

**WEAKENING INDONESIA'S MUJAHIDIN NETWORKS:
LESSONS FROM MALUKU AND POSO**

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WEAKENING INDONESIA'S MUJAHIDIN NETWORKS: LESSONS FROM MALUKU AND POSO

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the wake of a second terrorist attack on Bali, the need to understand Indonesia's violent jihadist networks is greater than ever. Two incidents in May 2005 -- the execution of paramilitary police in Ceram, Maluku, and the bombing of a market in Tentena, Poso -- offer case studies of how those networks are formed and operate. Weakening the networks is key to preventing further violence, including terrorism. In Maluku and Poso, sites of the worst communal conflicts of the immediate post-Soeharto period, one place to start is with programs aimed at ex-combatants and imprisoned mujahidin due for release. These men are often part of networks that extend beyond the two conflict areas, but if they can be "reintegrated" into civilian life, their willingness to support mujahidin elsewhere in Indonesia and engage in violence themselves might be lessened. Addressing broader justice and security issues would also help.

A study of the Ceram and Tentena incidents suggests that the conflict areas continue to be home to "leftover mujahidin" who went there to fight from other parts of the country and never left; who returned home but maintained regular contact with people they had trained or fought with there; or who were locally recruited and continued to be active in jihadist circles long after the conflicts waned.

Violent jihadist networks remain strong in these areas for several reasons:

- members of the major jihadist organisations in Indonesia -- Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), some splinters and offshoots of Darul Islam (DI), KOMPAK and others -- see Maluku and Poso as areas where "enemies of Islam", including local Christians, continue to pose a threat to the Muslim community;
- they believe that parts of Maluku and Poso, but particularly Poso, have the potential to develop into a *qoidah aminah*, a secure area where residents can live by Islamic principles and apply Islamic law: in their view, such a base could then serve as the building block of an Islamic state, and Maluku and

Poso thus remain a focus for religious outreach and recruitment efforts;

- for some fighters, both local and non-local, the combination of military training and active combat may have been the most meaningful experience of their lives: it may be difficult for them to return to more mundane "civilian" life unless better options emerge; and
- the concentration of ex-mujahidin has made both areas attractive to fugitives who in the past have found a ready support network there.

The Ceram attack on a paramilitary police post on 16 May 2005, in particular, shows how a disparate group of men linked through various networks can come together and form a team of operatives. The attack involved members of KOMPAK, Darul Islam, a Poso-based organisation, and perhaps JI, but the hit squad does not appear to have been organised through any institutional hierarchy. The common experience of training and fighting during the early stages of the Poso and Maluku conflicts appears to be more important as the organising principle. Those ties were also sufficiently strong to draw the attackers together from Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra and Maluku.

The bomb in the marketplace of the Christian town of Tentena, Poso, is more mysterious. The investigation has produced over a dozen arrests but no clear suspect. It has highlighted the complexity of the networks involved in other recent violence in the area, going beyond mujahidin circles to include local officials and gang leaders.

One need in these conflict areas is for better law enforcement. Problems are of long standing and not entirely of current incumbents' making, but police practices, particularly wrongful arrests and ill-treatment of detainees, have alienated local communities, making people unwilling to help investigations. The failure of government security forces in the past to provide protection to threatened communities means people who take the law into their own hands are treated as heroes. Prosecutors,

lawyers and judges have been subjected to intimidation and worse, and perpetrators of violence have often received questionable acquittals or rejoined their networks after serving short sentences.

Several measures would help: better treatment of detainees, control over access to firearms, better coordination among intelligence agencies, and serious punishment for serious crimes.

A second need is for direct engagement with local veterans of the Poso and Maluku violence to reintegrate them back into "civilian" life. One possibility is to link a reintegration program to the "assimilation" program of the Indonesian prison system, whereby those about to be released are allowed to work outside prison during the day under closely supervised conditions. This could be a vehicle for trying to introduce members of these networks to new social contacts while at the same time giving them viable alternatives to violence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Indonesia:

1. Conduct a systematic analysis of why police and intelligence agencies failed to detect preparations for the two May 2005 attacks, with a view to producing recommendations that could feed into draft bills on intelligence and security as well as into a much-needed strategic review of national security.
2. Develop a program to reduce the number of small arms and explosives in private hands in Maluku and Poso by:
 - (a) increasing scrutiny and audits of weapons and ammunition manufactured in Indonesia, as well as stocks issued to police and military;
 - (b) intensifying intelligence gathering to locate weapons caches still present in conflict areas; and
 - (c) instituting a weapons recovery program, through an amnesty or buy-back scheme.
3. Improve police-community relations, among other things by ensuring that suspects arrested in conflict areas are not ill-treated during arrest and interrogation, and that police are more often prosecuted in court for offences under the criminal code rather than simply subjected to internal disciplinary proceedings.
4. Improve law enforcement efforts in conflict areas, in part by ensuring that sufficient security is provided

to prosecutors, judges and defence lawyers to facilitate fair and transparent trials and that crimes committed in conflict areas are treated at least as seriously as crimes committed elsewhere in Indonesia.

To Donors:

5. Explore, in cooperation with the Department of Law and Human Rights and local stakeholders, options for a reintegration program aimed at detained members of mujahidin networks that would be tied into the assimilation programs of the Indonesian prison system.
6. Explore the possibility of vocational training for former gang members that would mesh with the local economy and job market while keeping them out of security-related jobs.
7. Explore the possibility for community development programs that would specifically include members of mujahidin networks but that would be available to ex-combatants from both Muslim and Christian communities.

Jakarta/Brussels, 13 October 2005

WEAKENING INDONESIA'S MUJAHIDIN NETWORKS: LESSONS FROM MALUKU AND POSO

I. INTRODUCTION

Two acts of violence in Indonesia in May 2005 -- an execution and a bombing -- offer case studies of how violent jihadist networks are formed. Personal bonds forged through joint training and shared combat experience in areas of communal conflict have helped perpetuate violence. They have also helped provide refuge for fugitives and possibly new recruits for operations elsewhere in the country. This report suggests that violent jihadist networks might be weakened and ongoing violence, including terrorism, reduced by more attention to post-conflict issues in areas once wracked by communal fighting.

The areas in question are Maluku, a province in the central Moluccan islands, and Poso, a district in Central Sulawesi.¹ Both saw intense fighting between Christian and Muslim communities erupt in the years following President Soeharto's May 1998 resignation, and both came to be seen as legitimate theatres for armed jihad, holy war, by violent jihadists across Indonesia -- and by a handful of foreign operatives as well. Peace agreements brokered in late 2001 and early 2002 by the then coordinating minister for people's welfare, now vice president, Jusuf Kalla, substantially reduced the violence but were not able to prevent sporadic further bombings and shootings.

The May 2005 attacks took place against this backdrop. On 16 May, eight armed men, outsiders and locals, attacked a remote security outpost on the island of Ceram, Maluku, killing five members of the paramilitary Mobile Brigade police (known as Brimob) and their cook. On 28 May, two bombs exploded in the crowded marketplace of Tentena, Poso, a Christian town, killing 22. While the

identities of the Tentena bombers remain unclear, violent jihadists were almost certainly involved, perhaps in alliance with others.

The Ceram and Tentena attacks reveal the degree to which both Maluku and Poso, even after the peace accords, remained places where perpetrators of violence enjoyed relative immunity, fugitives found sanctuary, and new foot-soldiers for jihadist operations were recruited. They also show how much remains to be done in terms of addressing local grievances, getting the legal system functioning more effectively, and reintegrating those who fought on both sides of the religious divide. Renewed attention to post-conflict Maluku and Poso is thus not only desirable on its own terms but could have the added benefit of helping contain terrorism.²

¹ For discussion of earlier phases of the Maluku and Poso conflicts, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°32, *Violence Erupts Again in Ambon*, 17 May 2004; Crisis Group Asia Report N°74, *Indonesia Background: Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, 3 February 2004; Crisis Group Asia Report N°31, *Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku*, 8 February 2002; Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°2, *Indonesia's Maluku Crisis: The Issues*, 19 July 2000.

² No local men from Maluku or Poso were recruited for the bombing operations in Jakarta in August 2003 and September 2004, although one of the men sentenced to death for his role in the Australian embassy bomb, Iwan alias Rois, travelled to Ambon as a mujahid for two weeks in early 2002 and to Poso from June 2002 to February 2003. See deposition of Iwan Dharmawan Mutho alias Rois alias Fajar alias Abdul Fatah alias Dharma alias Yadi alias Muhammad Taufik alias Ridho alias Hendi in case dossier of Hasan alias Agung Cahyono als Purnomo, Jakarta, 10 January 2005.

II. MALUKU, POSO, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCAL JIHADS

The Maluku and Poso conflicts had multiple causes, mostly political and economic rather than religious, but the parties to both ended up identifying themselves and their opponents as Muslims or Christians.

The Maluku fighting began in January 1999 with a dispute between a conductor and a passenger of a public transport minivan in Ambon that quickly led to an attack on a Muslim neighbourhood, whose residents were celebrating the end of the fasting month. Bitter communal fighting broke out in Ambon and surrounding islands, revealing deep social fissures and erosion of traditional authority structures that the political controls of the Soeharto years had largely obscured. The results were thousands of deaths, massive displacement and an influx of young men from elsewhere in Indonesia to fight on the Muslim side.

These mujahidin, as they called themselves, fell into two broad categories. The first, collectively known as Laskar Jihad, looked to a salafi religious teacher from Yogyakarta, Jafar Umar Thalib, for leadership. They saw the defence of Muslims in Ambon as an obligation, but they also saw their mission as defending the Indonesian state from Christian separatists. They blamed the fighting on supporters within the Christian community of an abortive 1950s separatist insurgency called Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas, RMS), and their involvement in Maluku took on an ultranationalist tinge, leading them to find common cause with at least some elements of the Indonesian army in the initial years of the conflict.³ Laskar Jihad sent an assessment team to Maluku in February 2000 but the first major influx of its fighters, in the thousands, came two months later.

The second category consisted of smaller groups, generally more militant, more committed to establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia, and some attracted by the salafi jihadist ideology of Osama bin Laden. Collectively known as Laskar Mujahidin, their first significant group arrived in Ambon in June 1999. They included Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and different factions and splinter groups of the Darul Islam (DI) movement. Like Laskar Jihad, JI was largely (but not exclusively) Java-based. Also included were members of an Islamic charity, KOMPAK, and the militia it later set up, Mujahidin KOMPAK. The KOMPAK office in Solo, Central Java, was instrumental in recruiting, financing, and training mujahidin volunteers but the office

in Makassar, Sulawesi was also active. That office in turn was closely allied with a Makassar-based organisation, Laskar Jundullah.

The Laskar Mujahidin forces had a systematic program of military and religious training, including in Mindanao, where JI and DI ran separate camps. In Ambon, they were more inclined to target churches and priests than control territory, as Laskar Jihad did. If Laskar Jihad saw the battle in Ambon as largely against Christian separatists, Laskar Mujahidin saw it as against kafirs (non-believers).

For a very brief period, the two groups worked together in Maluku, but personal, tactical, and ideological disputes quickly prevented further cooperation. In general, the networks linked to the various components of Laskar Mujahidin, not Laskar Jihad (which disbanded in October 2002), have been the source of much of the ongoing violence in Maluku and Poso.

As in Maluku, the Poso conflict began with a seemingly trivial clash. A brawl between youths in December 1998 led to a small riot. No one was killed, but the broader underlying tensions were not addressed. When further riots followed in April and particularly May-June 2000, in what became known as the "third phase" of the conflict, the violence escalated.⁴ In the worst single incident during this phase, Christian fighters on 28 May 2000 killed Muslims who had gathered at a religious boarding school, the Walisongo Pesantren, on the road between Poso city and Tentena, and over the next few days pursued those who had fled. In all, perhaps 100 people were killed either at the boarding school or shortly thereafter, while at least 250 people, mostly Muslims, were killed overall during the two weeks of violence.

In April 2001, three men were sentenced to death for their role in the May-June 2000 violence. One of them, Fabianus Tibo, named sixteen Christian "masterminds" of the riot in his defence plea. Arrest of the sixteen has been a key demand of Muslim groups to this day.⁵

Outrage over the Walisongo killings and belief that all Muslims in the area were in danger led to new mobilisation of mujahidin. Battle-hardened veterans of the Maluku conflict from JI, DI, Laskar Jundullah, and KOMPAK arrived in Poso a few months later, with KOMPAK often serving as an umbrella organisation and providing quick combat training for new recruits. Laskar Jihad only arrived in July 2001, and with far fewer people than in Ambon,

³ The Republic of the South Moluccas was proclaimed in 1950 and most, but not all, of its supporters were Christians. Many of them fled to the Netherlands after the Indonesian military defeated the movement.

⁴ Six people were killed in the April 2000 riot, three of them Muslims shot by the paramilitary police, Brimob. The city suburb of Lombogia was razed, and many Christians fled south to Tentena.

⁵ In fact, some of these men have been questioned by police, and it is likely not all were involved in the violence.

shortly after an incident in which fourteen Muslims, mostly women and children, were killed.⁶

In both areas, the alliance of outside and local fighters had a major impact on the dynamics of the conflict. Many, but by no means all, the locals recruited were urban thugs or petty criminals (*preman*), already used to violence and eager to join mujahidin ranks, particularly when their own neighbourhoods and families were affected. For them, fighting for Islam initially was a path to atonement, but in some cases, as the conflicts waned, the borderline between jihad and crime became blurred. Some of the thugs-turned-mujahidin really did leave their old way of life behind but others later returned to thuggery while remaining associated with local mujahidin groups.

Until now, attention to Maluku and Poso in the context of Indonesian terrorism has focused on the degree to which jihadist groups such as JI were able to exploit anger generated by attacks on Muslims to promote their own agenda. Video CDs of atrocities in the two areas shown at religious study sessions (*pengajian*), drew in recruits; many of the initial targets of JI operations, such as the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings, were Indonesian Christians, to retaliate for the deaths of Muslims in Maluku and Poso. But an equally important dynamic is the degree to which outside fighters adopted local agendas as their own and helped plan and implement attacks which make little sense in the context of international terrorism but much more as responses to local grievances.

Three other factors may explain why "left-over" mujahidin -- local fighters and outsiders who settled in the conflict areas, in some cases marrying local women -- continue to draw on networks of ex-combatants for occasional acts of violence:

- Members of the major outside organisations -- JI, DI, KOMPAK and others -- see Maluku and Poso as areas where enemies of Islam continue to pose a threat to the Muslim community. Although many in these organisations have moved away from, or indeed never fully supported, the idea of attacking Western targets, some appear to consider strikes against civilians in areas that produced Christian fighters as legitimate, pre-emptive, defensive measures.
- Top leaders in these organisations reportedly believe that a true jihad will only succeed if Muslims can operate from a secure base, *qoidah aminah* in the Indonesian transliteration of the Arabic phrase, where residents can live by Islamic principles and

apply Islamic law. In their view, no such base exists in Indonesia today but the Muslim areas in Maluku and Poso, particularly given the religious segregation of communities that occurred as a by-product of the fighting, may have particular potential to develop into such havens through religious education and outreach programs. The desire to establish a *qoidah aminah* thus acts as a pull factor, giving the large jihadist organisations an ongoing interest in the areas.

- For some of these fighters, both local and non-local, the combination of military training and active combat may have been the most meaningful experience of their lives. Unless better options emerge, they may want to return to active jihad if the opportunity arises, rather than continue with more mundane trading or farming activities.

The reasons why alliances of locals and outsiders continue to operate long after the conflicts have subsided are thus not hard to find. More interesting is how particular networks are forged, and for this, the Ceram attack is particularly noteworthy.

⁶ The attack took place in Buyung Katedo, near the Christian village Sepe, on 3 July 2001.

III. THE CERAM ATTACK

The police investigation into the 16 May 2005 attack on the police post in Ceram quickly revealed the identity of those responsible -- an ad hoc assortment of men linked to different Indonesian jihadist groups: KOMPAK, Darul Islam, a Poso-based organisation, and possibly, in one case, JI. Of the eight gunmen, three were from Maluku, one was from West Java, one from Riau, and three from Poso. The assault was reportedly planned in Ambon at the house of a leftover mujahid from Madura, Ustadz Arsyad alias Asad, from KOMPAK, who had gone to fight in Maluku and stayed on.

Interrogation of the suspects seemed to solve the mystery of who was responsible for attacks that had plagued Ambon over the previous twelve months, revealing hitherto unknown connections among an even more diverse array of individuals.⁷ Some knew each other from a training camp on Buru island in Maluku in June 1999; some had fought together in Poso; a few had trained in Mindanao. Some had tapped into important networks through marriage. Others had come to Ambon as fugitives, including two men involved in a bomb-making class who were forced to flee after materials procured for the class exploded, blowing the roof off a house in Cimanggis, Jakarta in March 2004.

While the Ceram attack may prove to be KOMPAK-inspired, neither it nor the string of attacks that preceded it made use of any institutional structure or hierarchy. Each operation appeared to rely on a different set of personal networks, most of which overlapped, but none of which involved exactly the same set of people.

A. BACKGROUND TO THE ATTACK IN LOKI

The Brimob post that the gunmen targeted was in the village of Loki, West Ceram, an area that had been the site of major violence between Muslims and Christians in 1999, resulting in widespread forced displacement.⁸ It

⁷ Prior to these arrests, police suspicion had been focused on the possibility that Indonesian military units, particularly elite Kopassus troops, were behind the violence. For a list of incidents, see Appendix C.

⁸ Loki village consists of several coastal hamlets of which only two, Loki and Seaputi, have Christian populations. In August 1999, these two were attacked by local Muslim mobs. At the same time, Christians from Ariate, the next village over, attacked Laala, one of Loki's Muslim hamlets, forcing villagers to flee. Wailisa, another hamlet near Loki, took in Muslims displaced from a nearby town. When Christians from Loki village first tried to return in 2002, they were driven away. Residents of Loki hamlet came back in February 2004 after a local NGO

consisted of two houses next to the main road. According to the police version, at around 3:00 a.m., four attackers entered the two houses, while the other four provided cover outside.⁹ All had weapons and several hundred rounds of ammunition. In one house, where men sick with malaria were sleeping, they shot four Brimob members in the head.¹⁰ In the second house, they shot and killed the cook, Petrus Sarpaly, and a fifth Brimob man, and wounded another. A policeman killed one attacker, who was then shot in the face by his own companions in an apparent attempt to conceal his identity. Two other attackers were wounded but escaped. The Maluku police chief said the Brimob victims and cook were "executed, not killed in battle".¹¹

The attackers were later identified as Asep alias Dahlan, a West Javanese from KOMPAK; Abdullah Umamit, an Ambonese member of Darul Islam, married to the sister-in-law of Omar al-Faruq, an alleged al-Qaeda operative now in U.S. custody; Ikhlas (the only attacker killed), a member of Darul Islam from Riau, Sumatra; Muchlis, Andi and Jodi, believed to be members of an organisation in Poso called Mujahidin Kayamanya that worked closely with KOMPAK; and two men from Ceram known only as Abu Zar and Abu Harun.¹²

Police believe that the attack had been planned a week earlier during a meeting at a house in the Ambon suburb of Air Kuning. The house belonged to Ustadz Arsyad

successfully mediated between the two communities, and the government provided funds to rebuild houses. Muslim villagers from other hamlets said they welcomed their return but as of mid-2005, few families had returned to either (Christian) Seaputi or (Muslim) Laala, although new houses had been constructed there. Crisis Group interview with director of a local NGO, Ambon, June 2005; Crisis Group interviews with residents of Ketapang, Loki, Seaputi, Tanah Goyang, July 2005.

⁹ Videotaped press conference by Chief of Maluku Police Brigadier General Aditya Warman, 19 May 2005.

¹⁰ The five police killed were Tony Susanto, Hasanudin, Teguh Erianto, Slamet Rianto and S Damanik. See "Menguntit Jejak Kapal Cepat", *Gatra*, 28 May 2005, p. 28.

¹¹ Videotape of address by Maluku Police Chief Brigadier General Aditya Warman, to local religious figures, 13 June 2005.

¹² Omar al-Faruq arrived in Indonesia from the southern Philippines in 1998, trained fighters in Ambon and Poso, and was arrested in June 2002 in Jakarta; he is currently in U.S. custody at an unknown location.. Abdullah Umamit's wife is the sister of Mira Augustina, al-Faruq's wife. The two women are the daughters of Haris Fadillah alias Abu Dzar, a Darul Islam member originally from Riau who fought with, provided arms to, and sometimes commanded Laskar Mujahidin in Ambon and who died in battle in Siri-Sori, Saparua in October 2000. See Crisis Group Asia Report N°92, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*, 22 February 2005, p. 36; Crisis Group Report, *Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

alias Asad, the KOMPAK member originally from Madura who trained in Mindanao, went to Ambon to fight, and remained there after hostilities waned.¹³ The eight attackers attended, as did a man named Nurdin, another long-time Ambon resident and local mujahidin commander, who was a Darul Islam member originally from Padang, West Sumatra. Asad ordered the two Ceram men to take four weapons each by public transport to the mountain behind Olas hamlet, near Loki, on 10 and 11 May. The other attackers travelled to Olas between 13 and 15 May to retrieve the weapons and launch the attack. Asep was the last to arrive.¹⁴

According to one attacker, the Christian residents of Loki were the real target, as they were a "thorn in the side" of Muslims, but the police post had to go first.¹⁵ After one member of the hit squad was killed, others wounded and their weapons jammed, the plan was aborted, and they fled toward the adjoining hamlet of Ketapang. Several villagers interviewed claimed they had heard the retreating attackers shout to residents to stay in their houses and not panic, as they had orders from their commander not to hurt them.¹⁶ Police suggested that Brimob men may also have been targeted because their presence had disrupted jihadist training activities on the mountain behind Olas and neighbouring areas.¹⁷

If the attack appeared well-planned, the escape was amateurish and haphazard, despite the fact that five of the seven surviving assailants did manage to evade arrest and are still at large. The attackers did not have their own getaway boat or vehicle. The day before the

attack, two men had gone to Ketapang to charter one of its several passenger speedboats early the next morning. As their attack started to unravel, the assailants fled there, carrying their wounded. The waiting speedboat took them on the bumpy one-hour ride to Ambon island, where they disembarked. Two of them then rented a pick-up truck to go to Laha, a Muslim village on the coast next to the airport. They asked the driver to stop along the way and discarded their ammunition, as well as the tarpaulin used to carry the weapons. Four others caught a public bus, then a speedboat into the city.¹⁸

A massive police manhunt began to yield results almost immediately. On the day of the attack, police located the speedboat the attackers had hired and arrested its crew. That night, they arrested Asep alias Dahlan in Kebun Cengeh, a Muslim neighbourhood in the city of Ambon.¹⁹ Suspected of being the leader, he had been shot in the arm during the attack.²⁰ Police also arrested Nurdin, the DI member, around the same time, and Abdullah Umamit three days later on Buru island.²¹

On 19 May, police recovered a significant weapons cache -- over a dozen rifles, 23 revolvers, thousands of rounds of ammunition and several mortars -- in the partially-constructed sports hall of the local State Islamic College (STAIN). Some are believed to have been left over from a raid by Muslim forces on a Brimob arms depot in Tantai, Ambon in June 2000. It is not clear how long the weapons had been there but STAIN may have been chosen as a hiding place because of a perception that police and military would not be able to set foot on campus.²² The discovery generated renewed scrutiny of STAIN's rector, Muhammad Attamimi. Well known as a hardline figure who had links both to Muslim militias fighting in Maluku and the local military command, he has taken a more moderate stance since his appointment as head of the college in 2003.²³ Police questioned him once as a witness after the weapons were discovered but took no further action.

¹³ "Sebelum Penyerangan, Tersangka Berapat di Air Kuning", *Siwali*, 28 June 2005, pp. 1, 11. Arsyad alias Asad has since become the main target of Maluku police, who claim to have found seven kilograms of TNT hidden in the roof of his house after he was suspected of orchestrating the small bomb explosion in Ambon's Mardika market on 25 August 2005.

¹⁴ Ibid. See also, "Polri: Otak Penyerang Pos Brimob Seram & Tentena dari Solo", *detik.com*, 31 May 2005.

¹⁵ Crisis Group interview, May 2005. Much of Ceram, which before 1999 had had numerous mixed Christian-Muslim villages, ended up with more segregated communities after the conflict. Before some families returned to Seaputi, Loki's residents were the only Christians in the village.

¹⁶ Crisis Group interviews, July 2005. If true, this could cast doubt on whether they really intended to attack civilians. At the same time, however, the villagers could have misheard the shouts or the attackers could have urged them to stay inside as a form of self-protection after the attack went wrong. By the same measure, if they intended to target civilians, attacking the post first was ill-conceived. The Brimob post was the only security in the area, located at one end of the hamlet, and it would have hardly prevented a hit-and-run attack on villagers by eight well-armed assailants.

¹⁷ "Pos Brimob Diserang karena Ganggu Latihan Para Teroris", *Sinar Harapan*, 14 June 2005.

¹⁸ "Lima Pelaku Penyerangan Lokki Ditangkap", *Ambon Ekspres*, 18 May 2005, pp. 1, 11.

¹⁹ Ibid, and "Pelaku Penyerangan Desa Lokki Ditangkap", *Ambon Ekspres*, 17 May 2005, p. 1. The boat's crew was later released.

²⁰ Videotape of press conference with Maluku Police Chief, Brigadier General Aditya Warman, 19 May 2005.

²¹ "Di Pulau Buru, Dua Orang Ditangkap Terkait Penembakan Pos Brimob", *Kompas*, 21 May 2005.

²² Crisis Group interview, July 2005. There is a widespread impression that security forces cannot set foot on campuses, although they sometimes do. STAIN may have seemed particularly off-limits because the campus complex was located within the main Muslim stronghold in Ambon, and the area around it had been used for training during the conflict.

²³ Crisis Group interviews, June, July 2005.

Based on information from the initial arrests, they also apprehended several other men who were part of the broader network, none of whom had been directly involved in Loki but who were all linked in some way to earlier violence. Among them were:

- Ongen Pattimura alias Idi Amin Tabrani, a resident of the Batumerah neighbourhood of Ambon.²⁴ Ongen, originally from the village of Latu, Ceram, had commanded men from Latu early in the conflict and subsequently led an urban gang that included Latu men. His men are believed to have received training from a JI member, Sueb, although they fell out with him in mid-2004 because he was demanding too much of them religiously. Their interests were local, not global, and they had little desire to change their lifestyle, which included drinking.²⁵
- Fatur, a leftover fighter from Makassar, Sulawesi, who had come to Ambon as a member of the Makassar-based organisations Laskar Jundullah and Wahdah Islamiyah and stayed on, marrying a local woman and selling fuel for a living. He was known as a religious teacher and adviser to many mujahidin. Police believe he knew about plans for Loki. Fatur is known to have been very close to so-called "shadow forces" (*pasukan siluman*), active members of the security forces who fought with their communities.
- Sueb, the JI member who ran a religious study group to which Ongen Pattimura and Fatur introduced local men. Originally from Central Java, he trained in Mindanao where he became an explosives expert. He was arrested on Buru, three weeks after the Loki attack. Police allege he was actively involved in planning violence up through May 2004, when a bombing took place across from a church in Ambon. He then reportedly became disillusioned with Ongen and his followers, finding their motives less pure than he expected, so he turned over his weapons to them and moved to Buru.²⁶ He ran a business buying cloves in Maluku and selling them in Java.

- Tomo, a friend of Fatur's, was Javanese but a long-term resident of Ambon who worked as a computer technician. His Batumerah house was used as a gathering point by many of the men who have been arrested since the Loki attack and may have been a place where mujahidin from outside Maluku stayed when they came to Ambon.
- Harun alias Syaiful alias Fathurobi alias Nazarudin Mochtar from Cilacap, Central Java, was arrested on Buru on the same day as Abdullah Umamit and accused of helping him flee. A man with a long track record of militant activity, Harun was on the police wanted list for being the instructor in the bomb-making class in Cimanggis, Jakarta in March 2004. A Poso veteran, he had worked with a Darul Islam splinter group in Sukabumi, West Java, where one of his first recruits was Heri Golun, the suicide bomber in the September 2004 Australian embassy bombing.²⁷ He had been in Ambon since June 2004.²⁸
- Cholid, another suspect in the March 2004 Cimanggis explosion, who, like Harun, also had links to Loki attacker Abdullah Umamit. He was arrested in mid-July in Ambon on suspicion of driving the motorbike from which Umamit threw a grenade into a public transport van in Batumerah in March 2005. He had fled to Ambon with Harun in June 2004.
- Hardi Tuasikal, an Ambon resident, arrested on 13 June in Maros, South Sulawesi. He was accused of taking part in a grenade attack in Lateri village, Ambon in March 2005.

With each new arrest, the complexity of the network became more apparent.

B. NETWORKS PERSONIFIED -- ASEP'S STORY

The intricate web of alliances among the men involved in the Loki attack is well illustrated by looking at the history of one attacker, Asep alias Dahlan. An ethnic Sundanese from West Java, he was a veteran of Ambon and Poso, and through combat experience there had personal ties to members of all the major jihadist organisations in Indonesia.

²⁴ He at one point enrolled in the Political and Social Science Faculty of STAIN, owned a cafe in Batumerah and ran for the Ambon city legislature for Islamic party PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera -- Prosperous Justice Party) in 2004. Crisis Group interviews, June, July 2005.

²⁵ Crisis Group interview with senior policeman in Maluku, July 2005.

²⁶ Crisis Group interview with senior police source in Maluku, July 2004. See also "Mengaku diajak Ongen dan Fatur", *Info Baru*, 13 June 2005, pp. 1, 11.

²⁷ For a fuller description of Harun and his activities, see Crisis Group Report, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia*, op. cit., pp. 28-30.

²⁸ Crisis Group phone interview with senior member of Maluku provincial police, August 2005. For a description of the Cimanggis bomb, see Crisis Group Asia Report N°83, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, 13 September 2004, pp. 27-28.

Asep was born in Tasikmalaya, West Java. He did not seem particularly focused on religious study as a youth but in his early twenties he moved to Cipayung, Jakarta to stay with his uncle while he attended college, and there he began to change. The neighbourhood he lived in was a tense mixture of several well-known Muslim teachers (ustadz) with a strong anti-Christian streak and associated with the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) and equally hardline Protestant evangelicals associated with a fundamentalist organisation, Doulos.²⁹ Asep began attending religious study sessions (*pengajian*) at a mosque where a DDII preacher named Mujayin Abdul Wahab was the imam. Because DDII was one of the first organisations to disseminate detailed information about the violence in Ambon, the followers of Ustadz Mujayin became committed to idea of waging jihad in defence of fellow Muslims.

Around June 1999, after a religious training session (*dauroh*) at Ustadz Mujayin's mosque, a sign-up sheet was circulated for those interested in going to Ambon to fight. Asep and a friend, Abdullah Sonata, put their names down.

They stopped first in Solo, where they met Ustadz Mujayin's brother, Arismunandar, a JI member then in charge of the local office of KOMPAK, which had already begun to help finance jihadist activity in Ambon. Arismunandar arranged for them to go to Surabaya and on to Ambon. They stopped only briefly in Ambon, then went directly to Waimurat, Buru where KOMPAK had set up a military training program (*tadrib*). A list of the instructors and other trainees at the Buru camp is a who's who of Indonesian jihadists, including:

- ❑ Salman alias Apud, who was arrested off the coast of Sabah in September 2003 as he was returning from Mindanao. He is now in custody in Malaysia;
- ❑ Saefuddin alias Faiz, a JI member and Ngruki graduate arrested in Zamboanga, Mindanao in December 2004. His information led to the arrest of Sonata in June 2005;
- ❑ Nurudin, the twin brother of Saefuddin, was also a JI member and later killed in Ambon;
- ❑ Umar and Ali, two members of Darul Islam from Tasikmalaya, recruited by Jabir, a friend of Hambali's, who died in 2000 when a bomb he was making for a Christmas Eve operation went off prematurely.³⁰

Also present was Ustadz Arsyad alias Asad, the man police are seeking as a planner of the Loki attack. The training lasted three months. It was financed by KOMPAK and managed by JI, until differences over fund-raising prevented further cooperation. Instructors included Umar Wayan and Ali Imron, convicted in the Bali bombings, and Zulkarnaen, head of JI's military operations. (At the time, Zulkarnaen was overall JI commander for Maluku.)

In November 1999, Asep left Buru for Ambon. By that time, there were already hundreds of mujahidin from outside Ambon on the ground, from Laskar Jundullah to Darul Islam. The base for these outside fighters was set up by KOMPAK in Kebun Cengkeh -- the same neighbourhood where Asep was arrested for the Loki attack in 2005.

Asep took a direct role in one now-famous episode, the raid on the Brimob barracks in Tantai, Ambon in June 2000. Jihadists from inside and outside Maluku, working with "shadow forces" led the raid, which netted some 800 guns.³¹ Some of the weapons found at STAIN in the aftermath of the Loki attack were from this raid.

Asep's prowess on the battlefield in Ambon led him eventually to Poso. After hundreds of Muslims died in a paroxysm of violence there from 23 May to early June 2000, KOMPAK leaders decided to send men. They put together a team of six militants who had been active in Maluku, led by Abdullah Sonata, Asep's friend from Jakarta. Carrying Rp. 17 million (\$1,700)³² in cash and fourteen guns from the Brimob raid, they left Ambon and headed for Poso via Makassar.

Their main task was to assist in the evacuation of bodies as well as to map out areas of enemy strength and weakness.

Asep came with a second team of five that replaced the first after a few months.³³ Its assignment was to conduct

covering Malaysia and Singapore) and the JI leader with the closest links to al-Qaeda, was arrested in Thailand in August 2003 and is now in U.S. custody at an unknown location. He was one of the JI leaders responsible for the initiation of JI's bombing campaign in 2000.

³¹ The shadow forces included Brimob members from Sukasari and Kedunghalang Bogor; Battalion 303 Garut; Battalion 327 from Majalengka; and Battalions 611, 732 and 733, as well as Benteng Raiders from Semarang. Wearing civilian clothes, they passed out large amounts of ammunition to the mujahidin, and speaking Sundanese, invited the mujahidin to help themselves. Some sources say that Christian forces also obtained some of the weapons but the raid was clearly led by the mujahidin side.

³² Figures denoted in dollars (\$) are in U.S. dollars.

³³ The second team was led by Farihin Ibnu Ahmed, with Ali Fauzi (brother of Bali bombers Amrozi and Mukhlas) as his deputy.

²⁹ A seminary, belonging to the Doulos foundation, was attacked by hundreds of violent jihadists and one of its buildings burned to the ground in December 1999.

³⁰ Hambali, former head of JI's Mantiqi I (the subdivision

a second assessment of enemy strength, and to recruit local mujahidin for military training. The training program began about October 2000 and lasted for some three weeks.

This second team was assisted by a number of Darul Islam members, including a man known as Abdullah alias Jet Li from Riau.³⁴ Most were Ambon veterans, although not Abdullah. Once they were in place, KOMPAK leaders withdrew Asep from Poso and sent him back to Maluku.

While he was there, his Poso-based associates in the second team set up a militia, Pasukan Jihad (Jihad Forces), composed of local and outside mujahidin. Its first effort, an attack in December 2000 on Sepe village, was not a success, and the leader was arrested. Abdullah alias Jet Li took over temporarily as commander, but shortly thereafter, Asep was recalled to Poso to replace him. Abdullah, freed from military duties, began focusing on giving religious training to the local mujahidin in the Kayamanya area of Poso city, at the same time recruiting these young men for Darul Islam. Dozens of new DI members were inducted as a result. In 2001, about 100 of these local mujahidin agreed among themselves to form a new organisation, Mujahidin Kayamanya, with Abdullah alias Jet Li as their leader. This is the organisation that Jodi, Andi and Muchlis, each wanted for the Loki attack, are believed to have joined. Abdullah himself was killed during an assault on Tangkura, near Poso, in November 2001.³⁵

After a few months back in Poso, Asep took on a new role. He was instructed by Arismunandar of the KOMPAK Solo office to go to the Philippines.³⁶ He was to undergo training, purchase weapons, and accompany Indonesian mujahidin back and forth from Sulawesi to Mindanao.

³⁴ Abdullah was a follower of Gaos Taufik, a Darul Islam commander from the 1950s who remains active in the DI organisation.

³⁵ After his death, Sofyan Djumpai alias Pian took over as commander. Pian was arrested in connection with the shooting of the Palu prosecutor Ferry Silalahi in 2004 and is now in prison on charges of firearms possession. He was acquitted of the murder charge in March 2005 but prosecutors lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court. Pian was eventually succeeded in Mujahidin Kayamanya by Hence Said, who was himself arrested in Java in June 2005.

³⁶ In this role he replaced Suryadi Ma'soed. The decision to send him to the Philippines was apparently taken jointly by Arismunandar, Agus Dwikarna of the KOMPAK office in Makassar (now in detention in the Philippines) and Syawal Yasin, an Afghan veteran and most senior of the Sulawesi-based mujahidin. See Crisis Group Asia Report N°63, *Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*, 26 August 2003, p. 21.

Accordingly, around April-May 2001, Asep, accompanied by three others, left by ship for General Santos city, Mindanao. Upon arrival, he left to meet with Usamah, a JI member married to a Filipina who was JI's arms procurer in Mindanao. He then went to Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat province to take part in a five or six-month military training course at an Moro Islamic Liberation Front camp.³⁷ There he became arms proficient and also very close to Faturrahman al-Ghozi, the JI member based in Mindanao who was close to Hambali.

As Asep was honing his military skills in Mindanao, the members of Mujahidin Kayamanya, the group set up in Poso, were honing theirs -- in Maluku. In June 2001, several dozen men from Poso, led and financed by Abdullah alias Jet Li, left for Ambon.³⁸ The training took place around the STAIN campus in Batumerah for a month, then all returned to Poso.

Asep finished his training in Mindanao around October 2001. He went back to Indonesia with two companions, one of whom went immediately on to Makassar. The other, Bakri, stopped with Asep in Tomohon, North Sulawesi en route back to Poso. While they were there, a Christian militia, the Manguni Brigadean, organised an anti-Osama bin Laden demonstration in the aftermath of the 11 September terror attacks in the U.S. The militia leader was a man named Antonius Rolly Roring. Asep and Bakri took great offence at the demonstration, and since Antonius worked as a contract driver, they hired him, saying they wanted to go to a nearby town, but in fact planning to rob him, in an act of *fa'i* (robbing non-Muslims for jihad).

On 25 October 2001, Antonius picked up Asep and Bakri. Shortly after leaving Tomohon, Asep asked him to stop. When the car had pulled off the road, Bakri shot Antonius in the head, and he and Asep put his body in the trunk. Asep took over as driver but soon crashed into another vehicle, and their car flipped over. Asep and Bakri were not seriously hurt, but they panicked and ran off, leaving not only the body in the trunk but also a bag containing their documents from the Bedis Military Academy in

³⁷ This Usamah was misidentified in an earlier Crisis Group report as Mustopa, then leader of JI's Mantiqi III, who also used the alias Usamah. See Crisis Group Report, *Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia*, op. cit, p. 21.

³⁸ Participants in the Ambon training included: Aco and Ambo Torik from Kayamanya; Wiwin Likman from Moengko; Taufik alias Ufik; Hence Said from Kayamanya; Emil Salim (Erwin's brother) from Donggulu; Basri alias Harun from Moengko; Rafiq, Andreas, and Farauk Arab all from Bonesompe. The instructors were Abdullah and a man named Fauzan, who had a Malaysian or Sumatran accent. See interrogation deposition of Erwin Mardani, 21 August 2004, in dossier of Sofyan Djumpai alias Pian for murder of Ferry Silalahi.

Mindanao, about 50 bullets, and a passport in the name of Syamsul Huda that belonged to Asep.

Asep and Bakri made it safely to Poso where Asep rejoined his old friends from KOMPAK and Mujahidin Kayamanya, and began taking part with them in planning attacks on Christian strongholds. One leader of these attacks was Salman alias Apud, a veteran of 1999 KOMPAK-financed training in Buru who is now in custody in Malaysia. The first assault was against Betalemba village on 27 November 2001. The army and police failed to hold back the mujahidin, who were armed with automatic weapons. Three people were wounded and over 70 houses destroyed. The next day, the mujahidin attacked Patiwunga village, burning some 200 houses. Then they moved on to Tangkura, where they set fire to and destroyed about 300 homes, the village headman's office and a church. In clashes there with Christian forces, Abdullah alias Jet Li was killed.

In three days, combined Muslim forces had taken five towns in a string of "victories" that gave them a sense that Tentena, the major Christian market town in the area and from their perspective, the real prize, was within their grasp. Tentena was home to some 30,000 displaced Christians, and both the diocese of Manado and the Protestant church had appealed to the world for help.

President Megawati's government designated Yusuf Kalla to open peace talks on the Poso conflict.³⁹ These began in Malino, South Sulawesi in December 2001. Many mujahidin from outside Poso, including JI, and some members of KOMPAK including Arismunandar, supported the talks and the accord that followed.⁴⁰ Asep and some local mujahidin, however, saw them as sabotaging their military successes, just as they were getting ready to attack Tentena. (A massive security deployment, however, made it unlikely they would have succeeded even if they had tried.) They were also angry that their demand for prosecution of the sixteen men named as "masterminds" of the May-June 2000 violence was ignored in the final agreement, so they decided to continue to fight, even if on a smaller scale.

Shortly after the Malino agreement was signed, Laskar Jihad, which had also taken part in the fighting, established

a task force in Poso to abolish places of gambling, prostitution and vice. Not to be outdone, KOMPAK and JI set up a similar operation in mid-March 2002, calling it the Choirul Ummah (also seen as Khairul Umah) task force.

In August 2002, the Muslim forces renewed large-scale attacks in Poso. The largest, in which Asep took part, was a joint operation of jihadist groups against the Christian stronghold of Sepe-Silanca on 12 August. The mujahidin associated with KOMPAK also set up religious outreach (*dakwah*) and special forces units. Arismunandar, the KOMPAK-Solo head, took over the first and began recruiting preachers from Java to send to every corner of Poso.

Asep went back to Java around August 2003 and married a graduate of a JI school, al-Islam pesantren in Lamongan, where several Bali bombers taught. He returned to Ambon on 23 April 2005 on KOMPAK orders in anticipation of trouble around 25 April, the RMS anniversary. If trouble had been planned, it was deterred by the security forces' presence, but shortly thereafter he took part in the Loki attack.

The story of Asep's activities since 1999 is revealing on several counts. It shows the importance of Ambon and Poso in motivating thousands of Indonesians to move from theory to practice in waging jihad and turning hundreds into semi-professional fighters. It shows the ease with which men from Java and elsewhere in Indonesia moved between the two conflict areas, and how important Ambon was in producing battle-hardened leaders like Abdullah Jet Li or Asep himself, who could apply their skills in new areas. It also demonstrates the fluidity of organisational boundaries, as JI, KOMPAK, Mujahidin Kayamanya and others combined, disbanded, and regrouped in large alliances, small task forces, hit squads and vice patrols.

Finally, it shows the many overlapping networks into which a single individual can tap. If someone asked Asep for help in recruiting mujahidin, he could point to the study group around Ustadz Mujayin in Jakarta; the men he trained and fought with in Ambon; the KOMPAK network in Solo, Ambon, Makassar, and Poso; Mujahidin Kayamanya in Poso; the Mindanao contacts; and his and his wife's extended families. With mobile telephone and internet communications, one man's network can be vast.

³⁹ Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, then coordinating minister for political and security affairs, also attended the talks, as well as a subsequent round of negotiations for the Maluku conflict.

⁴⁰ In a separate meeting held on 5 December 2001 in Makassar, Muslim delegates led by Agus Dwikarna had formulated a nine-point joint "Statement of the Muslims of Poso in Malino". Most of these points made it into the final agreement. See Crisis Group Report, *Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, op. cit, pp. 14-16.

IV. THE TENTENA BOMBING

Some of the same characters who appear in the Loki and Asep stories reappear as suspects in the Tentena market bombing of 28 May 2005.⁴¹ But in some ways, the complexity of the networks operating in Poso only adds to the mystery of who was responsible for that attack and why no one has yet been charged with planning or carrying it out. Jakarta officials believe it was done by a radical Muslim group or ad hoc alliance of individuals from different groups. Many locals believe it was an effort by local officials, perhaps using ex-mujahidin, to divert attention from a corruption scandal. The investigation has raised interesting associations between criminals and ex-jihadists; it has also highlighted the urgency of re-integrating ex-mujahidin and having a functioning, impartial justice system in Indonesia's conflict areas if further violence is to be avoided.

A. THE BOMBS

The attack on Tentena on 28 May 2005 involved two bombs, detonated fifteen minutes apart. The first exploded in the crowded city marketplace. The second went off beside the local branch office of the Indonesian People's Bank (Bank Rakyat Indonesia, BRI), next to the market. The interval meant that the second bomb killed people who had rushed to the aid of the first victims or had simply come to the market to see what had happened. The attack killed 22 and injured 53, making it the most deadly in Indonesia since the Bali bombings in October 2002.⁴²

The bombing was an indiscriminate attack on civilians but among the dead was a young man named Berni Tungkunan, whose father, Paulus Tungkunan, was one of the sixteen named as "masterminds" of the May 2000 violence and regarded by many Muslims as one of

⁴¹ Located 60 kilometres south of Poso town on the shore of Poso lake, Tentena itself is the main Christian stronghold in Poso district, where the headquarters of the Central Sulawesi Christian Church (GKST) is located. Before the May bomb blasts, Tentena had been largely shielded from the violence of the Poso conflict by virtue of its location. (To reach Tentena from Poso town, one passes through many Christian villages.)

⁴² A partial list of victims of the Tentena bombs includes: Andreas Pontali (two-year-old infant), Marlin Papaya (f), Suyati Monanggu (f), Deni Doelelia (m), Fattira Pilohima (f), Rosdian Tojambu (f), Yoseph Rantelimba (m), Riman Rajantonda (m), Marice Tumbuapu (f), Timparoso Nggau (f), Enteng Pindonga (m), Natali Ntoy (f), Anis (m), Berni Tungkunan (m), Alengki (m), Sukiem (f), Ari Ru'us (m), and Rame Momua (m). *Bom Tentena.....*, Posting on POSO-NEWS Mailing List, 29 May 2005.

the driving forces behind it.⁴³ Although the son's death appears coincidental, the timing of the bomb, on the fifth anniversary of the Walisongo Massacre, almost certainly was not.

The death toll from the two bombs ensured that the police investigation would be under national and international scrutiny. President Yudhoyono, in Vietnam at the time, immediately condemned the attack, while Vice President Jusuf Kalla set police a seven-day deadline to arrest the perpetrators.⁴⁴ Although police swiftly made a series of arrests and at one point had eighteen suspects in custody, then Central Sulawesi Police Chief Brigadier General Aryanto Sutadi told Crisis Group in mid-August that they were holding no "significant suspects".⁴⁵ Four men initially declared suspects remained in detention, but on charges unrelated to the bombing; all others had been released.⁴⁶

B. THEORIES ABOUT THE BOMBERS

The two most prevalent theories are that either radical Muslims or corrupt local officials were responsible, although there is little hard evidence, at least in the public domain, to back either.

1. Radical Islam

The idea that violent jihadists were responsible was logical given the target, a market in the main Christian town of a district that had been wracked by Christian-Muslim conflict; the timing, on the anniversary of the Walisongo massacre; and the fact that many local Muslim militias knew how to make bombs and had a history of using them.

But several sources pointed out that the Tentena bombs were clearly designed to kill, unlike many others in the area attributed to local militias that seemed more aimed at getting attention or intimidating without killing (the exception was the November 2004 bomb in Poso's Central Market that killed six and which also remains unsolved.)⁴⁷ A local NGO activist told Crisis Group that it was difficult to understand what interest local radical

⁴³ Paulus Tungkunan was arrested briefly in May 2004 for weapons possession but never tried. "Berny Tungkunan Korban Ledakan Bom di Tentena", *Radar Sulteng*, 1 June 2005.

⁴⁴ "Saya Sangat Marah dan Sedih", *Kompas*, 30 May 2005, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Crisis Group interview with Central Sulawesi Police Chief Brigadier General Aryanto Sutadi, 18 August 2005.

⁴⁶ "Pengungkapan Bom Tentena, Jauh Panggang dari Api", *Suara Pembaruan*, 17 July 2005.

⁴⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, Palu, May-August 2005. No more than one person was killed in any of the ten other violent incidents involving fatalities between January 2004 and September 2005.

Muslims would have had in bombing Tentena market. The situation in Poso was calm, he said, and several militant groups had been building bridges with the Christian community. As in Maluku, however, local and outside groups have worked together, and the likelihood remains that a Loki-like network placed the bombs.

That network in theory could have drawn on any of three local groups, all of which have been involved in post-conflict violence. One was Mujahidin Kayamanya, whose members took part in the Loki attack. A second was Bulan Sabit Merah (Red Crescent, BSM), a front set up in Poso in 2000 by the Darul Islam offshoot responsible in part for the Australian embassy bombing. Its members were involved in the Mamasa violence, and BSM was at one point rumoured to have played a role in Tentena, although no facts emerged to confirm this. The third was Anak Tanah Runtuh (ATR), named for the Tanah Runtuh neighbourhood of Poso where it is based. Its members look for leadership to Adnan Aرسال, a civil servant and religious teacher who worked closely in the past with JI; his son-in-law, Hasanuddin, ran the local JI subdivision in Poso, at least through 2003.

During 2005, however, Aرسال had participated in a series of meetings with Christian figures including Rev. Rinaldy Damanik, the head of the Central Sulawesi Christian Church synod, who has arguably become the most prominent figure in Poso's Christian community since the conflict began.⁴⁸ Damanik and Aرسال are members of an inter-faith group of religious leaders, the Poso Humanitarian Alliance (AKP), and they met the day after the bombing to jointly condemn it.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ In June 2003 Damanik was sentenced to three years in prison after homemade firearms were found in a vehicle in which he was a passenger in August 2002. He was released in November 2004.

⁴⁹ Aرسال's relation with Damanik was rumoured to have soured after a local election in Poso district in June 2005 that a Christian candidate won. Rumours circulated that Damanik had secretly supported the winner, despite assuring Aرسال that he would allow a Muslim candidate to win, but there is little evidence of either the support or the alleged assurances. The caretaker bupati, Andi Asikin Suyuti, designated AKP to manage the Rp. 3 billion (\$300,000) donated by the Manokwari government to the Poso government. Although the money had not been received as of early September 2005, AKP has maintained close communication to prepare for its use in assisting the construction of places of worship and providing economic empowerment to former combatants. Several months earlier, when a polemic emerged over whether Suyuti's term as caretaker should be extended due to allegations of corruption, AKP members came to Jakarta to argue in his favour. Crisis Group phone interview with Rev. Damanik and member of GKST Crisis Centre, September 2005; "Manokwari Bantu Rakyat Miskin Poso Miliaran Rupiah", *Poso Post*, 12-20 August 2005.

Individual ATR members, however, reportedly were involved in violence in late 2004 and early 2005 in coalition with members of other groups; the interest of Adnan Aرسال in religious dialogue does not preclude less benign activity on the part of his followers. Krisno alias Ion, an ATR member, for example, was one of 42 men arrested in Mamasa, West Sulawesi after violence there in October 2004.⁵⁰

Another Tanah Runtuh member, Andi Ipong, was suspected of a long string of crimes but served time for only one.⁵¹ He completed a two-and-a-half-year sentence for armed robbery in early 2005.⁵² He is now wanted for another robbery, this time of the payroll at the Poso District Head's office in April 2005, in which Rp. 583 million (\$58,000) was stolen.⁵³ Ipong was not directly involved in the robbery but he received a share of the funds, which he used to help pay for his wedding.⁵⁴ Police made a well-publicised attempt to arrest him in the Poso suburb of Kasintuwu on 2 July 2005, but he escaped.⁵⁵ Adnan Aرسال provided him with an alibi in a statement to the local media, saying Ipong had been with him in a mosque at the time of the robbery and had been participating in Muslim educational activities, not violence, since release from prison.⁵⁶

A month after Ipong eluded police, a former ATR member, Budiyanto, who had been helping police track Ipong's whereabouts, was shot dead while eating out with his wife in Gebangrejo, near Tanah Runtuh, on 3 August.⁵⁷ Early the following morning, near the site of Budiyanto's murder, a second Muslim man, Sugito, was shot dead as he walked to a mosque for the pre-dawn prayer. Because most victims of so-called "mysterious shootings" since the Malino Accord have been Christian, and the reaction to the shootings was muted, many concluded this was an inside job. The Chief of Central Sulawesi Police Brigadier General Aryanto Sutadi, announced that the two men

⁵⁰ See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°37, *Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa Case*, 3 May 2005.

⁵¹ For a list of some of Ipong's other alleged offences, see Crisis Group Report, *Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, op. cit., p. 19.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ A man called Tukiran is on trial for this case. Crisis Group phone interview with Poso Police chief, August 2005.

⁵⁴ Crisis Group interviews, September 2005.

⁵⁵ See for example, "Polisi Memburu Tersangka Kekerasan di Poso", *liputan6.com*, 2 July 2005. Some media reports of the attempt to arrest Ipong erroneously named Ipong as a suspect in the murder of Palu prosecutor Ferry Silalahi and Palu priest Susianti Tinulele.

⁵⁶ "Jamin bukan pelakunya", *Radar Sulteng*, 4 July 2005, p. 9. This alibi may well have been genuine, given that Ipong was not directly involved in the robbery.

⁵⁷ Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta and Palu, August 2005.

appeared to have been shot because they had helped the police on other recent Poso violence.

2. Corruption

A group of local NGO activists and community leaders concluded that the Tentena bombing was organised by certain local officials to disrupt the ongoing investigation into corruption in Poso and protect powerful individuals from prosecution.⁵⁸ The theory was that the bombing would monopolise investigative resources and might also result in the removal of provincial Police Chief Aryanto Sutadi, who had been leading an investigation into the misappropriation of a significant portion of just over \$200,000 in humanitarian assistance allocated for distribution to the displaced in Poso.⁵⁹ To many outside Poso, the theory seemed improbable -- why would corruptors launch a lethal, indiscriminate attack on civilians rather than a targeted attack on individuals with damaging information about them? But for some locals, earlier corruption-related violence supported such a conclusion.

On 4 November 2004, Carminelis Ndele, the village chief of Pinedapa village in Poso Pesisir subdistrict, was found murdered. His head was dumped in the Poso suburb of Sayo, while his mutilated body was found in Poso Pesisir, a few kilometres from his house. Ndele had been one of thirteen village heads who received a proportion of Rp. 2.2 billion (\$220,000) in assistance funds for displaced villagers between August and September 2004. Much of this money was embezzled by a team from the district government's Social Affairs Office that had been set up to

disburse it.⁶⁰ Two members of the team had visited Ndele the day he received his village's allocation of Rp. 75 million (\$7,500). A man resembling one of them, Ahmad Laparigi, also picked Ndele up from his house on the evening he was murdered.⁶¹ On 8 November, police arrested Laparigi under the anti-terror law -- now applied to most violence in Poso and Maluku -- but subsequently charged him only with corruption.⁶²

Another incident linking corruption and violence was the 28 April 2005 detonation of small bombs in front of the offices of two non-governmental organisations in Poso, causing minor damage to the buildings. The targeted NGOs, Lembaga Penguatan Masyarakat Sipil (Institute for the Strengthening of Civil Society, LPMS) and Pusat Rekonsiliasi Konflik dan Perdamaian Poso (Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace in Poso, PRKP), had been campaigning against corruption in Poso, including demands to investigate the then caretaker, *bupati* (district head) Andi Asikin Suyuti, who is also head of the provincial Social Office. In late September 2005, police arrested Mad (short for Ahmad) Haji Sun, also seen as Akhmat Sum and Ali Maksum, in connection with the bombing.⁶³

⁵⁸ The testimony in police interrogation depositions of two men put on trial, Ahmad Laparigi and the head of the Poso social office, Anwar Ali, mentioned several important district and province-level officials. Ali claimed that he had given Rp. 605 million (\$60,500) earmarked for the internally displaced to Joko, the National Intelligence Agency's (BIN) representative in Central Sulawesi, and Raden Badri, former head of the Poso District Prosecutor's office. Laparigi claimed that Abdul Kadir Sidik, the civil servant assigned to the distribution team, had told him that around Rp. 1 billion (\$100,000) would be siphoned off and that he had seen notes specifying amounts between Rp. 30 million (\$3,000) and Rp. 100 million (\$10,000) that would be paid to the head of Poso District Prosecutor's office, the chief and deputy chief of Poso Police, the Poso district head, the head of the Detective Unit of Poso Police, the Poso district secretary, a member of Poso Police and himself.

⁵⁹ There is a precedent of sorts. Deddy Woerjantono, then police chief of Poso, was removed in 2000 after the second riot in the city, when Poso police were investigating corruption of an agricultural credit program known as KUT (Kredit Usaha Tani). Coincidentally, Sutadi was subsequently rotated to a new post four months after the bombing, when he was appointed head of the Narcotics Division at police headquarters in September 2005.

⁶⁰ The team disbursed funds to village heads, who were then meant to pay them to the eligible families in their village. Four members of the distribution team have been found guilty of corruption, along with the head of the Poso District Social Office.

⁶¹ Laporan Polisi No. Pol: LP / 354 / XI / Res Poso, 8 November 2004. Laparigi (53), a fish trader, admitted that he and Abdul Kadir Sidik had gone to Pinedapa after Ndele received the money to check whether he still had it. Testimony of Ahmad Alimun Laparigi in dossier of Andi Makassar and Ahmad Alimun Laparigi, 9 November 2004.

⁶² On the same day, another member of the team, Andi Makassar, was also arrested under the anti-terror law, reportedly on suspicion of involvement in a shooting outside Poso's Bethani church in October 2004. Like Laparigi, he has been charged only with corruption. Makassar, however, is known to have made small donations often to local mujahidin, less than Rp. 1 million (\$100) at a time. Crisis Group interviews, June 2005.

⁶³ "Pelaku Bom Poso Ditangkap", *Koran Tempo*, 26 September 2005; "Wanted man in Poso attacks captured", *Jakarta Post*, 26 September 2005, p. 4. Mad's position had already begun to unravel two weeks earlier when he was sentenced in two cases -- one narcotics, the other terrorism -- on the same day. In the narcotics possession case, the Palu District Court sentenced him to six months imprisonment. After sentencing in that case, he was acquitted of the more serious charge of threatening violence to provoke fear under the Anti-Terror Law, but was sentenced to four months imprisonment on the lesser charge of "hurtful actions" under the Criminal Code. This charge was for sending threatening SMS messages to the Palu branch of Bank Mandiri, where Mad had a credit problem. See "Sehari, Ahmad H Ali Divonis Dua kali", *Radarsulawesi*, 6 September 2005; "Tersangka

A building contractor and former head of the Poso branch of Pemuda Pancasila -- an organisation that during the Soeharto years developed a reputation as a goon squad linked to the ruling Golkar party -- Mad offers another example of how complex the networks behind violence can be. Perceived as close to the acting district head, Suyuti, and other local officials, in part through previous positions in both Pemuda Pancasila and Golkar, he also has known ties to jihadist groups in Poso and beyond.⁶⁴ He is believed to have helped Arismunandar of KOMPAK sell cacao beans at the height of the conflict and was reportedly close as well to Agung Hamid, the Laskar Jundullah head sentenced to life imprisonment in August 2005 for his role in the Makassar bombings of December 2003.⁶⁵ He was also frequently seen in Poso with Ipong after the latter's release from prison and is believed to have helped him escape to Java.⁶⁶ Mad's contacts seemingly made him an ideal intermediary between local officials and those with access to bombs.

Mad Haji Sun, Laparigi and Makassau, however, are not suspected of involvement with the Tentena bombs. Two other men implicated in corruption were quickly arrested in connection with Tentena, reinforcing beliefs that a link with corruption would emerge, but neither is now a suspect. The first, Abdul Kadir Sidik, was a provincial civil servant seconded to the District Social Office disbursement team. At the time of the Tentena bombs, he was on trial for his role in the distribution of funds and should have been in prison.⁶⁷ Instead, police arrested him on the road back to Poso from the coastal town of Ampana, along with his friend Ismet, who works at the Poso Health

Office. Ismet is mentioned in interrogation dossiers as receiving a small portion of the embezzled money, and local activists claimed he had actively mobilised opposition to their anti-corruption drive.⁶⁸ He was soon released. Sidik has since been sentenced for corruption.

C. THE SUSPECTS

The men arrested after the bombing fall broadly into three groups:⁶⁹

The Poso prison suspects. Police announced in June that there was forensic evidence linking two men connected to the Poso prison with the Tentena bombs: Hasman, the head of the prison, and Abdul Kadir Sidik. According to the police, TNT powder was found in Sidik's car and on Hasman's shoes. Hasman was arrested with two prisoners, Suratman and Jufri, and a woman, Tanri Firna, at a police checkpoint on the road to Palu on 29 May. Sidik, who should have been behind bars on a pending corruption charge, was arrested in Tumbiano village, Tojo Una-Una district. But no one in this group was ultimately charged with the bombing. Hasman has been charged only with possession of an unregistered firearm and other weapons, while Suratman and Jufri were accused of violating their detention. Abdul Kadir Sidik remains in prison after being sentenced on corruption charges.⁷⁰

The Pandanjaya suspects. Police arrested ten men in Pandanjaya, near Pendolo, south of Tentena near the border with South Sulawesi, in early June. They said the arrests were based on information the men had been involved in violence about six weeks earlier in Mamasa, West Sulawesi, not far from Poso, in which five people were killed. Perhaps because of the closeness in time and space between the Mamasa and Tentena incidents, because some detainees had acknowledged links to other bombings, and because Pandanjaya (also seen as Pandajaya) and nearby Pendolo had been training and operations centres for several jihadist groups, there was initial speculation that the ten detainees might have links to the Tentena bombing. However, no conclusive evidence

Teror Bom di Bank Mandiri Ditangkap", *detik.com*, 21 June 2004; "Divonis Juli, Olky Belum Dieksekusi", *Radar Sulteng*, 24 August 2005, pp. 6-7.

⁶⁴ Mad was also a member of the Aliansi Kemanusiaan Poso (Poso Humanitarian Alliance, AKP), members of which came to Jakarta in May to argue for Suyuti's term to be extended. At the same time, some NGO activists came to Jakarta to report Suyuti's alleged involvement to the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK).

⁶⁵ After Mad was himself arrested in September 2005, outgoing Central Sulawesi Police Chief Aryanto Sutadi stated that he had previously been questioned regarding Hamid, after an SMS from Hamid was found on his cellular phone. Crisis Group interviews. On the latter point, see "Pelaku Bom Poso Ditangkap", *Koran Tempo*, 26 September 2005.

⁶⁶ He also has links to members of Mujahidin Kayamanya.

⁶⁷ His absence from prison is not in itself suspicious. Prisoners are known to enter into illicit arrangements with prison officials to be able to come and go with relative freedom, and Sidik had allegedly been spotted outside prison on several previous occasions. Media reports also stated Sidik had been granted a temporary suspension of detention not long before the Tentena bomb but had failed to return when it expired. On the latter point, see "Menguat, Indikasi LP Poso Dijadikan Tempat Persiapan Peledakan Bom", *Kompas*, 4 June 2005.

⁶⁸ To Crisis Group's knowledge, Ismet is not under investigation for corruption. Crisis Group interview with Central Sulawesi NGO activists, June 2005.

⁶⁹ Two army special forces (Kopassus) members were also arrested immediately after the Tentena bombing. Indonesian police are not allowed by law to question military personnel, and they were quickly released.

⁷⁰ When he was briefly made a suspect for the Tentena bombs, he brought a pre-trial petition alleging unlawful arrest (*praperadilan*) against the Poso and Central Sulawesi Police Chiefs, but the Poso court rejected it on 23 June. "Pra-peradilan Kadir Ditolak", *Radar Sulteng*, 24 June 2005, p. 8; "Polda dan Polres dipraperadilan", *Radar Sulteng*, 11 June 2005, p. 10.

has emerged.⁷¹ A local NGO, LPS-HAM, initiated unlawful arrest petitions on behalf of four of them after they had been released. The Poso court declared that the arrest of two, Jumari and Mastur Saputra, had been unlawful and granted them compensation. It found against the other two.⁷²

The Dolong suspects. Two men from Dolong, in the Togian Islands off the coast of Central Sulawesi east of Poso were initially named as suspects in the Tentena bombing, Erwin Mardani, alias Jodi and Muhamad Safri Dekuna known as Andu or Andreas. Erwin was one of the Mujahidin Kayamanya members involved in the Loki attack and wounded by Brimob fire. He is married to a woman from Tasikmalaya, West Java, a marriage arranged by Asep alias Dahlan's friend and fellow Ambon fighter, Abdullah Sonata. He had been in prison in Palu on suspicion of hiding a suspect in the 2004 murder of a Palu prosecutor and was only released in March 2005.⁷³ Police suspect he placed the bomb in Tentena market, although after he was wounded in the Loki attack, it would have been difficult, but not impossible, for him to reach Tentena in time to do this on 28 May, given that he is believed to have fled Ambon by ship to North Sulawesi only on 25 May. But in any case, he remains at large.

Andu was a fellow member of Mujahidin Kayamana from the same village as Erwin, who like him had received military training on the STAIN campus in Ambon in 2001. Police named him as a suspect in the Tentena bombing, apparently based more on his past association with jihadist groups than any hard evidence.⁷⁴ It is believed he had been living on Dolong for at least a year before his arrest.⁷⁵ Upon learning that he was wanted by police, Andu initially fled but turned himself in to the police station in Wakai, which covers Dolong, on 4 June 2005 after being given guarantees he would not be ill-treated.⁷⁶ But after a week in custody, he was so badly beaten that he required hospital treatment in Poso and Makassar. He was released on 20 June without charge.⁷⁷

Police thus came up empty-handed on all of their initial suspects. Publicly, their investigation is focused on Erwin Mardani and a man known by his initials, "AT", whom they suspect placed the bombs in Tentena. AT is Aat, formerly a mujahidin from Bonesompe (a suburb of Poso). The grounds for suspicion are not clear, and the question of who bombed Tentena remains a mystery.

⁷¹ Phone interview with Poso Police Chief AKBP Soleh Hidayat, 25 April 2005. In the immediate aftermath of the Mamasa violence, three men had been arrested in Pandanjaya -- Saifulloh, Sucipto and Suryadi -- and a fourth, Amiruddin, in Mamasa. Amiruddin was from Poso, while Saifulloh was reportedly a KOMPAK member from West Java. Sucipto was from Ponorogo, East Java, and Suryadi was from Pandanjaya. Saifulloh was taken to Yogyakarta as a suspect in two bombings there in 2000, and told Yogyakarta police that in 2001, he had made 50 bombs for a man named Ahmad Yani. The latter was then arrested in Pandanjaya in June 2005, but has since been released. Crisis Group interview with Chief of Central Sulawesi Police, Brigadier General Aryanto Sutadi, 18 August 2005; phone interview with Poso Police Chief, AKBP Soleh Hidayat, 25 August 2005. South Sulawesi police submitted case files for Amiruddin and Sucipto to prosecutors in Polewali, West Sulawesi, in June for their alleged role in the April Mamasa violence. Two other men, Dandong and Tating, are also charged with involvement in Mamasa. See "BAP Tersangka Dilimpahkan ke Kejari", *Fajar Online*, 30 June 2005.

⁷² "Dua Dikabulkan, Dua Ditolak", *Radar Sulteng*, 15 July 2005, p. 9; Crisis Group phone interview, October 2005.

⁷³ Erwin was arrested on 21 August 2004 and charged with hiding Sofyan Djumpai, another Mujahidin Kayamanya member, who at the time was wanted for the murder of Central Sulawesi prosecutor Ferry Silalahi (Verdict No. 01/Pid.B/2005/PN.Palu in case of Erwin Mardani alias Jodi alias Wiwin, 30 March 2005). Erwin was also charged with possession of a pistol. As of August 2005, the case had proceeded to appeal at the Supreme Court, after Erwin was acquitted in the Palu District Court and Central Sulawesi High Court.

⁷⁴ In October 2001, he was one of 32 men arrested in Mapane, Poso Pesisir, in the infamous Mapane incident, where Brimob troops arrested a number of mujahidin, beat and humiliated them, and shot one man dead at the scene. The Palu district court then declared the imprisonment of 27 of the men, including Andu, unlawful and ordered police to pay Rp. 200,000 (\$20) to each. "Tuntutan Pra Peradilan Dikabulkan, Tahanan Tragedi Mapane Dibebaskan", *Bel@* (Berita Laskar Jihad), 12 December 2001.

⁷⁵ Crisis Group phone interview with Poso man, June 2005.

⁷⁶ Crisis Group interviews, August 2005. "Tersangka Kasus Peledakan Bom Serahkan Diri", *Republika*, 5 June 2005.

⁷⁷ His release from police custody was dated 20 June 2005 but he was only able to return home on 22 June, when he was discharged from Poso hospital. "Polres Poso Lepas Andreas: Tak Terlibat Bom Tentena", *Radar Sulteng*, 24 June 2005, pp. 1, 15.

V. JUSTICE, REINTEGRATION AND NETWORKS

The personal networks, born of shared experience in Poso and Maluku, are incubators for jihadist operations in Indonesia, and there is no question the country would be safer if they could be weakened or the energies of their members diverted to more constructive goals. There is no silver bullet for doing so, but there are ways to start the process. One is through better law enforcement. The other is through renewed attention to the reintegration of fighters who perhaps have come to see conflict as a way of life.

A. JUSTICE AND SECURITY

Any response to the activities of networks is complicated by the culture of impunity that prevailed in both Poso and Maluku from 1999 to 2003 and to some extent continues to this day. With a few notable exceptions, the perpetrators of violence in these areas were either not identified, went unpunished or received only light sentences and were quickly released. The consequences have been clear: individuals who received light sentences or questionable acquittals for violent acts often have gone on to commit further violence, in the knowledge that if caught, their punishment was unlikely to be severe.

In both conflict areas, the justice system broke down during the period of most intense fighting and has never entirely recovered for several reasons:

- Police practices, particularly wrongful arrests and beating suspects during interrogation, have alienated the community, leading to popular support for demonstrations against the police on behalf of detainees, occasionally resulting in their release. In Poso, the Muslim organisation Forum Silaturahmi dan Perjuangan Umat Islam (Islamic Community Struggle and Social Forum, FSPUI) led demonstrations on 8 and 10 June 2005 demanding the release of several suspects held by police and the investigation of unsolved cases.⁷⁸ At the second demonstration, police released three men and justified this by saying the period of detention without charge under the anti-terror law had expired.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ The cases were the November 2004 Poso market bomb, the July 2001 Buyung Katedo murder of fourteen Muslims, and the May 2000 Walisongo massacre. The latter two are among the symbols of injustice most frequently raised by Muslims in Poso.

⁷⁹ The three men released were Abdul Rauf, Jemari and Buchari. "Warga Poso Demo Lagi, Tiga Tahanan Dilepas", *Radar Sulteng*, 11 June 2005.

- In the past, general insecurity and the communities' perceived need for defence meant that individuals who committed violence against the other side were often seen as heroes, hampering investigations. Police in Maluku, for example, acknowledged that only since 2003 have they been able to conduct searches in certain neighbourhoods, and even then they have had to "zig-zag" from a Christian neighbourhood one day to a Muslim the next, to give the impression of balance.⁸⁰
- Agents of the law -- police, prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges -- have been subjected to intimidation or worse. Ferry Silalahi, a prosecutor handling several conflict and terrorism cases, was shot dead in Palu in May 2004.⁸¹ Cases relating to the Poso conflict were often tried in the provincial capital, Palu, because trials would not be secure in Poso.⁸²
- Mutual mistrust often characterises relations among police, prosecutors and judges in conflict areas. Senior police in both Central Sulawesi and Maluku would prefer outside prosecutors to handle conflict cases, or even for cases to be tried in Jakarta, in part because they believe locals may make deals with defendants or be intimidated.⁸³ In April 2005, the director of the Central Sulawesi Criminal Detective Unit, Senior Commissioner Tatang Somantri, complained to the press that judges in the Palu District Court were giving light sentences in cases tried under the anti-terror law.⁸⁴ The judges have called for the police to be more professional in developing cases.⁸⁵

Some of these problems are more easily addressed than others.

⁸⁰ Crisis Group interview with senior police officer, Maluku, July 2005.

⁸¹ Sofyan Djumpai alias Pian was acquitted of his murder in March 2005 but the case is still under appeal. Two other Mujahidin Kayamanya members, Hence Said and Farid Podunge, are now being held by Central Sulawesi police after they were arrested in July 2005 in Yogyakarta.

⁸² Even there, the trial of three Christian men sentenced to death was conducted in the face of large demonstrations, and the vehicle bringing defendants to court was pelted by the crowd.

⁸³ Crisis Group interviews, Ambon and Central Sulawesi, July - August 2005.

⁸⁴ In several of these cases, defendants were found not guilty under the Anti-Terror Law but convicted of lesser charges under the Criminal Code.

⁸⁵ "Kasus Terorisme di Sulawesi Tengah Divonis Ringan", *Koran Tempo*, 26 April 2005. Crisis Group interviews, Palu, August 2005.

1. Improving police-community relations

Although the success of criminal prosecutions depends on the work of prosecutors and judges as well as the police, the latter have the most direct contact with the community. Prosecutions will continue to be hampered as long as police-community relations remain poor. The problems are of long standing, not entirely of current incumbents' making, but there are several steps police at both local and national levels could take to improve them.

Ill-treatment of suspects after arrest is routine, often involving severe beatings. This is counterproductive and also illegal under the criminal procedure code, not to mention being a violation of the International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which Indonesia has ratified. Better treatment of suspects would help reduce local anger at arrests and might increase community willingness to assist police with their investigations.

Police need to discipline officers who abuse suspects, fail to make arrests because of communal sympathies, or are themselves involved in violence. A clear example of failed discipline is Bripda (Constable) Syarif Tarabubun, who remained a member of Ambon police despite being caught on camera in 2003 withdrawing money from the account of a recently murdered man.⁸⁶ He is now wanted for the 15 February 2005 shooting attack on a karaoke bar in Hative Besar village, Ambon, in which two people were killed.⁸⁷

Several steps would improve internal discipline. The first is to develop a fully-fledged internal affairs division within the National Police with its own investigative authority and capacity, rather than the provost section that exists now, so serious investigations into police wrongdoing could be carried out without fear of being obstructed by professional solidarity. The second would be to do away with the authority of police commanders to decide on what to do or not do with complaints about their subordinates and leave this to an impartial body. The third would be to establish a clear procedure for public complaints. In addition, police suspected of crimes under the Criminal

Code should more often stand trial in regular courts. At present, they often simply face disciplinary proceedings before either a disciplinary board, under the police professional code, or, less frequently, an ethics commission, under the police ethics code. These boards can punish officers, but by treating criminal offences as internal discipline problems, they may function to protect officers from criminal investigation.

Supporters of detainees are often able to control the spin in the media, and police find themselves reacting to accusations that they have arrested "activists" rather than individuals against whom there is strong prima facie evidence of involvement in violence. More effort to reach out to the community and explain the rationale for actions would help. In one instance when residents of Batumerah, Ambon, initially blocked an arrest, police took a local official and youth leader to confirm with individuals already in custody that the suspect was indeed involved, after which they were able to make the arrest without further opposition.⁸⁸

Police relations with the community may also benefit from an extension to Poso and Ambon of pilot projects in community policing that have been successful elsewhere.⁸⁹

2. Dealing with the past

In both Maluku and Poso, a sense of injustice, combined with a desire for retaliation, fuels some of the violence, particularly on the part of local participants, and there is no question that many killings, arson attacks and land grabs remain uninvestigated and uncompensated. Realistically, most of these cases will never be prosecuted. Even serious fact-finding via a truth commission is unlikely soon, in part for fear of disrupting the fragile local peace. A National Independent Investigative Team for Maluku was established by Presidential Decree in June 2002, mandated among other things to investigate the beginnings of the conflict in 1999. More than three years later, its findings have not been made public.

In the aftermath of Loki, when new information on numerous unsolved cases came to light, Maluku police decided to apply an informal policy of not investigating cases that occurred before 2003, on the grounds that it might worsen the situation by stirring up old enmities.

⁸⁶ Tarabubun is a member of the district-level police command for Ambon and the Lease Islands. He is the brother-in-law of the man convicted of abducting and murdering Fauzi Hasby, Edy Putra and Ahmad Saridup in February 2003 in Ambon and reportedly took part in the abduction. He was tried but acquitted, despite the evidence of his withdrawing funds from an ATM machine using Edy Putra's card. Crisis Group interview, Jakarta, June 2005. "Satu Demi Satu Teroris di Maluku Ditangkap", *radiovoxpopuli.com*, 21 May 2005.

⁸⁷ Another policeman, Ismael Yamsehu, was arrested for his involvement in this attack, fired from the police force, and faces trial in a civilian court.

⁸⁸ Crisis Group interviews, Ambon, July 2005.

⁸⁹ For instance, Partnership has supported pilot projects in West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and Jakarta Metropolitan Police. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has supported projects in West Java, West Kalimantan and East Java; the Asia Foundation a project in Yogyakarta; and the Japanese government a project in Bekasi, on the eastern outskirts of Jakarta.

This was probably the only feasible approach under the circumstances, although any cut-off date would be seen as arbitrary in some quarters. But if the aim is to stop violence, the local police are going to have to give priority to more recent crimes, and going back two years would at least ensure that many men in the network uncovered by the Loki investigation were prosecuted. The 2003 cut-off will mean that some will not be sentenced as severely as they might have been. For example, Ongen Pattimura, arrested after Loki, had previously been sought by police for an April 2002 bombing in Ambon that killed four people and wounded more than 50.⁹⁰ None of the subsequent crimes in which he is now believed to have been involved caused as many casualties but he may never have to face charges in that case.

After the Tentena bombs, some local groups have called for the establishment of a Joint Fact-Finding Team to be included in a forthcoming presidential decree expected to address security issues in Poso, but local opinion is divided over its merits. Some are worried that the flaws of the Maluku model would just be repeated. In that case, the decree setting up the fact-finding team required its members to investigate a dauntingly large set of issues and did not specify an end date for the team's work or a date for their report to be made public. It did not specify how the findings would be used or provide administrative staff or a definite budget. A Poso fact-finding process would have to be based on local consensus about the mandate, which would be difficult, and it would not likely provide an early resolution to the sense of injustice that fuels the violence.

3. Giving a sense of security

As noted, the general climate of insecurity turned some perpetrators of violence into local heroes, because they were seen as providing justice or protection that the local security forces could not or would not offer. The overall situation in Maluku and Poso has now improved through a combination of large police and military deployments, the passage of time, and local reconciliation efforts. Many of the additional troops have been stationed at checkpoints on the borders between villages. Their presence has helped prevent open conflict but has been less successful in preventing bombings, hit-and-run attacks by small groups, and the arrival in certain villages of known trouble-makers.

Three measures might help address the lingering sense of insecurity and weaken the networks at the same time: better control over access to firearms and explosive

materials; better coordination between intelligence agencies to prevent attacks; and serious punishments for serious crimes.

No one knows how many "standard" -- that is, not homemade -- firearms are in private hands or hidden away in Poso and Maluku. The weapons cache found at the STAIN school in Ambon is almost certainly one of many. Police sweeps designed to find and confiscate guns, bombs and ammunition, however, have had only very limited success. If weapons cannot be recovered by intelligence work, an amnesty period or guns buy-back scheme may be worth considering, but only if linked to a broader recovery process and properly thought through.⁹¹ Central Sulawesi police offered Rp. 5 million (\$500) in December 2004 to anyone who handed in a standard firearm but that was less than what could have been received on the black market.⁹² At the same time, there is no point in a buy-back program if the supply of weapons from Mindanao or corrupt security forces continues unabated. Indeed, if the price offered were high enough, those turning in weapons could keep a flourishing arms trade going by buying low in the Philippines or elsewhere and selling at a mark-up to the police.

Intelligence coordination and analysis remains a problem, with each new attack prompting announcement of new bureaucratic solutions. For example, the government described plans to revive intelligence coordination desks at the local level after the Tentena attack, just as after the September 2004 Australian embassy bomb, it proclaimed creation of a task force to coordinate the anti-terror response of law enforcement and intelligence agencies.⁹³ The anticipated presidential decree on Poso is also expected to address intelligence coordination. But rather than ad hoc measures, it might be better to undertake a systematic analysis of why intelligence failed in these cases, with a view toward identifying effective solutions. On the substantive side, understanding the nature of ad hoc networks of mujahidin and how they work -- and getting that information to local police around the country -- could be critical to preventing future attacks. On the administrative side, an assessment of where and how coordination fell short could lead to recommendations that might then be fed into a draft intelligence law now

⁹⁰ The bomb, on Jl Yan Pays on 3 April 2002, occurred shortly before the arson attack on the governor's office. See "Berbagai Peristiwa Pasca Malino II", *Suara Pembaruan*, 9 September 2002.

⁹¹ For one suggestion of how disarmament might be attempted in Maluku and Poso, see Arianto Sangaji, "Peredaran Ilegal Senjata Api di Sulawesi Tengah", Position paper no. 4, YTM and LPMS, Palu, 2005, p. 26.

⁹² "Polda Sulteng Periksa 25 Saksi Bom Poso", *tempointeraktif*, 3 December 2004.

⁹³ The task force was never formed and would have duplicated the role that the Anti-Terror Body in the Coordinating Ministry of Political and Security Affairs is intended to play. See Crisis Group Asia Report N°90, *Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy*, 20 December 2004, p. 7.

under consideration in the parliament -- and more broadly into a much-needed strategic review of national security.⁹⁴

A third step that would directly weaken networks and improve security would be to treat offences in conflict areas as least as seriously as crimes committed elsewhere. Light sentences and questionable acquittals mean that members of networks perpetrating violence are quickly released, whereupon they go on to commit new crimes. Erwin Mardani, who was acquitted in March 2005, became involved in the Loki attack in Ceram only two months after being released from prison in Palu.⁹⁵ In Poso, Andi Ipong is wanted for an armed robbery committed in March 2005, only months after he completed a sentence for an earlier robbery.

B. DISMANTLING NETWORKS

A second strategy would be to engage directly with local veterans of the Poso and Maluku violence and develop a program to reintegrate them into civilian life. Such a program might initially be based in the conflict areas themselves, building on the success that some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in both areas have had in working with ex-combatants. This obviously would not reach network members based elsewhere but if the local links were weakened, the potential of the network as a whole to do damage would be reduced.

Three factors in particular make a reintegration program attractive:

- for the program to work (and to be acceptable locally), it would need to be available to both Muslim and Christian ex-combatants. This might assist conflict recovery more generally;
- because local ex-combatants in particular are less likely to be motivated by rigid ideological precepts, they may be drawn by the prospect of economic opportunities; and
- the arrests and short sentences that many who have stood trial for violence have received have produced a group of readily identifiable individuals around whom a program could be built.

It is worth trying to provide at least some of these individuals with genuine alternatives to violence. One possibility would be to combine a reintegration project

with the "assimilation" program of the Indonesian prison system. Assimilation involves the daytime release of prisoners who have served at least half their sentence into the custody of a member of the community. Prisoners can thus work, in theory but not always in practice, under close supervision and gradually prepare to resume their lives in society. The aim would be to ensure that ex-combatants were released into the custody of someone who was not a sympathiser with the violence.

For such a program to succeed, several factors need to be considered:

- training must be matched with needs that prisoners themselves identify and with the local job market. Many Muslim fighters earn their living by petty trade, which has the advantages of requiring low capital while offering high mobility and independence. The short sentences that many arrested in conflict areas have received means they are likely to be able to resume their old occupations easily when released, since they are not imprisoned long enough to lose their skills or contacts.⁹⁶ For these men, any alternative would have to be at least as attractive as their former trade;
- it should be non-governmental, because prospective participants may otherwise opt out, seeing the program as being run by the same system that imprisoned them.⁹⁷ Close attention would be needed to selection of mentors, so that those supervising the prisoners were neither active nor tacit supporters of violent jihadist activity;
- it should aim to generate a new set of social contacts for participants. The precise nature of training is almost secondary to the opportunity to introduce released prisoners to circles different from the ones they moved in prior to their arrest. The aim cannot be to replace those circles, or cut the participants off from old friends, since the bonds forged through local mosques, trading ties, families, neighbourhoods and Islamic organisations will be deeper than anything a training program could possibly provide. Instead, the goal should be to build on new contacts to lessen the chance that the released prisoners would undertake or support acts of violence;

⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 13-16.

⁹⁵ The court found that Mardani had not hidden Sofyan Djumpai, despite both Mardani and Djumpai admitting that three days before their arrest, Mardani had told Djumpai that he knew Djumpai was sought by police. The court's reasoning was that Djumpai had invited Mardani to go with him, not vice versa.

⁹⁶ This contrasts with Northern Ireland, for example, where many prisoners served long sentences. For a discussion of the problems this created there, see Brian Gormally, "Conversion from war to peace: Reintegration of ex-prisoners in Northern Ireland", BICC, Bonn, 2001, p. 20.

⁹⁷ Tracy Irwin, "Prison education in Northern Ireland: Learning from our paramilitary past", *The Howard Journal*, 42 (5) December 2003, p. 476.

- ❑ while matching skills with market needs is important, it should not be carried too far: it would not help reduce violence, for example, if thugs-turned-mujahidin were directed to vocations that capitalised on their old *preman* skills, such as private security; and
- ❑ to reinforce and maintain new social contacts, a post-release program should follow any training or work provided during the assimilation process.⁹⁸

A reintegration program tied to prison assimilation would work best for prisoners detained near their homes. For prisoners detained further away, a post-release component could still reach them once they returned to their own villages. For example, a man from Poso detained in the provincial capital Palu (approximately 300 kilometres away) might receive commercial training during the assimilation phase and then be assisted to join a trade cooperative in Poso after returning. Some NGOs have been successful in drawing ex-combatants -- not necessarily former prisoners -- into advocacy or development programs they run in the latter's home villages. This provides the ex-combatants with some income, status, and the experience of different work, while the NGOs benefit from the influence and networks of the men in question.

Reintegration programs not linked to prisons would also be worth exploring, but it would be more difficult to identify participants and supervise the training. It is also worth noting that even a well-designed program will not prevent some participants from accepting invitations from their old networks to take part in new violence. Success should be measured in terms of denting these networks, not eliminating them entirely.

One obvious problem is that it will be difficult for many donors to fund any program designed to benefit anyone suspected or convicted of terrorism, and yet rehabilitation and reintegration in some cases may be a powerful antidote to terror -- and more importantly, an important strategy for long-term conflict resolution.

⁹⁸ Evaluations of other prisoner reintegration programs also stress the need to have some continuity between the end of skills training and an opportunity to apply skills -- that is, not providing skills to prisoners who will still be incarcerated for long periods. This is less relevant for Maluku and Poso, where short sentences are typical. For an example of the former, see Lukas Muntingh, *After prison: The case for offender reintegration*, Institute for Security Studies, March 2001, Chapter 3.

VI. CONCLUSION

Six years after conflicts broke out in Maluku and Poso, mujahidin networks formed there are still causing security problems, even though inter-communal fighting has long since ceased. The members of these networks are mostly young men in their twenties and thirties, many of whom are mobile and combat-hardened. The failure to identify and reintegrate ex-mujahidin; to resettle the displaced and provide compensation and other forms of assistance as promised; and to prosecute perpetrators and funders of past violence to the fullest extent of the law all feed into these networks' continuing activity.

The members of these networks share several characteristics:

- ❑ they may have less rigorous training than the older Indonesian mujahidin who went to Afghanistan to train in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but more "battlefield" experience and hence a greater tendency to be motivated by revenge or a desire to continue the jihad than by ideology per se;
- ❑ they can use guns as well as bombs;
- ❑ they appear to be more likely to see other Indonesians, particularly Indonesian Christians, rather than foreigners as the enemy: for many, their jihad is local, and as a whole the network may have fewer connections to the Middle East or South Asia than the earlier generation of Indonesian jihadists;
- ❑ some have trained in the Philippines and/or have knowledge of travel routes and trading networks there, including networks for arms trading;
- ❑ they may be more accustomed to working with gang members or may indeed come from gangs themselves, blurring the line between jihadist violence and ordinary crime; and
- ❑ mujahidin who have fought in one of the two conflict areas often develop contacts in the other and travel back and forth between them.


The networks clearly extend beyond Maluku and Poso but the key to weakening them may lie in restricting their ability to operate there. A key target for this may be the local mujahidin, men who were known to their often Java-based recruiters as "situational mujahidin" -- fighters by force of circumstance. Their religious training was brief and ad hoc, and they are less likely to be ideologues. While they may be susceptible to approaches from criminals, corruptors and gang leaders, they may also be a group for

whom reintegration programs could be particularly effective.

Weakening these networks will not guarantee an end to violence in conflict areas, nor end terrorism elsewhere in Indonesia, but it could make an important contribution to both objectives.

Jakarta/Brussels, 13 October 2005


APPENDIX A MAP OF INDONESIA



Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin


APPENDIX B

MAP OF OF EASTERN INDONESIA




APPENDIX C

MAP OF MALUKU



APPENDIX D

MAP OF POSO DISTRICT



APPENDIX E

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS AND INDONESIAN TERMS

AKP	Aliansi Kemanusiaan Poso (Poso Humanitarian Alliance)
AMIN	Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (Nusantara Islamic Mujahidin Forces), a Darul Islam splinter group that emerged in 1999
ATR	Anak Tanak Runtuh, a local mujahidin group in Poso with past ties to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
BAP	Berita Acara Pemeriksaan (Interrogation Deposition)
BIN	Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency)
Brimob	Acronym for Brigade Mobil (Mobil Brigade), the paramilitary police
Bripda	Police rank equivalent to Constable
Bulan Sabit Merah	Red Crescent, a group formed in Poso by a West Java offshoot of Darul Islam known as Ring Banten; provided a humanitarian cover to jihadist activity at height of Poso conflict, some members believed to be responsible for violence in West Sulawesi in April 2005. No connection to International Red Crescent.
Choirul Ummah	An anti-vice squad set up in Poso by KOMPAK and JI
Dakwah	Islamic proselytisation and religious outreach
Darul Islam	Name given to regional rebellions that broke out in West Java in 1948, and in South Sulawesi and Aceh in 1953, which later united, becoming a movement to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. Jemaah Islamiyah, a splinter of DI, emerged in 1993.
Dauroh	Religious training
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council)
DI	Darul Islam
Fa'i	Robbing non-believers as a way of raising funds for jihad.
FSPUI	Forum Silaturahmi dan Perjuangan Umat Islam (Islamic Community Struggle and Social Forum)
GKST	Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah (Central Sulawesi Protestant Church)
Golkar	Golongan Karya, political party that was formerly ruling party during Soeharto years.
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
Jihad	As used in this report, holy war.
Kafir	Infidel
Khairul Umah	see Choirul Ummah
KOMPAK	Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (Action Committee for Crisis Response), Islamic charity set up by DDII, which funded many jihadist activities in Maluku and Poso.
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus (Indonesian Military Special Forces Unit)
Laskar Jihad	Salafi militia based in Yogyakarta, Central Java that sent thousands of fighters to Ambon in mid-2000. In mid-2001 it established smaller presence in Poso.
Laskar Jundullah	Militia formed in South Sulawesi in 1999 that fought in the communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso.
Laskar Mujahidin	Name given to coalition of forces in Ambon and Poso that included JI, KOMPAK, and some DI fighters.
LPMS	Institute for the Strengthening of Civil Society, an NGO in Poso.

Malino accords	Peace agreements signed in the town of Malino, South Sulawesi aimed at ending conflicts in Poso (Malino I, signed December 2001) and Ambon (Malino II, signed February 2002).
Mantiqi	Regional sub-division of Jemaah Islamiyah
Mujahidin	Arabic word for fighters in a holy war, (singular: <i>mujahid</i>).
Mujahidin Kayamanya	Poso-based jihadist group with ties to KOMPAK whose members were involved in 16 May 2005 attack in Ceram, Maluku.
Mujahidin KOMPAK	Militia set up by KOMPAK
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
Pasukan siluman	Shadow forces, used to refer to active duty military and police who secretly fought on the side of parties to the conflict in Ambon or Poso.
Pemuda Pancasila pengajian	Organisation seen during Soeharto years as state-sponsored thug group. Religious study session
pesantren	Islamic boarding school
preman	Thug, gangster
PRKP	Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace in Poso, an NGO.
qoidah aminah	Arabic for secure base, used by JI and KOMPAK to refer to an area where Islamic law and principles can be fully applied and that can serve as building block for Islamic state.
Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS)	Short-lived state proclaimed in 1950 in Maluku, quickly defeated by Indonesian military, now associated with small group of Christian separatists.
Salafi	Describes a puritanical stream of Islam that seeks to purge it of all practices considered unwarranted innovations that deviate from the practices of the Prophet and his companions.
STAIN	Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (State Islamic College)
Tadrib	Military training

APPENDIX F

VIOLENCE IN POSO AND MALUKU, 2004-2005

POSO⁹⁹

1 January 2004, Bomb explodes at 19:15 near Kasiguncu airstrip, Poso Pesisir, no casualties.

6 March 2004, Sugianto Kaimudin beaten by two men who attempted to stop his motorbike on road from Tojo Barat to Poso town.

27 March 2004, Jhon Christian Tanalida, Kawua resident, shot dead in his field near the city suburb of Sayo at 17:00.

30 March 2004, The dean of the Law Faculty of Poso's Sintuwu Maroso University (Unsimar), Rosy Tilongo SH, shot in the head while on campus.

30 March 2004, Rev Perdi shot fatally in the chest after answering the knock of his two assailants on the door of his church in Membuke hamlet, Tumora, Poso Pesisir.

10 April 2004, Tabernakel church in Maranda hamlet, Kilo Trans village, Poso Pesisir fired upon. Seven injured.

26 May 2004, Central Sulawesi prosecutor Ferry Silalahi shot dead shortly after leaving a prayer session at the house of Palu lawyer Thomas Ihalauw. Several cases Silalahi had handled could have been connected to his death: the day before his murder, several JI suspects were held in detention despite winning their appeal to the Central Sulawesi High Court. Ferry had also handled drugs cases in Tangerang before being moved to Central Sulawesi.

16 July 2004, Motorcycle cab driver from Gebangrejo, Poso Kota, Melki, hacked to death by Yonatan M Canda, who asked Melki to drive him south of the city to Pandiri.

17 July 2004, Sudisman Mobinta shot in Betania, Poso Kota, while climbing tree to retrieve sager (traditional alcoholic drink).

17 July 2004, Helmi Tombiling stabbed to death at 21:00 at her petrol stand in Kawua, Poso city by a motorcyclist who had stopped purportedly to buy petrol.

17 July 2004, A small bomb explodes in Kasintuwu, Poso Kota, no victims.

18 July 2004, Rev. Susianty Tinulele fatally shot while leading a church service in Effatha church, Palu. Four members of congregation suffer gunshot wounds.

28 July 2004, Police team led by Ricky Naldo, who as of mid-2005 had become Poso Deputy Police Chief, shoot Bambang, whom they suspect is perpetrator of Susianty Tinulele shooting in Lore Selatan. Bambang later released after police admit a case of mistaken identity.

13 October 2004, Shots fired at houses in Mauru hamlet, Kawende village, Poso Pesisir. One dead, three wounded. Gunmen flee in motor boat towards Poso city.

17 October 2004, Bomb explodes in yard of house in JI Pulau Morotai, Poso Kota. No victims.

21 October 2004, Gunman on motorbike fired shots at people gathered in front of Bethani church, Poso Kota. Hans Lanipi suffered gunshot wound to back. Andi Makassau arrested but not charged for the shooting.

4 November 2004, Carminalis Ndele, village head of Pinedapa village, Poso Pesisir sub-district, found beheaded after leaving his house with a man resembling Ahmad Laparigi. Ndele's head was dumped in a bag in the city suburb of Sayo, his body was found near Pinedapa. Ahmad Laparigi arrested in connection with the murder but not charged.

6 November 2004, A bomb explodes in Lembomawo, Poso Kota. No victims.

8 November 2004, Imbo shot fatally at close range by a gunman on a motorbike in city suburb of Bonesompe while driving public transport vehicle on Tentena-Madale route. Poso District Military Commander Lieutenant Colonel Ray Gunawan commented that the attack appeared to be planned, as Imbo was shot on the return journey from Tentena after a person hiding behind bushes had called out that he had just gone past.

11 November 2004, Three youths climbing a mango tree in Bonesompe, Poso Kota, fire at tree's owner, who was not wounded.

13 November 2004, Bomb placed in public transport vehicle parked at Poso central market. Six people killed, three at scene, two seriously injured. Those killed mainly from majority-Christian Sepe-Silanca village.

12 December 2004, Attacks on Imanuel and Anugerah churches in Palu. Immanuel church bombed (one injured), Anugerah church fired on (two wounded). Following the attacks, Palu City Police Chief Noman Siswandi and South

⁹⁹ Details drawn from the following sources: LPS-HAM Sulteng, *Matriks Kekerasan Tahun 2004*, Palu, 2004; Arianto Sangaji, "Peredaran Ilegal Senjata Api di Sulawesi Tengah", Position paper no. 4, YTM and LPMS, Palu, 2005; e-mail list servers, local media sources, Crisis Group interviews.

Palu Police Chief Sumantri Sudirman removed from their posts.

24 December 2004, Rev. Jembris Tamabalino and Joni Tegel attacked by five men wielding knives on the road between Masani and Saatu villages, Poso Pesisir. Police arrested a man from neighbouring Tokorondo village after the attack.

27 December 2004, Bomb explodes in Sayo, Poso Kota. No victims.

29 December 2004, Bomb explodes in Kawua, Poso Kota. No victims.

31 December, 1 January 2005, Small bombs explode almost simultaneously at several locations in Poso city shortly after midnight. No one injured.

3 January 2005, Small bomb explodes near Hotel Alamanda, Poso city, which Brimob from Jakarta were using as barracks. No victims.

7 January 2005, Bomb explodes in empty house in Moengko Lama, Poso Kota. No victims.

1 April 2005, Armed robbery of payroll at Poso bupati office of Rp. 583 million (\$58,000). Local man Tukiran on trial.

28 April 2005, Two bombs explode at NGO offices in Poso: First at Pusat Rekonsiliasi Konflik dan Perdamaian Poso (Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace in Poso, PRKP), and then fifteen minutes later at Lembaga Penguatan Masyarakat Sipil (Institute for the Strengthening of Civil Society, LPMS). No injuries, damage caused to front of LPMS office.

28 May 2005, Two bombs explode in Tentena market, fifteen minutes apart. First bomb in market stall, second in front of BRI near market. 22 killed, approximately 70 injured.

28 June 2005, Bomb explodes in front of Kasintuwu, Poso Kota campaign office of Piet Inkiriwang and Thalib Rimi, candidates in Poso district head election. No injuries.

29 June 2005, Small bomb explodes in front of Poso Central Market. No victims.

3 August 2005, Budiyanto (26) shot dead at 20:30 in city suburb of Gebangrejo while eating with wife and child.

4 August 2005, Sugito (48) shot dead by assailant using 38 calibre weapon in Gebangrejo while walking to prayer-house to perform the morning prayer. Location of shooting was only 100 metres from site where Budiyanto was murdered the previous night.

17 September 2005, Bomb explodes at party in city suburb of Bonesompe, four injured.

29 September 2005, Hasrin Latorape (42) shot fatally in face and arm in Toini village, Poso Pesisir, at approximately 17:20. Police suspect Latorape was shot because he was a witness to other recent violence.

4 October 2005, Milton Tadoa (51) fatally shot while riding motorbike towards Pantangolemba village, Poso Pesisir sub-district office, where he lived. Tadoa was treasurer of the sub-district office and had just withdrawn approximately Rp. 54 million (\$5400) to pay civil servants' wages. Robbery is the suspected motive.

MALUKU¹⁰⁰

5 May 2004, Gunmen attack Wamkana village, Buru Selatan. Three killed (Arnold Latua, Afi Nurlaka, Obet Lesusa), four injured.

23 May 2004, Bomb explodes at 09:00 across road from Seventh Day Adventist church in Halong village, Ambon. Second bomb explodes half an hour later in Ambon city suburb of Batumerah. In all, five injured: Yodi Mataheru (critically), Ranel Manuputty, Isak Manuputty, Chris Wattimena, Marselo Manusiwa.

25 May 2004, Bomb explodes at 10:30 in Batu Meja Market, Ambon. One killed. Three other unexploded bombs discovered in separate locations. Suspected perpetrators: Mato alias Tohar alias Metro.

15 June 2004, Police arrested Rizky, carrying identity cards from both Palu and Ambon, after a shot was fired while security forces and residents were dismantling a street barricade on the border of Wainitu-Talake, Ambon city.

8 August 2004, Brimob BKO Resimen II Pelopor shoots a wanted man, Remon Kaya, but also hits a nine-year-old child, Henry Pentury. Remon charged with illegal weapons possession.

16 November 2004, Amir Latuconsina shot in arm in early morning at Tulehu port by assailants who arrived on two speedboats, Latuconsina was waiting for passengers for his speedboat to Haruku island.

24 or 25 November 2004, T Tanase, a resident of Leahoni village, found shot dead 100 metres from Waesoan village, South Buru.

2 December 2004, Jokran Hardiratu, minister at Pentakosta Church in Lahuban sub-village, Elfule village, Namrole sub-district, Buru district abducted late at night by several masked men. Jokran's church had received Rp. 10 million (\$1,000) in assistance from the province government

¹⁰⁰ Details drawn from Jacky Manuputty, "Mungkinkah Merebak Lagi Konflik Baru", local media sources and Crisis Group interviews.

shortly before, and the abductors stole Jokran's bank books before discarding them.

2 December 2004, Ismael Wael, resident of Wakal village, Ambon, stabbed to death, three injured and one house burned during a fight at a wedding. The following night Wakal residents attacked Mamua sub-village, burning seventeen houses and damaging others.

3 February 2005, Bomb exploded at shop in city suburb of Batumerah, Ambon.

4 February 2005, Two homemade bombs explode on vacant lot in Benteng Atas, Ambon.

7 February 2005, Gunmen using speedboat fire at Lai-Lai 7 ferry in waters off South Buru. Two passengers wounded: F. Lasamahu, Daud Yarenmase. Perpetrators flee when a Field Artillery (Artilleri Medan, referred to as *Armed*) Company Commander on board returns fire.

6 February 2005, Ismael Pelu shot dead by off-duty policeman at Waitatiri, Ambon. Some reports maintain Pelu was killed when a group of returning haji was fired upon. However, victim was far away from the group when shot.

15 February 2005, Gunmen using a speedboat fire on Villa Karaoke in Hative Besar. Two killed (Siti Ratnawati and Jondri Puturuhi), one wounded (James Tanisiwa). Attack may have been linked to shooting of Ismael Pelu, as several of those apprehended by police were family members.

27 February 2005, Fake bomb placed in Halong Baru village, Kota Ambon.

5 March 2005, Two assailants on motorbike lob grenade at motorcycle taxi post late at night in Lateri village, Ambon. Three injured (Simon Tusmain, Audi Mindje, Julius Moses).

11 March 2005, Explosions heard in Tanah Lapang Kecil (Talake) and Mardika, Ambon city, around 23:30.

12, 13 March 2005, Explosions heard late at night on border of Mardika and Batumerah suburbs in Ambon city, where conflict started in 1999.

17 March 2005, Christian motorcycle taxi driver, Paulus Wemay (28), found murdered in Tulehu. Murdered by Christian (arrested), but body discarded on public street in Muslim area.

21 March 2005, Grenade injures five people in Ambon city suburb of Batumerah at 20:30; fourteen passengers of an Ambon-Passo local transport minivan then injured when villagers pelted the van which they suspected had been the source of the grenade. In fact, two men on a motorbike threw the grenade into the van, after which passengers kicked it out of the van. Suspected perpetrators: Abdullah Umamit, Cholid.

22 March 2005, Explosion at 02:00 in Urimesing, Kota Ambon. No casualties.

25 March 2005, School in Galunggung, Batumerah, fired on, breaking glass but causing no casualties.

12 April 2005, Bomb explodes at intersection in Pohon Puleh, Kota Ambon, at around 00:45. Two motorcycle taxi drivers who were at the scene were arrested but later released.

16 May 2005, Attack on Brimob post in Loki village, West Ceram. Five Brimob members and local cook killed, one attacker (Ikhlis) also killed.

20 May 2005, Residents of Arma and Watmuri villages in Southeast Maluku clash over sea border between two villages, three killed, 51 injured.

25 August 2005, Package given to pedicab driver to take to Mardika market in Ambon city explodes after driver noticed smell of sulphur, seven injured.

APPENDIX G

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with over 110 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

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October 2005

APPENDIX H

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2002

CENTRAL ASIA

The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign, Asia Briefing N°11, 30 January 2002 (also available in Russian)

Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, Asia Report N°33, 4 April 2002

Central Asia: Water and Conflict, Asia Report N°34, 30 May 2002

Kyrgyzstan's Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy, Asia Report N°37, 20 August 2002

The OSCE in Central Asia: A New Strategy, Asia Report N°38, 11 September 2002

Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, Asia Report N°42, 10 December 2002

Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan's Failing Dictatorship, Asia Report N°44, 17 January 2003

Uzbekistan's Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?, Asia Report N°46, 18 February 2003 (also available in Russian)

Tajikistan: A Roadmap for Development, Asia Report N°51, 24 April 2003

Central Asia: Last Chance for Change, Asia Briefing N°25, 29 April 2003

Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, Asia Report N°58, 30 June 2003

Central Asia: Islam and the State, Asia Report N°59, 10 July 2003

Youth in Central Asia: Losing the New Generation, Asia Report N°66, 31 October 2003

Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for Engagement, Asia Report N°72, 22 December 2003

The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the International Community, Asia Report N°76, 11 March 2004

Tajikistan's Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?, Asia Briefing N°33, 19 May 2004

Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects, Asia Report N°81, 11 August 2004

Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy, Asia Report N°85, 4 November 2004 (also available in Russian)

The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia's Destructive Monoculture, Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian)

Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, Asia Report N°97, 4 May 2005 (also available in Russian)

Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 May 2005 (also available in Russian)

NORTH EAST ASIA

Taiwan Strait I: What's Left of "One China"?, Asia Report N°53, 6 June 2003

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