplomatic mediation and counsel on protection of minorities, as well as peacekeepers and monitors to control cease-fire arrangements.

44. Upgrading the CSCE is part of a two-track NATO approach in revamping security arrangements in Europe. On the other track, the study referred to above will outline for the eastern European states what they will need to do to join NATO. Thus in a year's time, NATO is to formally tell prospective member countries what their militaries have to do to be ready to integrate with the NATO structure, and what it will cost.

45. William Pfaff, "A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, 74(1), January/February 1995, 6.


46. *Le Monde*, January 11, 1995, 17.


47. Haiti is a non-African but still another pertinent example where French influence is in reflux. The French government, despite its secular linguistic and cultural ties, basically left the Haitian dilemma of military rule of the Raul Cedras government, and the associated human suffering and chaos up to the United States. When American forces returned President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office in mid-October 1994, it launched a wholesale influence of Haitian life by American culture. This gave a sudden acceleration to a process that was at least 15 years old. One U.S. official told a newspaperman: "September 19 was a death knell for French influence in this country. They basically ceded the territory to us, and now they are steamed about it." (*International Herald Tribune*, December 31, 1994, 1.) Today there are perhaps 1 million Haitians living in the United States as compared with about 40,000 in France. Travel, especially to Miami and New York, and university study also has become directed much more to the United States than to France. Of course the United States occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934, without changing the culture very much. But so much else has changed since the time before WWI—in French and American patterns, in international conditions—that past precedent holds much less power than it once did.

48. *Le Monde*, January 11, 1995, 11.

49. On this point an interested reader can also see Ronald Tiersky, "Mitterrand's Legacies," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1), January-February 1995. A recent extensive study of the long-term legacy of Gaullism in security affairs is Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). The issue is also studied in Gregory Flynn, ed., *The New France in the New Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), especially the analysis by Frédéric Bozo, "France and Security in the New Europe: Between the Gaullist Legacy and the Search for a New Model," 213-32.

APPENDIX: Selected 1994 White Paper Maps





ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ronald Tiersky is currently a professor of political science at Amherst College. Past assignments include Director of John Hopkins SAIS Bologna Center and consultant for the Departments of States and Defense. His fields of expertise include European politics, European integration and security, comparative politics and international relations, and problems of war and peace.

Dr. Tiersky, who received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, is the authors of several books and articles, the latest of which are *France and the New Europe: Changing Yet Steadfast* (1994) and "Mitterrand's Legacies," *Foreign Affairs* (Jan-Feb 1995).

McNair Papers

The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, home of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University. An Army post since 1794, the fort was given its present name in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair. General McNair, known as "Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground forces in Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 25 July 1944.

The following is a complete listing of published McNair Papers. For information on availability of specific titles, contact the Distribution Manager, Publications Directorate & NDU Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 20319-6000 (telephone: commercial 202/475-1913; DSN 335-1913).

1. Joseph P. Lorenz, *Egypt and the New Arab Coalition*, February 1989.
2. John E. Endicott, *Grand Strategy and the Pacific Region*, May 1989.
3. Eugene V. Rostow, *President, Prime Minister, or Constitutional Monarch?*, October 1989.
4. Howard G. DeWolf, *SDI and Arms Control*, November 1989.
5. Martin C. Libicki, *What Makes Industries Strategic*, November 1989.
6. Melvin A. Goodman, *Gorbachev and Soviet Policy in the Third World*, February 1990.
7. John Van Oudenaren, "The Tradition of Change in Soviet Foreign Policy," and Francis Conte, "Two Schools of Soviet Diplomacy," in *Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy*, April 1990.
8. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, *A Strategic View of Insurgencies: Insights from El Salvador*, May 1990.
9. Steven R. Linke, *Managing Crises in Defense Industry: The PEPCON and Avtex Cases*, June 1990.
10. Christine M. Helms, *Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and Nationless States*, September 1990.
11. Ralph A. Cossa, *Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns*, July 1990.
12. Ewan Jamieson, *Friend or Ally? A Question for New Zealand*, May 1991.
13. Richard J. Dunn III, *From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond: Coping with Revolutionary Technological Change in Land Warfare*, March 1992.
14. Ted Greenwood, *U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military Operations in the Mediterranean*, June 1993.
15. Oscar W. Ciyatt, Jr., *Bulgaria's Quest for Security After the Cold War*, February 1993.
16. William C. Bodie, *Moscow's "Near Abroad": Security Policy in Post-Soviet Europe*, June 1993.

17. William H. Lewis (ed.), *Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, June 1993.
18. Sterling D. Sessions and Carl R. Jones, *Interoperability: A Desert Storm Case Study*, July 1993.
19. Eugene V. Rostow, *Should Article 43 of the United Nations Charter Be Raised From the Dead?* July 1993
20. William T. Johnsen and Thomas Durrell-Young; Jeffrey Simon; Daniel N. Nelson; William C. Bodie, and James McCarthy, *European Security Toward the Year 2000*. August 1993.
21. Edwin R. Carlisle, ed., *Developing Battlefield Technologies in the 1990s*, August 1993.
22. Patrick Clawson, *How Has Saddam Hussein Survived? Economic Sanctions, 1990–93*, August 1993.
23. Jeffrey Simon, *Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Divorce," Visegrad Cohesion, and European Fault Lines*, October 1993.
24. Eugene V. Rostow, *The Future of Palestine*, November 1993.
25. William H. Lewis, John Mackinlay, John G. Ruggie, and Sir Brian Urquhart, *Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead?* November 1993.
26. Edward Marks and William Lewis, *Triage for Failing States*, January 1994.
27. Gregory D. Foster, *In Search of a Post-Cold War Security Structure*, February 1994.
28. Martin C. Libicki, *The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon*, March 1994.
29. Patrick Clawson, ed., *Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities*, April 1994.
30. James W. Morrison, *Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An Assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist*, April 1994.
31. Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, November 1994.
32. Scott W. Conrad, *Moving the Force: Desert Storm and Beyond*, December 1994.
33. John N. Petrie, *American Neutrality in the 20th Century: The Impossible Dream*, January 1995.
34. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, *The Russian Military's Role in Politics*, January 1995.
35. S. Nelson Drew, *NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition*, January 1995.
36. Karl W. Eikenberry, *Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers*, February 1995.
37. William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, *Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations*, March 1995.
38. Robbin Laird, *French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of Continuity and Change*, March 1995.
39. Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO*

39. Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion*, April 1995.
40. James W. Morrison, *NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments in Europe*, April 1995.
41. Barry R. Schneider, *Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation*, May 1995.
42. John Jaworsky, *Ukraine: Stability and Instability*, August 1995.

***A popular Government,
without popular information or the means
of acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power
which knowledge gives.***

**JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY
August 4, 1822**