



**INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL  
STRATEGIC STUDIES**

**NATO  
FROM BERLIN TO BOSNIA  
Trans-Atlantic Security  
in Transition**

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**S. NELSON DREW**

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**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY**

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**McNair Paper 35**

***A popular Government,  
without popular information or the means of  
acquiring it,  
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or  
perhaps both.  
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;  
And a people who mean to be their own  
Governors,  
must arm themselves with the power which  
knowledge gives.***

**JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY**  
August 4, 1822

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# **NATO From Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition**

**S. Nelson Drew  
National War College**

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## **"THE BONFIRE OF THE CERTAINTIES"**

In mid-September 1994, North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces deployed to Poland alongside troops from seven former Warsaw Pact members to conduct the first joint peacekeeping exercise under the mantle of the newly formed "Partnership for Peace." Exercise "Co-operative Bridge 94," as it was called, involved less than 1,000 military personnel—not a particularly significant deployment in purely military terms. But in political terms, it was, according to General George Joulwan, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, "a truly historic occasion."<sup>1</sup> As German Defense Minister Volker Rühle noted, "Anyone who knows even a little bit about history knows this is not a routine event when Polish and German soldiers are working together."<sup>2</sup>

Certainly this was not a "routine" event by any standard. It was, in fact, an event that less than five years ago would have been considered unthinkable. But since the

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fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989—described at the time by a NATO officer as "the bonfire of the certainties"<sup>3</sup>—events in Europe have moved so rapidly that even the unthinkable has become reality in security affairs. During this period, even the "routine" functioning of the Alliance has ceased to be routine, and the nature of the American leadership role has been called into question on both sides of the Atlantic. From the fall of the Berlin Wall through the first use of NATO forces in combat in Bosnia in 1994, NATO has found itself in a race to keep up with these dramatic changes in the trans-Atlantic security environment.

The growth of a NATO role in peace support operations such as those in Bosnia, and, within the NATO framework, the development of the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping and the Partnership for Peace (PFP), are examples of this phenomenon. Yet the pace of these breathtaking developments has not been maintained without cost. The ability of NATO, NACC and the PFP to play an effective role in promoting peace and stability in Eurasia has been complicated by the rapid and sometimes disjointed manner in which these institutions have been forced to evolve.

Indeed, while many of NATO's new "partners" have expressed concern that the "Partnership" has not evolved far enough or fast enough, a convincing case can be made that the events of the past five years may have outstripped the capabilities of trans-Atlantic and European security institutions—and the political will of their members—to adapt to them. The resulting roles and limits associated with potential NATO, NACC, and PFP involvement in future operations can best be understood in the context of

NATO's original attempts to respond to the unanticipated requirements for a revision of the Alliance role in meeting the security and defense requirements of its members in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.



## **. . . AND THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN**

NATO itself was certainly not prepared for the pace of change that followed the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. In the fall of 1989, as the Berlin Wall was coming down, a survey of over 30 NATO and SHAPE staff officers could find only 2 who were willing to consider adopting a new NATO strategy to replace MC 14-3's twin pillars of "forward defense and flexible response" within the next decade in response to the changes underway in Europe. "After all," it was explained, "MC 14-3 took seven years—and the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structures—to gain Alliance approval even when there was consensus about the nature of the threat." It would be "too difficult" to attempt to craft a new strategy—NATO would just have to make do with the old.<sup>4</sup>

Yet little over half a year later, the NATO heads of state held a momentous meeting in London; there, noting that "the walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing," they directed the Alliance to undertake a "fundamental" revision of NATO's strategy and to "build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe" by reaching out to NATO's former adversaries in the East and extending to them "the hand of friendship."<sup>5</sup> To further that end, the NATO heads of state invited the members of the Warsaw Pact to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. At its next summit meeting, in Rome in November of 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and adopted its new Strategic Concept.

The speed with which NATO moved to craft and adopt its new strategic concept was astonishing to anyone who had studied the pace of change within the Alliance for the previous 40 years. From the meeting of Heads of State and Government in London in July of 1990, when the Allies agreed "on the need to transform the Alliance to reflect the new more promising era in Europe," to the adoption of the Alliance's Strategic Concept and the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation took only 16 months.<sup>6</sup> The transformation of the Alliance signaled by those two documents was remarkable. The basis for NATO strategy since 1967 was contained in MC 14-3, a classified Military Committee document agreed to without French participation, and based on the perception that Allies faced the immediate threat of an overwhelming Warsaw Pact attack. MC 14-3 was replaced by an unclassified new "Strategic Concept" agreed to by all 16 Allies in which the word "threat" was no longer used to describe challenges to Allies' security. At the same time, the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation set out a new "institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues" in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) between NATO and the newly independent Baltic states and all the former members of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>7</sup> With the adoption of these two documents, NATO committed itself to "realise in full [a] broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects," and, within this context and in conjunction with other regional and international organizations (including an emerging European Security and Defense Identity) comprising a new "security architecture" for Europe, to "protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion" throughout the trans-Atlantic community.<sup>8</sup>

## THE RHETORIC OF ROME: VISION OR REQUIEM?

The rhetoric of Rome reflected Alliance realization that significant changes were required in the way in which NATO would have to perform if it was to remain relevant to the security interests of its members in the post-Cold War environment. In less than two years, an organization that for nearly half a century had been an integral part of the division of Europe was transformed into an organization dedicated to fostering integration from "Vancouver to Vladivostok." From that point until today, the Alliance and its members have struggled to keep pace with a rapidly evolving security environment in their efforts to adapt the institution and the instruments of NATO policy to match the vision put forward in London and Rome.

Yet even before the final event of the Rome Summit (a performance—some might say "significantly"—of Mozart's "Requiem Mass" at the Vatican), there were signs of strain in the fabric of this bold new tapestry the Allies had attempted to weave. NATO was entering a period in which the pace of change in the European security landscape exceeded the institutional capacity to adapt to it. The first evidence of this came from within the Alliance. At a press conference immediately after the signing ceremony, French President Mitterand seemed to distance his government from elements of the documents just signed. Then, on the day of the first meeting of the NACC in December 1991, another shock (this time external to NATO) was dealt to the vision of Rome: the Soviet Union ceased to exist as a nation. At the conclusion of the meeting the representative of the Soviet Union was forced

to make a dramatic announcement that, officially, his country had not participated, because officially there was no longer a Soviet Union.<sup>9</sup> The initial challenge to NATO was the decision over whether or not to admit all of the successor states of the USSR to NACC membership. Subsequently, as Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev has noted, "local conflicts in the CIS have given rise to a host of security problems for Russia and other nations in the Euro-Atlantic area."<sup>10</sup>

By the time members of the Alliance began to prepare themselves for the next round of meetings (at the level of defense and foreign ministers) in May and June of 1992, it was increasingly evident that the vision of stability and security in a trans-Atlantic community stretching from "Vancouver to Vladivostok" was not being matched by reality. The Rome documents had been intended as a roadmap to help the Alliance advance toward this goal, but there was in fact no NATO capability in place to ensure peace and stability in the face of serious challenges. And serious challenges there were. While one segment of Europe had met in Maastricht at the end of 1991 to adopt a charter seeking to overcome centuries of European nationalism, other segments, freed from the repression of years of Communist domination, had begun renewing ages-old nationalistic and ethnic conflicts with a vengeance. This was particularly true with regard to the violent and bloody conflict taking place in the former Yugoslavia, in close proximity to the borders of several NATO and NACC members. If NATO was to make good on its pledges in Rome, it was becoming increasingly evident that the Alliance would have to be prepared to commit its forces to a type of operation that had heretofore never been considered as an Alliance mission: peacekeeping.

## **NATO CONFRONTS THE "TEST CASE FROM HELL"**

NATO's struggle to reconcile the vision of trans-Atlantic security put forward in Rome with what can only be described as the "test case from hell" posed by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia has exposed all of the potential fault lines associated with the harsh reality of the post-Cold War security environment. These have included the gap between the desire for European unity (and a common foreign and security policy) and the reality of the post-Maastricht state of affairs in Europe; the associated tension between NATO and the WEU as vehicles to implement trans-Atlantic and European security decisions; the continuing reluctance of the French government to accept the usefulness of the NATO integrated military command structure for crisis management and peacekeeping operations; the tension between a desire to continue American leadership and domestic pressures to reduce American commitments abroad; and the difficulty of moving a consensus-based organization such as NATO from an essentially reactive posture (collective response to a Warsaw Pact attack) to a "pro-active" one (in which consensus is required to act in "gray areas" to prevent a conflict from erupting or spreading).

While the word "peacekeeping" did not appear in either the new Strategic Concept or the Rome Declaration, it was difficult to envision a means by which NATO or the NACC could make good on their commitment to stability and peace throughout the trans-Atlantic community without consideration of an Alliance role in peacekeeping activities. There was little agreement, however, on what such a role

should be. Some allies favored a direct NATO role, in which the Alliance could develop its own peacekeeping forces and plans to be used as required for peace support operations where ever Allied security interests were threatened. Others sought a far more limited role, with peacekeeping based on national contributions which might simply be coordinated through the Alliance before being placed under UN control. Some rejected an Alliance role altogether, preferring to see an expanded CSCE role in this field, perhaps in concert with the new European mechanisms for a common foreign and security policy as called for in Maastricht.<sup>11</sup> As a result of these differences, it was only at the eleventh hour that Allies were able to agree on language in the June 1992 Oslo NAC ministerial communique stating that the Alliance was "prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE" and to address "the practical options and modalities by which such support might be provided."<sup>12</sup>

The ink was hardly dry on the Oslo Communique when the UN, responding to the 1992 CSCE Helsinki declaration identifying CSCE as a regional organization under Article VIII of the UN Charter, called upon the CSCE for assistance in Bosnia. Acknowledging the NATO declaration in Oslo, a copy of the UN request was sent to the office of NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, where it touched off a fierce debate among the Allies over whether or not NATO had to await a formal request from the CSCE before it could begin planning (a problem, since the relevant CSCE bodies were not in session at the time). As a result of the delays in developing a coherent response to the UN request occasioned by this debate, the Allies

were persuaded to adopt a new statement on NATO peacekeeping as part of the next NAC ministerial communique in December 1992, confirming NATO's preparedness to support peacekeeping operations directly under the authority of the UN Security Council. At the same time the Alliance declared its readiness to "respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions."<sup>13</sup> For the United States, where pressure had been building for NATO to "go out of area or out of business,"<sup>14</sup> this was a critical step for the Alliance.

## MAKING IT UP AS WE GO ALONG

What was missing from the December 1992 statement was any agreement on the "practical options and modalities" for peacekeeping that had been called for the previous spring in Oslo. Efforts by NATO to reach agreement on a broad set of guidelines and procedures for peacekeeping operations had failed to achieve consensus. Yet at the same time, the Alliance was already fully engaged in supporting efforts to halt the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The more immediate demands upon NATO to react to the situation in the Balkans far outpaced the ability of its members to reach agreement in principle on a broad policy that might guide those reactions. As a result, NATO, which for years had enjoyed the luxury of long-range detailed planning for potential allied military operations that never occurred, was reduced to "making it up as it went along" on the road to the first actual use of force in Alliance history.

NATO was not unique in this regard. Indeed, all of the organizations that were supposed to form the basis for "a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other," as called for in Rome, were attempting to make it up as they went along. This was not surprising, since they all reflected the national policies of their members, and their members are to a large extent the same group of nations. Even the UN was not immune, as its members and bureaucracy struggled to adjust to a new post-Cold War environment in which, for the first time, a central goal of UN peacekeeping efforts was *not* merely keeping a regional conflict from becoming a venue for superpower confrontation. This combination of factors directly contributed to tensions in developing smooth



coordination between NATO (whose involvement in the past would have certainly heightened the risk of superpower confrontation) and the UN peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia.

The gap between NATO and the UN on peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia was vividly illustrated by the initial Alliance efforts to respond to the first UN requests for assistance. The original UN request was for planning estimates to support the provision of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo. Once NATO resolved its internal debate over whether or not a formal request from CSCE was required to initiate planning, the NATO Military Authorities were tasked with developing preliminary options to satisfy the UN request. Based on NATO's military assessment that a benign environment could not be guaranteed, they prepared initial force estimates to satisfy, literally, the UN requirement to "insure" the delivery of aid to Sarajevo, in a potentially hostile environment, using up to 100,000 troops. UN peacekeeping officials were aghast: since their planning assumptions had always been for a permissive environment, they were looking for a plan that involved closer to 2000-4000 troops.<sup>15</sup> Later, when the mission expanded to include areas outside of Sarajevo, the UN asked for assistance in providing an adequate headquarters. NATO was prepared to offer the mobile core of its Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) headquarters, with approximately 750 personnel and their communications equipment, for the task of coordinating UN operations that would involve isolated units spread throughout Bosnia. UN officials and several nations working within the UN feared such a large NATO contribution would be out of proportion to the UN effort, so a small cadre of under 50 NATO personnel was requested

to establish the headquarters. From a military standpoint, the result was a serious degradation in the ability of the UNPROFOR-BH Commander to coordinate the actions of his forces.<sup>16</sup> It was not until after the December 1992 NAC Ministerial decision permitting NATO to respond directly to the UN on peacekeeping matters that a direct liaison was established between the two organizations, permitting advance coordination on such issues. NATO and the UN have since agreed that the Alliance should routinely send liaison personnel to UN headquarters in New York and to UN field operations when warranted by NATO engagement in UN peacekeeping planning and operations.

NATO's early efforts to define its role in peace support operations encountered problems with organizations other than the UN. As the various institutional players in what the Rome Declaration described as the "new security architecture in Europe" all sought to define their roles in the post-Cold War security environment, it was inevitable that some friction would occur. Perhaps nowhere was this more evident than in the approach of NATO and the WEU to Adriatic operations in support of the UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia. While official NATO and WEU statements have made every effort to put a good face on what is publicly described as the "cooperative" effort between NATO and WEU in this operation, the reality was, until the eventual merger of operations after nearly a full year, exactly the sort of competition and wasteful duplication of effort about which the United States has always been concerned.<sup>17</sup> In this case, the wound was, at least in part, self-inflicted. Washington pressed at first for Europe to take the lead in responding to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and therefore resisted initial efforts to involve NATO in the Adriatic. It was only after the WEU

had determined to act, using naval assets that were also committed to the newly created NATO Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), that the U.S. articulated its case for the Adriatic to be a NATO operation.

By this time, however, it was politically impossible for the WEU *not* to become involved, since the issue had become a test of Europe's ability to respond collectively in the spirit of Maastricht. The result was an artificial division of the Adriatic into two zones, with NATO and WEU swapping from one to the other at periodic intervals. Even the current, more successful, joint NATO/WEU operation (with unity of military command maintained through the NATO chain, but responding to joint political decisions of the NATO and WEU Councils) is somewhat artificial, as the views of all the individual WEU member states could just as effectively be articulated through NATO council sessions.

## GETTING IT RIGHT?

A somewhat more positive effort was reflected in NATO's efforts to monitor and enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia, and the subsequent agreements that established procedures for NATO to provide close air support (CAS) to UN peacekeepers and to use air strikes to compel Serbian compliance with agreements to withdraw from Bosnian "Safe Areas." In these cases, the command and control arrangements were drawn directly from the NATO integrated command structure, with modifications as required to permit interface with the UN and participation by nations not normally part of NATO's integrated military structure.

These arrangements were put to an initial test following the Serbian shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace in February 1994, when NATO issued its ultimatum to carry out airstrikes under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 836 unless Serbian weapons were withdrawn. The ability of the Alliance to coordinate its actions closely with both the UN authorities and with its former adversaries to the East proved essential in establishing the legitimacy of the NATO role in this case.

Still, strains continue to exist both within the Alliance—where the French government has resisted efforts to use the existing NATO command structure for any non-Article 5 operations—and in NATO coordination with the UN—where the initial authorization to use NATO air power for CAS to protect UN peacekeepers was delayed for so long that the forces were no longer in contact. Moreover, the pattern of NATO-UN coordination in applying pressure to the Serb forces around Sarajevo and Gorazde did not carry over to efforts to protect the UN safe area in Bihac.

It is clear that NATO and the UN still have a long way to go in developing a common understanding of the role of force in such situations.

The NATO ultimatum also revealed lingering Russian concerns about the Alliance's new role in peacekeeping, as nationalist elements launched a strong domestic campaign against the use of force by NATO. Despite such reservations, Moscow did exert influence on the Serbian side to comply, and subsequently acknowledged the legitimacy of such enforcement operations—and the role of NATO as the only multi-national agent currently capable of taking such actions effectively.<sup>18</sup> However, the Russian appreciation of the effectiveness of NATO as a vehicle to support UN-sanctioned peace operations in Bosnia does not extend to a willingness to accept a role for NATO forces closer to Russia's borders.

Nevertheless, the modest success of the application of NATO air power to the no-fly zone and the situations around Sarajevo and Gorazde (the first actual uses of force in Alliance history) may provide some indication that the concept of deterrence, which NATO is uniquely positioned to bring into the equation, can play a role in future peace support operations. Unfortunately, the reluctance of the UN to use NATO airstrikes effectively in retaliation for Serbian air attacks across the Croatian border into Bihac in November 1994 reflects the need to go much further in developing tactics and doctrine that are trusted and understood by both NATO and the UN. If this can be accomplished, NATO will have taken a significant step toward developing a capability to foster stability in the post-Cold War European security environment.

## **AN EVEN ROCKIER ROAD AHEAD?**

One additional test of the Alliance's relevance to the new environment—at least in the eyes of many of its member states—may be whether or not NATO is prepared to deploy and command forces to support implementation of a peace plan for Bosnia, should one be successfully negotiated. The potential for discord on this issue within the Alliance should not be underestimated. As the conflict in the former Yugoslavia drags on, it is becoming increasingly evident that many of the member nations of NATO are having second thoughts about their willingness to provide the necessary forces. This is particularly true in the United States, where the American losses in the UN operation in Somalia have eroded virtually all Congressional support for deploying U.S. forces as peacekeepers. The critical factor in this situation is not in fact the evolution of institutional arrangements for peacekeeping within NATO, but rather the political will of its member states.

At the same time, there is an ongoing internal NATO debate over the command arrangements that would be necessary to support a NATO intervention under a UN peace operations mandate. At its heart is an almost other-worldly "chicken and the egg" dispute between the United States—which refuses to commit its forces unless they are part of an operation using the NATO command structure—and France—which argues that command relationships can only be agreed on the basis of which nations have committed the most forces. The result is that France will not seriously consider using the existing NATO chain of command unless the U.S. has already committed its forces, while the U.S. will not agree to commit its forces unless there is prior agreement on using the NATO chain of

command. From the American perspective, this debate strikes at the very core of the Alliance, since the French position is seen to imply that any non-Article 5 military operation would require an "ad hoc" command arrangement totally dependent on the number of forces each nation commits. From the French perspective, the American insistence on using the command relationships of the integrated military structure, where France is not a player, seems designed to deliberately marginalize the French role.

While as a practical matter the NATO chain of command has already been adopted for both naval and air operations in support of UN activities involving the former Yugoslavia, resolution of the theoretical debate is crucial if the Alliance is to move beyond crisis response to developing standard doctrine and long range planning for peace support operations.<sup>19</sup>

This is not to say that progress is not being made in the development of NATO doctrine for peace support operations. Current efforts to draw on the lessons of the former Yugoslavia have identified potential NATO roles in a spectrum of operations including humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, traditional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations should a situation develop that would require the use of force.<sup>20</sup> Such NATO roles, to be carried out in support of UN or CSCE mandates, are designed to build on unique capabilities that the Alliance has developed over the past 45 years. These capabilities are generally agreed to include: a proven multinational command and control structure; the development of NATO standardization agreements on procedures and equipment; the availability of Alliance infrastructure and communications systems; and the maintenance of readily

available multinational forces, to include both standing forces under the operational command of Major NATO Commanders (such as the NAEW AWACS force) and reaction forces that, while provided by member nations, have already exercised and trained together.<sup>21</sup>

One of the clear lessons of the Yugoslav experience, however, has been that as impressive as these capabilities may be, NATO is unlikely to be called upon to act alone in peace support operations. At the same time, it is increasingly probable that not all Allies will choose to participate in all aspects of any given NATO peace support operation. Provisions must be made to incorporate non-NATO forces and organizations alongside those of the Alliance, and to provide the Alliance with the capability to package its own forces in a flexible but effective manner. Within NATO, this issue is being addressed through the development of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept of force employment, which lends itself to both Alliance flexibility and integration of non-NATO units for specific missions such as peacekeeping. It also provides a vehicle through which NATO resources, including command arrangements, can be made available to the European allies if NATO itself chooses not to become involved.



## **NATO, THE U.S., CJTF, AND ESDI**

It was this combination of potential uses for the CJTF concept that helped shape a revision in the U.S. approach to the NATO relationship to ESDI at the January 1994 Summit. In theory, the United States had always been supportive of European efforts to forge a common foreign and security policy, and a European security and defense identity (ESDI) to help implement it as called for in Maastricht. Yet seen from a European perspective, the efforts of the U.S. had not always seemed to match the rhetoric. As the threat of a massive attack on Europe receded, and Europeans, for the first time since the end of WW II, began to feel that they might be able to meet more of their own immediate security needs without direct assistance from the United States, the U.S. was seen to be ambivalent at best (if not openly hostile) toward the efforts of the European members of the Alliance to develop their own security identity. The U.S., on the other hand, saw the development of ESDI as a logical extension of its long-standing desire for European states to assume a more equitable share of the burden of their own security, but the benefits of this development to the U.S. would be lost if it took place in a manner that set up a competition for scarce defense resources between NATO and ESDI commitments. The tension between a European desire for greater independence and the American desire to avoid creation of a competitor for NATO became a source of considerable frustration among Allies.

Initially, the United States adopted what might best be called a "hands off" policy toward discussions of the possible shape of an emerging ESDI. The source of this approach was two-fold. On the one hand, there was no

desire in the U.S. to contribute to the emergence of a competitor to NATO. On the other, the shape of ESDI was seen, legitimately, to be primarily a European concern. The result was a period of nearly two years which saw the trans-Atlantic debate on ESDI reduced to a cycle: European proposals would be put forward with very little input from Washington; the U.S. would then react negatively to the elements of the concept it did not like, while saying nothing about the elements it found acceptable. Underlying this Washington approach was also a subtle suspicion among many on both sides of the Atlantic that, left to their own devices, the European Allies would never be able to agree on any alternative to acting within NATO.

This view was itself based on a reasonably accurate assessment that there was, for the foreseeable future, no militarily viable alternative to NATO. It overlooked the fact, however, that from the outset, the European need for ESDI had been political, not military. Although the events in Bosnia seemed to support the contention that there was no military alternative to collective action through NATO, they also served to exacerbate the political pressures for Europe to demonstrate an ability to act on its own. These pressures, however, did not lead to agreement among the European states as to *how* they should act on their own, or through what vehicle: NATO, WEU, CSCE, or something totally new such as the EuroCorps.

The result was a growing inability to obtain political consensus within the Alliance for NATO to act, with no real alternative in place. At the same time, the debate in Washington over the feasibility of committing American ground forces to Bosnia heightened awareness that, in the

post-Cold War environment, there might be cases when it would be in the interests of the United States for Europe to have the capability to employ military forces without the direct involvement of American troops. What followed was Washington endorsement of a "separable, but not separate" ESDI that could draw on existing NATO assets and command structures to conduct operations at the behest of the European Union—a concept that eventually emerged as the twin ESDI and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) proposals of the January 1994 Summit.<sup>22</sup>

The CJTF concept of NATO force employment was a logical outgrowth of the new strategic concept, which notes that, "to ensure that . . . Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary."<sup>23</sup> Thus the CJTF concept does not need ESDI as a justification, but rather permits the Alliance to adapt to its own requirements in a manner that is supportive of—rather than in competition with—ESDI. This is the first and most important use of the CJTF concept: as a configuration for deployment of NATO forces in the new trans-Atlantic security environment. Potential CJTF deployment in support of ESDI, facilitating the dual use of some NATO forces and command arrangements for European-only operations, would be a second possible configuration. In this configuration, the CJTF commander would in all likelihood be a WEU commander (or would at least report to a WEU commander). At the same time, the CJTF concept builds on the lessons learned in both the Gulf War and the experience of the former Yugoslavia to date by providing a third capability: for NATO or WEU forces to be

augmented, if required, by forces from nations not in the Alliance, such as those that could be made available under the Partnership for Peace (PFP).

## NACC'S ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING

NATO's initial efforts to facilitate cooperation with non-NATO states in peace support operations had been advanced through the NACC. While much of the first year of NACC's existence was taken up with efforts to agree on a viable workplan for cooperation on practical matters, it was evident from the first meeting of NACC ministers in December 1991 that one topic that would dominate discussion among members would be how to keep the peace among the newly emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe. Two main themes emerged from these discussions: the desire of many of the NACC partners for closer integration in NATO activities as a hedge against instability and external threats; and the specific need for cooperation in developing a common approach to peacekeeping. Not surprisingly, it was the second of these themes that was addressed first, with the establishment of the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping at the meeting of NACC Foreign Ministers in Brussels on 18 December 1992.<sup>24</sup>

The NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping was given the charter of "developing a common understanding on the political principles of and the tools for peacekeeping, and to share experience and thereby develop common practical approaches and co-operation in support of peacekeeping under the responsibility of the UN or the CSCE."<sup>25</sup> The Ad Hoc Group itself was opened to non-NACC members of the CSCE, who could participate in its meetings as observers and contribute to informational sessions and cooperation activities agreed to by the Group.<sup>26</sup> Over the first six months of 1993, the Ad Hoc Group was able to succeed, where NATO had stalled, in producing a

document covering terminology, general criteria and operational principles for peace support operations. Their initial report was presented to the NACC Ministers in Athens in June 1993.<sup>27</sup> However, the NACC Ad Hoc Group's success should be viewed against the fact that, unlike NATO itself, the NACC charter does not invest it with any direct operational authority. As a result, Allies who had resisted efforts to conclude agreement on a NATO document outlining peacekeeping doctrine—one that would apply to employment of their own military forces under a NATO banner—were less opposed to a more general NACC document that set forward principles to foster "common understanding on conceptual approaches and a common program for practical cooperation aimed at sharing information and experiences."<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless, the NACC Ministers in Athens did note that there was a possibility that "practical cooperation" could include joint training, education and exercises.<sup>29</sup> At the level of military-to-military contacts under the NACC programs, this was an accurate assessment. NATO's military authorities and their Central and Eastern European counterparts had jumped at the opportunity for cooperation provided by the NACC framework, and efforts were well underway to support the transition of the military establishments of the former Warsaw Pact nations into organizations more compatible with NATO procedures and democratic forms of governance. Unfortunately, the pace of military contacts exceeded the pace of political cooperation within the NACC, with the result being a growing misperception in some quarters that NATO was more interested in cooperation with active Eastern military leadership than with developing democratic leadership.

This perceptual problem was exacerbated by one of the most serious shortcomings of the NACC program: it had no defense ministerial component. At the time the NACC charter was drafted in 1991, many allies still had reservations about opening NATO's defense planning process to their former adversaries. Moreover, due to the fact that France did not participate in NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC), which was the forum for defense ministerial contacts within the Alliance, Paris had blocked inclusion of any specific reference to meetings of Defense Ministers in the NACC charter. Consequently, the institution that, in most Western democracies, is most instrumental in exercising civilian control over the military establishment was missing from the NACC framework. Subsequent efforts to redress this gap by creating a NACC Group on Defense Matters (GDM) independent of the DPC did not go far enough in satisfying French concerns to achieve NATO consensus. While the GDM did nevertheless establish a forum for NATO's Defense Ministers to meet with their NACC counterparts, it had no legal institutional linkage to either NATO or the NACC. The result was that a critical component for coordinating the pace of political and military development was missing from the NACC.

## **PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE**

The combination of a lack of an operational component in the NACC charter and the lack of a Defense Ministerial component in NACC organization meant that, despite the prospect for joint peacekeeping exercises held out in the NACC Athens communique, there was little chance that the NACC would be able to provide the necessary institutional framework for joint peacekeeping operations. It was in part to satisfy this requirement that the Partnership for Peace was conceived. Originally proposed at SHAPE Headquarters as a "Partnership for Peacekeeping" under the military-to-military contacts portion of the NACC, Partnership for Peace gradually emerged with a political component as a hybrid response to a wide range of requirements. As the Framework Document for Partnership for Peace, issued at the Brussels NATO Summit in January 1994, sets forth, the Partnership has five main objectives: (1) to facilitate transparency in defense planning and budgeting; (2) to help ensure democratic control of armed forces; (3) to maintain the capability and readiness of members to contribute to UN or CSCE operations; (4) to develop cooperative military relations between the Partners and NATO for the purposes of joint planning, training and exercises in support of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and other operations as may be subsequently agreed; and (5) to develop among Partners forces that are better able to operate alongside those of NATO.<sup>30</sup>

The requirement for transparency in defense planning and budgeting is one of the most critical steps in promoting stability throughout the trans-Atlantic region as called for in NATO's Strategic Concept and the Rome



Declaration. As the late NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner expressed it, "Partnership for Peace is, above all, an outstanding opportunity for Europe to begin to develop a common defense culture and habits of cooperation."<sup>31</sup> The defense planning mechanisms of the Alliance have played a central role in avoiding the renationalization of defense among the NATO allies, by fostering an environment in which security is viewed collectively rather than competitively. It is this benefit that the first objective of PFP seeks to extend to the East.

Recognizing that not all of the partners are comfortable yet with the idea of full transparency in all defense planning with their neighbors, PFP seeks to move in this direction in incremental steps. Once nations have indicated their willingness to participate in the Partnership by signing the Framework Document, they are required to present to NATO a "Presentation Document." This document outlines steps taken nationally to enhance transparency and democratic control of the armed forces, and contains "an indication of the kind of cooperative activities of interest to the partner, and the military forces and other assets that it might make available for Partnership activities."<sup>32</sup> The Alliance draws from these documents and its own experience to produce a "Partnership Work Program," which serves as a sort of "menu" of cooperative activities that could be undertaken by PFP. The Work Program and the Presentation Documents then form the basis for preparation of national "Partnership Programs," which, like the Presentation Documents, are developed between individual nations and NATO. Once these programs are finalized, however, they are made available to all partner states in the interest of transparency.<sup>33</sup>

It was the intention of at least some Allies that the processes of encouraging transparency and of promoting democratic control of defense forces could be advanced together by developing a defense component of PFP. Eventually, such a component might form the basis for involving partner states in a defense planning process parallel to that of the annual NATO defense review process. Despite the earlier French objections to including a Ministry of Defense component in the NACC, there were some indications that these objections would not necessarily apply to a new organization dedicated primarily to the task of peacekeeping. Paris had insisted, and the Alliance had acquiesced, in full French participation in all Alliance deliberations concerning peacekeeping operations. By mid-1993, this had translated into a more active, if not consistent, French role in the NATO Military Committee, and a tendency for NATO Ambassadors to make almost all decisions regarding Bosnia in the forum of the Council in permanent session rather than the DPC. Moreover, the French had led the way in insisting that NATO make its defense planning processes more transparent to potential non-NATO peacekeeping partners, as part of an effort to ensure similar transparency to Paris.

As a result, there appeared to be a window of opportunity to promote NATO cooperation with the NACC partners and other European states in defense matters—at least those associated with peacekeeping. PFP was made a NATO Summit initiative in part to ensure that it was created by direction of the members' Heads of State, rather than Ministers of Foreign Affairs, so that the charter could be seen to include both Foreign and Defense Ministries. Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the June 1994 Istanbul NAC Ministerial, which reviewed the implementation of the

previous January's Summit decisions, the French objections to a formal role for Defense Ministers in implementing the PFP resurfaced, and this aspect of the concept remains unfulfilled.<sup>34</sup>

Instead of a formal Defense Ministerial component, NATO has established a Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC) to provide the linkage between civilian political control of PFP programs and the military implementation of those programs. The PMSC, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, is designed to be flexible enough to permit nations to send representatives from whichever ministries or agencies are most appropriate for the individual topics under discussion. It also has the flexibility to meet in differing configurations: it can meet as the 16 NATO members with a single partner to address issues related to individual partnership programs; with a group of several partners to coordinate activities, such as limited exercises, common to several but not all partners; and with all NACC/PFP partners to handle common issues of PFP. To avoid duplication of effort, the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping will gradually be absorbed into the PMSC.<sup>35</sup>

The third stated objective of PFP, that of maintaining the ability to contribute to UN and CSCE peacekeeping operations, sets both a goal and the necessary boundaries for Partnership operations. The goal is the development of an effective multinational capability to bring force to bear, where necessary, in support of CSCE or UN missions throughout Eurasia. At present, this capability can be provided outside of NATO only as a unilateral initiative or on an ad hoc basis. Unilateral action tends to be perceived as lacking in legitimacy, and frequently is

viewed with distrust or hostility by the states in the immediate neighborhood. Ad hoc operations, on the other hand, while potentially satisfying the need for a multilateral approach to peace support operations, take time to organize and run the risk of inefficient integration of forces that have little or no experience in working together. Both can prove disastrous when there is a crisis requiring rapid and effective response. PFP is designed to give both the UN and CSCE a more legitimate and effective tool to apply in such situations. At the same time, by clearly establishing the boundaries for employment of PFP as being "in support of UN and CSCE operations," the PFP charter seeks to remove residual fears that PFP could be employed as a vehicle for NATO intervention against the wishes of other states in Eurasia. Like NATO itself, it is the intention of the PFP members to use the capabilities they hope to develop for peace support operations only in connection with a UN or CSCE mandate.

The types of operational capabilities that PFP seeks to develop among its member states are specified in the fourth and fifth objectives: cooperative relations with NATO for planning, training and exercises in peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and other operations; and developing forces better able to operate in conjunction with those of NATO. The former aims at developing the habits of cooperation necessary for effective employment of multilateral forces for collective responses to threats to peace and stability among the member states throughout Eurasia. The latter, and final, phase of PFP will be the eventual ability of PFP member states actually to perform such missions in a manner that allows them to draw seamlessly upon the effective operational and command capabilities currently available within NATO.

To establish the basis for such operations, partner states have sent permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters in Brussels and to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, Belgium, "where SHAPE is located."<sup>36</sup> The liaison officers in Brussels will participate in PMSC meetings, while the Coordination Cell in Mons is responsible for coordinating joint military activities and carrying out the broad military planning necessary to implement Partnership Programs. Detailed operational planning for deployments and exercises, such as the initial exercise in Poland, is the responsibility of the military commands that will actually be involved.<sup>37</sup>

The Partnership for Peace stops short of extending a NATO security guarantee to the Partner states, but it does dramatically expand the geographic area within which the legitimacy of collective allied and partner activities in peace support operations is recognized. This expansion is not without its potential costs. Designed to provide an institutional vehicle to advance the ability of the Alliance to make good on its promise in Rome to promote peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic region, it raises expectations of NATO-backed solutions for problems that may simply outstrip the ability of any institution to resolve.

This may prove to be particularly true in the CIS, where it is far from certain that the partner states share identical interests in either the means or outcomes of peace support operations. Russia, for example, has suggested an arrangement under which "Russia, acting alone or together with its CIS partners, would conduct a peacekeeping operation, the CSCE would send observers, while . . . partners would provide logistical back-up or finance the training of Russian peacekeeping personnel."<sup>38</sup> Many of

Russia's neighbors fear that this approach, with its implicit recognition of a Russian right of unilateral action in the "near abroad," could lead to PFP serving as a legitimating mask for the reassertion of Russian hegemony. At the same time, most would accept Manfred Wörner's observation that "a European-wide order of peace would be difficult, if not impossible to achieve without the active participation of Russia."<sup>39</sup> For the Partnership for Peace to be effective in this wider arena, its members will have to find a way to satisfy both sets of demands.

## THE MEMBERSHIP QUESTION

In addition to the basic objectives of the Partnership set forward in the Framework Document, the NATO Heads of State used the occasion of the formal PFP "Invitation" to reaffirm the fact that the Alliance "remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty."<sup>40</sup> Despite the popular perception in the press that PFP was merely "an alternative to expanding NATO into Eastern Europe,"<sup>41</sup> it was, as noted above, originally conceived to fill a set of legitimate needs in its own right. It was not, however, merely happenstance that PFP also was designed to provide a vehicle to draw the Central and Eastern European states into a closer relationship with NATO that fell short of their aspirations for membership. The Alliance would have been hard pressed to emerge unscathed from a full blown debate on membership expansion in late 1993 or early 1994. Even if there had been consensus in principle on immediate membership expansion—and there clearly was not—it would have been impossible to reach consensus on precisely which nations should be first in line to join. The issue was tied up not only with the concerns of several Allies not to provide ammunition to potentially destabilizing nationalist elements in Russia, but also with the thorny problems associated with the pace of membership expansion in other European organizations such as the EU and WEU.

The PFP concept avoided this no-win debate, while at the same time providing some immediate benefits to the partner states through joint exercises and training with NATO forces. It also served the interests of both the Alliance and its prospective new members by making it possible to develop some performance-based standards for

consideration of future membership expansion. The ability of partner states to meet their obligations under PFP, to include transparency in defense planning, democratic standards of civilian control of the military, and an ability to fund their own participation in exercises,<sup>42</sup> should provide a useful indicator of which states are capable of satisfying the requirements of Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty that new NATO members must "be in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area." It is on this basis that the Alliance has been able to press forward with plans for limited expansion in the near term, as called for in the 1994 fall ministerial meetings in Brussels.

There are, however, some potentially negative, unintended consequences of the way in which the membership issue has been linked to the Partnership for Peace. By making it appear that membership may be tied to "outstanding performance" in PFP, the Allies may have encouraged competition rather than cooperation among the partners. In such a competition, it is likely to be the development of a more efficient military establishment, rather than more efficient democratic control, that is seen by the partners as having the potential of paying the biggest and most immediate dividends.<sup>43</sup> Such a misreading of the Partnership program would, rather than contributing to peace and stability, have exactly the opposite effect.



## NATO WITHOUT BARBARIANS

The mere fact that NATO must now seriously consider which of its former adversaries from the Warsaw Pact are best in a position to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area through eventual membership in the Alliance is, in and of itself, testimony to the pace at which the Alliance has sought to adapt to the new security environment. But even in light of the pace of change within the Alliance, it is easy to make the case that the Alliance has still not adapted rapidly enough. Indeed, there are those on both sides of the Atlantic who would argue that the Alliance cannot adapt to the new security environment: that it is an institution whose time has come and gone, and that the appearance of adaptation over the past five years is nothing other than a classic case of a bureaucracy seeking to justify its continued existence after the reason for its existence has disappeared. One is reminded of a poem about ancient Alexandria that has been often repeated within the halls of NATO over the past five years:

Why this sudden bewilderment? This confusion?  
Why are the streets and squares  
emptying so rapidly,  
Everyone going home, lost in thought?  
Because night has fallen,  
and the Barbarians have not come!  
And some of our men, just in from the border,  
Say there are no Barbarians any longer.  
Now what's going to happen to us  
without the Barbarians?  
They were, those people, after all,  
A kind of solution.<sup>44</sup>

The answer to the question of what will happen to NATO without the "barbarians" depends primarily on whether or not the Alliance remains a bargain to its members. It seems obvious today that it would be impossible to recreate NATO in the absence of the overwhelming immediate threat that was seen to exist from the Soviet Union at the end of WW II. If NATO is worth sustaining in the absence of that threat, then it must be perceived by its member states as continuing to satisfy their legitimate security needs, and to do so at a price that is cheaper than the alternatives of either unilateral action or working through another organization.

On balance, NATO has taken some very promising steps as an Alliance and in conjunction with its European neighbors to enhance the capabilities for effective, collective engagement in peace support operations. It remains to be seen whether that promise will be fulfilled. For the United States, this means that NATO cannot become, as some members of the Alliance would have it, merely an insurance policy against the eventuality of a renewed Article 5 threat from some future resurgent "barbarians." Nor is it merely a question of NATO going "out of area or out of business." NATO has already gone "out of area" in its response to Bosnia, and demonstrated a willingness to use force (albeit after extensive and sometimes fierce debate) in the process. For NATO to maintain its relevance to the security interests of its members and the trans-Atlantic community as a whole, it must continue to adapt as an institution which can make good on the vision of enduring peace and stability in the London and Rome Declarations. This will not be an easy task.

There is a tremendous difference between the ability to generate consensus to respond to an Article 5 attack on a member of the Alliance and the ability to generate and sustain consensus to deploy NATO or PFP forces to engage in crisis management or peace support operations outside of the territory of member states. Obviously, the critical element in determining the future usefulness of either a NATO or PFP role in peacekeeping will be the political will of the member states when confronted with a situation in which NATO or Partnership forces might be deployed. At the present time, this is problematic, both as it relates to the willingness of members to deploy forces, and as it relates to the willingness of some states in Eurasia to have those forces deployed on or near their borders.

However, national political will is not static. Developing confidence in effective and legitimate institutional arrangements through which peacekeeping forces can be deployed and controlled could be a major step in building and shaping the requisite national political will to employ those forces when they are needed. This may be the most important contribution that NATO and the Partnership for Peace can make. By providing access to NATO's proven effective institutional command arrangements, while at the same time developing habits of cooperation and confidence among Partner states in the use of those arrangements through PFP, it may be possible to foster the emergence of the political conditions necessary for more effective peacekeeping throughout the entire trans-Atlantic and broader European region. This is not a short-term solution, but rather a long-term process. As the Harmel Report on *The Future Tasks of the Alliance* noted over a quarter of a century ago, it is one of the enduring functions of the Alliance to "pursue the search for progress

toward a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved."<sup>45</sup> This remains the goal reflected in both NATO and the Partnership for Peace today.

The Alliance has come a long way since its inception, when Lord Ismay is reported to have made his now infamous statement of NATO's three purposes: "Keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." But it is important not to lose sight of the broader truths behind this "politically incorrect" shorthand. NATO's mission is not just keeping the Russians out, but preventing the domination of Europe by any hostile hegemon. That can be accomplished, as it was for 40 years, by a hostile standoff, or, as it must be in the future, by concerted efforts to bring our former adversaries more closely into the fold of Western democracies through programs such as NACC and PFP. NATO must provide a valid rationale for America wanting to be kept in, through a workable program of equitably shared roles, risks and responsibilities without wasteful duplication or competition. The CJTF has the potential to advance this concept, if the Alliance can find a way to implement it. And NATO must be prepared to extend the benefits of participation in the integrated military structure to all of Europe, as it once did for Germany, not to "keep the Germans down," but to ensure that, as a result of a sense of real collective defense which only the integrated military structure of NATO provides, no member of the Alliance need ever arm itself to the point where it is more of a threat than an ally to its neighbors. If NATO can continue to fulfill these basic purposes, then its members need not worry about what's going to happen to them "without the Barbarians."

## NOTES

1. "NATO begins first exercises in Poland." *The London Financial Times*, 13 September 1994: p. 2.
2. "The Cold War Armies Meet, Just to Link Arms." *The New York Times*, 15 September 1994: p. 4.
3. "Soviet Union Grapples with an Upheaval It Began." *The Boston Globe*, 19 November 1989: p. 1.
4. Research conducted by the author in November 1989, during the course of drafting *The Future of NATO*, Praeger, N.Y., 1991.
5. *The London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London, July 5-6, 1990: Paragraphs 1, 4 and 14.
6. *Ibid.*, and *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, November 1991: Preamble, Paragraph 1.
7. *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, November 1991: Paragraph 11.
8. *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*: Paragraph 39, and the *Rome Declaration*: Paragraph 4.

9. The dissolution of the Soviet Union introduced a major complication into the NACC. Begun as a "European" institution linking NATO's 16 members with the 6 remaining countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the 3 Baltic states, it now faced an overnight expansion to 36 members (since increased to 38), many with decidedly non-European outlooks.

10. Kozyrev, Andrei. "Neoimperialism or Defense of Interests of the Democratic Community," in *NATO's Sixteen Nations*; Volume 39, Number 2, 1994: p. 49.

11. On a parallel track, a successful proposal was put forward for the Helsinki CSCE summit in June 1992 to adopt a declaration identifying the CSCE as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN charter.

12. *Communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo*. 4 June 1992: paragraph 11.

13. *Communique Issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*. Brussels, Belgium, 17 December 1992: paragraph 4.

14. See, for example, Asmus, Ronald D., Richard Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4, September/October 1993: p. 31.

15. "NATO Seeks Options to Big Troop Deployment for Insuring Delivery of Aid to Bosnia." *The New York Times*, 14 August 1992: p. A-6.

16. This account is based upon interviews with numerous NATO and UNPROFOR staff officers who were engaged in early planning for the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia, 1992-1993.

17. For an example of the "official" view of the early NATO/WEU efforts in the Adriatic, note the language in the *Communique Issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council*, Brussels, 17 December 1992.
18. Genschel, Dietrich. "Russia and a Changing Europe," in *Joint Force Quarterly*; Summer 1994, No. 5: pp. 34-35.
19. One cynical characterization of the French position on the use of the NATO chain of command has been posed as the question: "We know it works in practice, but can you make it work in theory?"
20. "NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations." Draft version, change 1, 28 February 1994.
21. Ibid.
22. *Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994*: p. 1.
23. *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*: Paragraph 47.
24. *Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping*. NATO Press Service Press Release M-NACC 1(93)40; 11 June 1993.
25. Ibid.
26. Austria, Finland and Sweden have participated in the NACC Ad Hoc Group as observers.
27. *Report to Ministers by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping*. NATO Press Service Press Release M-NACC 1(93)40; 11 June 1993.

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28. *Statement Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council*. Athens, Greece: 11 June 1993.
29. Ibid.
30. *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*. 10 January 1994.
31. Wörner, Manfred. "Partnership with NATO - The Political Dimension," in *NATO's Sixteen Nations*; Volume 39 Number 2, 1994: p. 7.
32. von Moltke, Gebhardt. "Building a Partnership for Peace," in *NATO Review*; Volume 42, No. 3, June 1994: pp. 5-6.
33. Ibid.
34. *Final Communique*, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Istanbul, Turkey; 9 June 1994: paragraphs 2 - 8.
35. von Moltke, Gebhardt. "Building a Partnership for Peace," in *NATO Review*; Volume 42, No. 3; June 1994: pp. 7.
36. The phrase "where SHAPE is located," rather than "at" or "collocated with" SHAPE is communique language devised to satisfy French political sensitivity about the role of SHAPE and NATO's integrated military command structure.
37. "Partnership for Peace." *Basic Fact Sheet*, issued by the NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels; June 1994: No. 9, p. 3.
38. Kozyrev. op. cit.: p. 52.



39. Wörner. "Partnership with NATO—The Political Dimension," p. 7.
40. *Partnership for Peace: Invitation*. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 10-11 January 1994; NATO Press Communique M-1(94)2: 10 January 1994.
41. "Ex-foes' NATO partnerships net tepid response in Europe," *The Washington Times*, June 1, 1994: p. 8.
42. In an effort to ensure that PFP gets off to a good start, some NATO allies—most notably the U.S.— have agreed to help defray the costs of partner states' participation in early PFP exercises.
43. For a more thorough examination of the potentially negative consequences of Partnership for Peace, see Simon, Jeffrey. "Partnership for Peace: Stabilizing the East," in *Joint Force Quarterly*; Summer 1994, No. 5: pp. 36-45.
44. Constantinos Kavafis, Greek poet, as cited by Theodore Couloumbis at the opening conference of the Marshall Center in Garmish, Germany, June 1993. The poem has also been used in presentations at NATO HQ in Brussels by David Nicholas, formerly Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission to NATO, and Major-General Dr. D. Genschel, GEAR, formerly Director of the Plans and Policy Division of the IMS.
45. *The Future Tasks of the Alliance* (Harmel Report), report to the Council, December 14, 1967, as reprinted in *NATO Facts and Figures*, NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1989: pp. 402-404.

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*The McNair Papers are published at Fort Lesley J. McNair, home of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University. An Army post since 1794, the fort was given its present name in 1948 in honor of Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair. General McNair, known as "Educator of the Army" and trainer of some three million troops, was about to take command of Allied ground forces in Europe under Eisenhower, when he was killed in combat in Normandy, 25 July 1944.*

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