Remarks and Q&A by the Director of National Intelligence
Ambassador John D. Negroponte

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AMB. NEGROPONTE: Thank you very much for you're your kind introduction Bob [Murrett], and it's a pleasure to be here. Although as some of you may have heard it was a bit of an iffy proposition. We spent about 45 minutes sitting on the tarmac at Andrews Air Force Base because CNN and the FAA had information that there were tornadoes in the area, but the Air Force didn't have any such information. It took them a while to de-conflict that, and I was thinking of proposing, in the inimitable style of the Intelligence Reform Act, an Information Sharing Executive for the Air Force and the FAA.

But in any case, I am delighted to be here. I've been very much looking forward to delivering these remarks. I also want to acknowledge the presence of the previous people who are up here on the dais – John Deutch, the former Director of Central Intelligence, and a good friend. And then the two former and current Director's of the NGA – James King, Jim Clapper, and Bob Murrett. And I also want to thank Stu Shea, the President of the Foundation, for having extended the invitation to me to come and speak to you this afternoon.

I'm delighted to be here with you at GEOINT 2006. The scale and diversity of GEOINT's participation makes it a high point on our national intelligence calendar. I'm very grateful to the United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation for its hard work in ensuring GEOINT's consistent success.

Today I'd like to speak to you about the value of geospatial intelligence to our national security, also want to talk about the Integrated Collection Architecture we are developing within which GEOINT will play a vital role, and the special contributions we have seen every day of the last ten years since the creation of the NGA.

I know I'm speaking to the choir, but it bears repeating that geospatial intelligence is a crucial element in our national security enterprise. GEOINT, among other things, is a window providing undeniable evidence of events taking place on the ground; it reveals hidden aspects of otherwise poorly understood phenomena; it brings "visual clarity" and precision to identifying and locating targets anywhere on the globe; it enables us to search vast expanses of the earth's surface; and it is often the "unique discipline," if you will, in its ability to depict intelligence issues in areas otherwise denied to us.

The crisis in the Darfur region of Western Sudan is a good example of this last point. It was GEOINT that enabled the Department of State and USAID to identify massive concentrations of internally displaced persons and mobilize relief efforts ahead of the rest of the world. As a

result, we can say that GEOINT helped mitigate a tragic humanitarian crisis, saving tens of thousands of lives.

And on the domestic front, GEOINT is a key contributor to warning, reaction, and recovery activities as they relate to natural or man-made crises. Think of Hurricane Katrina. The value added of geospatial intelligence is easy to grasp: it creates a "common picture" that improves planning and response.

Now, if I may, I'd like to place GEOINT in the context of intelligence reform in general and the Integrated Collection Architecture, the ICA, we are developing in particular.

When it comes to intelligence reform, "integration" is the key word. In a sentence, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and I'm sorry Bob Murrett that we appropriated those initials and I promise you I had nothing to do with it. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence was created to integrate the military, domestic, and foreign dimensions of national security intelligence.

For the Intelligence Community, that means productive overlaps, not inadvertent gaps – information sharing, not information withholding – and working as a multi-int, multi-domain team, not going it alone.

We are in the business of creating a unified intelligence enterprise that is responsive to national security threats wherever they may present themselves. Our assignment is to set the highest standards for intelligence collection and analysis and to meet those standards whether the agency in action is the CIA, the DIA, the NGA, the DEA, any other member of our community, or any combination thereof.

In the post-9/11 world, we have no choice. Fast-evolving threats and technological challenges take parasitical advantage of globalization's strengths while attacking its weaknesses. The enemy may be a so called "businessman" constantly on the move, or he may be an expert forger in Peshawar. The enemy may be a deadly virus that has mutated beyond the scope of current medical science, or it may be an import-export business that has mutated into a WMD – a Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation framework. Which ship at sea or container on the docks contains components that could advance a rogue state's efforts to develop nuclear weapons? Whose forces are assembling near what borders? And why? And with what intent?

To answer these and many other questions – including questions no one would ask today but might be a vital interest tomorrow – the Intelligence Community of the 21st century needs collection capabilities that are, among other things: comprehensive; survivable; persistent; timely; adaptable; innovative; credible, and, above all, as I have said, integrated.

As we in the ODNI along with the Defense Department began developing the Imagery Way Ahead as our first major task in the area of collection, however, we saw that we didn't have a suite of collection capabilities that consistently met those criteria. Of greater concern, we saw that we lacked a sound methodology for thinking through how to develop an architecture that would address them.

Several issues stood out. We had more intelligence collection programs than resources to support them. We had an uneven ability to assess the relative value of capabilities and programs within each discipline and extremely limited ability to assess them across all disciplines. And we couldn't use mission priorities and requirements to inform resource allocations to the maximum effect.

The WMD Commission reinforced our resolve to address these deficiencies when it was recommended that, "The DNI should create a new management structure within his office that manages collection as an 'integrated collection enterprise'."

So there you have the origins of the Integrated Collection Architecture we have been developing over the last fifteen months. The ICA is a work in progress that really is making strides toward its four goals:

First, the United States must have a capabilities-based intelligence collection architecture that is built, managed and operated as an enterprise.

Second, our nation's intelligence collection architecture must respond to the full breadth of requirements for both enduring missions and stressing events.

Third, risk-mitigation must be an intrinsic factor of our intelligence collection architecture, guarding against target and technology changes, countering denial and deception, and ensuring survivability, security and continuity of operations.

Fourth, the way we think through developing our integrated collection architecture must be a repeatable process that enables us to adjust the answers we arrive at today as more information becomes available tomorrow – information about our targets, our requirements and needs, and/or the state of the technologically possible.

In short, the ICA is not a study, destined to sit on the shelf. It is an ongoing mission-driven tool for shaping our future portfolio of collection investments. Absolute precision, if such a thing were possible, is not our objective, but as an enterprise, we are positioning ourselves to be able to adjust and focus our collection capabilities more dynamically and more effectively than in the past.

The ICA is a joint venture between the ODNI, my office, and the Department of Defense, because it addresses both national and military intelligence needs.

In year one we have divided architecture development into seven critical areas or domains – SIGINT, MASINT, GEOINT, Clandestine Technical Collection, Special Communications, Mission Communications, and Data Management. In year 2, we will add Human Intelligence, and Open Source capabilities into the mix, while continuing work on technical collection issues. An Intelligence Community agency was assigned to lead each team of domain experts, working with their partners across the community to develop architectural alternatives using the fiscal year 2007 to 2011 Program of Record as the baseline. The first step in developing these

alternatives was an assessment of our current performance relative to agreed upon scenarios and capabilities.

Here is perhaps the nub of what most differentiates the Integrated Collection Architecture from previous efforts – common agreement regarding scenarios, capabilities and analytic methodology with a resolute focus on intelligence mission capabilities, as opposed to rigid specifications. The ICA, then, is not an ODNI or a DoD attempt to engineer a scientific architecture. We are not the Intelligence Community's technical architects or system developers. Those are the responsibilities of the individual Intelligence Community agencies. Our job is to facilitate the discussions; develop and coordinate the scenarios and capabilities necessary to meet national security needs as defined by our principal customers; work with the intelligence users throughout the national security sector to prioritize needs to set the boundaries for the range of acceptable architectures; and then to ensure that due diligence has been conducted and all potential alternatives explored.

I want to emphasize that this study is an integral part of our ongoing budget planning process, which is carefully coordinated with the Department of Defense. The ODNI has no more important responsibility than seeing to it that our budget authorities are used in the wisest and most efficient way.

This is a new and different way of doing business that requires more transparency, teamwork and integration than has traditionally been the case. And only with this level of IC-wide partnership will we meet the National Intelligence Strategy's objective that calls on us to "rebalance, integrate and optimize collection capabilities."

As I speak to you today, I do not yet know the scale of programmatic change that we might undertake as part of the Integrated Collection Architecture, nor would I preclude consideration of other options that the Secretary of Defense or I might bring to the fore. Nonetheless, I would anticipate that from a resource perspective, the greatest influence of the ICA will lie in determining where the Intelligence Community should spend its next dollar or how any top line adjustment to the overall programs – national or military intelligence – should be allocated. The most valuable outcome, however, could very well be the "social engineering" that is occurring as we develop and pursue the ICA process itself. In effect, the ICA represents one of the more important cultural changes that we are driving forward in our second year. If reform means to integrate, then it is one of our highest order responsibilities and mandates to foster processes that allow the Intelligence Community's 16 agencies to integrate their expertise and capabilities in support of our national security.

One of those agencies, of course, is the agency whose work brings us here today and whose ten years of achievement merit a few words of special commendation.

Since its creation a decade ago, the NGA has been a forward-leaning leader in providing intelligence support to the United States most senior officials. This is to the credit, above all, of NGA's highly skilled, diverse, and dedicated workforce. People are what make NGA such an outstanding exemplar of the capacity of our government to transform itself in response to the nation's needs. I especially admire the NGA's spirit of innovation in pursuit of partnerships

throughout the Intelligence Community. NGA's work with NSA has been key in making the Intelligence Community more effective in supporting the warfighter – a difficult but crucial task in these dangerous times.

And as NGA marches into its second decade, it now has the benefit of new leadership. I can already see indeed, that Vice Admiral Bob Murrett's energy, vision, and experience is building on the legacy of his distinguished predecessors. Only the best can lead the best – so I think NGA and Bob Murrett are a perfect match.

So, I want to join all of you who today, I believe, have already had the opportunity to wish a happy birthday to the NGA. You've done great work in the past, and I'm sure you'll do even better work in the years ahead.

Thank you very much.

MR. RICH HAVER: The Director has been kind enough to say he'll answer a few questions. We have just a few minutes left. We've gotten several in. I'll read them and see how you want to handle them.

The first one – and this has come up several times during the course of the last three days – "With the change in the Secretary of Defense, do you see a change in the relationship between DNI and DoD, specifically with the USDI [Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence]?"

AMB. NEGROPONTE: All right. First of all, Rich, thank you.

MR. HAVER: Thank you, sir.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: Thank you for your question. Also, thank you for your service, both in the Navy and in the Pentagon.

MR. HAVER: You weren't here for the Haver roast a little earlier. That was a different story.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: You've had a very distinguished career in the Intelligence Community and we appreciate it.

First of all, one of the things that I found when I was appointed to this job a year and a half ago was that everybody kind of expected, well, this – everybody thought that now in Washington there would be a ringside seat for this boxing match between the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense, and particularly between me and Mr. Rumsfeld, and, frankly, it really hasn't turned out that well – that way – and I –

MR. HAVER: A slip of the tongue.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: A slip of the tongue. It has not turned out that way. And I want to stress, for the record – it's turned out very well. We've had a good working relationship. We meet on a very regular basis, myself and the Secretary, and then at all levels of the ODNI, with the USDI, Steve Cambone's office, there is literally daily contact on the myriad issues that we're jointly dealing with.

So I want to say that I think we've worked through a lot of very, very important issues, whether it has to do with the kind of things we're talking about here today or whether it's the relationship between the DoD and the CIA, for example, with respect to Human Intelligence collection in the field, setting of standards for HUMINT collectors and so forth. So we're going to have a change at the Pentagon. I can't begin to predict whether there might be some kind of ripple effect as a result of Bob Gates's selection. I honestly don't know. But I am pleased to say that Bob and I have been colleagues in the past. I happen to have been the Deputy National Security Advisor at the very end of the Reagan administration under – when Colin Powell was the National Security Advisor, and then in the transition to the Bush 41 administration, Bob took my job as the Deputy NSC.

So we've had a long friendship, and I of course worked with him closely when he was the Deputy Director of the CIA. So I expect that we'll just continue to build on the relationships that we've already established during the past year and a half, and we'll just have to see how that goes, but I have very positive expectations.

MR. HAVER: Here is a quick on. On Monday, Dr. –

AMB. NEGROPONTE: Provided I don't flub it like –

MR. HAVER: Dr. Stopher, a HPSCI staffer, indicated on Monday that budget supplements may be coming to an end. Now, that's an easy-to-predict prediction, but that's – Do you share this view, and if so, what advice would you give organizations that have become dependent on budget supplements. I assume that means all of us.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: Well, supplementals have become a feature of the budget since 9/11 and with the war on terror, and in two areas I can think of that I've been intimately involved in, they've been absolutely critical to our ability to pursue our objectives. Number one has been with respect to Iraq. A lot of our funding for the Iraq war, if not most, has been through supplementals – the additive costs, that is – and then of course in the Intelligence Community and in the war on terror. So we've got these two situations.

We've adopted, as a principle, at the ODNI – and I think it's one that the community as a whole shares – that we want to get as much of what's in the supplementals into the base as possible. And so we try each year to build that base so that if that eventuality occurs that you mention, we'll be better prepared to withstand any potential setback that could result from losing the benefit of supplementals.

But I've got to tell you – I'm not the person to make forecasts on this, but I have sort of a working assumption in my mind that as long as our involvement in Iraq continues, and as long as

the threat level in the war on terror stays as high as it is, I find it difficult to visualize the complete elimination of supplemental funding in the foreseeable future.

MR. HAVER: This last question is – as a diplomat you're used to these 'when are you going to stop beating your wife' questions, so – this obviously came from the industrial side of our audience out there. When will you change the security rules to allow contractors with SCI access from one agency to work with contractors and data from other agencies without requiring cross-agency approval? And then added parenthetically – 'The current situation is a major impediment to innovation and integration.'

AMB. NEGROPONTE: Soon.

MR. HAVER: Good answer, sir.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: I'm not going to elaborate here because then it would take another 20 minutes.

MR. HAVER: Oh, that's right, another 20 minutes.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: But let me just thank you greatly for that opportunity.

MR. HAVER: Thank you, sir. Thank you for weathering the storms in Washington, honoring us with your presence, and having someone of your stature and position come to this gathering and give a vote of confidence to the GOINT community means more than you can imagine, sir. Thank you very much.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: Well, I appreciated the opportunity.

MR. HAVER: Thanks, sir.

AMB. NEGROPONTE: Thanks a lot, Rich.