

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

PEACEKEEPING: THE WAY AHEAD?

Contributors

William H. Lewis John Mackinlay
John G. Ruggie Sir Brian Urquhart

Editor

William H. Lewis

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

McNair Paper 25

***A popular Government,
without popular information or the means of
acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or
perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance;
And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.***

**JAMES MADISON to W. T. BARRY
August 4, 1822**

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Report of a Special Conference

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From time to time, INSS publishes short papers to provoke thought and inform discussion on issues of U.S. national security in the post-Cold War era. These monographs present current topics related to national security strategy and policy, defense resource management, international affairs, civil-military relations, military technology, and joint, combined, and coalition operations.

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Foreword

The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a dramatic growth in the number of multilateral military operations, most loosely linked with the generic term "peacekeeping." The overwhelming majority of these operations have taken place under the auspices of the United Nations. They are a reflection of the rebirth of tribal nationalism, spreading religious xenophobia, and the threatened impoverishment and disintegration of Third World nation-states that have slipped their colonial moorings since World War II. As a result, we are witnessing new challenges to the United States, to the regional organizations in which we share membership, and to the United Nations system.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University, in collaboration with Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, has launched a major effort to examine these challenges. The study effort will concentrate on the changing nature of peace operations, their likely impact on the U.S. military, and ways to improve and enhance the capabilities of various organizations to successfully complete future peace operations. A series of six workshops have been planned for the coming year.

The initial workshop was convened at Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., on September 10, 1993. Its participants included senior officials, academics, and research specialists from New York and the Washington area. The terms of reference included the changing international security environment, the strengths and weaknesses of the United

Nations and NATO in coping with existing security issues, and possible remedial actions. We were fortunate to have the views of four experts in the field—Dean John Ruggie (Columbia University), Sir Brian Urquhart (Ford Foundation), Professor William Lewis (The George Washington University), and John Mackinlay (Brown University)—whose papers are included in this INSS Proceedings.

The discussions produced a number of policy proposals and recommendations. Among the most constructive were the following: a need to develop military doctrine that provides operational guidance for the broad range of activities that fall under the term "peace operations"; the urgent requirement for development of various types of unified command and control arrangements to meet future contingency operations; and the desirability of including civilian components in early stages of operational planning.

The Institute is pleased to publish these essays as a contribution to the current debate on UN peace operations and the U.S. role therein.

STUART E. JOHNSON
Acting Director

The United Nations: Stuck in a Fog Between Peacekeeping and Enforcement

JOHN GERARD RUGGIE

The United Nations has opened up a domain of military activity between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement measures. It has done so largely by ratcheting up the peacekeeping mechanism. This has enabled the United Nations to respond to new security challenges in the post-Cold War world. Nearly 70,000 blue-helmeted peacekeepers are now in the field, and the demand for more increases almost daily. However, by now the largest number serves in contexts for which peacekeeping was not intended. They function under rules of engagement and with equipment frequently inadequate to their missions. And their effectiveness and sometimes their very survival depend on a UN infrastructure that not only is overburdened, in terms of financial, material, and human resources, but also lacks any operational concept to guide these activities.

This growing misuse of peacekeeping does more than strain the United Nations materially and institutionally.

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It has brought the world body to the point of outright strategic failure—indeed, in Bosnia the line has been crossed already. UN peacekeeping forces there have performed a valuable humanitarian role, to be sure, but having been deployed in a security environment for which the peacekeeping mechanism was not designed, the presence of those forces has deterred not the Serbs but the international community itself from undertaking more forceful action. Thus, the Europeans opposed President Clinton's proposed airstrikes against Serbian artillery positions because they have peacekeeping troops on the ground that are highly vulnerable to retaliation. Yet those troops are neither intended nor capable of producing the military stalemate from which a political settlement could emerge, because of their small numbers and their quasipeacekeeping rules of engagement and capabilities.

Governments must move quickly to assess the constraints and opportunities facing UN-sanctioned forces. For if the United Nations continues on its present course of action, its newly constructed house of cards will collapse and take traditional peacekeeping as well as humanitarian intervention down with it. Recent developments in U.S. policy, culminating in the Clinton administration's Policy Review Document 13, indicate that a greater willingness exists in the country today than in the past to explore seriously what U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Madeleine K. Albright, has dubbed "assertive multilateralism."¹¹ To date, however, the notion lacks any corresponding expression in military doctrine and operational concepts.

The critical next step is for the international community to define the new domain of collective military activity located between peacekeeping and enforcement, and to figure out if and how its military requirements can be

meshed with the national military capabilities and doctrines of those states that are able and willing to make a meaningful contribution to it. This brief paper suggests the outlines of a strategic logic for this domain, and also indicates some of the practical problems that would have to be resolved for that logic to be instituted. Let us begin with what we understand.

Peacekeeping

Over the years, the United Nations has evolved a well-articulated and widely recognized operational concept for peacekeeping. Brian Urquhart, who was present at its creation and presided over the activity for many years, described peacekeeping as follows:

The use by the United Nations of military personnel and formations not in a fighting or enforcement role but interposed as a mechanism to bring an end to hostilities and as a buffer between hostile forces. In effect, it serves as an internationally constituted pretext for the parties to a conflict to stop fighting and as a mechanism to maintain a cease-fire.²

Given their interpositionary or "umpire" role, peacekeeping forces fight against neither side in a dispute but remain impartial and help keep them apart. Toward that end, they observe and report. They carry only light arms and shoot only in self-defense. And because they lack any constitutional basis in the UN charter, peacekeeping forces are sent only with the consent of the country or countries in which they are stationed. In sum, unlike combat units, peacekeeping forces are not designed to create the conditions for their own success on the ground; those conditions must pre-exist for them to be able to perform their role. Theirs is essentially a nonmilitary

mission, carried out by military personnel. Accordingly, the combat effectiveness of such units and the adequacy of UN headquarters operations that support them have not had to be a major concern.³

To this classical peacekeeping portfolio, the United Nations, beginning in the late 1980s, has added monitoring and sometimes actually conducting elections, supporting and sometimes actually performing the tasks of civil administration, and related services that facilitate transitions to stable government. Namibia was a successful instance, and Cambodia may yet become one. To ensure the future viability of these activities, the United Nations requires higher levels and more timely provision of financial resources, better trained personnel, and more sophisticated logistical support and communication facilities. But neither the classical peacekeeping portfolio nor its noncombatant offshoots requires any doctrinal or institutional innovations.

Military Enforcement

Enforcement is primarily a legal, not military, term. It refers to actions authorized under Chapter VII or the UN Charter. An aggressor is collectively identified and punished by an escalating ladder of means until its aggression is reversed. Ultimately, enforcement involves flat-out war-fighting—the "all necessary means" of Resolution 678, authorizing what became Operation *Desert Storm*. War-fighting of that sort is everything that peacekeeping is not—doctrinally, in terms of on-the-ground assets, and in its command and control requirements. As defined by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the doctrines and rules governing U.S. troops in *Desert Storm* and similar campaigns are antithetical to standard UN peacekeeping practice: the decisive, comprehensive, and synchronized

application of preponderant military force to shock, disrupt, demoralize, and defeat opponents.⁴

The United Nations does not have an institutionalized military enforcement capability. Notwithstanding some charter language and mythology to the contrary, the major powers never intended for it to have one. And it is exceedingly difficult to imagine how it could come to acquire any militarily significant variant of such a capability. Proposals for a UN standby force or an international volunteer force may provoke thought but are unlikely to yield enough funding and facilities or field enough troops. Large-scale military enforcement by the United Nations in the future, therefore, will remain episodic and, when it occurs at all, will continue to consist of UN authorization and general political oversight together with execution by ad hoc coalitions.

Neutralizing Force

It is in the gray area between peacekeeping and all-out war-fighting that the United Nations has gotten itself into trouble—trouble which stems from the UN application of perfectly good tools to inappropriate circumstances.

The ill-fated UN peacekeeping mission sent to Somalia prior to Operation *Restore Hope* (UNISOM I) is an example. Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid, so-called Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed, and the other warlords did not create domestic anarchy in Somalia serendipitously. The insecurity of the Somali population was their very objective, the basis of their power and revenues. Those hapless 400 Pakistani Blue Berets confined to Mogadishu airport were the only lightly armed contingents in the country. When international humanitarian assistance personnel wanted to move about they had to hire armed

thugs for protection, thereby reinforcing the very system that created the human tragedy that had brought them to Somali.

The same is true in the former Yugoslavia. From the start, as Aleksa Djilas recently wrote, "Milosevic counted on war, the ultimate condition of fear, to unite Serbs around him."⁵ There was no peace to be kept in Bosnia. And the displacement of Muslims in Bosnia is not an incidental byproduct of the war but the Serbs' objective. By definition, therefore, deploying a UN humanitarian mission to Bosnia meant that its personnel would not be considered impartial and that they could become potential pawns in the conflict. Seeking to "protect" them with peacekeepers only added to the number of potential international hostages on the ground.

Alas, the domain between peacekeeping and enforcement is a doctrinal void.⁶ The United Nations has not sought to articulate an operational concept on the basis of which it could design missions, and train and deploy troops. This intermediate domain of military activity often concerns internal conflicts, though that describes rather than defines it in any strategically significant way. And it has tended to be animated by humanitarian objectives, though that determines relatively little about appropriate military dimensions.

A core strategic logic for the new domain can be simply put. In game-theory language, peacekeeping resembles a coordination problem: an interpositionary presence seeks by means of transparency to ensure that mutually agreed rules are adhered to. Enforcement is akin to a game of chicken: the international community attempts to force the aggressor off the track, ultimately by means of military defeat. The domain here resembles a suasion game:⁷ real conflicts of interest exist, but there is no clear-cut aggressor

who crosses a line in the sand; international force is then brought to bear, not to defeat but to neutralize the force deployed by the parties to a conflict.

The political objective of using international force to neutralize local force is to prevent local force from becoming the successful arbiter of outcomes, and to speed up the process whereby the local combatants become persuaded that they have no viable alternative but to reach a negotiated political settlement. The military objective of the strategy is to deter, dissuade, and deny (D³).

Ideally, the timely show of sufficient international force would deter the local use of force altogether; a flotilla of warships off the coast of Dubrovnik, firing warning shots when the Serbs first shelled the city, might have gone a long way to arrest armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia. If the time for deterrence has passed, or should deterrence fail, international force would be deployed in the attempt to dissuade local forces from continuing their military activities; Operation *Restore Hope* was an attempt—if not entirely successful—to accomplish that end. As a last step, international force would seek to deny military victory to any side in the dispute, thereby creating the military stalemate on which negotiated settlements often depend; President Clinton's "lift and strike" proposal for Bosnia would have been an instance had it been adopted.

To achieve any of these objectives, the international force must above all be militarily credible. Neither its size nor its technological and operational capabilities can be defined generically, therefore, merely by virtue of the categorical nature of the mission. Each will depend on circumstances. At the high end of the spectrum, such a force might be indistinguishable from war-fighting units in all respects *except* its rules of engagement and military as well as political objectives. The air-strike component of

President Clinton's "lift and strike" proposal would have exemplified that feature, but even at the lower end, as illustrated by the current UN operation in Somalia, such forces require more extensive training than traditional peacekeepers, as well as heavier equipment, greater operational flexibility and mobility, access to more sophisticated communication and intelligence systems, and tactical direction by a viable field command.

Even if the proposed D³ strategy were satisfactorily refined and adopted as policy by government, however, a number of practical problems would have to be resolved before it could be successfully instituted.

Implementation

First, any move in this direction would increase the military presence of the major powers in the United Nations. Relatively few countries have the military capabilities to implement the strategy in any but minor conflicts. And those countries that do can hardly be expected simply to turn over their forces to the international body. Greater military involvement by the major powers would go a long way toward closing the military infrastructural gaps of the United Nations. But it would also increase the constant tension between the competing desires for UN vs. national control over field operations, and extend that struggle to headquarters operations. At the same time, the management of UNISOM II, the current Somalia mission, shows that a mutually acceptable interface is not impossible to achieve.

Second, like the old arrangement, neither the capabilities nor the willingness would exist under the new one to right all wrongs, even the relatively small number of wrongs that are deemed to warrant international action. Hence any such security system is bound to lack universality of coverage.

But that need not necessarily be a fatal flaw. The chief defining attribute of multilateralism, including collective security arrangements, should not be construed as universality but nondiscrimination.⁸ Great care would have to be taken, therefore, to minimize bias against or in favor of any particular region or type of party. For bias would undo any such system politically by reducing its legitimacy, and militarily by reducing its deterrent effect.

Third, a doctrinal clash would have to be overcome between, in particular, the U.S. military and the United Nations. For the U.S. military, the D³ strategy at first blush is likely to conjure up concepts of gradual escalation and limited war, discredited by and discarded after Vietnam. Under the new strategy, the political and military objectives of the deployment of international force would be limited, it is true; but there is no reason why those objectives could not be coupled with maximum military strength geared to the specificities of the situation at hand. The United Nations, however, both as a collection of governments and an institution in its own right, is averse to force and instinctively favors gradual escalation, and therefore would have to be taught to distinguish between the utility of force and its actual use.

Fourth and finally, the relationship between this new mode of intervention and traditional peacekeeping as well as humanitarian assistance would have to be worked out. On paper, the transition from Operation *Restore Hope* to UNISOM II looked good. In practice, it has not been smooth or entirely effective, largely because the military mission of the former was under-specified and inadequately executed.

Conclusion

The UN peacekeeping modality has been pushed too far, and UN-sanctioned military enforcement will continue to be a rarity. The domain of a potentially enhanced UN military role occupies the space between those two. The major challenge for the international community is to define that space and to mesh it effectively with national military capabilities and doctrines. I have attempted to sketch out a strategic logic for this new domain, premised on the international use of force to persuade local combatants that their use of force to resolve disputes will not succeed.

NOTES

1. Address to the Council on Foreign Relations Conference on Cooperative Security and the United Nations, 11 June 1993.

2. Brian Urquhart, "Thoughts on the Twentieth Anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld's Death," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (Fall 1981): 6.

3. John Mackinlay, "The Requirement for a Multinational Enforcement Capability," in Thomas G. Weiss, ed., *Collective Security in a Changing World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 142.

4. "A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts," Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Washington, DC, 23 November 1992.

5. Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Summer 1993): 88.

6. The best available descriptive typology of possible operations in the "gray" area may be found in John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, *A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993* (Providence, RI: The Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Institute, Brown University, 1993).

7. The concept of suasion games, though not this application, is from Lisa L. Martin, "The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

8. John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*.

"Assertive Multilateralism": Rhetoric vs. Reality

WILLIAM H. LEWIS

The post-Cold War international security environment has come unglued and, today, there are mounting doubts about the ability of institutions that have sprung up over the past half century to resolve the myriad crises that afflict the "community of nations." Old American programs, doctrinal strategies, and force structures, as well as international organizations of which the United States is a founding member, are being revisited and, like toys in a dusty attic, are found wanting. As a result, we appear embarked on a voyage of discovery, one on which we confront complex foreign policy issues with an uncertain compass to guide us.

In the midst of vast uncertainties, the United Nations has come to assume a pivotal position in U.S. policy planning. Its place has been inscribed as part of a strategy for multilateralism which, once in place, is to be vigorously pursued. Little in the Clinton administrations' performance to date has suggested a coherent strategic design. Rather, in the instances of Bosnia, Somalia,

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Haiti, and the Middle East "peace process," the administration has offered only a series of short-term, pragmatic initiatives. Many of these initiatives suggest an inclination to react to events largely shaped by other nations and by forces seemingly beyond U.S. capacity or desire to control. The President's critics suggest that, in the foreign policy arena, he came to office to preside rather than to lead or to shape a national consensus on critical issues. This judgement may be too harsh and, indeed, as will be underscored in the following passages, a general design and posture on salient national security issues is beginning to emerge in Washington.

"Plus ca change . . . "

One quality of strategic thought is imperative in a period when old verities have been divested of legitimacy—this requires a capacity, as Abraham Lincoln observed more than a century past, to "think anew and to act anew". Peter Tarnoff, the erstwhile grandee of the Council on Foreign Relations and currently the sitting Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, apparently took this admonition to heart when in a May 1993 newspaper interview he outlined elements of the administration's post-Cold War thinking. The Under-Secretary, perhaps in an excess of candor, indicated that the U.S. expected to play a diminished world leadership role—in part because of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the manifest failures of Marxist ideology but also in substantially larger measure because of pressing domestic economic difficulties. The U.S. no longer could be expected to intervene in all of the world's political and economic upheavals but would "save" its power for "those situations which threaten our deepest national interest". Tarnoff declined to identify which situations would attract

U.S. intervention or precisely what constituted our "deepest national interest," but the Under-Secretary alluded to the expectation that America's friends and allies would shoulder much of the emerging international burden.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in a bit of unseemly haste perhaps engendered by pique over a major policy expose carrying the sobriquet of a subordinate (the soon to be banished Tarnoff "doctrine"), intervened to announce that U.S. foreign policy leadership remains undiminished. He later expatiated in a public address that "When it is necessary, we will act unilaterally to protect our interests." The Secretary subsequently offered a caveat, however: the nature and extent to which U.S. military force is to be employed will be influenced by four criteria: (1) the goal must be stated clearly to the American people; (2) there must be a strong likelihood of success; (3) the U.S. must have "an exit strategy", and (4) and the involvement of the U.S. military must have "sustained public support." These "tests" clearly reflected the dicta of the Chairman of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and are reminiscent of the preconditions set forth by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger at midstream in the Reagan administration.

As history has taught, credos and criteria can be damaged by devilmint arising from concrete situations requiring detailed policy responses. Nattering critics observe that candidate Clinton, circa 1992, pledged if once elected he would despatch a peace envoy to Northern Ireland, apply stringent conditions to certification of most-favored-nation treatment for China, and reverse the Bush administration practice of forcibly returning Haitian boat people to their homeland (including refugees entitled to asylum). In addition, he declaimed: "I will never turn over

the security of the United States to the UN or any other international organization"—the inference being that transfer of United States forces to foreign command would denigrate both the sovereignty and Constitution (a concern expressed by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin during his confirmation hearings). Nevertheless, in April 1993, the U.S. Government agreed to place residual logistics support forces under the operational control of a UN "peacekeeping" commander, Turkish General Bir, with the proviso that they would serve under the day-to-day command of a U.S. flag officer.

In the instance of Bosnia, the record is even more ambiguous. At the onset of his administration, the President pledged to support Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity (but without the deployment of U.S. ground forces to buttress other UN contingents). Several weeks later, after a special envoy—Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew—had been designated to facilitate negotiations by former U.K. Foreign Secretary Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, senior officials in Washington expressed reservations concerning the practicality of the Owen-Vance peace plan; as the situation continued to deteriorate in Bosnia, President Clinton unveiled a proposal to lift the UN arms embargo for the government of Bosnia and to seek UN Security Council approval for air strikes against Serbs attacking Muslim forces—a reversal of denunciation of the Owen-Vance plan once seen as rewarding Serb aggression. Secretary Christopher, apparently lukewarm to this "lift and strike" strategy, was unable to secure support by his NATO counterparts for this shift in policy, reportedly because UN peacekeeping troops might become targets and/or hostages and the U.S. might refuse to provide ground forces. Moreover, Congress and the U.S. public reacted negatively to the general approach propounded by Secretary

Christopher.

Today, despite fingerprinting for the debacle, including charges of failed American leadership, the principal international actors appear prepared to accept the failure of the Owen-Vance plan, the collapse of the "lift and strike" strategy, and acceptance of the dissolution of the Republic of Bosnia as a viable member of the international community.

This sequence of events has raised growing doubt in some quarters about the strategic design and purposes of the U.S. in a world confronting manifold crises and challenges to the integrity and stability of international society. Inevitably, the U.S. is seen as having turned to the UN as a life boat in which diverse passengers are expected to fashion a consensus on the most critical security issues that today confront the post-Cold War community of nations

Multilateralism Redux

Multilateralism is viewed by some observers as a partial response lodged halfway between unilateralism and full-fledged internationalism. They believe Secretary Tarnoff accurately reflected the basic policy orientation of the new administration. His strategic "thought" reflected an accounting of national priorities, a weighing of national needs and limitations, and, in light of all these, a rearrangement of commitments abroad to bring them into balance with national resources. The strategy is neither minimalist nor filled with hubris. Rather, it is intended to accomplish downloading of superpower responsibility, offset with an effort to encourage multilateral burden sharing. In the process, the U.S. will insist that it alone must identify and seek to accomplish its autonomous goals.

The policy conundrum surrounding the application

of U.S. strategy revolves around American leadership at a time of diminished resources and in the absence of national consensus on policy goals. Within an American public accustomed to U.S. paramountcy and global influence, residual pride of position remains and few would accept with equanimity any hint of policies that voluntarily placed their country among the "also rans". Secretary Christopher, aware of the national compulsion to appear influential, has sought to calm public nerves by repeatedly assuring that other nations continue to look to Washington for leadership on contentious international issues.

Nevertheless, domestic economic needs compete with national security realities. Recognition of this imperative has become obvious in the Department of Defense. In mid-June, Defense Secretary Les Aspin announced that a diminished budget has led the military to adopt a "win-hold-win" strategy for future war fighting. Under this blueprint, the U.S. would downsize its "base force" of 1.6 million active duty troops to 1.4 million; the army would shrink from 12 to 10 active duty divisions; the Navy's 12 carrier groups would decline to 10; the Air Force's 26.5 wings would be clipped to 20. Emphasis would be placed on power projection from a continental base, reflected in a shrinkage of forward basing and forward deployment of forces—with the exception of lightly armed Marine units and a handful of carrier battle groups. Protection of friends and allies would fall to the very same under the announced force sizing.

The essence of the newly unfurled "war fighting" strategy is an acknowledged capacity to fight only one regional war at a time. Should two such conflicts erupt simultaneously, American military power would be concentrated on one theatre in expectation of rapid defeat of the main adversary. Only a small force would be

dispatched to the second theatre in a holding operation, to be reinforced after successful conclusion of the initial theatre action. Several factors are thought to have bearing on successful application of the "win-hold-win" strategy: (1) availability of air and port facilities to receive U.S. forces; (2) availability of allied forces to provide a robust defense pending arrival of U.S. troops; (3) terrain that is hospitable to defensive, or holding, operations; (4) an initial adversary brought under control expeditiously; and (5) successful U.S. development of advanced military technologies. Secretary Aspin has alluded to the emergence of two "high tech" systems synergistically that have made successful introduction of the strategy somewhat less problematic. Sophisticated anti-armor technology, combined with new surveillance systems, are expected to enhance targeting and destruction of adversary armored formations by forces operating under American command.

Considerable skepticism currently obtains within senior U.S. military echelons concerning the degree of risk that inheres in the announced strategy. Some of the aforementioned defense technology is in research phase and will not enter the military inventory, after extensive testing, for several years to come. Timing is also significant with respect to the plans and intentions of adversaries. Saddam Hussein might not provide a cushion of six months and protected reception facilities for U.S. forces should he determine it safe to reinvest Kuwait and seek to seize Saudi oil fields in adjoining territory. Should the U.S. find itself re-engaged in the Gulf, South Korea might confront a situation in the "hold" phase where sufficient U.S. forces are not available to provide a robust defense north of Seoul. General Powell has cautioned: "I think it is essential that as we bring the force down, we have a clear understanding of what we will not be able to do." Noting that defense

spending has been reduced almost 30 percent in real terms over the past several years—and additional cuts of 5-10 percent are in prospect through 1987—the General reluctantly concluded that if the attendant risks are acceptable, "We ought to go ahead and save money and bring the force down. It's a very difficult judgment to make." His reluctance is predicated on the fact that, since the conclusion of the Cold War, calls on U.S. military forces for support to deal with global crises have not diminished but, rather, have multiplied. With a shrinking budget and reduced manpower, the military leadership has been compelled to operate at higher tempo, which, if the present trend continues, will provoke a decline in troop morale and recruitment problems, as well as a decline in wartime readiness of men and equipment.

The preferred "solution" outlined by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, is a division of labor involving American support for the world organization's "peacekeeping" efforts. The Ambassador has coined this approach somewhat flamboyantly as "assertive multilateralism". While the Clinton administration has been slow to provide the intellectual or architectural underpinnings for this approach, its essential purposes are not difficult to discern. Premised on policy engagement in multilateral fora, including NATO, CSCE, and other such organizations, it anticipates a continuing U.S. leadership role in shaping the policy decisions of these organizations. Indeed, the U.S. will view the various international bodies dedicated to crisis prevention and conflict resolution as user friendly. The increasing prominence and involvement of the United Nations and other organizations in regional peacekeeping operations is also presumed to be in the U.S. national interest. It follows, therefore, that "peacekeeping", provision of humanitarian relief, and enforcement operations

must be seen as important assets in helping to shape "the international security environment.

Until recently, the main U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations has been, in addition to individual, U.S. observers, to provide support in two areas: lift of UN elements (by sea or air) and financing of operations. A significant change was announced by President Bush in his September 21, 1992 address to the General Assembly. He directed Secretary of Defense Cheney to undertake several new actions to support UN peacekeeping, including: (1) training of U.S. combat, engineering, and logistics units for future peacekeeping operations; (2) working with the UN to "best employ" U.S. communications and intelligence capabilities; (3) offering joint simulations and exercises to other nations interested in peacekeeping; and (4) providing military expertise to the UN to help strengthen its planning and operations. Bush also underscored the need to "broaden American support for monitoring, verification, reconnaissance and other requirements of peacekeeping." Finally, he directed the Secretary of Defense to establish "a permanent peacekeeping curriculum in U.S. military schools".

In the period since, the U.S. national security community has conducted a number of studies intended to buttress U.S. capabilities, as well as to strengthen those of the UN and regional organizations. Among the more salient issues addressed have been the following: the nature of changes taking place in the international security environment and challenges likely to arise to U.S. interests; the spectrum of military peacekeeping missions likely to emerge over the coming decade; how such missions might impact on U.S. military forces; the strengths and discernible weaknesses of United Nations Military Headquarters in effecting military, political, and humanitarian assistance

coordination; acceptable command and control arrangements when U.S. forces are involved; and doctrines and international rules of engagement to be fashioned when forces are injected into intra-state conflict situations. An awareness is evident throughout the national security community that the UN system has major organizational deficiencies and financial problems in the realm of peacekeeping.

Ambassador Albright, in a June 1993 talk before the Council on Foreign Reactions, perhaps imprudently, identified some of the glaring weaknesses of the UN command system. Pointing to the "programmed amateurism" of the UN, she cited a "near total absence of contingency planning", a "lack of centralized command and control", and "lift arrangements cobbled together on a wing and a prayer." She also observed that military and civilian staffs are "hastily recruited, ill-equipped, and often unprepared." Part of the problem revolves around the fact that the UN has no dedicated standby forces and has no integrated troop training program, relying instead on member states to train their forces for peacekeeping duties, to arm them and to support them while on field assignment. The Ambassador's critique is echoed by a number of former field commanders, all of whom acknowledge that post-Cold War demands on the organization have outdistanced its capabilities.

The Headquarters Secretariat is seeking to meet burdens placed upon it that border on system overload. Over the past three years, the peacekeeping caseload has proliferated, from 11-12,000 troops deployed in early 1990 to more than 85,000 in mid-1993, with budgetary requirements that are not being met and threaten to impoverish operations. Concomitantly, the spectrum of mission assignments has expanded from traditional observer

and interposition responsibilities to disarming contending forces, monitoring elections, provision of humanitarian aid, police support for civil authority, and nation building. Officials in the UN Secretariat feel hardpressed to create a system that meets these diverse requirements within the resources available to them. While some welcome proffered U.S. contingency and military planning support, others fear American domination or Third World member state accusations that the UN is accommodating to the U.S. hegemonic impulses.

Despite these admitted UN shortcomings, the Clinton administration has embarked on a far-reaching policy review intended to commit the U.S. well beyond the Bush pledges before the General Assembly. According to recent newspaper reports, drafts of a policy review document designated PRD-13 has generated considerable interagency "debate", particularly over the stricture that U.S. forces become involved in intra-state conflicts if such involvement addresses threats to U.S. interests. Disagreements have also emerged within the U.S. military regarding the extent and nature of military resources to be dedicated to UN operations.

In the interim, the machinery of government continues to grind. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed a strategic planning paper—the so-called "Slocombe Doctrine", in honor of Walter Slocombe, Principal Deputy Undersecretary for policy—which observes. "In most cases, the United States cannot hope to effectively address the dangers facing us through unilateral approaches". As a result, the U.S. military is enjoined to revise and update its Joint Doctrine and Military Operations guideline to include sections addressing support for UN peacekeeping operations.

Strategy in Search of Contents

The breaching of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, followed by the implosion of the Soviet empire, was greeted with gleeful triumphalism in the U.S. and within other NATO member nations. Today, our assessments are somewhat more somber, with some contending the bipolarities of the past four decades were a "Golden Age" in which systemic stability has given way to the ungluing of alliances, the resurrection of ancient nationalisms, and the dismemberment of nation-states once presumed to be the bedrock of a civilized international order.

Such assessments are predicated on vast uncertainties as to what type of political order is possible in a period when Cold War institutions appear powerless to cope with failed ideologies and crumbling political systems in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Central to the challenge of policymakers in the U.S. is the perspective adopted—whether to regret the resulting diffusion of power and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of radical religious movements and to become a passive observer, or whether to seek to develop networks of interdependence and conflict resolution that facilitate transition to a new systemic order.

As one looked at the world at the beginning of the decade of the 1980s, the existing international system fell into four main groups. The first evolved around the division of the world along the axis of the East-West conflict (modified by the Sino-Soviet and other internal communist world conflicts); the second constellation clustered around an axis dividing the industrialized "North" and the underdeveloped "South"; the third tier involved so-called regional "powers" or nations entertaining hegemonic ambitions, tied in part to one of the superpowers; the last

"group" reflected the rise of conflicts involving not states but units below states, reflecting ethnic or religious tensions and international terrorism. The 1990s reflects a dramatic shift in the influence and significant potential for disorder and fragmentation because of the widening influence of the last two constellations—witnessed in the threatened collapse of the nation-state system, the avalanche of mass migrations to "capitalist" democratic nations, and the dangers posed to regional organizations by radical religious and separatist movements.

In assessing current threats to the international order, it is useful to measure the capacity of existing institutions to deal with these challenges and how their performance levels might be enhanced. One approach would emphasize limitation of U.S. intervention to avoid unrealistic expectation and inevitable public frustration. The United Nations, it is argued, cannot assume the mythic status of international policeman, peace enforcer or system preserver. Its interventions in conflict situations would destroy the myth given the UN's basic role as a forum for international debate, diplomatic posturizing, and ambiguous compromise. Moreover, there is little in the record to suggest that, beginning with its founding, the organization has felt compelled to intervene in the majority of conflict situations. Of the more than 150 local conflicts that have erupted since World War II, the UN has provided good offices, truce supervisory services, and related conflict resolution services in less than 25 percent of these conflicts, clear reflection of bureaucratic prudence, limited financial resources, and opposition to intervention where respect for sovereignty would be violated.

The question of limitation also applies to the avowed U.S. strategy of "assertive multilateralism". Many questions relating to purpose, intent and sustainability

abound. The following questions need to be addressed:

- To what extent does the U.S. propose to surrender freedom of initiative to others when vital U.S. national interests are at risk?

- How can the U.S. identify strategic interests in the present transition and to what extent should the U.S. subordinate these interests to international consensus?

- Is the notion of burden sharing essentially a U.S. admission of diminished capacity for leadership? As a corollary, are other international leaders prepared to fill the void in support of peace resolution efforts?

- Is the United Nations system amenable to reform and improved peacekeeping performance? Under what conditions?

- What are the implications of "assertive multilateralism" for the U.S. military?

In the present environment, the U.S. military is only beginning to adjust doctrine, planning, and force structures to meet the challenges presented by contemporary realities. The U.S. Joint Staff has prepared a series of three documents that are of particular relevance. The first is *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. This publication addresses operations that fall in the *short of war* rubric, including peacekeeping operations, combating terrorism, and Department of Defense support for counterdrug operations. The second directive is *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, which addresses command and control, training requirements and support functions. The third, *Joint Doctrine for Peace-Enforcing Functions*, is under current development but should be issued before the end of year. The trilogy is an useful point of departure for planning U.S.

military involvement in a wide array of peace support operations.

However, a number of planning and command issues have yet to be fully addressed and resolved. For example, should the U.S. allocate dedicated forces to peace support operations—much as the Russian high command proposes to organize—or continue to operate on the principle that existing organizations are readily adapted to such missions and roles? A second consideration deals with command and control of U.S. forces, as already alluded. The lashup in UNISOM II (Somalia) provides one model, involving U.S. forces under two command layers, the most immediate being U.S. controlled and the second involving overall non-U.S. command. Finally, the question of joint and combined training, as directed by President's Bush and Clinton, must overcome a number of bureaucratic impediments, some of which involve turf and funding problems. These have delayed implementation of PRD-13, a matter of serious concern to the White House staff.

Finally, at a more general level, is the question of Congressional support for "assertive multilateralism." A number of members have expressed concern regarding the meaning and content of the strategy, most notably: what strategic U.S. interests are to be engaged; when and where the U.S. will intervene when such interests are not at serious risk; U.S. national security priorities in a period of resource constraint; the role the U.S. is to play in intrastate conflicts, particularly in situations where central government authority has collapsed; and the degree to which the UN and regional organizations are willing and ready to meet the multiplicity of crises that have burst forth since the turn of this decade.

The stars that instructed and guided U.S. policy over the previous four decades have disappeared and there

are few navigation aids to replace them. Unless the Clinton administration is able to provide a significant measure of content to its newly announced strategy, others will invariably be guided by narrow national self-interest. As a consequence, the opportunity for U.S. leadership in constructing foundations for a stable international order will have been squandered. At present, the prevailing perspective in the world at large is of a United States badly adrift in uncertainty and self-doubt.

Problems for U.S. Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping

JOHN MACKINLAY

After the deployment of three ambitious and powerfully organized peace support forces to Cambodia, Somalia, and former Yugoslavia, the United Nations has crossed the threshold into a new chapter of operations. The characteristics and needs of these contingencies are still unclear. Success has also been elusive, and without an overall concept that has been operationally validated, each force has developed in its own idiosyncratic manner. As a result, a race to develop and promulgate a new concept of operations has begun among the NATO armies. Training and doctrine staff of the U.S. Army are now addressing these contingencies with some urgency. In common with other NATO army staffs, their task is to find a concept of operations to interpret these unfamiliar scenarios to future contingent commanders. But in some aspects their learning curve will be steeper, because for three decades the U.S. armed forces have distanced themselves from UN peace operations. Now that they are joining the peacekeepers club, what problems does this raise for them and for the older members?

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Circumstances of U.S. Forces Deployment

The first priority has been to understand as accurately as possible the contingencies to which the administration would be prepared to deploy U.S. forces. In a 1993 address to the National War College, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright said that the following concerns would have to be answered satisfactorily before U.S. military forces could become involved in future UN multinational operations:

- Seriousness of the threat to international peace and security
- A clear definition of the mission and parameters for the proposed operation
- Consent of parties involved on the ground
- Effectiveness of the cease-fire between parties
- Availability of sufficient finances and resources to achieve the mission
- Finite nature of the UN's duration in the host nation.

She also stipulated that the administration was unwilling to hazard the lives of young men and women on missions that were badly planned, unprofessionally executed, and without competent commanders. She stressed the Clinton administration would choose the means to implement these responses case by case.¹

These conditions are well stated and amount to what any caring government should regard as *sine qua non* for involvement of a national contingent in a UN operation. However, recent case history of UN operations in former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Somalia indicates that in reality, the U.S. Government, in common with other contributors, is more likely to find itself submitting a national contingent

as part of a UN force operating in areas where no peace agreement has been successfully negotiated; locally, consent to a UN presence is in doubt; and there is no clearly defined military mission or end state for the UN involvement.

However desirable, the Albright manifesto may be making assumptions about the standard and the orderly nature of UN operations that, institutionally, the United Nations will be unable to deliver for some years to come. It is also possible that a future situation may arise that is internationally so intolerable or morally so abhorrent that the administration, far from coolly appraising each contingency case by case, is thrust into a situation as the result of mounting pressure from the domestic constituency to "do something"—against the professional judgment of its military advisors and contrary to its own preconditions.

Although the UN institutional capability to plan and direct multinational military operations has not significantly improved, its post-Cold War contingencies have become increasingly complex and hazardous. In their unpublished manuals currently under draft, British and American doctrine writers have acknowledged that future UN forces face a new dimension of operations in which the most likely and challenging tasks amount to something more than peacekeeping but fall short of enforcement by all possible means.² In this category there may be no agreed peace process, and local support for UN intervention may not be universal. Although some traditionalists argue that the United Nations should not intervene under these circumstances, there may be situations where there is overwhelming international pressure for an intervention coupled with assurances from the majority of warring factions in the host country that they will support, and submit their armed elements to a UN peace process. If a

UN force is deployed in these circumstances and then finds locally that a tiny minority of fighters have refused to cooperate in the process and are subverting the local population away from UN objectives by using terror and coercion, it must act to protect threatened civilian minorities.

The role of the military in this case involves providing a reassuring security presence and a reserve with a quick reaction capability to restore a situation. During multiparty cease-fires and the cantonment procedures that should follow, military tasks will be intensive and central to the whole success of the UN plan. But after the conflict has stabilized, in the period of civil restoration, their role is subordinated to the political and civil elements of the overall peace strategy. The UN military contingents are still crucial to the success of the process; if they allow the security of these civilian-led programs to become threatened, the whole strategy will fail. Their role must be coordinated within the overall process of a multifunctional solution. In this mode their tasks include support and protection of the activities of the other UN elements so that elections can be held, relief continues to be delivered, disarmed fighters return safely to their villages, and the reins of power are gently but firmly removed from the grasp of local war lords and passed over to a lawfully elected government.

Whether a U.S. military contingent deployed in this scenario is submitted to the command of an integrated UN multinational HQ, or remains a distinct element commanded from an offshore US national HQ, the operational problems and conditions on the ground will remain the same in both cases. Its tasks, provisionally listed in the recent U.S. Army draft FM 100 23 (version 4), may include:

- Maintenance and restoration of order in civil disturbances
- Preventive deployment to forestall violence between communities or states
- Provision and protection of humanitarian assistance efforts
- Guarantee and denial of movement
- Enforcement of sanctions
- Establishment of protective zones
- Forcible separation of belligerents

A Concept for Success

Although success, in terms of the targets stipulated in their agreed mandates, has so far eluded the significantly larger UN forces deployed since the end of the Cold War, it is still possible to identify some of the essential criteria for a favorable outcome.

Need for Civilian Support

Recent experience has shown the importance of maintaining civilian support, and that UN elements need continued goodwill to function from day to day. The deployment of small, vulnerable groups of newly arrived foreigners into a conflict zone raises obvious problems, particularly of personal security. With common sense and sound local information it may be possible to avoid known hazards such as minefields and no-go areas dominated by hostile fighters. A close relationship between UN commanders and surrounding local authorities is essential for the effective distribution of relief, the protection of aid workers, and the maintenance of an acceptable level of individual security. Their involvement in the planning of long-term activities

such as rehabilitation and the organization of elections is essential. If the United Nations becomes alienated locally from the population there may be a number of serious consequences. Movement of convoys and individuals becomes hazardous through lack of information; looting and banditry against foreigners may increase and information withheld concerning the perpetrators, but above all the achievement of a long-term peace process becomes almost impossible. In this way the withdrawal of local civilian support can lead to the defeat of a peace process.

Disaffection on this scale is caused not only by inherent problems of an intervention by culturally unacceptable foreign troops, but also by planned subversion. Techniques to mobilize popular opinion to overturn a government or, in this case, to turn them against a UN presence or peace process are found in doctrines of counterinsurgency dating back to Mao Tse Tung. The function of encouraging the civil population to support the process of restoration in "new era" peace support operations, which distinguishes them from traditional peacekeeping, has become a crucial factor of success. Unless the mandate for intervention has the unqualified consent of every armed gang in the involved state, a local UN commander or official is likely to face subversion, and therefore confrontation, of some kind.

Coordination

UN forces now have diverse range of tasks and consequently are multifunctionally organized to address four main functional areas:

- Continue negotiating
- Provide relief
- Restore the civil administration of the host nation
- Maintain security.

Although the functional elements have separate roles, implicitly at a strategic level, all have the same long-term objectives. The orchestration of these diverse activities has proved to be extremely complex and there are many reasons why a multinational/multi-agency UN force is particularly unsuited for this type of operation.

In previous UN experience, maintaining interagency cohesion was not crucially important, especially for buffer-zone forces; now it is essential for success. A multifunctional UN force that must achieve a lasting cease-fire and help recreate a viable political system requires the full support of all elements. In many cases the problems will be civil and political and cannot be solved by purely military means. In particular the aid agencies, cooperating closely with the UN military, may take a leading role in the rehabilitation of disarmed fighters. For example, in Cambodia, although there was an agreed rehabilitation process, execution relied on several functional elements acting together. Thousands of returnees from the refugee camps in Thailand needed secure movement arrangements and above all a safe home free from mines and violence, for their resettlement. This needed a demining and disarmament program that ran in synchronization with the resettlement plan.


Coordination across the elements of the force would be easier if UN structures and procedures existed for that purpose. However, so far in every force the staff has had to improvise agreements and ad hoc meetings to bring together the strands of different activities into a single strategy with a common purpose. The plan thus achieved is then reinterpreted at a lower level in each district by a similarly convened group representing the essential elements of the force. It is important to have a district level structure for coordination because some administrative

districts cover huge areas and are isolated. But in many cases district coordination is poorly conducted. Often there is no obvious appointee to be director of operations at district level; civil agencies resent a military director and vice-versa.

Assessment of Operational Viability

Although a UN intervention not underwritten by a strong moral and legal rationale may fail through lack of international support, it does not follow that a UN intervention that has all these factors weighing behind it will necessarily succeed. Even when international pressure to do something is very intense, success will hinge on the practicability of the operation, and usually this factor will be the subject of a military judgment regarding the balance of armed forces. To succeed, the sum of the military power of the intervening force (IF), the warring factions (WF), and the civilian population (CIVPOP) supporting the peace process must greatly exceed the sum of the opposed elements in the host nation (figure 1).

Figure 1. Supporting the Peace Process



In Operations *Desert Storm* and *Just Cause*, the relative power and capability of the IF was very much greater than shown in the example above, completely overwhelming all other military and civil parties in the conflict area, making it irrelevant whether the latter resisted or supported the intervention. For a limited period it was possible for both IFs to militarily subjugate their respective areas and dictate solutions. But in succeeding UN operations, UNTAC, UNPROFOR, and UNOSOM 2, the IF was much smaller, so it was crucially important that a substantial element of the WF and CIVPOP actively support the peace process.

In a UN organized intervention, once an international consensus has been achieved, the judgment to decide its viability still rests initially on a military assessment of comparative strengths. The comparatively smaller and militarily weaker UN forces, such as intervened to assist in Cambodia, Somalia, and former Yugoslavia, require that a substantial element of the warring factions will support them, if they are to carry out the tasks stipulated in the mandate. However, this apparently simple matter of counting bayonets is vastly complicated when the behaviors of the civil population also have to be predicted for the duration of the intervention. It is quite possible that an intervention, militarily viable because the balance of armed forces is highly favorable to the intervention force, may fail if the tiny schism of fighters ("against" in figure 1) continues to oppose the process and successfully subverts a sizable element of civil population to its side.

This possibility, already demonstrated in Mogadishu and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, introduces an essential condition for success that has not yet been fully understood by UN officials or in some cases by the military staffs and contingents involved. UN forces now face the prospect of having to win over and maintain the support of an

uncommitted civilian population. If they fail, not only will their immediate operational environment become hazardous but the whole success of what might otherwise be a viable peace support operation will be jeopardized. In a confrontation the UN troops are faced with a dilemma: to succeed they will have to protect local people from subversion, especially unlawful terrorist attacks, but at the same time individual contingents have to make themselves culturally acceptable. Overreaction and the use of force in an indiscriminating manner may alienate local people and serve the subversives.

Foreign affairs officials who advise U.S. and European governments on UN policy have for some time fostered the misconception that UN peace support operations will only involve token military activities. This was true of the interpositional forces of the Cold War period, but experience has demonstrated that the larger, recently deployed forces need to be militarily effective and locally are required to be proactive when, for example, they are called on to restore security and order. Furthermore, prior to the current UK and U.S. efforts to develop a concept for land operations, many officers were unable to see that military action to restore security or protect relief operations was not something that could be done simply by force of arms. It required force to be used judiciously and implicitly, rather than in a gun-pointing manner that tended to lead swiftly on to the use of explicit force. Above all, contrary to the unofficial but widely held view among UN officials in New York, it requires a very high standard of infantry soldier to execute these missions effectively if they are going to be done with the minimum of violence. These ideas are now more widely accepted and better understood by policy makers. It is for these mid-level contingencies,

and not to garrison an interpositional buffer zone, that the U.S. armed forces must now prepare.

Problems for U.S. Armed Forces

Staff from each service have already begun to consider the perceived problems of adapting and preparing selected U.S. Armed Forces for peace support duties. Although there are many aspects to consider, there is no reason to suppose that with the resources and innovative energy available, these problems, largely questions of operational detail, cannot be successfully addressed. There are several obvious areas where planning staff will have to focus their attention, particularly in the case of contested operations that amount to more than peacekeeping but fall short of a coalition enforcement action. The most challenging areas will occur at the U.S. interface with allies and the host country; obstacles to achieving a smoothly integrated UN force include:

- Degree of command subordination of U.S. units to multinational UN HQs
- Responsibilities for liaison and lateral communication
- Language and procedural problems within the host country
- Lack of agreed operating concepts and the need to develop a common *modus operandi*
- Difficulty of lateral coordination of effort between the civil and military elements of the force
- The decision to develop unilateral or multilateral emergency evacuation plans
- Overcoming the caveats on the use and release of strategic intelligence

- Whether to rely on UN or unilateral/national combat support arrangements.

Most of these problems will have to be resolved in the planning and training stages of preparation prior to deployment. In some cases it will take significant time and effort to design and put into effect a training system that can prepare future peace support contingents to a reasonable standard. The September-October debates in Congress have fostered political uncertainty on the preconditions and willingness to participate in UN operations. The net effect has been to delay and possibly even diminish PDD 13. They may have also reduced the urgency of professional staff to start the machinery to establish the additional facilities and organizations needed. However, in common with leading European armed forces, some embryo staff have already been established for this contingency, and training allocated, both in United States and USAREUR, which will provide the basis of future planning and training needs. In the event of a firm decision to engage more effort in multinational forces under the UN, military staff and training resources should not take long to mobilize.

Fundamental Issues

It would be unduly optimistic to imagine there is no price to pay for U.S. nonparticipation during the painful 30-year development of UN operations, starting with the first UN Emergency Force that deployed to Suez in 1956.³ Although the purely organizational problems cited above can be overcome, especially by a professional staff with the necessary resources to address them, there are much more fundamental issues arising from recent U.S. military history and service attitudes that, because they are quintessentially

American in their nature, may be hard to recognize and even harder to overcome. The unusual characteristics of UN multinational peace support operations confront the American military psyche at several levels.

Problems of Strategic Approach

At the highest level it the U.S. military psyche has to contend with the specter of Vietnam. In the staff pyramid of the armed forces there is a fracture line that marks the separation of the Vietnam-experienced officers, who now occupy positions at the apex of their respective organizations, from the later intakes. At present it is safe to say that policy will be fundamentally influenced for perhaps another 5 years, by the former group. It is hardly surprising that instinctively this cadre will favor the deployment of decisive force in any future conflict where U.S. Armed Forces are involved. As a result there is a deeply held reluctance to become involved in future military commitments that could be construed as open ended, where U.S. forces may be subordinated to a foreign or multinational command and where the "American way of doing things" may have to be abandoned in favor of a less effective multinational procedure. This instinctive reluctance is fueled by politicians of both parties who are acutely sensitive on the "quagmire effect" of open-ended military commitments and even more vulnerable on the low public tolerance of casualties once photography of dead and wounded American servicemen reaches constituencies. The combination of domestic political sensitivity and the idiosyncratic historical experience of Vietnam tends to separate the United States from even their closest allies in the operating concepts of their participation in a UN multinational force. The acrimony and dismay in

Washington over the European lack of support for the U.S. military proposals in former Yugoslavia, and the Italian efforts to distance themselves from U.S. tactics in Mogadishu are indications of a fundamental difference of approach.

The nature of recent military successes in Panama and Kuwait/Iraq reinforces the position of the Vietnam-experience lobby. In both contingencies it was possible to achieve swift military success using overwhelming U.S. force levels, concentrated for a short, finite period of intense activity. Not only were both actions highly successful, but they can be used to demonstrate the validity of U.S. war fighting doctrines, the preeminence of U.S. military technology, and the soundness of the policy to deploy only at *decisive* force levels.

Given their historical background and in view of these solid achievements, it is hardly surprising that there is considerable reluctance in Washington, both politically and militarily, to entertain the apparently weak and open-ended policies that seem to prevail among the European members of the UN contingent contributors club. This antipathy for the "limp wristed" approach was emphasized during a spring 1993 visit to (European) UN contingents based at Split, when a U.S. member of the Senate remarked that the UN unit commanders' preference for negotiation and consensus over the unequivocal use of force was not the exercise of tactical option but a fundamental consequence of their having to operate from a position of weakness. It was not, the visitor felt, an option that would face U.S. forces if they found themselves in the same theater.

Despite the obvious political attractions in Washington for the application of "decisive force" to future UN operations, there are several problems that will undermine the success of this approach. First, it is both internationally

more acceptable and militarily less costly for the United States to support and ensure a successful UN multinational solution rather than a unilateral US military initiative. Second, the decisive use of military force to achieve a mandate assumes that there are military targets, military tasks, and identifiable "enemy" forces. But in reality the situation is more complicated. There will be no easily identifiable targets against which to use decisive force and the long-term strategic objectives of the mandate will be primarily political in which the military element must play a subordinate role. In a typical mid-level scenario there are no quick-fix problems that have an easily identified beginning and end state. The social damage of intercommunal violence on the scale of Bosnia, Angola, or Somalia is so deep and divisive that it is quite unrealistic to imagine that after a 6-month cease-fire and restructuring program these collapsed states can be abandoned on the grounds that they have suddenly become viable, stand-alone structures. They will require healing processes that are measured in decades not months and a military element will be an essential component of that process. If the international community under the United Nations, or led by the United States, is to intervene, it should not ignore the realities of the situation on the ground so as to facilitate their desire for a quick-fix solution that will respond to the use of force. Not only is the long-term approach more realistic, it is cheaper, more humane, and internationally stabilizing than allowing intercommunal violence to flourish in an abhorrent and threatening manner.

In these circumstances the use of decisive force on an overwhelming scale that initially subdues and marginalizes any factions that may oppose the peace plan, is not an option. The senator who observed that the conciliatory approach of the European contingents in Bosnia was

imposed on them by their weakness omitted to observe that using force to achieve their Bosnian mandate was certainly not an option either. The history of intervention shows that the intrusive arrival of a powerful and aggressive third-party force, particularly one that comprises largely foreign troops, will incite an equally determined and aggressive reaction and rejection by local people.⁴ Even local communities, who should by their politics and inclination have every reason to welcome their arrival, will find it hard to support them actively, and it is increasingly evident that this category of *active* support is an essential condition for success.

Only if the third party can subjugate the host country in the manner of an occupying forces does the need for civil support become marginalized. It is true that, in the initial states of an intervention of this scale, the presence of a massive third-party military forces has an overpowering effect on local opposition, after which law and order can be swiftly restored. However, when the novelty of their sudden arrival has worn off and the limitations of the intervening troops have been observed, disaffection and resistance will gather momentum. It is likely that faced with a deteriorating situation in these circumstances an intervention force, however massively deployed, would experience resistance and have to consider the use of subjugation methods that would not be acceptable to democratically elected governments of the Security Council, which may have authorized the intervention.

Isolated Military Culture

To be successful in a multinational force, continent staff officers must have a propensity for integration. Although in the preparatory phase of *Desert Storm*, U.S. staff were

successful in negotiating a joint plan for the coalition forces, integration as partners on a more equal basis in a UN force may prove to be challenging. The majority of armed forces comprising the group of nations that habitually contribute to UN operations have a developed capability for integration. For the U.S. staff the geographical isolation of the United States is intensified by the enclosed nature of their service life. In Europe and the Southern hemisphere, there is neither the real estate nor the resources to separate the armed forces from the civil community. Consequently, in the nucleus of UN contributor states, armed forces are not only living in a less isolated manner as part of a civil community, but in some cases are also part of a multilingual environment. In addition, a much greater proportion of service personnel from smaller European armed forces will have served in NATO; in the relatively even smaller armed forces of NORDIC and Southern hemisphere nations, many long-service professional officers will have UN experience. These smaller nations already constitute a club, their officers an alumni, whose linguistic capabilities, experience, and attitude facilitate their integration in a multinational staff. They will tend to approach some issues from a different vantage point than their U.S. colleagues. Their professional expectations may be lower but in some cases more realistic; their capability to achieve targets through consensus and compromise, of necessity, more keenly developed. Above all, the UN veteran may understand better than his American colleague that it is sometimes more realistic to achieve a lesser objective at a slightly lower standard than to strive for the absolute solution. To some extent the weary cynicism of the UN veteran needs the energizing influence of an American approach, but there is also a need for a compromise that tempers the inclination for over

achievement with a realism derived from hard-won experience.

Importance of Infantry

Along the running surfaces of the military element, UN troops will have to cooperate on a daily basis with local armed factions, protect the civilian aid agencies, and liaise successfully with UN soldiers from other nations. At the heart of this web of interaction stands the infantryman; in his humble way he is the key to its success. Much is required of him: if he behaves badly, overplays his hand, uses force indiscriminately, and fails to win the confidence of the local people who constitute his environment, the viability of the peace process in his neighborhood will begin to erode. In this role he is more than a combat infantryman. He has to be able to move and operate comfortably in an urban or rural environment, projecting an aura of goodwill and security to civilians he routinely meets, but at the same time, in an instant he must be able to protect himself or people in his care from a lethal attack.

The U.S. infantryman is trained to the highest degree for war fighting. His skills and physical development are specially designed to give him the best chance of survival in a hazardous, battlefield environment, but above all to overcome the enemy. In the conflict zone there are only friendly and enemy forces. Most of his training time and energy is directed to learning how to support friendly forces and search for, recognize, and finally destroy or neutralize the enemy. It is a stark landscape in which the players are characterized in absolute terms; there is no time or need to develop their characterization any further, friendly force soldiers are good and must be supported, enemy forces are bad and must be destroyed.

But in a mid-level intervention scenario, the infantryman's landscape is more complex. The subversives, who oppose the peace process and will probably kill him if given a risk-free opportunity, look exactly the same as the civilian population. Among the civilians there are some who will respond warmly to his presence and others who will shun him and even react with hostility. Even among the armed factions who ostensibly support the peace process there will be varying shades of enthusiasm, and these may alter as the overall political situation changes. Whatever threats exist for him beneath the inscrutable appearance and behavior of the local people, the infantryman cannot regard them as simply enemies or friends. He must present himself to them at all times as a supportive but neutral presence, friendly, fair, but also firm. He remains impartial to the politics and moral judgments of the conflict in which he has intervened. His duty is first of all to the mandate that underwrites his presence and role. If individuals or schisms defy or disobey the mandate, he must deal with them equally, whether they are from the camp of his potential friends or potential enemies.

This places a great deal of responsibility on the infantryman, particularly on the personal skills of the junior officers who will have to operate in small, sometimes isolated groups and make a great many decisions about the civilian population around them. In addition to combat skills essential for this task, junior infantry leaders must develop capabilities that do not sit comfortably with a war-fighting ethos. They must be capable of negotiation, familiar with the tactics of compromise, able to use the threat of force as a bargaining tool and not in a direct gun-pointing manner that takes the situation immediately to the brink of violence. In situations where human rights are threatened, policing skills will be needed to gather evidence, protect and uphold

the rights of threatened minorities and individuals, make searches that are effective but at the same time lawfully conducted, and make arrests. They will need to develop communication skills and an ability to reassure civilians that they meet routinely, encouraging them to talk, give information, and discuss their problems and anxieties. But in addition, the junior commander must above all maintain the skills of a top-class infantry soldier, and when the situation changes, they must act swiftly to handle a threatening confrontation, and in the last resort use lethal force in a cool and effective manner.

The U.S. infantryman, trained intensely but narrowly for a war-fighting role, cannot be thrust into this complex scenario without preparation. It will require policy makers and their staff firstly to recognize the need for a range of skills that lie beyond current training parameters for war fighting, and secondly to allow combat units time for preparation and training before they are deployed into a peace support emergency. For all their particular skills there are several reasons why peace support operations should not become the special responsibility of the military police or civil affairs units—the most important of all being the need to combine these special peace support characteristics with the skills of a top-class infantryman, the latter taking much longer to perfect. The UK army's mechanized infantry has performed well in Bosnia, showing that individual communication and allied skills can flourish beside the survival instincts of infantry. Their successful Northern Ireland training programs re-role combat units from NATO divisions in Germany for foot-mobile duties in urban areas in 5 months. This seems to show not only that specialist units are not required, but that a short spell of duty in a new and challenging role can have a very positive effect on a unit, especially at a junior commander level.

Conclusions

Although the end of the Cold War brought with it a change in the role and intensity of UN peace-support operations, it has taken some time for the special needs of these contingencies to be recognized. World wide, foreign affairs advisors continued to play down the significance of military participation, while some military staff advocated the use of decisive military force, even in situations where the strategic objectives were political and could not respond to a purely military solution. In some particular cases, gaps in approach have opened between the United States and her closest allies. This may be the result of an instinctive U.S. reliance on the decisive use of force that prevails at political and policy-making levels. In all forces the brunt of operations is carried by the infantry; it is important for these to have the skills and a concept for using force that are appropriate to the politically sensitive tasks in which civil support is essential. This is particularly important in mid-level operations that amount to more than peacekeeping but fall short of enforcement by all possible means. Overall, the U.S. Armed Forces are well endowed with resources and innovative energy, and provided the needs and special characteristics of UN forces can be recognized, there are no fundamental obstacles to individual units of U.S. Armed Forces, particularly the infantry, adapting to the tempo and nature of UN operations.

NOTES

1. Ambassador M. K. Albright, "Use of Forces in a Post-Cold War World," National War College, 23 September 1993.
2. Both the UK and U.S. concepts use the tasks shown in John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, *Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993* (Providence: Watson Institute, 1993), 7-29.
3. Some might argue that U.S. forces provided vital strategic lift assets and essential equipment throughout this period. However, the "painful development" took place on the ground and did not involve U.S. forces.
4. For example, the rejection of MNF 2 in Beirut in 1983 and of the IPKF by the Tamils in the norther provinces of Sri Lanka in 1986-87.

Peace Support Operations: Implications for the U.S. Military

SIR BRIAN URQUHART

In considering the implications of peace support operations for the U. S. military, it is necessary to consider two basic questions: What is the general objective, in reference to peace and security in the world? How do we propose to try to reach that objective? There is no question that the United States will be a key player in providing the answers to these questions. For the first question there seem to be three main possibilities:

- Continue with a world of chance and surprises, trying to deal with the worst disasters through impromptu actions.
- Hope to maintain some peace and stability by a series of ad hoc coalitions of like-minded countries put together for specific purposes that may, in the case of some disasters, mean no organized actions at all.
- Set about devising some sort of international system to be evolved over a considerable period of time.

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I shall address the last alternative. I do this not least because, as long as there is a large degree of anarchy and violence in the world, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to rally the political consensus, the will, and the resources to deal with the new generation of problems that will determine the nature of life on this planet by the middle of the next century. I refer, of course, to such problems as poverty, population, unemployment, and environmental degradation.

The United Nations

For better or worse, the United Nations is the framework upon which a developing international system will be founded. At the present time the United Nations is going through an identity crisis. At its founding in 1945, the primary purpose of the United Nations was to deal with disputes and conflicts between states, and threats or acts of aggression by states. In the post-Cold War period, however, a large proportion of the items on the agenda of the Security Council relate to *intrastate* situations—civil, ethnic, or religious conflicts, and situations resulting from the collapse of state authority. In public opinion and in the media the United Nations is thus increasingly perceived as a kind of world emergency service, police force, and fire brigade for such situations. This is a far cry from the original concept, and it is not surprising that the organization, after short period of post-Cold War euphoria, has suffered a series of severe setbacks.

The new challenges to the United Nations have created great problems for the organization and have in some cases considerably undermined its credibility. In fact, the organization is sometimes even made the scapegoat for the disorderly transition in world affairs that came

unexpectedly with the end of the Cold War. The old concept of the United Nations as an interstate dispute-solving mechanism is reluctantly giving way to what may later appear to be the beginning of an effort to establish the minimal institutions of a world community that does not yet exist except in the speeches of politicians. To develop such institutions effectively will require much more than a not very enthusiastic effort to strengthen the existing objectives and practices of the United Nations.

The Security Council

Public attention is now very largely focussed on the Security Council of the United Nations, which has suddenly, after the frustrations of more than 40 years of Cold War, learned to reach consensus on most of the subjects that come before it. While in one way this is a considerable step forward, it is in another something of a delusion, since the Security Council does not dispose of adequate means, in most cases, to implement its decisions on the ground. There has been a tendency, therefore, for the Council to come to be seen as a resolution-passing machine without real power or resources. It is obviously essential to come to terms with this situation before the credibility of the Security Council is seriously damaged.

Methods of Intervention

There is also a problem with the methods of intervention now available to the United Nations. The concept of peacekeeping has become so generally accepted that the deployment of peacekeeping forces is now almost an automatic reaction to large-scale violence. This has proved to be a mistake in some cases. Peacekeeping was designed

as a cooperative and voluntary undertaking in which conflicting parties, of their own free will, became partners. Peacekeeping forces intervened only when the agreement of the parties had been secured and there was a cease-fire in place. They were very specifically *not* expected to use force. The arrangements for peacekeeping were normally with the governments of sovereign states, which were usually respectful of Security Council decisions and on which, if necessary, considerable political, diplomatic, economic, and other forms of pressure could be brought to bear in support of a peacekeeping operation.

The fighting parties in most of the situations with which the United Nations is now dealing are not sovereign governments but unofficial militias or, in some cases, local thugs. They have little or no respect for Security Council decisions, international agreements, or the special status of UN peacekeeping forces, and are usually not susceptible to diplomatic or economic pressure. Because the conditions were unfavorable to traditional peacekeeping operations, the United Nations has recently suffered serious setbacks in low-level conflict situations (e.g., Bosnia, Somalia, Angola).

The present armory of the Security Council consists of preventive diplomacy, various forms of peaceful settlement under Chapter VI of the Charter, the good offices of the Secretary-General and other intermediaries, and peacekeeping forces. If all of the above fail, measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, including sanctions and enforcement, may be brought into play.

This repertory of mechanisms is not as yet framed in a consistent and interrelated system based on a constant watch and analysis of international developments, contingency planning, preventive action, and a permanent infrastructure of logistics, training, and operational command. It does not provide for rapid deployment of

peace *enforcement* units at an early stage in a crisis to deal with low-level, nongovernmental threats, or use, of force, and to give practical effect to Security Council decisions immediately and on the spot. There is, at present, no convincing practical means of displaying at an early stage the firmness and seriousness of the Security Council's intentions. This shortcoming has led to a dangerous erosion of UN authority at a time when the UN Security Council has, at last, learned to reach consensus on virtually all the important issues that come before it. (The Council has adopted more than 40 resolutions on Bosnia alone.) There is thus at present a serious danger that the Council will come to be perceived as an illusion factory, an Oz-like mechanism where copious resolutions become a substitute for effective action.

The Secretary-General

The other institution now much in the limelight is the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Dag Hammarskjold once described this position as a pope without a church, particularly true during the Cold War. At its best the office provides a manager of the international system, the world's most available honest broker, and an office through which it is occasionally possible to express international solidarity in a moving and persuasive way. It may be added that the Secretary-General has for nearly 50 years served as an extremely useful scapegoat when things go wrong on the international scene.

Governments

The sovereign governments who make up the membership of the United Nations are also key players in the present

drama and they also often find themselves without a chart or a compass in treacherous and unknown waters. Governments, especially democratic ones, have to juggle the considerations of domestic politics with the overriding concerns for national security, with international obligations, and in most cases, with an occasional dash of idealism. Governments also pay the bill for international operations and provide most the manpower and resources. They, too, have found the post-Cold War period international relations to be full of unexpected difficulties and tribulations. This particularly applies to their support of peace operations of different kinds.

It is only natural that member states of the United Nations are reluctant to become too far committed to the kind of conflicts that now dominate the UN agenda. They are reluctant to approve rapid intervention in intrastate conflicts at an early stage, when there is the best chance to avert large-scale violence. At a later state, when large-scale violence *has* erupted, they are reluctant to commit military forces to take combat risks in a situation that has little or no relevance to their national security. They are also reluctant to envisage the increase in their assessed contributions to the UN that will inevitably result from the organization's increasing commitments. Authorities in or near those territories where international intervention may be undertaken are often equally reluctant, especially in the early states of a disaster, to welcome UN intervention.

Media and Public Opinion

An essential and growing influence on the international scene is exercised by the media and public opinion, because interaction can produce powerful pressures on governments and international organizations. A mixture of conscience,

gadfly, sentinel, and critic, the media and the public increasingly fuel public action, especially in democratic countries.

Operational Personnel

The relatively small number of soldiers and civilians performing in international operations in the field, including peacekeeping forces, international civil servants, and nongovernmental organizations, are an element all too frequently forgotten. Although they are the ones on the cutting edge of crisis, comparatively little attention is given to the tasks allotted to them and the conditions in which they are required to work.

Events themselves are, of course, the heart of the challenge of peace operations. The nature of current developments is so complex and often so unpredictable, that any international response needs to be extremely flexible and to be the result of a very imaginative decisionmaking process.

The part of the United States in developing, over time, an adaptable but effective international system is quite literally critical. As is often said, the United States is the only surviving superpower. It is also the original begetter of the present international system and should be a main source of ideas for its development. The evolution I believe we should seek is similar to the evolution of nation-states—from anarchy, to improvised efforts to achieve some degree of law and order, and eventually to a legally based system that applies to all and which can, if necessary, be enforced. This will be a long evolution and will require patience, wisdom, and determination.

However, events will not wait upon this evolution. It is therefore necessary to build absolutely essential peace

operations on the existing foundations with existing resources. As Dag Hammarskjold once observed, "The United Nations was not set up to bring humanity to heaven but to save it from hell." Looked at in this perspective, we have already made some progress, if the minimum aim is to avoid the worst. I leave aside the extremely difficult question now being debated in various places, of the criteria and conditions for international intervention. It is easy to formulate rational lists of conditions and criteria in noncritical times. The problem is that international involvement in peace operations usually takes place in emotional periods of crisis when logic and reason are not predominant.

Current Questions On Peacekeeping Operations

There are many questions relating to peace operations that need to be debated and resolved. In recent months a new level of peacekeeping, with a strong element of peace enforcement, has emerged, to some extent blurring the line between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement operations. It has also become clear that the more violent the situation, the more reluctant governments are to commit their military contingents to it, unless, of course, their national security is involved.

New institutional and organizational arrangements are crucial to improving the performance of the United Nations. The whole question of military advice to the Secretary-General is of critical importance. There is now an effort to convert the ad hoc arrangements in the Secretariat to a permanent infrastructure for contingency planning, logistics, and a consistent training program. Financial constraints are a considerable restriction on the development of this infrastructure. It is obviously essential,

however, that the UN improve on the current practice of starting every operation from scratch and on a shoestring.

There is now a public debate in the United States on when, where, and how it is acceptable to put the lives of U.S. military personnel at risk in international operations. This question is also very relevant for all the other countries who provide contingents for UN peace operations. If current trends persist it will become increasingly difficult to get suitable contingents for the more difficult peace operations. Even an elaborate system of standby arrangements and an improved training program will not guarantee that governments will make forces available in particular emergencies. If this happens, it might be necessary to consider the feasibility of a small, highly trained UN volunteer force for rapid deployment. This is, of course, a controversial idea that could open a new chapter in the history of peace operations.

The question of command and control has also become controversial in recent months. Peacekeeping operations, with their ban on forceful action, have always been commanded by a UN commander appointed by the Secretary-General and confirmed by the Security Council. The UN commander exercises operational command over the contingents of any given operation. Operational *control* is vested in the Secretary-General in full consultation with the Security Council and, in some cases, with an advisory committee composed of representatives of the troop-contributing countries. In peace *enforcement* operations, when UN troops are asked to take combat risks, the question of command and control becomes far more critical. While it is virtually impossible to run a difficult operation without a unified and generally accepted command, it is natural that the governments putting their troops at risk should have strong feelings about this question. A serious

discussion is needed to reconcile these two ostensibly conflicting factors. This matter is, of course, also related to command and staff doctrine and training, something almost nonexistent in the present UN system.

The recent flood of Security Council decisions involving military activities in various parts of the world serves to highlight the need for consistent and sound military advice as the basis of Security Council decisions. Here again, there are many possibilities, among them a revived Military Staff Committee or a permanent military staff in the Secretariat.

Recent experience has also underlined the absolute necessity of developing consistent military doctrine and standards among the contingents serving the United Nations. A consistent training scheme and an inspectorate to ascertain the level of training in different standby contingents would be essential elements of improved UN performance. With the new popularity of enforcement operations it is also necessary to experiment with the instant transformation that may be required for the soldiers of a peacekeeping force from traditional nonforceful peacekeeping to enforcement action.

Much has been written about the humanitarian element that is increasingly an important part of UN operations. The coordination between military and humanitarian elements, the doctrine and rules of engagement that need to be developed, the organization of the humanitarian emergency operations of the UN system, and cooperation with nongovernmental organizations are all matters needing urgent attention.

The U.S. Role

As I said at the beginning, the United States is a key player in all these matters. In the complexities of the post-Cold War world, it is inconceivable that the United States can go it alone as the world's policeman. This would be impossible from the point of view of the United States and would, in all probability, be unacceptable to the rest of the community of nations as well. For this reason, the evolution, over time, of a better international system based on sound arrangements and principles is as important for the United States as it is for all the other nations of the world.

General Discussion

WILLIAM H. LEWIS

The general discussion session was initiated with a conceptual approach that addressed: (a) the types of forces and challenges that are emerging in the international security environment; (b) the changing roles and responsibilities being assumed by the United Nations; (c) the reasons why NATO and regional organizations have a limited capacity to shoulder a share of the peace operations burden; and (d) the principal policy issues confronting the U.S. military in the field of peacekeeping and the reasons why "assertive multilateralism" may prove illusory. There was general agreement that the global strategic environment had changed dramatically with the demise of Soviet communism, a brief moment of triumph for the United States. At the same time, the "Golden Age" for the United States and the United Nations has proved transitory and illusory. We confront a strategic environment of alliance realignment, government breakdown, and growing disorder. Indeed, the environment is even more fluid diplomatically—Syria's Hafez al-Assad was yesterday's terrorist; today he is a partner in peace negotiations. Similar observations were made about other "rehabilitated" international figures.

Additional observations of general interest were offered: (a) in the Third World, the ability of governments to meet the promises of their "Social Contract" is under growing strain; (b) an age of ideological certainty is giving way to rootlessness as reflected in civil wars, ethnic

conflicts and anarchy; (c) also reflective of these trends, we have over 15 million refugees in the world at large, many pressing for entry into the industrialized world. Military force, within this context, is only a limited palliative. The entry point as crises erupt is essentially economic and social—where humanitarian considerations assume heightened importance.

As one commentator noted: "The United Nations has become the Court of First and Last Resort. Its Golden Age is over, and the organization faces system overload as it attempts to meet peace support and humanitarian assistance requirements." There are 18 UN peacekeeping operations underway, involving 80,000 troops, whereas 6 years previous the number barely exceeded 7,000 men deployed in various regions. Nine additional missions have been proposed ranging from a greatly expanded force in Bosnia to election monitors in South Africa to buffer zones in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Rwanda, the Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Liberia and Abkhazia. All agreed that the United Nations currently lacks the planning, management and financial resources to cope with missions that it is being called upon to perform.

Some participants noted that Somalia and Bosnia illustrate the growing connection between humanitarian relief and military operations, which has led all too often to confusion as a result of inadequate coordination. Uncertainties also surround objectives where civic action needs collide with security concerns, and where operational procedures are incompatible. Some participants pointed out that the United Nations is not an independent actor, but an agent of the expressed collective will of its members. In short, the Secretary-General can only act with the tools and resources that member states are willing to contribute. In this respect, a number of issues have not been resolved.

- Such questions as sovereignty versus the right of self-determination, minority rights and protections, and UN obligation to undertake and sustain nation-building operations.
- The willingness of member states to inject their forces into threatening security environments where casualties cannot be avoided.
- The circumstances under which the UN will authorize the use of military force, and with what attendant modifications in traditional rules of engagement.
- The mechanisms the UN should turn to for effective conflict management? Should there be primary reliance on regional organizations such as NATO or on *ad hoc* coalitions? When should the UN initiate such operations?

One participant opined that Bosnia represents the litmus test for NATO's cohesion and *raison d'être*. At the heart of the challenge is U.S. leadership, "our sense of purpose and mission." Several questions arose with respect to NATO's future peacekeeping roles.

- Is the NATO rapid reaction force an expeditionary force? What are the far horizons of its AOR? Is it dedicated to crisis management, as well as peace enforcement roles?

- Is NATO, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to become an agent of the United Nations given the absence of a UN standing force?
- Will NATO serve under the command-and-control of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and his Headquarters Secretariat?
- Are national contingents to exercise autonomy, with reference to the chain of command?
- What national resources are to be allocated to "peacekeeping"?

Some participants noted that the biggest piece in the current post-Cold War strategy puzzle is the United States. Thus far, the U.S. has failed to provide a strategic design of its own. This was not proffered as a criticism since most of the policy options available to Washington are unappealing, and courses of action to be pursued by the U.S. problematic as to successful outcome. It was opined that a blank cheque to the UN in the form of troop availability would not be acceptable to the American people and Congress; on the other hand, the U.S. has a vested interest in seeing the UN evolve into a more effective crises management institution. Some of the issues currently debated within Washington are the following:

- Whether the U.S. should nominate "standby" or "designated" forces for UN employment;

- Whether a separate national chain of command should be established when U.S. forces are under the direction of a non-U.S. led commander;
- Whether specialized military training is required as a prerequisite for UN employment;
- Whether the Executive Branch is itself appropriately organized to implement policy decisions when they are taken.

These issues have particular relevance when we recognize that traditional dividing lines between "peacekeeping" (Chapter VI of the UN Charter) and "enforcement" (Chapter VII) are becoming blurred, and that humanitarian interventions may lead to conflict escalation or UN "interveners" becoming hostages in a deteriorating security environment.

As part of a spirited discussion, other points were addressed, including: (a) whether a division of labor is feasible involving the UN assuming the primary burden for Chapter VI operations, with regional security organizations and the U.S. assuming responsibility for the remainder; (b) whether the U.S. should consider placing American troops under foreign command as opposed to foreign operational control; (c) whether, in the UN environment, it is possible to develop a unified chain of command; (d) whether existing UN humanitarian operations require more clearly defined doctrine and standardized operating procedures; and (e) how to avoid the appearance of peacekeeping operations becoming a rich man's club.

Of particular importance, several participants underscored the need for greater specificity and clarity in Security Council resolutions mandating peacekeeping operations, as well as precision in language linking such operations with UN political objectives. Others observed that *Desert Storm* should not be regarded as a model for future peacekeeping efforts and that conflict situations of the Level Two variety require more extensive study. The latter should include doctrine and training for military units required to play a variety of roles ranging from the friendly policeman-mediator to an aggressive peace enforcer. To be resisted under all foreseeable circumstances is a "Waffen S.S." posture. In addition, for strategic planning purposes, civilian NGOs and private corporations should be included if operations are likely to prove of lengthy duration.

A further field for future study is the combat support role. The U.S. military, working with UN Headquarters, NATO, etc, should seek to develop "arrangements" that lead to "functional commands". Others noted that the downsizing of U.S. forces poses difficulties since it could inhibit long-range peacekeeping doctrinal development and force planning.

On the question of casualties, several participants noted that this is a matter that must be confronted head on, much as the French government has done with its citizens. As a result, most "Frenchmen" accept that peacekeeping is a risky venture in the existing international security environment and that some casualties are unavoidable.

A particularly noteworthy point raised involves the putative "Vietnam syndrome," the contention being that *Desert Storm* seemed to have laid that pathology to rest. Peacekeeping, in Somalia and Bosnia may resurrect the same taboos, however. Now, American civilians and military leaders are asking: "What is it going to cost us?"

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