

# DO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE NEED A MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM?

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## JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

AND THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,  
NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
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## **DO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE NEED A MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM?**

**THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2007**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, AND  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION,  
AND TRADE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert Wexler (chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe) presiding.

Mr. WEXLER. Thanks for being here. I would like to call the joint subcommittee meeting of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Nonproliferation to order.

Just as a matter of housekeeping; Mr. Gallegly and the chairman, Mr. Sherman, will be here shortly. There has been a bit of confusion regarding the vote schedule on the floor. We thought there were going to be votes about 5 minutes ago. It appears they will now start in about 15 minutes. Since Mr. Royce is here we have decided to start now, with the permission of the witnesses, and then take a break for what will probably be not more than 20 minutes, I hope.

I want to thank my distinguished colleague, Congressman Brad Sherman, who chairs as I said earlier, the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. I also want to thank Mr. Royce, the ranking member on that subcommittee, as well as Mr. Elton Gallegly, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on Europe, for cooperating and putting together what I think is a very timely hearing.

The hearing today is, I think, aptly titled: Does the United States and Europe need missile defense? This is a critical question for American and European officials, given the mounting and complex global threats from non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, and from rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran. In this increasingly dangerous environment, it is essential that America, along with our allies in Europe, be proactive and cooperate closely to ensure that both sides of the Atlantic are protected and secure.

To this end, I have deep reservations about the President's proposed Europe-based missile defense plan that would include placing ten interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar base in the Czech Republic. I am also deeply concerned about the administration's rush to put in place an unproven ballistic missile defense sys-

tem, as well as its impact on our relations with our allies in Europe.

According to the *Washington Post's* editorial page yesterday, this system has had "only one successful test," and that was "under controlled conditions that would not be present in a real attack." Frederick Lamb, who co-chaired a 2003 American Physical Society study on boost-phase intercept systems for missile defense noted that "not a single test of this system has ever been carried out under realistic combat conditions. To assume it is going to work under realistic conditions with only a few minutes warning is like assuming a gun that has only been fired against a single, carefully arranged target in a brightly lit firing range is going to be successful in a fast-moving night battle against many enemies."

Congress is correct to question whether U.S. resources are best spent on a questionable ballistic missile defense program or better spent securing our Nation's borders, ports and railways against another 9/11-type attack. Given the political, economic and security concerns being raised, it is unacceptable for the American people—who have footed hundreds of billions of dollars for the war in Iraq—to once again provide a blank check to the President to spend billions more on a questionable missile defense program—whose costs, at a minimum, are to be shared by our European allies.

I strongly support the bipartisan vote yesterday in the House Armed Forces Strategic Subcommittee that significantly cuts funding for the President's plan for a missile defense site in Europe. I believe the subcommittee acted in the best interest of America by halting construction of the system while at the same time providing funding for an independent, comprehensive study to be conducted to examine the technical feasibility of the system, its economic impact, as well as the effect on our NATO and European allies.

I would like to address to our witnesses—whom I am very grateful for being here—specifically to Secretary Fried, I stand in great admiration of both your efforts and the efforts of Under Secretary Burns. Particularly, in the last 2 years, I think you two gentlemen, along with others in the administration, have shown an extraordinary ability to engage with Europe and repair transatlantic relations, and my hat is off to you for doing so.

On the other hand, it would seem that one of the lessons we could learn about the beginning of the war in Iraq, whether one supports the President's plans now or whether one opposes it, is that there is a value to multinational cooperation. I believe this is a lesson that has been learned and incorporated by the administration in terms of the manner in which we now deal with Iran and the manner in which we now deal with North Korea.

I would respectfully ask that the witnesses address the issue: Why would we engage at the beginning of this process in a bilateral way with Poland and with the Czech Republic and not engage with NATO, not engage in a multilateral forum, which would seem to make the most sense?

The other question, which I think is self-evident, is: If this is a missile defense program that is designed to benefit our European allies in addition to benefiting America, then wouldn't it make sense that our European allies would be on the ground floor of the funding of the system?



To suggest that America would be funding a system that has joint benefits or disproportionate benefits for Europe suggests that we are acting in a unilateral way, which suggests we are footing a bill that we irrationally have taken on ourselves, or does that suggest that we are pursuing a program that has little or no public support in Europe and that funding would be impossible to procure from European Parliaments?

Then that raises the question: If European Parliaments and European leaders do not believe either that the missile defense program meets a legitimate threat, then how is it that we will be successful if we foist this upon them?

Having said that, I would like to turn over the time now to Mr. Royce and give him an opportunity to make whatever statements he wishes, and when we come back, I will properly introduce the witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

The joint subcommittee hearing will come to order. I would like to welcome my distinguished colleague, Congressman Brad Sherman, Chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Trade, who is co-chairing this hearing. I also want to welcome the Ranking Member of the Europe Subcommittee Elton Gallegly and the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Non-proliferation and Trade Ed Royce.

Today's hearing is aptly titled "Does the United States and Europe Need Missile Defense?" This is a critical question for American and European officials given mounting and complex global threats from Non-State Actors, such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, and from rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran. In this increasingly dangerous environment, it is essential that America, along with our allies in Europe, be proactive and cooperate closely to ensure that both sides of the Atlantic are protected and secure.

To this end, I have deep reservations about the President's proposed Europe-based missile defense plan that would include placing 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar base in the Czech Republic. I am deeply concerned about the Administration's rush to put in place an unproven ballistic missile defense system as well as its impact on our relations with our allies in Europe.

According to the *Washington Post's* Editorial page yesterday, this system has had "only one successful test" and that was "under controlled conditions that wouldn't be present in a real attack." Frederick K. Lamb, who co-chaired a 2003 American Physical Society study on boost-phase intercept systems for missile defense noted that, "not a single test of this system has ever been carried out under realistic combat conditions. To assume it is going to work under realistic conditions with only a few minutes warning is like assuming a gun that has only been fired against a single, carefully arranged target in a brightly lit firing range is going to be successful in a fast-moving night battle against many enemies."

Congress is right to question whether US resources are best spent on a questionable ballistic missile defense program or securing our nation's borders, ports and railways against another 9/11-type attack or on additional funding to beef up our counter intelligence agencies and military capabilities to combat global terrorist networks.

Given the political, economic and security concerns being raised, it is unacceptable for the American people—who have footed hundreds of billions of dollars for the debacle in Iraq—to once again provide a blank check to the President to spend billions more on a questionable missile defense program—whose costs at a minimum ought to be shared by our European allies.

I strongly support the vote taken in the House Armed Forces Strategic Forces Subcommittee yesterday that significantly cuts funding for the President's plan for a missile defense site in Europe. The subcommittee has acted in the best interest of America by halting construction of the system while at the same time providing funding for an independent comprehensive study to be conducted to examine the technical feasibility of the system, its economic impact as well as effect on our NATO and European allies.

It is clear there is no consensus of opinion in Congress whether this particular missile defense program is in the best interest of the United States, and it is painfully clear that many of our European allies are wary of placing this system in Europe and its impact on relations with an increasingly bellicose Russia. Europeans also question why—if this program is really intended to protect Europe—did the Administration choose to bilaterally negotiate with Poland and the Czech Republic rather than collectively decide this issue in NATO.

Mr. Fried, you along with Under Secretary Nick Burns have spent the last two years tirelessly working to reverse America's setbacks in Europe—I say this with the greatest amount of respect for your efforts. If that is the case, shouldn't the Administration be wary of cherry picking allies—a kind of coalition of the willing—instead of making certain that our missile defense policy is agreed to by our European allies in a Transatlantic organization such as NATO?

From an Al Qaeda terrorist carrying a suitcase bomb to ensuring energy security to addressing proliferation of missile technologies—the US along with European must determine collectively whether it makes strategic sense to deploy this missile program or to focus our collective resources on more immediate threats facing America and our allies.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Royce.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this hearing.

I think I will start my remarks here by saying that when we begin this discussion, we should start by gauging the threat. Today, we know that missile proliferation is a growing menace. Today, some 24 countries possess missiles of various ranges. The most troubling though are those countries seeking weapons of mass destruction. Primarily for us here today in this debate, I think it is North Korea and it is, certainly, Iran; the topic at hand is about Iran.

Given what we know about Iran's technical capabilities and what we suspect of its intentions, based upon the remarks by its head of state, enhancing our ability to counter its missiles is common sense. The proposed missile defense deployments in Poland and in the Czech Republic would help do that, better protecting the United States and Europe from any future threatening attack from Iran.

Russia's diplomatic attack on this proposal has certainly done some damage to our standing in Europe. The fact that this modest deployment of radars and non-lethal interceptors poses no threat to Russian security, is almost beside the point, I think, to the Russians. Of late, outreach to help Europe has helped change the debate some. It is beneficial that the President has engaged with European leaders, including on Monday of this week. It also helps that the United States has been exceptionally open to Russia; going the extra mile in offering its technology and offering the Russians site visits to see what we are doing here.

President Putin, though, has gone an extra 2 miles in the other direction; leading a public relations assault. This reflects, to some extent, Russia's trend away from democracy. This controversy, stripped to its essence, is about Russia's ambitions to diminish United States clout and expand its power eastward, not its national security. In attacking this deployment, Russia says Iran will pose no threat to Europe for a long time, if ever. Many Europeans respectfully disagree with that Russian assertion.

Russia, not coincidentally, has profited by arming Iran with a state-of-the-art air defense system and an increasing amount of weaponry. Some have suggested that Iran is using Russian tech-

nology for its missiles. Meanwhile, Russia is resisting meaningful international action against Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. All of this makes Moscow, to my mind, no fair judge of the Iranian threat to Europe or to the United States, nor am I particularly interested in Moscow's view of the appropriateness of our responses, including missile defense deployments in Eastern Europe.

I differ with the point that throwing away this missile defense deployment would make Russia more cooperative in defaming Iran's nuclear program. It is unlikely that Russia would meaningfully compromise a deepening relationship with Iran over what its leadership surely understands is our relatively minor and unthreatening defensive deployment. Besides, the Russians are enjoying tweaking our tail over this. Some sensitivity to Russians is called for, but not here.

Missile defense will not address all of the threats we face, as its critics unrealistically demand, but it certainly is a valuable tool among others, including export controls, deterrents and the Proliferation Security Initiative that we need to counter missile proliferation which knows no borders, especially in a world awash in WMD material and technology. Given the threat we face, it is only prudent to press forward, overcoming the considerable technical challenges and working with our European allies to build the best protection possible against all classes of missiles.

The majority party has largely opposed missile defense over the years. A key subcommittee chair yesterday moved legislation to cut out the Polish interceptors. This opposition, I am afraid, is partly because missile defense is a legacy of President Reagan. It is my hope that this Congress does nothing to weaken our missile defense efforts which might encourage Iran, North Korea, and others to redouble their missile development efforts.

I look forward to the administration witnesses making their cases, and I would just close by mentioning that President Clinton said that we have enough confidence in the technology and in the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system to move forward to deployment. That was the view of President Clinton. That is also my view.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you to Mr. Royce.

The votes have been called. I thank Mr. Wilson for joining us. I think what we will do at this point is break. We will come back. If Mr. Sherman and Mr. Gallegly at that point wish to say a few words, we will do that, and then I will introduce the witnesses.

Before I break I just want to associate myself with some of the remarks of Mr. Royce—which I think are very well stated—and simply suggest that I think most in the majority party understand there is a value to missile defense. I do not think there is any debate about that. I also do not think there is a debate in terms of the threat that Iran and North Korea face to the United States.

The question, from my mind, is does this proposal meet the threat, and if it does, are we going about its implementation in a way that would ensure the greatest likelihood of its success? That is, I hope, what we could engage in when we come back.

I thank Mr. Royce very much for his thoughtful remarks, and we will break for the two votes. Thank you very much.

[Recess.]

Mr. WEXLER. The votes just ended a moment ago, so I am going to give my colleagues a couple of minutes to get here.

Mr. Royce having arrived, I think it is time to begin. I would like now to introduce our witnesses. I will first call the joint subcommittee hearing back into order.

Our first witness is Ambassador Daniel Fried, the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs for the Department of State. Prior to his current position, Ambassador Fried served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council. His long and quite distinguished career has seen service in the former Soviet Union and as a Senior Advisor on European policy for several administrations. In addition, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Poland from November 1997 to May 2000.

Our second witness is Mr. John C. Rood, the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at the Department of State. Previously, Mr. Rood served as the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterproliferation Strategy at the National Security Council. He worked for over 5 years at the National Security Council, holding several positions. Additionally, Mr. Rood was a Senior Policy Analyst for Senator Kyl after holding a variety of positions at the Central Intelligence Agency.

I would also like to note that we are joined by Air Force Major General Chris Anzalone, the Deputy for Test Integration and Fielding, and Mr. Keith Englander, the Director of Engineering, both of the Missile Defense Agency, who will not be testifying but who will be able to answer questions related to the technical aspects of the missile defense system.

Before we go to our witnesses, as I mentioned earlier this is a joint subcommittee hearing, Congressman Brad Sherman has joined us, who chairs the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, and I would invite Mr. Sherman to make his opening statement.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would have been here at the beginning of the festivities, but I had been informed that we were going to hold them after the votes. I then went into a place where my Blackberry would not work, and have reemerged.

Despite spending approximately \$110 billion since the 1980s, our system of national missile defense does not inspire confidence in a rush to deploy this system, notwithstanding test failures; and I should point out that in the vast majority of those tests, the participants knew the missile was coming. There was only one missile to hit at a time, and the incoming missile offer had no countermeasures. But in spite of those test failures, in 2002 the Bush administration scrapped the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty so it could deploy the renamed Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System. The Pentagon installed missiles in Alaska and in Vandenberg, California. Two intercept flight test systems failed to launch. The Alaska site was flooded due to poor planning.

Now, the administration wants Congress to spend \$4 billion on another ground-based system, this time in Europe. It will consist

of—and I will not go into the details as to how many missiles will be in Europe—but of course, as we know, the system will be in Poland and the Czech Republic. Not only does the administration want to deploy a system that does not work, but it is willing to do so at the expense of cooperation with Russia and our NATO allies and a host of issues far more important to our defense.

Before I go on, I should also point out that the real threat to the United States is a nuclear weapon smuggled into the U.S., much like a bale of marijuana is smuggled into the U.S. You do not have to be a rocket scientist to smuggle a bale of marijuana into the United States, and that, of course, could come either from an Iranian nuclear weapon or as a result of the failure to fund the Nunn-Lugar program, a loose nuke from Russia.

The question, then, is not whether our newly reminted Star Wars system fails and whether it just costs us \$110 billion to no avail, but whether it actually increases the likelihood that an American city will be destroyed by a smuggled nuclear weapon.

I will enter into the record a description of how the missile tests have been, if anything, rigged—or “slanted” is probably a better word than “rigged”—to show that missile defense was capable and, at the same time, demonstrate failure after failure. But again, even the best missile defense system is harmful to our national security if it increases the likelihood that a weapon will be smuggled across our borders.

Keep in mind, unlike the marijuana smugglers, a nuclear weapon only has to reach a mile offshore. It does not actually have to cross the border into the United States. An explosion in Juarez could destroy a big chunk of El Paso. So it is considerably harder to stop a nuclear weapon from entering the United States than a bale of marijuana, and I am told that marijuana has been successfully smuggled into the United States by entities far less sophisticated than a government capable of creating nuclear weapons.

So, other than the \$110 billion, though, what has this system cost us?

Well, in my view, it has caused a severe irritant in our relationship with Russia at a time when Russia’s cooperation is critical on the two real threats to us. We need Russian support on Nunn-Lugar implementation and the resulting control of loose nukes.

How can we turn to Russia and say, “We are deploying an anti-missile system in the Czech Republic and Poland designed,” you would think, “to eliminate your strategic capacities—although we will tell you it is not—and at the same time, we want to send our inspectors to ‘help you’ reduce your nuclear capacity”?

Needless to say, via the tearing up of the anti-ballistic missile treaty, followed by the creation of a Star Wars system and now, just to stick it to them, the deployment in the Czech Republic and Poland, it is virtually guaranteed to stop any real cooperation on Nunn-Lugar, although I am sure that they will still go through the motions for a diplomacy stake.

Another issue: We need Russia’s cooperation with regard to Iran. The key to stopping Iran is U.N. sanctions. The key to those U.N. sanctions is to prevent the importation into Iran of refined oil products. We are nowhere near getting Russia’s cooperation on that. Our plan to put pressure on the Iranian Government is a manifest

failure. The centrifuges turn at Natanz, and I can think of no better way to assure that Russia will do very little—and they have done a little—but do very little to help us stop the Iranian program than to stick it to them by putting our missiles in what used to be their allies.

I yield back.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sherman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BRAD SHERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

Despite spending approximately \$110 billion since the 1980's, our system of national missile defense does not inspire great confidence. In a rush to deploy the system, notwithstanding test failures, the Bush Administration decided in 2002 that it would scrap the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, so that it could deploy the newly re-minted Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD).

In 2004, the Pentagon installed missiles at Fort Greely in Alaska and additional missiles at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Since then, two of the intercept flight tests of the system failed to even launch, and the Alaska site was recently flooded due to poor planning.

Without any acknowledgement of these failures, the Bush Administration now wants Congress to spend \$4 billion on another ground-based ballistic missile system, this time in Europe. It will consist of ten Ground-based Midcourse Defense Interceptor missiles in Poland, a mid-course radar moved from the Marshall Islands to the Czech Republic, and an x-band radar positioned in a second area, one closer to the Middle East, potentially in the Caucasus.

Not only does the Administration want to deploy a system that does not work, it is willing to do it at the expense of cooperation with Russia and our NATO allies on a host of critical issues, including nuclear and missile proliferation, the very concerns missile defense is meant to counter.

*Our Missile Defense System Will Likely Fail If We Ever Have to Call on It.*

Even if we had the luxury of ignoring the political ramifications of moving forward on the President's proposal, the reality is that this system we have does not work. It makes no sense, therefore, to put it in other places.

The recent record of the GMD is not good. Out of the five tests conducted since 2002 in which an "intercept" of a target missile was planned, three failed. Curiously, the 6th and most recent test, and the one touted by missile defense supporters as proving the critics wrong, did not involve a planned intercept. The Missile Defense Agency and the contractors stated prior to that September 2006 test that their objective was just to see if certain components worked properly, not to hit an incoming missile. Lo and behold, the interceptor did hit the target. T

These tests are generally conducted under favorable conditions. The September 2006 test unlike previous tests, did not involve any countermeasures. It had to be put off for a day due to bad weather at Vandenberg. The tests are rigged in favor of the intercept vehicle—the flight paths of the target have often been plugged into the system. Even then, it still has a success rate of just 50 percent since 2002—but only 40 percent when the Missile Defense Agency is actually trying.

This leaves us with the same failure rate of 60 percent that we have witnessed since missile interception tests began in the early 80s. Both the GAO and the DOD Director of Operational Test & Evaluation recommended that the Missile Defense Agency conducts additional flight tests to validate its effectiveness *before* deployment. I know that the Pentagon often has to rush systems into the field due to the exigencies of war—but this is the only major system I am aware of that was deployed in the R and D phase *by design*.

We should not compound this error by placing the system in a provocative location overseas. I cannot fault the Bush Administration for trying to protect America from a nuclear Iran. I do feel, however, that pushing missile defense will fail to protect us. I am afraid it may actually make it more likely that we will actually have to face a nuclear Iran.

*The Deployment will Further Fray U.S.-Russian Relations*

While the threat of an Iranian ICBM capability is not yet upon us, and in my view is somewhat exaggerated anyway, the day that Iran can carry out a nuclear attack with a smuggled weapon or an attack through a terrorist proxy is coming

much quicker than many in our government think. Rather than focusing on an aggressive strategy to diplomatically and economically isolate Iran, the Bush Administration is pushing the deployment of system that strains U.S. relations with Russia, a necessary and not always very willing partner in international efforts to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program.

Senior Russian officials have publicly and loudly raised concerns about the proposed deployment. President Putin went so far as to describe this system as the start of "an inevitable arms race." Now, instead of talking to the Russians about the problems in Tehran, we are involved in a tit-for-tat exchange with the Russians over missile defense program that may never work.

Russia has suspended, and may actually terminate, its adherence to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). It has threatened to withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) which prohibits America and Russia from possessing ground based nuclear and conventional missiles with a range of 500–550 kilometers. Russia has also warned that it may cease cooperation on a joint missile launch warning center.

Not worried by those prospects? Think Russia is all bluster, no bite? You can add the European missile defense to list of Russian grievances—when it comes time to vote on the next round of Iran sanctions, or when we seek greater Russian cooperation on any of the issues where we *need* Russia, we pay a high price for antagonizing Moscow. We often do so for little or no gain.

*Another Coalition of the Willing*

These problems could be mitigated somewhat if the system were deployed within the framework of NATO. The Bush Administration has tried to sell this program as helping both America and European security. But because the Bush Administration has pursued agreements with the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic, it seems we are unwilling to sell it to the wider Europe that would benefit.

Because we are again "going it alone," we are again paying for it alone. Deployment of this missile system will drain an estimated \$4 billion from our defense budget over the next six years.

*The Real Threats From Iran*

Again, this approach completely neglects the reality of the threats we face. This system is intended to protect against a nuclear ICBM strike from Iran. But a missile defense shield does nothing to protect us against a smuggled bomb or nuclear weapon hidden on a ship in one of our ports. Iran is far more likely to use terrorist proxies to carry out an attack on the United States (or Europe for that matter), than use missile technology it does not possess yet.

A missile defense shield simply will not deter a rouge government from providing a terrorist organization with nuclear materials, and it will not deter radical governments from using one by unconventional means. We have an obligation to increase international pressure on Iran to abandon these programs entirely, and we need to step up cooperation from Russia and our European allies. We do not need to deploy a system which is still, for all intents and purposes, still in the development phase.

Ineffective missile defense cannot substitute for an effective nonproliferation policy. Unfortunately, I think that substitute is exactly what we are being sold today.

Mr. WEXLER. With that, we will go to Ambassador Fried. Thank you very much.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Ambassador FRIED. Chairman Wexler, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Royce, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you again. It is a pleasure to be here. Thank you, Chairman Wexler, for your kind words earlier.

The short answer to the question of whether Europe and the United States need a missile defense system is, in my view and in the administration's view, an emphatic "yes." This answer is based on an assessment of the strategic context we face today, which is radically different than that prevailing during the Cold War.

We face the possibility that some of the world's most threatening and unstable regimes will develop and deploy lethal nuclear arsenals and the ballistic missiles to deliver them to Europe and to the United States. In the Cold War, classic deterrence theory held that near-absolute vulnerability and reliable retaliatory capability—the so-called “Mutual Assured Destruction” theory—provided security. During the debate over President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, the so-called “Star Wars” 25 years ago, others argued that defenses were a better answer to strategic challenges. That debate was never settled, but it is not, at any rate, relevant today. Today, we face threats of a different kind and need different answers, unencumbered by heated arguments and positions of the past.

Iran already possesses many medium- to short-range missiles. The Shahab-3 missile is capable today of reaching targets in Southeast Europe, and Iran will not stay put. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iran could have long-range missiles capable of reaching all of Europe and the United States before 2015 if it chooses to develop them. Iran’s development of threatening capability is matched by threatening rhetoric, including direct threats to Europe.

As an example, let me quote Iranian President Ahmedinejad from last October, and this is, let me recall, a leader who denies the Holocaust ever existed and who says the State of Israel should be wiped off the map. Referring to possible war between Israel and the Palestinians, this is what the Iranian President stated to our European friends:

“We have advised the Europeans that the Americans are far away, but you are the neighbors of the nations in the region. We inform you that the nations are like an ocean that is welling up, and if a storm begins, the dimensions will not stay limited to Palestine, and you may get hurt.”

Other threats may develop as well beyond Iran. As Defense Secretary Gates told European allies and the Russians last week, we must think 20 years ahead and consider all of the threats we may face. Diplomatic efforts may help reduce or even prevent these threats. Along with our European allies and Russia, we are engaged in intensive diplomacy intended to change Iran’s current nuclear development plans. This is the best course, and we may succeed, but we may not; and we have, in any event, a responsibility to defend the American people and our allies.

In this context, our proposal for a limited missile defense system makes sense. It allows for a wider, more flexible range of options to respond to a potential attack should deterrence fail. Let me stress that the system we are contemplating is nowhere as ambitious as was the missile defense plans, the so-called “Star Wars” of the Cold War. It is limited, fitting the threats we face.

The importance of having multiple options was evident last summer when we activated our fledgling defense system for the first time in response to the North Korean missile launch preparations. A missile defense system does not mean that the United States is abandoning nonproliferation efforts or other efforts to prevent other sorts of nuclear threats.



On the contrary, a missile defense system can help our non-proliferation efforts. Effective defenses reduce incentives for states to acquire missiles in the first place. The missile defense system we are proposing to place in Europe, in cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic, would provide an extra layer of protection against possible missile attacks to our NATO allies, other European friends, and the United States.

The threat is real, and the system we are proposing can work. It calls for fielding ten interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar facility in the Czech Republic. These assets would be for purely defensive purposes to counter missile threats from the Middle East, particularly Iran. They have no offensive capability. The interceptors carry no explosive warhead of any type, but rely on kinetic energy to collide with and destroy incoming warheads.

Poland and the Czech Republic have accepted our offer to negotiate with them. My colleague, Assistant Secretary Rood, will lead the first round of negotiations later this month. Basing missile defense assets there deepens our strategic relationships with Poland and the Czech Republic. Deploying this limited system on the territory of these two important NATO allies would extend defensive coverage to their territory and most of Europe as a whole. Secretary Gates was in Poland last week, and I accompanied him. The Poles and Czechs will have questions about the systems, and we will have answers. We have agreed that these systems must increase net security to Poland and to the Czech Republic. A great deal has been said and written about Russia's reaction to our plans.

The system poses no threat to Russian security. The interceptors cannot be used effectively against Russia's strategic forces, and the Russians know this. We have consulted with Russia on this issue on numerous occasions and at very high levels, starting last year. We have recently intensified our consultations with Russia, and President Bush offered President Putin cooperation on missile defense. Assistant Secretary Rood can explain this in more detail. In Moscow last week, Secretary Gates made clear to the Russian leadership that we were prepared to address their concerns.

Mr. Chairman, transatlantic security is indivisible. If Europe is not secure, the United States is not secure. We cannot have U.S. security decoupled from that of our NATO allies. We cannot take a unilateral or isolationist approach to security. Indeed, we have on multiple occasions, over some time, consulted and cooperated with our NATO allies and friends on missile defenses, both within the NATO Alliance and the NATO-Russia Council. President Bush made it a priority to offer extended coverage to our friends and allies and deployed forces. We have been working on theater missile defenses within NATO and the NATO-Russia Council for some time now, and we have made progress. Our most recent discussions were on April 19th in Brussels and last week in Oslo at the level of NATO Foreign Ministers, where I accompanied Secretary Rice.

We have made significant progress within NATO and the NRC, NATO-Russia Council, in explaining the security rationale for the system, its technical capabilities, what it can do against Iranian capability in particular, and what it cannot do against the Russian arsenal. After the April 19th NATO-Russia Council meeting, NATO

Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told reporters that “there is a shared threat perception and that allies agree that a threat from ballistic missiles exists.” Last week’s meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo showed near unanimity in support of the concept of missile defenses from our NATO allies. Security is indivisible, as I said.

The location of the proposed defense installations in Poland and in the Czech Republic is optimal for covering the most Alliance territory possible. We are currently working with NATO to explore how a U.S. long-range missile system could work with NATO missile defense systems. The U.S. proposed system is designed to counter long-range threats from the Middle East and would be able to protect all of those NATO countries facing such threats. However, some allies still could face threats from short- and medium-range missiles. For these countries to be protected, they would require short- and medium-range missile defense systems. These systems are more mobile than the systems we are proposing and can be deployed quickly if a need should arise.

As I mentioned, NATO has already launched a development effort focused on countering shorter-range threats specifically through its Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense system, a NATO-funded, command-and-control system integrating sensors and interceptors which will be provided by member nations.

NATO is also exploring options to protect the Alliance against the full range of ballistic missile threats, including long-range missiles. At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO heads of state in government noted the conclusions of the Missile Defense Feasibility Study, which agreed that missile defense for NATO territory is technically feasible within the assumptions of the study. U.S. and NATO efforts are complementary and could work together to form a more effective defense for Europe. We would be able to link NATO systems with the ones we plan to deploy. We have raised this idea of cooperation with NATO.

In sum, we have made progress with our European allies, with NATO, and potentially with Russia about our proposed missile defense system in Europe.

Thank you for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Ambassador Fried.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,  
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Chairman Wexler, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Gallegly, Ranking Member Royce, members of the Subcommittees, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you again. Today, I will speak about our missile defense plans for Europe, focusing on the regional issues, while Assistant Secretary John Rood will focus on the more technical and performance issues related to missile defense.

I will start by asserting that the strategic context we face today is radically different than that prevailing during the Cold War. We face the possibility that some of the world’s most threatening and unstable regimes can develop and deploy lethal nuclear arsenals and the ballistic missiles to deliver them to Europe and even the United States.

In the Cold War, classic deterrence theory held that near-absolute vulnerability and reliable retaliatory capability—so-called Mutual Assured Destruction—provided security stability. Others, especially in the 1980s during the debate over President

Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, argued that defenses were in fact a better answer to the strategic nuclear challenge of the time. That debate was never settled; my point is that this debate is no longer relevant and should not be carried forward to the early 21st century. We face threats of a different kind and need different answers unencumbered by heated arguments of the past.

The missile and nuclear threat from Iran is developing. That country already possesses hundreds of medium range Shahab-3 and short-range ballistic missiles. Iran is developing follow-on medium range systems that will be capable of reaching targets in southeast Europe. Iran has expressed its intent to develop space launch vehicles (SLVs), which is cause for some concern given the similarities between SLV technology and that found in longer-range ballistic missiles. The Intelligence Community estimates that Iran could develop long-range missiles capable of reaching all of Europe and the United States by 2015 if it chooses to do so.

Iran's worrying development of a threatening capability is matched by threatening rhetoric, including direct threats to Europe. As an example, let me offer recent remarks by Iranian President Ahmadinejad made last October 20 in Tehran. Referring to possible war between Israel and the Palestinians, he stated, "We have advised the Europeans that the Americans are far away, but you are the neighbors of the nations in the region. We inform you that the nations are like an ocean that is welling up, and if a storm begins, the dimensions will not stay limited to Palestine, *and you may get hurt.*"

There may be other threats that develop in the region of the Middle East or elsewhere. As Defense Secretary Gates told European Allies and the Russians last week, we must think twenty years ahead, and consider the threats we may face.

Diplomatic efforts may help reduce these threats and even prevent some of them from arising altogether. We hope for the best and indeed are engaged in intensive diplomacy with our European allies and Russia intended to change Iran's current nuclear development plans. We may succeed, and this is the best course. But we may not succeed.

We have in any event a responsibility to defend the American people and our allies. In this context, limited missile defense makes sense. It does not substitute for deterrence, but in a situation where we may face smaller threats from countries more radical and potentially more dangerous than was the Soviet Union, it allows for a wider, more flexible range of options to respond to a potential attack should deterrence fail.

Let me stress that the system we are contemplating is nowhere as ambitious as was the missile defense plans of the Cold War. It is limited, fitting the threats we may face. And the new strategic environment is not hypothetical, but emerging in our time. The importance of defenses and multiple options was evident last summer when we activated our fledgling defense system for the first time in response to the North Korean missile launch preparations.

Developing a missile defense system does not mean that the United States is abandoning an emphasis on non-proliferation. Indeed, putting a missile defense system in place could help our non-proliferation efforts as effective defenses reduce incentives for states to acquire missiles in the first place.

The missile defense system that we are proposing to place in Europe—in cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic—would provide an extra layer of protection against possible missile attacks not only to the United States, but also to NATO allies and other European friends. The goal is to field a system that is capable of enhancing protection of the United States that also has the benefit of protecting Europe.

Transatlantic security is indivisible. As we learned the hard way in the 20th century, if Europe is not secure, the United States is not secure. We cannot have U.S. security decoupled from that of our NATO allies. We cannot take a unilateral or isolationist approach to security. We need a common level of protection from threats for the United States and for our European allies.

The threat is real, and the system we are proposing is practical. Testing has demonstrated that the limited missile defense system we are proposing works. Since 2001, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has had 27 successful hit-to-kill intercepts out of 35 attempts. And 15 of the last 16 flight tests have been successful.

The proposed system calls for fielding 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar facility in the Czech Republic. These would be for purely defensive purposes—to counter missile threats from the Middle East, particularly Iran. They have no offensive capability. Indeed, the ballistic missile defense interceptors carry no explosive warheads of any type, but rely instead on their kinetic energy to collide with and destroy incoming warheads. Moreover, the silos constructed for the deployment of defensive interceptors are substantially smaller than those used for our offensive missiles. We have no plans to modify these silos in the future, and any conversion

would require extensive modifications, thus precluding the possibility of covertly converting the interceptor silos for use by offensive missiles.

We have made a formal offer to begin negotiations with both Poland and the Czech Republic. They have accepted our offer; Assistant Secretary Rood will lead the first round of negotiations, which are scheduled to begin in late May. Basing these missile defense assets in Europe presents the United States with an opportunity to deepen our strategic relationships with Poland and the Czech Republic. Mutually agreeing to deploy a limited capability on the territory of two important NATO Allies would extend defensive coverage to their populations and territory, and to most of Europe as a whole.

We have consulted intensively with the Poles and Czechs on these issues; Secretary Gates was in Poland last week and I accompanied him. The Poles and Czechs will have questions about the system, and we will have answers. The Poles and Czechs will want to make sure that their national security is increased as a result of any deployment that takes place. We look forward to discussing with both these allies the nature of current and potential threats to their security from any quarter and how we can address them together.

I said earlier that we did not believe in unilateral security. Indeed, we have on multiple occasions over several years consulted and cooperated with our Allies and friends on missile defenses within both NATO and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). President Bush made it a priority to offer to extend coverage to our friends and Allies and deployed forces. We have also been working on theater missile defenses within NATO and the NRC for some time now and have made progress.

NATO's work on missile defense has focused on three activities: the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, technical work to support decisions on possible missile defense for the protection of NATO territory and population centers, and cooperation with Russia on Theater Missile Defense (TMD).

In 2005, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the ALTBMD program, a NATO-funded Command and Control structure integrating sensors and missile defense interceptors which will be provided by member nations. This system is focused on the protection of NATO deployed forces against ballistic missiles with a range of up to 3,000 km (shorter-to-medium range missile defense). NATO plans to an initial capability to defend its forces by 2010; a fully operational system capable of protecting areas against missiles up to 3,000 km is planned for the 2015-2016 timeframe.

NATO has also begun to explore options to protect the Alliance against the full range of ballistic missile threats, including long-range missiles. At the 2006 Riga Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government noted the conclusions of the Missile Defense Feasibility Study, which found that missile defense for NATO territory is technically feasible within the assumptions and limitations of the study. Now that the U.S. is proposing a long-range missile defense system in Europe, NATO is assessing how the U.S. plan could work with NATO missile defense.

We have had three senior-level NATO and NRC discussions on U.S. missile defense plans in Europe within the past six months. Our most recent discussions were on April 19 in Brussels and last week in Oslo at the level of Foreign Ministers, where I accompanied Secretary Rice.

A great deal has been said and written about Russia's reaction to our plans. As we have stated publicly and privately, the system poses no threat to Russian security. The interceptors do not have the capability to be used against Russia's strategic forces. Moreover, ten defensive missiles would be of no use against Russia's hundreds of missiles and thousands of nuclear warheads. The Russians know this.

We have consulted with Russia on this issue on numerous occasions and at very high levels, starting last year. We have recently intensified our consultations with Russia, and President Bush offered to President Putin U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense.

Two weeks ago my colleague Assistant Secretary of State John Rood and DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary Brian Green traveled to Moscow and offered Russia a detailed proposal for such cooperation. He can explain this to you in more detail. In Moscow last week, Secretary Gates expanded on this proposal, and made clear to the Russian leadership that we were prepared to address their concerns about our program and plans.

Although Russia remains wary of U.S. missile defense plans, I believe that we have made significant progress within NATO and the NRC in explaining the security rationale for the system, its technical capabilities, what it can do against Iranian capability in particular, and what it cannot do against the Russian arsenal.

Our most recent consultations have been well received. After the April 19 NRC meeting, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told reporters that "there is a shared threat perception" and that "Allies agree that a threat from ballistic mis-

siles exists." He also stated that, "There is a shared desire that any U.S. system should be complementary to any NATO missile defense system." The missile defense assets we propose to deploy in Europe have been designed to be complementary to any future NATO ballistic missile defense system. We welcome NATO cooperation in missile defense, particularly in addressing the short-range threats that Europe faces from the Middle East.

At last week's meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Oslo there was near unanimity in support of missile defense from our NATO allies. Minister after Minister acknowledged that a genuine problem exists, a genuine security threat that missile defense is designed to address. Allies support further NATO work on the subject and supported our offers to cooperate with the Russians. During his press statement on April 26, Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer noted that U.S. missile defense plans do not upset the strategic balance of Europe. He stated, "It is clear that there is a full understanding between the allies that the plans in the framework of the third site cannot, and will not, and do not upset the strategic balance in Europe. There was a lot of support for the wide-ranging United States proposals vis-&-vis our Russia partners for closer cooperation on missile defence." De Hoop Scheffer also publicly stated that U.S. offers of missile defense cooperation to the Russians were "very forward leaning and open."

I said earlier that security is indivisible. The location of the proposed defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic is optimal for covering the most Alliance territory possible. We are currently working with NATO to explore how a U.S. long-range missile defense system could work with NATO missile defense systems.

The U.S. proposed system is designed to counter long-range threats from the Middle East and would be able to protect all NATO countries facing such threat. However, some Allied countries could still face threats from shorter and medium-ranged missiles. For these countries to be protected, they would require short- and medium-range missile defense systems. These systems are more mobile than the system we are proposing to build in Europe and can be deployed relatively quickly if a need should arise.

Again, U.S. and NATO efforts are complementary and could work together to form a more effective defense for Europe. We would be able to link NATO systems with the ones we plan to deploy in order to ensure interoperability. We have raised this idea of cooperation with NATO and hope that the alliance will agree to it.

In sum, we have made progress with our European allies, with NATO, and potentially with Russia about our proposed missile defense system in Europe. NATO agrees that the threat of ballistic missiles is real and is currently debating its next steps on missile defense. Discussions with Russia continue; we have proposed various opportunities for cooperation on missile defense and are awaiting their considered response. We believe that a missile defense system in Europe would greatly increase the overall security of Europe.

Thank you for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity to be here and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Rood, please.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN C. ROOD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. ROOD. Thank you, Chairman Wexler, Chairman Sherman, Mr. Royce. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have observed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The proliferation of these capabilities has continued despite the best efforts of the United States and our allies, including notable successes in Libya and in shutting down the A.Q. Khan network. Today, roughly two dozen countries possess ballistic missiles of varying ranges. The trend is toward missiles of increasing ranges and greater sophistication. Of particular concern are missile programs underway in Iran and North Korea. As the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Maples, testified to the Senate in February:

“North Korea continues to develop the Taepo Dong 2, which could reach parts of the United States and is capable of carrying a nuclear payload. On 4–5 July 2006, North Korea conducted seven widely published launches. Despite the failure of the Taepo Dong 2, North Korea successfully tested six theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating the capability to target U.S. Forces and our allies in South Korea and Japan.”

Of course, you are familiar with North Korea’s conduct of a nuclear test last October.

We continue to see Iran field additional ballistic missiles capable of reaching states in the region, such as Israel, and to pursue the development of more advanced missiles with even longer ranges. The Intelligence Community assesses Iran would be able to develop an ICBM capable of reaching the United States and all regions of Europe before 2015 if it chose to do so. And I would point out that Iran has acquired missiles from North Korea in the past, and it could do so in the future, potentially acquiring missiles with even longer ranges, quicker than the Intelligence Community estimate.

Iranian intentions are also of concern. For example, in October 2005, President Ahmedinejad called for Israel to be “wiped off the map.” That same speech called for achieving a “world without America.” These statements take on greater significance given Iran’s missile efforts and its pursuit of nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community and U.N. Security Council resolutions.

It is important to note that our NATO allies are also concerned about the proliferation of ballistic missiles. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said on April 19th, after a North Atlantic Council meeting, “There is absolutely a shared threat perception. Allies all agree a threat from ballistic missiles exists.”

Missile defenses are an important response to these threats but are one element of the administration’s broader counterproliferation effort. We have pursued a number of efforts to secure materials and technology at their sources through cooperative threat reduction efforts and export control assistance. We have worked to curb trade in these dangerous technologies through the use of financial measures, support for the missile technology control regime, and efforts like the Proliferation Security Initiative. In addition, we have pursued active multilateral diplomacy at the U.N. Security Council and in groupings like the Six Party Talks with North Korea.

Missile defenses reduce incentives for missile proliferation by undermining the military utility and attractiveness of these weapons. Missile defenses are part of contemporary deterrence and promote stability, as we saw last summer when we activated our system for the first time in response to North Korea’s missile launch preparations. In that case, our missile defense system allowed our national leadership to consider a wider, more flexible range of responses to a potential attack.

To help address these threats, we have proposed fielding ten ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Such missile defenses would build upon the initial capabilities we have fielded in Alaska, California, and elsewhere and improve our ability to defend the United States from a missile attack

from the Middle East. Such additional assets would also have the capability of providing missile defense coverage to most of Europe against long-range missiles.

We continue to consult with the Russian Government regarding its concerns. Such deployments are not directed at Russia but, rather, are intended to address the emerging threat from the Middle East. The ten interceptors and radar we hope to field in Europe would have little or no capability against Russia's large, strategic, offensive force which could overwhelm the United States system's limited number of interceptors, regardless of their location.

In theoretical one-on-one engagements, the United States interceptors in Europe would have little or no capability to intercept Russian ICBMs launched at the United States, as the U.S. interceptors are too slow to catch Russian missiles.

The NATO Secretary General commented after the April 19 NATO-Russia Council meeting:

"The allies were convinced and are convinced that there are no implications of the United States system for the strategic balance. Ten interceptors will not and cannot affect the strategic balance, and ten interceptors cannot pose a threat to Russia."

On April 17th, I led an interagency delegation to Moscow to consult with our Russian colleagues and offer new proposals for cooperation between the United States and Russia across the full spectrum of missile defense activities. This proposal was a follow-up to President Bush's March 28th phone conversation with President Putin.

Mr. Chairman, I plan to lead an interagency team to Warsaw and Prague in late May to begin the formal negotiations on the placement of missile defense facilities in those countries. As we embark on this endeavor, I would urge you and your colleagues to support the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request of \$310 million for the placement of missile defense capabilities in Europe.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you today.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Rood.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rood follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN C. ROOD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,  
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT  
OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

#### A NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Since the end of the Cold War, we have observed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles. The proliferation of these capabilities has continued despite the best efforts of the United States and our allies, including notable successes in Libya and in shutting down the A.Q. Khan network. Today, roughly two dozen countries possess ballistic missiles of varying ranges. The trend is toward missiles of increasing ranges, payloads, lethality, and sophistication.

Of particular concern are the missile programs underway in North Korea and Iran. As the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, LTG Michael Maples testified to the Senate on January 11, 2007, "North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has exported missiles and missile technology to other countries, including Iran. . . ." General Maples also testified on February 27, 2007, to the Senate that "North Korea continues to develop the Taepo Dong 2, which could reach parts of the United States and is capable of carrying a nuclear payload. On 4-5 July 2006, North Korea conducted seven widely-published launches . . . . Despite the failure of the Taepo Dong 2, North Korea successfully tested six theater

ballistic missiles, demonstrating the capability to target U.S. forces and our allies in South Korea and Japan.” And of course, North Korea conducted a nuclear test in October. In Iran, we continue to see that government field additional ballistic missiles that are capable of reaching states in the region such as Israel, and the continued development of more advanced missiles with longer ranges. The Intelligence Community assesses that Iran would be able to develop an ICBM capable of reaching the United States and all regions of Europe before 2015 if it chose to do so. And, I would point out that Iran has acquired ballistic missiles from North Korea in the past and note the possibility that it could do so again in the future, potentially acquiring missiles with even longer ranges.

Iranian intentions are also of concern. For example, in October 2005 President Ahmedinejad called for Israel to be “wiped off the map” and in that same speech called for achieving “a world without America.” These statements obviously take on greater significance given our concerns about Iran’s ballistic missile efforts and its pursuit of nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community, UN Security Council resolutions, and its international obligations.

Mr. Chairman, it is important to note that our NATO Allies are also concerned about the proliferation of ballistic missiles. As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer observed after the April 19, 2007, North Atlantic Council meeting, “There is absolutely a shared threat perception . . . Allies all agree a threat from ballistic missiles exists.”

#### DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Missile defenses are an important response to the threats that I have just described, but are just one element of the Administration’s broader counter-proliferation effort. Under the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Administration has pursued a number of efforts in this area to secure materials and technology at their sources through cooperative threat reduction efforts and export control assistance. We have worked to curb the trade in these dangerous technologies through use of financial measures, support for the Missile Technology Control Regime, and efforts like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which today includes over 80 countries which have conducted dozens of successful interdictions of missile and WMD-related items. In addition, we have pursued active multilateral diplomacy at the UN Security Council and in groupings like the Six Party Talks with North Korea.

Missile defenses reduce incentives for missile proliferation by undermining the military utility and attractiveness of these weapons. Missile defenses are part of contemporary deterrence and promote stability, as we saw last summer, when we activated our system for the first time in response to North Korean missile launch preparations. In that case, our missile defense system allowed our national leadership to consider a wider, more flexible range of responses to a potential attack.

#### THE FIELDING OF MISSILE DEFENSES IN EUROPE

To help address the threats that I outlined, the Administration has proposed fielding 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. Such missile defenses would build upon the initial capabilities we have fielded in Alaska, California, and elsewhere, and improve our ability to defend the United States from missile attack from the Middle East. Such additional assets deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic would also have the capability of providing missile defense coverage to most of Europe against intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.

#### RUSSIAN CONCERNS

We continue to consult with the Russian Government regarding its concerns about the potential fielding of U.S. missile defense capabilities in Europe. Such deployments are not directed at Russia but rather are intended to address the emerging missile threat from the Middle East. The 10 interceptors we hope to field in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic would have little or no capability against Russia’s large strategic offensive force, which could overwhelm the U.S. system’s limited number of interceptors regardless of their location. In theoretical one-on-one engagements, U.S. interceptors located in Europe would have little or no capability to intercept Russian ICBMs launched at the United States as the U.S. interceptors are too slow to catch Russian ballistic missiles.

As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented after the April 19 NATO-Russia Council meeting, “The Allies were convinced and are convinced that there are no implications of the United States system for the strategic balance . . .



Ten interceptors will not, and cannot affect the strategic balance and ten interceptors cannot pose a threat to Russia.”

On April 17, I led an interagency delegation to Moscow to consult with our Russian colleagues on this issue and to offer some new proposals for missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia across the full spectrum of missile defense activities—including experimentation with new concepts and technologies, research and development of missile defense systems and components, and work to improve the capability of our forces to successfully conduct cooperative missile defense operations during peacekeeping or other joint military operations. This proposal was a follow-up to President Bush’s March 28 phone conversation with President Putin. In the week after my visit, Secretary of Defense Gates led another interagency delegation to Moscow to discuss opportunities for cooperation on missile defense. It is our hope that through the transparency and confidence-building measures that we have proposed, as well as potential missile defense cooperation, that we can address Russian concerns.

#### WAY AHEAD

Mr. Chairman, we will continue to discuss this issue with our European and Russian colleagues. In addition, I plan to lead an interagency team to Warsaw and Prague in late May to begin formal negotiations on the placement of missile defense facilities in those countries. If successful, these agreements would enable us to improve the security of the United States and our allies by giving us the capability to defend against the real and growing missile threat from the Middle East. As we embark on this endeavor, I would urge you and your colleagues to support the President’s FY 2008 request of \$310 million for the placement of missile defense capabilities in Europe.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for holding this hearing on this important topic.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you both, gentlemen. I will begin.

As I have said on several occasions, Ambassador Fried, I do not think there is a more intellectually honest, shrewd, capable diplomat that our country is fortunate to have the service of than you. The argument that you present today, however, is somewhat incredulous. So help me understand why I am wrong and you are right.

First of all, there is not anything I, and I think most Members of Congress, would not do to assist our ally Israel in her defense of an external threat, particularly from Iran. But with all due respect, if I understand it correctly, a Ground-based Midcourse Defense System stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic, or anywhere else in Europe, will have no defense effect with respect to protecting or assisting Israel from protecting herself from Iran.

So, while we appreciate the description of the threat presented by Iran—and agree—this proposal for a missile defense system in Europe, unless you tell me otherwise, would seem to add zero in terms of defense capability for Israel versus Iran. It seems to me to be a somewhat deceptive argument to, in any way, bolster the cause for the European system by throwing in the threat to Israel.

Second, both gentlemen have very articulately outlined the arguments that have been made to our NATO allies, through the process of NATO, as to why this is a justified response.

Given the very complete descriptions that you have provided and the response by Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the apparent responses of our allies in NATO, that begs the question: Why not do it through NATO? If the reception is so good, then do it through NATO. Why on a bilateral basis?

The third aspect that I would raise in terms of the capability and the testing of the system is, if I understand it correctly, that the system we have developed/deployed in Alaska and California is a

three-part system. The system that is to be proposed to be deployed in Europe is a two-stage configuration, different than what we have in Alaska and in California. If I understand it correctly, the two-stage configuration has not been tested at all.

If that is the case, how can we make any assertion as to the reliability of the two-stage system?

Please.

Ambassador FRIED. Mr. Chairman, the question about the relationship to Israel brings me back 30 years to deterrence theory and strategic nuclear issues that I studied many, many years ago. Let us start, though, with Ahmedinejad's statement which I quoted to you.

He may be an extremist, but he is not stupid. What he was telling the Europeans is Iran may be in a position to threaten Israel, and I will make sure that Iran is in a position to threaten you so that you cannot come to Israel's assistance. In classic nuclear strategy, the purpose of ballistic missiles was not simply to attack; it was to undercut the political will of your adversary, divide your enemies, and isolate your genuine target.

The situation we want to avoid is one where Europe would be in a position of absolute vulnerability to an Iranian nuclear arsenal, even a small one, thereby decoupling transatlantic security and also giving Iran an ability to use its other forces in support for terrorism in the Middle East and perhaps, at some point, conventional forces to threaten Israel. We do not want Iran to be able to use a nuclear arsenal to extend its power or to threaten Europe. That is the relationship, the configuration, that we wish to avoid. That is the first answer.

Secondly, NATO. There are, actually, very few NATO-wide systems. NATO brings together national military systems. The only current existing NATO system is an AWACS system. The Bush administration has proposed and the allies have accepted a C-17 transport system, a NATO-like system. The NATO missile defense system that is already being developed would bring together national mid-range missile defense systems. In our conception—and John and I have agreed that this is something we are still thinking through—NATO could bring together national systems, short/mid-range systems, plus the American system, if it is agreed with the Poles and Czechs, so that you would have an integrated and complete missile defense system which would cover all of the Alliance.

Now, we have discussed this with NATO, and especially in the last 3 weeks, we have seen a real change in the attitude of European governments as we have presented more comprehensively what could be a genuinely multilateral approach by integrating national systems and NATO systems and, hopefully, even a system with Russia, depending on the Russian view. And we hope to be able to work through NATO and do this as multilaterally as possible, but it is certainly well within NATO standard practice that the Alliance helps integrate national systems. That is not unusual at all.

Mr. ROOD. Mr. Chairman, may I respond to a couple of the points that you made?

Mr. WEXLER. Of course.

Mr. ROOD. You had talked about Israel's security and our concerns about it, and I think we in the administration are obviously very concerned about our friends and allies' security, but what I would urge you to think about here in the missile defense area is that we and the Israelis have taken a similar approach to the development of missile defenses. There were some concerns expressed by the members about perhaps rushing systems to the field too soon. Are they adequately tested?

In Israel, we have a joint program with them called the Arrow Missile Defense System. That system was very important for Israel's security, and Israel took an approach in their development and fielding like we have in the United States. You will recall they began fielding the system, deploying it, in 2000 when they put out a radar before they had any interceptors. They began with the deployment of the first interceptor as soon as the first interceptor was available, while testing was continuing, because they face a real and growing threat, as we do in the United States.

That is why we moved in the early part of this administration to begin putting capabilities in the field, in Alaska and California, while our very robust test program continued. The Israelis have continued with their test program, and it will continue for some time. We think it is a rigorous program. In some cases, they have used simulated targets. Their tests are always done in controlled conditions, as our tests are. That is the reason for experimentation. You need to know the results of that testing.

I would urge you in your review of the administration's budget request, whether it be the Arrow program or ours, to show support for that approach, because we do face these real and growing threats. Had we not taken that approach, we would not have had a missile defense system last summer that we could activate in the face of North Korean launch preparation activity with an unknown payload and unknown intentions. In that case, missile defense has proved very stabilizing.

One of the other points that was made in the members' opening comments was that the fielding of missile defenses might increase the risk of terrorists smuggling a nuclear weapon into the United States. I would say again, in Israel they have faced this issue as we have. What you saw last summer is a terrorist group, Hezbollah. Its weapon of choice was one of rockets and missiles, and the reason was Israel lacked a defense against those shorter-range systems. They are working to put that in place now. They feel as though that is a gap that they would like to fill. But I would not say that because one threat exists and you deal with it that you do not have to deal with another. We have to deal with both of those, the possibility that nuclear weapons could be smuggled into the United States.

That is why we have the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, at the Department of Homeland Security, and other efforts; and we need to do better at those things, but clearly, we cannot ignore the fact that our adversaries are investing in ballistic missiles with long ranges and not deal with that threat as well.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEXLER. I appreciate both of the gentlemen's answers. I will now go to Mr. Royce, but I would just ask either gentleman, in the

context of this hearing, if you could address, where it may be appropriate, the difference between the two-stage configuration and the three-stage configuration in the testing.

Mr. Royce, please.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was in Israel in August to witness the lack of effectiveness in terms of being able to respond to these rockets and to the missile attacks, including the missile attacks on one of the Israeli ships, and the consequences of that were very, very grave. I was in Haifa when the town was attacked, and I went down afterwards to the trauma hospital, which was also targeted, and saw the consequences there. There were about 500 people hospitalized in that trauma center.

I wanted to make a couple of points. The first is, since 2001, the Missile Defense Agency has had 26 successful missile intercepts; 15 of the last 16 flight tests have been successful.

My second point is that it will not work if we do not fund it. Missile defense is a system of systems that is constantly being upgraded and improved, and we have to recognize that.

I would like to focus on the Iranian threat for a moment, and I would like to focus on it because one of the consequences of being in Israel at that time was finding out that, in terms of those firing those missiles, not only were many of the missiles Syrian—all of the missiles were either Syrian- or Iranian-manufactured—but some of the missiles were actually fired by Iranian crews. In particular, we know that the missile that hit the Israeli ship off the coast of Israel was fired by an Iranian crew, and we also know that, as positions were overrun, Iranian IDs were found on many of the combatants. So I would like to focus on that threat.

What are the trend lines in the Iranian program? That is my first question because, according to unclassified U.S. intelligence assessments, including the assessment you gave today, they may be able to develop long-range ballistic missile capabilities by 2015.

Here is the point I would like to make. What confidence do you have in 2015? Because I recall the North Korean Taepo Dong 1 missile, and we had unclassified material on that. That missile was launched in 1998, and as I recall, that was many years ahead of the intelligence estimates of when it would be launched. So my first question: How confident are you that it is going to take all the way to 2015 for them to have that capability in Iran?

Mr. ROOD. Well, I think, Mr. Royce, you raise an important question, which is our intelligence estimates are based on projections of when Iran could acquire this capability on its own, perhaps with some foreign assistance. A key determinant of how rapidly Iran might progress, of course, would be that foreign assistance, but as I mentioned in my testimony, there is also the possibility that Iran could procure a completed system from North Korea as it has done in the past. North Korea possesses ICBM-range missiles. It is certainly possible that another sale like that could occur in the future. We in the United States would take other efforts to try to prevent that, but that would potentially move the date up further beyond 2015, but depending on the amount of foreign assistance Iran might receive, you might also see that time frame move up.

To the third point, these are estimates by intelligence analysts trying to project trends in the future. Estimates are sometimes not accurate, despite the best efforts of those making them, and so missile defense provides a means by which we could hedge against that concern. I would point out that we are hoping to complete the fielding of these assets in Europe by 2013, just slightly before when the threat might emerge from Iran in 2015. We prefer to be ahead of the threats. There are some who would say wait until the threat is fully present before we would deploy something. We would prefer to have defense capabilities in advance of when our adversaries can threaten us.

Mr. ROYCE. As I say, I was there for about a week in Haifa during that struggle between Hezbollah and Israel, and during that period of time, I saw what happened to Haifa. Those missiles could not reach Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. I can only imagine what would have happened to that state if they had had that capability.

As you say, they could not reach this on their own or perhaps with North Korea, but I want to throw out another possibility here because, more than once, the International Institute for Strategic Studies out of London has proved right on this, and Mark Fitzpatrick is a pretty well-respected voice on Iran's nuclear missile programs. He told the *Financial Times* the Iranians are developing a long-range missile with Russian technology, and of course, Russian technology as opposed to North Korean technology is a real shot in the arm here.

I wanted to know if you thought that might be an accurate statement, or if you knew of any other sources for outside support besides Russia and Iran. From your comment, I think we can conclude that 2015 is a bit deceptive, especially in light of what we found in North Korea about the capability for them to bring their system on line before we anticipated it.

Before we go to your answer, also a House Armed Services subcommittee has withheld funding for the interceptors in Poland but has provided funding for the Czech Republic. We will see how this develops. But if this holds that they cut off the funds, how does that affect, first, operational capabilities of the system; and second, how will that affect your negotiations with the Poles?

Those were my questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROOD. Congressman, I have also visited Haifa recently and have met with the mayor and others there, and I think it is important to bear in mind the effect that those attacks had with rockets and missiles on the population there. The mayor of Haifa told me he and his people had not had to experience this sort of threat despite all of the difficulties that have occurred in that region in the world over time. Even now, many months after that conflict has occurred, he told me that there are children; other members of the society are still coping with the after-effects of those attacks, and this is an important thing that the municipality is trying to deal with.

Obviously, the ability to provide a defense and not have to weather a barrage of rockets and missiles like that is clearly preferable in terms of the manner of dealing with that threat.

With respect to your other questions about the Iranians and their receipt of foreign aid, I would say ballistic missile-related co-

operation from entities in China, North Korea, and Russia over the years has helped Iran move forward toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. That is a real concern for us because of the expertise that can be transferred and the effect that can have, then, not only for the Iranian program but on what expertise and capabilities Iran might provide to other states.

Finally, with respect to your question about the House Armed Services Committee's action yesterday, we obviously would like to see the Congress fully fund the President's request. I think if we were left in the situation where at the opening of the negotiations the Congress were moving to cut those, obviously that will undermine the negotiations. It will present issues for us in our discussions with those allies, and at a time when the NATO allies have responded so positively to our recent discussions, I would urge against taking such a step.

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I know the vote in the last Congress was 301 against cutting off those funds, 124 in favor.

I would just say, of course, if Russia is aiding Iran in this, its opposition to our deployment of a missile defense system is somewhat audacious, especially in light of the former Defense Minister, who at the time was Sergei Ivanov, admitted—and this was in April—that the deployment posed no medium-term threat to Russia.

So the Russians understand what we are trying to do here; it is to offset what Iran is developing. And I think, in light of that, we have to be especially vigilant about their support, given their past activities of the Iranian programs.

Thank you very much.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much.

I, too, was in Israel during the second week of the war. The only point I would like to make is that a ballistic missile defense system is not designed in any way, if I understand it correctly, to protect against the short-range system and rockets that were hailed upon Israel during the last war. That is not to say it will happen in the future.

Mr. ROYCE. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEXLER. Right.

Chairman Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Rood, my staff tried to secure you for hearings our subcommittee was going to have on proliferation in general. We were told that, as is the custom, you are unavailable to testify until you are confirmed as Under Secretary. I am thrilled to see you here.

Can you commit to coming back later this month or sometime in June for hearings on general proliferation issues?

Mr. ROOD. I would be happy to try to work with your staff to look at a time and the appropriate venue and so on.

Mr. SHERMAN. We will get something that works for schedules.

Mr. Rood, you say that the system that is going to be deployed in Poland and in the Czech Republic would be useless against Russian missiles because it is too slow to catch them. Does that mean that that defense system would be utterly useless against an accidental Russian launch?

Mr. ROOD. Mr. Chairman, the interceptors that would be placed in Poland and in the Czech Republic, based on our operation of the system, will not be fast enough to—they will have little or no capability against Russian ICBMs.

When we do the modeling—the Missile Defense Agency does this—from the time that we can detect—

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I have got limited time.

You are saying that whether it is a deliberate Russian launch or whether it is an accidental Russian launch, it is highly unlikely that this system would be hitting a Russian missile, correct?

Mr. ROOD. As for the use of the interceptors in Poland and in the Czech Republic, those interceptors would have little or no capability against Russian ICBMs launched against the United States.

Mr. SHERMAN. Even an accidental launch. They are little to no use against an accidental launch.

Mr. ROOD. However, the system that we have deployed in Alaska and in California would have some capability against that.

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, our focus here, joined by the chair of the Europe Subcommittee, is Europe.

So, by using the term “little or no,” you are basically saying that it would have a little bit of an effect against an intentional Russian launch, that they would lose a little bit of their intentional nuclear capacity.

Why wouldn't they be worried about that? Why do they go to the cost of building, say, 100 missiles if 20 percent of them or 10 percent of them or a little portion of them, if you will, is going to be destroyed by our system? Wouldn't that worry them?

Mr. ROOD. I would not say it is 10 or 20 percent. Remember, the Russians have thousands of nuclear warheads, and so ten interceptors would have little or no capability against those. But the part that I would say is—

Mr. SHERMAN. Now we are told that the Iranians are getting Russian technology. Why would a Russian-designed missile launched from Iran—why would that missile be susceptible to this defense system while a Russian-designed missile out of Russia would not be susceptible?

Mr. ROOD. That is because the geography is very different, and therefore, the placement of the interceptors and radar in the Czech Republic and Poland have been chosen in order to optimize the coverage of both the United States and Europe against a long-range missile attack. Because of the geometry and the location of those facilities, it would have a very good capability against entering—

Mr. SHERMAN. Aren't there some Russian facilities and missiles located in the same region of the world as Iran; that is to say, Central Asia?

Mr. ROOD. Russian ICBM facilities in Central Asia outside of Russia?

Mr. SHERMAN. No. Siberia and the Urals in non-European Russia.

Mr. ROOD. The Russians have missile facilities in their Far East, yes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, not the Far East but the middle, what they do not call the “Middle East.” The middle of Russia, right snap dab in the middle, is pretty much directly north of Iran.

Let me go on to another line of questioning. It is my understanding that these missiles placed in the Czech Republic and in Poland are optimally located in order to defend the NATO population of Europe. And the majority of the NATO population lives in Europe, and that is the reason we would put them there rather than in Canada or closer to home or in other places. And we are told that the Europeans really want us to do this because—and you keep quoting the same statement—they acknowledge that ballistic missiles are a threat. Well, there are lots of threats and lots of ways to respond to them, but in all of my conversations with Europeans off the record, with the exception of Poles and Czechs, they hate this system.

If it is there predominantly to defend the European NATO population, how much money are Germany and France willing to put up to pay for a system that does more to protect Paris than it does to protect Chicago?

Mr. ROOD. I think in the first part of your question—

Mr. SHERMAN. Have they offered any money so far, sir?

Mr. ROOD. If I can address your question, in the first year of the administration, we thought it was important to move beyond a unilateral approach to missile defense, to pursue missile defense cooperation with our friends and allies. That is why we dropped the “N” from National Missile Defense to make clear that we were interested in cooperation with our allies.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Secretary, I am going to reclaim my time. I am just going to ask which European countries have offered how much money, and if you cannot respond with the name of a country and an amount of money, I will assume that no European country has offered a specific amount of money, with the exception of the basing rights being provided perhaps by the Czechs and Poles.

Mr. ROOD. Well, I think what we have seen is that our allies who we are planning to negotiate this system with are interested in making a contribution. It is meaningful that they would host these facilities on their territory. Real estate and other things are important contributions, and it is important that we not overlook the fact—

Mr. SHERMAN. So that is with regard to the Poles and Czechs. As to France, Germany, and the nations of old Europe, the reason we would say that the majority of the NATO population lives in Europe is because of the population of Western Europe.

Which country west of the old Warsaw Pact has announced that they are going to contribute materially to this system which is better designed to defend Berlin and to defend Paris than it is to defend Chicago?

Mr. ROOD. I would take issue with your characterization that the system is better designed to protect Berlin than it is Chicago. I think that we see the system as very effective in protecting the United States and that that is a key purpose of it. It will significantly improve the defense of the United States if we are able to have interceptors and a radar in Europe, because it significantly improves the battle space and performance of the system. We would be happy to have some simulations and other things shown to you to demonstrate—

Mr. SHERMAN. In any case—



Mr. ROOD. But with respect to your point—

Mr. SHERMAN.—you came here and told us how much it would defend Europe, how it would liberate Europe to help Israel in a time of danger; and yet you cannot identify a single euro that will be contributed by any of the nations of the richer part of Europe, by Western Europe.

Mr. ROOD. We are told we have not asked those countries to contribute.

Mr. SHERMAN. Why not? We are trying to run a country here with a huge deficit. Would you really come to Congress and say, “Give us the money for this system. Yet, we have not bothered to send a letter to Paris or to Berlin, asking for a penny or a euro”? I mean, come on.

Is there any fiscal responsibility if there are a few—if there is money there, ask for it, and the only reason not to ask for it is if you are convinced that they are going to laugh at your letter. Based on my private conversations with you—I mean I try to be polite in public, but based on the private conversations, the reason you have not invested a postage stamp to ask for a euro is you figure it is not even worth the cost of a postage stamp.

Is there any evidence that old Europe is going to contribute significantly to the cost of this program? Which, by the way, it is not just a few hundred million dollars. That is just the beginning.

Do you have an answer?

Ambassador FRIED. Well, I would just point out that the NATO program, the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense program, is funded at NATO at 700 million euros, about \$1 billion.

Mr. SHERMAN. Excuse me. We are here focusing on the program to put missile defense in Poland and in the Czech Republic. Has any nation in Western Europe offered a euro for that program?

Ambassador FRIED. As my colleague said, we have not asked them about this program, but they are funding, without our assistance, their own national shorter-range programs.

Mr. SHERMAN. How could you possibly, representing a government with a huge budget deficit, come to us and ask for hundreds of millions of dollars when among the chief beneficiaries are Western Europe, and you have not bothered to ask them for a single euro?

Let me shift off to something else, and that is this theory that we are somehow defending Israel by allowing Europe to come to Israel’s aid in its hour of need.

First of all, I think those of us familiar with European attitudes and actions toward Israel doubt very much whether European armies would be deployed to defend Israel in a time of need. But we are being told that the Europeans would be willing to do so, which seems odd because they have not now, and they do not face nuclear attack from Iran now. It is only if they had this missile defense system, which at best is like a 50/50 chance that you would lose Berlin.

Is there any evidence that Europeans, who have been able at the present time and in 1973 and in 1967 to send their armies to defend Israel at no risk of nuclear attack, would be willing to do so in the future when they face nuclear attack, perhaps, but they had

the “might work, might not work, never been tested in battle” system that we plan to deploy in Poland and in the Czech Republic?

Ambassador FRIED. I would be far more comfortable working with Europe to deal with potential Iranian pressures and threats in the Middle East if Europe were not absolutely vulnerable to potential Iranian ballistic missile attacks. Yes, I do think that is not only intuitively clear, I think it is a defensible strategic assertion. I would much rather—I would feel much more secure thinking about the Middle East if Europe were not under threat of an Iranian missile attack.

Mr. SHERMAN. I am reclaiming my time.

I will point out in Europe today—if I can just have 30 seconds.

Mr. WEXLER. Sure.

Mr. SHERMAN. I just want to point out that it is somewhat disingenuous to have an administration that has just wanted missile defense so badly, for any reason or for no reason, that we are told that we are doing it to deal with the Iranians, knowing that this administration violates American law in order to protect foreign oil companies from a statute; namely, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, now the Iran Sanctions Act. When this administration has acquiesced in World Bank loans to Iran, it seems like the only thing we are actually going to do vis-a-vis Iran is to do something that the administration has just wanted to do really badly anyway.

With that, I yield back to the chairman.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

We have votes. If we could go to Mr. Royce for a quick question, then I have got a quick question. Then we will let the gentlemen respond to whatever they want to in total.

Mr. ROYCE. I appreciate it very much, Mr. Chairman.

It reads, just going to the page of the *Financial Times*, “U.K. wants U.S. missile defense sites,’ U.K. officials say. Tony Blair has pressed Washington to place at least some interceptors on British soil.” It says, “The U.K. Prime Minister is said to share U.S. concerns about the threat posed by missiles from states of concern. In the face of rogue states, this is something that can assist in Britain’s defense,’ a U.K. official said yesterday.”

One of the geographic realities is that the reason this should not be a concern to the Russians is because a Russian attack on the United States, because of its geographic position, comes over the polar caps, and that is why the Alaskan system and the other systems that we have to deal with or attempt to be a deterrent to a Russian threat.

But with Tehran’s placement in an attack on Washington, DC, from Iran, the trajectory is over Warsaw, Poland to make that attack. So, if Iran were to attack Europe or to attack the United States, the placement of this system, where it would have to be placed, is in the Czech Republic and in Poland for maximum effectiveness. Also, the Danes have expressed their interest and some of their concerns.

I just want to go back to Ambassador Fried. Are there any remarks you might have in terms of why the Russians should not be concerned about the placement of this system?

Ambassador FRIED. The ten unarmed interceptors planned for Poland are obviously not going to be an effective—will not effec-

tively degrade any of the Russian strategic nuclear force. They physically, as John Rood said, cannot catch them. So I am comfortable being pretty categoric about the lack of any threat to the Russian offensive system.

Mr. ROYCE. We have the Russian Defense Minister on record with the same comment.

Ambassador FRIED. I think there is no threat. I think the Russians know that. I think Secretary Gates heard two levels of concerns from the Russians when he was in Moscow. The first level was based on, perhaps, Russian misunderstanding of the capabilities of the system. The second level was based on Russian concerns that in the future this system could grow. Secretary Gates said he wanted to address those Russian concerns, and in addition to offering extensive cooperation with the Russians on missile defense, he said he looked forward to setting up experts' groups to discuss these Russians' mid- and longer-range concerns.

We have shared our proposals with the NATO allies. They were universally appreciative of our offer to the Russians, and we hope, despite the rhetoric, that the Russians will accept this.

Mr. ROYCE. In conclusion, I think they are just gaining diplomatic advantage in pressing this point, or we are pressing the point against them, not to assist Iran with their programs. And that looks to me like the real politic of what is going on in Europe with the Russian assertions.

Ambassador FRIED. Well, it is true that, of some of us who remember the missile defense debates of 25 years ago or the Persia-2 debates of the mid-1980s, there is something familiar about the Russian arguments designed to appeal to West Europeans, but I think we can get through that.

Mr. WEXLER. Just very quickly, gentlemen, is it correct that the two-stage configuration system proposed for Europe has never been tested?

Mr. ROOD. Congressman, the two-stage configuration that we are looking at has 98 percent of the same components as the three-stage configuration. So I would say that those components and that system have had testing as part of that.

The plan is to conduct two flight tests of the two-stage version prior to 2010. You will recall we are hoping to put in place these systems in Poland and in the Czech Republic by 2013, 3 years later. So that is, I guess, what I would offer in response to your question.

Mr. WEXLER. So the two-stage system has not been tested, but your testimony is that it is comprised of almost all of the three-stage system; and therefore, testing of the two-stage system is not necessary? Or we can go forth with some degree of reliability without it?

Mr. ROOD. My testimony would be that we not only think testing is required—we have planned two flight tests prior to 2010 of that system—but since there is a high degree of commonality in the components, that provides some additional assurance. If you have further questions, we can ask the director of testing.

Mr. WEXLER. I will tell you what. We have probably got about 1 minute. I want to give you an opportunity to respond to Mr. Sherman's statement earlier.

I think you would probably appreciate a response.

Mr. SHERMAN. I would. But I would also point out that a chimp is 99 percent similar to a human being in its DNA, and one would expect that you would not test one and figure you did not need to test the other. And I would also point out that given the way we have shredded the ABM Treaty, Russian fears that that system will grow seem more than fanciful.

With that, I would like to hear from the witnesses.

Ambassador FRIED. I was thinking, Chairman Sherman, why I was not entirely comfortable with the line of argument that on every NATO program there must be a bill presented and divided up.

When the European allies moved forces into Albania 10 years ago to stabilize it, they did so; and in doing so, they helped all of our security. Yet they did not ask us to pay a portion of the cost. When we deployed Persia-2—planned to deploy Persia-2 missiles into Europe in response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s, we did so, or proposed to do so, on a national basis, without European contributions. When the Germans are developing their mid-range missile defense system and shorter-range systems, they do not ask us to foot the bill, even though their systems will help protect U.S. assets and U.S. Forces. When the Poles sent off an additional battalion for combat duty in Afghanistan, they swallowed tremendous costs, for which we are grateful.

In our Alliance, I look to a balance of costs. I do not think, at each stage for each program, we start sending bills to each other. That is not a full answer; but I think in an Alliance, we take on different kinds of responsibilities. We look for allies to do their share. The Dutch in the south of Afghanistan, the British, the Poles, the Czechs, and many others are doing their part. We think that our part might be fielding a missile defense system which will defend Europe, and an Alliance is solidarity, not divided bill-paying. At least that is my view.

Mr. WEXLER. I want to thank the witnesses very much.

The joint subcommittees stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]

