



Stabilization and Reconstruction series

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 • www.usip.org

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report is part of a series produced by the United States Institute of Peace's Filling the Gaps program, which aims to systematically address the causes of failure in specific areas in reconstruction and stabilization operations and to generate policy options for those in the U.S. government and elsewhere who lead and staff these missions. Filling the Gaps is directed by Daniel Serwer and managed by Beth Cole of the Institute.

Yll Bajraktari is a former program specialist at the United States Institute of Peace's Center of Innovation on Media and Conflict; he is now at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Emily Hsu is a program specialist at the Institute's Center on Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations.

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STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION SERIES NO. 7
OCTOBER 2007

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Yll Bajraktari and Emily Hsu

Developing Media in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

Summary and Recommendations

- In war-torn societies, the development of independent, pluralistic, and sustainable media is critical to fostering long-term peace and stability. Post-conflict civilian populations are particularly vulnerable to manipulation by mass media as tensions run high and the possibility of violent relapse remains strong. Many civilians harbor deep skepticism and mistrust of the media, being accustomed to platforms that are controlled either by the state or by political groups looking to further their political agendas.
- An effective media strategy can mitigate postwar tensions by elevating moderate voices and dampening extremist ones. It can create peaceful channels through which differences can be resolved without resort to violence. The creation of a robust media culture will also allow citizens to begin holding their government accountable for its actions and ensuring its commitment to democracy.
- Efforts to develop local media institutions should be undertaken separately from attempts to develop strategic communications. In an increasing number of non-permissive environments (i.e., environments where security is not fully established), the distinction between these two endeavors is blurred because of a mistaken assumption among some players that both activities share the same purpose and goal.
- A poorly developed media strategy can be detrimental in a war-ravaged country still rife with violence. A hastily conceived plan may reinforce divisions between warring parties or create a weak media sector that is vulnerable to exploitation by warlords, political patrons, and spoilers. Media development efforts also fail when the public does not trust them to establish a credible source of information.

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- Ideally, given the media's capacity to shape war-torn countries, interveners should apply a coherent strategy in the pursuit of media development. Unfortunately, no such strategy yet exists and thus interveners have little guidance as to what tools and methods work best in the development of media institutions. In fact, media development is still conducted on an ad hoc basis from conflict to conflict.
- This report seeks to fill this strategic gap. More particularly, it recommends that interveners take the following series of steps as they generate a strategy for media development in post-conflict zones.

Predeployment Phase: Mapping and Strategizing

- Map out the existing media landscape
 - o Identify the postwar condition of the media infrastructure, media personnel, and other resources that have survived the conflict
 - o Assess the history of state-media relations
 - o Analyze the potential market for sustainable media
- Create a strategy for developing media
 - o Coordinate all relevant players in media development
 - o Identify spoilers and create a plan to isolate extremist voices while elevating moderate ones
 - o Plan to establish a responsible media sector before the first postwar elections are held

Deployment Phase: Building and Developing

- Build a foundation for the media sector
 - o Establish a mission-owned outlet to monitor and counter hate speech while promoting peace operations
 - o Create a representative media commission to establish media standards
 - o Create legal underpinnings for media during the transition or help the government to do so
- Create media outlets and develop personnel
 - o Encourage creation of a diverse array of media outlets and ensure media accessibility by different segments of the population
 - o Establish effective on-the-job training programs and mechanisms for evaluating trainees and university-based training programs
 - o Create local associations of journalists, publishers, and editors to strengthen leadership and connect local media actors to international media networks

Exit Phase: Transitioning and Sustaining

- Transition to local control and ensure long-term sustainability
 - o Gradually give full control to local media leaders
 - o Ensure a robust media market in which private outlets are self-sustaining
 - o Create an indigenous mechanism to continue monitoring hate speech

Introduction

As history has demonstrated repeatedly, mass media can be a powerful tool in fanning the flames of conflict and inciting bloodshed. In Nazi Germany, to cite a particularly notori-

ous example, mass media was used to stoke the anti-Semitism that led eventually to the Holocaust. In 1994, to take a more recent example, Rwandan Hutus used hate radio to mobilize a genocidal campaign that took the lives of eight hundred thousand Tutsis in just four weeks.¹

But while the media's power to provoke violence is well known, less appreciated is its ability to foster peace and stability—something it can do in various ways:

- A pluralistic media sector puts an end to the dominance of a narrow range of extremist views by giving citizens the opportunity to access a diverse array of voices with competing perspectives.
- A transparent media can become a credible source of information and a peaceful channel for public dialogue.
- An independent media culture that serves the public interest helps keep the government accountable to the people and enables citizens to monitor the state's commitment to reform and democratization.

The positive contribution that the media can make has given media development a central role in stabilizing societies emerging from conflict. Even so, there is still no tried-and-tested strategy to which interveners can turn when seeking to develop media in postwar zones. This strategic gap is reflected in the challenges that plague practitioners in almost every mission. Some of the same issues that confronted post-World War II reconstruction efforts in Germany and Japan, for example, surfaced again in the Balkans in the 1990s and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. Recurring challenges include reconciling the tension between, on the one hand, winning "hearts and minds" and, on the other, promoting independent journalism; determining the breadth of media regulation; dealing with hate speech and inflammatory journalism; coordinating the activities of external and internal players; and ensuring the viability of media after interveners depart.

To address this critical gap, this report identifies important tasks that interveners should consider in fashioning a strategy for independent, pluralistic, and sustainable media. Drawing on best practices from past and present postwar media development efforts, the report presents a strategy that encompasses the three phases of an intervention: predeployment, deployment, and exit.

Predeployment Phase: Mapping and Strategizing

Mapping the Media Landscape

Lesson: Identify media outlets and personnel that have survived the conflict and could potentially support media reforms and the development of society as a whole.

The nature and extent of postwar media resources can vary widely. Practitioners should begin by creating a thorough map of the country's existing media landscape, including an assessment of the postwar status of the media infrastructure, media personnel, and the intended media market. Identifying available resources will help shape the course of the media strategy.

In some cases, practitioners find that many media resources have survived the war: broadcasting capacity (antennas, for instance), printing presses, and transmission systems may still be intact and a significant number of journalists may still be at work. After the fighting ended in Bosnia, for example, many radio stations and broadcast centers continued to function, albeit under the control of the leaders of political factions. Iraq's former Ministry of Information retained a reservoir of journalistic talent after the Ba'thist regime fell and many of these journalists were eager to create an independent, grassroots media network after their experience under authoritarian rule.

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Many war-torn countries, however, are left with few or no viable resources with which to launch a media sector. Such was the case in Afghanistan, where the Taliban abolished virtually all forms of media in the late 1990s. In Kosovo, all terrestrial broadcast cables were destroyed during the war and had to be replaced. Indonesians ransacked media outlets during their withdrawal from East Timor, leaving little behind with which to build a new media sector.

In Liberia, the Partnership for Media and Conflict Prevention in West Africa, formed at a conference held at the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) in July 2003, sought to provide support to media affected by conflict. An assessment mission to Liberia in late 2003, undertaken in cooperation with United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), included experts from the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Panos Institute West Africa, Media Rights Agenda, MFWA, International Media Support, the International Federation of Journalists, International Freedom of Expression eXchange, and Article 19. This mission produced a detailed plan for media intervention that addressed the reform of media policy, the capacity of the media for the elections, public service broadcasting, assistance to regional broadcast media, and support for print media. It also proposed an institutional framework for media and the establishment of the Liberia Media Center.² (At the request of UNESCO, the mission also contributed to the needs assessment that was prepared jointly by the UN Development Program and the World Bank and that became part of “Results-Focused Transition Framework” the baseline document for international donor assistance in Liberia.)

Each situation and society poses its own challenges. For instance, building a media sector from scratch calls for significant financial investment in facilities and training, but it also enables implementers to avoid the difficulties of managing existing outlets and of dealing with journalists who have grown accustomed to a status quo and who resist reforms.

Lesson: Assess the history of the media’s relationship with the government and with society prior to and during the conflict.

Understanding the media’s traditional role in a society is imperative for determining how best to cultivate a sustainable new media culture, one that facilitates a sense of independence and ownership by the people. A centrally controlled public broadcasting model, for example, may not be the best option for a society emerging from totalitarian rule and seeking pluralism and independence.

Like the postwar condition of media resources, the relationship that exists between media and the government or society will vary from conflict to conflict. In many war-torn countries, the media will have been heavily state controlled and allowed little, if any, independence. In Liberia, Charles Taylor monopolized the country’s media institutions during the civil war (1989–96), shutting down a slew of independent radio stations that sought to offer an alternative voice to that of the government. These stations included Radio Monrovia, which broadcast news on the International Red Cross; Star Radio, a humanitarian radio station funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development; and Radio Veritas, which was run by the Catholic Church.³

In Bosnia and Rwanda, the dominant media resources resided not only with the state but also with nationalist or ethnic parties seeking to incite violence against opposing parties and to further their political agendas. In response to the April 1994 assassination of President Habyarimana of Rwanda, Hutu extremists launched a radio station whose broadcasts would incite the Hutu population to wage a genocidal campaign against the Tutsis and enable genocidaires to coordinate their operations. Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM, or Free Radio-Television of the Thousand Hills) was initially ignored by the international community, which considered the propaganda to be so outrageous that it would not be taken seriously.⁴

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Lesson: Assess the viability of a self-sustaining media market and identify available resources for creating a steady stream of revenue for a private market.

As past media development endeavors have revealed, media must be understood not only as a producer of news but also as a complex interaction of economic, social, and political forces. The economic aspect is often overlooked in media development, even though it is central to creating a self-sustaining, market-driven media sector.

To factor in economic forces, interveners should conduct an economic business analysis to identify available funding, advertising potential, and other sources of revenue that can sustain a private media market. Measuring the size of the market will help planners determine how many radio or television stations can be supported. Although media institutions often enjoy a flood of capital at the outset of reconstruction and stabilization missions, their longevity depends on the cultivation of a robust market able to generate a steady stream of advertising revenue. Without such revenue, any advances made in an immature media sector will likely falter when grants expire and international support wanes.

The situation in Bosnia reflects the importance of factoring economic forces into the media strategy. The radio and television sectors today are oversized for the market, forcing channels to compete fiercely with one another for advertisement revenue while weakening the impact of international investments. In 2000, the Independent Media Commission reported that there were more than two hundred registered radio stations and seventy-one television stations—forty-two in the Federation and twenty-nine in Republika Srpska. An IREX ProMedia study of the advertising market in the country suggests that it generates only enough revenue to support a handful of stations. Oversaturation of the market also makes it difficult for listeners to focus on a single station and forces financial investments to be spread thinly across many outlets.⁵

Creating the Media Strategy

Lesson: Create a plan for coordinating all the relevant players in media development.

The coordination of international donors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other common players in media development is critical to the long-term success of the media sector. In some cases, media development sponsorships come from a range of diverse organizations, which makes a focused effort more challenging. Bosnian media development, for example, enjoyed support from several international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the Southeast European Stability Pact, as well as NGOs such as IREX ProMedia, Internews, Media Plan Institute, Media Center Sarajevo, and the Open Society Foundation.

Better communication and planning among all the actors involved helps to avoid duplicative efforts and cement alliances. Creating joint working groups or task forces that meet regularly to discuss media development activities can be very effective. The Serbian experience is a model to learn from; it enabled the international community to collectively challenge Slobodan Milosevic's clampdown on media freedoms. In Serbia, periodic meetings were held among international media practitioners to share best practices, form coalitions, and address other challenges. The meetings were held regularly, even though the political situation was in constant flux.

By contrast, in Iraq the task of media development was given to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), whose major contractors had little or no relevant experience. Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC), a longtime DOD contractor, was awarded an initial contract of \$15 million to undertake something it had never done before—transform an entire state-run media system into an independent, BBC-style national news service. The research and engineering firm received the grant just eight days before the initial U.S. offensive took place in Iraq. Moreover, supervising SAIC was a DOD office specializing in psychological warfare operations, which many believe contributed to the perception among Iraqis that the Iraq Media Network (IMN) was merely a mouthpiece for the Coalition Provisional Authority. Before another company won the contract through a competi-

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tive bidding process in January 2004, SAIC's performance in Iraq was considered costly, unprofessional, and a failure in terms of establishing the objectivity and independence of the IMN.

Coordination of strategies and the management of competing interests among international players are also critical to successful media development. A difference in approach between European and U.S. media developers created friction and delayed the progress of developing the media sectors in Kosovo and Bosnia. The Europeans favored a public service broadcast approach, looking to pool media efforts with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Their focus was on monitoring media outlets and tracking their outputs in order to maintain a fragile peace. The Americans, however, insisted on supporting private broadcasters to pave the way for a market-driven media. The U.S. approach emphasized minimal state regulation, allowing for the development of a strong media foundation for private, independent media outlets.⁶

Similarly, in Cambodia, a lack of consensus among international funding agencies and NGOs was problematic. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established in 1991, when NGO activity was exploding across the international arena. A lack of coordination and vetting of strategies resulted in a series of ad hoc journalist training programs that did little to jumpstart a vibrant media culture in the country. The fragmented effort left behind a media system that was fragile, vulnerable to exploitation, and economically unsustainable.

Lesson: Identify potential spoilers, and their associated infrastructure, who may seek to dominate media channels or continue to broadcast or print hate speech. Identify and elevate repatriates or local leaders with the potential to lead independent media development.

The media strategy should include a plan for marginalizing extremist voices that seek to discredit the international mission and/or promote their violent political goals. During its mission in Cambodia, UNTAC was continually accused by opposition groups of being a puppet of the Vietnamese government. Opponents of the peace attacked the transitional authority, warning the Cambodian people that UNTAC was a threat to the country.

This lesson is also clear in the case of Bosnia, where nationalist factions retained control over media resources after the war and used them to pursue divisive objectives. Each of the three main territories—Republika Srpska, the Bosniak-controlled part of the Federation, and the Croat-controlled part of the Federation—held fast to their party-controlled media, scrambling to repair damaged transmitters and extend their frequencies as widely as possible. To diversify each region's access to information and minimize the impact of each party's nationalistic messages, the OSCE (tasked by the 1995 Dayton Accords to organize elections) tried to establish a set of media regulations. These regulations required media outlets to meet an airtime quota for opposition political parties, report information accurately and truthfully, and avoid airing provocative programs. Although they complied to a limited degree, the media outlets in all three territories continued to resist pressures.

In a more specific case, irresponsible use of the media has prolonged ethnic divisions and hindered prospects for reconciliation. In Kosovo, the Albanian newspaper Dita accused a local UN worker of having been a Serb paramilitary and published his home address. Within two weeks, the named individual was kidnapped and stabbed to death by vigilantes. Under orders from the Kosovo UN administrator, the police and NATO forces shut down the newspaper for eight days on charges that it was encouraging vigilante violence.

One approach that has been effective in mitigating extremist voices involves media policies that level the playing field and boost moderate voices during electoral campaigns. A successful program in Afghanistan sought to provide equal airtime opportunities for emergent leaders during the 2005 Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council elections. The

Afghan Media Commission implemented the Sponsored Advertisement Program (SAP), which allotted equal advertising spaces for parliamentary candidates. Reflecting the program's success, no political advertisements other than those provided for under SAP were broadcast on televisions or radios once SAP was in place. In a post-election assessment, candidates said they found the system to be very useful, particularly women, who were otherwise excluded from campaigning in mosques and schools. Seventy-six percent of female candidates used the system, as opposed to fifty-six percent of their male counterparts. SAP was the largest program of its kind in any international mission.

In addition to marginalizing extremism, interveners should also identify repatriates or local leaders with the experience and credibility to lead independent media development. Selecting capable individuals for this role can be a sensitive and difficult process. Practitioners should look for leaders who are able to fight corruption and can resist manipulation, uphold professional standards, and prioritize the public interest. These individuals should be well respected within their communities.

Lesson: Plan for an accountable media sector to begin operating before the first postwar elections are held.

Setting an appropriate timeline for media development is crucial in the context of other stabilization and reconstruction activities that may be running in tandem. In particular, having a responsible and accountable media sector in place is instrumental in conducting free and fair elections. Media should provide balanced coverage of candidates and their platforms, publicizing information on election processes that may be unfamiliar to certain populations and exposing society to the fundamental concepts of free media.

A positive example of the media's influence in elections involves the work of the U.S. Agency International Development's Office of Transitions Initiative (OTI) in Bosnia. In the first postwar Bosnian election, in 1996, U.S.-backed candidate Biljana Plavsic ran against Radovan Karadic, a nationalist candidate who has since been accused of genocide. At the time, Karadic's stronghold, Republika Srpska, allowed very few independent media outlets to operate within its territory. Between February 1996 and November 1998, however, OTI awarded \$6.3 million in grants to various independent media outlets throughout the country, including Republika Srpska, which increased the amount of available public information about the contest between Plavsic and Karadic. Through the expanded work of these new independent journalists, Plavsic was able to consolidate her power and win a stronger constituency.⁷

In Cambodia, UNTAC, recognizing that building a free press would take years and that free elections would be impossible without a free press, established Radio UNTAC, the first broadcast station run by a UN peacekeeping mission. Radio UNTAC was credited with bringing credible news and information to the public and with helping to produce a turnout of 95 percent of voters in the 1993 elections in spite of an aggressive campaign by the Khmer Rouge to dissuade the public from going to the polls.⁸ This achievement underscores the need for a widely accessible and credible news outlet as a critical component in a transitional environment. Although Radio UNTAC stands out as the best practice of facilitating an open and trusted information environment conducive to elections, a free and independent press with legal protections has still not been established in Cambodia due to government crackdowns on the media.

In the 2005 Afghan parliamentary elections, media coverage of the campaign was beneficial to the Afghan people, the electoral candidates, and the media entities themselves. For the public, media coverage of the elections provided critical information about candidates' platforms, voting locations, and the electoral process, which was new to the Afghan people. For the candidates, the experience of using the media to campaign exposed them to liberal concepts of free media and objective reporting. For the media sector, election coverage became a capacity-building experience. Through SAP, Afghan television and radio stations learned how to run a large advertising program efficiently and to create

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political advertisements in concise, two- to five-minute packages. Outlets also learned to adhere to professional standards and to apply media laws designed to encourage even-handed coverage of candidates regardless of their gender and party affiliations.

By contrast, in Kosovo, the U.S.-supported media initiative was not launched long enough before the first postwar Kosovar election, held in October 2000, to have much impact on those elections. U.S.-supported private media entities did not go on the air until September 2000, seventeen months after the Serbian withdrawal, a delay that media observers consider one of the biggest mistakes made during the pre-election period. As a result, there was insufficient time to train journalists before they had to cover the politically sensitive elections.

In addition to ensuring the presence of a media sector during elections, practitioners should seek to maximize diversity and pluralism. In Bosnia, before the first postwar elections were held, many media outlets existed but they were deeply veined by ethnic fault lines, which resulted in stations promoting sectarian candidates. The UN Office of the High Representative (OHR) realized that without an effort to diversify the media and create a stronger multiethnic voice, the elections would merely empower the nationalist leaders who had begun the war in the first place. The OHR established the Independent Media Commission (IMC) in Bosnia, which aimed to monitor hate speech and promote a tolerant and democratic society through independent media. The IMC also adopted political campaign coverage guidelines intended to ensure fair coverage of and equitable access to all political parties.

Deployment Phase: Building and Developing

Building a Foundation for the Media Sector

Lesson: Create a mission-owned outlet to deliver critical information about peace operations while monitoring and countering hate speech. Also consider ways to provide alternative programming.

Developing a mature media sector can take years, if not decades. One of the most immediate media tasks in a post-conflict environment is to create an outlet or outlets with the capacity to monitor and counter hate speech while promoting a durable peace.

Virtually every UN mission since UNTAC has created its own radio outlet to serve a range of functions critical to maintaining peace. Cambodia's Radio UNTAC was a positive model for mission-owned radio stations. Radio UNTAC was the most popular radio station in the country during the UN mission, delivering information on humanitarian assistance initiatives, disarmament sites, electoral processes, and other mission activities.⁹ Radio UNTAC also countered hate messages that sought to undermine the mission objectives, including rumors that UN personnel posed a threat to civilians and that voting devices had been tampered with.

The station denounced electoral violence and reassured voters that steps were being taken to ensure their safety and that their votes would be cast secretly. It also provided free and equal opportunities for political parties to air their messages and made a strong effort to inform all voters, many of whom were illiterate and had limited access to television, about all the candidates and their platforms.

Aside from their informational activities, mission-owned radios have also set positive examples for local media outlets. Within three weeks of its deployment, the UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slovakia (UNTAES) had set up Radio UNTAES in partnership with local broadcaster Radio Vukovar. Over time, Radio UNTAES, which was committed to unbiased reporting of UN efforts, became widely credited with "mellowing" Radio Vukovar's programming. Like Radio UNTAC, Radio UNTAES provided election coverage,

including news of election developments and practical advice on voting procedures. It also offered nonsensational coverage of the exhumations of mass graves.

But, like any regulatory entity, mission-owned radios can present challenges. Creating a media entity that is controlled by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) and that dominates the local airwaves can conflict with efforts to create the perception of the establishment of an independent, transparent media, even if the IGO's control is meant to be temporary. It can also weaken the indigenous capacity for media development and alienate the local population from a process that will be vital for the country's democratic progress. Furthermore, once the mission is complete, many international journalists return to their home countries, leaving few local practitioners with the skills to continue operations.

Lesson: Create a representative media commission to regulate media entities and establish norms that are consistent with international standards.

A healthy media sector requires a credible state media commission to establish standards, monitor media abuses, and address complaints. The inability to reign in irresponsible media can be detrimental in war-torn societies where ethnic tensions are still strong and violent relapse remains a possibility. To be effective, however, these regulatory entities must be fair and transparent, with clearly defined powers to avoid opportunities for abuse of authority. The task of creating a media commission is a delicate one, because indigenous populations may be wary of giving the state such authority, especially if the pre-conflict regime was a dictatorship.

The precise role of a media commission will vary according to the maturity of a country's media sector. Afghanistan's first media commission, established in 2005, focused on educational initiatives to introduce liberal media concepts to Afghans and educate people on the role of media in politics and society. Although the commission was limited in scope—its mandate was to monitor media coverage of the 2005 elections and handle any violations of media laws—it was able to achieve noteworthy success by establishing media standards throughout the Afghan provinces. Based in Kabul, the commission—which was composed of three national commissioners and two international commissioners—worked closely with the Joint Electoral Management Body to deliver critical information to the public while establishing a monitoring unit to track media coverage and ensure compliance with a code of conduct for the mass media.¹⁰

To implement the monitoring mandate, the commission contracted with Inkeshaf Consulting, an Afghani consulting firm that specializes in media monitoring. The firm trained sixty-eight monitors to track the output from nearly sixty media outlets nationwide. Working from offices located across seventeen provinces, the monitors included representatives from the Pashtun, Tajik, and Hazara ethnic groups, as well as twelve women. Monitors were trained in methodology, data entry, and other relevant tasks.¹¹

By contrast, the media commissions in Bosnia and Kosovo assumed a broader role over their media sectors, with greater authority to clamp down on nationalistic propaganda broadcast by party-controlled outlets. Bosnia's Independent Media Commission (IMC) has a jurisdictional reach that extends across all of the country's outlets, with full authority to grant and rescind operational licenses, order sanctions, and seize equipment.¹² Prior to 1997, the IMC was known as the Media Experts Commission (MEC), whose mandate included setting forth rules and regulations on the content of media outlets. Some of these policies included "providing true and accurate information," "refraining from broadcasting incendiary programming," and enabling parties to advertise on stations run by their political opponents. Although the regulatory body was resisted by local stations and was, by many accounts, largely ineffective, the MEC produced substantive successes for the media sector. Journalists praised it for raising the professional bar for journalism during electoral campaign periods and for seeking to enhance the personal safety and professional freedom of journalists by documenting complaints and violations of their

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One of the most fundamental levels involves implementing a strong legal framework that safeguards the greatest possible freedoms for the press and lays down a robust foundation on which to build radio, television, and print outlets.

rights. During the 1998 elections, the IMC addressed many complaints about extremist language being used in certain outlets.

In 2000, the UN established the office of the Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC) in Kosovo, whose job it was to monitor press reports. The TMC has since become an advocate for responsible media and has imposed fines on press outlets that have violated the UN media legal framework and the Code of Conduct for the Print Media. The commissioner fined Bota Sot, a daily newspaper, for making unsubstantiated accusations that two Albanian editors were working with the Serbian secret service, a claim that put the journalists' lives in danger. The TMC eventually used accumulated revenue from the fine to establish an award for journalism.¹³

Lesson: Create the legal underpinnings for media on a transitional basis and assist the indigenous government in passing sound media laws that protect journalists' freedom of speech while also protecting individuals from libel or slander.

The creation of a fully functioning media sector requires intensive work on various levels. One of the most fundamental levels involves implementing a strong legal framework that safeguards the greatest possible freedoms for the press and lays down a robust foundation on which to build radio, television, and print outlets.

Establishing or reforming a legal media framework can entail a range of tasks, including lobbying for media safeguards in the country's constitution, establishing a code of ethics for journalists, transforming state-controlled broadcasters into public service broadcasters, amending the penal and civil code to protect journalists against defamation charges, and adopting laws on information access to ensure transparency of public administration. Many different organizations have been involved in reforming media regulations and laws. In East Timor, Internews was the key actor in drafting press laws and lobbying the Timor constituent assembly for six months to include media freedoms in the state constitution. Other NGOs—Article 19, the World Press Freedom Association, and the Journalists' Association of East Timor (TJLA)—contributed to the process by providing legal advice and assistance in lobbying. The TJLA also created a self-regulating code of ethics with help from Internews and the UNTAES Office of Communication and Public Information.¹⁴

Media laws should be stated as unambiguously as possible to avoid misunderstanding in implementation. In 2004, the Afghan government passed a media law establishing the National Commission of Electronic Media Broadcast. Although the commission was designed to regulate and make policy for Afghan mass media, it was misunderstood to be an executive authority with control over Afghanistan's main public radio and television station, Radio and Television Afghanistan. For Afghans, who are unlikely to be well versed in liberal media vocabulary, the law does not sufficiently explain the different roles of policymaking bodies, regulatory authorities, and media operators.¹⁵

Another indispensable aspect of media law is the protection of journalists. Protecting journalists' rights has become imperative. Each year, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, dozens of journalists are murdered for their work as reporters, while hundreds more are persecuted by governments or opposition groups and face death threats to their families and themselves. In a well-known Bosnian case, Zeljko Kopanja, the editor of Banja Luka's (Republika Srpska) *Nezavisne novine*, was targeted because of his coverage of Serbian war criminals and lost both of his legs in a car bombing.¹⁶

Once media laws are in place, interveners must seek to ensure that state judiciary bodies have the capacity and the will to fully enforce these laws and to do so as consistently as possible. The weakness of the Afghanistan judicial system, for example, has enabled warlords to enforce their own media policies while ignoring national standards on free speech. The absence of a viable institutional framework for media has undermined the enforcement of media laws. Cambodia today still lacks an effective means by which to file complaints of libel, leaving the media unfettered by professional standards and more likely to breed a culture of journalistic impunity. At the same time, the government has

arbitrarily sanctioned outlets, creating a climate of uncertainty in which there are no uniform codes of conduct for journalists. Effective justice must also be administered against perpetrators of threats or violence against journalists.

Developing Media Outlets and Personnel

Lesson: Establish a diverse array of media outlets, including private and public entities and radio, television, and print outlets. Assess country demographics to maximize media accessibility by different segments of the population (e.g., minorities, women, youth, the illiterate).

One of the most visible steps in a media development strategy involves establishing media outlets that provide the public with truthful, objective information. The kinds of outlets that are created will shape the overall success of the strategy. Ultimately, practitioners should seek to create a diverse array of media outlets that includes a wide range of voices, including women and minorities, not just the leaders of dominant factions. Greater diversity typically produces a more open debate and a more competitive media market, which is critical to the long-term sustainability of media outlets. A pluralistic market also helps to dilute radical views and elevate moderate voices. Competing views also improve opportunities for peaceful public dialogue that will strengthen democratic values of non-violence and compromise.

The Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK), created by the OSCE, is considered one of the most successful examples of an inclusive, multiethnic outlet established in a post-conflict country. As Kosovo's sole public broadcaster, RTK sought to expand its accessibility to the country's diverse ethnic communities by implementing projects to provide captions for foreign films in the many different languages spoken by the various communities. In 2004, RTK also began to offer daily news broadcasts in the Serbian language and initiated programs directed specifically at various ethnic communities. Although RTK was initially run by a board of directors comprising both internationals and locals, governing authority was later transferred to locals.¹⁷

Similarly, in Bosnia, the OSCE established Radio FERN in July 1996, which became the first station in the country to be operated by a multiethnic staff of journalists. The news it produced was also multiethnic in nature; eventually, the station became independent of the OSCE and served as the foundation for the country's public radio structure.¹⁸

To determine the most suitable forms of media for a particular country, interveners should collect demographic information on language, literacy rates, and access to electricity, television, and radio. Widespread illiteracy and poverty in Afghanistan, Timor, Cambodia, and Rwanda, for example, warranted greater investment in radio rather than newspapers. Limited access to electronics and electricity could preclude the use of television stations as major media outlets. By comparison, Iraq has a high rate of literacy as well as substantial access to satellite technologies, which has resulted in the spread of newspapers and satellite television. According to Internews, television stations tend to be the media of choice in European and Eurasian regions, with radio, the Internet, and newspapers getting secondary attention. In Asia and Africa, where literacy rates are low, radio is the most popular medium. As a general trend, the role of the Internet in the spread of information has become increasingly important.¹⁹

Another consideration involves determining the suitable mix of public and private outlets. Both types have their benefits and drawbacks. Public outlets sometimes have more credibility with the public because they exist ostensibly to serve public interests, but they also tend to suffer from low levels of international assistance, which constricts their ability to produce high-quality programming. Private outlets tend to lack a clear mechanism for public service, but they offer diversity, a decentralized media culture, and

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prospects for developing a self-sustaining, market-driven media corps. Some interveners believe that a sustainable democracy requires both public and private media. The U.S. and European approaches to media outlet development that are fundamentally distinct, as mentioned earlier. Whereas Europeans favor transforming and strengthening publicly owned entities, U.S. media developers tend to focus on fostering new, independent, privately owned outlets.

The economic situation of the country may drive the outcome of the public-private debate. In many less developed countries, especially in Africa, the lack of a robust market for media explains why privately owned media outlets are few in number and overshadowed by the state media structure. Small, independent media entities are more likely to be found in more developed countries, such as in Asia and the Middle East.

One successful example of supporting private media features what eventually became Afghanistan's first private radio station, Radio Arman. The U.S. Agency for International Development gave \$2.2 million to three Afghan-Australian brothers. Within months, the brothers had successfully established the country's first radio station; they later started the country's first private television station, Tolo TV. This example is unusual insofar as international funding was given to a local entity that also used its own investment money.²⁰

Lesson: Establish effective journalism-training programs and institutions. Create a follow-up mechanism to ensure proper training of journalists.

Practitioners should develop rigorous media training programs to educate personnel on journalistic standards of professional integrity and independence. Many reporters in post-conflict societies have worked only under authoritarian regimes and lack experience in running independent media. Training programs must be designed with long-term interests in mind; they should offer a comprehensive education, include follow-up initiatives, and run for a long time.

A successful training program should educate people in the concepts of truth, impartiality, public service, and journalistic ethics. Business concepts, such as competition in the media market and management and administrative capacities, must also be taught. Station managers should understand how to run a business, including how to create and manage a sales department, run classified advertisements, arrange distribution, and manage revenue.

One positive model for media education is the Soros Media Center in Sarajevo, established in 1995 by financier and philanthropist George Soros. Many native journalists in Bosnia point to the center as a highly successful training initiative. After several years of operation, the center was turned over to Bosnians as an independent journalism school.

Care should be taken to continue to monitor trainees after the completion of their training programs. Too often, NGOs are preoccupied with being able to report that a high volume of trainees have completed a program and overlook the importance of testing trainees after the course is completed and helping them secure local jobs. Interveners should assess not only the trainees but also the training programs themselves to determine their long-term effectiveness in creating a competent cadre of local journalists. In Cambodia, international journalism training programs had limited impact because they were too narrowly focused on short-term gains and failed to follow up with trainees after the programs had been completed. Many Khmer journalists left the country after training or went to work for wire services.

Another task essential for long-term success is to establish vocational and post-graduate courses at the university level to encourage students to pursue journalism as a profession. Training programs must also get "buy in," or acceptance, from managers and media owners to maximize the benefits of training lower-level journalists. Additionally, interveners must groom local individuals to become trainers themselves and thus be able

to continue the education process once international programs have concluded. The first wave of trainers is typically made up of foreign journalists, but subsequent waves should feature an increasing number of locals. Interveners should also consider using journalists from the surrounding region as trainers; such people will likely better understand the history and culture of the host country than will trainers recruited from distant parts of the world.

In addition to training journalists, interveners must make a determined effort to educate the broader public about liberal conceptions of the role of media in politics and society. Many post-conflict societies are unaccustomed to having more than one dominant media outlet, which is typically controlled by the state. Moreover, some citizens are deeply suspicious about the media, having been accustomed to the distortions and half-truths that state-owned media outlets often disseminate. Others, especially in deeply divided societies, are easily manipulated by hate radio. Given these conditions and deep-seated preconceptions, substantial investment must be made to inform and educate the public on the role of free and independent media in democracies and the importance it has in protecting their rights and spotlighting abuses of government power.

Many NGOs specializing in media development have implemented educational programs, holding workshops and publishing informational materials to educate journalists and government officials on the proper relationship between the state and media.

Lesson: Create professional associations of journalists, publishers, and editors to strengthen leadership, promote the principles that undergird an independent media, and encourage accountability and compliance with community standards. Connect local journalists with international networks to enhance accountability.

Interveners should facilitate interaction among broad communities of independent journalists to bolster a culture of professionalism and encourage high standards. By engaging in a wider support network, journalists avoid being isolated from their domestic and international colleagues and are better positioned to resist manipulation by the state or other entities.

An association of media outlets can broadly represent the media community when its interests are at stake. Positive tasks for such an association might include developing widely accepted standards of journalism and negotiating with the government when it is designing media policies. Moreover, for interveners, supporting a community of media outlets may be more beneficial in terms of stimulating diversity than singling out individual outlets to support.

A number of existing entities help connect journalism communities across the world. One notable example is the International Journalists' Network, which is sponsored by the International Center for Journalists. Its Web site (www.ijnet.org) contains collections of media laws and codes of ethics adopted worldwide, as well as contact information for media assistance organizations around the world. The organization also tracks media assistance programs and seeks to coordinate donor activities to prevent duplication and to maximize impact.

A useful media standards entity in Bosnia is www.mediaonline.ba, a Web site dedicated to monitoring media in that country. Created with help from the French government in 2000, the site provides a forum for media experts and journalists to communicate and share experiences with colleagues from other countries that are also in transition. The organization comprises a network of correspondents throughout southeast Europe who track media development in their own countries.

Internews created the Global Forum for Media Development in 2005 to help connect media assistance organizations and improve strategies and policies for developing media around the world. The forum's first conference brought together more than five hundred participants from ninety-seven countries.²¹

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Exit Phase: Transitioning and Sustaining

Transition to Local Control and Ensure Long-Term Sustainability

Lesson: Transition control to local media leaders to avoid an erosion of capacity when the international mission concludes.

When developing media, implementers should assist new media outlets with an eye toward developing local capacity while mitigating dependency on the international community and other external entities. The strategy should involve weaning outlets off external support as soon as possible, forcing them to become self-sustaining. Private media outlets will become sustainable based on advertising revenue, the availability of which will ultimately depend on the ability of an outlet's programming to draw viewers or listeners.

A successful model for empowering local media is the mission-owned radio station in Bosnia, which assisted a student group (the Students' Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina) in establishing a station with the slogan "106.5—Keepin' You Alive, eFM Radio." The station started broadcasting from a wrecked militia barracks in Sarajevo's "snipers' alley" with \$20,000 worth of equipment from United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH). With additional funding and assistance from the European Union, Norway, Canada, and IFOR, eFM became a twenty-four-hour media outlet, broadcasting music and entertainment as well as news. (One exclusive interview that garnered the station respect and popularity was with the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.) The station is still popular and today broadcasts not only to the Sarajevo area but also beyond. It is now partners with other local broadcasters under an umbrella corporation, Cross Radio, which incorporates Croatian, Kosovar Albanian, and Serbian broadcasters. eFM has also become a training center for the students, teaching them not only the arts of journalism but also how to manage a radio station.

Lesson: Develop a robust media market in which private outlets can be self-sustaining over the long run, after international funding wanes. Establish funding mechanisms for local outlets to ensure continued funding to cover operating costs, training, and so forth.

A recurring challenge for media developers involves creating a sector that is sustainable beyond the mandate of the UN mission and is not dependent on international aid. In East Timor, the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) ran popular radio and television stations that reached all parts of the country. Programming on the stations focused on providing information on the Timorese elections and included UN news and entertainment. But despite their success among the Timorese population, the stations were unable to continue beyond the UNTAET mandate because no local broadcasting company was capable of assuming operations. The stations were shifted to the National Public Broadcasting Authority, a public service managed by the state.

Likewise, in Cambodia, Radio UNTAC was popular among the population but faltered after UNTAC's mandate ended. Local journalists lacked the technical know-how to sustain the station and did not have adequate funding to cover transmitter costs, spare parts for recording equipment, and other important assets.

Without the ability to fund operations over the long term, media entities become vulnerable to manipulation by political patrons who do have the funding to support media operations. Such dependency on external funding threatens outlets' credibility and independence. Many Cambodian outlets today, for example, remain hostage to political patrons, who shape media content to favor their own agendas.

To expedite the development of a sustainable media market, interveners should nurture a private media market that can begin to sustain itself based on market demand.

A recurring challenge for media developers involves creating a sector that is sustainable beyond the mandate of the UN mission and is not dependent on international aid.

According to industry experts, it takes more than five years to get a media market up and running. The market requires four key components—content creation, distribution, viewership, and outside revenues—that together create a positive feedback loop that can become self-propagating when properly nurtured.

Although a previously closed society will initially consume a great deal of news, the economic sustainability of a media outlet will depend on the entertainment it provides. In general, media environments consist overwhelmingly of entertainment, which drives ratings and the overall economics of a media market. Hence, interveners should introduce entertainment content to media outlets to foster the sustainability of the market over time.

Lesson: Create an indigenous mechanism to continue monitoring hate speech.

Once the international presence diminishes, having a permanent entity dedicated to monitoring media development is critical to fostering a healthy, independent media sector. It is particularly important to monitor hate speech; if the ability to monitor and respond to hate media declines, any progress made to that point in media development can be easily reversed.

Although Radio UNTAC was applauded for stimulating the growth of independent broadcast media in Cambodia, the trend reversed when the radio shut down. Within two years of the station's demise, the new Cambodian government passed a media law permitting the state to censor media that it considers a threat to national security. Opposition parties are no longer allowed to broadcast in the country and dissenting journalists are subjected to intimidation.

Elections in particular require robust media monitoring mechanisms. Three entities most commonly take up monitoring responsibilities: electoral management bodies; international electoral observation missions; and NGOs and other civic bodies. During parliamentary elections, the Afghan Media Commission successfully implemented a monitoring program that reached across all seventeen provinces. The Media Monitoring Unit trained Afghan media monitors to monitor Afghan media during the electoral campaign. Following the elections, the monitors were hired by an Afghan company that continues to monitor local media.²²

Conclusion

While each post-conflict situation will inevitably pose unique challenges for media practitioners, experience has shown that some issues present themselves—in one form or another—in almost all operations. If practitioners not only recognize these challenges but also learn how they have been handled in other interventions, then practitioners can shape their media development strategies accordingly and avoid repeating past mistakes.

In tailoring an appropriate model for media development in a given society, interveners should consider the following:

- The relationship that existed between the government and media outlets before and during the conflict. In some instances, this relationship may in some instance have led to or fed violence.
- The economic landscape of a country and its market potential to sustain media outlets once international donors and foundations have departed. After carefully considering all the components of the media sector, international players should calculate how best to distribute resources to enhance the prospects of that sector becoming self-sustaining. Intervenors should also focus on the creation of local capacity to maintain the media outlets even after the interveners are gone; local buy-in and ownership are important in ensuring longevity and success.

Once the international presence diminishes, having a permanent entity dedicated to monitoring media development is critical to fostering a healthy, independent media sector.

- The presence or absence of institutional mechanisms to regulate the conduct of the media. Where no effective institutions exist, interveners should create a mechanism such as a media commission to help ensure that media outlets play by the rules. Intervenors should also consider establishing independent associations of journalists, editors, and publishers to help protect journalists' rights and promote high professional standards.
- The timing of elections. Organizing free and fair elections is usually an important milestone in the development of societies emerging from conflict. However, such elections should be organized only after free and nonpartisan media outlets have been established in a country to ensure proper representation of all the actors involved.

Free media can serve as a powerful tool in societies emerging from conflict. If interveners can create a media sector that is not only independent, self-sustaining, and self-regulating but also inclusive and diverse, they can help to give a voice to those people who were silenced during the conflict, initiating open and honest dialogue about both the violent past and a peaceful future.

DEVELOPING MEDIA IN STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION MISSIONS

PREDEPLOYMENT PHASE

1. Map the Landscape	a. Map the existing media landscape in the country by identifying media outlets and personnel that have survived the conflict and could potentially support media reforms and the development of society at large.
	b. Assess the history of the media's relationship with the government and with society prior to and during the conflict.
	c. Assess the viability of a self-sustaining media market and identify available resources for creating a steady stream of revenue for a private market.
2. Create a Strategy	a. Create a plan for coordinating all the relevant players in media development by creating joint working groups or task forces (donors, trainers, NGOs, IOs, etc).
	b. Identify potential spoilers, and their associated infrastructure, who may seek to dominate media channels or continue to broadcast or print hate speech. Identify and elevate repatriates or local leaders with the potential to lead independent media development.
	c. Plan for an accountable media sector to begin operating before the first postwar elections are held.

DEPLOYMENT PHASE

1. Build a Foundation for the Media Sector	a. Create a mission-owned outlet to deliver critical information about peace operations while monitoring and countering hate speech. Also consider other ways to provide alternative programming for the public.
	b. Create a representative media commission to regulate media entities and establish norms that are consistent with international standards.
	c. Create the legal underpinnings for media on a transitional basis and assist the indigenous government, if applicable, in passing sound media laws that protect journalists' freedom of speech while also protecting individuals from libel or slander.

<p>2. Develop Media Outlets and Personnel</p>	<p>a. Establish a diverse array of media outlets, including private and public entities and radio, television, and print outlets. Assess country demographics to maximize media accessibility by different segments of population (e.g., minorities, women, youth, the illiterate).</p>
	<p>b. Establish effective journalism-training programs. Create a follow-up mechanism to ensure proper training of journalists.</p>
	<p>c. Create professional associations of journalists, publishers, and editors to strengthen leadership, promote the principles that underpin an independent media, and encourage accountability and compliance with community standards. Connect local journalists with international networks to enhance accountability.</p>
<p>EXIT PHASE</p>	
<p>1. Ensure Sustainability</p>	<p>a. Transition control to local media leaders to avoid an erosion of capacity when the international mission concludes.</p>
	<p>b. Develop a robust media market in which private outlets can be self-sustaining over the long run, after international funding wanes. Establish funding mechanisms for local outlets to ensure continued funding for local initiatives to cover operating costs, training, and so forth.</p>
	<p>c. Create an indigenous mechanism to continue monitoring hate speech.</p>

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