Results of the IAEA Emergency Meeting on Iran - the U.S. View

MR. BAILY: Good afternoon and welcome to the Foreign Press Center. This afternoon we have Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Robert Joseph. He'll be making a short statement about the IAEA and the recent report on Iran and then he'll be happy to take your questions, and we also have journalists joining us from New York, so we’ll be taking their questions as well.

Under Secretary Joseph.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Good afternoon. Thank you very much. Let me just start by making five points related to Iran and the determined efforts on the part of the international community to meet the challenge from Iran.

The first point is that there is a very apparent growing concern about Iran's nuclear activities on the part of the international community and that is clearly reflected in the IAEA Board of Governors vote from Saturday. It was a large majority -- 27 in favor and 3 against. Of the 27, you have representation from all of the major regions of the world. The message is as clear as the outcome of the vote, and that is that the international community will not permit Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

Second, I think the vote should be for, and can be accurately portrayed, as a very clear and sharp condemnation of Iran's failure to take the steps that the IAEA Board over the course of the last two and a half years have identified as necessary. The vote reflects the fact that Iran has been unwilling to address what the IAEA Director-General Dr. El Baradei has called a confidence deficit that Iran's actions have produced. It also, I think, is very consistent with our description of Iranian nuclear activities and the political choices that they have made choosing consistently confrontation over negotiation. You saw this last August when Iran moved to resume conversion to produce UF-6, the feed material for centrifuge, and you saw it very clearly in early January when Iran removed the IAEA seals and declared that it was moving forward with what it called research and development on enrichment.

Third, this is not about denying Iran its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, its rights to pursue peaceful nuclear energy. This is about stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, and there is no right under the treaty that provides for enrichment if the purpose of that enrichment is for a nuclear weapons programs.

Fourth, I'd emphasize that this is not the end of diplomacy; this is moving diplomacy to the next level. It is a very important step in doing that. But the IAEA will continue to play a very important role. And in fact, one of the purposes of moving this to the Security Council, a body that has additional authorities and additional tools, is to give the IAEA a greater, you know, a greater chance for succeeding.

And fifth, I would just say that we hope that the Iranian regime will heed the very strong message of the IAEA Board of Governors and will reverse course by taking those actions that the Board has identified as necessary and that you see in the resolution, whether that be re-suspending its enrichment activities, fully cooperating with the IAEA or returning to the negotiations on the basis of the Paris Agreement. That basis, of course, has been shattered by Iran's activities.

The ball is in Iran's court. Unfortunately, what we have seen in the last couple of days does not lead one to be optimistic. It is a continuation of the threats and the obfuscation that we have seen before -- again, continuing the pattern of confrontation over negotiations and cooperation. And here I would cite Iran's decision to end its cooperation under the Additional Protocol and its announcement of its intent to resume full-scale enrichment.

Let me stop there and take your questions. Thank you.

MR. BAILY: We'll go to the front row, to Russia.

QUESTION: Thank you. Dimitry Kirsanov with TASS, the Russian newswire service. I believe you and your colleague, Secretary Nicholas Burns, have plans to travel to Moscow this week. I'm wondering if this trip has been canceled for whatever reasons or merely postponed. And secondly, since it is a stated position of the U.S. Government that nuclear program of Iran is not civilian, at least not entirely, I was wondering if you could, as the point man of the Bush Administration, give us an estimate of how far actually Iran is far from a nuclear bomb.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: With regard to your first question, I had no plans to visit Moscow this week or next week. I was in Moscow two weeks ago. I can't speak for my colleague Nick Burns, but I doubt that it was in his -- that he had planned such a visit, but you'd have to check with his office on that.

In terms of how far Iran may be from a nuclear weapons capability, that's a very difficult question to answer with precision. I wouldn't want to go any further than what Ambassador Negroponte said in his testimony. There are a lot of unknowns in making the assessment that has been provided.

MR. BAILY: We have India here in the front row.

QUESTION: Thank you. Raghubir Goyal, India Globe and Asia Today. Sir, could you give some details about the votings in IAEA in Vienna as far as India's voting is concerned, because before the vote a week ago there was a lot of controversy created by the Ambassador, U.S. Ambassador in Delhi. And where do the U.S. and India civil nuclear deal is heading now as far as presidential visit also coming end of the month to India? And one more --

MR. BAILY: That'stwo questions, I think.

QUESTION: That Iran is threatening to cut the oil and gas to India and also taking actions against India if voting will go with UN.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, I certainly can't elaborate in terms of the internal dynamics that led the Indian Government to vote the way that it did. India, of course, cast a positive vote in September. That was a resolution that found Iran to be in formal noncompliance with its safeguard obligations. And this time India joined the large majority of other states on the board to send this matter to the Security Council.

In terms of the status of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India, well, I think both governments continue to believe that this is a very important arrangement for the future. We have made some progress, but we have more progress that needs to be made. Both Nick Burns and I have testified both on the Senate side and on the House side in terms of the importance of meeting all commitments under the 18 July agreed statement. And we're continuing to work with the Indian Government to make this a win-win for both countries.

MR. BAILY: Let's go to the third row here.

QUESTION: I'm Katja Gloger with Stern Magazine from Germany. Now that the matter is referred to the Security Council, what is the possible set of sanctions you are thinking of? Past experience has shown that sanctions has to be quite -- have to be quite draconian in order to really work.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, our goal, of course, is as I said, to get Iran to reverse course and we have agreed that the Security Council will not take any substantive action until following the 6 March IAEA Board meeting. What we want to do is concentrate on using the time between now and the 6th of March to encourage Iran to meet those actions that have been identified in the resolution. I think it's really premature to talk about sanctions at this time, even though that is a possible tool for the future. But a lot will depend on Iranian actions between now and the 6th of March and between now and the time that the Security Council meets on this issue.

MR. BAILY: Let'sgo over here in the third row.

QUESTION: Hi. I'm Mahtab Farid from U.S. Iran News. You mentioned a March 6th deadline. Some agree that that could have anything to do with the fact that Ambassador Bolton is the President of Security Council in the month of March, if you could react on that?

And as you know, Tehran hasn't changed any tones since, you know, the decision and they actually gotten worse and they may -- they said they would stop the inspections. So what kind of detailed plans do you have? How do you plan to stop Iran?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, in terms of the first question, I have not been in any discussion that would suggest that the timing is related to who is the president of the Council, you know, during the month of February. The idea was to allow some time between the time that the Board sends this issue to the Security Council and the time that the Security Council takes it up -- again, to get Iran to do the right thing, to reverse course. And I think that has much more to do with it than any personality.

Things have gotten worse in the sense that Iran has declared that it will not continue what it calls the voluntary measures under the Additional Protocol and it has stated that it will now move to full-scale enrichment. Iran had said that it would do the first and that it has to do the first under the law that was passed by the Iranian parliament.

With regard to the second, we saw Iran moving in that direction, you know, before the IAEA Board vote on Saturday. Again, Iran has said that this is innocent research and development or at least that's what it was saying before the Board meeting. We said that this was not innocent research and development; this was the next logical and necessary step to move Iran from its current capability to full-scale, industrial-size production of enrichment. And we see this as simply moving forward in the way that it had already been moving.

MR. BAILY: Go to the first row here, Turkey.

QUESTION: Umit Eginsoy, NTV Turkey. In the course of the diplomatic process, what do you want Turkey to do on Iran?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, I think Turkey plays a very important role. Turkey can send the signal -- can reinforce the signal of the IAEA Board. It can make very clear to Iran that it, like other members of the international community, will not tolerate Iran moving to a nuclear weapons capability, that that would be very dangerous and destabilizing, not just for the immediate Gulf region but well beyond that region. And if one looks at the ever-increasing capability of Iran in terms of ballistic missile delivery systems, Turkey certainly needs to take note and continue to act with the other members of the international community on this.

MR. BAILY: Can we go to the back row, please?

QUESTION: I'm Chidanand Rajghatta, Times of India. In the context of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement, do you see India's "yes" vote advancing the chances of concluding this agreement before President Bush visits the region next month? And also how does a country like India reconcile because of the "yes" vote loss of its oil and energy trade with Iran? India will have to pay a price for this vote. So how does -- what is your advice for countries like this?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, we of course, are encouraged by the votes of all of those countries who decided that it was in their interest and in the interest of the international community to move this to the next level of diplomacy, to move the Iran issue to the Security Council. This was a vote that India made of its own free choice, of course.

I believe that standing up to Iran is a sign of being in the nonproliferation mainstream and I think the size of the majority that we saw voting on this issue on Saturday is an indication of that.

In terms of paying a price, I'm not sure of how one calculates that because there are, of course, significant prices that one would have to pay if Iran did acquire a nuclear weapons capability. And in fact, the price might be much higher under those circumstances in the future than the price for standing up to Iran and insisting that it reverse course on its nuclear program.

QUESTION: Do you see the nuclear deal being concluded before President Bush's visit? My first question was that.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Yeah. I don't have, you know, clarity in my crystal ball, but my sense is we're making progress. The visit will be very important. But these issues take time to resolve. These are complex issues and we’ll see where we are when the President visits.

MR. BAILY: Let's go to France there, please.

QUESTION: Philippe Gelie, Le Figaro. Aren't you a little bit pessimistic at this point on the chance of diplomacy? And again, the question that hasn't been answered: What do you think can stop Iran, practically?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, I think what is necessary to stop Iran is a firm indication that the international community not only will speak to this issue, but will take whatever measures are necessary to convince Iran that it is in its interest to forego a nuclear weapons capability. Is that difficult? Yes. It's a very difficult thing to do. And what we've seen to date is a very determined Iranian regime, determined to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.

The diplomatic process is not a perfect one. It has taken a long time to move from the original vote in November of 2003, which found Iran basically in noncompliance without using the word "noncompliance," to the vote this past Saturday. But during this time, we have worked with the EU-3, we've worked with Russia, we've tried to give Iran every opportunity to resolve this issue through diplomacy and through negotiation. The EU-3 led a two-year effort to try to convince Iran that negotiations would provide enormous benefits to the Iranian people. Iran rejected that arrangement out of hand last August and, instead of engaging seriously in the negotiations with the EU-3, simply moved to conversion, as I mentioned.

We've also supported the Russian proposal on enrichment. Here again, the Iranians haven't engaged seriously. There have been some statements to the effect that negotiations continue and that there could possibly be interested in the Russian proposal, but actions speak louder than words in this case and we have watched Iran proceed step by step, conversion to enrichment-related activities, in a way that demonstrates very clearly that they are moving forward to a nuclear weapons capability.

What we need to do is we need to work as an international community to build the resolve to meet that challenge because this is a challenge that extends well beyond the region. This is a challenge to the entire framework of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. And one can -- you know, one can speculate on the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran. And I think as you do that, you will see that this is something that simply is intolerable to not only the United States, but to the world community in general.

MR. BAILY: Go to the third row here.

QUESTION: Tom Baldwin from the Times of London. The President famously described Iran as -- he called it an "axis of evil." And last week he was talking about how he looked forward to one day seeing Iran free from the yoke of a clerical elite. Can you negotiate with evil or do you believe that a long-term solution to this is regime change, to coin a phrase?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, we have supported the EU-3 and Russian efforts to negotiate the end to their nuclear weapons aspirations. But the problems with Iran include not just their nuclear weapons program: it's their support for terrorism, it's the denial by this Iranian regime of the fundamental human rights in terms of how they treat their own population. I said that moving to the Security Council is not the end of negotiations or diplomacy. We're going to continue to use every resource we can to ensure that we can have a peaceful diplomatic outcome. But no options are off the table. And we have a number of instruments that we use in our counter-proliferation strategy to delay and disrupt not just Iran, but other proliferators, from achieving their objectives.

MR. BAILY: The third row again here.

QUESTION: Khaleed Dawoud from Egypt Al-Ahram newspaper. I have two quick questions, sir. There was a news analysis in the New York Times yesterday stating that basically all these efforts are aimed at delaying Iran and that most -- they were quoting some unnamed officials, saying they believe that they are ready there and it's only a matter of time. So I wonder what's your comment about this. And as a person coming from an Arab country, I wonder whether in order to create some credibility for the call on Iran, whether you'd make a similar call towards Israel; for example, opening its nuclear reactors for inspection -- just to convince other Arab countries to join you in the call to prevent Iran from possessing nuclear weapons. Thank you, sir.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, I would not underestimate the importance of delay. And clearly, we want to delay any acquisition of nuclear weapons by this Iranian regime -- a regime that has emphasized their desire for Israel to be wiped off the map, also to have the same fate for the United States. This is a regime that denies the historical reality of the Holocaust. This is a set of abhorrent comments that have been made by this regime.

Our objective is to stop the program, and it may be that if we can delay it long enough, that will result in the end of the program. But we're using every tool -- diplomatic, economic -- every tool that we have to stop this program.

In terms of Israel, I mean, this is really about Iran. This is about Iran violating its commitments under the Nonproliferation Treaty. This is about Iran violating its safeguards commitments with the IAEA. Clearly, we all need to work to achieve the global objectives that we have with regard to nonproliferation and stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and that includes a Middle East that would be free of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery.

QUESTION: Are you saying, sir, Israel is not in violation of its obligations under the NPT?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Israel is not a member of NPT, so it's not violating.

QUESTION: It's not a violation?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: No, it's not a violation. They haven't joined the treaty, so they can't violate it.

QUESTION: Jyri Raivio, Hesingin Sanomat Finland. Is it your understanding that Iran is technically capable of building a nuclear weapon without outside help? Can they do it by themselves?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, Iran has already received outside help and I think that the IAEA report that was provided to Board members immediately prior to this last meeting gives real pause in this context. There was assistance with regard to the different types of centrifuges that have been provided, or at least assistance in the context of centrifuges. There are indications of efforts dealing directly with weaponization. There are efforts that deal with conversion. I would recommend that you read that report and I believe that that report had a real impact on a number of the countries that ultimately voted to send this forward, send the issue forward to the Security Council on Saturday.

I would also say that Iran has tremendous resources, tremendous financial resources, and Iran has a very sophisticated, a very advanced scientific and technical community. I would say that Iran does have the capability to develop nuclear weapons and the delivery means for those weapons.

MR. BAILY: We'll go to Italy. We have time for about two more.

QUESTION: Giampiero Gramaglia, Italian News Agency ANSA. Following the two last questions, if Iran already has the capacity to build a nuclear weapon, how long a delay could be safe -- month, years?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, it's a very difficult question to answer because what you're asking is, in a sense, what is the point of no return. Is it when Iran masters the ability to spin centrifuges, for example, which would demonstrate a capability to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon? There are many things that we don't know, presumably, about the Iranian program. My sense is that we do everything we can to delay this program for as long as possible with the objective of stopping the program. No options are off the table. We cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran. But we are giving every chance for diplomacy to work. And again, we've entered the next level of diplomacy.

MR. BAILY: Let's go to Lebanon here, Al Hayat.

QUESTION: Yes, Joyce Karam of Al Hayat newspaper. My question is how much are you concerned that more pressure on Iran would further destabilize the situation in Iraq, security situation, or even Lebanese-Israeli border with Hezbollah group that has been escalating lately? And have you had any talks or are you having any talks with the Lebanese Government regarding this issue?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, we are, of course, confronting Iran in a number of areas, in a number of contexts. We are dealing with Iran in the context of Iraq. We are dealing with Iran in the context of Hezbollah. We are dealing with Iran and Syria in the context of Lebanon. There are many contexts in which we have fundamental problems with this Iranian regime and we need to deal with them effectively in all of these contexts and we intend to do that. It's not as though Iran is holding back and my view is that we have to confront them in each of these contexts.

MR. BAILY: Can we go on the fourth row here?

QUESTION: Jinsook Lee of MBC Television South Korea. In terms of nuclear capability, if the compare Iran with North Korea, North Korea is far ahead and the frame of the six-party talks is not working right now. Is the same thing going to happen to North Korea if six-party talks will not work out?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, I think, in fact, we had in September a very positive outcome in terms of the six-party discussions. Now, there have been a number of events that have transpired since then and we have not had another productive round. We want to get the next round going. We want to have the six parties meet without any preconditions. And again, diplomacy is our first choice. We are also very clear about the fact that we are taking defensive measures in that context against the various threats from North Korean proliferation and we are taking those steps that are necessary to deal with the illicit activities of North Korea, including money laundering and counterfeiting.

What we need to do is we need to move the diplomacy forward and at the same time take those measures that protect ourselves. I believe that if we do take those measures we will, in fact, increase the prospects for the success of the talks. And yes, we need to apply many of those same tools in the context of Iran.

MR. BAILY: Let's go here in the middle. Can you wait for the mike, please?

QUESTION: Majid Joneidi, Persian Service BBC World Service. Iran and the EU-3 have been engaged in a serious diplomacy in the past three years over the nuclear issue. Russia did the same, tried to bring its own initiative. All of these things have failed. Don't you think it will be much better if Iran and the U.S. directly engage in diplomatic talks over the issue?

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: No, I don't. (Laughter.) We have made very clear that we support the EU-3 efforts, that we support the Russia efforts to resolve this. The President last March took a number of steps that indicated not just our rhetorical support but the fact that we would take concrete measures to try to enhance the prospects for the success of these negotiations.

Iran has shattered the basis for those negotiations. That's why the EU ministers have described the status of those discussions as at a dead end. They're at a dead end. We need to move this to the next level. As I said, we have a number of fundamental problems with this Iranian regime, including terrorism and human rights, and I don't think it's now time that we sat down with them.

And I would also, quite frankly, take issue with how you described the negotiations. I don't believe that the Iranians have been serious in these negotiations. I think that they've been using the negotiations to play for time.

MR. BAILY: We've got time for one last one. Germany.

QUESTION: Thank you. Christian Wernicke from the German daily Seuddeutsche Zeitung. Just to follow up on the question, I mean, what you also hear from, let's say, Atlantic non-American diplomats is the basic thing Iran wants is to negotiate about its some sort of security reassurance by the United States. So all the talk about the nuclear program supposedly is only a means, not the end, for that regime. Why, if you're seriously trying to get a nuclear bomb out of their hand possible, why don't (inaudible)? Why don't you do it? Is that just because of domestic policy reasons? I mean, reason would demand that if you want to stop them producing a nuclear bomb, talk to them directly.

UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH: Well, we have made our views very clear and we have made our support for a negotiated outcome that would provide for commercial benefits, that would provide for cultural and political and even security benefits, we've made that very clear. This is not about Iran's security. This is about Iran moving to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. And I think when you put that capability in the context of this particular regime and the stated objectives of this regime, not just wiping Israel and the United States off the map but all of its other objectives that it has made very clear both in words and in actions, this is not a situation in which they're simply looking for a security guarantee. That's not at all what this is about.