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Title: Situation Report from Somalia

Author: Various

Synopsis

A number of disparate reports that detail the financial and living situation prevalent in the organization's projects in Somalia, and describe the situation in Somalia in the face of Ethiopian attacks, attempts by the Somali tribes to unify, and cooperation with the Ittihad.

Key Themes

The first news report (dated 7 September 1996, written by correspondent Harun Khan Amin) describes a military attack by Ethiopian forces and their secular Somali allies against the forces of the Islamic Union (al-Ittihad al-Islami) and the Ogaden fundamentalists (presumably they are a branch of the Islamic Union – see AFGP-2002-600104), who had taken shelter and were using training camps in the Gedo region of Somalia. After a series of bomb attacks in Addis Ababa against a bus, a hotel, and a bridge, as well as an assassination attempt against the Ethiopian Minister of Transportation, Ethiopia convinced the leader of the Marehan tribes, as well as the leader of Somali secular forces, General Masali, to attack the Ogaden fundamentalists in the wake of Farrah Aidid's death. The combined Ethiopian-Somali National Front swept the fundamentalists from three cities, Balad Huwa, Luuq, and Dalo. The fundamentalists condemned the attack, and vowed to continue to fight within Ethiopia, but were thrown into confusion for a time. Kenya also condemned the attack, saying that one of its soldiers was killed in cross-border violence.

The second news report (dated 7 September 1996, written by correspondent Shu'ayb al-Salihi) describes events in the Lower Juba region during the Gedo offensive. Marghan, a Somali leader based in Kismayo, moved with his tribesmen toward Kenya in an attempt to unite the Darud tribe (it has three constituent groups, the Mujirtin, the Ogaden, and the Marihan). He also attempted to retrieve weapons that he had left in Kenya in the face of attacks from Aideed three or four years ago, but was blocked by the 'Abdallah tribe. A number of Somali leaders and tribes are mentioned in the report, especially Ogaden leaders.

A financial report, written by Mukhtar Husayn Kaim on 16 January 1997, describes the costs associated with a pond project, which has a budget of \$10,000

The third news report (dated 1 February 1997, written by Shu'ayb al-Salihi) describes the current situation in the Lower Jubbah region of Somalia. Engineers from the Gulf have arrived to gather information. Al-Akhwan are present in Kambooni. A technical director for the 'farm' has been appointed, money has been set aside for buying 'agricultural necessities', and the workers have not yet been trained [The translation seems to be using code words for weapons, fighters, and training camps]. The Ethiopians continue their attacks, but have been double-crossed by 'Ali Mahdi, who sold 70 tons of weapons he received from them in Mogadishu.

The next report (by Nur al-Din al-Bahar) describes the financial situation of the Fishing Project. The engineers have purchased boats and refrigerators, but do not have enough money for necessities in the face of the failure of the 'plan'. They will try to sell some boats and refrigerators to raise capital.

The following report (by all the engineers, Khalid Mukhtar, Tawfiq al-Mumbasi, Nur al-Din al-Malindi, and

Shu'ayb al-Malindi) describes the dire living situation in what they find themselves.

Finally, there is a report from Salih 'Abd-al-Wahid to Sheikh Abu-Hafs on 1 December 1993. Three days earlier, Salih met with Sheikh 'Abdallah Sahl, Hasan Tahir, and 'Uthman, and discussed several points amid a concern for secrecy.

1. They needed to strike UN forces, and more specifically American forces in Somalia.
2. If the Ittihad carries out a military operation, Salih's group will rally the Mujahidin to work for the Ittihad, otherwise Salih's group will continue to help the secularist groups.
3. Salih's groups is willing to pay all expenses.

Sheikh Hasan advocated continuing to use political means until they had built up a sufficiently large and trained military force, to which Salih responded that the Sheikh had not sent any forces for training to the camps already open. Sheikh Hasan replied that the camps were vulnerable to air attack, and the Shura council preferred in-house training in Mogadishu. Abu Hafs agreed to close the camps. Sheikh Hasan has not been in Ittihad for two years, but maintains strong ties.